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Return -ENOMEM from page_alloc() if there's not enough memory for shadow or origin. #2
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Fixed in some previous incarnation of 583dc56 |
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Currently we can crash perf record when running in pipe mode, like: $ perf record ls | perf report # To display the perf.data header info, please use --header/--header-only options. # perf: Segmentation fault Error: The - file has no samples! The callstack of the crash is: 0x0000000000515242 in perf_event__synthesize_event_update_name 3513 ev = event_update_event__new(len + 1, PERF_EVENT_UPDATE__NAME, evsel->id[0]); (gdb) bt #0 0x0000000000515242 in perf_event__synthesize_event_update_name #1 0x00000000005158a4 in perf_event__synthesize_extra_attr #2 0x0000000000443347 in record__synthesize #3 0x00000000004438e3 in __cmd_record #4 0x000000000044514e in cmd_record #5 0x00000000004cbc95 in run_builtin #6 0x00000000004cbf02 in handle_internal_command #7 0x00000000004cc054 in run_argv #8 0x00000000004cc422 in main The reason of the crash is that the evsel does not have ids array allocated and the pipe's synthesize code tries to access it. We don't force evsel ids allocation when we have single event, because it's not needed. However we need it when we are in pipe mode even for single event as a key for evsel update event. Fixing this by forcing evsel ids allocation event for single event, when we are in pipe mode. Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180302161354.30192-1-jolsa@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
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Kernel crashed when register a duplicate cache device, the call trace is bellow: [ 417.643790] CPU: 1 PID: 16886 Comm: bcache-register Tainted: G W OE 4.15.5-amd64-preempt-sysrq-20171018 #2 [ 417.643861] Hardware name: LENOVO 20ERCTO1WW/20ERCTO1WW, BIOS N1DET41W (1.15 ) 12/31/2015 [ 417.643870] RIP: 0010:bdevname+0x13/0x1e [ 417.643876] RSP: 0018:ffffa3aa9138fd38 EFLAGS: 00010282 [ 417.643884] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8c8f2f2f8000 RCX: ffffd6701f8 c7edf [ 417.643890] RDX: ffffa3aa9138fd88 RSI: ffffa3aa9138fd88 RDI: 00000000000 00000 [ 417.643895] RBP: ffffa3aa9138fde0 R08: ffffa3aa9138fae8 R09: 00000000000 1850e [ 417.643901] R10: ffff8c8eed34b271 R11: ffff8c8eed34b250 R12: 00000000000 00000 [ 417.643906] R13: ffffd6701f78f940 R14: ffff8c8f38f80000 R15: ffff8c8ea7d 90000 [ 417.643913] FS: 00007fde7e66f500(0000) GS:ffff8c8f61440000(0000) knlGS: 0000000000000000 [ 417.643919] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 417.643925] CR2: 0000000000000314 CR3: 00000007e6fa0001 CR4: 00000000003 606e0 [ 417.643931] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 00000000000 00000 [ 417.643938] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 00000000000 00400 [ 417.643946] Call Trace: [ 417.643978] register_bcache+0x1117/0x1270 [bcache] [ 417.643994] ? slab_pre_alloc_hook+0x15/0x3c [ 417.644001] ? slab_post_alloc_hook.isra.44+0xa/0x1a [ 417.644013] ? kernfs_fop_write+0xf6/0x138 [ 417.644020] kernfs_fop_write+0xf6/0x138 [ 417.644031] __vfs_write+0x31/0xcc [ 417.644043] ? current_kernel_time64+0x10/0x36 [ 417.644115] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xbf/0xe3 [ 417.644124] vfs_write+0xa5/0xe2 [ 417.644133] SyS_write+0x5c/0x9f [ 417.644144] do_syscall_64+0x72/0x81 [ 417.644161] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2 [ 417.644169] RIP: 0033:0x7fde7e1c1974 [ 417.644175] RSP: 002b:00007fff13009a38 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000 000000001 [ 417.644183] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000001658280 RCX: 00007fde7e1c 1974 [ 417.644188] RDX: 000000000000000a RSI: 0000000001658280 RDI: 000000000000 0001 [ 417.644193] RBP: 000000000000000a R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 000000000000 0077 [ 417.644198] R10: 000000000000089e R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000000 0001 [ 417.644203] R13: 000000000000000a R14: 7fffffffffffffff R15: 000000000000 0000 [ 417.644213] Code: c7 c2 83 6f ee 98 be 20 00 00 00 48 89 df e8 6c 27 3b 0 0 48 89 d8 5b c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 8b 47 70 48 89 f2 48 8b bf 80 00 00 00 <8 b> b0 14 03 00 00 e9 73 ff ff ff 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 8b 47 40 39 [ 417.644302] RIP: bdevname+0x13/0x1e RSP: ffffa3aa9138fd38 [ 417.644306] CR2: 0000000000000314 When registering duplicate cache device in register_cache(), after failure on calling register_cache_set(), bch_cache_release() will be called, then bdev will be freed, so bdevname(bdev, name) caused kernel crash. Since bch_cache_release() will free bdev, so in this patch we make sure bdev being freed if register_cache() fail, and do not free bdev again in register_bcache() when register_cache() fail. Signed-off-by: Tang Junhui <tang.junhui@zte.com.cn> Reported-by: Marc MERLIN <marc@merlins.org> Tested-by: Michael Lyle <mlyle@lyle.org> Reviewed-by: Michael Lyle <mlyle@lyle.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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When using seg6 in encap mode, we call ipv6_dev_get_saddr() to set the source address of the outer IPv6 header, in case none was specified. Using skb->dev can lead to BUG() when it is in an inconsistent state. This patch uses the net_device attached to the skb's dst instead. [940807.667429] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 000000000000047c [940807.762427] IP: ipv6_dev_get_saddr+0x8b/0x1d0 [940807.815725] PGD 0 P4D 0 [940807.847173] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [940807.890073] Modules linked in: [940807.927765] CPU: 6 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/6 Tainted: G W 4.16.0-rc1-seg6bpf+ #2 [940808.028988] Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL120 G6/ProLiant DL120 G6, BIOS O26 09/06/2010 [940808.128128] RIP: 0010:ipv6_dev_get_saddr+0x8b/0x1d0 [940808.187667] RSP: 0018:ffff88043fd836b0 EFLAGS: 00010206 [940808.251366] RAX: 0000000000000005 RBX: ffff88042cb1c860 RCX: 00000000000000fe [940808.338025] RDX: 00000000000002c0 RSI: ffff88042cb1c860 RDI: 0000000000004500 [940808.424683] RBP: ffff88043fd83740 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffffffffffff [940808.511342] R10: 0000000000000040 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88042cb1c850 [940808.598012] R13: ffffffff8208e380 R14: ffff88042ac8da00 R15: 0000000000000002 [940808.684675] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88043fd80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [940808.783036] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [940808.852975] CR2: 000000000000047c CR3: 00000004255fe000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 [940808.939634] Call Trace: [940808.970041] <IRQ> [940808.995250] ? ip6t_do_table+0x265/0x640 [940809.043341] seg6_do_srh_encap+0x28f/0x300 [940809.093516] ? seg6_do_srh+0x1a0/0x210 [940809.139528] seg6_do_srh+0x1a0/0x210 [940809.183462] seg6_output+0x28/0x1e0 [940809.226358] lwtunnel_output+0x3f/0x70 [940809.272370] ip6_xmit+0x2b8/0x530 [940809.313185] ? ac6_proc_exit+0x20/0x20 [940809.359197] inet6_csk_xmit+0x7d/0xc0 [940809.404173] tcp_transmit_skb+0x548/0x9a0 [940809.453304] __tcp_retransmit_skb+0x1a8/0x7a0 [940809.506603] ? ip6_default_advmss+0x40/0x40 [940809.557824] ? tcp_current_mss+0x24/0x90 [940809.605925] tcp_retransmit_skb+0xd/0x80 [940809.654016] tcp_xmit_retransmit_queue.part.17+0xf9/0x210 [940809.719797] tcp_ack+0xa47/0x1110 [940809.760612] tcp_rcv_established+0x13c/0x570 [940809.812865] tcp_v6_do_rcv+0x151/0x3d0 [940809.858879] tcp_v6_rcv+0xa5c/0xb10 [940809.901770] ? seg6_output+0xdd/0x1e0 [940809.946745] ip6_input_finish+0xbb/0x460 [940809.994837] ip6_input+0x74/0x80 [940810.034612] ? ip6_rcv_finish+0xb0/0xb0 [940810.081663] ipv6_rcv+0x31c/0x4c0 ... Fixes: 6c8702c ("ipv6: sr: add support for SRH encapsulation and injection with lwtunnels") Reported-by: Tom Herbert <tom@quantonium.net> Signed-off-by: David Lebrun <dlebrun@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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syzbot reported a LOCKDEP splat [1] in rt6_age_examine_exception() rt6_age_examine_exception() is called while rt6_exception_lock is held. This lock is the lower one in the lock hierarchy, thus we can not call dst_neigh_lookup() function, as it can fallback to neigh_create() We should instead do a pure RCU lookup. As a bonus we avoid a pair of atomic operations on neigh refcount. [1] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 4.16.0-rc4+ #277 Not tainted syz-executor7/4015 is trying to acquire lock: (&ndev->lock){++--}, at: [<00000000416dce19>] __ipv6_dev_mc_dec+0x45/0x350 net/ipv6/mcast.c:928 but task is already holding lock: (&tbl->lock){++-.}, at: [<00000000b5cb1d65>] neigh_ifdown+0x3d/0x250 net/core/neighbour.c:292 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #3 (&tbl->lock){++-.}: __raw_write_lock_bh include/linux/rwlock_api_smp.h:203 [inline] _raw_write_lock_bh+0x31/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:312 __neigh_create+0x87e/0x1d90 net/core/neighbour.c:528 neigh_create include/net/neighbour.h:315 [inline] ip6_neigh_lookup+0x9a7/0xba0 net/ipv6/route.c:228 dst_neigh_lookup include/net/dst.h:405 [inline] rt6_age_examine_exception net/ipv6/route.c:1609 [inline] rt6_age_exceptions+0x381/0x660 net/ipv6/route.c:1645 fib6_age+0xfb/0x140 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2033 fib6_clean_node+0x389/0x580 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1919 fib6_walk_continue+0x46c/0x8a0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1845 fib6_walk+0x91/0xf0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1893 fib6_clean_tree+0x1e6/0x340 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1970 __fib6_clean_all+0x1f4/0x3a0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1986 fib6_clean_all net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1997 [inline] fib6_run_gc+0x16b/0x3c0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2053 ndisc_netdev_event+0x3c2/0x4a0 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:1781 notifier_call_chain+0x136/0x2c0 kernel/notifier.c:93 __raw_notifier_call_chain kernel/notifier.c:394 [inline] raw_notifier_call_chain+0x2d/0x40 kernel/notifier.c:401 call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0x32/0x70 net/core/dev.c:1707 call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:1725 [inline] __dev_notify_flags+0x262/0x430 net/core/dev.c:6960 dev_change_flags+0xf5/0x140 net/core/dev.c:6994 devinet_ioctl+0x126a/0x1ac0 net/ipv4/devinet.c:1080 inet_ioctl+0x184/0x310 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:919 sock_do_ioctl+0xef/0x390 net/socket.c:957 sock_ioctl+0x36b/0x610 net/socket.c:1081 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:46 [inline] do_vfs_ioctl+0x1b1/0x1520 fs/ioctl.c:686 SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:701 [inline] SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xc0 fs/ioctl.c:692 do_syscall_64+0x281/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 -> #2 (rt6_exception_lock){+.-.}: __raw_spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:135 [inline] _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x31/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:168 spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:315 [inline] rt6_flush_exceptions+0x21/0x210 net/ipv6/route.c:1367 fib6_del_route net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1677 [inline] fib6_del+0x624/0x12c0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1761 __ip6_del_rt+0xc7/0x120 net/ipv6/route.c:2980 ip6_del_rt+0x132/0x1a0 net/ipv6/route.c:2993 __ipv6_dev_ac_dec+0x3b1/0x600 net/ipv6/anycast.c:332 ipv6_dev_ac_dec net/ipv6/anycast.c:345 [inline] ipv6_sock_ac_close+0x2b4/0x3e0 net/ipv6/anycast.c:200 inet6_release+0x48/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:433 sock_release+0x8d/0x1e0 net/socket.c:594 sock_close+0x16/0x20 net/socket.c:1149 __fput+0x327/0x7e0 fs/file_table.c:209 ____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:243 task_work_run+0x199/0x270 kernel/task_work.c:113 exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:22 [inline] do_exit+0x9bb/0x1ad0 kernel/exit.c:865 do_group_exit+0x149/0x400 kernel/exit.c:968 get_signal+0x73a/0x16d0 kernel/signal.c:2469 do_signal+0x90/0x1e90 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:809 exit_to_usermode_loop+0x258/0x2f0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:162 prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:196 [inline] syscall_return_slowpath arch/x86/entry/common.c:265 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x6ec/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:292 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 -> #1 (&(&tb->tb6_lock)->rlock){+.-.}: __raw_spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:135 [inline] _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x31/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:168 spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:315 [inline] __ip6_ins_rt+0x56/0x90 net/ipv6/route.c:1007 ip6_route_add+0x141/0x190 net/ipv6/route.c:2955 addrconf_prefix_route+0x44f/0x620 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:2359 fixup_permanent_addr net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3368 [inline] addrconf_permanent_addr net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3391 [inline] addrconf_notify+0x1ad2/0x2310 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3460 notifier_call_chain+0x136/0x2c0 kernel/notifier.c:93 __raw_notifier_call_chain kernel/notifier.c:394 [inline] raw_notifier_call_chain+0x2d/0x40 kernel/notifier.c:401 call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0x32/0x70 net/core/dev.c:1707 call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:1725 [inline] __dev_notify_flags+0x15d/0x430 net/core/dev.c:6958 dev_change_flags+0xf5/0x140 net/core/dev.c:6994 do_setlink+0xa22/0x3bb0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:2357 rtnl_newlink+0xf37/0x1a50 net/core/rtnetlink.c:2965 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x57f/0xb10 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4641 netlink_rcv_skb+0x14b/0x380 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2444 rtnetlink_rcv+0x1c/0x20 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4659 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1308 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x4c4/0x6b0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1334 netlink_sendmsg+0xa4a/0xe60 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1897 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:639 ___sys_sendmsg+0x767/0x8b0 net/socket.c:2047 __sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x210 net/socket.c:2081 SYSC_sendmsg net/socket.c:2092 [inline] SyS_sendmsg+0x2d/0x50 net/socket.c:2088 do_syscall_64+0x281/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 -> #0 (&ndev->lock){++--}: lock_acquire+0x1d5/0x580 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3920 __raw_write_lock_bh include/linux/rwlock_api_smp.h:203 [inline] _raw_write_lock_bh+0x31/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:312 __ipv6_dev_mc_dec+0x45/0x350 net/ipv6/mcast.c:928 ipv6_dev_mc_dec+0x110/0x1f0 net/ipv6/mcast.c:961 pndisc_destructor+0x21a/0x340 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:392 pneigh_ifdown net/core/neighbour.c:695 [inline] neigh_ifdown+0x149/0x250 net/core/neighbour.c:294 rt6_disable_ip+0x537/0x700 net/ipv6/route.c:3874 addrconf_ifdown+0x14b/0x14f0 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3633 addrconf_notify+0x5f8/0x2310 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3557 notifier_call_chain+0x136/0x2c0 kernel/notifier.c:93 __raw_notifier_call_chain kernel/notifier.c:394 [inline] raw_notifier_call_chain+0x2d/0x40 kernel/notifier.c:401 call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0x32/0x70 net/core/dev.c:1707 call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:1725 [inline] __dev_notify_flags+0x262/0x430 net/core/dev.c:6960 dev_change_flags+0xf5/0x140 net/core/dev.c:6994 devinet_ioctl+0x126a/0x1ac0 net/ipv4/devinet.c:1080 inet_ioctl+0x184/0x310 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:919 packet_ioctl+0x1ff/0x310 net/packet/af_packet.c:4066 sock_do_ioctl+0xef/0x390 net/socket.c:957 sock_ioctl+0x36b/0x610 net/socket.c:1081 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:46 [inline] do_vfs_ioctl+0x1b1/0x1520 fs/ioctl.c:686 SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:701 [inline] SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xc0 fs/ioctl.c:692 do_syscall_64+0x281/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &ndev->lock --> rt6_exception_lock --> &tbl->lock Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&tbl->lock); lock(rt6_exception_lock); lock(&tbl->lock); lock(&ndev->lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 2 locks held by syz-executor7/4015: #0: (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000a2f16daa>] rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20 net/core/rtnetlink.c:74 #1: (&tbl->lock){++-.}, at: [<00000000b5cb1d65>] neigh_ifdown+0x3d/0x250 net/core/neighbour.c:292 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 4015 Comm: syz-executor7 Not tainted 4.16.0-rc4+ #277 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0x194/0x24d lib/dump_stack.c:53 print_circular_bug.isra.38+0x2cd/0x2dc kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1223 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1863 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1976 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2417 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x30a8/0x3e00 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3431 lock_acquire+0x1d5/0x580 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3920 __raw_write_lock_bh include/linux/rwlock_api_smp.h:203 [inline] _raw_write_lock_bh+0x31/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:312 __ipv6_dev_mc_dec+0x45/0x350 net/ipv6/mcast.c:928 ipv6_dev_mc_dec+0x110/0x1f0 net/ipv6/mcast.c:961 pndisc_destructor+0x21a/0x340 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:392 pneigh_ifdown net/core/neighbour.c:695 [inline] neigh_ifdown+0x149/0x250 net/core/neighbour.c:294 rt6_disable_ip+0x537/0x700 net/ipv6/route.c:3874 addrconf_ifdown+0x14b/0x14f0 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3633 addrconf_notify+0x5f8/0x2310 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3557 notifier_call_chain+0x136/0x2c0 kernel/notifier.c:93 __raw_notifier_call_chain kernel/notifier.c:394 [inline] raw_notifier_call_chain+0x2d/0x40 kernel/notifier.c:401 call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0x32/0x70 net/core/dev.c:1707 call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:1725 [inline] __dev_notify_flags+0x262/0x430 net/core/dev.c:6960 dev_change_flags+0xf5/0x140 net/core/dev.c:6994 devinet_ioctl+0x126a/0x1ac0 net/ipv4/devinet.c:1080 inet_ioctl+0x184/0x310 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:919 packet_ioctl+0x1ff/0x310 net/packet/af_packet.c:4066 sock_do_ioctl+0xef/0x390 net/socket.c:957 sock_ioctl+0x36b/0x610 net/socket.c:1081 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:46 [inline] do_vfs_ioctl+0x1b1/0x1520 fs/ioctl.c:686 SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:701 [inline] SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xc0 fs/ioctl.c:692 do_syscall_64+0x281/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 Fixes: c757faa ("ipv6: prepare fib6_age() for exception table") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com> Cc: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Acked-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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May 16, 2018
Some HP laptops have only a single wifi antenna. This would not be a problem except that they were shipped with an incorrectly encoded EFUSE. It should have been possible to open the computer and transfer the antenna connection to the other terminal except that such action might void the warranty, and moving the antenna broke the Windows driver. The fix was to add a module option that would override the EFUSE encoding. That was done with commit c18d8f5 ("rtlwifi: rtl8723be: Add antenna select module parameter"). There was still a problem with Bluetooth coexistence, which was addressed with commit baa1702 ("rtlwifi: btcoexist: Implement antenna selection"). There were still problems, thus there were commit 0ff78ad ("rtlwifi: rtl8723be: fix ant_sel code") and commit 6d62269 ("rtlwifi: btcoexist: Fix antenna selection code"). Despite all these attempts at fixing the problem, the code is not yet right. A proper fix is important as there are now instances of laptops having RTL8723DE chips with the same problem. The module parameter ant_sel is used to control antenna number and path. At present enum ANT_{X2,X1} is used to define the antenna number, but this choice is not intuitive, thus change to a new enum ANT_{MAIN,AUX} to make it more readable. This change showed examples where incorrect values were used. It was also possible to remove a workaround in halbtcoutsrc.c. The experimental results with single antenna connected to specific path are now as follows: ant_sel ANT_MAIN(#1) ANT_AUX(#2) 0 -8 -62 1 -62 -10 2 -6 -60 Signed-off-by: Ping-Ke Shih <pkshih@realtek.com> Fixes: c18d8f5 ("rtlwifi: rtl8723be: Add antenna select module parameter") Fixes: baa1702 ("rtlwifi: btcoexist: Implement antenna selection") Fixes: 0ff78ad ("rtlwifi: rtl8723be: fix ant_sel code") Fixes: 6d62269 ("rtlwifi: btcoexist: Fix antenna selection code") Cc: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.7+ Reviewed-by: Larry Finger <Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net> Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
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May 16, 2018
syzbot caught an infinite recursion in nsh_gso_segment(). Problem here is that we need to make sure the NSH header is of reasonable length. BUG: MAX_LOCK_DEPTH too low! turning off the locking correctness validator. depth: 48 max: 48! 48 locks held by syz-executor0/10189: #0: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x30f/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3517 #1: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #1: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #2: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #2: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #3: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #3: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #4: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #4: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #5: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #5: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #6: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #6: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #7: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #7: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #8: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #8: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #9: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #9: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #10: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #10: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #11: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #11: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #12: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #12: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #13: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #13: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #14: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #14: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #15: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #15: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #16: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #16: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #17: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #17: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #18: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #18: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #19: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #19: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #20: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #20: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #21: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #21: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #22: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #22: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #23: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #23: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #24: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #24: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #25: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #25: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #26: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #26: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #27: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #27: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #28: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #28: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #29: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #29: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #30: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #30: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #31: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #31: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 dccp_close: ABORT with 65423 bytes unread #32: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #32: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #33: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #33: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #34: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #34: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #35: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #35: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #36: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #36: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #37: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #37: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #38: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #38: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #39: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #39: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #40: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #40: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #41: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #41: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #42: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #42: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #43: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #43: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #44: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #44: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #45: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #45: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #46: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #46: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #47: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #47: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 INFO: lockdep is turned off. CPU: 1 PID: 10189 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc2+ #26 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x1b9/0x294 lib/dump_stack.c:113 __lock_acquire+0x1788/0x5140 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3449 lock_acquire+0x1dc/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3920 rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:246 [inline] rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:632 [inline] skb_mac_gso_segment+0x25b/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2789 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 __skb_gso_segment+0x3bb/0x870 net/core/dev.c:2865 skb_gso_segment include/linux/netdevice.h:4025 [inline] validate_xmit_skb+0x54d/0xd90 net/core/dev.c:3118 validate_xmit_skb_list+0xbf/0x120 net/core/dev.c:3168 sch_direct_xmit+0x354/0x11e0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:312 qdisc_restart net/sched/sch_generic.c:399 [inline] __qdisc_run+0x741/0x1af0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:410 __dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:3243 [inline] __dev_queue_xmit+0x28ea/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3551 dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3616 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2951 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x40f8/0x6070 net/packet/af_packet.c:2976 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x120 net/socket.c:639 __sys_sendto+0x3d7/0x670 net/socket.c:1789 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1801 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1797 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0xe1/0x1a0 net/socket.c:1797 do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Fixes: c411ed8 ("nsh: add GSO support") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Acked-by: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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…inux/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm KVM/arm fixes for 4.17, take #2 - Fix proxying of GICv2 CPU interface accesses - Fix crash when switching to BE - Track source vcpu git GICv2 SGIs - Fix an outdated bit of documentation
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May 16, 2018
Currently; we're grabbing all of the modesetting locks before adding MST connectors to fbdev. This isn't actually necessary, and causes a deadlock as well: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 4.17.0-rc3Lyude-Test+ #1 Tainted: G O ------------------------------------------------------ kworker/1:0/18 is trying to acquire lock: 00000000c832f62d (&helper->lock){+.+.}, at: drm_fb_helper_add_one_connector+0x2a/0x60 [drm_kms_helper] but task is already holding lock: 00000000942e28e2 (crtc_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}, at: drm_modeset_backoff+0x8e/0x1c0 [drm] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #3 (crtc_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}: ww_mutex_lock+0x43/0x80 drm_modeset_lock+0x71/0x130 [drm] drm_helper_probe_single_connector_modes+0x7d/0x6b0 [drm_kms_helper] drm_setup_crtcs+0x15e/0xc90 [drm_kms_helper] __drm_fb_helper_initial_config_and_unlock+0x29/0x480 [drm_kms_helper] nouveau_fbcon_init+0x138/0x1a0 [nouveau] nouveau_drm_load+0x173/0x7e0 [nouveau] drm_dev_register+0x134/0x1c0 [drm] drm_get_pci_dev+0x8e/0x160 [drm] nouveau_drm_probe+0x1a9/0x230 [nouveau] pci_device_probe+0xcd/0x150 driver_probe_device+0x30b/0x480 __driver_attach+0xbc/0xe0 bus_for_each_dev+0x67/0x90 bus_add_driver+0x164/0x260 driver_register+0x57/0xc0 do_one_initcall+0x4d/0x323 do_init_module+0x5b/0x1f8 load_module+0x20e5/0x2ac0 __do_sys_finit_module+0xb7/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x60/0x1b0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe -> #2 (crtc_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}: drm_helper_probe_single_connector_modes+0x58/0x6b0 [drm_kms_helper] drm_setup_crtcs+0x15e/0xc90 [drm_kms_helper] __drm_fb_helper_initial_config_and_unlock+0x29/0x480 [drm_kms_helper] nouveau_fbcon_init+0x138/0x1a0 [nouveau] nouveau_drm_load+0x173/0x7e0 [nouveau] drm_dev_register+0x134/0x1c0 [drm] drm_get_pci_dev+0x8e/0x160 [drm] nouveau_drm_probe+0x1a9/0x230 [nouveau] pci_device_probe+0xcd/0x150 driver_probe_device+0x30b/0x480 __driver_attach+0xbc/0xe0 bus_for_each_dev+0x67/0x90 bus_add_driver+0x164/0x260 driver_register+0x57/0xc0 do_one_initcall+0x4d/0x323 do_init_module+0x5b/0x1f8 load_module+0x20e5/0x2ac0 __do_sys_finit_module+0xb7/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x60/0x1b0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe -> #1 (&dev->mode_config.mutex){+.+.}: drm_setup_crtcs+0x10c/0xc90 [drm_kms_helper] __drm_fb_helper_initial_config_and_unlock+0x29/0x480 [drm_kms_helper] nouveau_fbcon_init+0x138/0x1a0 [nouveau] nouveau_drm_load+0x173/0x7e0 [nouveau] drm_dev_register+0x134/0x1c0 [drm] drm_get_pci_dev+0x8e/0x160 [drm] nouveau_drm_probe+0x1a9/0x230 [nouveau] pci_device_probe+0xcd/0x150 driver_probe_device+0x30b/0x480 __driver_attach+0xbc/0xe0 bus_for_each_dev+0x67/0x90 bus_add_driver+0x164/0x260 driver_register+0x57/0xc0 do_one_initcall+0x4d/0x323 do_init_module+0x5b/0x1f8 load_module+0x20e5/0x2ac0 __do_sys_finit_module+0xb7/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x60/0x1b0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe -> #0 (&helper->lock){+.+.}: __mutex_lock+0x70/0x9d0 drm_fb_helper_add_one_connector+0x2a/0x60 [drm_kms_helper] nv50_mstm_register_connector+0x2c/0x50 [nouveau] drm_dp_add_port+0x2f5/0x420 [drm_kms_helper] drm_dp_send_link_address+0x155/0x1e0 [drm_kms_helper] drm_dp_add_port+0x33f/0x420 [drm_kms_helper] drm_dp_send_link_address+0x155/0x1e0 [drm_kms_helper] drm_dp_check_and_send_link_address+0x87/0xd0 [drm_kms_helper] drm_dp_mst_link_probe_work+0x4d/0x80 [drm_kms_helper] process_one_work+0x20d/0x650 worker_thread+0x3a/0x390 kthread+0x11e/0x140 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &helper->lock --> crtc_ww_class_acquire --> crtc_ww_class_mutex Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(crtc_ww_class_mutex); lock(crtc_ww_class_acquire); lock(crtc_ww_class_mutex); lock(&helper->lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 5 locks held by kworker/1:0/18: #0: 000000004a05cd50 ((wq_completion)"events_long"){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x187/0x650 #1: 00000000601c11d1 ((work_completion)(&mgr->work)){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x187/0x650 #2: 00000000586ca0df (&dev->mode_config.mutex){+.+.}, at: drm_modeset_lock_all+0x3a/0x1b0 [drm] #3: 00000000d3ca0ffa (crtc_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}, at: drm_modeset_lock_all+0x44/0x1b0 [drm] #4: 00000000942e28e2 (crtc_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}, at: drm_modeset_backoff+0x8e/0x1c0 [drm] stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 18 Comm: kworker/1:0 Tainted: G O 4.17.0-rc3Lyude-Test+ #1 Hardware name: Gateway FX6840/FX6840, BIOS P01-A3 05/17/2010 Workqueue: events_long drm_dp_mst_link_probe_work [drm_kms_helper] Call Trace: dump_stack+0x85/0xcb print_circular_bug.isra.38+0x1ce/0x1db __lock_acquire+0x128f/0x1350 ? lock_acquire+0x9f/0x200 ? lock_acquire+0x9f/0x200 ? __ww_mutex_lock.constprop.13+0x8f/0x1000 lock_acquire+0x9f/0x200 ? drm_fb_helper_add_one_connector+0x2a/0x60 [drm_kms_helper] ? drm_fb_helper_add_one_connector+0x2a/0x60 [drm_kms_helper] __mutex_lock+0x70/0x9d0 ? drm_fb_helper_add_one_connector+0x2a/0x60 [drm_kms_helper] ? ww_mutex_lock+0x43/0x80 ? _cond_resched+0x15/0x30 ? ww_mutex_lock+0x43/0x80 ? drm_modeset_lock+0xb2/0x130 [drm] ? drm_fb_helper_add_one_connector+0x2a/0x60 [drm_kms_helper] drm_fb_helper_add_one_connector+0x2a/0x60 [drm_kms_helper] nv50_mstm_register_connector+0x2c/0x50 [nouveau] drm_dp_add_port+0x2f5/0x420 [drm_kms_helper] ? mark_held_locks+0x50/0x80 ? kfree+0xcf/0x2a0 ? drm_dp_check_mstb_guid+0xd6/0x120 [drm_kms_helper] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0xed/0x180 ? drm_dp_check_mstb_guid+0xd6/0x120 [drm_kms_helper] drm_dp_send_link_address+0x155/0x1e0 [drm_kms_helper] drm_dp_add_port+0x33f/0x420 [drm_kms_helper] ? nouveau_connector_aux_xfer+0x7c/0xb0 [nouveau] ? find_held_lock+0x2d/0x90 ? drm_dp_dpcd_access+0xd9/0xf0 [drm_kms_helper] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x3b/0x280 ? drm_dp_dpcd_access+0xd9/0xf0 [drm_kms_helper] drm_dp_send_link_address+0x155/0x1e0 [drm_kms_helper] drm_dp_check_and_send_link_address+0x87/0xd0 [drm_kms_helper] drm_dp_mst_link_probe_work+0x4d/0x80 [drm_kms_helper] process_one_work+0x20d/0x650 worker_thread+0x3a/0x390 ? process_one_work+0x650/0x650 kthread+0x11e/0x140 ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x50/0x50 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 Taking example from i915, the only time we need to hold any modesetting locks is when changing the port on the mstc, and in that case we only need to hold the connection mutex. Signed-off-by: Lyude Paul <lyude@redhat.com> Cc: Karol Herbst <kherbst@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Lyude Paul <lyude@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Skeggs <bskeggs@redhat.com>
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Local clients are not properly synchronized on 32-bit CPUs when updating stats (3.10+). Now it is possible estimation_timer (timer), a stats reader, to interrupt the local client in the middle of write_seqcount_{begin,end} sequence leading to loop (DEADLOCK). The same interrupt can happen from received packet (SoftIRQ) which updates the same per-CPU stats. Fix it by disabling BH while updating stats. Found with debug: WARNING: inconsistent lock state 4.17.0-rc2-00105-g35cb6d7-dirty #2 Not tainted -------------------------------- inconsistent {IN-SOFTIRQ-R} -> {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} usage. ftp/2545 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE1:SE1] takes: 86845479 (&syncp->seq#6){+.+-}, at: ip_vs_schedule+0x1c5/0x59e [ip_vs] {IN-SOFTIRQ-R} state was registered at: lock_acquire+0x44/0x5b estimation_timer+0x1b3/0x341 [ip_vs] call_timer_fn+0x54/0xcd run_timer_softirq+0x10c/0x12b __do_softirq+0xc1/0x1a9 do_softirq_own_stack+0x1d/0x23 irq_exit+0x4a/0x64 smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x63/0x71 apic_timer_interrupt+0x3a/0x40 default_idle+0xa/0xc arch_cpu_idle+0x9/0xb default_idle_call+0x21/0x23 do_idle+0xa0/0x167 cpu_startup_entry+0x19/0x1b start_secondary+0x133/0x182 startup_32_smp+0x164/0x168 irq event stamp: 42213 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&syncp->seq#6); <Interrupt> lock(&syncp->seq#6); *** DEADLOCK *** Fixes: ac69269 ("ipvs: do not disable bh for long time") Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg> Acked-by: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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The handling of CB.CallBack messages sent by the fileserver to the client is broken in that they are currently being processed after the reply has been transmitted. This is not what the fileserver expects, however. It holds up change visibility until the reply comes so as to maintain cache coherency, and so expects the client to have to refetch the state on the affected files. Fix CB.CallBack handling to perform the callback break before sending the reply. The fileserver is free to hold up status fetches issued by other threads on the same client that occur in reponse to the callback until any pending changes have been committed. Fixes: d001648 ("rxrpc: Don't expose skbs to in-kernel users [ver #2]") Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Petr Machata says: ==================== net: ip6_gre: Fixes in headroom handling This series mends some problems in headroom management in ip6_gre module. The current code base has the following three closely-related problems: - ip6gretap tunnels neglect to ensure there's enough writable headroom before pushing GRE headers. - ip6erspan does this, but assumes that dev->needed_headroom is primed. But that doesn't happen until ip6_tnl_xmit() is called later. Thus for the first packet, ip6erspan actually behaves like ip6gretap above. - ip6erspan shares some of the code with ip6gretap, including calculations of needed header length. While there is custom ERSPAN-specific code for calculating the headroom, the computed values are overwritten by the ip6gretap code. The first two issues lead to a kernel panic in situations where a packet is mirrored from a veth device to the device in question. They are fixed, respectively, in patches #1 and #2, which include the full panic trace and a reproducer. The rest of the patchset deals with the last issue. In patches #3 to #6, several functions are split up into reusable parts. Finally in patch #7 these blocks are used to compose ERSPAN-specific callbacks where necessary to fix the hlen calculation. ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Add a test which shows a race in the multi-order iteration code. This test reliably hits the race in under a second on my machine, and is the result of a real bug report against kernel a production v4.15 based kernel (4.15.6-300.fc27.x86_64). With a real kernel this issue is hit when using order 9 PMD DAX radix tree entries. The race has to do with how we tear down multi-order sibling entries when we are removing an item from the tree. Remember that an order 2 entry looks like this: struct radix_tree_node.slots[] = [entry][sibling][sibling][sibling] where 'entry' is in some slot in the struct radix_tree_node, and the three slots following 'entry' contain sibling pointers which point back to 'entry.' When we delete 'entry' from the tree, we call : radix_tree_delete() radix_tree_delete_item() __radix_tree_delete() replace_slot() replace_slot() first removes the siblings in order from the first to the last, then at then replaces 'entry' with NULL. This means that for a brief period of time we end up with one or more of the siblings removed, so: struct radix_tree_node.slots[] = [entry][NULL][sibling][sibling] This causes an issue if you have a reader iterating over the slots in the tree via radix_tree_for_each_slot() while only under rcu_read_lock()/rcu_read_unlock() protection. This is a common case in mm/filemap.c. The issue is that when __radix_tree_next_slot() => skip_siblings() tries to skip over the sibling entries in the slots, it currently does so with an exact match on the slot directly preceding our current slot. Normally this works: V preceding slot struct radix_tree_node.slots[] = [entry][sibling][sibling][sibling] ^ current slot This lets you find the first sibling, and you skip them all in order. But in the case where one of the siblings is NULL, that slot is skipped and then our sibling detection is interrupted: V preceding slot struct radix_tree_node.slots[] = [entry][NULL][sibling][sibling] ^ current slot This means that the sibling pointers aren't recognized since they point all the way back to 'entry', so we think that they are normal internal radix tree pointers. This causes us to think we need to walk down to a struct radix_tree_node starting at the address of 'entry'. In a real running kernel this will crash the thread with a GP fault when you try and dereference the slots in your broken node starting at 'entry'. In the radix tree test suite this will be caught by the address sanitizer: ==27063==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60c0008ae400 at pc 0x00000040ce4f bp 0x7fa89b8fcad0 sp 0x7fa89b8fcac0 READ of size 8 at 0x60c0008ae400 thread T3 #0 0x40ce4e in __radix_tree_next_slot /home/rzwisler/project/linux/tools/testing/radix-tree/radix-tree.c:1660 #1 0x4022cc in radix_tree_next_slot linux/../../../../include/linux/radix-tree.h:567 #2 0x4022cc in iterator_func /home/rzwisler/project/linux/tools/testing/radix-tree/multiorder.c:655 #3 0x7fa8a088d50a in start_thread (/lib64/libpthread.so.0+0x750a) #4 0x7fa8a03bd16e in clone (/lib64/libc.so.6+0xf516e) Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180503192430.7582-5-ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: CR, Sapthagirish <sapthagirish.cr@intel.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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…ring #2 memory-barriers.txt has been updated with the following requirement. "When using writel(), a prior wmb() is not needed to guarantee that the cache coherent memory writes have completed before writing to the MMIO region." Current writeX() and iowriteX() implementations on alpha are not satisfying this requirement as the barrier is after the register write. Move mb() in writeX() and iowriteX() functions to guarantee that HW observes memory changes before performing register operations. Signed-off-by: Sinan Kaya <okaya@codeaurora.org> Reported-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
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…/git/mattst88/alpha Pull alpha fixes from Matt Turner: "A few small changes for alpha" * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mattst88/alpha: alpha: io: reorder barriers to guarantee writeX() and iowriteX() ordering #2 alpha: simplify get_arch_dma_ops alpha: use dma_direct_ops for jensen
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Calling XDP redirection requires bh disabled. Softirq can call another XDP function and redirection functions, then the percpu static variable ri->map can be overwritten to NULL. This is a generic XDP case called from tun. [ 3535.736058] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000018 [ 3535.743974] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 3535.746530] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [ 3535.750049] Modules linked in: vhost_net vhost tap tun bridge stp llc ebtable_filter ebtables ip6table_filter ip6_tables iptable_filter sunrpc vfat fat ext4 mbcache jbd2 intel_rapl skx_edac nfit libnvdimm x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp coretemp kvm_intel kvm ipmi_ssif irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel pcbc ses aesni_intel crypto_simd cryptd enclosure hpwdt hpilo glue_helper ipmi_si pcspkr wmi mei_me ioatdma mei ipmi_devintf shpchp dca ipmi_msghandler lpc_ich acpi_power_meter sch_fq_codel ip_tables xfs libcrc32c sd_mod mgag200 i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops ttm drm smartpqi i40e crc32c_intel scsi_transport_sas tg3 i2c_core ptp pps_core [ 3535.813456] CPU: 5 PID: 1630 Comm: vhost-1614 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc4 #2 [ 3535.820127] Hardware name: HPE ProLiant DL360 Gen10/ProLiant DL360 Gen10, BIOS U32 11/14/2017 [ 3535.828732] RIP: 0010:__xdp_map_lookup_elem+0x5/0x30 [ 3535.833740] RSP: 0018:ffffb4bc47bf7c58 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 3535.839009] RAX: ffff9fdfcfea1c40 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff9fdf27fe3100 [ 3535.846205] RDX: ffff9fdfca769200 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 3535.853402] RBP: ffffb4bc491d9000 R08: 00000000000045ad R09: 0000000000000ec0 [ 3535.860597] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffff9fdf26c3ce4e R12: ffff9fdf9e72c000 [ 3535.867794] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: fffffffffffffff2 R15: ffff9fdfc82cdd00 [ 3535.874990] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9fdfcfe80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 3535.883152] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 3535.888948] CR2: 0000000000000018 CR3: 0000000bde724004 CR4: 00000000007626e0 [ 3535.896145] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 3535.903342] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 3535.910538] PKRU: 55555554 [ 3535.913267] Call Trace: [ 3535.915736] xdp_do_generic_redirect+0x7a/0x310 [ 3535.920310] do_xdp_generic.part.117+0x285/0x370 [ 3535.924970] tun_get_user+0x5b9/0x1260 [tun] [ 3535.929279] tun_sendmsg+0x52/0x70 [tun] [ 3535.933237] handle_tx+0x2ad/0x5f0 [vhost_net] [ 3535.937721] vhost_worker+0xa5/0x100 [vhost] [ 3535.942030] kthread+0xf5/0x130 [ 3535.945198] ? vhost_dev_ioctl+0x3b0/0x3b0 [vhost] [ 3535.950031] ? kthread_bind+0x10/0x10 [ 3535.953727] ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 [ 3535.957334] Code: 0e 74 15 83 f8 10 75 05 e9 49 aa b3 ff f3 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 f3 c3 e9 29 9d b3 ff 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 <8b> 47 18 83 f8 0e 74 0d 83 f8 10 75 05 e9 49 a9 b3 ff 31 c0 c3 [ 3535.976387] RIP: __xdp_map_lookup_elem+0x5/0x30 RSP: ffffb4bc47bf7c58 [ 3535.982883] CR2: 0000000000000018 [ 3535.987096] ---[ end trace 383b299dd1430240 ]--- [ 3536.131325] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception [ 3536.137484] Kernel Offset: 0x26a00000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff) [ 3536.281406] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception ]--- And a kernel with generic case fixed still panics in tun driver XDP redirect, because it disabled only preemption, but not bh. [ 2055.128746] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000018 [ 2055.136662] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 2055.139219] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [ 2055.142736] Modules linked in: vhost_net vhost tap tun bridge stp llc ebtable_filter ebtables ip6table_filter ip6_tables iptable_filter sunrpc vfat fat ext4 mbcache jbd2 intel_rapl skx_edac nfit libnvdimm x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp coretemp kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel pcbc ses aesni_intel ipmi_ssif crypto_simd enclosure cryptd hpwdt glue_helper ioatdma hpilo wmi dca pcspkr ipmi_si acpi_power_meter ipmi_devintf shpchp mei_me ipmi_msghandler mei lpc_ich sch_fq_codel ip_tables xfs libcrc32c sd_mod mgag200 i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops ttm drm i40e smartpqi tg3 scsi_transport_sas crc32c_intel i2c_core ptp pps_core [ 2055.206142] CPU: 6 PID: 1693 Comm: vhost-1683 Tainted: G W 4.17.0-rc5-fix-tun+ #1 [ 2055.215011] Hardware name: HPE ProLiant DL360 Gen10/ProLiant DL360 Gen10, BIOS U32 11/14/2017 [ 2055.223617] RIP: 0010:__xdp_map_lookup_elem+0x5/0x30 [ 2055.228624] RSP: 0018:ffff998b07607cc0 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 2055.233892] RAX: ffff8dbd8e235700 RBX: ffff8dbd8ff21c40 RCX: 0000000000000004 [ 2055.241089] RDX: ffff998b097a9000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 2055.248286] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 00000000000065a8 R09: 0000000000005d80 [ 2055.255483] R10: 0000000000000040 R11: ffff8dbcf0100000 R12: ffff998b097a9000 [ 2055.262681] R13: ffff8dbd8c98c000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff998b07607d78 [ 2055.269879] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8dbd8ff00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 2055.278039] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 2055.283834] CR2: 0000000000000018 CR3: 0000000c0c8cc005 CR4: 00000000007626e0 [ 2055.291030] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 2055.298227] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 2055.305424] PKRU: 55555554 [ 2055.308153] Call Trace: [ 2055.310624] xdp_do_redirect+0x7b/0x380 [ 2055.314499] tun_get_user+0x10fe/0x12a0 [tun] [ 2055.318895] tun_sendmsg+0x52/0x70 [tun] [ 2055.322852] handle_tx+0x2ad/0x5f0 [vhost_net] [ 2055.327337] vhost_worker+0xa5/0x100 [vhost] [ 2055.331646] kthread+0xf5/0x130 [ 2055.334813] ? vhost_dev_ioctl+0x3b0/0x3b0 [vhost] [ 2055.339646] ? kthread_bind+0x10/0x10 [ 2055.343343] ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 [ 2055.346950] Code: 0e 74 15 83 f8 10 75 05 e9 e9 aa b3 ff f3 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 f3 c3 e9 c9 9d b3 ff 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 <8b> 47 18 83 f8 0e 74 0d 83 f8 10 75 05 e9 e9 a9 b3 ff 31 c0 c3 [ 2055.366004] RIP: __xdp_map_lookup_elem+0x5/0x30 RSP: ffff998b07607cc0 [ 2055.372500] CR2: 0000000000000018 [ 2055.375856] ---[ end trace 2a2dcc5e9e174268 ]--- [ 2055.523626] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception [ 2055.529796] Kernel Offset: 0x2e000000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff) [ 2055.677539] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception ]--- v2: - Removed preempt_disable/enable since local_bh_disable will prevent preemption as well, feedback from Jason Wang. Fixes: 761876c ("tap: XDP support") Signed-off-by: Toshiaki Makita <makita.toshiaki@lab.ntt.co.jp> Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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The dw_hdmi_setup_rx_sense exported function should not use struct device to recover the dw-hdmi context using drvdata, but take struct dw_hdmi directly like other exported functions. This caused a regression using Meson DRM on S905X since v4.17-rc1 : Internal error: Oops: 96000007 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [...] CPU: 0 PID: 124 Comm: irq/32-dw_hdmi_ Not tainted 4.17.0-rc7 #2 Hardware name: Libre Technology CC (DT) [...] pc : osq_lock+0x54/0x188 lr : __mutex_lock.isra.0+0x74/0x530 [...] Process irq/32-dw_hdmi_ (pid: 124, stack limit = 0x00000000adf418cb) Call trace: osq_lock+0x54/0x188 __mutex_lock_slowpath+0x10/0x18 mutex_lock+0x30/0x38 __dw_hdmi_setup_rx_sense+0x28/0x98 dw_hdmi_setup_rx_sense+0x10/0x18 dw_hdmi_top_thread_irq+0x2c/0x50 irq_thread_fn+0x28/0x68 irq_thread+0x10c/0x1a0 kthread+0x128/0x130 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 Code: 34000964 d00050a2 51000484 9135c042 (f864d844) ---[ end trace 945641e1fbbc07da ]--- note: irq/32-dw_hdmi_[124] exited with preempt_count 1 genirq: exiting task "irq/32-dw_hdmi_" (124) is an active IRQ thread (irq 32) Fixes: eea034a ("drm/bridge/synopsys: dw-hdmi: don't clobber drvdata") Signed-off-by: Neil Armstrong <narmstrong@baylibre.com> Tested-by: Koen Kooi <koen@dominion.thruhere.net> Signed-off-by: Sean Paul <seanpaul@chromium.org> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/1527673438-20643-1-git-send-email-narmstrong@baylibre.com
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The current MIPS implementation of arch_trigger_cpumask_backtrace() is broken because it attempts to use synchronous IPIs despite the fact that it may be run with interrupts disabled. This means that when arch_trigger_cpumask_backtrace() is invoked, for example by the RCU CPU stall watchdog, we may: - Deadlock due to use of synchronous IPIs with interrupts disabled, causing the CPU that's attempting to generate the backtrace output to hang itself. - Not succeed in generating the desired output from remote CPUs. - Produce warnings about this from smp_call_function_many(), for example: [42760.526910] INFO: rcu_sched detected stalls on CPUs/tasks: [42760.535755] 0-...!: (1 GPs behind) idle=ade/140000000000000/0 softirq=526944/526945 fqs=0 [42760.547874] 1-...!: (0 ticks this GP) idle=e4a/140000000000000/0 softirq=547885/547885 fqs=0 [42760.559869] (detected by 2, t=2162 jiffies, g=266689, c=266688, q=33) [42760.568927] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [42760.576146] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 1216 at kernel/smp.c:416 smp_call_function_many+0x88/0x20c [42760.587839] Modules linked in: [42760.593152] CPU: 2 PID: 1216 Comm: sh Not tainted 4.15.4-00373-gee058bb4d0c2 #2 [42760.603767] Stack : 8e09bd20 8e09bd20 8e09bd20 fffffff0 00000007 00000006 00000000 8e09bca8 [42760.616937] 95b2b379 95b2b379 807a0080 00000007 81944518 0000018a 00000032 00000000 [42760.630095] 00000000 00000030 80000000 00000000 806eca74 00000009 8017e2b8 000001a0 [42760.643169] 00000000 00000002 00000000 8e09baa4 00000008 808b8008 86d69080 8e09bca0 [42760.656282] 8e09ad50 805e20aa 00000000 00000000 00000000 8017e2b8 00000009 801070ca [42760.669424] ... [42760.673919] Call Trace: [42760.678672] [<27fde568>] show_stack+0x70/0xf0 [42760.685417] [<84751641>] dump_stack+0xaa/0xd0 [42760.692188] [<699d671c>] __warn+0x80/0x92 [42760.698549] [<68915d41>] warn_slowpath_null+0x28/0x36 [42760.705912] [<f7c76c1c>] smp_call_function_many+0x88/0x20c [42760.713696] [<6bbdfc2a>] arch_trigger_cpumask_backtrace+0x30/0x4a [42760.722216] [<f845bd33>] rcu_dump_cpu_stacks+0x6a/0x98 [42760.729580] [<796e7629>] rcu_check_callbacks+0x672/0x6ac [42760.737476] [<059b3b43>] update_process_times+0x18/0x34 [42760.744981] [<6eb94941>] tick_sched_handle.isra.5+0x26/0x38 [42760.752793] [<478d3d70>] tick_sched_timer+0x1c/0x50 [42760.759882] [<e56ea39f>] __hrtimer_run_queues+0xc6/0x226 [42760.767418] [<e88bbcae>] hrtimer_interrupt+0x88/0x19a [42760.775031] [<6765a19e>] gic_compare_interrupt+0x2e/0x3a [42760.782761] [<0558bf5f>] handle_percpu_devid_irq+0x78/0x168 [42760.790795] [<90c11ba2>] generic_handle_irq+0x1e/0x2c [42760.798117] [<1b6d462c>] gic_handle_local_int+0x38/0x86 [42760.805545] [<b2ada1c7>] gic_irq_dispatch+0xa/0x14 [42760.812534] [<90c11ba2>] generic_handle_irq+0x1e/0x2c [42760.820086] [<c7521934>] do_IRQ+0x16/0x20 [42760.826274] [<9aef3ce6>] plat_irq_dispatch+0x62/0x94 [42760.833458] [<6a94b53c>] except_vec_vi_end+0x70/0x78 [42760.840655] [<22284043>] smp_call_function_many+0x1ba/0x20c [42760.848501] [<54022b58>] smp_call_function+0x1e/0x2c [42760.855693] [<ab9fc705>] flush_tlb_mm+0x2a/0x98 [42760.862730] [<0844cdd0>] tlb_flush_mmu+0x1c/0x44 [42760.869628] [<cb259b74>] arch_tlb_finish_mmu+0x26/0x3e [42760.877021] [<1aeaaf74>] tlb_finish_mmu+0x18/0x66 [42760.883907] [<b3fce717>] exit_mmap+0x76/0xea [42760.890428] [<c4c8a2f6>] mmput+0x80/0x11a [42760.896632] [<a41a08f4>] do_exit+0x1f4/0x80c [42760.903158] [<ee01cef6>] do_group_exit+0x20/0x7e [42760.909990] [<13fa8d54>] __wake_up_parent+0x0/0x1e [42760.917045] [<46cf89d0>] smp_call_function_many+0x1a2/0x20c [42760.924893] [<8c21a93b>] syscall_common+0x14/0x1c [42760.931765] ---[ end trace 02aa09da9dc52a60 ]--- [42760.938342] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [42760.945311] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 1216 at kernel/smp.c:291 smp_call_function_single+0xee/0xf8 ... This patch switches MIPS' arch_trigger_cpumask_backtrace() to use async IPIs & smp_call_function_single_async() in order to resolve this problem. We ensure use of the pre-allocated call_single_data_t structures is serialized by maintaining a cpumask indicating that they're busy, and refusing to attempt to send an IPI when a CPU's bit is set in this mask. This should only happen if a CPU hasn't responded to a previous backtrace IPI - ie. if it's hung - and we print a warning to the console in this case. I've marked this for stable branches as far back as v4.9, to which it applies cleanly. Strictly speaking the faulty MIPS implementation can be traced further back to commit 856839b ("MIPS: Add arch_trigger_all_cpu_backtrace() function") in v3.19, but kernel versions v3.19 through v4.8 will require further work to backport due to the rework performed in commit 9a01c3e ("nmi_backtrace: add more trigger_*_cpu_backtrace() methods"). Signed-off-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com> Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/19597/ Cc: James Hogan <jhogan@kernel.org> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Huacai Chen <chenhc@lemote.com> Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.9+ Fixes: 856839b ("MIPS: Add arch_trigger_all_cpu_backtrace() function") Fixes: 9a01c3e ("nmi_backtrace: add more trigger_*_cpu_backtrace() methods")
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Crash dump shows following instructions crash> bt PID: 0 TASK: ffffffffbe412480 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "swapper/0" #0 [ffff891ee0003868] machine_kexec at ffffffffbd063ef1 #1 [ffff891ee00038c8] __crash_kexec at ffffffffbd12b6f2 #2 [ffff891ee0003998] crash_kexec at ffffffffbd12c84c #3 [ffff891ee00039b8] oops_end at ffffffffbd030f0a #4 [ffff891ee00039e0] no_context at ffffffffbd074643 #5 [ffff891ee0003a40] __bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffffbd07496e #6 [ffff891ee0003a90] bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffffbd074a64 #7 [ffff891ee0003aa0] __do_page_fault at ffffffffbd074b0a #8 [ffff891ee0003b18] do_page_fault at ffffffffbd074fc8 #9 [ffff891ee0003b50] page_fault at ffffffffbda01925 [exception RIP: qlt_schedule_sess_for_deletion+15] RIP: ffffffffc02e526f RSP: ffff891ee0003c08 RFLAGS: 00010046 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffffc0307847 RDX: 00000000000020e6 RSI: ffff891edbc377c8 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff891ee0003c18 R8: ffffffffc02f0b20 R9: 0000000000000250 R10: 0000000000000258 R11: 000000000000b780 R12: ffff891ed9b43000 R13: 00000000000000f0 R14: 0000000000000006 R15: ffff891edbc377c8 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #10 [ffff891ee0003c20] qla2x00_fcport_event_handler at ffffffffc02853d3 [qla2xxx] #11 [ffff891ee0003cf0] __dta_qla24xx_async_gnl_sp_done_333 at ffffffffc0285a1d [qla2xxx] #12 [ffff891ee0003de8] qla24xx_process_response_queue at ffffffffc02a2eb5 [qla2xxx] #13 [ffff891ee0003e88] qla24xx_msix_rsp_q at ffffffffc02a5403 [qla2xxx] #14 [ffff891ee0003ec0] __handle_irq_event_percpu at ffffffffbd0f4c59 #15 [ffff891ee0003f10] handle_irq_event_percpu at ffffffffbd0f4e02 #16 [ffff891ee0003f40] handle_irq_event at ffffffffbd0f4e90 #17 [ffff891ee0003f68] handle_edge_irq at ffffffffbd0f8984 #18 [ffff891ee0003f88] handle_irq at ffffffffbd0305d5 #19 [ffff891ee0003fb8] do_IRQ at ffffffffbda02a18 --- <IRQ stack> --- #20 [ffffffffbe403d30] ret_from_intr at ffffffffbda0094e [exception RIP: unknown or invalid address] RIP: 000000000000001f RSP: 0000000000000000 RFLAGS: fff3b8c2091ebb3f RAX: ffffbba5a0000200 RBX: 0000be8cdfa8f9fa RCX: 0000000000000018 RDX: 0000000000000101 RSI: 000000000000015d RDI: 0000000000000193 RBP: 0000000000000083 R8: ffffffffbe403e38 R9: 0000000000000002 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffffbe56b820 R12: ffff891ee001cf00 R13: ffffffffbd11c0a4 R14: ffffffffbe403d60 R15: 0000000000000001 ORIG_RAX: ffff891ee0022ac0 CS: 0000 SS: ffffffffffffffb9 bt: WARNING: possibly bogus exception frame #21 [ffffffffbe403dd8] cpuidle_enter_state at ffffffffbd67c6fd #22 [ffffffffbe403e40] cpuidle_enter at ffffffffbd67c907 #23 [ffffffffbe403e50] call_cpuidle at ffffffffbd0d98f3 #24 [ffffffffbe403e60] do_idle at ffffffffbd0d9b42 #25 [ffffffffbe403e98] cpu_startup_entry at ffffffffbd0d9da3 #26 [ffffffffbe403ec0] rest_init at ffffffffbd81d4aa #27 [ffffffffbe403ed0] start_kernel at ffffffffbe67d2ca #28 [ffffffffbe403f28] x86_64_start_reservations at ffffffffbe67c675 #29 [ffffffffbe403f38] x86_64_start_kernel at ffffffffbe67c6eb #30 [ffffffffbe403f50] secondary_startup_64 at ffffffffbd0000d5 Fixes: 040036b ("scsi: qla2xxx: Delay loop id allocation at login") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.17+ Signed-off-by: Chuck Anderson <chuck.anderson@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Himanshu Madhani <himanshu.madhani@cavium.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
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My recent fix for dns_resolver_preparse() printing very long strings was incomplete, as shown by syzbot which still managed to hit the WARN_ONCE() in set_precision() by adding a crafted "dns_resolver" key: precision 50001 too large WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 864 at lib/vsprintf.c:2164 vsnprintf+0x48a/0x5a0 The bug this time isn't just a printing bug, but also a logical error when multiple options ("#"-separated strings) are given in the key payload. Specifically, when separating an option string into name and value, if there is no value then the name is incorrectly considered to end at the end of the key payload, rather than the end of the current option. This bypasses validation of the option length, and also means that specifying multiple options is broken -- which presumably has gone unnoticed as there is currently only one valid option anyway. A similar problem also applied to option values, as the kstrtoul() when parsing the "dnserror" option will read past the end of the current option and into the next option. Fix these bugs by correctly computing the length of the option name and by copying the option value, null-terminated, into a temporary buffer. Reproducer for the WARN_ONCE() that syzbot hit: perl -e 'print "#A#", "\0" x 50000' | keyctl padd dns_resolver desc @s Reproducer for "dnserror" option being parsed incorrectly (expected behavior is to fail when seeing the unknown option "foo", actual behavior was to read the dnserror value as "1#foo" and fail there): perl -e 'print "#dnserror=1#foo\0"' | keyctl padd dns_resolver desc @s Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Fixes: 4a2d789 ("DNS: If the DNS server returns an error, allow that to be cached [ver #2]") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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If the controller supports effects and goes down during the passthru admin command we will deadlock during namespace revalidation. [ 363.488275] INFO: task kworker/u16:5:231 blocked for more than 120 seconds. [ 363.488290] Not tainted 4.17.0+ #2 [ 363.488296] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [ 363.488303] kworker/u16:5 D 0 231 2 0x80000000 [ 363.488331] Workqueue: nvme-reset-wq nvme_reset_work [nvme] [ 363.488338] Call Trace: [ 363.488385] schedule+0x75/0x190 [ 363.488396] rwsem_down_read_failed+0x1c3/0x2f0 [ 363.488481] call_rwsem_down_read_failed+0x14/0x30 [ 363.488504] down_read+0x1d/0x80 [ 363.488523] nvme_stop_queues+0x1e/0xa0 [nvme_core] [ 363.488536] nvme_dev_disable+0xae4/0x1620 [nvme] [ 363.488614] nvme_reset_work+0xd1e/0x49d9 [nvme] [ 363.488911] process_one_work+0x81a/0x1400 [ 363.488934] worker_thread+0x87/0xe80 [ 363.488955] kthread+0x2db/0x390 [ 363.488977] ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 Fixes: 84fef62 ("nvme: check admin passthru command effects") Signed-off-by: Scott Bauer <scott.bauer@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Keith Busch <keith.busch@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
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When pmem namespaces created are smaller than section size, this can cause an issue during removal and gpf was observed: general protection fault: 0000 1 SMP PTI CPU: 36 PID: 3941 Comm: ndctl Tainted: G W 4.14.28-1.el7uek.x86_64 #2 task: ffff88acda150000 task.stack: ffffc900233a4000 RIP: 0010:__put_page+0x56/0x79 Call Trace: devm_memremap_pages_release+0x155/0x23a release_nodes+0x21e/0x260 devres_release_all+0x3c/0x48 device_release_driver_internal+0x15c/0x207 device_release_driver+0x12/0x14 unbind_store+0xba/0xd8 drv_attr_store+0x27/0x31 sysfs_kf_write+0x3f/0x46 kernfs_fop_write+0x10f/0x18b __vfs_write+0x3a/0x16d vfs_write+0xb2/0x1a1 SyS_write+0x55/0xb9 do_syscall_64+0x79/0x1ae entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0x0 Add code to check whether we have a mapping already in the same section and prevent additional mappings from being created if that is the case. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/152909478401.50143.312364396244072931.stgit@djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Robert Elliott <elliott@hpe.com> Cc: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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When building the kernel as Thumb-2 with binutils 2.29 or newer, if the assembler has seen the .type directive (via ENDPROC()) for a symbol, it automatically handles the setting of the lowest bit when the symbol is used with ADR. The badr macro on the other hand handles this lowest bit manually. This leads to a jump to a wrong address in the wrong state in the syscall return path: Internal error: Oops - undefined instruction: 0 [#2] SMP THUMB2 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 652 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G D 4.18.0-rc3+ #8 PC is at ret_fast_syscall+0x4/0x62 LR is at sys_brk+0x109/0x128 pc : [<80101004>] lr : [<801c8a35>] psr: 60000013 Flags: nZCv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment none Control: 50c5387d Table: 9e82006a DAC: 00000051 Process modprobe (pid: 652, stack limit = 0x(ptrval)) 80101000 <ret_fast_syscall>: 80101000: b672 cpsid i 80101002: f8d9 2008 ldr.w r2, [r9, #8] 80101006: f1b2 4ffe cmp.w r2, #2130706432 ; 0x7f000000 80101184 <local_restart>: 80101184: f8d9 a000 ldr.w sl, [r9] 80101188: e92d 0030 stmdb sp!, {r4, r5} 8010118c: f01a 0ff0 tst.w sl, #240 ; 0xf0 80101190: d117 bne.n 801011c2 <__sys_trace> 80101192: 46ba mov sl, r7 80101194: f5ba 7fc8 cmp.w sl, #400 ; 0x190 80101198: bf28 it cs 8010119a: f04f 0a00 movcs.w sl, #0 8010119e: f3af 8014 nop.w {20} 801011a2: f2af 1ea2 subw lr, pc, #418 ; 0x1a2 To fix this, add a new symbol name which doesn't have ENDPROC used on it and use that with badr. We can't remove the badr usage since that would would cause breakage with older binutils. Signed-off-by: Vincent Whitchurch <vincent.whitchurch@axis.com> Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
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Kernel panic when with high memory pressure, calltrace looks like, PID: 21439 TASK: ffff881be3afedd0 CPU: 16 COMMAND: "java" #0 [ffff881ec7ed7630] machine_kexec at ffffffff81059beb #1 [ffff881ec7ed7690] __crash_kexec at ffffffff81105942 #2 [ffff881ec7ed7760] crash_kexec at ffffffff81105a30 #3 [ffff881ec7ed7778] oops_end at ffffffff816902c8 #4 [ffff881ec7ed77a0] no_context at ffffffff8167ff46 #5 [ffff881ec7ed77f0] __bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff8167ffdc #6 [ffff881ec7ed7838] __node_set at ffffffff81680300 #7 [ffff881ec7ed7860] __do_page_fault at ffffffff8169320f #8 [ffff881ec7ed78c0] do_page_fault at ffffffff816932b5 #9 [ffff881ec7ed78f0] page_fault at ffffffff8168f4c8 [exception RIP: _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+47] RIP: ffffffff8168edef RSP: ffff881ec7ed79a8 RFLAGS: 00010046 RAX: 0000000000000246 RBX: ffffea0019740d00 RCX: ffff881ec7ed7fd8 RDX: 0000000000020000 RSI: 0000000000000016 RDI: 0000000000000008 RBP: ffff881ec7ed79a8 R8: 0000000000000246 R9: 000000000001a098 R10: ffff88107ffda000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000008 R14: ffff881ec7ed7a80 R15: ffff881be3afedd0 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 It happens in the pagefault and results in double pagefault during compacting pages when memory allocation fails. Analysed the vmcore, the page leads to second pagefault is corrupted with _mapcount=-256, but private=0. It's caused by the race between migration and ballooning, and lock missing in virtballoon_migratepage() of virtio_balloon driver. This patch fix the bug. Fixes: e225042 ("virtio_balloon: introduce migration primitives to balloon pages") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jiang Biao <jiang.biao2@zte.com.cn> Signed-off-by: Huang Chong <huang.chong@zte.com.cn> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
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syzbot found that the following sequence produces a LOCKDEP splat [1] ip link add bond10 type bond ip link add bond11 type bond ip link set bond11 master bond10 To fix this, we can use the already provided nest_level. This patch also provides correct nesting for dev->addr_list_lock [1] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 4.18.0-rc6+ #167 Not tainted -------------------------------------------- syz-executor751/4439 is trying to acquire lock: (____ptrval____) (&(&bond->stats_lock)->rlock){+.+.}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:310 [inline] (____ptrval____) (&(&bond->stats_lock)->rlock){+.+.}, at: bond_get_stats+0xb4/0x560 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:3426 but task is already holding lock: (____ptrval____) (&(&bond->stats_lock)->rlock){+.+.}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:310 [inline] (____ptrval____) (&(&bond->stats_lock)->rlock){+.+.}, at: bond_get_stats+0xb4/0x560 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:3426 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&(&bond->stats_lock)->rlock); lock(&(&bond->stats_lock)->rlock); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 3 locks held by syz-executor751/4439: #0: (____ptrval____) (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20 net/core/rtnetlink.c:77 #1: (____ptrval____) (&(&bond->stats_lock)->rlock){+.+.}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:310 [inline] #1: (____ptrval____) (&(&bond->stats_lock)->rlock){+.+.}, at: bond_get_stats+0xb4/0x560 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:3426 #2: (____ptrval____) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: bond_get_stats+0x0/0x560 include/linux/compiler.h:215 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 4439 Comm: syz-executor751 Not tainted 4.18.0-rc6+ #167 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x1c9/0x2b4 lib/dump_stack.c:113 print_deadlock_bug kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1765 [inline] check_deadlock kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1809 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2405 [inline] __lock_acquire.cold.64+0x1fb/0x486 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3435 lock_acquire+0x1e4/0x540 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3924 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:142 [inline] _raw_spin_lock+0x2a/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:144 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:310 [inline] bond_get_stats+0xb4/0x560 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:3426 dev_get_stats+0x10f/0x470 net/core/dev.c:8316 bond_get_stats+0x232/0x560 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:3432 dev_get_stats+0x10f/0x470 net/core/dev.c:8316 rtnl_fill_stats+0x4d/0xac0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:1169 rtnl_fill_ifinfo+0x1aa6/0x3fb0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:1611 rtmsg_ifinfo_build_skb+0xc8/0x190 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3268 rtmsg_ifinfo_event.part.30+0x45/0xe0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3300 rtmsg_ifinfo_event net/core/rtnetlink.c:3297 [inline] rtnetlink_event+0x144/0x170 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4716 notifier_call_chain+0x180/0x390 kernel/notifier.c:93 __raw_notifier_call_chain kernel/notifier.c:394 [inline] raw_notifier_call_chain+0x2d/0x40 kernel/notifier.c:401 call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0x3f/0x90 net/core/dev.c:1735 call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:1753 [inline] netdev_features_change net/core/dev.c:1321 [inline] netdev_change_features+0xb3/0x110 net/core/dev.c:7759 bond_compute_features.isra.47+0x585/0xa50 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:1120 bond_enslave+0x1b25/0x5da0 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:1755 bond_do_ioctl+0x7cb/0xae0 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:3528 dev_ifsioc+0x43c/0xb30 net/core/dev_ioctl.c:327 dev_ioctl+0x1b5/0xcc0 net/core/dev_ioctl.c:493 sock_do_ioctl+0x1d3/0x3e0 net/socket.c:992 sock_ioctl+0x30d/0x680 net/socket.c:1093 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:46 [inline] file_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:500 [inline] do_vfs_ioctl+0x1de/0x1720 fs/ioctl.c:684 ksys_ioctl+0xa9/0xd0 fs/ioctl.c:701 __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:708 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:706 [inline] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x73/0xb0 fs/ioctl.c:706 do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x440859 Code: e8 2c af 02 00 48 83 c4 18 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 3b 10 fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007ffc51a92878 EFLAGS: 00000213 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000440859 RDX: 0000000020000040 RSI: 0000000000008990 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 00000000004002c8 R09: 00000000004002c8 R10: 00000000022d5880 R11: 0000000000000213 R12: 0000000000007390 R13: 0000000000401db0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Jay Vosburgh <j.vosburgh@gmail.com> Cc: Veaceslav Falico <vfalico@gmail.com> Cc: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Amit Pundir and Youling in parallel reported crashes with recent mainline kernels running Android: F DEBUG : *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** F DEBUG : Build fingerprint: 'Android/db410c32_only/db410c32_only:Q/OC-MR1/102:userdebug/test-key F DEBUG : Revision: '0' F DEBUG : ABI: 'arm' F DEBUG : pid: 2261, tid: 2261, name: zygote >>> zygote <<< F DEBUG : signal 7 (SIGBUS), code 2 (BUS_ADRERR), fault addr 0xec00008 ... <snip> ... F DEBUG : backtrace: F DEBUG : #00 pc 00001c04 /system/lib/libc.so (memset+48) F DEBUG : #1 pc 0010c513 /system/lib/libart.so (create_mspace_with_base+82) F DEBUG : #2 pc 0015c601 /system/lib/libart.so (art::gc::space::DlMallocSpace::CreateMspace(void*, unsigned int, unsigned int)+40) F DEBUG : #3 pc 0015c3ed /system/lib/libart.so (art::gc::space::DlMallocSpace::CreateFromMemMap(art::MemMap*, std::__1::basic_string<char, std::__ 1::char_traits<char>, std::__1::allocator<char>> const&, unsigned int, unsigned int, unsigned int, unsigned int, bool)+36) ... This was bisected back to commit bfd40ea ("mm: fix vma_is_anonymous() false-positives"). create_mspace_with_base() in the trace above, utilizes ashmem, and with ashmem, for shared mappings we use shmem_zero_setup(), which sets the vma->vm_ops to &shmem_vm_ops. But for private ashmem mappings nothing sets the vma->vm_ops. Looking at the problematic patch, it seems to add a requirement that one call vma_set_anonymous() on a vma, otherwise the dummy_vm_ops will be used. Using the dummy_vm_ops seem to triggger SIGBUS when traversing unmapped pages. Thus, this patch adds a call to vma_set_anonymous() for ashmem private mappings and seems to avoid the reported problem. Fixes: bfd40ea ("mm: fix vma_is_anonymous() false-positives") Cc: Kirill Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Joel Fernandes <joelaf@google.com> Cc: Colin Cross <ccross@google.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Reported-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org> Reported-by: Youling 257 <youling257@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Commit 05ea886 ("mm, hugetlbfs: introduce ->pagesize() to vm_operations_struct") adds a new ->pagesize() function to hugetlb_vm_ops, intended to cover all hugetlbfs backed files. With System V shared memory model, if "huge page" is specified, the "shared memory" is backed by hugetlbfs files, but the mappings initiated via shmget/shmat have their original vm_ops overwritten with shm_vm_ops, so we need to add a ->pagesize function to shm_vm_ops. Otherwise, vma_kernel_pagesize() returns PAGE_SIZE given a hugetlbfs backed vma, result in below BUG: fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c 443 if (unlikely(page_mapped(page))) { 444 BUG_ON(truncate_op); resulting in hugetlbfs: oracle (4592): Using mlock ulimits for SHM_HUGETLB is deprecated ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c:444! Modules linked in: nfsv3 rpcsec_gss_krb5 nfsv4 ... CPU: 35 PID: 5583 Comm: oracle_5583_sbt Not tainted 4.14.35-1829.el7uek.x86_64 #2 RIP: 0010:remove_inode_hugepages+0x3db/0x3e2 .... Call Trace: hugetlbfs_evict_inode+0x1e/0x3e evict+0xdb/0x1af iput+0x1a2/0x1f7 dentry_unlink_inode+0xc6/0xf0 __dentry_kill+0xd8/0x18d dput+0x1b5/0x1ed __fput+0x18b/0x216 ____fput+0xe/0x10 task_work_run+0x90/0xa7 exit_to_usermode_loop+0xdd/0x116 do_syscall_64+0x187/0x1ae entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x150/0x0 [jane.chu@oracle.com: relocate comment] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180731044831.26036-1-jane.chu@oracle.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180727211727.5020-1-jane.chu@oracle.com Fixes: 05ea886 ("mm, hugetlbfs: introduce ->pagesize() to vm_operations_struct") Signed-off-by: Jane Chu <jane.chu@oracle.com> Suggested-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Jérôme Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com> Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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This patch fixes the race between netvsc_probe() and rndis_set_subchannel(), which can cause a deadlock. These are the related 3 paths which show the deadlock: path #1: Workqueue: hv_vmbus_con vmbus_onmessage_work [hv_vmbus] Call Trace: schedule schedule_preempt_disabled __mutex_lock __device_attach bus_probe_device device_add vmbus_device_register vmbus_onoffer vmbus_onmessage_work process_one_work worker_thread kthread ret_from_fork path #2: schedule schedule_preempt_disabled __mutex_lock netvsc_probe vmbus_probe really_probe __driver_attach bus_for_each_dev driver_attach_async async_run_entry_fn process_one_work worker_thread kthread ret_from_fork path #3: Workqueue: events netvsc_subchan_work [hv_netvsc] Call Trace: schedule rndis_set_subchannel netvsc_subchan_work process_one_work worker_thread kthread ret_from_fork Before path #1 finishes, path #2 can start to run, because just before the "bus_probe_device(dev);" in device_add() in path #1, there is a line "object_uevent(&dev->kobj, KOBJ_ADD);", so systemd-udevd can immediately try to load hv_netvsc and hence path #2 can start to run. Next, path #2 offloads the subchannal's initialization to a workqueue, i.e. path #3, so we can end up in a deadlock situation like this: Path #2 gets the device lock, and is trying to get the rtnl lock; Path #3 gets the rtnl lock and is waiting for all the subchannel messages to be processed; Path #1 is trying to get the device lock, but since #2 is not releasing the device lock, path #1 has to sleep; since the VMBus messages are processed one by one, this means the sub-channel messages can't be procedded, so #3 has to sleep with the rtnl lock held, and finally #2 has to sleep... Now all the 3 paths are sleeping and we hit the deadlock. With the patch, we can make sure #2 gets both the device lock and the rtnl lock together, gets its job done, and releases the locks, so #1 and #3 will not be blocked for ever. Fixes: 8195b13 ("hv_netvsc: fix deadlock on hotplug") Signed-off-by: Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com> Cc: Stephen Hemminger <sthemmin@microsoft.com> Cc: K. Y. Srinivasan <kys@microsoft.com> Cc: Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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I hit the following splat in my tests: ------------[ cut here ]------------ IRQs not enabled as expected WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 0 at kernel/time/tick-sched.c:982 tick_nohz_idle_enter+0x44/0x8c Modules linked in: ip6t_REJECT nf_reject_ipv6 ip6table_filter ip6_tables ipv6 CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Not tainted 4.19.0-rc2-test+ #2 Hardware name: MSI MS-7823/CSM-H87M-G43 (MS-7823), BIOS V1.6 02/22/2014 EIP: tick_nohz_idle_enter+0x44/0x8c Code: ec 05 00 00 00 75 26 83 b8 c0 05 00 00 00 75 1d 80 3d d0 36 3e c1 00 75 14 68 94 63 12 c1 c6 05 d0 36 3e c1 01 e8 04 ee f8 ff <0f> 0b 58 fa bb a0 e5 66 c1 e8 25 0f 04 00 64 03 1d 28 31 52 c1 8b EAX: 0000001c EBX: f26e7f8c ECX: 00000006 EDX: 00000007 ESI: f26dd1c0 EDI: 00000000 EBP: f26e7f40 ESP: f26e7f38 DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068 EFLAGS: 00010296 CR0: 80050033 CR2: 0813c6b0 CR3: 2f342000 CR4: 001406f0 Call Trace: do_idle+0x33/0x202 cpu_startup_entry+0x61/0x63 start_secondary+0x18e/0x1ed startup_32_smp+0x164/0x168 irq event stamp: 18773830 hardirqs last enabled at (18773829): [<c040150c>] trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0xc/0x10 hardirqs last disabled at (18773830): [<c040151c>] trace_hardirqs_off_thunk+0xc/0x10 softirqs last enabled at (18773824): [<c0ddaa6f>] __do_softirq+0x25f/0x2bf softirqs last disabled at (18773767): [<c0416bbe>] call_on_stack+0x45/0x4b ---[ end trace b7c64aa79e17954a ]--- After a bit of debugging, I found what was happening. This would trigger when performing "perf" with a high NMI interrupt rate, while enabling and disabling function tracer. Ftrace uses breakpoints to convert the nops at the start of functions to calls to the function trampolines. The breakpoint traps disable interrupts and this makes calls into lockdep via the trace_hardirqs_off_thunk in the entry.S code. What happens is the following: do_idle { [interrupts enabled] <interrupt> [interrupts disabled] TRACE_IRQS_OFF [lockdep says irqs off] [...] TRACE_IRQS_IRET test if pt_regs say return to interrupts enabled [yes] TRACE_IRQS_ON [lockdep says irqs are on] <nmi> nmi_enter() { printk_nmi_enter() [traced by ftrace] [ hit ftrace breakpoint ] <breakpoint exception> TRACE_IRQS_OFF [lockdep says irqs off] [...] TRACE_IRQS_IRET [return from breakpoint] test if pt_regs say interrupts enabled [no] [iret back to interrupt] [iret back to code] tick_nohz_idle_enter() { lockdep_assert_irqs_enabled() [lockdep say no!] Although interrupts are indeed enabled, lockdep thinks it is not, and since we now do asserts via lockdep, it gives a false warning. The issue here is that printk_nmi_enter() is called before lockdep_off(), which disables lockdep (for this reason) in NMIs. By simply not allowing ftrace to see printk_nmi_enter() (via notrace annotation) we keep lockdep from getting confused. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 42a0bb3 ("printk/nmi: generic solution for safe printk in NMI") Acked-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com> Acked-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
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Patch series "mm/hugetlb: uffd-wp fixes for hugetlb_change_protection()". Playing with virtio-mem and background snapshots (using uffd-wp) on hugetlb in QEMU, I managed to trigger a VM_BUG_ON(). Looking into the details, hugetlb_change_protection() seems to not handle uffd-wp correctly in all cases. Patch #1 fixes my test case. I don't have reproducers for patch #2, as it requires running into migration entries. I did not yet check in detail yet if !hugetlb code requires similar care. This patch (of 2): There are two problematic cases when stumbling over a PTE marker in hugetlb_change_protection(): (1) We protect an uffd-wp PTE marker a second time using uffd-wp: we will end up in the "!huge_pte_none(pte)" case and mess up the PTE marker. (2) We unprotect a uffd-wp PTE marker: we will similarly end up in the "!huge_pte_none(pte)" case even though we cleared the PTE, because the "pte" variable is stale. We'll mess up the PTE marker. For example, if we later stumble over such a "wrongly modified" PTE marker, we'll treat it like a present PTE that maps some garbage page. This can, for example, be triggered by mapping a memfd backed by huge pages, registering uffd-wp, uffd-wp'ing an unmapped page and (a) uffd-wp'ing it a second time; or (b) uffd-unprotecting it; or (c) unregistering uffd-wp. Then, ff we trigger fallocate(FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE) on that file range, we will run into a VM_BUG_ON: [ 195.039560] page:00000000ba1f2987 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x0 [ 195.039565] flags: 0x7ffffc0001000(reserved|node=0|zone=0|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) [ 195.039568] raw: 0007ffffc0001000 ffffe742c0000008 ffffe742c0000008 0000000000000000 [ 195.039569] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 195.039569] page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(compound && !PageHead(page)) [ 195.039573] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 195.039574] kernel BUG at mm/rmap.c:1346! [ 195.039579] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ 195.039581] CPU: 7 PID: 4777 Comm: qemu-system-x86 Not tainted 6.0.12-200.fc36.x86_64 #1 [ 195.039583] Hardware name: LENOVO 20WNS1F81N/20WNS1F81N, BIOS N35ET50W (1.50 ) 09/15/2022 [ 195.039584] RIP: 0010:page_remove_rmap+0x45b/0x550 [ 195.039588] Code: [...] [ 195.039589] RSP: 0018:ffffbc03c3633ba8 EFLAGS: 00010292 [ 195.039591] RAX: 0000000000000040 RBX: ffffe742c0000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 195.039592] RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: ffffffff8e7aac1a RDI: 00000000ffffffff [ 195.039592] RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffbc03c3633a08 [ 195.039593] R10: 0000000000000003 R11: ffffffff8f146328 R12: ffff9b04c42754b0 [ 195.039594] R13: ffffffff8fcc6328 R14: ffffbc03c3633c80 R15: ffff9b0484ab9100 [ 195.039595] FS: 00007fc7aaf68640(0000) GS:ffff9b0bbf7c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 195.039596] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 195.039597] CR2: 000055d402c49110 CR3: 0000000159392003 CR4: 0000000000772ee0 [ 195.039598] PKRU: 55555554 [ 195.039599] Call Trace: [ 195.039600] <TASK> [ 195.039602] __unmap_hugepage_range+0x33b/0x7d0 [ 195.039605] unmap_hugepage_range+0x55/0x70 [ 195.039608] hugetlb_vmdelete_list+0x77/0xa0 [ 195.039611] hugetlbfs_fallocate+0x410/0x550 [ 195.039612] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x23/0x40 [ 195.039616] vfs_fallocate+0x12e/0x360 [ 195.039618] __x64_sys_fallocate+0x40/0x70 [ 195.039620] do_syscall_64+0x58/0x80 [ 195.039623] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x17/0x40 [ 195.039624] ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80 [ 195.039626] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 195.039628] RIP: 0033:0x7fc7b590651f [ 195.039653] Code: [...] [ 195.039654] RSP: 002b:00007fc7aaf66e70 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000011d [ 195.039655] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000558ef4b7f370 RCX: 00007fc7b590651f [ 195.039656] RDX: 0000000018000000 RSI: 0000000000000003 RDI: 000000000000000c [ 195.039657] RBP: 0000000008000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000073 [ 195.039658] R10: 0000000008000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000018000000 [ 195.039658] R13: 00007fb8bbe00000 R14: 000000000000000c R15: 0000000000001000 [ 195.039661] </TASK> Fix it by not going into the "!huge_pte_none(pte)" case if we stumble over an exclusive marker. spin_unlock() + continue would get the job done. However, instead, make it clearer that there are no fall-through statements: we process each case (hwpoison, migration, marker, !none, none) and then unlock the page table to continue with the next PTE. Let's avoid "continue" statements and use a single spin_unlock() at the end. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221222205511.675832-1-david@redhat.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221222205511.675832-2-david@redhat.com Fixes: 60dfaad ("mm/hugetlb: allow uffd wr-protect none ptes") Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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This lockdep splat says it better than I could: ================================ WARNING: inconsistent lock state 6.2.0-rc2-07010-ga9b9500ffaac-dirty #967 Not tainted -------------------------------- inconsistent {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} -> {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} usage. kworker/1:3/179 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE1:SE1] takes: ffff3ec4036ce098 (_xmit_ETHER#2){+.?.}-{3:3}, at: netif_freeze_queues+0x5c/0xc0 {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} state was registered at: _raw_spin_lock+0x5c/0xc0 sch_direct_xmit+0x148/0x37c __dev_queue_xmit+0x528/0x111c ip6_finish_output2+0x5ec/0xb7c ip6_finish_output+0x240/0x3f0 ip6_output+0x78/0x360 ndisc_send_skb+0x33c/0x85c ndisc_send_rs+0x54/0x12c addrconf_rs_timer+0x154/0x260 call_timer_fn+0xb8/0x3a0 __run_timers.part.0+0x214/0x26c run_timer_softirq+0x3c/0x74 __do_softirq+0x14c/0x5d8 ____do_softirq+0x10/0x20 call_on_irq_stack+0x2c/0x5c do_softirq_own_stack+0x1c/0x30 __irq_exit_rcu+0x168/0x1a0 irq_exit_rcu+0x10/0x40 el1_interrupt+0x38/0x64 irq event stamp: 7825 hardirqs last enabled at (7825): [<ffffdf1f7200cae4>] exit_to_kernel_mode+0x34/0x130 hardirqs last disabled at (7823): [<ffffdf1f708105f0>] __do_softirq+0x550/0x5d8 softirqs last enabled at (7824): [<ffffdf1f7081050c>] __do_softirq+0x46c/0x5d8 softirqs last disabled at (7811): [<ffffdf1f708166e0>] ____do_softirq+0x10/0x20 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(_xmit_ETHER#2); <Interrupt> lock(_xmit_ETHER#2); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by kworker/1:3/179: #0: ffff3ec400004748 ((wq_completion)events){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1f4/0x6c0 #1: ffff80000a0bbdc8 ((work_completion)(&priv->tx_onestep_tstamp)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1f4/0x6c0 #2: ffff3ec4036cd438 (&dev->tx_global_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: netif_tx_lock+0x1c/0x34 Workqueue: events enetc_tx_onestep_tstamp Call trace: print_usage_bug.part.0+0x208/0x22c mark_lock+0x7f0/0x8b0 __lock_acquire+0x7c4/0x1ce0 lock_acquire.part.0+0xe0/0x220 lock_acquire+0x68/0x84 _raw_spin_lock+0x5c/0xc0 netif_freeze_queues+0x5c/0xc0 netif_tx_lock+0x24/0x34 enetc_tx_onestep_tstamp+0x20/0x100 process_one_work+0x28c/0x6c0 worker_thread+0x74/0x450 kthread+0x118/0x11c but I'll say it anyway: the enetc_tx_onestep_tstamp() work item runs in process context, therefore with softirqs enabled (i.o.w., it can be interrupted by a softirq). If we hold the netif_tx_lock() when there is an interrupt, and the NET_TX softirq then gets scheduled, this will take the netif_tx_lock() a second time and deadlock the kernel. To solve this, use netif_tx_lock_bh(), which blocks softirqs from running. Fixes: 7294380 ("enetc: support PTP Sync packet one-step timestamping") Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Alexander Duyck <alexanderduyck@fb.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230112105440.1786799-1-vladimir.oltean@nxp.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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This fixes the following trace caused by attempting to lock cmd_sync_work_lock while holding the rcu_read_lock: kworker/u3:2/212 is trying to lock: ffff888002600910 (&hdev->cmd_sync_work_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: hci_cmd_sync_queue+0xad/0x140 other info that might help us debug this: context-{4:4} 4 locks held by kworker/u3:2/212: #0: ffff8880028c6530 ((wq_completion)hci0#2){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x4dc/0x9a0 #1: ffff888001aafde0 ((work_completion)(&hdev->rx_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x4dc/0x9a0 #2: ffff888002600070 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: hci_cc_le_set_cig_params+0x64/0x4f0 #3: ffffffffa5994b00 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: hci_cc_le_set_cig_params+0x2f9/0x4f0 Fixes: 26afbd8 ("Bluetooth: Add initial implementation of CIS connections") Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
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This attempts to fix the following trace: iso-tester/52 is trying to acquire lock: ffff8880024e0070 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: iso_sock_listen+0x29e/0x440 but task is already holding lock: ffff888001978130 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: iso_sock_listen+0x8b/0x440 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO){+.+.}-{0:0}: lock_acquire+0x176/0x3d0 lock_sock_nested+0x32/0x80 iso_connect_cfm+0x1a3/0x630 hci_cc_le_setup_iso_path+0x195/0x340 hci_cmd_complete_evt+0x1ae/0x500 hci_event_packet+0x38e/0x7c0 hci_rx_work+0x34c/0x980 process_one_work+0x5a5/0x9a0 worker_thread+0x89/0x6f0 kthread+0x14e/0x180 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 -> #1 (hci_cb_list_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: lock_acquire+0x176/0x3d0 __mutex_lock+0x13b/0xf50 hci_le_remote_feat_complete_evt+0x17e/0x320 hci_event_packet+0x38e/0x7c0 hci_rx_work+0x34c/0x980 process_one_work+0x5a5/0x9a0 worker_thread+0x89/0x6f0 kthread+0x14e/0x180 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 -> #0 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: check_prev_add+0xfc/0x1190 __lock_acquire+0x1e27/0x2750 lock_acquire+0x176/0x3d0 __mutex_lock+0x13b/0xf50 iso_sock_listen+0x29e/0x440 __sys_listen+0xe6/0x160 __x64_sys_listen+0x25/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x42/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x62/0xcc other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &hdev->lock --> hci_cb_list_lock --> sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO); lock(hci_cb_list_lock); lock(sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO); lock(&hdev->lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 1 lock held by iso-tester/52: #0: ffff888001978130 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: iso_sock_listen+0x8b/0x440 Fixes: f764a6c ("Bluetooth: ISO: Add broadcast support") Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
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The cited commit changed class of tc_ht internal mutex in order to avoid false lock dependency with fs_core node and flow_table hash table structures. However, hash table implementation internally also includes a workqueue task with its own lockdep map which causes similar bogus lockdep splat[0]. Fix it by also adding dedicated class for hash table workqueue work structure of tc_ht. [0]: [ 1139.672465] ====================================================== [ 1139.673552] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 1139.674635] 6.1.0_for_upstream_debug_2022_12_12_17_02 #1 Not tainted [ 1139.675734] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 1139.676801] modprobe/5998 is trying to acquire lock: [ 1139.677726] ffff88811e7b93b8 (&node->lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: down_write_ref_node+0x7c/0xe0 [mlx5_core] [ 1139.679662] but task is already holding lock: [ 1139.680703] ffff88813c1f96a0 (&tc_ht_lock_key){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: rhashtable_free_and_destroy+0x38/0x6f0 [ 1139.682223] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 1139.683640] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 1139.684887] -> #2 (&tc_ht_lock_key){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 1139.685975] __mutex_lock+0x12c/0x14b0 [ 1139.686659] rht_deferred_worker+0x35/0x1540 [ 1139.687405] process_one_work+0x7c2/0x1310 [ 1139.688134] worker_thread+0x59d/0xec0 [ 1139.688820] kthread+0x28f/0x330 [ 1139.689444] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [ 1139.690106] -> #1 ((work_completion)(&ht->run_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: [ 1139.691250] __flush_work+0xe8/0x900 [ 1139.691915] __cancel_work_timer+0x2ca/0x3f0 [ 1139.692655] rhashtable_free_and_destroy+0x22/0x6f0 [ 1139.693472] del_sw_flow_table+0x22/0xb0 [mlx5_core] [ 1139.694592] tree_put_node+0x24c/0x450 [mlx5_core] [ 1139.695686] tree_remove_node+0x6e/0x100 [mlx5_core] [ 1139.696803] mlx5_destroy_flow_table+0x187/0x690 [mlx5_core] [ 1139.698017] mlx5e_tc_nic_cleanup+0x2f8/0x400 [mlx5_core] [ 1139.699217] mlx5e_cleanup_nic_rx+0x2b/0x210 [mlx5_core] [ 1139.700397] mlx5e_detach_netdev+0x19d/0x2b0 [mlx5_core] [ 1139.701571] mlx5e_suspend+0xdb/0x140 [mlx5_core] [ 1139.702665] mlx5e_remove+0x89/0x190 [mlx5_core] [ 1139.703756] auxiliary_bus_remove+0x52/0x70 [ 1139.704492] device_release_driver_internal+0x3c1/0x600 [ 1139.705360] bus_remove_device+0x2a5/0x560 [ 1139.706080] device_del+0x492/0xb80 [ 1139.706724] mlx5_rescan_drivers_locked+0x194/0x6a0 [mlx5_core] [ 1139.707961] mlx5_unregister_device+0x7a/0xa0 [mlx5_core] [ 1139.709138] mlx5_uninit_one+0x5f/0x160 [mlx5_core] [ 1139.710252] remove_one+0xd1/0x160 [mlx5_core] [ 1139.711297] pci_device_remove+0x96/0x1c0 [ 1139.722721] device_release_driver_internal+0x3c1/0x600 [ 1139.723590] unbind_store+0x1b1/0x200 [ 1139.724259] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x348/0x520 [ 1139.725019] vfs_write+0x7b2/0xbf0 [ 1139.725658] ksys_write+0xf3/0x1d0 [ 1139.726292] do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90 [ 1139.726942] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 [ 1139.727769] -> #0 (&node->lock){++++}-{3:3}: [ 1139.728698] __lock_acquire+0x2cf5/0x62f0 [ 1139.729415] lock_acquire+0x1c1/0x540 [ 1139.730076] down_write+0x8e/0x1f0 [ 1139.730709] down_write_ref_node+0x7c/0xe0 [mlx5_core] [ 1139.731841] mlx5_del_flow_rules+0x6f/0x610 [mlx5_core] [ 1139.732982] __mlx5_eswitch_del_rule+0xdd/0x560 [mlx5_core] [ 1139.734207] mlx5_eswitch_del_offloaded_rule+0x14/0x20 [mlx5_core] [ 1139.735491] mlx5e_tc_rule_unoffload+0x104/0x2b0 [mlx5_core] [ 1139.736716] mlx5e_tc_unoffload_fdb_rules+0x10c/0x1f0 [mlx5_core] [ 1139.738007] mlx5e_tc_del_fdb_flow+0xc3c/0xfa0 [mlx5_core] [ 1139.739213] mlx5e_tc_del_flow+0x146/0xa20 [mlx5_core] [ 1139.740377] _mlx5e_tc_del_flow+0x38/0x60 [mlx5_core] [ 1139.741534] rhashtable_free_and_destroy+0x3be/0x6f0 [ 1139.742351] mlx5e_tc_ht_cleanup+0x1b/0x30 [mlx5_core] [ 1139.743512] mlx5e_cleanup_rep_tx+0x4a/0xe0 [mlx5_core] [ 1139.744683] mlx5e_detach_netdev+0x1ca/0x2b0 [mlx5_core] [ 1139.745860] mlx5e_netdev_change_profile+0xd9/0x1c0 [mlx5_core] [ 1139.747098] mlx5e_netdev_attach_nic_profile+0x1b/0x30 [mlx5_core] [ 1139.748372] mlx5e_vport_rep_unload+0x16a/0x1b0 [mlx5_core] [ 1139.749590] __esw_offloads_unload_rep+0xb1/0xd0 [mlx5_core] [ 1139.750813] mlx5_eswitch_unregister_vport_reps+0x409/0x5f0 [mlx5_core] [ 1139.752147] mlx5e_rep_remove+0x62/0x80 [mlx5_core] [ 1139.753293] auxiliary_bus_remove+0x52/0x70 [ 1139.754028] device_release_driver_internal+0x3c1/0x600 [ 1139.754885] driver_detach+0xc1/0x180 [ 1139.755553] bus_remove_driver+0xef/0x2e0 [ 1139.756260] auxiliary_driver_unregister+0x16/0x50 [ 1139.757059] mlx5e_rep_cleanup+0x19/0x30 [mlx5_core] [ 1139.758207] mlx5e_cleanup+0x12/0x30 [mlx5_core] [ 1139.759295] mlx5_cleanup+0xc/0x49 [mlx5_core] [ 1139.760384] __x64_sys_delete_module+0x2b5/0x450 [ 1139.761166] do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90 [ 1139.761827] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 [ 1139.762663] other info that might help us debug this: [ 1139.763925] Chain exists of: &node->lock --> (work_completion)(&ht->run_work) --> &tc_ht_lock_key [ 1139.765743] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 1139.766688] CPU0 CPU1 [ 1139.767399] ---- ---- [ 1139.768111] lock(&tc_ht_lock_key); [ 1139.768704] lock((work_completion)(&ht->run_work)); [ 1139.769869] lock(&tc_ht_lock_key); [ 1139.770770] lock(&node->lock); [ 1139.771326] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 1139.772345] 2 locks held by modprobe/5998: [ 1139.772994] #0: ffff88813c1ff0e8 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: device_release_driver_internal+0x8d/0x600 [ 1139.774399] #1: ffff88813c1f96a0 (&tc_ht_lock_key){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: rhashtable_free_and_destroy+0x38/0x6f0 [ 1139.775822] stack backtrace: [ 1139.776579] CPU: 3 PID: 5998 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 6.1.0_for_upstream_debug_2022_12_12_17_02 #1 [ 1139.777935] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 1139.779529] Call Trace: [ 1139.779992] <TASK> [ 1139.780409] dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x7d [ 1139.781015] check_noncircular+0x278/0x300 [ 1139.781687] ? print_circular_bug+0x460/0x460 [ 1139.782381] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x70 [ 1139.783121] ? lock_release+0x487/0x7c0 [ 1139.783759] ? orc_find.part.0+0x1f1/0x330 [ 1139.784423] ? mark_lock.part.0+0xef/0x2fc0 [ 1139.785091] __lock_acquire+0x2cf5/0x62f0 [ 1139.785754] ? register_lock_class+0x18e0/0x18e0 [ 1139.786483] lock_acquire+0x1c1/0x540 [ 1139.787093] ? down_write_ref_node+0x7c/0xe0 [mlx5_core] [ 1139.788195] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x3f0/0x3f0 [ 1139.788978] ? register_lock_class+0x18e0/0x18e0 [ 1139.789715] down_write+0x8e/0x1f0 [ 1139.790292] ? down_write_ref_node+0x7c/0xe0 [mlx5_core] [ 1139.791380] ? down_write_killable+0x220/0x220 [ 1139.792080] ? find_held_lock+0x2d/0x110 [ 1139.792713] down_write_ref_node+0x7c/0xe0 [mlx5_core] [ 1139.793795] mlx5_del_flow_rules+0x6f/0x610 [mlx5_core] [ 1139.794879] __mlx5_eswitch_del_rule+0xdd/0x560 [mlx5_core] [ 1139.796032] ? __esw_offloads_unload_rep+0xd0/0xd0 [mlx5_core] [ 1139.797227] ? xa_load+0x11a/0x200 [ 1139.797800] ? __xa_clear_mark+0xf0/0xf0 [ 1139.798438] mlx5_eswitch_del_offloaded_rule+0x14/0x20 [mlx5_core] [ 1139.799660] mlx5e_tc_rule_unoffload+0x104/0x2b0 [mlx5_core] [ 1139.800821] mlx5e_tc_unoffload_fdb_rules+0x10c/0x1f0 [mlx5_core] [ 1139.802049] ? mlx5_eswitch_get_uplink_priv+0x25/0x80 [mlx5_core] [ 1139.803260] mlx5e_tc_del_fdb_flow+0xc3c/0xfa0 [mlx5_core] [ 1139.804398] ? __cancel_work_timer+0x1c2/0x3f0 [ 1139.805099] ? mlx5e_tc_unoffload_from_slow_path+0x460/0x460 [mlx5_core] [ 1139.806387] mlx5e_tc_del_flow+0x146/0xa20 [mlx5_core] [ 1139.807481] _mlx5e_tc_del_flow+0x38/0x60 [mlx5_core] [ 1139.808564] rhashtable_free_and_destroy+0x3be/0x6f0 [ 1139.809336] ? mlx5e_tc_del_flow+0xa20/0xa20 [mlx5_core] [ 1139.809336] ? mlx5e_tc_del_flow+0xa20/0xa20 [mlx5_core] [ 1139.810455] mlx5e_tc_ht_cleanup+0x1b/0x30 [mlx5_core] [ 1139.811552] mlx5e_cleanup_rep_tx+0x4a/0xe0 [mlx5_core] [ 1139.812655] mlx5e_detach_netdev+0x1ca/0x2b0 [mlx5_core] [ 1139.813768] mlx5e_netdev_change_profile+0xd9/0x1c0 [mlx5_core] [ 1139.814952] mlx5e_netdev_attach_nic_profile+0x1b/0x30 [mlx5_core] [ 1139.816166] mlx5e_vport_rep_unload+0x16a/0x1b0 [mlx5_core] [ 1139.817336] __esw_offloads_unload_rep+0xb1/0xd0 [mlx5_core] [ 1139.818507] mlx5_eswitch_unregister_vport_reps+0x409/0x5f0 [mlx5_core] [ 1139.819788] ? mlx5_eswitch_uplink_get_proto_dev+0x30/0x30 [mlx5_core] [ 1139.821051] ? kernfs_find_ns+0x137/0x310 [ 1139.821705] mlx5e_rep_remove+0x62/0x80 [mlx5_core] [ 1139.822778] auxiliary_bus_remove+0x52/0x70 [ 1139.823449] device_release_driver_internal+0x3c1/0x600 [ 1139.824240] driver_detach+0xc1/0x180 [ 1139.824842] bus_remove_driver+0xef/0x2e0 [ 1139.825504] auxiliary_driver_unregister+0x16/0x50 [ 1139.826245] mlx5e_rep_cleanup+0x19/0x30 [mlx5_core] [ 1139.827322] mlx5e_cleanup+0x12/0x30 [mlx5_core] [ 1139.828345] mlx5_cleanup+0xc/0x49 [mlx5_core] [ 1139.829382] __x64_sys_delete_module+0x2b5/0x450 [ 1139.830119] ? module_flags+0x300/0x300 [ 1139.830750] ? task_work_func_match+0x50/0x50 [ 1139.831440] ? task_work_cancel+0x20/0x20 [ 1139.832088] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x273/0x3f0 [ 1139.832873] ? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x1d/0x50 [ 1139.833661] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x2d/0x100 [ 1139.834328] do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90 [ 1139.834922] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 [ 1139.835700] RIP: 0033:0x7f153e71288b [ 1139.836302] Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 9d 75 0e 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa b8 b0 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 6d 75 0e 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [ 1139.838866] RSP: 002b:00007ffe0a3ed938 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000b0 [ 1139.840020] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000564c2cbf8220 RCX: 00007f153e71288b [ 1139.841043] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000800 RDI: 0000564c2cbf8288 [ 1139.842072] RBP: 0000564c2cbf8220 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 1139.843094] R10: 00007f153e7a3ac0 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000564c2cbf8288 [ 1139.844118] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000564c2cbf7ae8 R15: 00007ffe0a3efcb8 Fixes: 9ba3333 ("net/mlx5e: Avoid false lock depenency warning on tc_ht") Signed-off-by: Vlad Buslov <vladbu@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Eli Cohen <elic@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Roi Dayan <roid@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@nvidia.com>
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The commit 4af1b64 ("octeontx2-pf: Fix lmtst ID used in aura free") uses the get/put_cpu() to protect the usage of percpu pointer in ->aura_freeptr() callback, but it also unnecessarily disable the preemption for the blockable memory allocation. The commit 87b93b6 ("octeontx2-pf: Avoid use of GFP_KERNEL in atomic context") tried to fix these sleep inside atomic warnings. But it only fix the one for the non-rt kernel. For the rt kernel, we still get the similar warnings like below. BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/spinlock_rt.c:46 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 1, name: swapper/0 preempt_count: 1, expected: 0 RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0 3 locks held by swapper/0/1: #0: ffff800009fc5fe8 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: rtnl_lock+0x24/0x30 #1: ffff000100c276c0 (&mbox->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: otx2_init_hw_resources+0x8c/0x3a4 #2: ffffffbfef6537e0 (&cpu_rcache->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: alloc_iova_fast+0x1ac/0x2ac Preemption disabled at: [<ffff800008b1908c>] otx2_rq_aura_pool_init+0x14c/0x284 CPU: 20 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W 6.2.0-rc3-rt1-yocto-preempt-rt #1 Hardware name: Marvell OcteonTX CN96XX board (DT) Call trace: dump_backtrace.part.0+0xe8/0xf4 show_stack+0x20/0x30 dump_stack_lvl+0x9c/0xd8 dump_stack+0x18/0x34 __might_resched+0x188/0x224 rt_spin_lock+0x64/0x110 alloc_iova_fast+0x1ac/0x2ac iommu_dma_alloc_iova+0xd4/0x110 __iommu_dma_map+0x80/0x144 iommu_dma_map_page+0xe8/0x260 dma_map_page_attrs+0xb4/0xc0 __otx2_alloc_rbuf+0x90/0x150 otx2_rq_aura_pool_init+0x1c8/0x284 otx2_init_hw_resources+0xe4/0x3a4 otx2_open+0xf0/0x610 __dev_open+0x104/0x224 __dev_change_flags+0x1e4/0x274 dev_change_flags+0x2c/0x7c ic_open_devs+0x124/0x2f8 ip_auto_config+0x180/0x42c do_one_initcall+0x90/0x4dc do_basic_setup+0x10c/0x14c kernel_init_freeable+0x10c/0x13c kernel_init+0x2c/0x140 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Of course, we can shuffle the get/put_cpu() to only wrap the invocation of ->aura_freeptr() as what commit 87b93b6 does. But there are only two ->aura_freeptr() callbacks, otx2_aura_freeptr() and cn10k_aura_freeptr(). There is no usage of perpcu variable in the otx2_aura_freeptr() at all, so the get/put_cpu() seems redundant to it. We can move the get/put_cpu() into the corresponding callback which really has the percpu variable usage and avoid the sprinkling of get/put_cpu() in several places. Fixes: 4af1b64 ("octeontx2-pf: Fix lmtst ID used in aura free") Signed-off-by: Kevin Hao <haokexin@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230118071300.3271125-1-haokexin@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
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…kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD KVM/arm64 fixes for 6.2, take #2 - Pass the correct address to mte_clear_page_tags() on initialising a tagged page - Plug a race against a GICv4.1 doorbell interrupt while saving the vgic-v3 pending state.
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Jakub Sitnicki says: ==================== This patch set addresses the syzbot report in [1]. Patch #1 has been suggested by Eric [2]. I extended it to cover the rest of sock_map proto callbacks. Otherwise we would still overflow the stack. Patch #2 contains the actual fix and bug analysis. Patches #3 & #4 add coverage to selftests to trigger the bug. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/00000000000073b14905ef2e7401@google.com/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/all/CANn89iK2UN1FmdUcH12fv_xiZkv2G+Nskvmq7fG6aA_6VKRf6g@mail.gmail.com/ --- v1 -> v2: v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230113-sockmap-fix-v1-0-d3cad092ee10@cloudflare.com [v1 didn't hit bpf@ ML by mistake] * pull in Eric's patch to protect against recursion loop bugs (Eric) * add a macro helper to check if pointer is inside a memory range (Eric) ==================== Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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…eues(). Christoph Paasch reported that commit b5fc292 ("inet6: Remove inet6_destroy_sock() in sk->sk_prot->destroy().") started triggering WARN_ON_ONCE(sk->sk_forward_alloc) in sk_stream_kill_queues(). [0 - 2] Also, we can reproduce it by a program in [3]. In the commit, we delay freeing ipv6_pinfo.pktoptions from sk->destroy() to sk->sk_destruct(), so sk->sk_forward_alloc is no longer zero in inet_csk_destroy_sock(). The same check has been in inet_sock_destruct() from at least v2.6, we can just remove the WARN_ON_ONCE(). However, among the users of sk_stream_kill_queues(), only CAIF is not calling inet_sock_destruct(). Thus, we add the same WARN_ON_ONCE() to caif_sock_destructor(). [0]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/39725AB4-88F1-41B3-B07F-949C5CAEFF4F@icloud.com/ [1]: multipath-tcp/mptcp_net-next#341 [2]: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 3232 at net/core/stream.c:212 sk_stream_kill_queues+0x2f9/0x3e0 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 3232 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.2.0-rc5ab24eb4698afbe147b424149c529e2a43ec24eb5 #2 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:sk_stream_kill_queues+0x2f9/0x3e0 Code: 03 0f b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e ec 00 00 00 8b ab 08 01 00 00 e9 60 ff ff ff e8 d0 5f b6 fe 0f 0b eb 97 e8 c7 5f b6 fe <0f> 0b eb a0 e8 be 5f b6 fe 0f 0b e9 6a fe ff ff e8 02 07 e3 fe e9 RSP: 0018:ffff88810570fc68 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffff888101f38f40 RSI: ffffffff8285e529 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 0000000000000ce0 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000ce0 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff8881009e9488 R13: ffffffff84af2cc0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8881009e9458 FS: 00007f7fdfbd5800(0000) GS:ffff88811b600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000001b32923000 CR3: 00000001062fc006 CR4: 0000000000170ef0 Call Trace: <TASK> inet_csk_destroy_sock+0x1a1/0x320 __tcp_close+0xab6/0xe90 tcp_close+0x30/0xc0 inet_release+0xe9/0x1f0 inet6_release+0x4c/0x70 __sock_release+0xd2/0x280 sock_close+0x15/0x20 __fput+0x252/0xa20 task_work_run+0x169/0x250 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x113/0x120 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1d/0x40 do_syscall_64+0x48/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc RIP: 0033:0x7f7fdf7ae28d Code: c1 20 00 00 75 10 b8 03 00 00 00 0f 05 48 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 31 c3 48 83 ec 08 e8 ee fb ff ff 48 89 04 24 b8 03 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 8b 3c 24 48 89 c2 e8 37 fc ff ff 48 89 d0 48 83 c4 08 48 3d 01 RSP: 002b:00000000007dfbb0 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000003 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 00007f7fdf7ae28d RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffffffffffff RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 000000007f338e0f R09: 0000000000000e0f R10: 000000007f338e13 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 00007f7fdefff000 R13: 00007f7fdefffcd8 R14: 00007f7fdefffce0 R15: 00007f7fdefffcd8 </TASK> [3]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20230208004245.83497-1-kuniyu@amazon.com/ Fixes: b5fc292 ("inet6: Remove inet6_destroy_sock() in sk->sk_prot->destroy().") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Reported-by: Christoph Paasch <christophpaasch@icloud.com> Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Mar 13, 2023
Following warning reported by KASAN during driver unload ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: double-free in bnxt_remove_one+0x103/0x200 [bnxt_en] Free of addr ffff88814e8dd4c0 by task rmmod/17469 CPU: 47 PID: 17469 Comm: rmmod Kdump: loaded Tainted: G S 6.2.0-rc7+ #2 Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R740/01YM03, BIOS 2.3.10 08/15/2019 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x33/0x46 print_report+0x17b/0x4b3 ? __call_rcu_common.constprop.79+0x27e/0x8c0 ? __pfx_free_object_rcu+0x10/0x10 ? __virt_addr_valid+0xe3/0x160 ? bnxt_remove_one+0x103/0x200 [bnxt_en] kasan_report_invalid_free+0x64/0xd0 ? bnxt_remove_one+0x103/0x200 [bnxt_en] ? bnxt_remove_one+0x103/0x200 [bnxt_en] __kasan_slab_free+0x179/0x1c0 ? bnxt_remove_one+0x103/0x200 [bnxt_en] __kmem_cache_free+0x194/0x350 bnxt_remove_one+0x103/0x200 [bnxt_en] pci_device_remove+0x62/0x110 device_release_driver_internal+0xf6/0x1c0 driver_detach+0x76/0xe0 bus_remove_driver+0x89/0x160 pci_unregister_driver+0x26/0x110 ? strncpy_from_user+0x188/0x1c0 bnxt_exit+0xc/0x24 [bnxt_en] __x64_sys_delete_module+0x21f/0x390 ? __pfx___x64_sys_delete_module+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_mem_cgroup_handle_over_high+0x10/0x10 ? _raw_spin_lock+0x87/0xe0 ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10 ? __audit_syscall_entry+0x185/0x210 ? ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64+0x51/0x80 ? syscall_trace_enter.isra.18+0x126/0x1a0 do_syscall_64+0x37/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc RIP: 0033:0x7effcb6fd71b Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 6d 17 2c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa b8 b0 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 3d 17 2c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffeada270b8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000b0 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005623660e0750 RCX: 00007effcb6fd71b RDX: 000000000000000a RSI: 0000000000000800 RDI: 00005623660e07b8 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 00007ffeada26031 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00007effcb771280 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007ffeada272e0 R13: 00007ffeada28bc4 R14: 00005623660e02a0 R15: 00005623660e0750 </TASK> Auxiliary device structures are freed in bnxt_aux_dev_release. So avoid calling kfree from bnxt_remove_one. Also, set bp->edev to NULL before freeing the auxilary private structure. Fixes: d80d88b ("bnxt_en: Add auxiliary driver support") Reviewed-by: Ajit Khaparde <ajit.khaparde@broadcom.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Gospodarek <andrew.gospodarek@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: Selvin Xavier <selvin.xavier@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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&xdp_buff and &xdp_frame are bound in a way that xdp_buff->data_hard_start == xdp_frame It's always the case and e.g. xdp_convert_buff_to_frame() relies on this. IOW, the following: for (u32 i = 0; i < 0xdead; i++) { xdpf = xdp_convert_buff_to_frame(&xdp); xdp_convert_frame_to_buff(xdpf, &xdp); } shouldn't ever modify @xdpf's contents or the pointer itself. However, "live packet" code wrongly treats &xdp_frame as part of its context placed *before* the data_hard_start. With such flow, data_hard_start is sizeof(*xdpf) off to the right and no longer points to the XDP frame. Instead of replacing `sizeof(ctx)` with `offsetof(ctx, xdpf)` in several places and praying that there are no more miscalcs left somewhere in the code, unionize ::frm with ::data in a flex array, so that both starts pointing to the actual data_hard_start and the XDP frame actually starts being a part of it, i.e. a part of the headroom, not the context. A nice side effect is that the maximum frame size for this mode gets increased by 40 bytes, as xdp_buff::frame_sz includes everything from data_hard_start (-> includes xdpf already) to the end of XDP/skb shared info. Also update %MAX_PKT_SIZE accordingly in the selftests code. Leave it hardcoded for 64 bit && 4k pages, it can be made more flexible later on. Minor: align `&head->data` with how `head->frm` is assigned for consistency. Minor #2: rename 'frm' to 'frame' in &xdp_page_head while at it for clarity. (was found while testing XDP traffic generator on ice, which calls xdp_convert_frame_to_buff() for each XDP frame) Fixes: b530e9e ("bpf: Add "live packet" mode for XDP in BPF_PROG_RUN") Acked-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Alexander Lobakin <aleksander.lobakin@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230224163607.2994755-1-aleksander.lobakin@intel.com Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
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…omic context The following issue was discovered using lockdep: [ 6.691371] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at include/linux/sched/mm.h:209 [ 6.694602] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 128, non_block: 0, pid: 1, name: swapper/0 [ 6.702431] 2 locks held by swapper/0/1: [ 6.706300] #0: ffffff8800f6f188 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: __device_driver_lock+0x4c/0x90 [ 6.714900] #1: ffffffc009a2abb8 (enable_lock){....}-{2:2}, at: clk_enable_lock+0x4c/0x140 [ 6.723156] irq event stamp: 304030 [ 6.726596] hardirqs last enabled at (304029): [<ffffffc008d17ee0>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0xc0/0xd0 [ 6.736142] hardirqs last disabled at (304030): [<ffffffc00876bc5c>] clk_enable_lock+0xfc/0x140 [ 6.744742] softirqs last enabled at (303958): [<ffffffc0080904f0>] _stext+0x4f0/0x894 [ 6.752655] softirqs last disabled at (303951): [<ffffffc0080e53b8>] irq_exit+0x238/0x280 [ 6.760744] CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G U 5.15.36 #2 [ 6.768048] Hardware name: xlnx,zynqmp (DT) [ 6.772179] Call trace: [ 6.774584] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x300 [ 6.778197] show_stack+0x18/0x30 [ 6.781465] dump_stack_lvl+0xb8/0xec [ 6.785077] dump_stack+0x1c/0x38 [ 6.788345] ___might_sleep+0x1a8/0x2a0 [ 6.792129] __might_sleep+0x6c/0xd0 [ 6.795655] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x270/0x3d0 [ 6.800127] do_feature_check_call+0x100/0x220 [ 6.804513] zynqmp_pm_invoke_fn+0x8c/0xb0 [ 6.808555] zynqmp_pm_clock_getstate+0x90/0xe0 [ 6.813027] zynqmp_pll_is_enabled+0x8c/0x120 [ 6.817327] zynqmp_pll_enable+0x38/0xc0 [ 6.821197] clk_core_enable+0x144/0x400 [ 6.825067] clk_core_enable+0xd4/0x400 [ 6.828851] clk_core_enable+0xd4/0x400 [ 6.832635] clk_core_enable+0xd4/0x400 [ 6.836419] clk_core_enable+0xd4/0x400 [ 6.840203] clk_core_enable+0xd4/0x400 [ 6.843987] clk_core_enable+0xd4/0x400 [ 6.847771] clk_core_enable+0xd4/0x400 [ 6.851555] clk_core_enable_lock+0x24/0x50 [ 6.855683] clk_enable+0x24/0x40 [ 6.858952] fclk_probe+0x84/0xf0 [ 6.862220] platform_probe+0x8c/0x110 [ 6.865918] really_probe+0x110/0x5f0 [ 6.869530] __driver_probe_device+0xcc/0x210 [ 6.873830] driver_probe_device+0x64/0x140 [ 6.877958] __driver_attach+0x114/0x1f0 [ 6.881828] bus_for_each_dev+0xe8/0x160 [ 6.885698] driver_attach+0x34/0x50 [ 6.889224] bus_add_driver+0x228/0x300 [ 6.893008] driver_register+0xc0/0x1e0 [ 6.896792] __platform_driver_register+0x44/0x60 [ 6.901436] fclk_driver_init+0x1c/0x28 [ 6.905220] do_one_initcall+0x104/0x590 [ 6.909091] kernel_init_freeable+0x254/0x2bc [ 6.913390] kernel_init+0x24/0x130 [ 6.916831] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Fix it by passing the GFP_ATOMIC gfp flag for the corresponding memory allocation. Fixes: acfdd18 ("firmware: xilinx: Use hash-table for api feature check") Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev> Cc: Amit Sunil Dhamne <amit.sunil.dhamne@xilinx.com> Cc: Michal Simek <michal.simek@xilinx.com> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230308222602.123866-1-roman.gushchin@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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The following LOCKDEP was detected: Workqueue: events smc_lgr_free_work [smc] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.1.0-20221027.rc2.git8.56bc5b569087.300.fc36.s390x+debug #1 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ kworker/3:0/176251 is trying to acquire lock: 00000000f1467148 ((wq_completion)smc_tx_wq-00000000#2){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_workqueue+0x7a/0x4f0 but task is already holding lock: 0000037fffe97dc8 ((work_completion)(&(&lgr->free_work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x232/0x730 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #4 ((work_completion)(&(&lgr->free_work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x58e/0xbd8 lock_acquire.part.0+0xe2/0x248 lock_acquire+0xac/0x1c8 __flush_work+0x76/0xf0 __cancel_work_timer+0x170/0x220 __smc_lgr_terminate.part.0+0x34/0x1c0 [smc] smc_connect_rdma+0x15e/0x418 [smc] __smc_connect+0x234/0x480 [smc] smc_connect+0x1d6/0x230 [smc] __sys_connect+0x90/0xc0 __do_sys_socketcall+0x186/0x370 __do_syscall+0x1da/0x208 system_call+0x82/0xb0 -> #3 (smc_client_lgr_pending){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x58e/0xbd8 lock_acquire.part.0+0xe2/0x248 lock_acquire+0xac/0x1c8 __mutex_lock+0x96/0x8e8 mutex_lock_nested+0x32/0x40 smc_connect_rdma+0xa4/0x418 [smc] __smc_connect+0x234/0x480 [smc] smc_connect+0x1d6/0x230 [smc] __sys_connect+0x90/0xc0 __do_sys_socketcall+0x186/0x370 __do_syscall+0x1da/0x208 system_call+0x82/0xb0 -> #2 (sk_lock-AF_SMC){+.+.}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x58e/0xbd8 lock_acquire.part.0+0xe2/0x248 lock_acquire+0xac/0x1c8 lock_sock_nested+0x46/0xa8 smc_tx_work+0x34/0x50 [smc] process_one_work+0x30c/0x730 worker_thread+0x62/0x420 kthread+0x138/0x150 __ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x58 ret_from_fork+0xa/0x40 -> #1 ((work_completion)(&(&smc->conn.tx_work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x58e/0xbd8 lock_acquire.part.0+0xe2/0x248 lock_acquire+0xac/0x1c8 process_one_work+0x2bc/0x730 worker_thread+0x62/0x420 kthread+0x138/0x150 __ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x58 ret_from_fork+0xa/0x40 -> #0 ((wq_completion)smc_tx_wq-00000000#2){+.+.}-{0:0}: check_prev_add+0xd8/0xe88 validate_chain+0x70c/0xb20 __lock_acquire+0x58e/0xbd8 lock_acquire.part.0+0xe2/0x248 lock_acquire+0xac/0x1c8 __flush_workqueue+0xaa/0x4f0 drain_workqueue+0xaa/0x158 destroy_workqueue+0x44/0x2d8 smc_lgr_free+0x9e/0xf8 [smc] process_one_work+0x30c/0x730 worker_thread+0x62/0x420 kthread+0x138/0x150 __ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x58 ret_from_fork+0xa/0x40 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: (wq_completion)smc_tx_wq-00000000#2 --> smc_client_lgr_pending --> (work_completion)(&(&lgr->free_work)->work) Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock((work_completion)(&(&lgr->free_work)->work)); lock(smc_client_lgr_pending); lock((work_completion) (&(&lgr->free_work)->work)); lock((wq_completion)smc_tx_wq-00000000#2); *** DEADLOCK *** 2 locks held by kworker/3:0/176251: #0: 0000000080183548 ((wq_completion)events){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x232/0x730 #1: 0000037fffe97dc8 ((work_completion) (&(&lgr->free_work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x232/0x730 stack backtrace: CPU: 3 PID: 176251 Comm: kworker/3:0 Not tainted Hardware name: IBM 8561 T01 701 (z/VM 7.2.0) Call Trace: [<000000002983c3e4>] dump_stack_lvl+0xac/0x100 [<0000000028b477ae>] check_noncircular+0x13e/0x160 [<0000000028b48808>] check_prev_add+0xd8/0xe88 [<0000000028b49cc4>] validate_chain+0x70c/0xb20 [<0000000028b4bd26>] __lock_acquire+0x58e/0xbd8 [<0000000028b4cf6a>] lock_acquire.part.0+0xe2/0x248 [<0000000028b4d17c>] lock_acquire+0xac/0x1c8 [<0000000028addaaa>] __flush_workqueue+0xaa/0x4f0 [<0000000028addf9a>] drain_workqueue+0xaa/0x158 [<0000000028ae303c>] destroy_workqueue+0x44/0x2d8 [<000003ff8029af26>] smc_lgr_free+0x9e/0xf8 [smc] [<0000000028adf3d4>] process_one_work+0x30c/0x730 [<0000000028adf85a>] worker_thread+0x62/0x420 [<0000000028aeac50>] kthread+0x138/0x150 [<0000000028a63914>] __ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x58 [<00000000298503da>] ret_from_fork+0xa/0x40 INFO: lockdep is turned off. =================================================================== This deadlock occurs because cancel_delayed_work_sync() waits for the work(&lgr->free_work) to finish, while the &lgr->free_work waits for the work(lgr->tx_wq), which needs the sk_lock-AF_SMC, that is already used under the mutex_lock. The solution is to use cancel_delayed_work() instead, which kills off a pending work. Fixes: a52bcc9 ("net/smc: improve termination processing") Signed-off-by: Wenjia Zhang <wenjia@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Karcher <jaka@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Karsten Graul <kgraul@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Tony Lu <tonylu@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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The naming of space_info->active_total_bytes is misleading. It counts not only active block groups but also full ones which are previously active but now inactive. That confusion results in a bug not counting the full BGs into active_total_bytes on mount time. For a background, there are three kinds of block groups in terms of activation. 1. Block groups never activated 2. Block groups currently active 3. Block groups previously active and currently inactive (due to fully written or zone finish) What we really wanted to exclude from "total_bytes" is the total size of BGs #1. They seem empty and allocatable but since they are not activated, we cannot rely on them to do the space reservation. And, since BGs #1 never get activated, they should have no "used", "reserved" and "pinned" bytes. OTOH, BGs #3 can be counted in the "total", since they are already full we cannot allocate from them anyway. For them, "total_bytes == used + reserved + pinned + zone_unusable" should hold. Tracking #2 and #3 as "active_total_bytes" (current implementation) is confusing. And, tracking #1 and subtract that properly from "total_bytes" every time you need space reservation is cumbersome. Instead, we can count the whole region of a newly allocated block group as zone_unusable. Then, once that block group is activated, release [0 .. zone_capacity] from the zone_unusable counters. With this, we can eliminate the confusing ->active_total_bytes and the code will be common among regular and the zoned mode. Also, no additional counter is needed with this approach. Fixes: 6a921de ("btrfs: zoned: introduce space_info->active_total_bytes") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.1+ Signed-off-by: Naohiro Aota <naohiro.aota@wdc.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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The check introduced in the commit a5fd394 ("igc: Lift TAPRIO schedule restriction") can detect a false positive error in some corner case. For instance, tc qdisc replace ... taprio num_tc 4 ... sched-entry S 0x01 100000 # slot#1 sched-entry S 0x03 100000 # slot#2 sched-entry S 0x04 100000 # slot#3 sched-entry S 0x08 200000 # slot#4 flags 0x02 # hardware offload Here the queue#0 (the first queue) is on at the slot#1 and #2, and off at the slot#3 and #4. Under the current logic, when the slot#4 is examined, validate_schedule() returns *false* since the enablement count for the queue#0 is two and it is already off at the previous slot (i.e. #3). But this definition is truely correct. Let's fix the logic to enforce a strict validation for consecutively-opened slots. Fixes: a5fd394 ("igc: Lift TAPRIO schedule restriction") Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Kurt Kanzenbach <kurt@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Vinicius Costa Gomes <vinicius.gomes@intel.com> Tested-by: Naama Meir <naamax.meir@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
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When a system with E810 with existing VFs gets rebooted the following hang may be observed. Pid 1 is hung in iavf_remove(), part of a network driver: PID: 1 TASK: ffff965400e5a340 CPU: 24 COMMAND: "systemd-shutdow" #0 [ffffaad04005fa50] __schedule at ffffffff8b3239cb #1 [ffffaad04005fae8] schedule at ffffffff8b323e2d #2 [ffffaad04005fb00] schedule_hrtimeout_range_clock at ffffffff8b32cebc #3 [ffffaad04005fb80] usleep_range_state at ffffffff8b32c930 #4 [ffffaad04005fbb0] iavf_remove at ffffffffc12b9b4c [iavf] #5 [ffffaad04005fbf0] pci_device_remove at ffffffff8add7513 #6 [ffffaad04005fc10] device_release_driver_internal at ffffffff8af08baa #7 [ffffaad04005fc40] pci_stop_bus_device at ffffffff8adcc5fc #8 [ffffaad04005fc60] pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device at ffffffff8adcc81e #9 [ffffaad04005fc70] pci_iov_remove_virtfn at ffffffff8adf9429 #10 [ffffaad04005fca8] sriov_disable at ffffffff8adf98e4 #11 [ffffaad04005fcc8] ice_free_vfs at ffffffffc04bb2c8 [ice] #12 [ffffaad04005fd10] ice_remove at ffffffffc04778fe [ice] #13 [ffffaad04005fd38] ice_shutdown at ffffffffc0477946 [ice] #14 [ffffaad04005fd50] pci_device_shutdown at ffffffff8add58f1 #15 [ffffaad04005fd70] device_shutdown at ffffffff8af05386 #16 [ffffaad04005fd98] kernel_restart at ffffffff8a92a870 #17 [ffffaad04005fda8] __do_sys_reboot at ffffffff8a92abd6 #18 [ffffaad04005fee0] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff8b317159 #19 [ffffaad04005ff08] __context_tracking_enter at ffffffff8b31b6fc #20 [ffffaad04005ff18] syscall_exit_to_user_mode at ffffffff8b31b50d #21 [ffffaad04005ff28] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff8b317169 #22 [ffffaad04005ff50] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffff8b40009b RIP: 00007f1baa5c13d7 RSP: 00007fffbcc55a98 RFLAGS: 00000202 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f1baa5c13d7 RDX: 0000000001234567 RSI: 0000000028121969 RDI: 00000000fee1dead RBP: 00007fffbcc55ca0 R8: 0000000000000000 R9: 00007fffbcc54e90 R10: 00007fffbcc55050 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000005 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007fffbcc55af0 R15: 0000000000000000 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a9 CS: 0033 SS: 002b During reboot all drivers PM shutdown callbacks are invoked. In iavf_shutdown() the adapter state is changed to __IAVF_REMOVE. In ice_shutdown() the call chain above is executed, which at some point calls iavf_remove(). However iavf_remove() expects the VF to be in one of the states __IAVF_RUNNING, __IAVF_DOWN or __IAVF_INIT_FAILED. If that's not the case it sleeps forever. So if iavf_shutdown() gets invoked before iavf_remove() the system will hang indefinitely because the adapter is already in state __IAVF_REMOVE. Fix this by returning from iavf_remove() if the state is __IAVF_REMOVE, as we already went through iavf_shutdown(). Fixes: 9745780 ("iavf: Add waiting so the port is initialized in remove") Fixes: a841733 ("iavf: Fix race condition between iavf_shutdown and iavf_remove") Reported-by: Marius Cornea <mcornea@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Assmann <sassmann@kpanic.de> Reviewed-by: Michal Kubiak <michal.kubiak@intel.com> Tested-by: Rafal Romanowski <rafal.romanowski@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
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…kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD KVM/arm64 fixes for 6.3, part #2 Fixes for a rather interesting set of bugs relating to the MMU: - Read the MMU notifier seq before dropping the mmap lock to guard against reading a potentially stale VMA - Disable interrupts when walking user page tables to protect against the page table being freed - Read the MTE permissions for the VMA within the mmap lock critical section, avoiding the use of a potentally stale VMA pointer Additionally, some fixes targeting the vPMU: - Return the sum of the current perf event value and PMC snapshot for reads from userspace - Don't save the value of guest writes to PMCR_EL0.{C,P}, which could otherwise lead to userspace erroneously resetting the vPMU during VM save/restore
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Apr 17, 2023
…ct_cfm This attempts to fix the following trace: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.3.0-rc2-g0b93eeba4454 #4703 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ kworker/u3:0/46 is trying to acquire lock: ffff888001fd9130 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_SCO){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: sco_connect_cfm+0x118/0x4a0 but task is already holding lock: ffffffff831e3340 (hci_cb_list_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: hci_sync_conn_complete_evt+0x1ad/0x3d0 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (hci_cb_list_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x13b/0xcc0 hci_sync_conn_complete_evt+0x1ad/0x3d0 hci_event_packet+0x55c/0x7c0 hci_rx_work+0x34c/0xa00 process_one_work+0x575/0x910 worker_thread+0x89/0x6f0 kthread+0x14e/0x180 ret_from_fork+0x2b/0x50 -> #1 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x13b/0xcc0 sco_sock_connect+0xfc/0x630 __sys_connect+0x197/0x1b0 __x64_sys_connect+0x37/0x50 do_syscall_64+0x42/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x70/0xda -> #0 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_SCO){+.+.}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x18cc/0x3740 lock_acquire+0x151/0x3a0 lock_sock_nested+0x32/0x80 sco_connect_cfm+0x118/0x4a0 hci_sync_conn_complete_evt+0x1e6/0x3d0 hci_event_packet+0x55c/0x7c0 hci_rx_work+0x34c/0xa00 process_one_work+0x575/0x910 worker_thread+0x89/0x6f0 kthread+0x14e/0x180 ret_from_fork+0x2b/0x50 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_SCO --> &hdev->lock --> hci_cb_list_lock Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(hci_cb_list_lock); lock(&hdev->lock); lock(hci_cb_list_lock); lock(sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_SCO); *** DEADLOCK *** 4 locks held by kworker/u3:0/46: #0: ffff8880028d1130 ((wq_completion)hci0#2){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x4c0/0x910 #1: ffff8880013dfde0 ((work_completion)(&hdev->rx_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x4c0/0x910 #2: ffff8880025d8070 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: hci_sync_conn_complete_evt+0xa6/0x3d0 #3: ffffffffb79e3340 (hci_cb_list_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: hci_sync_conn_complete_evt+0x1ad/0x3d0 Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
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…sockopt This attempts to fix the following trace: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.3.0-rc2-g68fcb3a7bf97 #4706 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ sco-tester/31 is trying to acquire lock: ffff8880025b8070 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: sco_sock_getsockopt+0x1fc/0xa90 but task is already holding lock: ffff888001eeb130 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_SCO){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: sco_sock_getsockopt+0x104/0xa90 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_SCO){+.+.}-{0:0}: lock_sock_nested+0x32/0x80 sco_connect_cfm+0x118/0x4a0 hci_sync_conn_complete_evt+0x1e6/0x3d0 hci_event_packet+0x55c/0x7c0 hci_rx_work+0x34c/0xa00 process_one_work+0x575/0x910 worker_thread+0x89/0x6f0 kthread+0x14e/0x180 ret_from_fork+0x2b/0x50 -> #1 (hci_cb_list_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x13b/0xcc0 hci_sync_conn_complete_evt+0x1ad/0x3d0 hci_event_packet+0x55c/0x7c0 hci_rx_work+0x34c/0xa00 process_one_work+0x575/0x910 worker_thread+0x89/0x6f0 kthread+0x14e/0x180 ret_from_fork+0x2b/0x50 -> #0 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x18cc/0x3740 lock_acquire+0x151/0x3a0 __mutex_lock+0x13b/0xcc0 sco_sock_getsockopt+0x1fc/0xa90 __sys_getsockopt+0xe9/0x190 __x64_sys_getsockopt+0x5b/0x70 do_syscall_64+0x42/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x70/0xda other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &hdev->lock --> hci_cb_list_lock --> sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_SCO Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_SCO); lock(hci_cb_list_lock); lock(sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_SCO); lock(&hdev->lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 1 lock held by sco-tester/31: #0: ffff888001eeb130 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_SCO){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: sco_sock_getsockopt+0x104/0xa90 Fixes: 248733e ("Bluetooth: Allow querying of supported offload codecs over SCO socket") Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
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During an IGT GPU reset test we see the following oops, [ +0.000003] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ +0.000000] WARNING: CPU: 9 PID: 0 at kernel/workqueue.c:1656 __queue_delayed_work+0x6d/0xa0 [ +0.000004] Modules linked in: iptable_filter bpfilter amdgpu(OE) nls_iso8859_1 snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_hda_codec_generic intel_rapl_msr ledtrig_audio snd_hda_codec_hdmi intel_rapl_common snd_hda_intel edac_mce_amd snd_intel_dspcfg snd_intel_sdw_acpi snd_hda_codec snd_hda_core iommu_v2 gpu_sched(OE) kvm_amd drm_buddy snd_hwdep kvm video drm_ttm_helper snd_pcm ttm snd_seq_midi drm_display_helper snd_seq_midi_event snd_rawmidi cec crct10dif_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel sha512_ssse3 snd_seq aesni_intel rc_core crypto_simd cryptd binfmt_misc drm_kms_helper rapl snd_seq_device input_leds joydev snd_timer i2c_algo_bit syscopyarea snd ccp sysfillrect sysimgblt wmi_bmof k10temp soundcore mac_hid sch_fq_codel msr parport_pc ppdev drm lp parport ramoops reed_solomon pstore_blk pstore_zone efi_pstore ip_tables x_tables autofs4 hid_generic usbhid hid r8169 ahci xhci_pci gpio_amdpt realtek i2c_piix4 wmi crc32_pclmul xhci_pci_renesas libahci gpio_generic [ +0.000070] CPU: 9 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/9 Tainted: G W OE 6.1.11+ #2 [ +0.000003] Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. AB350-Gaming 3/AB350-Gaming 3-CF, BIOS F7 06/16/2017 [ +0.000001] RIP: 0010:__queue_delayed_work+0x6d/0xa0 [ +0.000003] Code: 7a 50 48 01 c1 48 89 4a 30 81 ff 00 20 00 00 75 38 4c 89 cf e8 64 3e 0a 00 5d e9 1e c5 11 01 e8 99 f7 ff ff 5d e9 13 c5 11 01 <0f> 0b eb c1 0f 0b 48 81 7a 38 70 5c 0e 81 74 9f 0f 0b 48 8b 42 28 [ +0.000002] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000398d60 EFLAGS: 00010007 [ +0.000002] RAX: ffff88810d589c60 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ +0.000002] RDX: ffff88810d589c58 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000002000 [ +0.000001] RBP: ffffc90000398d60 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88810d589c78 [ +0.000002] R10: 72705f305f39765f R11: 7866673a6d72645b R12: ffff88810d589c58 [ +0.000001] R13: 0000000000002000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ +0.000002] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8887fee40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ +0.000001] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ +0.000002] CR2: 00005562c4797fa0 CR3: 0000000110da0000 CR4: 00000000003506e0 [ +0.000002] Call Trace: [ +0.000001] <IRQ> [ +0.000001] mod_delayed_work_on+0x5e/0xa0 [ +0.000004] drm_sched_fault+0x23/0x30 [gpu_sched] [ +0.000007] gfx_v9_0_fault.isra.0+0xa6/0xd0 [amdgpu] [ +0.000258] gfx_v9_0_priv_reg_irq+0x29/0x40 [amdgpu] [ +0.000254] amdgpu_irq_dispatch+0x1ac/0x2b0 [amdgpu] [ +0.000243] amdgpu_ih_process+0x89/0x130 [amdgpu] [ +0.000245] amdgpu_irq_handler+0x24/0x60 [amdgpu] [ +0.000165] __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x4f/0x1a0 [ +0.000003] handle_irq_event_percpu+0x15/0x50 [ +0.000001] handle_irq_event+0x39/0x60 [ +0.000002] handle_edge_irq+0xa8/0x250 [ +0.000003] __common_interrupt+0x7b/0x150 [ +0.000002] common_interrupt+0xc1/0xe0 [ +0.000003] </IRQ> [ +0.000000] <TASK> [ +0.000001] asm_common_interrupt+0x27/0x40 [ +0.000002] RIP: 0010:native_safe_halt+0xb/0x10 [ +0.000003] Code: 46 ff ff ff cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc eb 07 0f 00 2d 69 f2 5e 00 f4 e9 f1 3b 3e 00 90 eb 07 0f 00 2d 59 f2 5e 00 fb f4 <e9> e0 3b 3e 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 53 e8 b1 d4 fe ff 66 90 [ +0.000002] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000018fdc8 EFLAGS: 00000246 [ +0.000002] RAX: 0000000000004000 RBX: 000000000002e5a8 RCX: 000000000000001f [ +0.000001] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffff888101298800 RDI: ffff888101298864 [ +0.000001] RBP: ffffc9000018fdd0 R08: 000000527f64bd8b R09: 000000000001dc90 [ +0.000001] R10: 000000000001dc90 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: 0000000000000001 [ +0.000001] R13: ffff888101298864 R14: ffffffff832d9e20 R15: ffff888193aa8c00 [ +0.000003] ? acpi_idle_do_entry+0x5e/0x70 [ +0.000002] acpi_idle_enter+0xd1/0x160 [ +0.000003] cpuidle_enter_state+0x9a/0x6e0 [ +0.000003] cpuidle_enter+0x2e/0x50 [ +0.000003] call_cpuidle+0x23/0x50 [ +0.000002] do_idle+0x1de/0x260 [ +0.000002] cpu_startup_entry+0x20/0x30 [ +0.000002] start_secondary+0x120/0x150 [ +0.000003] secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xe5/0xeb [ +0.000004] </TASK> [ +0.000000] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ +0.000003] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000102 [ +0.006233] [drm:amdgpu_job_timedout [amdgpu]] *ERROR* ring gfx_low timeout, signaled seq=3, emitted seq=4 [ +0.000734] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ +0.009670] [drm:amdgpu_job_timedout [amdgpu]] *ERROR* Process information: process amd_deadlock pid 2002 thread amd_deadlock pid 2002 [ +0.005135] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ +0.000002] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ +0.000002] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ +0.000002] CPU: 9 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/9 Tainted: G W OE 6.1.11+ #2 [ +0.000002] Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. AB350-Gaming 3/AB350-Gaming 3-CF, BIOS F7 06/16/2017 [ +0.012101] amdgpu 0000:0c:00.0: amdgpu: GPU reset begin! [ +0.005136] RIP: 0010:__queue_work+0x1f/0x4e0 [ +0.000004] Code: 87 cd 11 01 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 57 41 56 41 55 49 89 d5 41 54 49 89 f4 53 48 83 ec 10 89 7d d4 <f6> 86 02 01 00 00 01 0f 85 6c 03 00 00 e8 7f 36 08 00 8b 45 d4 48 For gfx_rings the schedulers may not be initialized by amdgpu_device_init_schedulers() due to ring->no_scheduler flag being set to true and thus the timeout_wq is NULL. As a result, since all ASICs call drm_sched_fault() unconditionally even for schedulers which have not been initialized, it is simpler to use the ready condition which indicates whether the given scheduler worker thread runs and whether the timeout_wq of the reset domain has been initialized. Signed-off-by: Vitaly Prosyak <vitaly.prosyak@amd.com> Cc: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Luben Tuikov <luben.tuikov@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Luben Tuikov <luben.tuikov@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230406200054.633379-1-luben.tuikov@amd.com
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xfs/170 on a filesystem with su=128k,sw=4 produces this splat: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000010 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP CPU: 1 PID: 4022907 Comm: dd Tainted: G W 6.3.0-xfsx #2 6ebeeffbe9577d32 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS ?-20171121_152543-x86-ol7-bu RIP: 0010:xfs_perag_rele+0x10/0x70 [xfs] RSP: 0018:ffffc90001e43858 EFLAGS: 00010217 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000100 RDX: ffffffffa054e717 RSI: 0000000000000005 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff888194eea000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000037 R10: ffff888100ac1cb0 R11: 0000000000000018 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffffc90001e43a38 R14: ffff888194eea000 R15: ffff888194eea000 FS: 00007f93d1a0e740(0000) GS:ffff88843fc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 000000018a34f000 CR4: 00000000003506e0 Call Trace: <TASK> xfs_bmap_btalloc+0x1a7/0x5d0 [xfs f85291d6841cbb3dc740083f1f331c0327394518] xfs_bmapi_allocate+0xee/0x470 [xfs f85291d6841cbb3dc740083f1f331c0327394518] xfs_bmapi_write+0x539/0x9e0 [xfs f85291d6841cbb3dc740083f1f331c0327394518] xfs_iomap_write_direct+0x1bb/0x2b0 [xfs f85291d6841cbb3dc740083f1f331c0327394518] xfs_direct_write_iomap_begin+0x51c/0x710 [xfs f85291d6841cbb3dc740083f1f331c0327394518] iomap_iter+0x132/0x2f0 __iomap_dio_rw+0x2f8/0x840 iomap_dio_rw+0xe/0x30 xfs_file_dio_write_aligned+0xad/0x180 [xfs f85291d6841cbb3dc740083f1f331c0327394518] xfs_file_write_iter+0xfb/0x190 [xfs f85291d6841cbb3dc740083f1f331c0327394518] vfs_write+0x2eb/0x410 ksys_write+0x65/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0x2b/0x80 This crash occurs under the "out_low_space" label. We grabbed a perag reference, passed it via args->pag into xfs_bmap_btalloc_at_eof, and afterwards args->pag is NULL. Fix the second function not to clobber args->pag if the caller had passed one in. Fixes: 8584332 ("xfs: factor xfs_bmap_btalloc()") Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
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KCSAN found a data race in sock_recv_cmsgs() where the read access to sk->sk_stamp needs READ_ONCE(). BUG: KCSAN: data-race in packet_recvmsg / packet_recvmsg write (marked) to 0xffff88803c81f258 of 8 bytes by task 19171 on cpu 0: sock_write_timestamp include/net/sock.h:2670 [inline] sock_recv_cmsgs include/net/sock.h:2722 [inline] packet_recvmsg+0xb97/0xd00 net/packet/af_packet.c:3489 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1019 [inline] sock_recvmsg+0x11a/0x130 net/socket.c:1040 sock_read_iter+0x176/0x220 net/socket.c:1118 call_read_iter include/linux/fs.h:1845 [inline] new_sync_read fs/read_write.c:389 [inline] vfs_read+0x5e0/0x630 fs/read_write.c:470 ksys_read+0x163/0x1a0 fs/read_write.c:613 __do_sys_read fs/read_write.c:623 [inline] __se_sys_read fs/read_write.c:621 [inline] __x64_sys_read+0x41/0x50 fs/read_write.c:621 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc read to 0xffff88803c81f258 of 8 bytes by task 19183 on cpu 1: sock_recv_cmsgs include/net/sock.h:2721 [inline] packet_recvmsg+0xb64/0xd00 net/packet/af_packet.c:3489 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1019 [inline] sock_recvmsg+0x11a/0x130 net/socket.c:1040 sock_read_iter+0x176/0x220 net/socket.c:1118 call_read_iter include/linux/fs.h:1845 [inline] new_sync_read fs/read_write.c:389 [inline] vfs_read+0x5e0/0x630 fs/read_write.c:470 ksys_read+0x163/0x1a0 fs/read_write.c:613 __do_sys_read fs/read_write.c:623 [inline] __se_sys_read fs/read_write.c:621 [inline] __x64_sys_read+0x41/0x50 fs/read_write.c:621 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc value changed: 0xffffffffc4653600 -> 0x0000000000000000 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 1 PID: 19183 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 6.3.0-rc7-02330-gca6270c12e20 #2 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Fixes: 6c7c98b ("sock: avoid dirtying sk_stamp, if possible") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230508175543.55756-1-kuniyu@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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KCSAN found a data race of sk->sk_receive_queue->qlen where recvmsg() updates qlen under the queue lock and sendmsg() checks qlen under unix_state_sock(), not the queue lock, so the reader side needs READ_ONCE(). BUG: KCSAN: data-race in __skb_try_recv_from_queue / unix_wait_for_peer write (marked) to 0xffff888019fe7c68 of 4 bytes by task 49792 on cpu 0: __skb_unlink include/linux/skbuff.h:2347 [inline] __skb_try_recv_from_queue+0x3de/0x470 net/core/datagram.c:197 __skb_try_recv_datagram+0xf7/0x390 net/core/datagram.c:263 __unix_dgram_recvmsg+0x109/0x8a0 net/unix/af_unix.c:2452 unix_dgram_recvmsg+0x94/0xa0 net/unix/af_unix.c:2549 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1019 [inline] ____sys_recvmsg+0x3a3/0x3b0 net/socket.c:2720 ___sys_recvmsg+0xc8/0x150 net/socket.c:2764 do_recvmmsg+0x182/0x560 net/socket.c:2858 __sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2937 [inline] __do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2960 [inline] __se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2953 [inline] __x64_sys_recvmmsg+0x153/0x170 net/socket.c:2953 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc read to 0xffff888019fe7c68 of 4 bytes by task 49793 on cpu 1: skb_queue_len include/linux/skbuff.h:2127 [inline] unix_recvq_full net/unix/af_unix.c:229 [inline] unix_wait_for_peer+0x154/0x1a0 net/unix/af_unix.c:1445 unix_dgram_sendmsg+0x13bc/0x14b0 net/unix/af_unix.c:2048 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:724 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0x148/0x160 net/socket.c:747 ____sys_sendmsg+0x20e/0x620 net/socket.c:2503 ___sys_sendmsg+0xc6/0x140 net/socket.c:2557 __sys_sendmmsg+0x11d/0x370 net/socket.c:2643 __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2672 [inline] __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2669 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x58/0x70 net/socket.c:2669 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc value changed: 0x0000000b -> 0x00000001 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 1 PID: 49793 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.3.0-rc7-02330-gca6270c12e20 #2 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Fixes: 1da177e ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reviewed-by: Michal Kubiak <michal.kubiak@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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May 15, 2023
KCSAN found a data race around sk->sk_shutdown where unix_release_sock() and unix_shutdown() update it under unix_state_lock(), OTOH unix_poll() and unix_dgram_poll() read it locklessly. We need to annotate the writes and reads with WRITE_ONCE() and READ_ONCE(). BUG: KCSAN: data-race in unix_poll / unix_release_sock write to 0xffff88800d0f8aec of 1 bytes by task 264 on cpu 0: unix_release_sock+0x75c/0x910 net/unix/af_unix.c:631 unix_release+0x59/0x80 net/unix/af_unix.c:1042 __sock_release+0x7d/0x170 net/socket.c:653 sock_close+0x19/0x30 net/socket.c:1397 __fput+0x179/0x5e0 fs/file_table.c:321 ____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:349 task_work_run+0x116/0x1a0 kernel/task_work.c:179 resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:49 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:171 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x174/0x180 kernel/entry/common.c:204 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:286 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1a/0x30 kernel/entry/common.c:297 do_syscall_64+0x4b/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc read to 0xffff88800d0f8aec of 1 bytes by task 222 on cpu 1: unix_poll+0xa3/0x2a0 net/unix/af_unix.c:3170 sock_poll+0xcf/0x2b0 net/socket.c:1385 vfs_poll include/linux/poll.h:88 [inline] ep_item_poll.isra.0+0x78/0xc0 fs/eventpoll.c:855 ep_send_events fs/eventpoll.c:1694 [inline] ep_poll fs/eventpoll.c:1823 [inline] do_epoll_wait+0x6c4/0xea0 fs/eventpoll.c:2258 __do_sys_epoll_wait fs/eventpoll.c:2270 [inline] __se_sys_epoll_wait fs/eventpoll.c:2265 [inline] __x64_sys_epoll_wait+0xcc/0x190 fs/eventpoll.c:2265 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc value changed: 0x00 -> 0x03 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 1 PID: 222 Comm: dbus-broker Not tainted 6.3.0-rc7-02330-gca6270c12e20 #2 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Fixes: 3c73419 ("af_unix: fix 'poll for write'/ connected DGRAM sockets") Fixes: 1da177e ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reviewed-by: Michal Kubiak <michal.kubiak@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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May 22, 2023
In the function ieee80211_tx_dequeue() there is a particular locking sequence: begin: spin_lock(&local->queue_stop_reason_lock); q_stopped = local->queue_stop_reasons[q]; spin_unlock(&local->queue_stop_reason_lock); However small the chance (increased by ftracetest), an asynchronous interrupt can occur in between of spin_lock() and spin_unlock(), and the interrupt routine will attempt to lock the same &local->queue_stop_reason_lock again. This will cause a costly reset of the CPU and the wifi device or an altogether hang in the single CPU and single core scenario. The only remaining spin_lock(&local->queue_stop_reason_lock) that did not disable interrupts was patched, which should prevent any deadlocks on the same CPU/core and the same wifi device. This is the probable trace of the deadlock: kernel: ================================ kernel: WARNING: inconsistent lock state kernel: 6.3.0-rc6-mt-20230401-00001-gf86822a1170f #4 Tainted: G W kernel: -------------------------------- kernel: inconsistent {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} -> {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} usage. kernel: kworker/5:0/25656 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE1:SE1] takes: kernel: ffff9d6190779478 (&local->queue_stop_reason_lock){+.?.}-{2:2}, at: return_to_handler+0x0/0x40 kernel: {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} state was registered at: kernel: lock_acquire+0xc7/0x2d0 kernel: _raw_spin_lock+0x36/0x50 kernel: ieee80211_tx_dequeue+0xb4/0x1330 [mac80211] kernel: iwl_mvm_mac_itxq_xmit+0xae/0x210 [iwlmvm] kernel: iwl_mvm_mac_wake_tx_queue+0x2d/0xd0 [iwlmvm] kernel: ieee80211_queue_skb+0x450/0x730 [mac80211] kernel: __ieee80211_xmit_fast.constprop.66+0x834/0xa50 [mac80211] kernel: __ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0x217/0x530 [mac80211] kernel: ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0x60/0x580 [mac80211] kernel: dev_hard_start_xmit+0xb5/0x260 kernel: __dev_queue_xmit+0xdbe/0x1200 kernel: neigh_resolve_output+0x166/0x260 kernel: ip_finish_output2+0x216/0xb80 kernel: __ip_finish_output+0x2a4/0x4d0 kernel: ip_finish_output+0x2d/0xd0 kernel: ip_output+0x82/0x2b0 kernel: ip_local_out+0xec/0x110 kernel: igmpv3_sendpack+0x5c/0x90 kernel: igmp_ifc_timer_expire+0x26e/0x4e0 kernel: call_timer_fn+0xa5/0x230 kernel: run_timer_softirq+0x27f/0x550 kernel: __do_softirq+0xb4/0x3a4 kernel: irq_exit_rcu+0x9b/0xc0 kernel: sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x80/0xa0 kernel: asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1f/0x30 kernel: _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3f/0x70 kernel: free_to_partial_list+0x3d6/0x590 kernel: __slab_free+0x1b7/0x310 kernel: kmem_cache_free+0x52d/0x550 kernel: putname+0x5d/0x70 kernel: do_sys_openat2+0x1d7/0x310 kernel: do_sys_open+0x51/0x80 kernel: __x64_sys_openat+0x24/0x30 kernel: do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x90 kernel: entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc kernel: irq event stamp: 5120729 kernel: hardirqs last enabled at (5120729): [<ffffffff9d149936>] trace_graph_return+0xd6/0x120 kernel: hardirqs last disabled at (5120728): [<ffffffff9d149950>] trace_graph_return+0xf0/0x120 kernel: softirqs last enabled at (5069900): [<ffffffff9cf65b60>] return_to_handler+0x0/0x40 kernel: softirqs last disabled at (5067555): [<ffffffff9cf65b60>] return_to_handler+0x0/0x40 kernel: other info that might help us debug this: kernel: Possible unsafe locking scenario: kernel: CPU0 kernel: ---- kernel: lock(&local->queue_stop_reason_lock); kernel: <Interrupt> kernel: lock(&local->queue_stop_reason_lock); kernel: *** DEADLOCK *** kernel: 8 locks held by kworker/5:0/25656: kernel: #0: ffff9d618009d138 ((wq_completion)events_freezable){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1ca/0x530 kernel: #1: ffffb1ef4637fe68 ((work_completion)(&local->restart_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1ce/0x530 kernel: #2: ffffffff9f166548 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: return_to_handler+0x0/0x40 kernel: #3: ffff9d6190778728 (&rdev->wiphy.mtx){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: return_to_handler+0x0/0x40 kernel: #4: ffff9d619077b480 (&mvm->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: return_to_handler+0x0/0x40 kernel: #5: ffff9d61907bacd8 (&trans_pcie->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: return_to_handler+0x0/0x40 kernel: #6: ffffffff9ef9cda0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: iwl_mvm_queue_state_change+0x59/0x3a0 [iwlmvm] kernel: #7: ffffffff9ef9cda0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: iwl_mvm_mac_itxq_xmit+0x42/0x210 [iwlmvm] kernel: stack backtrace: kernel: CPU: 5 PID: 25656 Comm: kworker/5:0 Tainted: G W 6.3.0-rc6-mt-20230401-00001-gf86822a1170f #4 kernel: Hardware name: LENOVO 82H8/LNVNB161216, BIOS GGCN51WW 11/16/2022 kernel: Workqueue: events_freezable ieee80211_restart_work [mac80211] kernel: Call Trace: kernel: <TASK> kernel: ? ftrace_regs_caller_end+0x66/0x66 kernel: dump_stack_lvl+0x5f/0xa0 kernel: dump_stack+0x14/0x20 kernel: print_usage_bug.part.46+0x208/0x2a0 kernel: mark_lock.part.47+0x605/0x630 kernel: ? sched_clock+0xd/0x20 kernel: ? trace_clock_local+0x14/0x30 kernel: ? __rb_reserve_next+0x5f/0x490 kernel: ? _raw_spin_lock+0x1b/0x50 kernel: __lock_acquire+0x464/0x1990 kernel: ? mark_held_locks+0x4e/0x80 kernel: lock_acquire+0xc7/0x2d0 kernel: ? ftrace_regs_caller_end+0x66/0x66 kernel: ? ftrace_return_to_handler+0x8b/0x100 kernel: ? preempt_count_add+0x4/0x70 kernel: _raw_spin_lock+0x36/0x50 kernel: ? ftrace_regs_caller_end+0x66/0x66 kernel: ? ftrace_regs_caller_end+0x66/0x66 kernel: ieee80211_tx_dequeue+0xb4/0x1330 [mac80211] kernel: ? prepare_ftrace_return+0xc5/0x190 kernel: ? ftrace_graph_func+0x16/0x20 kernel: ? 0xffffffffc02ab0b1 kernel: ? lock_acquire+0xc7/0x2d0 kernel: ? iwl_mvm_mac_itxq_xmit+0x42/0x210 [iwlmvm] kernel: ? ieee80211_tx_dequeue+0x9/0x1330 [mac80211] kernel: ? __rcu_read_lock+0x4/0x40 kernel: ? ftrace_regs_caller_end+0x66/0x66 kernel: iwl_mvm_mac_itxq_xmit+0xae/0x210 [iwlmvm] kernel: ? ftrace_regs_caller_end+0x66/0x66 kernel: iwl_mvm_queue_state_change+0x311/0x3a0 [iwlmvm] kernel: ? ftrace_regs_caller_end+0x66/0x66 kernel: iwl_mvm_wake_sw_queue+0x17/0x20 [iwlmvm] kernel: ? ftrace_regs_caller_end+0x66/0x66 kernel: iwl_txq_gen2_unmap+0x1c9/0x1f0 [iwlwifi] kernel: ? ftrace_regs_caller_end+0x66/0x66 kernel: iwl_txq_gen2_free+0x55/0x130 [iwlwifi] kernel: ? ftrace_regs_caller_end+0x66/0x66 kernel: iwl_txq_gen2_tx_free+0x63/0x80 [iwlwifi] kernel: ? ftrace_regs_caller_end+0x66/0x66 kernel: _iwl_trans_pcie_gen2_stop_device+0x3f3/0x5b0 [iwlwifi] kernel: ? _iwl_trans_pcie_gen2_stop_device+0x9/0x5b0 [iwlwifi] kernel: ? mutex_lock_nested+0x4/0x30 kernel: ? ftrace_regs_caller_end+0x66/0x66 kernel: iwl_trans_pcie_gen2_stop_device+0x5f/0x90 [iwlwifi] kernel: ? ftrace_regs_caller_end+0x66/0x66 kernel: iwl_mvm_stop_device+0x78/0xd0 [iwlmvm] kernel: ? ftrace_regs_caller_end+0x66/0x66 kernel: __iwl_mvm_mac_start+0x114/0x210 [iwlmvm] kernel: ? ftrace_regs_caller_end+0x66/0x66 kernel: iwl_mvm_mac_start+0x76/0x150 [iwlmvm] kernel: ? ftrace_regs_caller_end+0x66/0x66 kernel: drv_start+0x79/0x180 [mac80211] kernel: ? ftrace_regs_caller_end+0x66/0x66 kernel: ieee80211_reconfig+0x1523/0x1ce0 [mac80211] kernel: ? synchronize_net+0x4/0x50 kernel: ? ftrace_regs_caller_end+0x66/0x66 kernel: ieee80211_restart_work+0x108/0x170 [mac80211] kernel: ? ftrace_regs_caller_end+0x66/0x66 kernel: process_one_work+0x250/0x530 kernel: ? ftrace_regs_caller_end+0x66/0x66 kernel: worker_thread+0x48/0x3a0 kernel: ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kernel: kthread+0x10f/0x140 kernel: ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 kernel: ret_from_fork+0x29/0x50 kernel: </TASK> Fixes: 4444bc2 ("wifi: mac80211: Proper mark iTXQs for resumption") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/1f58a0d1-d2b9-d851-73c3-93fcc607501c@alu.unizg.hr/ Reported-by: Mirsad Goran Todorovac <mirsad.todorovac@alu.unizg.hr> Cc: Gregory Greenman <gregory.greenman@intel.com> Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/cdc80531-f25f-6f9d-b15f-25e16130b53a@alu.unizg.hr/ Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Cc: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org> Cc: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de> Signed-off-by: Mirsad Goran Todorovac <mirsad.todorovac@alu.unizg.hr> Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: tag, or it goes automatically? Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230425164005.25272-1-mirsad.todorovac@alu.unizg.hr Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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Our CI system caught a lockdep splat: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.3.0-rc7+ #1167 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ kswapd0/46 is trying to acquire lock: ffff8c6543abd650 (sb_internal#2){++++}-{0:0}, at: btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_inode+0x5f/0x120 but task is already holding lock: ffffffffabe61b40 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: balance_pgdat+0x4aa/0x7a0 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}: fs_reclaim_acquire+0xa5/0xe0 kmem_cache_alloc+0x31/0x2c0 alloc_extent_state+0x1d/0xd0 __clear_extent_bit+0x2e0/0x4f0 try_release_extent_mapping+0x216/0x280 btrfs_release_folio+0x2e/0x90 invalidate_inode_pages2_range+0x397/0x470 btrfs_cleanup_dirty_bgs+0x9e/0x210 btrfs_cleanup_one_transaction+0x22/0x760 btrfs_commit_transaction+0x3b7/0x13a0 create_subvol+0x59b/0x970 btrfs_mksubvol+0x435/0x4f0 __btrfs_ioctl_snap_create+0x11e/0x1b0 btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_v2+0xbf/0x140 btrfs_ioctl+0xa45/0x28f0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x88/0xc0 do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc -> #0 (sb_internal#2){++++}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x1435/0x21a0 lock_acquire+0xc2/0x2b0 start_transaction+0x401/0x730 btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_inode+0x5f/0x120 btrfs_evict_inode+0x292/0x3d0 evict+0xcc/0x1d0 inode_lru_isolate+0x14d/0x1e0 __list_lru_walk_one+0xbe/0x1c0 list_lru_walk_one+0x58/0x80 prune_icache_sb+0x39/0x60 super_cache_scan+0x161/0x1f0 do_shrink_slab+0x163/0x340 shrink_slab+0x1d3/0x290 shrink_node+0x300/0x720 balance_pgdat+0x35c/0x7a0 kswapd+0x205/0x410 kthread+0xf0/0x120 ret_from_fork+0x29/0x50 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(fs_reclaim); lock(sb_internal#2); lock(fs_reclaim); lock(sb_internal#2); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by kswapd0/46: #0: ffffffffabe61b40 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: balance_pgdat+0x4aa/0x7a0 #1: ffffffffabe50270 (shrinker_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: shrink_slab+0x113/0x290 #2: ffff8c6543abd0e0 (&type->s_umount_key#44){++++}-{3:3}, at: super_cache_scan+0x38/0x1f0 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 46 Comm: kswapd0 Not tainted 6.3.0-rc7+ #1167 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x58/0x90 check_noncircular+0xd6/0x100 ? save_trace+0x3f/0x310 ? add_lock_to_list+0x97/0x120 __lock_acquire+0x1435/0x21a0 lock_acquire+0xc2/0x2b0 ? btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_inode+0x5f/0x120 start_transaction+0x401/0x730 ? btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_inode+0x5f/0x120 btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_inode+0x5f/0x120 btrfs_evict_inode+0x292/0x3d0 ? lock_release+0x134/0x270 ? __pfx_wake_bit_function+0x10/0x10 evict+0xcc/0x1d0 inode_lru_isolate+0x14d/0x1e0 __list_lru_walk_one+0xbe/0x1c0 ? __pfx_inode_lru_isolate+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_inode_lru_isolate+0x10/0x10 list_lru_walk_one+0x58/0x80 prune_icache_sb+0x39/0x60 super_cache_scan+0x161/0x1f0 do_shrink_slab+0x163/0x340 shrink_slab+0x1d3/0x290 shrink_node+0x300/0x720 balance_pgdat+0x35c/0x7a0 kswapd+0x205/0x410 ? __pfx_autoremove_wake_function+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_kswapd+0x10/0x10 kthread+0xf0/0x120 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x29/0x50 </TASK> This happens because when we abort the transaction in the transaction commit path we call invalidate_inode_pages2_range on our block group cache inodes (if we have space cache v1) and any delalloc inodes we may have. The plain invalidate_inode_pages2_range() call passes through GFP_KERNEL, which makes sense in most cases, but not here. Wrap these two invalidate callees with memalloc_nofs_save/memalloc_nofs_restore to make sure we don't end up with the fs reclaim dependency under the transaction dependency. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14+ Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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Cited commit causes ABBA deadlock[0] when peer flows are created while holding the devcom rw semaphore. Due to peer flows offload implementation the lock is taken much higher up the call chain and there is no obvious way to easily fix the deadlock. Instead, since tc route query code needs the peer eswitch structure only to perform a lookup in xarray and doesn't perform any sleeping operations with it, refactor the code for lockless execution in following ways: - RCUify the devcom 'data' pointer. When resetting the pointer synchronously wait for RCU grace period before returning. This is fine since devcom is currently only used for synchronization of pairing/unpairing of eswitches which is rare and already expensive as-is. - Wrap all usages of 'paired' boolean in {READ|WRITE}_ONCE(). The flag has already been used in some unlocked contexts without proper annotations (e.g. users of mlx5_devcom_is_paired() function), but it wasn't an issue since all relevant code paths checked it again after obtaining the devcom semaphore. Now it is also used by mlx5_devcom_get_peer_data_rcu() as "best effort" check to return NULL when devcom is being unpaired. Note that while RCU read lock doesn't prevent the unpaired flag from being changed concurrently it still guarantees that reader can continue to use 'data'. - Refactor mlx5e_tc_query_route_vport() function to use new mlx5_devcom_get_peer_data_rcu() API which fixes the deadlock. [0]: [ 164.599612] ====================================================== [ 164.600142] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 164.600667] 6.3.0-rc3+ #1 Not tainted [ 164.601021] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 164.601557] handler1/3456 is trying to acquire lock: [ 164.601998] ffff88811f1714b0 (&esw->offloads.encap_tbl_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5e_attach_encap+0xd8/0x8b0 [mlx5_core] [ 164.603078] but task is already holding lock: [ 164.603617] ffff88810137fc98 (&comp->sem){++++}-{3:3}, at: mlx5_devcom_get_peer_data+0x37/0x80 [mlx5_core] [ 164.604459] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 164.605190] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 164.605848] -> #1 (&comp->sem){++++}-{3:3}: [ 164.606380] down_read+0x39/0x50 [ 164.606772] mlx5_devcom_get_peer_data+0x37/0x80 [mlx5_core] [ 164.607336] mlx5e_tc_query_route_vport+0x86/0xc0 [mlx5_core] [ 164.607914] mlx5e_tc_tun_route_lookup+0x1a4/0x1d0 [mlx5_core] [ 164.608495] mlx5e_attach_decap_route+0xc6/0x1e0 [mlx5_core] [ 164.609063] mlx5e_tc_add_fdb_flow+0x1ea/0x360 [mlx5_core] [ 164.609627] __mlx5e_add_fdb_flow+0x2d2/0x430 [mlx5_core] [ 164.610175] mlx5e_configure_flower+0x952/0x1a20 [mlx5_core] [ 164.610741] tc_setup_cb_add+0xd4/0x200 [ 164.611146] fl_hw_replace_filter+0x14c/0x1f0 [cls_flower] [ 164.611661] fl_change+0xc95/0x18a0 [cls_flower] [ 164.612116] tc_new_tfilter+0x3fc/0xd20 [ 164.612516] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x418/0x5b0 [ 164.612936] netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0x100 [ 164.613339] netlink_unicast+0x190/0x250 [ 164.613746] netlink_sendmsg+0x245/0x4a0 [ 164.614150] sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x60 [ 164.614522] ____sys_sendmsg+0x1d0/0x1e0 [ 164.614934] ___sys_sendmsg+0x80/0xc0 [ 164.615320] __sys_sendmsg+0x51/0x90 [ 164.615701] do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90 [ 164.616083] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 [ 164.616568] -> #0 (&esw->offloads.encap_tbl_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 164.617210] __lock_acquire+0x159e/0x26e0 [ 164.617638] lock_acquire+0xc2/0x2a0 [ 164.618018] __mutex_lock+0x92/0xcd0 [ 164.618401] mlx5e_attach_encap+0xd8/0x8b0 [mlx5_core] [ 164.618943] post_process_attr+0x153/0x2d0 [mlx5_core] [ 164.619471] mlx5e_tc_add_fdb_flow+0x164/0x360 [mlx5_core] [ 164.620021] __mlx5e_add_fdb_flow+0x2d2/0x430 [mlx5_core] [ 164.620564] mlx5e_configure_flower+0xe33/0x1a20 [mlx5_core] [ 164.621125] tc_setup_cb_add+0xd4/0x200 [ 164.621531] fl_hw_replace_filter+0x14c/0x1f0 [cls_flower] [ 164.622047] fl_change+0xc95/0x18a0 [cls_flower] [ 164.622500] tc_new_tfilter+0x3fc/0xd20 [ 164.622906] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x418/0x5b0 [ 164.623324] netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0x100 [ 164.623727] netlink_unicast+0x190/0x250 [ 164.624138] netlink_sendmsg+0x245/0x4a0 [ 164.624544] sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x60 [ 164.624919] ____sys_sendmsg+0x1d0/0x1e0 [ 164.625340] ___sys_sendmsg+0x80/0xc0 [ 164.625731] __sys_sendmsg+0x51/0x90 [ 164.626117] do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90 [ 164.626502] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 [ 164.626995] other info that might help us debug this: [ 164.627725] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 164.628268] CPU0 CPU1 [ 164.628683] ---- ---- [ 164.629098] lock(&comp->sem); [ 164.629421] lock(&esw->offloads.encap_tbl_lock); [ 164.630066] lock(&comp->sem); [ 164.630555] lock(&esw->offloads.encap_tbl_lock); [ 164.630993] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 164.631575] 3 locks held by handler1/3456: [ 164.631962] #0: ffff888124b75130 (&block->cb_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: tc_setup_cb_add+0x5b/0x200 [ 164.632703] #1: ffff888116e512b8 (&esw->mode_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: mlx5_esw_hold+0x39/0x50 [mlx5_core] [ 164.633552] #2: ffff88810137fc98 (&comp->sem){++++}-{3:3}, at: mlx5_devcom_get_peer_data+0x37/0x80 [mlx5_core] [ 164.634435] stack backtrace: [ 164.634883] CPU: 17 PID: 3456 Comm: handler1 Not tainted 6.3.0-rc3+ #1 [ 164.635431] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 164.636340] Call Trace: [ 164.636616] <TASK> [ 164.636863] dump_stack_lvl+0x47/0x70 [ 164.637217] check_noncircular+0xfe/0x110 [ 164.637601] __lock_acquire+0x159e/0x26e0 [ 164.637977] ? mlx5_cmd_set_fte+0x5b0/0x830 [mlx5_core] [ 164.638472] lock_acquire+0xc2/0x2a0 [ 164.638828] ? mlx5e_attach_encap+0xd8/0x8b0 [mlx5_core] [ 164.639339] ? lock_is_held_type+0x98/0x110 [ 164.639728] __mutex_lock+0x92/0xcd0 [ 164.640074] ? mlx5e_attach_encap+0xd8/0x8b0 [mlx5_core] [ 164.640576] ? __lock_acquire+0x382/0x26e0 [ 164.640958] ? mlx5e_attach_encap+0xd8/0x8b0 [mlx5_core] [ 164.641468] ? mlx5e_attach_encap+0xd8/0x8b0 [mlx5_core] [ 164.641965] mlx5e_attach_encap+0xd8/0x8b0 [mlx5_core] [ 164.642454] ? lock_release+0xbf/0x240 [ 164.642819] post_process_attr+0x153/0x2d0 [mlx5_core] [ 164.643318] mlx5e_tc_add_fdb_flow+0x164/0x360 [mlx5_core] [ 164.643835] __mlx5e_add_fdb_flow+0x2d2/0x430 [mlx5_core] [ 164.644340] mlx5e_configure_flower+0xe33/0x1a20 [mlx5_core] [ 164.644862] ? lock_acquire+0xc2/0x2a0 [ 164.645219] tc_setup_cb_add+0xd4/0x200 [ 164.645588] fl_hw_replace_filter+0x14c/0x1f0 [cls_flower] [ 164.646067] fl_change+0xc95/0x18a0 [cls_flower] [ 164.646488] tc_new_tfilter+0x3fc/0xd20 [ 164.646861] ? tc_del_tfilter+0x810/0x810 [ 164.647236] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x418/0x5b0 [ 164.647621] ? rtnl_setlink+0x160/0x160 [ 164.647982] netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0x100 [ 164.648348] netlink_unicast+0x190/0x250 [ 164.648722] netlink_sendmsg+0x245/0x4a0 [ 164.649090] sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x60 [ 164.649434] ____sys_sendmsg+0x1d0/0x1e0 [ 164.649804] ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x6d/0xa0 [ 164.650213] ___sys_sendmsg+0x80/0xc0 [ 164.650563] ? lock_acquire+0xc2/0x2a0 [ 164.650926] ? lock_acquire+0xc2/0x2a0 [ 164.651286] ? __fget_files+0x5/0x190 [ 164.651644] ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 [ 164.652006] ? __fget_files+0xb9/0x190 [ 164.652365] ? lock_release+0xbf/0x240 [ 164.652723] ? __fget_files+0xd3/0x190 [ 164.653079] __sys_sendmsg+0x51/0x90 [ 164.653435] do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90 [ 164.653784] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 [ 164.654229] RIP: 0033:0x7f378054f8bd [ 164.654577] Code: 28 89 54 24 1c 48 89 74 24 10 89 7c 24 08 e8 6a c3 f4 ff 8b 54 24 1c 48 8b 74 24 10 41 89 c0 8b 7c 24 08 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 33 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 be c3 f4 ff 48 [ 164.656041] RSP: 002b:00007f377fa114b0 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e [ 164.656701] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 00007f378054f8bd [ 164.657297] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007f377fa11540 RDI: 0000000000000014 [ 164.657885] RBP: 00007f377fa12278 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000000000000015c [ 164.658472] R10: 00007f377fa123d0 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000560962d99bd0 [ 164.665317] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000560962d99bd0 R15: 00007f377fa11540 Fixes: f9d196b ("net/mlx5e: Use correct eswitch for stack devices with lag") Signed-off-by: Vlad Buslov <vladbu@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Roi Dayan <roid@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Shay Drory <shayd@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@nvidia.com>
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In certain situations a program with subprograms may have a NULL extable entry. This should not happen, and when it does, it turns a single trap into multiple. Add a test case for further debugging and to prevent regressions. The test-case contains three essentially identical versions of the same test because just one program may not be sufficient to trigger the oops. This is due to the fact that the items are stored in a binary tree and have identical values so it's possible to sometimes find the ksym with the extable. With 3 copies, this has been reliable on this author's test systems. When triggered out of this test case, the oops looks like this: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000000c #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 0 PID: 1132 Comm: test_progs Tainted: G OE 6.4.0-rc3+ #2 RIP: 0010:cmp_ex_search+0xb/0x30 Code: cc cc cc cc e8 36 cb 03 00 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3 0f 1e fa 55 48 89 e5 48 8b 07 <48> 63 0e 48 01 f1 31 d2 48 39 c8 19 d2 48 39 c8 b8 01 00 00 00 0f RSP: 0018:ffffb30c4291f998 EFLAGS: 00010006 RAX: ffffffffc00b49da RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 000000000000000c RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 000000000000000c RDI: ffffb30c4291f9e8 RBP: ffffb30c4291f998 R08: ffffffffab1a42d0 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffffab1a42d0 R12: ffffb30c4291f9e8 R13: 000000000000000c R14: 000000000000000c R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007fb5d9e044c0(0000) GS:ffff92e95ee00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000000000000c CR3: 000000010c3a2005 CR4: 00000000007706f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> bsearch+0x41/0x90 ? __pfx_cmp_ex_search+0x10/0x10 ? bpf_prog_45a7907e7114d0ff_handle_fexit_ret_subprogs3+0x2a/0x6c search_extable+0x3b/0x60 ? bpf_prog_45a7907e7114d0ff_handle_fexit_ret_subprogs3+0x2a/0x6c search_bpf_extables+0x10d/0x190 ? bpf_prog_45a7907e7114d0ff_handle_fexit_ret_subprogs3+0x2a/0x6c search_exception_tables+0x5d/0x70 fixup_exception+0x3f/0x5b0 ? look_up_lock_class+0x61/0x110 ? __lock_acquire+0x6b8/0x3560 ? __lock_acquire+0x6b8/0x3560 ? __lock_acquire+0x6b8/0x3560 kernelmode_fixup_or_oops+0x46/0x110 __bad_area_nosemaphore+0x68/0x2b0 ? __lock_acquire+0x6b8/0x3560 bad_area_nosemaphore+0x16/0x20 do_kern_addr_fault+0x81/0xa0 exc_page_fault+0xd6/0x210 asm_exc_page_fault+0x2b/0x30 RIP: 0010:bpf_prog_45a7907e7114d0ff_handle_fexit_ret_subprogs3+0x2a/0x6c Code: f3 0f 1e fa 0f 1f 44 00 00 66 90 55 48 89 e5 f3 0f 1e fa 48 8b 7f 08 49 bb 00 00 00 00 00 80 00 00 4c 39 df 73 04 31 f6 eb 04 <48> 8b 77 00 49 bb 00 00 00 00 00 80 00 00 48 81 c7 7c 00 00 00 4c RSP: 0018:ffffb30c4291fcb8 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 00000000cddf1af1 RSI: 000000005315a00d RDI: ffffffffffffffea RBP: ffffb30c4291fcb8 R08: ffff92e644bf38a8 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000800000000000 R12: ffff92e663652690 R13: 00000000000001c8 R14: 00000000000001c8 R15: 0000000000000003 bpf_trampoline_251255721842_2+0x63/0x1000 bpf_testmod_return_ptr+0x9/0xb0 [bpf_testmod] ? bpf_testmod_test_read+0x43/0x2d0 [bpf_testmod] sysfs_kf_bin_read+0x60/0x90 kernfs_fop_read_iter+0x143/0x250 vfs_read+0x240/0x2a0 ksys_read+0x70/0xe0 __x64_sys_read+0x1f/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x68/0xa0 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x77/0x1f0 ? do_syscall_64+0x77/0xa0 ? irqentry_exit+0x35/0xa0 ? sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x4d/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc RIP: 0033:0x7fb5da00a392 Code: ac 00 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb be 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 56 c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 83 ec 28 48 89 54 24 RSP: 002b:00007ffc5b3cab68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055bee7b8b100 RCX: 00007fb5da00a392 RDX: 00000000000001c8 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000009 RBP: 00007ffc5b3caba0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000037 R10: 000055bee7b8c2a7 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000055bee78f1f60 R13: 00007ffc5b3cae90 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK> Modules linked in: bpf_testmod(OE) nls_iso8859_1 dm_multipath scsi_dh_rdac scsi_dh_emc scsi_dh_alua intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common intel_uncore_frequency_common ppdev nfit crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul psmouse ghash_clmulni_intel sha512_ssse3 aesni_intel parport_pc crypto_simd cryptd input_leds parport rapl ena i2c_piix4 mac_hid serio_raw ramoops reed_solomon pstore_blk drm pstore_zone efi_pstore autofs4 [last unloaded: bpf_testmod(OE)] CR2: 000000000000000c Though there may be some variation, depending on which suprogram triggers the bug. Signed-off-by: Krister Johansen <kjlx@templeofstupid.com> Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/4ebf95ec857cd785b81db69f3e408c039ad8408b.1686616663.git.kjlx@templeofstupid.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Previously during mlx5e_ipsec_handle_event the driver tried to execute an operation that could sleep, while holding a spinlock, which caused the kernel panic mentioned below. Move the function call that can sleep outside of the spinlock context. Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x49/0x6c __schedule_bug.cold+0x42/0x4e schedule_debug.constprop.0+0xe0/0x118 __schedule+0x59/0x58a ? __mod_timer+0x2a1/0x3ef schedule+0x5e/0xd4 schedule_timeout+0x99/0x164 ? __pfx_process_timeout+0x10/0x10 __wait_for_common+0x90/0x1da ? __pfx_schedule_timeout+0x10/0x10 wait_func+0x34/0x142 [mlx5_core] mlx5_cmd_invoke+0x1f3/0x313 [mlx5_core] cmd_exec+0x1fe/0x325 [mlx5_core] mlx5_cmd_do+0x22/0x50 [mlx5_core] mlx5_cmd_exec+0x1c/0x40 [mlx5_core] mlx5_modify_ipsec_obj+0xb2/0x17f [mlx5_core] mlx5e_ipsec_update_esn_state+0x69/0xf0 [mlx5_core] ? wake_affine+0x62/0x1f8 mlx5e_ipsec_handle_event+0xb1/0xc0 [mlx5_core] process_one_work+0x1e2/0x3e6 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 worker_thread+0x54/0x3ad ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0xda/0x101 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x29/0x37 </TASK> BUG: workqueue leaked lock or atomic: kworker/u256:4/0x7fffffff/189754#012 last function: mlx5e_ipsec_handle_event [mlx5_core] CPU: 66 PID: 189754 Comm: kworker/u256:4 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W 6.2.0-2596.20230309201517_5.el8uek.rc1.x86_64 #2 Hardware name: Oracle Corporation ORACLE SERVER X9-2/ASMMBX9-2, BIOS 61070300 08/17/2022 Workqueue: mlx5e_ipsec: eth%d mlx5e_ipsec_handle_event [mlx5_core] Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x49/0x6c process_one_work.cold+0x2b/0x3c ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 worker_thread+0x54/0x3ad ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0xda/0x101 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x29/0x37 </TASK> BUG: scheduling while atomic: kworker/u256:4/189754/0x00000000 Fixes: cee137a ("net/mlx5e: Handle ESN update events") Signed-off-by: Patrisious Haddad <phaddad@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com> Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@nvidia.com>
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…phys When booting with "intremap=off" and "x2apic_phys" on the kernel command line, the physical x2APIC driver ends up being used even when x2APIC mode is disabled ("intremap=off" disables x2APIC mode). This happens because the first compound condition check in x2apic_phys_probe() is false due to x2apic_mode == 0 and so the following one returns true after default_acpi_madt_oem_check() having already selected the physical x2APIC driver. This results in the following panic: kernel BUG at arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c:2409! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.4.0-rc2-ver4.1rc2 #2 Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R6515/07PXPY, BIOS 2.3.6 07/06/2021 RIP: 0010:setup_IO_APIC+0x9c/0xaf0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? native_read_msr apic_intr_mode_init x86_late_time_init start_kernel x86_64_start_reservations x86_64_start_kernel secondary_startup_64_no_verify </TASK> which is: setup_IO_APIC: apic_printk(APIC_VERBOSE, "ENABLING IO-APIC IRQs\n"); for_each_ioapic(ioapic) BUG_ON(mp_irqdomain_create(ioapic)); Return 0 to denote that x2APIC has not been enabled when probing the physical x2APIC driver. [ bp: Massage commit message heavily. ] Fixes: 9ebd680 ("x86, apic: Use probe routines to simplify apic selection") Signed-off-by: Dheeraj Kumar Srivastava <dheerajkumar.srivastava@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Kishon Vijay Abraham I <kvijayab@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Vasant Hegde <vasant.hegde@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230616212236.1389-1-dheerajkumar.srivastava@amd.com
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Currently, if a shadow or origin allocation fails, we set the corresponding pointer to NULL, which leads to BUG()s raised by KMSAN later.
Instead, we should tell page_alloc() that it can't allocate memory anymore.
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