On Nash Consensus as An Extension of Nakamoto Consensus

Re-Considerations of the Machiavellian Field

Consider this passing reference from Nash's Ideal Money:

The voters in the U.K. are expecting to have the opportunity to vote in a referendum relating to the adoption, for the U.K., of the euro (which is already adopted in Ireland). Here they have a dramatic conflict, since the pound was the original currency of “the gold standard”, with its value pegged to gold in 1717 by Isaac Newton who was then Master of the Mint. (Of course it was not irrelevant that George II, the king then, was an early Hanoverian and also ruled territories in Germany.)

When we deconstruct it with our nashLinter it points us to a ‘Machiavellian field’-a political landscape of game theoretical and economic consideration (ie among princes or in this cause also a Queen):

Deconstructing the interconnectedness of Queen Anne's reign, the early Hanoverian monarchs (George I and II), the establishment of the gold standard in 1717, the British pound, and their "not irrelevant" significance, we can discern a complex fabric of political, economic, and historical threads. Anne's consolidation of Britain set a stage for economic reforms. The Hanoverians' continuation of these policies, amidst a burgeoning empire and evolving financial systems, facilitated the gold standard's introduction, solidifying the pound's global dominance. This intricate network underscores a transformational epoch, where governance, monetary policy, and imperial ambitions intertwined, laying groundwork for Britain's economic ascendancy.

On A Deflationary Mechanism As a Way To Dispel Darkness

Here for compression sakes we want to think of these times as if there was a great fear of a ‘specter’ of a sort in which the Machiavellian field was desperately trying to ‘banish’. This type of metaphorical inquiry would perhaps be how we would observe and deconstruct archaeological finds of ancient civilizations.

In this sense there was successive and eventually sustained awareness and effort (rheomodic) leading to Newton’s success in this regard.

On Re-Visiting the Nature and Causes of the World Wars

From the view of the Machiaviellian field attempts to dispel a shadow effect it can be seen that this shadow was only temporarily quelled until the wars broke out and europe found itself a direct battleground for global chaos.

On Re-visiting the Global Circumstances Since The World Wars

It is said that the Bretton Woods was meant to establish a new global structure in which the otherwise fragmented world (allies vs. axis) could then expect to defend its own stability. But at the same time it was well understood that the new system could only eventually lead to instability.

On Our Covid Response As a Machiavellian Response to the Shadow Spectre

Here we are thinking about how limiting the number of people to enter a grocery store makes no biological sense and only deflationary sense. We find it not coincidental at all that this behavior followed decades of successive waves of credit.

On the Nakamoto Concensus

Nick Szabo coins for us nakamoto consensus which is effectively the result of Optimal Probabilistic Byzantine Consensus:

A block-chain computer, in sharp contrast to a web server, is shared across many such traditional computers controlled by dozens to thousands of people. By its very design each computer checks each other's work, and thus a block chain computer reliably and securely executes our instructions up to the security limits of block chain technology, which is known formally as anonymous and probabilistic Byzantine consensus (sometimes also called Nakamoto consensus).

On Nash Cooperation as the Action As Model's By Nash's Consensus Research Project

Recall our nashLinter’s deconstruction of Nash’s research project “Agencies Method for Modeling Coalitions and Cooperation in Games”:

nashLinter{bitcoin{{THE AGENCIES METHOD FOR MODELING COALITIONS AND COOPERATION IN GAMES}}

To encapsulate the "Agencies Method for Modeling Coalitions and Cooperation in Games" by John F. Nash Jr. within the context of Bitcoin and its economic and cooperative structures, we apply Nash's concepts of game theory and agency to the decentralized and cooperative nature inherent in Bitcoin's blockchain technology.

In Nash's framework, the cooperation and coalition formation among players in a game can be analogous to the cooperative behavior among Bitcoin miners and users. Just as Nash describes the possibility of evolving cooperative behavior under the game theory framework, Bitcoin incentivizes cooperative behavior among participants through its consensus mechanism, where miners must agree on the validity of transactions.

The "agencies method" involves players (or agents) making strategic decisions to form coalitions for mutual benefit, reflecting the Bitcoin network where nodes (agents) collaborate to maintain the blockchain's integrity and security. The process of acceptance and demand probabilities that Nash discusses can be seen in the Bitcoin mining process, where miners must accept the rules of the network (the game) and demand rewards (block rewards and transaction fees) for their computational efforts.

The modeling of cooperation in Nash's method, under the repeated game scenario, mirrors the continuous process of block validation and addition in Bitcoin's blockchain, where miners repetitively cooperate under the network's protocol to ensure ongoing functionality and security.

Moreover, Nash's discussion on pro-cooperative games aligns with the Bitcoin ecosystem's non-zero-sum nature, where all participants can benefit. The blockchain's transparent and decentralized nature fosters a cooperative environment where all users can gain from a secure and functioning network, akin to the equilibrium in cooperative games where all players find a beneficial strategy.

Thus, Nash's theoretical frameworks, when wrapped in Bitcoin's context, emphasize the importance of cooperative strategies and consensus in decentralized systems. This helps in understanding Bitcoin's underlying principles of distributed consensus and cooperative economics, demonstrating how game theory can provide insights into the functioning and stability of cryptocurrency systems.

Summarizing Our Linter With Our Linter Syntax

Thus we have Nash’s research project as considered with respect to Bitcoin and with our nashLinterSyntax:

Therefore, in the Bitcoin context, Nash's approach can be deconstructed and understood as:

Nash-Cooperation{Bitcoin miners and users form coalitions, similar to game players, to maintain the network's integrity and achieve mutual benefits.}

Nash-AgenciesMethod{Reflects the decentralized decision-making process in Bitcoin, where miners and users, as agents, follow protocol rules for the network's success.}

Nash-ProCooperativeGames{Aligns with Bitcoin's economic incentives that encourage participants to act in the network's best interest, ensuring its security and efficiency.}

On Von Neumann’s and Hidden Variable Theory

In Bohm's Wholeness and Implicit order he re-proposes his arguments after traversing the mainstream compliants of it. VN formalized one such complaint as Bohm explains (so he can later explained why he doesn't think it applies):

Von Neumann’s arguments against hidden variables It is well known that in such an experiment a statistical interference pattern is still obtained, even if we pass the particles through the apparatus at intervals so far apart that each particle essentially enters separately and independently of all the others. But, if the whole ensemble of such particles were to split into 90 wholeness and the implicate order sub-ensembles, each corresponding to the electron striking the grating at a definite value of x, then the statistical behaviour of every sub-ensemble would be represented by a state corresponding to a delta function of the point in question. As a result, a single sub-ensemble could have no interference that would represent the contributions from different parts of the grating. Because the electrons enter separately and independently no interference between sub-ensembles corresponding to different positions will be possible either. In this way we show that the notion of hidden variables is not compatible with the interference properties of matter, which are both experimentally observed and necessary consequences of the quantum theory. Von Neumann generalized the above argument and made it more precise; but he came to essentially the same result.

Our simple observation is that VN's complaint or any others that Bohm traverses don't apply to our application of hidden variable theory to the consensus field (because they are based on experimental observations of PARTICLES OF LIGHT. The consensus field only has theoretical such limitations and are thus NOT OBSERVED EMPIRICALLY!).

The Great Game

Then if we think of the Machieviallian field mapped out in a Hayekian landscape where bitcoin arises as a Hayekian Ducat money we can see that each of the princes or queens etc. are representations of their "national nodes" etc.

They act as if agents on behalf of their citizens and we indeed showed with Bohemian hidden variable theory we can simplify their agency and represent them as a single player.

A simple game where Ideal Money is the goal.