

EIP-1559

The Good

The Bad

The Ugly



Dominic Letz

Chief Technology Officer

<https://diode.io>

Taipei Ethereum Meetup Online Event
Thursday, 24 September 2020
Ethereum Governance, DeFi, vAMMs,
Layer 2 solutions, and more



Tim Beiko (Parity)


What Are We *Not* Trying To Fix?

High Gas Prices

- There is a common misconception that EIP-1559 will help “bring gas prices down”.
- This is only partially true: it will make intra-block gas prices more consistent and will allow for better management of demand spikes, but if demand is always high, and the block space (supply) is fixed, gas prices will be high.

ETH's Inflationary Supply

- There is a misconception that EIP-1559 will lead to “negative issuance” of ETH (i.e. a deflationary supply).
- This would only be true if transaction fees are significantly larger than block rewards for extended periods of time. Empirically, block rewards have almost always been much larger than total block transaction fees.



WHAT?

ABOUT ME



Diode

Co-Founder of Diode building **decentralized infrastructure**

- [BlockQuick paper](#) published on May 27, 2019
- PreNet Launched January 2020
- Diode Client v0.4.10
- Offices in Berlin and Taipei

Focusing on makers, Raspberry PI. Driving Network versatility. Broadcasting, secure tunneling, fleet management, VPN security, and storage.

BlockQuick Validation for IoT



| Client | Storage | Sync/Day |
|----------------|---------|----------|
| geth fast sync | 200 GB | ~100 MB |
| geth light | 1.2 GB | ~3.5 MB |
| IOTA | 8 GB | ~1 GB |
| BlockQuick | 20 KB | 20 KB |

The Problems EIP-1559 Tries to Solve

Mismatch between **volatility** of transaction fee levels and social cost of transactions

Needless **delays** for users


Inefficiencies of first price auctions

Instability of blockchains with no block reward

Vitalik Buterin March 2019

GOOD

Daily Gas Demand Cycle




The difference between average gasprice and 10th percentile gasprice in a regular block is something like 3x for median and 5-8x for mean. People needlessly overpay massively.

<https://solmaz.io/2019/10/21/gas-price-fee-volatility/>
<https://notes.ethereum.org/@vbuterin/BkS0mQTS8>

EIP-1559 TRANSACTION

GASFEE



TIP

BASEFEE

Pre EIP-1559 Block Capacity

(10 million gas today max)

EIP-1559 MAX Capacity


EIP-1559 TARGET Capacity

Decrease BASEFEE



Increase BASEFEE

Full Blocks Increase the BASEFEE by max. 12%
Empty Block Reduce it by max. 12%



Improvements

- Smooth BASEFEE Curve
- Predictable Gas Fees => Less Overpaid Gas
- Larger max. Blocks
- No/Less gas price Manipulation


BAD

It's a


TAX

Nobody profits

PRE EIP-1559




EIP-1559 Equilibrium?





EIP-1559 Equilibrium?

"Loose-Loose"



EIP-1559 Equilibrium?



→ ↻ 🏠 🔒 https://etherscan.io/block/10041 ... 📌 ☆ ⬇️ 📄 🗨️ 🚫 ⏏️

Overview Comments

🔍 Block Height: **10041942** < >

🔍 Timestamp: ⌚ 130 days 15 hrs ago (May-11-2020 01:22:05 AM +UTC)

🔍 Transactions: **91 transactions** and **22 contract internal transactions** in this block

🔍 Mined by: **0x5a0b54d5dc17e0aad383d2db43b0a0d3e029c4c (Spark Pool)** in 15 secs

🔍 Block Reward: **2.2158624519832014 Ether (2 + 0.1533624519832014 + 0.0625)**

Good old time with low tx fees
\$832

Today's defi reality
\$2,609
At Risk ~\$1,777

→ ↻ 🏠 🔒 https://etherscan.io/block/10887 ... 📌 ☆ ⬇️ 📄 🗨️ 🚫 ⏏️

Overview Comments

🔍 Block Height: **10887524** < >

🔍 Timestamp: ⌚ 30 secs ago (Sep-18-2020 05:28:47 PM +UTC)

🔍 Transactions: **157 transactions** and **59 contract internal transactions** in this block

🔍 Mined by: **0x04668ec2f57cc15c381b461b9fedab5d451c8f7f (zhizhu.top)** in 44 secs

🔍 Block Reward: **6.911983968455271477 Ether (2 + 4.911983968455271477)**

RISKS

- Stability: 2x Sized Blocks ??
- Implementation: Two Transaction Queues
- Miners: Lower Revenue Per Block
Harder to Earn Block Mining Incentives
- Price Equilibrium: ?

UGLY

IT'S NOT FIXING HIGH GAS PRICES


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<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Njv2lhdcmGo>
<https://slack-files.com/T9C7VSRBN-F0188EUPTGV-c4049dfb31>

“In Protocol”-Collusion

25 DAYS LATER



dominic


Jul 22

Just saw your comment @vbuterin



vitalik.eth ✓ @VitalikButerin · 17 Std.

Transaction fee revenue is now nearing half as high as block reward revenue. This actually risks making ethereum *less* secure because of [cs.princeton.edu/~arvindn/publi....](https://cs.princeton.edu/~arvindn/publications/mining_CCS.pdf) Fee market reform (ie. EIP 1559) fixes this; another reason why that EIP is important.



80

229

1.025




Could you lay out the thought how eip-1559 helps with the attack described in the paper? I was thinking about the impact myself but concluded that because the anticipated equilibrium in https://www.cs.princeton.edu/~arvindn/publications/mining_CCS.pdf has only half filled blocks it would keep the MINFEE at 0 and hence not change anything on the problem.

There was another paper proposing payout of the transaction fee in a sliding average window of the last 10 blocks. That might fix the risk of the petty miner scheme and could be quick follow of 1559.



Reply

IDEA: All Consensus Rules are Followed but we don't include all Transactions



On the Instability of Bitcoin Without the Block Reward

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ABSTRACT

Bitcoin provides two incentives for miners: block rewards and transaction fees. The former accounts for the vast majority of miner revenues at the beginning of the system, but it is expected to transition to the latter as the block rewards dwindle. There has been an implicit belief that whether miners are paid by block rewards or transaction fees does not affect the security of the block chain.

We show that this is not the case. Our key insight is that with only transaction fees, the variance of the block reward is very high due to the exponentially distributed block arrival time, and it becomes attractive to fork a "wealthy" block to "steal" the rewards therein. We show that this results in an equilibrium with undesirable properties for Bitcoin's security and performance, and even non-equilibria in some circumstances. We also revisit selfish mining and show that it can be made profitable for a miner with an arbitrarily low


Figure 1 shows a block chain with a current block containing 100 units of transaction fees. A pile of 5 units represents the remaining fees. Two options are shown for the next miner:

- Option One: extend longest chain.** Claim 5 units for self, leave 0 units for next miner.
- Option Two: fork longest chain.** Claim 55 units for self, leave 50 units for next miner.

Current State: head of longest chain contains 100 units of transaction fees. 5 units remain.


Top 25 Miners by Blocks

In the last 7 days
Source: Etherscan.io



| Block | Age | Txn | Uncles | Miner | Gas Used | Gas Limit | Avg.Gas Price | Reward |
|--------------------------|-------------|---------------------|--------|---|-------------------------------------|------------|---------------|---------------|
| 10887556 | 24 secs ago | 223 | 0 | 0x6ebaf477f83e055589... | 12,413,590 (99.75%) | 12,445,052 | 338.64 Gwei | 6.20373 Ether |
| 10887555 | 54 secs ago | 203 | 0 | Nanopool | 12,440,435 (99.87%) | 12,457,216 | 407.77 Gwei | 7.07282 Ether |
| 10887554 | 1 min ago | 200 | 0 | Spark Pool | 12,424,625 (99.84%) | 12,445,064 | 376.82 Gwei | 6.68183 Ether |
| 10887553 | 1 min ago | 142 | 0 | 0x84a0d77c693adabe0... | 12,409,204 (99.81%) | 12,432,924 | 301.02 Gwei | 5.73535 Ether |
| 10887552 | 1 min ago | 150 | 0 | Ethermine | 12,407,075 (99.69%) | 12,445,076 | 350.87 Gwei | 6.35328 Ether |
| 10887551 | 1 min ago | 142 | 0 | F2Pool | 12,424,149 (99.93%) | 12,432,936 | 429.19 Gwei | 7.33235 Ether |
| 10887550 | 1 min ago | 88 | 0 | Ethermine | 12,430,473 (99.88%) | 12,445,088 | 323.97 Gwei | 6.02708 Ether |
| 10887549 | 2 mins ago | 198 | 0 | F2Pool | 12,421,181 (99.91%) | 12,432,948 | 379.02 Gwei | 6.70793 Ether |
| 10887548 | 2 mins ago | 161 | 0 | Spark Pool | 12,440,039 (99.96%) | 12,445,100 | 329.96 Gwei | 6.10477 Ether |
| 10887547 | 2 mins ago | 194 | 0 | 0x84a0d77c693adabe0... | 12,431,325 (99.99%) | 12,432,960 | 387.76 Gwei | 6.82036 Ether |
| 10887546 | 2 mins ago | 161 | 0 | Minerall Pool | 12,433,019 (99.90%) | 12,445,112 | 402.77 Gwei | 7.00763 Ether |
| 10887545 | 2 mins ago | 20 | 1 | zhizhu.top | 1,149,933 (9.23%) | 12,457,276 | 338.68 Gwei | 2.45195 Ether |
| 10887544 | 2 mins ago | 222 | 0 | 2Miners: SOLO | 12,451,903 (99.86%) | 12,469,452 | 395.43 Gwei | 6.92391 Ether |
| 10887543 | 3 mins ago | 145 | 0 | BTC.com Pool | 12,466,044 (99.88%) | 12,481,640 | 317.81 Gwei | 5.96184 Ether |
| 10887542 | 3 mins ago | 153 | 1 | Mining Express | 12,460,580 (99.73%) | 12,493,840 | 333.35 Gwei | 6.21625 Ether |


Which Block Would you Follow?



Current State: head of longest chain contains 100 units of transaction fees. 5 units remain.



Option One: extend longest chain.
Claim 5 units for self, leave 0 units for next miner.




Option Two: fork longest chain.
Claim 55 units for self, leave 50 units for next miner.

You make
~\$800

You make
~\$2,700

Which Block Would you Follow?



Half-filled blocks:

- Leave more \$\$\$ for the next miner
- Reduce the BASEFEE **TAX**: "Win-Win"
- If everyone does it BASEFEE stays 0 and all stays as is pre eip-1559...


What are other Options?

Diode Logo


EIP-1559 + FeePool

- 1) No Burning, no **TAX**.
- 2) Gas is added to Pool.
- 3) Miner gets 10% of Pool per Block

- Simpler to implement (no two queues)
- Incentivizes High Block fill Rates for all Miners



FeePool Edition (Diode Network):



Full blocks:

- More \$\$\$ for the next miners
 $10\% (20\text{m gas} * 9 \text{ block} + 1\text{m} * 1 \text{ block}) = 18\text{m gas}$

Half-filled blocks:

- Leave **less! \$\$\$** for the next miners
 $10\% (10\text{m gas} * 9 \text{ block} + 10\text{m} * 1 \text{ block}) = 10\text{m gas}$
- Reduce the MINFEE: "Loose-Win"

Thank You!



<https://diode.io>



https://t.me/diode_chain



https://twitter.com/diode_chain



<https://www.linkedin.com/company/diode-chain>



partner@diode.io