

# Blockchains for Decentralized PKI on IoT Devices

Diode CTO Dominic Letz

<https://diode.io/>

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# Blockchain + IoT ??



PKI - The system that protects the Internet &  
IIoT is **fundamentally** broken



Is here to replace it

On April 8th, 2010 China Telecom hijacked 15% of the Internet traffic for 18 minutes, this was an early experiment of a reroute-and-open attack against BGP and PKI two fundamental Internet Protocols.

Since 2015 Internet Traffic is being hijacked regularly by groups from Russia, Iran, China.

And since 2018 by private unidentified groups.

# China Telecom's Internet Traffic Misdirection

Routing leak sent US domestic traffic through China



China Telecom's Internet Traffic Misdirection in 2017

My traffic is encrypted! So they can't read it.


My traffic is encrypted! So they can't read it.

**RIGHT?**





# WRONG! - Let's talk about PKI




- Pre-Installed in your Browser / OS
- Intermediate
- Entity


# 3,675 Intermediates

- Each intermediate can create certificates for **\*all\*** domains.
- Everyone has a root key.
- Each country not on the list wants to get one.

Valid Certificate Authorities by Subject Country



# Safe or not Safe?



The image shows two side-by-side browser windows illustrating security warnings for a revoked certificate. The left window is Google Chrome, displaying a 'Security Certificate Revocation Awareness' warning. The right window is Mozilla Firefox, displaying a 'Secure Connection Failed' error.

**Chrome Window:**


- Tab: GRC's | Security Cert x
- Address bar: <https://revoked.grc.com> (Secure)
- Warning Title: Security Certificate Revocation Awareness
- Text: If you can see this (and apparently you can) you are using a **revocation UNaware** web browser.
- Text: This TLS security certificate for this special website has been **completely** revoked. Since you **are** seeing this page, your web browser is allowing a site with a **known invalid** certificate to display its pages. This is likely not the behavior you want.
- Text: Here's what we know:

**Firefox Window:**

- Tab: Problem loading page x +
- Address bar: <https://revoked.grc.com>
- Error Title: Secure Connection Failed
- Error Message: An error occurred during a connection to revoked.grc.com. Peer's Certificate has been revoked. (SEC\_ERROR\_REVOKED\_CERTIFICATE)
- Causes:
  - The page you are trying to view cannot be shown because its authenticity can't be verified.
  - Please contact the website owners to inform them of this error.
- Learn more...
- Report errors like this to help Mozilla identify and block malicious sites (checkbox)

功課: Try yourself <https://revoked.grc.com>

# Time?




功課: Set your clock to 2020 and try browsing the web.

# 1

reroute


- February 2016 and **for about 6 months**, routes from Canada to Korean government sites were hijacked by **China**
- April 2017: **Russian** company Rostelecom. The hijacked prefixes belonged to financial institutions (most notably MasterCard and Visa), other telecom companies, and a variety of other organizations.
- April 2018: Roughly 1300 IP addresses within Amazon Web Services space, dedicated to Amazon Route 53, were hijacked by eNet (**or a customer thereof**), an ISP in **Columbus, Ohio**.
- July 2018: **Iran** Telecommunication Company originated 10 prefixes of Telegram Messenger.
- November 2018: US-based **China** Telecom site originated Google addresses.



# 2

open

Fake server can read and modify traffic.  
Fake, stolen or tricked certificates is being used.




- Fake** March 2015 **Egypt-based** MCS Holdings, an intermediate certificate authority that operates under the **China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC)** created fake certificates
- Stolen** June 2015 Hackers of **unknown origin** infect Kaspersky Labs using a stolen Foxconn root certificate
- Fake** September 2015 Symantec has fired an undisclosed number of employees after they were caught issuing unauthorized cryptographic certificates
- Trick** October 22, 2017: Hackers of **unknown origin** take control of **Brazilian banks** DNS server and trick a CA into issuing a valid certificate to them.
- Fake** 2017: **Chinese** WoSign & StarCom are banned from Firefox&Chrome after being found to have created invalid certificates.

# Solution

*blockchain based key infrastructure*


# Industrial IoT



Everything will be connected,  
let's ensure it is secure!



# The Four Horsemen of the PKI Apocalypse



Time

Consensus

Revocation

Governance





Time and PKI certificates are in **cyclic dependency** stolen, revoked, expired?

Time

N many certificates for the same identity?

Consensus

CRL & OCSP lists are outdated, and often not even implemented on IoT devices.

Revocation

Who gets the keys for all doors?  
gov is hard: money, countries, politics

Governance

## Time

**Time and current state** are be resolved trustless from the blockchain

## Consensus

There is **one agreed owner** per identity

## Revocation

Revocations happen **in-chain**, are part of the core protocol

## Governance

**No "global keys"** anymore. Governance can be decided per fleet in smart contracts

**Step #1: Replace PKI**



**Step #2: Decentralize IoT**



**Step #3: World Peace**



# Step #1: Replace Internet PKI



## Traditional PKI

```
int main() {  
    IP address = dns_lookup("time.google.com");  
  
    Date timestamp = ntp_lookup(IP);  
  
    address = dns_lookup("plant-control.com");  
  
    Connection conn = ssl_connect_with_pki(  
        address, "plant-control.com", timestamp  
    );  
    ...  
}
```

unsafe lookup

insecure protocol

unsafe lookup #2

validating using manipulated date,  
wrong ips,  
no revocation checking,  
how & when update roots?

## Blockchain Based

```
int main() {  
    Diode io = connect_blockchain();  
    Date timestamp = io.latest_block;  
  
    char* FLEET = "0xdb0d6541b738c3f71b3a360b5bdaf5";  
    IP address = lookup_map(io, FLEET, 0, "server_ip");  
    char* signature = lookup_map(io, FLEET, 0, "signature");  
  
    Connection conn = ssl_connect_with_signature(  
        address, signature  
    );  
    ...  
}
```

securely connecting to the  
blockchain

getting secure timestamp

fetching contract state &  
merkle proofing


# Step #1: Replace Internet PKI

```
char* FLEET = "0xdb0d6541b738c3f71b3a360b5bdaf5" ;

pragma solidity ^0.4.0;

contract Fleet {
    mapping (bytes32 => bytes32) public env;

    function setServer(bytes32 serverIP,
        bytes32 fingerprint) public {
        env["server_ip"] = serverIP;
        env["signature"] = fingerprint;
    }
}
```



# Step #1: Replace Internet PKI



In PKI there are currently 3,675 trusted certificate authorities. A **single point of failure** can be used to open any encrypted communication




Diode

In contrast, because Diode is a blockchain based network it requires an attacker to compromise **51% percent of all peers** to break




# Step #2: Decentralized IoT



# Step #2: Decentralized IoT


Device & Client Connect to the **NEAREST** node





# Step #2: Decentralized IoT


## 1. Store device location



Kademlia p2p Key-Value Network  
(like Ethereum / BitTorrent)

# Step #2: Decentralized IoT


## 2. Find the device location



**Kademlia p2p Key-Value Network**  
(like Ethereum / BitTorrent)

# Step #2: Decentralized IoT


## 3. Connect to device






Direct Connection is Possible  
otherwise proxy connection

# Miner Incentives and Tickets $\neq$ Transactions

# How does a miner work?



# How does a miner work?




# Miners select devices


Device  
<Pub>




1. New device connects



2. Server at capacity,  
cheap device removed



3. Miner optimizes  
revenue



# Layer 2 Scaling Solution

Millions of Tickets

25 Transactions/s






# Ticket Aggregation #1

- For each Device/Server combination only the most recent ticket need to be kept. With the highest counter.  
=> ~1 Ticket per Epoch and Device
- BLS Ticket signatures can be aggregated.

Epoch	Device	Node	Types	Counters	Signature (BLS)
2 byte	8 byte	4 byte	1 byte	12 byte	96 byte

- 1,836 gas ( $68 * 27$ ) => ~4,000 Tickets per Block
- 172,800 Blocks per Epoch \* 4,000 Tickets per Block
- ~691,200,000 Monthly Active Devices



# Ticket Aggregation #2

- Diode Registry reduces gas cost on valid ticket submission. 2x increase.
- Fleet Relayers take Tickets from same fleet contract and merge them. 100x - 1000x reduction in tickets.
- 138,240,000,000 - 1,382,400,000,000 (1,3兆)  
Monthly Active Devices  
(691,200,000 \* 2 \* 100...1000)




# Fleet Contracts

## ACME Company

Fleet Owner



Accounting



Operator/IT

Activates



Deposits Stake  
Registers the  
Fleet Contract

Manages Fleet Contract  
Identities, Permissions,  
Addresses.

EVM

Diode  
Registry  
«smart contract»

Fleet Contract  
«smart contract»



Devices

## Disaster Recovery Partners




N-of-M  
MultiSig Recovery

L1:

- BlockQuick™
- Service Awareness

L2:

- Diode Registry
- Fleet Contracts
- Service Tickets
- Service Rewards




We're looking for reviewers for Light  
<https://diodechain.io>



**WELCOME  
TO THE  
FUTURE OF IOT**

# Q&A

## BLOCKCHAIN NODES



Device is following and validating new blocks only as far as they

- 1) Are hash-correct (standard blockchain rules)
- 2) Have follow up-blocks that represent at least 51% of the previous known proof power (PoW or PoS)

## CHAIN BY WITH MINER INDICATION

