

# **Security Review of**

Orca Protocol
October 2021

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#### Files in scope

Following files in:

https://github.com/orcaprotocol/contracts/tree/0f77d81d1b8818e7a3ac633c9d71e5267646b318/contracts/

- Controller.sol
- ControllerRegistry.sol
- MemberToken.sol
- SafeTeller.sol

#### **Current status**

All issues have been fixed by the developer. There are no known issues in the relevant contracts in <a href="https://github.com/orcaprotocol/contracts/tree/a14e76a9ba36456f5c1bcbbaf35e1443e4fb1d7e/contracts/tree/a14e76a9ba36456f5c1bcbbaf35e1443e4fb1d7e/contracts/tree/a14e76a9ba36456f5c1bcbbaf35e1443e4fb1d7e/contracts/tree/a14e76a9ba36456f5c1bcbbaf35e1443e4fb1d7e/contracts/tree/a14e76a9ba36456f5c1bcbbaf35e1443e4fb1d7e/contracts/tree/a14e76a9ba36456f5c1bcbbaf35e1443e4fb1d7e/contracts/tree/a14e76a9ba36456f5c1bcbbaf35e1443e4fb1d7e/contracts/tree/a14e76a9ba36456f5c1bcbbaf35e1443e4fb1d7e/contracts/tree/a14e76a9ba36456f5c1bcbbaf35e1443e4fb1d7e/contracts/tree/a14e76a9ba36456f5c1bcbbaf35e1443e4fb1d7e/contracts/tree/a14e76a9ba36456f5c1bcbbaf35e1443e4fb1d7e/contracts/tree/a14e76a9ba36456f5c1bcbbaf35e1443e4fb1d7e/contracts/tree/a14e76a9ba36456f5c1bcbbaf35e1443e4fb1d7e/contracts/tree/a14e76a9ba36456f5c1bcbbaf35e1443e4fb1d7e/contracts/tree/a14e76a9ba36456f5c1bcbbaf35e1443e4fb1d7e/contracts/tree/a14e76a9ba36456f5c1bcbbaf35e1443e4fb1d7e/contracts/tree/a14e76a9ba36456f5c1bcbbaf3fa64baa7e4baa7

#### Issues

### 1. Controller.updatePodAdmin sets safeAddress instead of podAdmin

type: incorrect implementation / severity: major

Function Controller.updatePodAdmin is supposed to allow safe owners to set the podAdmin address for their safe, instead it sets the safeAddress mapping that controls which tokens control which safes.

status - fixed

Issue has been fixed and is no longer present in

https://github.com/orcaprotocol/contracts/tree/a14e76a9ba36456f5c1bcbbaf35e1443e4fb1d7e/contracts/

## 2. The fact one safe can be associated with multiple podlds leads to unnecessary trust assumptions and potentially corrupted state

type: security / severity: medium

The fact there's no mechanism that prevents different podlds to be associated with the same safe address through the safeAddress mapping means that createPodWithSafe can be called repeatedly on the same safe, leading to production of multiple incompatible sets of owner tokens for the same safe. Another implication is that owner of controllerRegistry can use Controller.updatePodState to make themselves podAdmin of any registered safe and hijack it.

status - fixed

Issue has been fixed and is no longer present in

#### **Notes**

- Since Controller.memberToken and Controller.controllerRegistry can't be changed, they can be immutable.SafeTeller.createSafe podId argument is unused.MemberToken.CREATE\_EVENT is unused.

- controller.functionCall is used in MemberToken.\_beforeTokenTransfer instead of using the contract's interface for no obvious reason.
- context state variable is not necessary and could be replaced by address(this).