



ELISA
Enabling **Linux** in
Safety Applications

WORKSHOP

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Industry Safety Level(s) vs. Aerospace Use Cases

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Aerospace Working Group


Charter:

“... shall develop use cases to inform and influence Linux architecture and related tools, work to derive technical requirements for avionics operating systems, and seek to enhance and expand avionics software lifecycle processes, practices, and tools to enable use of Linux in avionics systems that are certified to high design assurance levels.”

Agenda

- Aircraft Development Cycle
- DO-178C Safety Levels
- Safety Levels vs. Certification Artifacts
- A Comparison with Other Hazard Level Standards
- Use cases
- Demo

Aircraft Development Cycle



DO-178C Safety Levels


“Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification.” is published by RTCA (Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics) - DO-178C provides guidance for ensuring the safety, reliability, and airworthiness of software used in commercial and military aircraft.

Level	Severity	Example Impact	Example system
A	Catastrophic Failure	Multiple fatalities, loss of aircraft, irrecoverable	Flight control system, Terrain Awareness Warning System (TAWS)
B	Hazardous/Severe Failure	Large impact, severe injuries, a fatality	Legacy Flight Management System(FMS), Engine-Indicating and Crew-Alerting System
C	Major Failure	Discomfort, minor injuries, increased crew workload	Datalinks, Fuel monitoring
D	Minor Failure	Inconvenience	Maintenance, Cabin Lighting, WiFi
E	No Safety Effect	No impact to airplane operation or comfort	Cargo, Entertainment



Safety Levels vs. Certification Artifact

**Example:
Artifact
Trace**



By Steven H. VanderLeest -
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Example: DO-178C Annex A

The Annex outlines process objectives, activities and outputs by software level

Description	Ref	Activity	Applicability by Software Level				Output	Control Category by Software Level				
			A	B	C	D		Ref	A	B	C	D
1 The activities of the software life cycle processes are defined.	4.1.a		○	○	○	○	PSAC	11.1	○	○	○	○
							SDP	11.2	○	○	○	○
							SVP	11.3	○	○	○	○
							SCM Plan	11.4	○	○	○	○
							QA Plan	11.5	○	○	○	○
								...				
							PSAC					

A Comparison with Other Hazard Level Standards

Approximate cross-domain mapping of ASIL

Domain	Domain-Specific Safety Levels						Failure Rates [3,4]
	QM	ASIL A 1E-5	ASIL B =< 1E-6	ASIL C =< 1E-7	ASIL D =< 1E-8	- [1]	
Automotive (ISO 26262)	QM	ASIL A 1E-5	ASIL B =< 1E-6	ASIL C =< 1E-7	ASIL D =< 1E-8	- [1]	
General (IEC 61508)	-	SIL-1 1E-5		SIL-2	SIL-3	SIL-4 =< 1E-9	
Railway (CENELEC 50126/128/129)	-	SIL-1		SIL-2	SIL-3	SIL-4	
Space (ECSS-Q-ST-80)	Category E	Category D		Category C	Category B	Category A	
Aviation: airborne (ED-12/DO-178/DO-254)	DAL-E	DAL-D 1E-5		DAL-C =< 1E-5	DAL-B =< 1E-7	DAL-A =< 1E-9	
Aviation: ground (ED-109/DO-278)	AL6	AL5	AL4	AL3	AL2	AL1	
Medical (IEC 62304)	Class A	Class B		Class C	-		
Electrical controls (IEC 60730)	Class A	Class B		Class C	-		
Machinery (ISO 13849)	-	PL a	PL b	PL c	PL d	PL e	-
Agriculture (ISO 25119)	AgPL QM	AgPL a	AgPL b	AgPL c	AgPL d	AgPL e	-

Military ([MIL-STD-882E](#)), “Level of Rigor”

NASA ([NPR 7150.2](#)), “Class”

[2]

- [1] <https://www.rapitasystems.com/blog/whats-difference-between-sil-and-dal-how-does-it-affect-my-code-coverage>
- [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Automotive_Safety_Integrity_Level#Comparison_with_Other_Hazard_Level_Standards
- [3] <https://www.rapitasystems.com/do178c-testing> (DO-178C Failure Rate)
- [4] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IEC_61508#Probabilistic_analysis (SIL Failure Rate)





Use Cases

Our Process:

1) Propose, 2) Capture, 3) Establish concept, 4) Demo in environment, and 5) Publish results

Level	Severity	Case	Goals
A/B/C	Catastrophic Failure	Fault Tolerant (1) High Integrity Compute (1) Cabin Lights (1)	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Mixed criticality architecture w/ partitioning- Minimal Codebase / configuration defined- Fault tree / recovery / injection- Voting schemes- IO and protocol approach appropriate for level
D	Minor Failure	Cabin Lights (5) Cabin Lights w/ cFS (2)	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- First use case - Established outline to capture use cases- Runtime Verification w/ Copilot- Basic build/emulation/test workflow (patches welcome!)- Environment/Tool container
E	No Safety Effect	Attested Boot (1)	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Boot chain integrity/authenticity

Demo: Cabin Lights

- Requirements


- The Cabin Lights system shall turn lights on in less than 500 ms of the light switch turning on.
- The Cabin Lights system shall turn lights off in less than 500 ms of the light switch turning off.

- Design


- Switch, Server and Actuator(Light)
- Ethernet and system logging are used

- Test / Demo approach

- Applications are paired with CoPilot monitoring of logs / package



Demo: NASA Core Flight System (cFS)



Maturing Steps*

- 1) Demo cFS Sample app
- 2) Demo monitor event from sample app
- 3) Create Lights demo w/ framework**
- 4) Create Switch + Lights demo

* Assumes cFS running in embedded minimal Linux

** Ogma – generator of runtime m



How to engage with us?

Join our monthly call(s)

- 2nd Thursday – “General Topics”
- 3rd Thursday – Space Grade Linux SIG
- 4th Thursday – “Industry Papers” working session
- Weekly (Friday) – “Use Case” testing call



Mailing list / repos / resources

<https://lists.elisa.tech/g/aerospace>

Register here to receive a calendar invite

<https://elisa.tech/community/meetings/>



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A dark gray background featuring a faint, abstract network graph composed of numerous small white dots connected by thin lines.

Thank you for attending!

