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Description:
CometBFT is a Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) middleware that takes a state transition machine and replicates it on many machines. The mempool maintains two data structures to keep track of outstanding transactions: a list and a map.
These two data structures are supposed to be in sync all the time in the sense that the map tracks the index (if any) of the transaction in the list. In v0.37.0, and v0.37.1, as well as in v0.34.28, and all previous releases of the CometBFT repo2, it is possible to have them out of sync. When this happens, the list may contain several copies of the same transaction. Because the map tracks a single index, it is then no longer possible to remove all the copies of the transaction from the list. This happens even if the duplicated transaction is later committed in a block. The only way to remove the transaction is by restarting the node.
The above problem can be repeated on and on until a sizable number of transactions are stuck in the mempool, in order to try to bring down the target node. The problem is fixed in releases v0.34.29 and v0.37.2. Some workarounds are available. Increasing the value of cache_size in config.toml makes it very difficult to effectively attack a full node. Not exposing the transaction submission RPC's would mitigate the probability of a successful attack, as the attacker would then have to create a modified (byzantine) full node to be able to perform the attack via p2p.
Cross references:
No existing reports found with this module or alias.
See doc/triage.md for instructions on how to triage this report.
modules:
- module: github.com/cometbft/cometbft
vulnerable_at: 0.37.2
packages:
- package: cometbft
description: |-
CometBFT is a Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) middleware that takes a state
transition machine and replicates it on many machines. The mempool maintains two
data structures to keep track of outstanding transactions: a list and a map.
These two data structures are supposed to be in sync all the time in the sense
that the map tracks the index (if any) of the transaction in the list. In
`v0.37.0`, and `v0.37.1`, as well as in `v0.34.28`, and all previous releases of
the CometBFT repo2, it is possible to have them out of sync. When this happens,
the list may contain several copies of the same transaction. Because the map
tracks a single index, it is then no longer possible to remove all the copies of
the transaction from the list. This happens even if the duplicated transaction
is later committed in a block. The only way to remove the transaction is by
restarting the node.
The above problem can be repeated on and on until a sizable number of
transactions are stuck in the mempool, in order to try to bring down the target
node. The problem is fixed in releases `v0.34.29` and `v0.37.2`. Some
workarounds are available. Increasing the value of `cache_size` in `config.toml`
makes it very difficult to effectively attack a full node. Not exposing the
transaction submission RPC's would mitigate the probability of a successful
attack, as the attacker would then have to create a modified (byzantine) full
node to be able to perform the attack via p2p.
cves:
- CVE-2023-34451
references:
- advisory: https://github.com/cometbft/cometbft/security/advisories/GHSA-w24w-wp77-qffm
- fix: https://github.com/cometbft/cometbft/pull/890
- fix: https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/pull/2778
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered:
CVE-2023-34451 references github.com/cometbft/cometbft, which may be a Go module.
Description:
CometBFT is a Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) middleware that takes a state transition machine and replicates it on many machines. The mempool maintains two data structures to keep track of outstanding transactions: a list and a map.
These two data structures are supposed to be in sync all the time in the sense that the map tracks the index (if any) of the transaction in the list. In
v0.37.0
, andv0.37.1
, as well as inv0.34.28
, and all previous releases of the CometBFT repo2, it is possible to have them out of sync. When this happens, the list may contain several copies of the same transaction. Because the map tracks a single index, it is then no longer possible to remove all the copies of the transaction from the list. This happens even if the duplicated transaction is later committed in a block. The only way to remove the transaction is by restarting the node.The above problem can be repeated on and on until a sizable number of transactions are stuck in the mempool, in order to try to bring down the target node. The problem is fixed in releases
v0.34.29
andv0.37.2
. Some workarounds are available. Increasing the value ofcache_size
inconfig.toml
makes it very difficult to effectively attack a full node. Not exposing the transaction submission RPC's would mitigate the probability of a successful attack, as the attacker would then have to create a modified (byzantine) full node to be able to perform the attack via p2p.References:
Cross references:
No existing reports found with this module or alias.
See doc/triage.md for instructions on how to triage this report.
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: