

Security Review of

Symphony Finance

September 2021

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Files in scope

https://github.com/symphony-finance/polygon-contracts/blob/75e66247601bb3ebb837e814555352c2496f318e/contracts/

- adapters/AaveYield.sol
- Symphony.sol
- oracles/ChainlinkOracle.sol
- handlers/SushiswapHandler.sol

Current status

All issues have been fixed by the developer. There are no known issues in the relevant contracts in https://github.com/symphony-finance/polygon-contracts/blob/80e434aa34100c945ce7a0261cc7fb24c5772b38

Issues

1. No access control on AaveYield.maxApprove

type: security / severity: major

Anybody can call AaveYield.maxApprove, this can lead to a DoS attack making AaveYield.underlyingAssets becomoning too expensive by making the underlyingAssets array too long.

status - fixed

Issue has been fixed and is no longer present in

https://github.com/symphony-finance/polygon-contracts/blob/80e434aa34100c945ce7a0261cc7fb24c5772b38/contracts

2. AaveYield.orderRewardDebt can be incorrectly set to in AaveYield.setOrderRewardDebt causing overpaying of rewards

type: security / severity: critical

In AaveYield.setOrderRewardDebt on line 198 orderDebt calculation is skipped if either totalRewardBalance == 0 or totalShares == 0, with the assumption that zero value in either variable means no rewards have been paid out yet. This assumption is wrong with regards to both variables, totalShares can be lowered back to 0 after being a higher value before through share destruction and totalRewardBalance can equal 0 anytime no new rewards have been accumulated since last call of AaveYield.setOrderRewardDebt or AaveYield.withdraw.

status - fixed

Issue has been fixed and is no longer present in

 $\frac{https://github.com/symphony-finance/polygon-contracts/blob/80e434aa34100c945ce7a0261cc7fb24c5772b38/contracts}{}$

3. AaveYield.withdrawAaveReward and AaveYield.claimReward calls incentivesController.claimRewards without increasing AaveYield.previousAccRewardPerShare breaking the reward accounting

type: incorrect implementation / severity: major

Before incentivesController.claimRewards is called it's necessary to record the incentivesController.getRewardsBalance return value increase since the last time it was called into AaveYield.previousAccRewardPerShare, otherwise this increase won't be recorded in the internal accounting on the contract and the information will be lost because the counter is zeroed out in the incentivesController after incentivesController.claimRewards is called.

status - fixed

Issue has been fixed and is no longer present in

4. AaveYield.getRewardBalance will return @ when isExternalRewardEnabled == false breaking AaveYield.getAccumulatedRewardPerShare anytime some rewards are pending

type: incorrect implementation / severity: major

line 305 will throw the safemath underflow error when rewardBalance < pendingRewards[asset], this can happen when isExternalRewardEnabled is set to false after some rewards have been already counted in the pendingRewards[asset].

status - fixed

Issue has been fixed and is no longer present in

https://github.com/symphony-finance/polygon-contracts/blob/80e434aa34100c945ce7a0261cc7fb24c5772b38/contracts

5. A Symphony.emergencyWithdrawFromStrategy call will break Symphony.cancelOrder until rebalanceAsset is called

type: security / severity: major

On line 793 it's assumed that orderAmount + neededAmountInBuffer is always higher than bufferAmount at the time of withdrawal. This won't be the case if asset balance of the contract is suddenly increased without rebalancing. This happens in Symphony.emergencyWithdrawFromStrategy practically allowing an emergancy admin to freeze withdrawals at any time, this breaks security assumptions.

status - fixed

Issue has been fixed and is no longer present in

https://github.com/symphony-finance/polygon-contracts/blob/80e434aa34100c945ce7a0261cc7fb24c5772b38/contracts

6. Symphony.assetBuffer change without rebalancing can cause user actions to fail

type: incorrect implementation / severity: medium

If Symphony.assetBufer is updated without rebalancing the contract, user actions can unexpectedly fail due to line 453.

status - fixed

Issue has been fixed and is no longer present in

7. An attacker can cause reward withdrawal to be skipped by increasing strategy contract asset balance

type: security / severity: medium

amountToWithdraw on line 797 can be manipulated to be equal to by an external attacker since it depends on the Symphony contract's asset balance, this will cause the reward payout to be skipped, this can also happen when bufferAmount changes without rebalancing.

status - fixed

Issue has been fixed and is no longer present in

https://github.com/symphony-finance/polygon-contracts/blob/80e434aa34100c945ce7a0261cc7fb24c5772b38/contracts

8. ChainlinkOracle.get will fail when inputToken == address(0)

type: incorrect implementation / severity: medium

In ChainlinkOracle a call on line 58 will fail when inputToken == address(0)

status - fixed

Issue has been fixed and is no longer present in

Issues discovered by the developer

9. Lack of separate accounting of rewards for different assets in AAVE breaks accounting in AaveYield

type: incorrect implementation / severity: major

Since AAVE only keeps track of reward totals for each user regardless of the asset that generated the reward, in AaveYield rewards won't be correctly assigned to shareholders of a given asset.

status - fixed

Issue has been fixed and is no longer present in

https://github.com/symphony-finance/polygon-contracts/blob/80e434aa34100c945ce7a0261cc7fb24c5772b38/contracts

10. In Symphony.rebalanceAsset rebalancing is incorrectly skipped when assetBufferPercent == 10000

type: incorrect implementation / severity: medium

When Symphony.updateBufferPercentage increases assetBuffer to 10000 rebalancing will be skipped due to line 441.

status - fixed

Issue has been fixed and is no longer present in

Notes

n order for users to not be taken by surprise by the actions of administrators Symphony.owner and aveYield.governance should be timelocked contracts.					