rheomodeExamples

The following are Bohms examples of rheomodes followed by his explanations of their definitions and usage.

Each explanation leads into the next for a complete introduction, however, since the concept of rheomodes is an inquiry and experiment, creative experimentation and extension (and the observation of such) is implicitly encouraged.

Examples:

Levate, re-levate, re-levant, irre-levant, levation, re-levation, irrelevation.

Vidate, re-vidate, re-vidant, irre-vidant, vidation, re-vidation, irre-vidation.Di-vidate, re-dividate, re-dividant, irre-dividant, di-vidation, re-dividation, irre-dividation.

Ordinate, re-ordinate, re-ordinant, irre-ordinant, ordination, re-ordination, irre-ordination.

Factate, re-factate, re-factant, irre-factant

Con-statate, re-constatate, re-constatant, irre-constatant, re-constation

Explanations:

to levate

We then introduce the verb ‘to re-levate’. This means: ‘To lift a certain content into attention again, for a particular context, as indicated by thought and language.’

Here, it has to be emphasized that ‘re’ signifies ‘again’, i.e. on another occasion. It evidently implies time and similarity (as well as difference, since each occasion is not only similar but also different).

As pointed out earlier, it then requires an act of perception to see, in each case, whether the content thus ‘lifted again’ fits the observed context or not. In those cases in which this act of perception reveals a fit, we say: ‘to re-levate is re-levant’ (note that the use of the hyphen is essential here, and that the word should be pronounced with a break, as indicated by the hyphen). Of course, in those cases in which perception reveals non-fitting, we say ‘to re-levate is irre-levant’. We see, then, that adjectives have been built from the verb as a root form. Nouns also can be constructed in this way, and they 44 wholeness and the implicate order will signify not separate objects but, rather, continuing states of activity of the particular form indicated by the verbs. Thus, the noun ‘re-levation’ means ‘a continuing state of lifting a given content into attention’

To go on with re-levation when to do so is irre-levant will, however, be called ‘irre-levation’. In essence, irre-levation implies that there is not proper attention. When some content is irre-levant, it should normally sooner or later be dropped. If this does not happen, then one is, in some sense, not watchful or alert. Thus, irre-levation implies the need to give attention to the fact that there is not proper attention. Attention to such failure of attention is of course the very act that ends irre-levation

Finally, we shall introduce the noun form ‘levation’, which signifies a sort of generalized and unrestricted totality of acts of lifting into attention (note that this differs from the ‘to levate’, which signifies a single spontaneous and unrestricted act of lifting into attention).

Clearly, the above way of using a structure of language form built from a root verb enables us to discuss what is commonly meant by ‘relevance’ in a way that is free of fragmentation, for we are no longer being led, by the form of the language, to consider something called relevance as if it were a separate and fixed quality. Even more important, we are not establishing a division between what the verb ‘to levate’ means and the actual function that takes place when we use this verb. That is to say, ‘to levate’ is not only to attend to the thought of lifting an unrestricted content into attention but it is also to engage in the very act of lifting such an unrestricted content into attention. The thought is thus not a mere abstraction, with no concrete perception to which it can refer. Rather, something is actually going on which fits the meaning of the word, and one can, at the very moment of using the word, perceive the fit between this meaning and what is going on. So the content of thought and its actual function are seen and felt as one, and thus one the rheomode 45 understands what it can mean for fragmentation to cease, at its very origin.

Evidently, it is possible to generalize this way of building up language forms so that any verb may be taken as the root form. We shall then say that the rheomode is in essence characterized by this way of using a verb.

to vidate

As an example, let us consider the Latin verb ‘videre’, meaning ‘to see’, which is used in English in such forms as ‘video’. We then introduce the root verbal form ‘to vidate’. This does not mean merely ‘to see’ in the visual sense, but we shall take it to refer to every aspect of perception including even the act of understanding, which is the apprehension of a totality, that includes sense perception, intellect, feeling, etc. (e.g., in the common language ‘to understand’ and ‘to see’ may be used interchangeably). So the verb ‘to vidate’ will call attention to a spontaneous and unrestricted act of perception of any sort whatsoever, including perception of whether what is seen fits or does not fit ‘what is’, as well as perception even of the very attentioncalling function of the word itself. Thus, as happens with ‘to levate’, there is no division between the content (meaning) of this word and the total function to which it gives rise

We then consider the verb ‘to re-vidate’, which means to perceive a given content again, as indicated by a word or thought. If this content is seen to fit the indicated context, then we say: ‘to re-vidate is re-vidant’. If it is seen not to fit, then of course we say: ‘to re-vidate is irre-vidant’ (which means, in ordinary usage, that this was a mistaken or illusory perception).

‘Re-vidation’ is then a continuing state of perceiving a certain content, while ‘irre-vidation’ is a continuing state of being caught in illusion or delusion, with regard to a certain content. Evidently (as with irre-levation) irre-vidation implies a failure of attention, and to attend to this failure of attention is to end irre-vidation.

Clearly, vidation is not to be sharply distinguished from levation. In an act of vidation, it is necessary to levate a content into attention, and in an act of levation, it is necessary to vidate this content. So the two movements of levation and vidation merge and interpenetrate. Each of these words merely emphasizes (i.e., re-levates) a certain aspect of movement in general. It will become evident that this will be true of all verbal roots in the rheomode. They all imply each other, and pass into each other. Thus, the rheomode will reveal a certain wholeness, that is not characteristic of the ordinary use of language (though it is there potentially, in the sense that if we start with movement as primary, then we have likewise to say that all movements shade into each other, to merge and interpenetrate).

Let us now go on to consider the verb ‘to divide’. We shall take this to be a combination of the verb ‘videre’ and the prefix ‘di’, meaning ‘separate’. So, ‘to divide’ is to be considered1 as meaning ‘to see as separate’

We now consider the verb ‘to re-dividate’, which means through thought and language to perceive a given content again in terms of a particular kind of separation or division. If to do this is seen to fit the indicated context, then we say that ‘to the rheomode 47 re-dividate is re-dividant’. If it is seen not to fit, we say that to ‘re-dividate is irre-dividant’.

Re-dividation is then a continuing state of seeing a certain content in the form of separation or division. Irre-dividation is a continuing state of seeing separation where, in the ordinary language, we would say that separation is irrelevant.

Irre-dividation is clearly essentially the same as fragmentation. So it becomes evident that fragmentation cannot possibly be a good thing, for it means not merely to see things as separate but to persist in doing this in a context in which this way of seeing does not fit. To go on indefinitely with irre-dividation is possible only through a failure of attention. Thus irre-dividation comes to an end in the very act of giving attention to this failure of attention.

Finally, of course, the noun ‘dividation’ means an unrestricted and generalized totality of acts of seeing things as separate. As has been indicated earlier, di-vidation implies a division in the attention-calling function of the word, in the sense that dividation is seen to be different from vidation. Nevertheless, this difference holds only in some limited context and is not to be taken as a fragmentation, or actual break, between the meanings and functions of the two words. Rather, their very forms indicate that dividation is a kind of vidation, indeed a special case of the latter. So ultimately, wholeness is primary, in the sense that these meanings and functions pass into each other to merge and interpenetrate. Division is thus seen to be a convenient means of giving a more articulated and detailed description to this whole, rather than a fragmentation of ‘what is’

to ordinate

This simple notion of a sequential order, expressed in terms of regular divisions in a line on a scale, helps to direct us in our constructional work, our travels and movements on the surface of the Earth and in space, and in a wide range of general practical and scientific activities. But, of course, more complex orders are possible, and these have to be expressed in terms of more subtle divisions and categories of thought, which are significant for more subtle forms of movement. Thus, there is the movement of growth, development and evolution of living beings, the movement of a symphony, the movement that is the essence of life itself, etc. These evidently have to be described in different ways that cannot generally be reduced to a description in terms of simple sequential orders

Beyond all these orders is that of the movement of attention. This movement has to have an order that fits the order in that which is to be observed, or else we will miss seeing what is to be seen. For example, if we try to listen to a symphony while our attention is directed mainly to a sequential time order as indicated by a clock, we will fail to listen to the subtle orders that constitute the essential meaning of the music. Evidently, our ability to perceive and understand is limited by the freedom with which the ordering of attention can change, so as to fit the order that is to be observed.

It is clear, then, that in the understanding of the true meaning of the divisions of thought and language established for our convenience the notion of order plays a key role. To discuss this notion in the rheomode let us then introduce the verbal root form ‘to ordinate’.

This word calls attention to a spontaneous and unrestricted act of ordering of any sort whatsoever, including the ordering involved in seeing whether any particular order fits or does not fit some observed context, and even the ordering which arises in the attention-calling function itself. So ‘to ordinate’ does not primarily mean ‘to think about an order’ but, rather, to engage in the very act of ordering attention, while attention is given also to one’s thoughts about order. Once again, we see the wholeness of the meaning of a word and its overall function, which is an essential aspect of the rheomode.

‘To re-ordinate’ is then to call attention again to a given order, by means of language and thought. If this order is seen to fit that which is to be observed in the context under discussion, we say that ‘to re-ordinate is re-ordinant’. If it is seen not to fit, we say that ‘to re-ordinate is irre-ordinant’ (e.g., as in the application of a linear grid to a complex maze of alleyways).

The noun ‘re-ordination’ then describes a continuing state of calling attention to a certain order. A persistent state of reordination in an irre-ordinant context will then be called ‘irreordination’. As happens with all other verbs, irre-ordination is possible only through a failure of attention, and comes to an end when attention is given to this failure of attention.

Finally, the noun ‘ordination’ means, of course, an unrestricted and generalized totality of acts of ordering. Evidently, ordination implies levation, vidation and di-vidation, and ultimately, all these latter imply ordination. Thus, to see whether a given content is re-levant, attention has to be suitably ordered to perceive this content; a suitable set of divisions or categories will have to be set up in thought, etc., etc

to verrate

We shall begin by considering the Latin ‘verus’, meaning ‘true’. So we shall introduce the root verbal form ‘to verrate’. (The double ‘r’ is brought in here to avoid a certain confusion of a kind that will be evident as we proceed.) This word calls attention, in the manner discussed in the previous section, to a spontaneous and unrestricted act of seeing truth in any form whatsoever, including the act of seeing whether this perception fits or does not fit that which is perceived actually to happen in the apprehension of truth, as well as seeing the truth in the attention-calling function of the word itself. So, ‘to verrate’ is to be in the act of perceiving truth, as well as to be attending to what truth means

To re-verrate, then, is to call attention again, by means of thought and language, to a particular truth in a given context

If this is seen to fit what is to be observed in this context, we say that to re-verrate is re-verrant, and if it is seen not to fit, we say that to re-verrate is irre-verrant (i.e. a particular truth ceases to be valid when repeated and extended into a context that is beyond its proper limits).

We see, then, that the question of truth is no longer being discussed in terms of separate and essentially static fragments. Rather, our attention is called to the general act of verration, and to its continuation in a particular context as re-verration and irreverration. (Irre-verration, i.e. the persistent holding to a truth beyond its proper limits, has evidently been one of the major sources of illusion and delusion throughout the whole of history and in every phase of life.)

Verration is to be seen as a flowing movement, which merges and interpenetrates with levation, vidation, di-vidation, ordination, and indeed with all the other movements that will be indicated in the subsequent development of the rheomode.

to factate

Now, when we discuss truth in the ordinary mode, we are inevitably brought to consider what is to be meant by the fact. Thus, in some sense, to say: ‘This is a fact’ implies that the content of the statement in question is true. However, the root meaning of the word ‘fact’ is ‘that which has been made’ (e.g., as in ‘manufacture’). This meaning does have bearing here because, as is evident, in some sense we actually do ‘make’ the fact: for this fact depends not only on the context that is being observed and on our immediate perception, it also depends on how our perceptions are shaped by our thoughts, as well as on what we do, to test our conclusions, and to apply them in practical activities

Let us now go on to experiment with the use of the rheomode, to see where this leads when we consider what is meant by ‘the fact’. We thus introduce the root verb ‘to factate’, meaning a spontaneous and unrestricted attention to consciously directed human activity in making or doing any sort of thing whatsoever3 (and this, of course, includes the ‘making’ or ‘doing’ of the attention-calling function of the word itself). To re-factate is, then, through thought and language, to call attention again to such an activity of ‘making’ or ‘doing’ in a particular context. If this activity is seen to fit within the context (i.e. if what we are doing ‘works’) then we say ‘to re-factate is re-factant’ and if it is seen not to fit, we say ‘to re-factate is irre-factant’.

Clearly, a great deal of what is ordinarily meant by the truth or falsity of a statement is contained in the implication of the words ‘re-factant’ and ‘irre-factant’. Thus it is evident that when true notions are applied in practice, they will generally lead to our doing something that ‘works’, while false notions will lead to activities that ‘do not work’.

Of course, we have to be careful here not to identify truth as nothing more than ‘that which works’ since, as has been seen, truth is a whole movement, going far beyond the limited domain of our consciously directed functional activities

Indeed, it does not even cover all that is meant by fact. Far more is involved in establishing the fact than merely to observe that our knowledge is re-factant, i.e. that it has generally led us successfully to achieve the goals that were originally projected in thought

to con-statate

In addition, the fact has to be tested continually, through further observation and experience. The primary aim of such testing is not the production of some desired result or end but, rather, it is to see whether the fact will ‘stand up’, even when the context to which it refers is observed again and again, either in essentially the same way as before, or in new ways that may have bearing on this context.

In science, such testing is carried out through experiments, which not only have to be reproducible but which also have to fit in with ‘cross-checks’ provided by other experiments that are significant in the context of interest. More generally, experience as a whole is always providing a similar sort of test, provided that we are alert and observant to see what it actually indicates.

When we say ‘this is a fact’ we then imply a certain ability of the fact to ‘stand up to’ a wide range of different kinds of testing. Thus, the fact is established, i.e. it is shown to be stable, in the sense that it is not liable to collapse, or to be nullified at any moment, in a subsequent observation of the general sort that has already been carried out

Of course, this stability is only relative, because the fact is always being tested again and again, both in ways that are familiar and in new ways that are continually being explored

So it may be refined, modified, and even radically changed, through further observation, experiment and experience. But in order to be a ‘real fact’, it evidently has, in this way, to remain constantly valid, at least in certain contexts or over a certain period of time

To lay the ground for discussing this aspect of the fact in the rheomode, we first note that the word ‘constant’ is derived from order a now obsolete verb ‘to constate’, which means ‘to establish’, ‘to ascertain’, or ‘to confirm’. This meaning is made even more evident by considering the Latin root ‘constare’ (‘stare’ meaning ‘to stand’ and ‘con’ meaning ‘together’). Thus, we can say that in the activity of testing, we ‘constate’ the fact; so that is established and ‘stands together firmly’, as a coherent body, which is able in a certain relative sense, to ‘stand up’ to being put to the test. Thus, within certain limits, the fact remains con-stant

Actually, the very closely related word ‘constater’ is used in modern French, in much the sense that has been indicated above. In a certain way, it covers what is meant here better than ‘constate’ because it is derived from the Latin ‘constat’ which is the past participle of ‘constare’, and thus its root meaning would be ‘to have stood together’. This fits together quite well with ‘fact’ or ‘that which has been made’.

To consider these questions in the rheomode, we then introduce the root verb ‘to con-statate’. This means ‘to give spontaneous and unrestricted attention to how any sort of action or movement whatsoever is established in a relatively constant form that stands together relatively stably, including the action of establishing a body of fact that stands together in this way, and even the action of this very word in helping to establish the fact about the function of language itself’

To re-constatate is then by means of word and thought, to call attention again to a particular action or movement of this kind in a given context. If this latter is seen to fit within the context in question, we say: ‘to re-constatate is re-constatant’, and if it is seen not to fit, we say: ‘to re-constatate is irre-constatant’ (e.g. the fact as it had previously been established is not found factually to ‘stand up’ to further observation and experience).

The noun form ‘re-constation’ then signifies a particular kind of continuing state of action or movement in a given context that ‘stands together’ in a relatively constant way, whether this be our own action in establishing a fact, or any other kind of the rheomode movement that can be described as established or stable in form. It may thus, in the first instance, refer to the possibility of confirming again and again, in a series of acts of observation or experimentation, that ‘the fact still stands’; or it may refer to a certain continuing state of movement (or of affairs) which ‘still stands’ in an overall reality including and going beyond our acts of observation and experimentation.

Finally it may refer to the verbal activity of making a statement (i.e. state-ment) by which what one person re-constatates can be communicated, to be reconstatated by other people. That is to say, a re-constatation is, in ordinary use of language, ‘an established fact’ or ‘the actual state of movement or of affairs that the fact is about’ or ‘the verbal statement of the fact’