Skip to content
Calculate future (next boot) TPM PCRs after a kernel upgrade
Branch: master
Clone or download
grawity stop synthesizing PCR[8] if empty
Current LTS kernels now have the event log bugfix, so this isn't an
issue anymore. However, it causes a different issue with systemd-boot
v244, which does not appear to measure the cmdline when booting a signed
bundle in Secure Boot mode and the PCR ends up being legitimately empty.
Latest commit a915aae Feb 15, 2020


Type Name Latest commit message Commit time
Failed to load latest commit information.

The tpm_futurepcr script allows guessing what the future PCR[4] value will be after a kernel upgrade, before you reboot. This is useful when your rootfs is LUKS-encrypted with a key sealed by the TPM against PCR[4] (among others).

This script only recognizes measurements done by native UEFI LoadImage() – i.e. hashes of PE/COFF executables such as vmlinuz.efi. (Although it does parse the TPM 1.2 event log, it does not (yet) recognize measurements done by TrustedGRUB on BIOS systems, and in fact I'm not entirely sure whether the entire premise of sealing data against user-specified PCR values is even possible in the TPM 1.2 API.)

As an additional hack, this script also recognizes systemd-boot and updates PCR[8] according to the future kernel command line.

This script will understand the event log in both SHA1-only (TPM 1.2) and Crypto-Agile (TPM 2.0, Linux kernel 5.3+) formats. However, the current version only works with and outputs SHA-1 PCRs. In the future, support for selecting multiple digest algorithms will be added.


Neither systemd-boot nor EFISTUB currently measure the initramfs images. It is not safe to rely on PCR[4] unless you are using a combined kernel+initramfs file (such as the one produced by mksignkernels), or you are using a bootloader which measures the initramfs separately.


  • python-signify (for calculating Authenticode digests)
  • tpm2-tools (for reading current PCR values)


python install


Normally sealing data against PCRs starts by creating a "policy" which specifies the PCR values. In the Intel TPM 2.0 stack, this is done with tpm2_createpolicy:

tpm2_createpolicy -P -L sha1:0,2,4,7 -f policy.bin

This automatically uses current PCR values, and can be written to do so explicitly:

tpm2_pcrlist -L sha1:0,2,4,7 -Q -o pcrvalues.bin
tpm2_createpolicy -P -L sha1:0,2,4,7 -F pcrvalues.bin -f policy.bin

To do the same with future PCR values, use tpm_futurepcr:

tpm_futurepcr -L 0,2,4,7 -o pcrvalues.bin
tpm2_createpolicy -P -L sha1:0,2,4,7 -F pcrvalues.bin -f policy.bin
You can’t perform that action at this time.