Revert "feat: [NODE-1441] Upgrade GuestOS to 24.04 (#938)"

Bownairo · NikolaMilosa · commit 372b9a57494a · 2024-10-31T13:47:31.000+01:00
This reverts commit 87ed927.
diff --git a/ic-os/components/early-boot/relabel-machine-id/guestos/relabel-machine-id.sh b/ic-os/components/early-boot/relabel-machine-id/guestos/relabel-machine-id.sh
@@ -2,5 +2,4 @@
 
 # machine-id is set up in initramfs and bind-mounted over to the rootfs. Since
 # policy is not loaded in initramfs yet, it has wrong security context.
-systemd-machine-id-setup --commit
 restorecon -v /etc/machine-id
diff --git a/ic-os/components/early-boot/relabel-machine-id/relabel-machine-id.sh b/ic-os/components/early-boot/relabel-machine-id/relabel-machine-id.sh
@@ -4,5 +4,4 @@
 # over to the rootfs. Since policy is not loaded in initramfs yet, it has
 # wrong security context. Fix this up, but ignore failures (this will not
 # work on first boot).
-systemd-machine-id-setup --commit
 restorecon -v /etc/machine-id || true
diff --git a/ic-os/components/init/bootstrap-ic-node/bootstrap-ic-node.sh b/ic-os/components/init/bootstrap-ic-node/bootstrap-ic-node.sh
@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ while [ ! -f /boot/config/CONFIGURED ]; do
     fi
 
     # Fix up permissions. This is actually the wrong place.
-    chown ic-replica:nogroup -R /var/lib/ic/data
+    chown ic-replica.nogroup -R /var/lib/ic/data
 
     if [ "${DEV}" != "" ]; then
         umount /mnt
diff --git a/ic-os/components/init/setup-encryption/setup-encryption.service b/ic-os/components/init/setup-encryption/setup-encryption.service
@@ -3,11 +3,11 @@ Description=Set up encrypted storage on first boot
 DefaultDependencies=no
 After=boot-config.mount
 Requires=boot-config.mount
-Before=cryptsetup-pre.target
-Wants=cryptsetup-pre.target
+Before=systemd-cryptsetup@vda10\x2dcrypt.service
 
 [Install]
 WantedBy=local-fs.target
+RequiredBy=systemd-cryptsetup@vda10\x2dcrypt.service
 
 [Service]
 Type=oneshot
diff --git a/ic-os/components/misc/guestos/crypttab b/ic-os/components/misc/guestos/crypttab
@@ -1 +1 @@
-vda10-crypt /dev/vda10  /boot/config/store.keyfile  luks,discard
+vda10-crypt /dev/vda10  /boot/config/store.keyfile  luks2,discard
diff --git a/ic-os/components/networking/generate-network-config/guestos/generate-network-config.service b/ic-os/components/networking/generate-network-config/guestos/generate-network-config.service
@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
 [Unit]
 Description=Generate network config
 After=bootstrap-ic-node.service
-Requires=bootstrap-ic-node.service
 Before=systemd-networkd.service
 
 [Install]
diff --git a/ic-os/components/selinux/filebeat/filebeat.te b/ic-os/components/selinux/filebeat/filebeat.te
@@ -41,7 +41,6 @@ init_daemon_domain(filebeat_t, filebeat_exec_t)
 # Allow filebeat to perform its primary function, namely to read
 # the journal files.
 systemd_read_journal_files(filebeat_t)
-systemd_watch_journal_dirs(filebeat_t)
 
 # It wants to send the logs to remote host, allow unrestricted TCP for
 # this for now. Maybe this can be reasonably constrained more tightly.
@@ -57,7 +56,6 @@ corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(filebeat_t)
 
 # Read generic etc files (e.g. nsswitch.conf)
 files_read_etc_files(filebeat_t)
-files_read_etc_runtime_files(filebeat_t)
 
 # Read CA certificate
 miscfiles_read_generic_certs(filebeat_t)
@@ -126,7 +124,6 @@ require {
 search_dirs_pattern(filebeat_t, bin_t, bin_t)
 
 # Allow to read `/sys/fs/cgroup/unified/system.slice/filebeat.service/cgroup.controllers`
-require { type cgroup_t; }
 fs_read_cgroup_files(filebeat_t)
 allow filebeat_t cgroup_t:dir read;
 
diff --git a/ic-os/components/selinux/ic-node/ic-node.te b/ic-os/components/selinux/ic-node/ic-node.te
@@ -322,7 +322,6 @@ allow ic_canister_sandbox_t ic_canister_mem_t : file { map read write getattr };
 allow ic_replica_t ic_canister_mem_t : file { map read write getattr };
 
 # Wants to read its own control group. Should deny that.
-require { type cgroup_t; }
 dontaudit ic_canister_sandbox_t cgroup_t : dir { search };
 dontaudit ic_canister_sandbox_t cgroup_t : file { open read getattr };
 
diff --git a/ic-os/components/selinux/manageboot/manageboot.te b/ic-os/components/selinux/manageboot/manageboot.te
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ application_domain(ic_manageboot_t, ic_manageboot_exec_t)
 # write upgrades into partition). Allow entering sudo, and return
 # to the original domain when sudo re-executes the script (so
 # it is now running same domain, but with root privileges).
-sudo_role_template(ic_manageboot, ic_manageboot_t, ic_manageboot_exec_t, system_r)
+sudo_role_template(ic_manageboot, system_r, ic_manageboot_t)
 domtrans_pattern(ic_manageboot_sudo_t, ic_manageboot_exec_t, ic_manageboot_t)
 # Under certain circumstances, sudo signals its children.
 allow ic_manageboot_sudo_t ic_manageboot_t : process { signal };
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ allow ic_manageboot_t ic_manageboot_t : unix_stream_socket { connect create geta
 # Allow searching runtime process directories (/var/run which is symlinked to /run).
 # It is not perfectly clear what/why it is doing that, but it is harmless
 # enough. May to to forbid it and see if it still works.
-files_search_runtime(ic_manageboot_t)
+files_search_pids(ic_manageboot_t)
 
 # Allow reading /opt/ic/share/version.txt
-read_files_pattern(ic_manageboot_t, usr_t, usr_t)
+read_files_pattern(ic_manageboot_t, usr_t, usr_t)
diff --git a/ic-os/components/selinux/misc-fixes/misc-fixes.te b/ic-os/components/selinux/misc-fixes/misc-fixes.te
@@ -15,16 +15,12 @@ permissive unconfined_t;
 require { type lvm_t; }
 
 # Note that "cryptsetup" is also running as lvm_t.
-require { type initrc_t, initrc_runtime_t; }
-allow lvm_t initrc_t : sem rw_sem_perms;
 
 # cryptsetup needs to create /run/cryptsetup: This is its lockfile directory to
 # track which devices, which is the lockfile directory tracking devices on
 # which operations are in progress
-require { type var_run_t, initrc_runtime_t; }
+require { type var_run_t; }
 create_dirs_pattern(lvm_t, var_run_t, var_run_t)
-manage_dirs_pattern(lvm_t, initrc_runtime_t, initrc_runtime_t)
-manage_files_pattern(lvm_t, initrc_runtime_t, initrc_runtime_t)
 
 # lvm cryptsetup needs to manage its own cryptographic keys
 allow lvm_t lvm_t : key manage_key_perms;
diff --git a/ic-os/components/selinux/systemd-fixes/systemd-fixes.te b/ic-os/components/selinux/systemd-fixes/systemd-fixes.te
@@ -119,13 +119,6 @@ list_dirs_pattern(systemd_tmpfiles_t, unlabeled_t, unlabeled_t)
 # A tempfile is used as part of setting up machine-id
 read_files_pattern(systemd_tmpfiles_t, tmpfs_t, tmpfs_t)
 
-###############################################################################
-# systemd-generator
-
-# systemd_generator_t is missing this permission, and it blocks ssh
-require { type systemd_generator_t; }
-init_delete_runtime_files(systemd_generator_t)
-
 ###############################################################################
 # udev
 
@@ -153,12 +146,6 @@ systemd_connect_userdb(local_login_t)
 # ssh also needs access to userdb
 systemd_connect_userdb(sshd_t)
 
-###############################################################################
-# systemd-notify
-
-require { type systemd_runtime_notify_t; }
-allow sshd_t systemd_runtime_notify_t : sock_file write_sock_file_perms;
-
 ###############################################################################
 # pcscd
 
diff --git a/ic-os/guestos/context/Dockerfile b/ic-os/guestos/context/Dockerfile
@@ -32,14 +32,14 @@ RUN sed -e '/.*pam_motd.so.*/d' -i /etc/pam.d/login && \
 # but this is per system (so backups are not persisted across upgrades)
 # and thus not very useful, and /etc is read-only.
 # So simply suppress generating backups.
-RUN sed -e 's/\(# \)\?\(backup *= *\)[01]/\20/' -e 's/\(# \)\?\(archive *= *\)[01]/\20/' -i /etc/lvm/lvm.conf
+RUN sed -e 's/\(backup *= *\)1/\10/' -e 's/\(archive *= *\)1/\10/' -i /etc/lvm/lvm.conf
 
 # Deactivate systemd userdb. We don't use it.
 RUN sed -e 's/ *systemd//' -i /etc/nsswitch.conf
 
 # Clear files that may lead to indeterministic build.
 RUN apt-get clean && \
-    find /usr/lib/python3.12 -name "*.pyc" | xargs rm && \
+    find /usr/lib/python3.8 -name "*.pyc" | xargs rm && \
     find /usr/lib/python3 -name "*.pyc" | xargs rm && \
     find /usr/share/python3 -name "*.pyc" | xargs rm && \
     truncate --size 0 /etc/machine-id
@@ -97,7 +97,6 @@ RUN for SERVICE in /etc/systemd/system/*; do \
 RUN systemctl enable \
     chrony \
     nftables \
-    ssh \
     systemd-networkd \
     systemd-networkd-wait-online \
     systemd-resolved \
@@ -113,6 +112,10 @@ RUN systemctl disable \
     fstrim.service \
     fstrim.timer
 
+# Clear additional files that may lead to indeterministic build.
+RUN find /usr/local/share/fonts -name .uuid | xargs rm && \
+    find /usr/share/fonts -name .uuid | xargs rm
+
 # ------ GUESTOS WORK --------------------------------------------
 
 # Divert symbolic link for dynamically generated nftables
@@ -127,8 +130,19 @@ RUN mkdir -p /var/lib/ic/backup \
 # Create two mount points for temporary use during setup of "var" partition
 RUN mkdir -p /mnt/var_old /mnt/var_new
 
+# Add user/group entries specified here: /usr/lib/sysusers.d/systemd.conf E.g., systemd-timesync/coredump. 
+## `systemd-sysusers` does not honor the SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH env var. 
+## With `podman --timestamp=0` each file gets written with timestamp of the Unix epoch. 
+## When systemd-sysusers writes the shadow entry for these users, the 2nd field in the row (# days since the epoch) is set to (today - unix epoch). 
+## This is not reproducible. 
+## Reset the passwords to the locked password ("!!"). `usermod` honors SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH (set in the base dockerfile). This removes the password timestamp.
+## Why not use `faketime`? Doesn't work with `podman --timestamp=0`.
+RUN systemd-sysusers && \
+    usermod -p '!!' systemd-timesync && \
+    usermod -p '!!' systemd-coredump
+
 # Set /bin/sh to point to /bin/bash instead of the default /bin/dash
-RUN ln -sf /bin/bash /usr/bin/sh
+RUN echo "set dash/sh false" | debconf-communicate && dpkg-reconfigure -fnoninteractive dash
 
 # Group accounts to which parts of the runtime state are assigned such that
 # user accounts can be granted individual access rights.
diff --git a/ic-os/guestos/context/docker-base.dev b/ic-os/guestos/context/docker-base.dev
@@ -1 +1 @@
-ghcr.io/dfinity/guestos-base-dev@sha256:20c82af9837aca39faeaae76ded3604accb0baf2c04a627a4d2353e2aaa12f2c
+ghcr.io/dfinity/guestos-base-dev@sha256:bd3cc2296731e78191dbf8a989b5809e102230de5fe509548e944632a97bd5cb
diff --git a/ic-os/guestos/context/docker-base.prod b/ic-os/guestos/context/docker-base.prod
@@ -1 +1 @@
-ghcr.io/dfinity/guestos-base@sha256:4b523f92154add2087c177180ef9b62ed55358bfe48706fa3b17c69d310cc01e
+ghcr.io/dfinity/guestos-base@sha256:0a485d2d033df5aa7efd4ccbaad432c29d18f0f165cdcbeed5d49790c0d16340
diff --git a/rs/tests/driver/src/driver/group.rs b/rs/tests/driver/src/driver/group.rs
@@ -1108,12 +1108,6 @@ async fn stream_journald_from_cursor(
         cursor,
         stream.write_all(b"Accept: application/json\n").await
     );
-    unwrap_or_return!(
-        cursor,
-        stream
-            .write_all(format!("Host: {ipv6}:19531\n").as_bytes())
-            .await
-    );
     unwrap_or_return!(
         cursor,
         stream
diff --git a/rs/tests/driver/src/util.rs b/rs/tests/driver/src/util.rs
@@ -1476,9 +1476,7 @@ impl LogStream {
 
         // Use plaintext instead of json, because some messages are too large for the journal json serializer
         stream
-            .write_all(
-                format!("GET /entries?follow HTTP/1.1\r\nHost:{ip_addr}:19531\r\n\r\n").as_bytes(),
-            )
+            .write_all(b"GET /entries?follow HTTP/1.1\n\r\n\r")
             .await?;
 
         let bf = BufReader::new(stream);

Original file line number	Diff line number	Diff line change
`@@ -1 +1 @@`
`1`		`-vda10-crypt /dev/vda10 /boot/config/store.keyfile luks,discard`
	`1`	`+vda10-crypt /dev/vda10 /boot/config/store.keyfile luks2,discard`