



Eden Smart Proxy

TLDR:

- Centralized Vote Distribution and Politics have reduced the quality of network governance, accountability, and legitimacy.
- It is proposed that the EOS network itself should incentivize the act of voting, while disincentivizing BPs to privately or publicly reward their voters directly.
- The Eden Smart Proxy ("ESPx") will vote for a maximum of 30 Block Producers ("BP").
- The BPs available for Eden members to vote for will be provided by the ESPx Whitelist. (*Previously MyvoteEOS whitelist*)
- The whitelist has three criteria for BPs to agree to:
 - No engagement in vote compromise in any form;
 - Only operate one BP; and
 - Providing public financial and operational reports on a regular basis.
- The maintenance of the ESPx whitelist will be provided by the global Eden on EOS community.
- When more than 30 BPs are participating the global Eden community will vote to rank the BPs to decide who is voted for.
- The top 21 BPs will redirect their 0.25% of inflation b-pay to the ESPx pool to reward token holders.
- The ESPx will request an additional 0.8% inflation from the network bringing the total inflation directed to the ESPx to 1.05%
- Participating BPs will be expected to provide financial reports and participate in regular live-streamed video check-up calls.
- The ESPx account permissions will be held by known and established Eden community members representing the primary languages in our community and until the global set of Edens are up and running.

Introduction

In the very early days of Delegated Proof of Stake (“DPoS”) it was once suggested that the biggest concern or criticism of DPoS is its reliance on votes and how it breaks down under poor token distribution. It was also pointed out that politics would be unavoidable and therefore should be formalized.

It turns out in EOS selecting block producers (“BP”) is less dependent on token **ownership** distribution, and more dependent on token **vote** distribution. Meaning, actors that act as a custodian of customer tokens (exchanges, centralized and decentralized) contribute to a more centralized BP selection process than would normally occur if each token holder individually selected BPs to vote for.

In terms of politics, it is clear exchanges have a profound impact on not only the token vote distribution, but in reducing the ability for individual token holders to have a meaningful voice in BP selection. Most exchanges either sell votes directly to BPs or through a singular entity acting as a broker for the sale while taking a cut. This BP selection is therefore made without input from their token holder customers and is simply a financial transaction, favoring votes going to BPs that will pay the most for them.

Due to this imbalance in vote distribution and political influence, EOS has suffered with a distorted reward-based relationship between token holders, exchanges, and BPs. While BPs are enabled and required to make critical decisions on behalf of the community, the vast majority of network validators are providing an ever decreasing amount of information on who they are, what they do, and how they do it. This is a fundamental problem for any blockchain, where transparency, accountability, and legitimacy are paramount.

For EOS, this has occurred due to a dilemma between the voters' desire for compensation and the appropriate level of BP accountability. To correct this, we would like to propose that **the EOS network itself should incentivize the act of voting, while disincentivizing BPs rewarding their voters directly.**

This proposal is made possible when the interests of BPs, voters, and the network are properly aligned. By introducing an adjustment in the flow of the reward relationship between all parties the incentive structure will yield greater results for all.

There are three general steps for this change to materialize:

- 1) Utilize the Eden Smart Proxy (“ESPx”) whitelisting service and voting portal as an accountability layer for BP selection;
- 2) Modify the EOS network’s system contract to reward token holders who proxy to the ESPx with token inflation; and

- 3) Onboard token holders and exchanges to stake and proxy their vote towards the ESPx.

In the current voter/BP landscape, a moral hazard has been created. By BPs paying voters directly, a voter is being incentivized to select the BPs that will pay them the most for their votes. They are disincentivized to select BPs based on their merits as an infrastructure provider, nor for their governance decisions.

The deteriorating health of the network itself is the greatest consequence of this moral hazard. It is for this reason that the solution needs to be deployed at the system contract or network level.

The Eden Smart Proxy



ENGLISH

Delegate with integrity by choosing accessibility, accountability, and transparency.

The Eden Smart Proxy is an EOS BP Voting Proxy that aims to maximize the voice of individual EOS holders, leverage peer-vetted accountability, reward whitelisted BPs, and provide low-risk APR for all token stakers.

SIGN IN AND RANK BPS

DELEGATE VOTE

THIS HEADLINE WILL BE UPDATED WITH:

Delegate for Accountability, Choose Eden Smart Proxy.

The [Eden Smart Proxy](#) is an EOS Block Producer Proxy that intends to maximize **accountability and transparency** on the EOS mainnet. This will be achieved by not only leveraging the **legitimacy** of the consensus derived from Eden's up-vote democratic election process, but also the accountability and reputation of the EOS holders who have revealed their peer-vetted identity to the Eden and EOS community.

The ESPx will serve two primary services. One as a whitelisting service to identify and approve participating BPs who are entered in the proxy. Another as a platform for Eden members to rank BPs to receive the vote of the proxy.

For ranking BPs, the ESPx will reflect the collective voice of the active and participating Eden community by weighting each member's BP vote by their success and overall community participation in the most recent Eden election. Individual vote weight becomes the total number of voting election participants divided by the number of delegates in each particular round.

This is expressed as follows:

- Total Voters / Number of L1 Delegates = L1 Delegate Weight
- Total Voters / Number of L2 Delegates = L2 Delegate Weight
- Total Voters / Number of Ln Delegates = Ln Delegate Weight

The ESPx will cast votes for a maximum of 30 BPs. The BP ranking will be in the order of their tallied score thereby reflecting the collective decision-making of the most recent Eden election participants and elected delegates. To maximize the integrity and accountability of BP selection, **only BPs from Eden Smart Proxy whitelist** will be considered by the Eden voters. In addition Eden members' votes will only count if they have participated in the most recent Eden election for their respective Eden community.

Eden Smart Proxy Whitelist

The baseline function of the ESPx Whitelist is that of a self-regulatory body for the EOS community.

The ESPx will ensure the integrity and the accountability of the BPs that it whitelists, and that they represent the will of the community. This will be achieved through holding regular check-up / auditing calls with the pledged BPs, publicly reviewing their finances, and monitoring their activities. The ESPx Whitelist will set an integrity standard for all EOS BPs.

These calls are intended to be live-streamed and/or recorded providing an opportunity for the whitelisting service providers to ask questions of the BPs on their use of funds, activities, and intentions. All token holders will be encouraged to participate and raise questions on these calls.

Transparency is of the utmost priority with this proposed system. After transparency stands the extremely important provision of accessibility to the BPs for every single token holder. Through the ESPx the average token holder will now immediately know about the BPs and their representatives. **We are a community** of token holders AND block producers. It is time to once again come together and collaborate as one.

In order for an EOS BP to be accepted into the ESPx Whitelist, they must agree to the following commitments:

- No engagement in vote compromise in any form. This includes operating their own proxy with direct APR, buying votes from 3rd party exchanges or proxies, or trading votes with other token holders.
- Only operate one BP, e.g. no sock puppets.
- Providing public financial and operational reports on a regular basis, primarily focused on demonstrating the use of received pay from network inflation.
- Agree to being removed at any time if they are found to be breaking any of the previous commitments.

The ESPx Whitelist function will be operated by the Eden on EOS community as a service Eden provides to the network. Leaders (or Chief Delegates) will be selected from the Eden up-vote democratic process to then appoint trusted individuals to perform the whitelisting service and accountability checks.

EOS is a global network, and therefore it is imperative that the ESPx Whitelisting function is shared between the various global Eden on EOS communities. This means that every effort

will be made to ensure all important communications between the ESPx service providers and BPs are available in all languages, and as quickly as possible. Even live interactions between the ESPx team and BPs will strive to include as many multi-language interactions as possible.

Currently, the Genesis Eden (English language) community is the only one to have received support from the network via EOS tokens, hold elections on-chain, and ensure Sybil checks are completed through the election process itself. The roadmap to roll out the ESPx includes empowering regional Edens across the world. It ensures all regional Edens are properly established, supported by the network and equally contributing to the operation of the Whitelist curation thus forming a global community.

The specifics of how this will unfold is not yet determined as of the writing of this litpaper (December 21st, 2022), however the following are key considerations that will need to be addressed, and ideally are done so in a collaborative, community effort:

- What are the criteria or thresholds that an Eden community must reach in order to be supported via token donations from the EOS network itself?
- How many members must an Eden community have in order to be qualified to contribute to the ESPx Whitelist curation?
- Does election participation factor into this determination of qualification, or strictly the number of members?
- Can individuals be members in more than one Eden community that are each contributing to the ESPx Whitelist?
- How should the various Eden communities work together for this whitelisting service? E.g. Each community appoints a person to be a member of the whitelisting team and a new Peace Treaty is drafted and agreed to by participating Eden communities.

It is important to answer these questions together as a community so we may empower EOS token holders across the globe. The ESPx will respectfully listen to the community and incorporate its consensus into the ESPx.

The core team launching this initiative will retain control of the ESPx until the other global Edens are established, and meet the minimum requirements listed above. This team has a track record of being trusted in the EOS community and has been deliberately composed of members from around the world. The initial msig structure and its key holders are described later in this document.

Network to Reward Voters

Once 15 or more BPs in the top 21 agree to implement a basic system contract upgrade, a portion of inflation can be redirected and allocated to those EOS holders/custodians who delegate their voting power to the ESPx.

This act will align the incentives of voters with that of the BPs, and the network itself. The voter's incentive to receive a paid reward for staking will be met, while participating BPs will enjoy increased cash flow by no longer needing to purchase votes with 80-120% of their Block Producer pay. Finally, the cash-infused community oriented BPs will benefit the

network by having increased resources to maintain it. The network will also benefit by increasing the number of BPs who demonstrate transparency, accountability, and the highest operational standards.

In order for this to materialize, the top 21 BPs will voluntarily give up 0.25% of their pay, known as “block-pay” or “b-pay” and direct those tokens to the ESPx staking reward pool. This pool will in turn reward the stakers who have staked their tokens to the ESPx proxy. It should be noted, this change also removes the pay gap and unnecessary competition between the 21st and 22nd placed BPs. In addition to this 0.25% network inflation, a proposed additional 0.8% network inflation be directed towards the ESPx staking reward pool.

Referencing the previously produced [Stake-Based Voting and Reward Mechanism](#) document the total system inflation was suggested to have an upper limit of 3.8%. Figure one below shows a dynamic inflation rate with fixed APR, 390M staked EOS would be the upper limit to receive a 3% APR without increasing the total network inflation beyond 3.8%. In figure 2 the network inflation is fixed at 3.8%, meaning the APR would vary. With 3.8% total network inflation, it is proposed 1.05% network inflation would be permanently directed to the ESPx to reward token holders accordingly.

As the number of votes accumulate in the proxy, the APR will be reduced. With this configuration, there will be an incentive for token holders to participate in proxying their vote to the ESPx early to maximize their APR. When the proxy becomes incredibly successful, the relative APR will drop and may lead to additional conversations around increasing the allocation from inflation.




Figure 1. With fixed APR for the token holders, as more tokens are staked, the greater the amount of network inflation is required to maintain that APR.




Figure 2. With network inflation fixed, as more tokens are staked to the ESPx, their relative APR will decrease.

Block Producer Benefits

BPs choosing to participate in the ESPx will have additional responsibilities that come with adhering to the requirements of the ESPx Whitelist, while in return will have a substantial increase in their income by no longer needing to pay for votes.

The additional income for BPs is expected to far outweigh the cost of any additional burden that the ESPx will impose. Namely, BPs will be expected to provide financial reporting, and participate in regular livestreamed calls to review their activities. By using a small portion of the increased revenue BP's may pay for these services internally or grow their team accordingly.

With the remainder of BP's increased revenue, no obligations will be placed by the ESPx. That being said, with far greater transparency will come increased community expectations of the output of value by participating BPs. Some might view this as a negative aspect of transparency, while others will see this as an opportunity for BPs to build community trust and in fact advertise their output, and benefit to the community. The process of external BP communication can also be facilitated by the ESPx platform and team.

When EOS was launched in 2018 the concept of what a Block Producer symbolized to the community was far different from what we have come to accept today. BPs were meant to be key representatives and an integral part of the community. Their members' voices carried much weight, and the community looked up to them with respect and support. Today BPs have become largely faceless entities making no real attempt to be a part of the EOS

community at large. They are unreachable to most token holders, and but for a few, seemingly have no interest in considering and incorporating average token holder feedback.

Under this new ESPx paradigm, EOS BPs are expected to have a ‘face’, be reachable, and return to being an integral part of the community. It should be noted that BPs having a face doesn’t mean it needs to be their actual face. There is something to be said about the attack vector of the network that has all of its BPs identifiable and therefore sanctionable by government entities.

With this, there is likely an opportunity for BPs to have an avatar face, and actually be run by anonymous entities who are just as well known as those that participate in video calls. We have many contributing members of the EOS community that don’t show their faces, or reveal their identities. This same approach can also be considered by the ESPx for anonymous BPs that wish to participate under a pseudonym.

In general, BPs that are accepted into the ESPx will receive far more funding than they do in the current network status-quo. This means that there will be far more unique entities being well capitalized to deliver value to the network and community. The antifragility of a decentralized ecosystem cannot be understated, and with each BP deciding independently how to contribute, it should be obvious to all that this will create a far more dynamic and expansive ecosystem.




Figure 3. BP pay increase given the same number of votes received from ESPx without vote-pay.

Block Producer Requirements

After agreeing and adhering to the ESPx Whitelisting requirements via a recorded pledge, each BP is expected to work with ESPx auditors to demonstrate transparent use of their BP pay. The nature of their reporting requirements will be defined in a future document to standardize the information provided. This will provide not only a baseline financial accountability standard, but will provide a means to benchmark BPs against each other for their similar line item expenses.

This benchmarking will allow BPs to compare their costs with other BPs and will ideally encourage collaboration and sharing of processes and procedures, leading to increased efficiencies of participating members. What these financial reports look like is something we hope the community and current BPs will collaborate to develop. The underlying intention of these financial reports is to demonstrate the BP pay from inflation is being used for the net benefit of the EOS ecosystem and not being used to pay for votes. It is acknowledged that the auditing process can never guarantee that BPs aren't still paying for votes behind the scenes, but we can at least attempt to ensure the prudent use of EOS token inflation.

The question of BP infrastructure is also incredibly important as we discuss what is in the network's best interest. The ESPx is deliberately more focused on BP transparency, accountability, and accessibility than it is on purely technical merits. That being said, we very much will expect top tier performance from the BPs who are receiving the vote from the ESPx. This will be ensured by engaging with experts within the community to provide guidance and updates on BP technical performance. This will be one of the expectations of those who will be managing the ESPx whitelisting service; creating relationships and identifying consultants to assist with ensuring BPs are meeting the expected technical output and requirements.

The criteria by which a BP will be measured is still to be determined, and is expected to be a community discussion that includes both token holders and current BPs themselves. The operators of the ESPx are expected to follow the advice and guidance of those providing them with publicly available information on BP performance and respond accordingly. If an ESPx BP is found to be operating below the technical expectations, it will be temporarily removed from the voter list until it can be assured that their technical deficiencies have been resolved. Any decisions in this manner will be publicly addressed and transparently executed.

NOTE: BPs who are currently engaging in buying/selling/trading votes will be permitted to continue doing so until the MSIG is executed to enable network inflation to be directed towards the ESPx voter reward pool. The other requirements of financial disclosure and not operating more than one BP will however be immediately enforced. This exception is not indefinite, but it is understood that a grace period here is warranted.

Account Permissions

The ESPx will vote for the first 30 BPs that sign up for the proxy and maintain their membership by abiding by the previously listed commitments. Once more than 30 BPs are enrolled in the ESPx, as described earlier, the ESPx will place votes in accordance with the selections of the Eden community. Voting by the ESPx for BPs will be performed automatically by the ESPx smart contracts.

Account permissions for the ESPx will initially be set as follows:

Key Management: Owner / Active Key

Owner: Threshold (3)

- Hahn Ryu (+1) (Korean) / Edgar Fernandez (+1) (Spanish) /
Yves La Rose (+1) (English) / Gracie Lau (+1) (Chinese) / Chris Barnes (+1)
(English)

Active: Threshold (3)

- Hahn Ryu (+1) (Korean) / Edgar Fernandez (+1) (Spanish) /
Yves La Rose (+1) (English) / Gracie Lau (+1) (Chinese) / Chris Barnes (+1)
(English)

Once the global Eden community is formed, and meets the criteria previously described, the account permissions are anticipated to be replaced with:

Key Management: Owner / Active Key

Owner: Threshold (3)

- genesis.eden(Active) (+1) / kr.eden(Active)(+1) / cn.eden(Active)(+1) /
sp.eden(Active) (+1)

Active: Threshold (3)

- Genesis.eden representative(+1) / kr.eden representative(+1) / cn.eden
representative(+1) / sp.eden representative(+1)

As more Edens are formed that meet the previously mentioned criteria, they will be added to the Owner permissions. Adding more accounts will correspondingly increase the threshold. The Active permissions are filled with an appointed representative of each respective set of Eden CDs. These also will increase with more Eden communities, and will also increase the threshold accordingly.

Roadmap

The steps required to successfully launch the ESPx are anticipated to be as follows:

1. Release this ESPx Litepaper, and Pitch Deck in English, Chinese, Korean, and Spanish.
2. Announce the ESPx website and make the ESPx proxy account known to begin to receive token holder support by proxying their vote.

3. Engage in open public dialogue on the merits and deficiencies of this proposal with the entire global EOS community through chats and live video/audio discussions.
4. Make adjustments to this Litepaper, answer the questions contained, and generally improve the proposal based on community feedback.
5. Work with the various language communities to assist in their development and launch of their own Eden communities.
6. Publish the ESPx smart contracts for review.
7. Test the proposed system contract changes on an EOS testnet.
8. Work with BPs both in and out of the ESPx to gain their support so that 15/21 BPs execute the finalized system contract changes to modify BP pay and direct network inflation to the ESPx.
9. Ensure the ownership and control of the ESPx transitions to being under the stewardship of the global Eden community.

Conclusion

The solution proposed in the ESPx is a win/win for every stakeholder; exchanges, token holders, BPs and the network itself. The alignment of incentives for all parties will allow EOS to set a new industry standard of transparency with an accountable democratic governance framework that overlays with the standard programmatic blockchain approach. This will pioneer a forward-thinking elegant solution to tackling one of the biggest challenges DPoS faces; capturing the true voice of the community in on-chain governance and mitigating the negative effects of a Pareto token vote distribution.

The story of the EOS comeback will indeed be that of the community, but now it will include all token holders, large and small, having a mechanism to amplify their independent voices in on-chain governance. The Eden up-vote election process has yet to fulfill its potential of providing a truly democratic method to select leaders and representatives from within a broad community of global participants to actually affect the governance of a public blockchain. If successful, the ripple effect of this tool's accomplishment will plant seeds of possibilities in not only other cryptocurrency communities, but in the world at large.

Now with the Eden Smart Proxy, token vote distribution will be far more decentralized, and on-chain politics will be formalized via global Eden communities.

FAQ:

Q: Should the network inflation be directed to just one Proxy? Why not to other proxies and allow for a free market of proxies to compete for this yield?

A: The primary objective of this proposed network yield to a proxy program is to provide a mechanism that enables Block Producers to deliver the most possible value to the EOS network. BPs are able to achieve this by retaining as much of their pay as possible and spend it on what they determine provides the most value back to the network and token holders. This will be a fundamental aspect that will be used by token holders and the Eden community to decide if a BP is deserving of support by the Eden Smart Proxy.

The current pay for vote paradigm has commoditized the vote, created a moral hazard for token holders, and a race to the bottom by BPs to offer the greatest yield for the token holders they buy votes from.

Multiple proxies can absolutely share the network yield from this program, however the mechanism by which a proxy chooses BPs to receive their vote is where this question becomes nuanced. The properties by which a proxy judges and evaluates may differ. However, the primary principles of only operating one BP, not buying/trading/or selling votes and providing regular financial disclosure should remain.

If there are multiple proxies that operate with the same ethos, the next very important question is by what mechanism are the judges, and those that keep the BPs accountable, chosen? The ESPx is proposing to leverage the Eden up-vote Election process to select trusted, transparent, and accountable individuals to manage this responsibility. This is because the Eden process is open, transparent, accessible, and democratic. It would be in the best interest of the Network to ensure that any other proxy looking to do the same, has a similarly incorruptible, decentralized mechanism to identify and select these individuals.

The other notable consideration when we look at there being multiple proxies receiving a portion of network inflation to direct to token holders, is the net APR to the token holder will be reduced by splitting it across more proxies. This APR is of course entirely dependent on the number of tokens staked to these proxies, and so there is a dynamic here that is difficult to predict with it being unknown as to how many token holders and tokens will participate.

Certainly there will be decentralization benefits that will come from there being more than one proxy receiving a portion of this reward, and performing these valuable services to the network. So with that the proposers of this program are very open to how to best achieve this outcome.

Q: Why are the account permissions of the ESPx set as they are and not immediately put in control of the Genesis Eden community?

A: It is very important that the ESPx is not only represented by the global Eden community, but also by members of the Genesis Eden community who have demonstrated a track record of obtaining community support and dedication to the EOS network. All the identified individuals have either had success within the Genesis Eden community as Chief Delegates or within the network itself. In addition, the members identified represent the primary languages of users in the EOS network. These languages are Korean, Chinese, Spanish, and English. We understand that this doesn't cover all of the languages that interact with EOS, however as those communities form their own Eden's, and meet the previously mentioned requirements, they too can join the ESPx.

One option would be to immediately turn the ESPx account permissions over to the current Genesis Eden community. If this were to happen, we would lose global coverage by not being able to control what CD's are elected and what language region they represent. In this early stage of the project, having global representatives is more important than fully decentralizing the ownership and control of the ESPx. This is similar to the well understood

logic that starting centralized is advantageous when beginning a new venture, so long as the intention and clear actions are representative of a migration towards decentralization.

Q: Eden isn't mature enough yet. The community is too small and hasn't proven itself. It's too risky if the proxy becomes influential.

A: ESPx is an integrity layer that leverages the collective opinion of the people who are held accountable via their peer-vetted identity. Whether the ESPx achieves any significant influence on EOS will be up to the token holders as they are the ones who are required to delegate their vote. As we've been told many times, the rules of DPoS must always be respected. This argument has been used time and again to defend actions by BPs that some in the community feel were inappropriate. Therefore if token holders feel that the Eden community and process is worthy of their trust to delegate their tokens to, it is not for others to deny this right.

To token holders who are considering delegating their stake to the ESPx, which will be operated by the global Eden community, keep in mind that the Eden process for these various Eden communities is only being leveraged to identify trusted individuals from within each respective community that will individually appoint the most appropriate person to operate the required ESPx services. Therefore there is no dependency on a particular outcome of an election so long as the process remains incorrupt and elections are honest and transparent.

In terms of the size of the Eden community, Eden is still growing, and collectively will grow much faster when the other global Edens are up and running. The current genesis Eden also hasn't been sufficiently empowered to grow with an ever diminishing treasury and seemingly no purpose to participate. The size of the treasury has recently been greatly boosted, and the purpose of Eden is also coming into form. Both of these reasons bode well for the likely growth in not only the size of Eden(s) but also election participation.

Q: The network has enough inflation already. If anything we should be pushing to lower this from 3%, not increase it to 3.8%. Why do we need to do this?

A: While it is true that inflation is something that should be mitigated and minimized wherever possible, we must recognize that in order for the EOS network itself to incentivize the act of voting, while disincentivizing BPs rewarding their voters directly, some form of voter reward is required. So while it is true that higher inflation leads to an increased rate of existing token holder asset value depreciation, we must accept that compromises must be made in order to achieve the desired outcome.

One option that is certainly worth considering and exploring is starting with a smaller amount of increased inflation to be directed to the proxy. The downside of this approach is that there will be a smaller carrot or incentive for existing token holders to migrate their stake to this proxy. In this scenario the current voter buy/sell, sockpuppet, and no financial disclosure scheme will persist with greater success. It is only when token holders see a better paying option will they migrate their stake.

Also keep in mind that the increased inflation will be directed to existing token holders and not to a central entity or to the BPs that are already currently collecting network inflation. A direct token holder reward paid by the network will offset the dilutive effect to their asset value.

Lastly when it comes to network inflation and minimizing its use, we should also look to minimize its waste. For example we know that there are many “sock puppet” BPs who are propped up by token holders to extract greater value from the network while not delivering any explicit value back. Part of this initiative will be to reduce the number of sock puppets by drawing in more token holders to this initiative. This will therefore amplify the positive net benefit of system inflation. So even though a 0.8% network inflation increase is being proposed, the net growth in value generation from this increase will be far greater than the 0.8% in isolation.

Q: EOS has struggled in the past to instantiate and maintain a broadly accepted constitution. Will there be a renewed attempt at this?

A: Yes an EOS constitution has absolutely been discussed and efforts will most certainly be made to revive this idea. The previous attempts at a network Constitution failed due to there being no real way to enforce any such document. Under this voter reward scheme there is an opportunity to reintroduce a Constitution that participating BPs will adhere to. As the scope of this initiative broadens to influence more BPs then hopefully a new Constitution can be meaningfully implemented and accepted by all active participants.

Q: From a big picture point of view, will this initiative solve all of our problems and be the last stop on our quest to make EOS the best blockchain in the space?

A: No, most definitely not. This initiative is but a step towards the common goal that we all have of the EOS blockchain leading the way in the space as the most performant, reliable, accessible, scalable, and transparently run network. We absolutely believe this is an iterative process and by no means are suggesting everything written here is perfect without room for change and improvement.

It is absolutely expected and requested that the EOS community will have a lot of feedback on how this initiative unfolds. We want to hear from you. We want to know how this can be done better.

Bottom line we hope you agree that the network needs to change. The current status quo is not good enough, and so this may not be the perfect solution as presented, but we hope it can be a first step towards improvement, and positive change.