

# Cultural omnivorousness as a combination of highbrow, pop, and folk elements: The relation between taste patterns and attitudes concerning social integration

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## Abstract

This article attempts to move the discussion about the cultural omnivore ahead in two ways. Firstly, different types of omnivores will be discerned. To this end, we use a well-known division of the cultural field into three distinct *cultural schemes*: highbrow, pop, and folk. Seeing omnivorousness as an engagement in elements from at least two of these schemes, we can logically identify a number of combinatorial taste patterns and thereby distinguish between different types of cultural omnivores. Secondly, the relations between different types of omnivorousness and attitudes concerning social integration are estimated. We focus on the question whether these attitudes are related to breadth of taste, to characteristics of the specific schemes constituting a taste pattern, or to both. The results indicate that participating in a specific scheme is generally more strongly related to social integration than breadth of taste, although relations with participation in a specific scheme may depend on whether or not one participates in other schemes as well. © 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

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## 1. Introduction

In 1992, two publications by Richard A. Peterson ([Peterson and Simkus, 1992](#); [Peterson, 1992](#)) introduced the concept of the cultural omnivore into the field of the sociology of culture. Peterson found that members from higher-status groups do not limit their cultural behaviour to more prestigious or highbrow cultural items, such as classical music or opera, but also engage in non-elite or lowbrow culture. In fact, high-status people were even more likely than their lower status counterparts to enjoy non-elite musical genres such as bluegrass, big band, or barber shop

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music. Rather than being highbrow snobs, many members of higher-status groups turned out to have a broad, or omnivorous, cultural taste. This finding prompted Peterson to argue that we are witnessing a shift from the so-called highbrow–lowbrow model of cultural consumption, as advocated by Bourdieu (1984), to a cultural domain that is structured primarily by the distinction between high-status omnivores and low-status univores. In 1996, Peterson and Kern showed that, indeed, during the 1980s, the proportion of omnivores had increased in the US (see also Van Eijck and Van Rees, 2000; López-Sintas and Karz-Gerro, 2005).

Peterson's findings aroused a lot of interest among cultural sociologists, many of whom engaged in studies of empirical taste patterns looking for omnivores (see Peterson, 2005; Virtanen, 2006 for overviews). The omnivorous taste pattern showed up in numerous countries, which led Peterson (2005:261) to conclude that “omnivorousness as a standard for good taste has come into vogue at a discrete period of time, and if it is like earlier standards of taste, will gradually spread across geographic boundaries before it atrophies”.

Thus, omnivorousness as a structuring principle of cultural tastes has been well established. Its sociological significance, however, has received less consideration. Although a lot of speculation about the sociological meaning of (the emergence of) the cultural omnivore has been put forward, little empirical research has been devoted to understanding what it means to be a cultural omnivore, or how the patterning of one's taste is related to other characteristics such as value orientations, social attitudes, or leisure motivations.

This article attempts to move the discussion about the cultural omnivore ahead in two ways. Firstly, different types of omnivores will be discerned. Scholars who want to distinguish between different taste patterns (Bourdieu, 1984; Schulze, 1992), art worlds (Becker, 1982), or cultural discourses (Frith, 1996) have typically come up with three distinct *cultural schemes*: highbrow, pop, and folk. Taking diversity, or boundary-crossing, as the prime characteristic of the omnivore taste, we argue that taste patterns containing elements from more than one cultural scheme define the omnivore. This permits us to identify a limited number of repertoires or combinatorial taste patterns. Thus, rather than considering omnivorousness as a relatively broad taste to be measured by assessing the number or diversity of cultural items people appreciate or engage in, we will compare taste patterns consisting of specific combinations of elements from highbrow, pop, and folk culture and thus attempt to distinguish between qualitatively different ways of being a cultural omnivore.

Secondly, the relation between the resulting taste patterns, differing both in scope and in content, and attitudes concerning social integration will be estimated. As will be discussed below, Schulze (1992) maintains that different cultural taste patterns go together with different ways of relating to other people and society at large. More recently, Lizardo (2006) found that highbrow preferences imply other personal networks than does familiarity with popular culture. Others have shown breadth of taste to be also related to the scope of social networks (DiMaggio, 1991; Peterson, 1992; Mark, 1998). Maintaining large or heterogeneous networks would be easiest for people with a broad taste. These findings all indicate that cultural tastes are in some way related to people's integration in social networks and their sense of belonging to society at large. Speaking of omnivores as being open, tolerant, or actively constructing their own lifestyle (see Emmison, 2003; Wynne and O'Connor, 1998), implies that they would be, e.g., more individualist than others and feel at home in a world from which they freely grasp whatever suits their needs without caring too much for existing norms regarding matters of taste. The latter characteristics have been regarded as attitudes directly relevant for social integration (Billiet, 1998; Lievens et al., 2006). Thus, adherents to each of the cultural schemes are likely to differ in their attitudes toward social integration. Moreover, it can be argued that specific combinations of cultural schemes, or ways of

being a cultural omnivore, are related differently to the social integration attitudes to be studied here. We will distinguish six different attitudes that are related to social integration from a social capital perspective (Billiet, 1998): utilitarian and expressive individualism, social isolation, social disorientation, solidarity, and communitarianism. To test our expectations, we will then analyze how these attitudes, each being either conducive or detrimental to social integration, are related to the three cultural schemes or any combination thereof. We will not make any causal claims as to these relations. Our aim in this study is to demonstrate that operationalizing taste patterns in terms of combinations of cultural schemes leads to a more detailed understanding of people's concomitant attitudes towards other people and society in general than measuring either only (aspects of) the content of taste or only its breadth. Thus, different ways of being a cultural omnivore are expected to have different social implications, or reflect different attitudes.

## 2. Cultural schemes

Proceeding on the assumption that the cultural omnivore exists<sup>1</sup>, we want to introduce a more detailed way of looking at taste patterns that defy traditional cultural boundaries. Most studies on omnivorousness measure this characteristic as the number of cultural genres appreciated, or as the extent to which highbrow and lowbrow items are combined. We will also consider omnivorousness as an engagement in a heterogeneous set of cultural items, but we will replace the highbrow–lowbrow dichotomy by a three-way distinction of musical genres into highbrow, folk, and pop. As we will discuss in more detail below, this allows us to look at different types of omnivores, because omnivorousness can now manifest itself in several different combinations of these three cultural schemes, to be discussed below, that will be considered building blocks from which taste patterns are constructed.

Looking at people's cultural orientations in terms of streams, discourses, or schemes, researchers varying in approach tend to agree on the usefulness of a tripartite distinction. Peterson (1972) distinguished folk, fine art, and popular music. Frith (1990, 1996) differentiated between the art discourse, the folk discourse, and the pop discourse. Schulze (1992) discerned the high culture scheme (*Hochkulturschema*: highbrow), the trivial scheme (*Trivialschema*: folk), and the excitement scheme (*Spannungsschema*: pop). This tripartite distinction has also been corroborated in empirical analyses of cultural taste patterns (Deihl et al., 1983; O'Hagan, 1996; Van Eijck, 2001) and provides a useful categorization for the sociology of culture in general (e.g., Alexander, 2003).

According to Peterson (1972:136), although each stream can be further subdivided, “the contexts in which music is created and consumed are quite similar from one variety to another *within* each major stream”. This does not imply that one can just link any musical genre exclusively to any of these streams, as demonstrated in the same article where Peterson argues that jazz has developed through each of these streams. Rooted in black folk traditions, jazz became pop music in the 1930 (swing), whereas the bop style, being partly a black subcultural phenomenon where musicians wanted to play music that white people would not understand,

<sup>1</sup> There are signs that the number of cultural omnivores is already decreasing and that omnivores are being replaced by people appreciating predominantly popular or lowbrow forms of culture (see Peterson and Rossman, 2007; Van Eijck and Knulst, 2005). Van Eijck and Bargeman (2004) have shown that the audience for the fine arts comprises an increasingly elitist rearguard. Logically, if the interest in the fine arts is diminishing, the proportion of cultural consumers combining highbrow and lowbrow will decline as well. Nevertheless, empirical research has produced considerable evidence for the existence of cultural omnivorousness. Therefore, it is worthwhile to take a closer look at omnivorous consumption patterns.

expressed a disdain for the mass audience and in a sense led jazz into the world of the fine arts, with its conservatory trained musicians, dedicated funding agencies, coverage in the elite press, and its emphasis on genius, innovation, and interpretation.

Frith also takes the distinction between highbrow, pop, and folk as expressing ways of looking at music rather than as ‘meta-genres’. He speaks of discourses instead of streams, claiming that “. . . these days music is heard through three overlapping and contradictory grids, grids mapped by what I call the art discourse, the folk discourse, and the pop discourse” (Frith, 1996:26). After having demonstrated the historical contingency of the highbrow–lowbrow distinction, Frith discusses each of the three discourses. Again, as with Peterson, it seems that over time musical genres have been appreciated in different terms, that is, through different aesthetic discourses. The distinction between highbrow and lowbrow is certainly not cast in iron (see also Levine, 1988). At any given moment in time, due to specific socio-economic circumstances and class politics, societies may differ in the way they classify cultural expressions: as highbrow, popular, folk, lowbrow, mass culture, or whatever terms one deems appropriate to express these differences. Yet, even if jazz went through different streams during the twentieth century, as Peterson (1972) argues, by the 1960s much of jazz music fits into the fine art stream. Similarly, although what is regarded as classical music today need not always count as highbrow, or be framed in a highbrow discourse, and bluegrass or comic books need not always count as lowbrow or mass culture, we assume that, at any given point in time, distinct musical genres can be meaningfully placed onto the grid representing the highbrow, pop, and folk discourse.

As Frith states, although these discourses are in part contradictory, they may also show overlap. Classical music and opera may still be seen by many as offering transcendence rather than being subject to the hassles and compromises of everyday life, but people involved in the production and distribution of these genres also have to reckon with commercial considerations and cater for the tastes of target audiences (e.g., Martorella, 1982). Overlap of discourses is also evident in the fact that pop music has provided many (British) art school students with a livelihood, putting “art into pop” (Frith and Horne, 1987), whereas country music has at times virtually blended with pop music, as in rockabilly (Hughes, 2000). Indeed, boundaries are blurry in a number of cases, but still it can be argued that highbrow, pop, and folk culture can be used as *ideal types* or empirical generalizations to characterize both musical styles and their audiences.

### 3. From cultural schemes to taste groups

Drawing on a large-scale survey of over 1.000 inhabitants of the German city of Nürnberg and its suburbs, Schulze (1992) provides detailed descriptions of taste patterns deploying the highbrow scheme, the pop scheme, and the folk scheme. He distinguishes between schemes (comparable to Frith’s discourses) on the one hand, and milieu groups consisting of people adhering to (combinations of) these schemes, on the other hand. This is a highly relevant distinction as it clarifies how and why taste groups differ from discourses. Frith (1996) relates his discourses to Becker’s art worlds and Bourdieu’s status-based taste groups, but at times this leads to confusion as to what the discourses actually represent. He sometimes treats the terms art world, taste group, or discourse synonymously. Schulze, however, demonstrates that cultural schemes can be used to characterize the cultural practices of different taste groups without assuming that, e.g., the existence of a highbrow discourse implies the existence of a single, homogeneous high culture taste group. This is also what the omnivorousness thesis tells us: people who appreciate

art belonging to any of the discourses mentioned may also be inclined to use or enjoy other discourses, to take in elements of other art worlds.<sup>2</sup> And this suggests that a love of classical music may *mean* different things, i.e., is related to different social milieux or different sets of social values, depending on whether it is the only music one appreciates or whether it is combined with a love of pop or folk music. “Cultural omnivore” may refer to members of (an) identifiable omnivorous taste group(s), but it cannot be understood in terms of any single discourse, nor can its use be limited to a single discourse type. Schulze’s distinction between taste groups (milieu groups) and discourses (schemes) therefore allows us to use the three cultural discourses in analyzing taste patterns that may consist of combinations of discourses or schemes.

Schulze’s description of the three schemes is, obviously, quite similar to those offered by Frith and Peterson, but it is also richer because Schulze tries to figure out the constellation of values that inform these discourses and the social milieu groups to which they are relevant. Fig. 1 provides an overview of the milieu groups distinguished by Schulze.

Schulze distinguishes five milieu groups, three of which are primarily oriented towards a single scheme (high milieu, harmony milieu, and entertainment milieu). The two remaining milieu groups combine two schemes: while the integration milieu can be seen as a mixture of highbrow and folk, the self-fulfilment milieu is rather a mixture of highbrow and pop. The latter two milieux call into question the idea that class and culture are isomorphically related, although this is more clearly the case for the self-fulfilment milieu than for the integration milieu.

The high milieu, which adheres to the highbrow scheme or discourse, is a group driven by intellectual aspirations. Its members enjoy activities that require or elicit contemplation but distance themselves from anything deemed barbaric. They engage in cultural consumption in a rather cognitive mode of restrained, concentrated enjoyment. This serious, cultivated attitude is required by the notion that fine art is not a part of everyday life, but rather refers to something higher, something perfect, unlike folk or popular art forms (hence perfection as their life philosophy in Fig. 1). Transcendence is the ideal of cultural experience in this discourse, which is highly reminiscent of the cultural taste and practice of Bourdieu’s cultural elite. In their arts participation, the members of the high milieu very much appreciate complexity, which is to be understood and enjoyed in an orderly fashion (see fundamental interpretation in Fig. 1). This element of order is also reflected in the primary perspective of hierarchy which underlies their view of the (art) world. Art is about the finest achievements of mankind (like great science, hence the Nobel Prize ceremony as the experience paradigm) and such products of genius should be approached with proper reverence (see also Sheldon, 1986). Therefore, the outside world is hierarchically ordered and standards of excellence are taken to be well-established: quasi-absolute norms determine what is worthy of serious attention. It is then up to the individual person to try to understand and appreciate these evidently superb artistic achievements (This is also reflected in individuals’ striving for standing as their existential problem definition). That is what is meant by the notion that the relation between the ego and the world is anchored in the world. Life’s goals and the criteria by which to measure an individual’s achievement are given, so it is up to the individual to learn to acknowledge and honour the existing hierarchy. This is, of course, closely related to Kant’s conception of the possibility of a pure judgment of taste, which

<sup>2</sup> Bourdieu (1984) argued that the aesthetic disposition of the cultural elite allowed them to consider a wide range of objects from an aesthetic point of view. We rather argue, along with, e.g., Lahire (2008), that there is no single all-embracing habitus at work that determines how one looks at everything, but rather that different ‘grids’ or modes of interaction and evaluation are activated vis-à-vis different cultural products.

<b>Milieu:</b>	<b>High</b>	<b>Harmony</b>	<b>Entertainment</b>	<b>Integration</b>	<b>Self-fulfilment</b>
<i>Scheme:</i>	highbrow	Folk	pop	highbrow + folk	pop + highbrow
<i>Enjoyment:</i>	contemplation	cosiness	action	cosiness + contemplation	action + contemplation
<i>Distinction:</i>	anti-barbaric	Anti-eccentric	anti- conventional	anti-barbaric + anti-eccentric	anti-convention. + anti-barbaric
<i>Life philosophy</i>	perfection	harmony	Narcissism	harmony + perfection	Narcissism + perfection
<i>ego-world- relation</i>	anchored in world	anchored in world	anchored in ego	anchored in world	anchored in ego
<i>Primary perspective:</i>	hierarchy	danger	immediate needs / desires	social expectations	inner centre
<i>Existential problem def.:</i>	strive for standing	strive for security	strive for stimulation	strive for conformity	strive for self- fulfilment
<i>Fundamental interpretation:</i>	complexity and order	simplicity and order	simplicity and spontaneity	medium com- plexity + order	complexity + spontaneity
<i>Experience paradigm:</i>	Nobel Prize granting	wedding celebration	Miami Beach	pleasant neighbourhood	artists
<i>Age:</i>	over 40	over 40	below 40	over 40	below 40
<i>Education:</i>	higher	Lower	lower	intermediate	intermediate or higher

<sup>1</sup> This table is constructed by translating cells from five Tables that appear in Schulze (1992), chapter six

Fig. 1. Schulze's five milieu groups in keywords<sup>1</sup>.

refers to 'a capacity for aesthetic discrimination' (Allison, 2001:73). Through detached reflection and analysis, those gifted with this amazing capacity can reveal what is objectively and universally beautiful and what should therefore be acknowledged as such by everybody.

The second 'univorous' milieu is the harmony milieu, which is oriented towards the folk scheme. Adhering to tradition, striving for harmony and keen to avoid eccentricity, its members also have a world-anchored ego-world relation. The outside world is thus perceived as given, although this time it is a potentially dangerous world, and one should try and find a proper (hiding) place in it. People in the harmony milieu are striving for a cosy, safe place in the world, through which they hope to achieve security, simplicity, and order. These central features are also reflected in their relation to art. Art should be authentic and rather than offering transcendence, it should fulfil the social function of creating a sense of community or solidarity. The view of the world as a potentially threatening place encourages the members of the harmony milieu to live in a relatively small, or at least socially homogeneous world, surrounded mainly by people who can be trusted and objects that fill their home with a sense of reassurance and authenticity. Clearly, art and life are not distinct domains as in the high milieu and the needs met by folk culture are often also met by simply staying at home.



The entertainment milieu is all about fun, which is something completely different. Here the ego-world relation is anchored in the ego, implying that people attempt to adapt the world to their own personal needs rather than trying to conform to a pre-given set of norms and values. This is illustrated by the stress on narcissism, spontaneity, stimulation, and an anti-conventionalist attitude in the entertainment milieu. Popular culture participation is about commerce, fun, and indulgence with little concern for perfection or safety. Intense stimulation of the senses is a prominent means of entertainment and can be achieved through, e.g., loud music, exciting movies, sensational sports, or riding a roller coaster.

The other two milieus are each oriented at two aesthetic schemes. For the integration milieu, these are highbrow and folk. These people seem to be a rather straightforward combination of the highbrows and the folk fans; they might best be described using Bourdieu's concept of cultural goodwill, which refers to middlebrow culture as a diluted version of highbrow culture. Indeed, members of the integration milieu tend to appreciate art that is quite serious, but it should not be eccentric, nor too difficult, nor interfere with their need for harmony, cosiness, and conformity. Art should be both clever and recognizable, uplifting yet reassuring, just like their well-groomed neighbourhoods.

Finally, the self-fulfilment milieu combines the highbrow and pop discourse. This does not lead to a simple mixing or averaging-out of characteristics, as these discourses represent ways of being that are fundamentally different. If we want to make the distinction between an inclusive and a restricted mode of cultural practice (Emmison, 2003), combining pop and highbrow would be the most inclusive, in the sense that it would comprehend the most diverse elements. There is no logical middle course to be derived from these two schemes. People classified in the self-fulfilment milieu value spontaneity *and* complexity, narcissism *and* perfection, action *and* contemplation. Their relation to the world is anchored in the ego. Self-fulfilment should be seen as an attempt to develop a unique self and to try and change the world accordingly. Therefore, these people are the most active participants in social movements and avant-garde art and display a great concern for personal style in clothing and interior design. Unlike the older milieus, they do not start out with a certain conception of the world (as either hierarchically ordered [high milieu], a set of social expectations [integration milieu], or an endangered order [harmony milieu]) on which they base their life course. Rather, like in the similarly young entertainment milieu, reality is constructed around the self. Taking themselves as the core from which to start, they ask themselves how the world around them can be manipulated in order to meet their needs and desires. Contemplation and engaging in complexity are then ways of developing one's inner centre, but these are tools rather than paradigmatic goals.

The difference between the integration milieu and the self-fulfilment milieu is of great interest because it indicates that the frequently used highbrow–lowbrow or omnivore–univore dichotomies are not sufficient to understand cultural taste patterns. Pop and folk do not merge into a unified lowbrow or mass culture. As a consequence, the milieu combining highbrow and pop differs markedly from the milieu combining highbrow and folk. Whereas the former have characteristics that have also been put forward as typical of the cultural omnivore (Wynne and O'Connor, 1998; Van Eijck, 2001), the latter strongly resemble a middle class taste identified by Bourdieu (1984).

The five milieus discerned by Schulze do not represent all possible combinations of discourses. He does not find a milieu combining pop and folk nor a milieu combining all three discourses. A combination of pop and folk might make sense given the fact that the entertainment milieu and the harmony milieu are both lower educated. According to Schulze, the entertainment milieu cannot be merged with the self-fulfilment milieu into a single youth culture, nor with the

harmony milieu into a single working class milieu. Nevertheless, he does note that the harmony milieu is explicitly distant from the high scheme, but less so from the pop scheme. Thus, although the younger members of the entertainment milieu are likely to actively distance themselves from the folk scheme, the older members of the harmony milieu do not necessarily display a similar disdain for the pop scheme.

A combination of elements of all three discourses has been found in studies by Van Eijck (2001), Sintas and Álvarez (2004), and Sonnett (2004), who all looked at musical taste patterns. Peterson (1992) also found that members of the higher-status groups appreciate a range of musical genres including highbrow, pop/rock, and folk styles. When looking at cultural omnivores, it thus makes sense to also distinguish a group of people who display this most omnivorous taste pattern.

#### 4. Cultural taste and attitudes concerning social integration

Seeing omnivorousness as a capacity to cross the boundaries between highbrow, pop, and folk culture, it is now clear that these cultural schemes can be combined in several ways, implying there might be several types of cultural omnivores. Even if it is argued that people combining pop and folk culture still limit themselves to lowbrow culture<sup>3</sup>, we should at least discern three omnivorous patterns: highbrow + pop, highbrow + folk, and highbrow + folk + pop.

As briefly mentioned above, and also raised by Ollivier in this issue, a lot of speculation has been going on about the ‘character’ of the cultural omnivore. Omnivores are thought to be open, flexible, tolerant, cosmopolitan, etc. (see also Bryson, 1996; Peterson and Kern, 1996; Van Eijck, 2000; Emmison, 2003; Skrbis and Woodward, 2007). One reason for the alleged openness of the cultural omnivores is thought to lie in the larger size of their personal networks (DiMaggio, 1987; DiMaggio, 1991; Mark, 1998). According to DiMaggio (1987), the ego networks of high-status people are larger and less dense than the ego networks of low-status people. This would require them to have a broader stock of cultural knowledge offering some cultural common ground which would facilitate getting along with all these different people. In addition, as one gets to know more different people, one is also more likely to learn about their cultural preferences (Mark, 1998).

Schulze suggests that members of the harmony milieu group tend to have relatively small, dense networks. Their limited interest in people from other geographical or social places (Schulze would speak of their mistrust of strangers) induces them to limit their social network to close friends and relatives. The cultural omnivore is thought to be at the other end of the scale. It is hard to tell which of these two extremes would hold attitudes that are more conducive to social integration. Inasmuch as harmony milieu members have more intense contacts with their friends and relatives, they appear more socially integrated due to the strength of their network ties. On the other hand, as omnivores are likely to know more people, this larger social network might also be seen as evidence of a higher level of social integration. Clearly, social integration can come about in different ways.

In order to come up with somewhat more refined expectations, we will now briefly introduce six concepts that will serve to measure respondents’ attitudes related to social integration.

<sup>3</sup> Peterson and Rossman (2007) treat the highbrow–lowbrow and the omnivore–univore dimensions as separate axes, thus obtaining a two-by-two table containing highbrow omnivores, lowbrow omnivores, highbrow univores, and lowbrow univores. From this perspective, people combining pop and folk would be lowbrow omnivores.



The first two concepts, utilitarian individualism and solidarity, measure the extent to which people strive for their own interests versus the common good. Utilitarian individualism is an attitude stressing the former: it is about getting ahead in your life, ‘making it’, pursuing self-interest without much concern for other people (Bellah et al., 1985; Chung and Henderson, 2001). It is clearly not an attitude that enhances social integration, as utilitarian individualists do not care much about the well-being of others or of society as a whole. Also, it has been shown to contribute to antipathy toward foreigners (Billiet, 1995). Solidarity, on the other hand, refers to a warm interest in the well-being of others and a willingness to help other people without immediately expecting anything in return.

The next two concepts, social disorientation and social isolation, are aspects of anomie (cf. Stole, 1956; Billiet, 1998). Obviously, these attitudes are negatively related to social integration. Social disorientation captures the degree to which people perceive society as unpredictable and disorderly. Social isolation refers to the feeling that people are not, or no longer, supported by reliable, meaningful social relations.

Finally, two concepts, expressive individualism and communitarianism, tap the degree to which respondents tend to create their own rules or rather adhere to shared norms, values, and traditions. They may be associated with Schulze’s concept of the ego-world relation. Expressive individualism is said to moderate utilitarian individualism (Bellah, 1998). It centres on expression of the (inner) self. While it reflects a willingness to actively engage in social contexts, it also implies doing as one pleases. In that sense, it represents a relation to the world that is explicitly ego-anchored, to use Schulze’s phrase. Communitarianism, on the other hand, reflects a longing for shared norms, values, and traditions. It emphasizes duty and responsibility as opposed to expressive and, especially, utilitarian individualism (Galbo, 2004). Obligations follow from a belief in moral principles that are shared within a community. Thus, within one’s social context, values and norms are more or less given and people need to adapt to these notions, to commit themselves to the social sphere, indicating that the relation between the ego and the world is anchored in the world.

The ideas of DiMaggio (1987, 1991), Schulze (1992), and Lizardo (2006) imply a link between characteristics of the cultural schemes on the one hand, and attitudes relevant for social integration on the other. Not much research has been conducted on this specific relation. Scholars have been far more interested in the relation between social integration, or cohesion, and *social capital* (Hemingway, 1999; Kwak et al., 2004; Putnam, 1993). But cultural taste is also likely to be correlated to how people relate to society. Taste is, after all, a major indicator of cultural capital, which is as much structured by the underlying habitus as one’s general outlook on society. In the words of Jeannotte (2004: 39), who speaks about sustainable community development: “. . . how people view the world and the universe, their environmental philosophy and ethics, their traditional knowledge and their social and political institutions will dictate how they function within their environment. Embodied cultural capital, or habitus, therefore lies at the base of this concept.”

More specifically looking at social networks and taste, Lizardo (2006) found that cultural knowledge translates into integration in networks. His analyses suggest that the impact of taste on personal network characteristics is probably more relevant than the reverse process where networks determine taste. Tastes are then understood as “cultural structures that serve to organize social interaction around commonly shared knowledge and interests” (Lizardo, 2006: 785). Mastery of highbrow culture then tends to be converted into restricted strong-tie circles because highbrow culture appreciation is typically limited to a specific segment of society. A popular taste, on the other hand, is related to a denser network of weak ties because it is less socially

specific and therefore more likely to loosely connect people to a heterogeneous set of others. This is in line with Erickson's (1996) finding that cultural knowledge that is more widespread and less stratified is more useful in social interaction with a broad range of people. Although Lizardo (2006) does not distinguish folk culture, he does argue in a footnote that univorous tastes that are popular nor highbrow are likely to further network characteristics similar to those related to the highbrow taste, that is, smaller strong-tie networks that help sustain intra-class cohesion. This is also what Schulze claims. We can therefore expect each of the three cultural schemes to be related to attitudes concerning social integration in a specific manner as well.

Though our analyses are largely exploratory and we do not want to make any causal claims, we would like to make explicit a number of general expectations that can be derived from our theoretical considerations. The world-anchored ego-world relation is more likely to be prevalent among people adhering to the highbrow or the folk discourse while the ego-anchored relation to the world will be more typical of the pop aficionado's. This can be deduced from Schulze's schemes, but also from the fact that, according to Lizardo (2006), both folk and highbrow tastes are related to smaller strong-tie networks, where prevailing norms will be clung to more strictly because they help sustain intra-class cohesion. Hence, participation in the highbrow and the folk schemes will be negatively related to utilitarian and expressive individualism and positively to communitarianism. Participating in the pop discourse will be positively related to both individualisms and negatively to communitarianism.

The supposedly smaller, strong-tie social network of those engaged in the folk discourse is likely to imply a higher level of solidarity and a lower score on social isolation. Solidarity will be lower among the more individualist pop lovers, although we have little reason to believe that they will also be more socially isolated. The folk fans' alleged mistrust of the world outside their personal network is, however, likely to be reflected in a higher level of social disorientation. Social disorientation will be negatively related to engagement in the pop scheme, as the pop discourse is about keeping up with the latest trends in society and celebrating dynamism and novelty. Taking part in the highbrow discourse will probably have a weaker positive association with social disorientation than the folk discourse, assuming that the socio-cultural horizon of the highbrow lovers is wider than that of the folk fans. The former will therefore be more in touch with recent social or technological developments than the latter, although their respect for tradition will temper their enthusiasm for social change. Finally, the literature does not give much clues as to the relation between the highbrow discourse and solidarity. On the one hand, the supposedly more restricted strong-tie network of highbrows would go well with solidarity, as it does for the folk fans but probably to a lesser extent. On the other hand, the highbrows are more privileged and elitist, which makes their level of solidarity dependent on lofty notions of *noblesse oblige* more than on the experience that they need (to return) solidarity to get by.

It would be rather cumbersome to present predictions pertaining to all possible combinations of discourses. But we can state some general expectations about omnivorousness and attitudes concerning social integration based on previous research. After having assessed whether these relations occur in our data, we will use the specific combinations of cultural schemes to provide an interpretation of the relations between our social integration attitudes and general omnivorousness. The alleged openness of the cultural omnivore leads to the expectation that having a broader taste is likely to reflect feeling more comfortable in the face of diversity and complexity. Also, omnivorousness is thought to encourage or reflect creativity and to instil a concern for personal style (Wynne and O'Connor, 1998). We therefore expect omnivorousness to be positively related to expressive individualism and negatively to communitarianism, social isolation, and social disorientation. Regarding social solidarity and utilitarian individualism, we

	solidarity	utilitarian individual.	Social dis-orientation	social isolation	expressive individual.	communi-tarianism
Highbrow	?	-	+/-	?	-	+
Pop	-	+	-	?	+	-
Folk	+	-	+	-	-	+
Omnivore	?	?	-	-	+	-

Fig. 2. Expected relations between participation in the cultural schemes and omnivorousness on the one hand, and elements of social integration on the other.

are not sure what to expect. Although utilitarian individualism is, after all, individualism, it is a rather harsh version of it that we might expect to find among people who are mainly concerned with the accumulation of economic rather than cultural capital (see also Chung and Henderson, 2001). Likewise, solidarity is ambiguous. On the one hand, appreciating many genres is thought to be associated with the capacity to appreciate lots of different people (Bryson, 1996). On the other hand, a larger network size is negatively correlated with average tie strength. Our expectations are put together in Fig. 2.

## 5. Data and methods

### 5.1. Data

In order to answer our research questions, we use the data from the survey “Cultural Participation in Flanders 2003–2004” (Lievens et al., 2006), a research project of the Cultural Policy Research Centre “Re-Creatief Vlaanderen”. Flanders is the northern, Dutch speaking part of Belgium and has about 6 million inhabitants. In a computer-assisted face-to-face interview, 2849 randomly selected respondents aged between 14 and 85 were questioned in detail about their cultural behaviour (at home as well as through attending public events) and attitudes in a broad range of domains (arts, everyday culture, leisure activities, sports and recreation). Each of these were measured in detail, providing a detailed picture of cultural participation in Flanders and giving insight into the motives, expectations, or thresholds for participation and broader attitudes towards culture and society. The response rate in the sample was 61.03% of the eligible respondents. The data are weighted by gender, age, and schooling level in order to make them representative of the population of Flanders aged 14–85. In addition to the face-to-face interviews, data were gathered from the family members using written drop-off questionnaires. The latter data are not used here, as they provide insufficient information on our research questions.

### 5.2. Cultural schemes

As indicators for the cultural schemes, two alternative series of questions were available in the dataset: attending concerts and festivals on the one hand and listening to music on the other (both measured using the same 13 musical genres). We opt for the latter because listening to music relates closest to the concept of cultural schemes. Music participation in the private sphere is a more direct translation of musical preference as it is more easy to do than attending public events for which there are more inhibiting factors (e.g., time, financial cost, and cultural supply). Taking genre preferences rather than participation rates also reduces the chance that our

Table 1

Factor solution for musical genres listened to during the last month

	Highbrow	Popular	Folk
Classical works	<b>0.838</b>	0.082	0.058
Opera	<b>0.748</b>	–0.080	0.118
Baroque music	<b>0.598</b>	0.108	0.050
Operetta	<b>0.584</b>	–0.155	0.210
Contemporary classic	<b>0.517</b>	0.089	0.121
Pop/rock	–0.101	<b>0.813</b>	–0.049
Dance	–0.101	<b>0.668</b>	0.070
World music	0.112	<b>0.588</b>	0.338
Jazz/blues/soul/funk	0.260	<b>0.446</b>	0.145
Folk	0.223	0.268	<b>0.577</b>
Chansons	0.280	0.281	<b>0.459</b>
Brass band	0.246	–0.056	<b>0.439</b>
Popular flemish music	–0.055	0.046	<b>0.424</b>

Principal axis factoring, varimax rotation.

measures of cultural taste patterns are confounded by social network characteristics or aspects of social integration on which participation rates are likely to depend, because people rarely attend cultural events by themselves. Moreover, music participation frequencies for public events are extremely low as compared to those for listening to music. The latter then provide more variation among respondents and in this way better enable us to detect coherent patterns of musical preference.

Respondents were asked to indicate how often they had listened to each of thirteen musical genres during the month preceding the interview.<sup>4</sup> Answers were scored on a five-point scale ranging from ‘not during the last month’ (0) to ‘daily’ (4). Principal axis factoring using varimax rotation resulted in three components, as shown in Table 1. The first factor, labelled ‘highbrow’, shows high positive factor loadings for classical works, opera, baroque music, operetta, and contemporary classical music. The second factor groups together pop/rock, dance, world music, and jazz/blues/soul/funk.<sup>5</sup> These are genres that are commonly thought of as pop music, so we labelled this second component ‘popular’. Finally, the third factor is represented by popular Flemish music, brass band, (Flemish) folk music, and chansons. This set of genres, typically consisting of either traditional instrumental music or songs sung in the Dutch language using plain musical schemes and uncomplicated lyrics about love lost and found, has been labelled ‘folk’. Chansons are a borderline case, as these might be more appropriately considered as an element of middlebrow culture. Nevertheless, these three factors very nicely represent the three theoretical schemes.

Based on this factor solution, we first computed three variables indicating respondents’ participation in each of the schemes. Per scheme, we computed the average score of the musical genres involved. Next, for each scheme we distinguished two subgroups dependent on whether or

<sup>4</sup> Although our cultural discourses are based on musical taste patterns only, Peterson and Simkus (1992) have shown that musical tastes are rather homologous to tastes in other cultural domains.

<sup>5</sup> Although jazz was argued to have become increasingly highbrow over the years, in the questionnaire used the genre was grouped together with a number of more popular genres (blues, soul, and funk) so it ends up in the popular component.

Table 2  
Proportion of respondents per (combination of) schemes

	<i>n</i>	%
No participation	484	18.0
Highbrow univore	328	12.2
Pop univore	331	12.3
Folk univore	186	6.9
Highbrow + pop scheme	329	12.3
Highbrow + folk scheme	309	11.5
Pop + folk scheme	243	9.1
Highbrow + pop + folk scheme	474	17.7
Total	2684	100

not respondents had an above-average interest in it. Of course, this is an arbitrary boundary for inclusion in the schemes, but since we are interested in combinations of up to three schemes for which we need enough respondents, this proved to be the most fruitful approach. For the highbrow scheme ( $\alpha = 0.79$ ), this implied a distinction between respondents who had engaged in at least one of the five highbrow genres at all during the last month (mean score greater than 0; 53.6% of the respondents): they received score 1 on the highbrow scheme indicator, while all others received score 0. We computed a similar score for the pop factor ( $\alpha = 0.73$ ), although this time the criterion was a mean score on the popular genres of more than 1.5 (51.3%) in order to receive score 1 on the pop scheme indicator. Finally, respondents with an average score higher than 0.75 (45.2%) on the folk genres ( $\alpha = 0.57$ ) received score 1 on the folk scheme indicator. These three indicators were then used to construct additional variables indicating which specific combinations of schemes respondents engaged in. All possible combinations were coded separately. Respondents' distribution across this set of variables is shown in Table 2. Note that these proportions are determined by the boundaries set for scheme inclusion.

Using this set of eight indicators allows us to assess the relation between the attitudes related to social integration and being any type of univore or combining any set of cultural schemes. This will simultaneously inform us about the content and the scope of cultural taste patterns. Both aspects of taste patterns have been argued above to be related to social integration.

### 5.3. Attitudes related to social integration

As stated above, six concepts will be used to assess the attitudes related to social integration. Hence, six seven-point scales measuring these attitudes were computed. All scales are computed as the means of the items that make up the scale. The first two scales measure the extent to which respondents strive for their own interests versus the common good:

Utilitarian individualism (Cronbach's  $\alpha = 0.88$ ):

- humanity, our dear ones; this is all crap, people should look after themselves first and protect their own interests;
- people should pursue their own interests and not care too much about others;
- what matters is money and power, the rest is just baloney;
- going for personal success is more important than striving for good relations with others;
- in our society, people better take care of themselves first;
- first and foremost, one should strive for a prominent position for oneself;

- capable people should be allowed to use their talents mainly for their own benefit;
- in our society, you have to fight for your own position, other things will follow from there.

*Solidarity* (Cronbach's  $\alpha = 0.68$ ):

- one can only be happy if one regularly does something for other people without expecting them to do something back;
- I only feel really good if I can labour for some societal goal;
- people can only be happy if their fellow men are happy too.

Next, two components of the concept of anomie (cf. [Stole, 1956](#); [Billiet, 1998](#)) were measured: *Social disorientation* (Cronbach's  $\alpha = 0.89$ ):

- today, everything is so complicated that I do not know anymore what to do;
- these days we have so much new information coming at us that, in the end, we do not understand anything anymore;
- lately, things have become so speedy and hurried that I sometimes feel like I cannot keep up;
- today, I no longer understand what is going on;
- these days everything changes so fast that I do not know how to behave anymore.

*Social isolation* (Cronbach's  $\alpha = 0.63$ ):

- today, you really do not know whom you can trust anymore;
- most people are disappointing once you get to know them better;
- today, most people can be trusted (*item reversed*).

Finally, two scales tap the degree to which respondents tend to create their own rules or rather adhere to shared norms, values, and traditions. These scales refer directly to Schulze's concept of ego-world relation:

*Communitarianism* (Cronbach's  $\alpha = 0.85$ ):

- I believe customs and conventions should be adhered to;
- I believe people should follow traditional customs much more than they do;
- customs and etiquette should change as little as possible;
- people should be coerced more forcefully into obeying traditional values and manners.

*Expressive individualism* (Cronbach's  $\alpha = 0.81$ ):

- I always do as I please, even if it is completely at odds with what is generally accepted;
- nothing or nobody can restrict me in my quest for new experiences;
- both inside and outside my home I do not care about society's customs and manners;
- I do as I please and that is it.

#### 5.4. Control variables and model selection

Before we present the actual models, a methodological remark is appropriate here. In the regression tables below, the social integration attitudes will be treated as the dependent



variables. Our treatment of the cultural schemes as independent variables does not indicate that we are confident about the causal direction of the relation between these schemes on the one hand and the integration indicators on the other. Rather, including the schemes and their combinations as independent dummy variables into the analysis proved to be the most efficient ways of assessing and presenting the statistical relations in which we are interested. Using our data, there is in fact no sure way of telling which comes first; cultural taste or attitudes related to social integration. If we consider studies on the relation between social network characteristics and taste (seeing the logic behind this relation as largely analogous to that of the relation of the latter with the attitudes we measure), previous findings are contradictory. As mentioned above, Lizardo (2006) holds that taste is likely to affect networks, whereas Mark (1998) takes tastes to result from characteristics of one's social network. Both suggestions make sense. It is not unlikely that people's taste determines with whom they socialize, as we tend to seek out friends and spouses with whom we have certain things in common. On the other hand, the people you meet as friends, colleagues, or mere acquaintances may well bring to your attention music, novels, or other cultural products that you would not have known if you had not met these people.

More generally, it can be argued, on the one hand, that cultural preferences affect social attitudes, including those measured with our social integration attitude scales. See for example the ideas of the Frankfurt School on the supposedly debilitating effects of mass culture or the work of Raymond Williams (1971) on the long revolution. The German concept of *Bildung* similarly assumes that highbrow culture participation affects social attitudes, especially laudable ones like responsible citizenship or moral sensibility (Jenks, 2005). On the other hand, the concept of boundary work (Lamont, 1992) suggest an opposite causality, where values or attitudes are expressed or communicated through cultural practices and preferences. For example, Bryson (1996) uses political intolerance and racism as independent variables to explain cultural taste, although she is very careful not to draw causal inferences from her analyses. She refers to Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992) who claim that the relationship between the symbolic level and the social level is reciprocal. Concluding, however, Bryson states that cultural sociology needs more research on the effects of taste, as we do not really know how people use taste in their everyday lives (see also Swidler, 1986).

Although our analyses are set up as if we were to assess effects of taste, the resulting parameters will not reveal whether the relations retrieved should be interpreted as effects of taste patterns, or whether the causal process runs differently. By controlling for as many relevant additional variables as possible, however, we do hope to show that the relation between cultural taste and attitudes concerning social integration is not to be attributed to a number of obvious social background characteristics.

The control variables we added are the following. Gender was coded '0' for men and '1' for women. Age was coded into four categories: 18–34, 35–54, 55–64, and 65 and older. Education was measured using five categories: currently enrolled; no or only primary education; lower secondary education; higher secondary education; and tertiary education. Students who scored 'currently enrolled' on the educational variable were placed in the 'student' category of the set of variables indicating respondents' main activity, which was coded into: student; paid work; pensioner; and other. Family income was measured subjectively by asking the head of the household<sup>6</sup> whether they could live comfortably with their current family income. Answers were

<sup>6</sup> This was the only question that was not in all cases obtained from the primary respondent, but from the paper-and-pencil questionnaire administered to the head of the household ( $n = 1803$ ).

coded into seven categories ranging from “it is very difficult to make ends meet” to “we can live very comfortably”. Family situation was coded as: living with parents; being single; living with a partner, no children; living with a partner, youngest child living at home aged 10 or less; living with a partner, youngest child living at home aged older than 10. Finally, place of residence was measured in three categories: large city (Brussels, Antwerp, or Ghent); medium city; and small town.

We will start our analyses by estimating the effects of participation in each of the three cultural schemes on the six attitudes regarding social integration. For this purpose, we will use the separate scores on each of the three scales we constructed. Thus, we estimate the relations between social-integration related attitudes and the degree of participation in each scheme, controlled for participation in the other schemes plus the additional control variables. Presenting standardized effects allows us to compare the relative strength of the relations found per attitude. We thus test whether the predicted relationships can be confirmed at the single scheme level. In addition, assessing the relation between participation in each scheme and attitudes related to social integration will enable us to better interpret the effects of the patterns of combined schemes.

Next, we will assess the relation between social integration and omnivorousness measured as the number of musical genres people listened to during the six months preceding the interview. This will again allow us to test hypotheses derived from the existing literature and it will also be used for comparison with the final analysis, where relations between social integration attitudes and all possible combinations of cultural schemes will be assessed. If we find significant relations between the attitudes relevant for integration and omnivorousness, the analysis using patterns of cultural schemes will hopefully enable us to account for these relations more precisely. Do they indeed reflect an association of the social integration attitudes with the scope of one’s taste in general, or are specific cultural schemes included in a certain taste pattern responsible for the statistical relations found? The combinations of schemes will be entered as dummies, with those not participating in any scheme as the reference category. Taking the distinct taste patterns as independent variables allows us to explicitly compare the significance of these patterns.

## 6. Results

### 6.1. *Participation in each of the three schemes and attitudes concerning social integration*

First, the controlled effects of participation in each of the three schemes on the six elements of social integration will be assessed. They are presented in Table 3. With regard to solidarity, we expected this attitude to be most important to folk participants and least important for pop lovers. The results partly confirm these expectations. Solidarity is indeed positively related to the folk scheme. This is in line with our supposition that the folk scheme is about kind-heartedness, cosiness, and happy faces. Schulze also mentions a distrust of strangers as part of the triviality scheme, but the items measuring solidarity seem to refer to bonding rather than bridging social capital (Putnam, 2000), making it perfectly sensible that the folk participants have higher scores on this scale. In addition, women report higher levels of solidarity than men. People aged 55 and older show more solidarity than the reference group aged 35–54, while the youngest cohort has a significantly lower score. Holding a diploma in higher secondary education increases social solidarity.

Although folk participation is positively related to solidarity, we do not find a negative association with utilitarian individualism. The only significant relation with a cultural scheme

Table 3

Standardized effects of degree of involvement in the highbrow, pop, and folk schemes on aspects of social integration

	Value solidarity	Value utilitarian individual	Value social dis-orientation	Value social isolation	Value expressive individual.	Value communi- tarianism
Highbrow scheme	−0.019	−0.108***	−0.065***	0.007	−0.073***	−0.065***
Pop scheme	−0.026	−0.037	−0.066**	0.013	0.079***	−0.093***
Folk scheme	0.095***	−0.037	0.038	−0.075***	−0.038	0.069***
Gender (female)	0.098***	−0.066***	0.096***	0.086***	−0.026	0.004
Age 18–34 a	−0.119***	0.124***	−0.087***	0.001	0.077**	0.025
Age 55–64 a	0.077**	0.099***	0.035	−0.003	0.005	0.111***
Age 65+ a	0.167***	0.088*	0.076*	0.004	−0.074	0.219***
Tertiary education b	−0.010	−0.359***	−0.318***	−0.355***	−0.178***	−0.226***
Higher secondary education b	0.055*	−0.125***	−0.107***	−0.074**	−0.118***	−0.063*
Lower secondary education b	0.001	−0.238***	−0.208***	−0.145***	−0.133***	−0.113***
Subjective family income	−0.018	−0.058**	−0.127***	−0.145***	−0.060**	−0.039
Main activity: other c	−0.033	0.010	0.063**	0.069**	0.042	0.015
Main activity: pensioner c	0.012	−0.032	0.086*	0.085*	0.019	0.051
Main activity: student c	−0.016	−0.132***	−0.134***	−0.099***	−0.075**	−0.075**
Living with parents d	−0.044	0.007	0.035	−0.040	0.023	−0.004
Living single d	−0.007	0.017	−0.001	−0.026	0.114***	−0.034
Living with children up to 10 d	0.002	−0.020	−0.030	−0.012	0.028	0.019
Living with children over 10 d	0.028	−0.038	−0.024	−0.028	−0.006	0.033
Residence: large city e	−0.043	0.003	−0.067***	−0.038	0.036	0.022
Residence: small town e	−0.042	−0.019	−0.060**	−0.044*	−0.028	−0.028
Adjusted <i>R</i> square (%)	10.6	17.0	27.3	18.6	6.3	18.0

a: reference category = age 35–54; b: ref = no/primary education; c: ref = paid labor; d: ref = partner, no children; e: ref = medium size city.

\* Significance at  $p \leq 0.05$ .

\*\* Significance at  $p \leq 0.01$ .

\*\*\* Significance at  $p \leq 0.001$ .

is found for highbrow participation, which is negatively related to utilitarian individualism. Although highbrows are less concerned about actually contributing to the well-being of others than folk participants (solidarity), they do express ideas of solidarity at a more abstract level, as the negative effect on utilitarian individualism demonstrates. This might be indicative of a rather superficial ideology among the highbrow participants, where laudable principles are not necessarily consequential for the way people actually treat others. Referring to the intergroup values of the higher educated, Schuman and Bobo (1988:276) speak of “ideological sophistication rather than egalitarian commitment”. Here we see a similar constellation of perhaps socially desirable values which are not necessarily translated into praxis by higher-status individuals. In line with this superficial ideology thesis, a higher schooling level also reduces the level of utilitarian individualism in a nearly linear fashion while it hardly affects solidarity. In addition, students, women, people aged 35–54, and people from higher subjective income families show lower levels of utilitarian individualism.

Moving on to social disorientation, or the feeling that society changes too fast and is becoming too complex, we see that both highbrow and pop participants have a lesser chance of feeling that they cannot keep up with things, while folk participation is unrelated to social disorientation. The pop scheme indeed is very dynamic and up-to-date, so this negative relation

was expected. The negative relation with the highbrow scheme might be interpreted by the highbrow lovers' inclination not to shy away from complexity, also when it comes to social or technological change. Still, we had not expected the association between the highbrow scheme and social disorientation to be as strong as the relation with the pop scheme, as the highbrows were thought to be more traditional and therefore less enthusiastic about the pace of social change. In addition, women, people aged 65 and older, pensioners and people with 'other' main activities feel more disoriented. Persons with more than primary education, people from high (subjective) income families, students, and the cohort aged 18–34 report lower levels of disorientation, probably because they either have the resources (schooling, income) or the flexibility (youngsters, students) to cope with complexity and social change. Finally, place of residence is a relevant predictor here. Both people from large cities and people from small towns report lower levels of disorientation than people from medium-sized cities. Social disorientation has the highest proportion of explained variance of the six attitudes concerning social integration: 27.3%.

Social isolation, or the feeling that many people are not very trustworthy, is another element of anomie that we were able to include in our analyses. The folk scheme has a significantly negative relation with this indicator. If the relative mistrust towards strangers that Schulze posits as a feature of the folk scheme is present at all, it does not show up using the items for social isolation. Folk participation is related to trust in other people, whereas participation in the highbrow or pop scheme is unrelated to social isolation. Women, pensioners and people with 'other' main activities feel more isolated, whereas students, people from small towns, people with post-primary education and those from higher income families feel less isolated.

Like utilitarian individualism, expressive individualism is also negatively related to highbrow participation. Its relation to the pop scheme is positive. Expressive individualism measures the tendency not to conform to social conventions and traditions; an attitude that is clearly less customary among the participants in the two more traditional schemes (the negative relation with the folk scheme is just not significant at  $p = 0.06$ ). The ego-anchored ego-world relation of the pop scheme made us expect its positive association with expressive individualism. In addition, expressive individualism is higher among the youngest cohort aged up to 35 and among singles. Lower levels of expressive individualism are seen among people with at least secondary education, people from higher income families, and students. Overall, expressive individualism has the lowest proportion of explained variance of all the values (6.3%).

For communitarianism, all schemes show a significant effect. We see the same contrast between the highbrow and the pop scheme on the one hand and the folk scheme on the other as we saw for social disorientation, another indicator for concern with the pace or direction of social change. This time, however, the relation with the folk scheme is significant as well. The highbrow and pop schemes are negatively related to communitarianism, again indicating a lesser reverence for tradition among the highbrow and pop participants than among the folk participants. Furthermore, people aged 55 and older are more communitarian, while people with at least secondary education and students are less so.

## 6.2. *Omnivorousness and attitudes concerning social integration*

Table 4 shows the results of two sets of analyses. First, we computed a straightforward measure of omnivorousness by counting how many of the thirteen genres people had listened to at all during the last month. This variable was then entered as an independent variable in model 1. Next, we entered all possible combinations of the schemes (model 2). Comparing these estimates

Table 4

Effects of omnivorousness and participating in combinations of cultural schemes on aspects of social integration<sup>a</sup>

	Value solidarity	Value utilitarian individual.	Value social dis-orientation	Value social isolation	Value expressive individual.	Value communi- tarianism
Model 1:						
Omnivorousness (# genres)	0.042*	−0.172***	−0.061***	−0.061**	−0.063**	−0.045*
Adjusted <i>R</i> square (%)	10.1	18.0	27.1	18.5	5.9	17.4
Model 2:						
<i>Combination of schemes:</i>						
<i>No participation</i>	<i>ref</i>	<i>ref</i>	<i>ref</i>	<i>ref</i>	<i>ref</i>	<i>ref</i>
Highbrow univore	0.042	−0.142***	−0.039	−0.007	−0.050*	−0.049*
Pop univore	0.003	−0.045	−0.057*	0.006	0.070**	−0.063*
Folk univore	0.052*	−0.054*	0.016	−0.031	−0.038	−0.001
Highbrow + pop scheme	0.004	−0.125***	−0.051*	−0.010	−0.020	−0.079***
Highbrow + folk scheme	0.036	−0.100***	−0.013	−0.025	−0.053*	−0.030
Pop + folk scheme	0.062*	−0.097***	−0.037	−0.057*	0.015	−0.051*
Highbrow + pop + folk scheme	0.058*	−0.170***	−0.059*	−0.056*	−0.021	−0.061*
Adjusted <i>R</i> square (%)	10.3	17.5	27.0	18.5	6.3	17.5

<sup>a</sup> Standardized effects, all estimates are controlled for the same set of control variables as found in Table 2.\* Significance at  $p \leq 0.05$ .\*\* Significance at  $p \leq 0.01$ .\*\*\* Significance at  $p \leq 0.001$ .

might help us understand how the effects of omnivorousness in model 1 come about: can we discern specific combinations of discourses in model 2 that seem to account for potential omnivorousness effects? For both models, the effects are net of the influence of the control variables entered in Table 3.

Model 1 indicates that all relations between omnivorousness and elements of social integration are significant. As expected, levels of communitarianism, social isolation, and social disorientation decline with rising omnivorousness. The relation with solidarity is positive, albeit rather weak. The relations with both utilitarian and expressive individualism are negative, while we expected the latter to be positive. Taken together, these effect parameters suggest that omnivores are rather concerned about the well-being of others. They are neither isolated nor socially disoriented, but they are not likely to be very individualistic either. Having a broad taste does not make it more likely that people care little about other people's opinions. The eclecticism and openness attributed to cultural omnivores do not seem to imply a markedly self-willed attitude. This lack of individualism runs counter theoretical expectations, as it can be argued that omnivores actively construct their own, more or less eclectic lifestyle, which is supposed to require reflexivity, creativity or, more generally, an ego-anchored ego-world relation. None of these suppositions is supported by the current analysis. Perhaps being a cultural omnivore no longer requires a peculiarly individualistic attitude because it is not a very rare stance today. After all, 50.6% of our respondents participate in at least two cultural schemes (41.5% if we exclude the folk–pop combination).

### 6.3. Combinations of cultural schemes and attitudes concerning social integration

In model 2 of Table 4, the effects of seven possible combinations of cultural schemes are shown, with the respondents who do not participate significantly in any scheme being the

reference category. With regard to solidarity, the lowest score was expected for the pop participants and the highest score for the folk participants. In Table 3 we saw that, indeed, folk participation was positively associated with solidarity scores. The relations between solidarity and taste patterns in model 2 of Table 4 are not very strong. Being a folk univore is related to a higher solidarity score, as are the combination of folk with pop and the combination of all three schemes. Thus, it is mostly due to the inclusion of the folk scheme that two of the omnivorous groups, both combining folk and pop, show relatively high scores on solidarity. Highbrow engagement tends to imply lower solidarity, unless it is counteracted by this highbrow–pop–folk combination. Therefore, the overall positive relation between omnivorousness and solidarity found in model 1 can be attributed mainly to the folk elements that are likely to be represented in more omnivorous taste patterns.

Utilitarian individualism was very strongly related to omnivorousness in model 1 and we see this reflected in model 2 of Table 4. Clearly, non-participants have the highest scores, as only the pop univores do not differ significantly from them ( $p = 0.07$ ). Hence, non-participants appear to be the most cynical of all respondents, with relatively little faith in others or in society. Instead, they argue more often than others in favour of a virtually unrestrained striving for personal interests and success irrespective of the interests of others. In addition, it seems that omnivorousness itself is what matters most here, rather than the specific combination of schemes. Those combining all three schemes, the full omnivores, stand out most with a negative effect of  $-0.170$ . The effects of all patterns consisting of two schemes range between  $-0.097$  and  $-0.125$ ; the pop and folk univores show the least negative scores after the non-participants. Respondents limiting themselves to the highbrow scheme are the only univores with markedly low scores, so this is the only univorous pattern with a strong negative relation to utilitarian individualism. This strong association between highbrow engagement and utilitarian individualism was also found in Table 3. In general, though, it is safe to say that a broader taste in general seems to imply more confidence in others and a less selfish attitude.

Social disorientation is also high among the non-participants, although they do not differ from the highbrow and folk univores nor from people combining folk with either pop or highbrow. This is in line with our expectation that people engaged in the folk scheme would long for a sense of simplicity and belonging which they feel is lacking in the world today. The only patterns showing significantly different scores from the non-participants involve the pop scheme: the pop univores, those combining pop with highbrow, and the full omnivores. When pop is combined only with folk, this does not decrease social disorientation. Hence, the omnivore effect shown in model 1 is best interpreted as a consequence of involvement in the pop scheme and, to a lesser extent, the highbrow scheme.

For social isolation, only two patterns deviate from the non-participants. The full omnivores and those combining the pop and folk schemes are least socially isolated, or mistrusting. Whereas the folk scheme was negatively related to isolation in Table 3, we now see that this association does not hold for the folk univores. Being any type of univore is unrelated to levels of social isolation. It thus seems that the negative omnivorousness-effect of model 1 can be explained by the fact that engaging in the folk scheme only implies a lower level of social isolation under the condition that it is not the only scheme one adheres to. Trusting others seems to be related to involvement in more than one scheme and at the same time to engaging in folk culture with its emphasis on informality, authenticity, and equality.

In Table 3, expressive individualism was higher among those engaged in the pop scheme and lower among those engaged in the highbrow scheme. Table 4 shows the same relations at the level of the univores. In addition, combining highbrow and folk is also negatively related to expressive



individualism. This is in line with our expectations based on the ego-centred ego-world relation of the pop fans. The pop lovers like to do as they please, unless this tendency is held back by engaging in the highbrow or folk scheme as well. Being a highbrow univore makes a person score lower on expressive individualism, unless it is combined with the pop scheme. Thus, scheme content seems to matter more than breadth of taste when it comes to explaining expressive individualism.

This leaves the negative effect of omnivorousness on expressive individualism from model 1 unexplained, unless the highbrow lovers are in general more omnivorous than the adherents to the other schemes. Additional analyses have shown that this is indeed very much the case (see also [Sonnett, 2004](#)). The bivariate correlation between the score on the highbrow scheme and the measure of omnivorousness used in model 1 is 0.623. For the pop scheme and the folk scheme, these correlations are only 0.096 and 0.199, respectively.<sup>7</sup> Thus, highbrows are most likely to be omnivorous and vice versa, which probably explains the prevalence of the highbrow attitude towards expressive individualism among the omnivores of model 1.

Finally, communitarian values were expected to be most prominent among the folk participants and least prevalent among the pop participants. These expectations are confirmed for the univorous patterns by the results shown in the right-hand column of [Table 4](#). The folk univores do not differ from the non-participants, who seem to be the most communitarian type in our sample. All combinations of schemes that include pop also differ negatively from the non-participants. As in [Table 3](#), but at odds with our theoretical expectations, being a highbrow univore is also negatively related to communitarianism. The lowest score on communitarianism is for people who combine the two anti-communitarian schemes (highbrow and pop). Again, this indicates that the scheme content matters most. If two out of the three schemes (highbrow and pop) have a significantly negative relation to the level of communitarianism, it can be expected that omnivorousness shows the same negative effect.

## 7. Conclusions

The empirical patterning of musical genres confirmed the existence of three dimensions: highbrow, folk, and pop. Using these dimensions as indicators of the cultural schemes set forth in the literature, significant relations were found between participating in each of the cultural schemes and their combinations on the one hand, and attitudes concerning social integration on the other.

Level of participation in the highbrow scheme is negatively related to utilitarian and expressive individualism, social disorientation and communitarianism. All of these elements of social integration are also negatively related to omnivorousness, measured simply as the number of musical genres people appreciate. Using correlations, we have shown that degree of highbrow participation and number of genres listened to are very strongly related, which explains in part why the direction of the relations with omnivorousness are similar to the relations with highbrow participation for four out of six attitudes.

Participants in the highbrow scheme share with the pop enthusiasts their sense of being at home in the (post)modern world, as is reflected in their low levels of social disorientation and their low levels of communitarianism. Both schemes are thereby related to the idea that society has not become too complicated or is changing too fast. A close look at the items for

<sup>7</sup> The fact that the highbrow scale consists of 5 genres and the pop and folk scales of only 4 does not explain the magnitude of the differences between the correlations presented here.

communitarianism reveals that these involve a certain degree of authoritarianism and also dissatisfaction with the current level of conformity of most other people. In fact, communitarianism partially measures the extent to which people are dissatisfied with the actual level at which they perceive this attitude in society. Both highbrows and pop fans show no signs of such discontent.

The pop scheme and the highbrow scheme also differ from one another, especially regarding individualism. Pop scheme involvement is unrelated to utilitarian individualism and it is positively related to expressive individualism. This makes the pop fans more individualistic in both senses, in line with our expectations based on their ego-anchored ego-world relation. The world-anchored ego-world relation of those engaged in the highbrow scheme does not, however, make them very traditional in the sense of attaching great value to social customs (communitarianism) or feeling like society is changing too rapidly (social disorientation). Highbrow lovers may show a reverence for great cultural achievements from the past, but this does not imply a nostalgia that would make them weary of social change.

Only the folk participants show what we might label a traditional, perhaps *Gemeinschaft*-like attitude toward social integration. Engaging in the folk discourse is positively related to social solidarity and communitarian values, and negatively to social isolation. This seems to make the folk lovers, in a sense, more caring, more traditional, and more trusting. This set of values corresponds nicely with the picture of the harmony milieu sketched by Schulze, where people confide in a relatively small, homogeneous social network with strong bonds, matching their predilection for predictability, safety, and simplicity. And, indeed, the harmony milieu (folk univores) and the entertainment milieu (pop univores) differ a lot and cannot be merged into a single lower class milieu, as Schulze argued.

Moving on to our analysis of omnivorousness as indicated by the number of musical genres listened to, we were able to confirm the expectations that omnivorousness was negatively related to social disorientation, social isolation, and communitarianism. Its association with expressive individualism was, unexpectedly, negative, as was its relation to utilitarian individualism. The relation between omnivorousness and solidarity was slightly positive. In general, omnivores seem to foster attitudes that are mostly conducive to social integration and show no signs of serious discontent regarding their relation to other people or society in general. Neither do they seem particularly eager to be original or indifferent to what others think of them. This suggests that people who cross-traditional cultural boundaries do not see themselves as ringleaders. Only the pop discourse is related to a relatively rebellious attitude, but this is easily offset by the inclusion of highbrow or folk elements in one's cultural repertoire.

This brings us to our final question: how should the effects of omnivorousness be understood? Our subsequent analyses suggest that, in most cases, the effects of omnivorousness can be interpreted as the joint impact of one or more schemes rather than as an effect of breadth of taste per se. The only exception is utilitarian individualism. Scores on this attitude decrease rather systematically as people are involved in more schemes rather than in specific (combinations of) schemes. This is due to the fact that, even if they are not all significant, all scheme effects in [Table 3](#) and all combinatorial effects in model 2 of [Table 4](#) point in the same negative direction. This indicates that, indeed, any type of musical engagement is related to a lower level of utilitarian individualism. People who are culturally active, with pop univores as the only exception, are less likely than non-participants to believe that people should primarily take care of themselves and not pay much attention to the wellbeing of others.

In the case of social isolation, a combination of scheme content and breadth of taste seems to matter. According to [Table 3](#), folk participation is negatively related to social isolation, but [Table 4](#)

shows that only those combining folk with pop have significantly lower scores than the non-participants. This makes sense as well. Being a folk univore is likely to signal the most pure folk lifestyle, where typical features like a preference for a network of perhaps limited size but with strong ties will be most noticeable. In itself, this is not related to social isolation, but if they engage in the pop scheme as well, folk lovers might have a more expanded network (probably including bridging social capital) and this combination seems to reduce their score on social isolation.

In three out of six cases, relations between social integration and omnivorousness could be interpreted simply as a consequence of participating in specific schemes that are correlated to specific attitudes regarding social integration. When schemes have opposite relations with the attitudes in question, they either cancel each other out, or the most dominant scheme determines the overall effect of omnivorousness. For example, the positive relation between omnivorousness and solidarity seems to be entirely attributable to the fact that omnivores are likely to participate in combinations of schemes that entail folk elements. Table 4 shows that only cultural patterns including the folk scheme, which is the only scheme related to solidarity according to Table 3, are in fact positively related to solidarity. This positive effect is absent only when folk is combined with the highbrow scheme (but not pop). Similarly, only patterns including the pop scheme reduce social disorientation. In this case, combining pop with folk cancels out the negative effect of pop, because folk lovers are most likely to feel relatively socially disoriented, as Table 3 shows. Combining pop with highbrow leaves the negative relation intact; this also makes sense on the basis of the negative highbrow scheme effect in Table 3. Communitarianism is also lower for people who participate in the pop and the highbrow scheme, but the smaller negative highbrow effect can be compensated for by folk participation alongside. Nevertheless, with two out of three schemes significantly reducing communitarianism, omnivores are less likely to approve of communitarian values as well.

Finally, a phenomenon we might call ‘highbrow scheme dominance’ seems to be at play. As highbrows are more likely to be omnivores, relations between attitudes and omnivorousness – measured as the number of musical genres – are often similar to relations between attitudes and participation in the highbrow scheme. This seems the only plausible explanation for the negative association between omnivorousness and expressive individualism. Despite the fact that pop scheme participation is positively related to expressive individualism, the omnivorousness effect mirrors the negative relation of highbrow participation with this value. A pattern consisting of highbrow and pop has no effect, as these schemes cancel each other out, but the highbrow plus folk scheme also has a negative effect. Here the conclusion seems to be: when multiple schemes are at play simultaneously, the highbrow scheme is most consequential for a person’s outlook on life and most likely to explain the impact of an omnivore taste pattern. It is the scheme that is most closely related to omnivorousness, as correlations between the latter and the three schemes have shown. Its dominance is also revealed in the findings that, for the patterns consisting of two schemes, it cancels out the positive folk scheme effect on solidarity and the negative folk scheme effect on social isolation.

Where does all this lead our understanding of omnivorousness? Let us first recapitulate some limitations of this study. Although we have been talking about cultural schemes, we have only used patterns of music listening as indicators of these schemes. Admittedly, this is a limited operationalization, and we cannot guarantee that the same findings will emerge if other indicators are used. Looking at Schulze’s work, other indicators could be as diverse as interior design, sports participation, TV preferences, or choice of pub. Therefore, the schemes as we used them are not as all-encompassing as they should ideally be. We rather consider them to be an element of people’s cultural outlook on life that has some validity but is obviously not an impeccable *pars*

*pro toto*. In addition, we only tested the relation between these schemes and attitudes related to social integration. If we had chosen other dependent variables, other patterns might have emerged and breadth of taste might in itself be more relevant. Nevertheless, we regard the attitudes regarding social integration as very interesting, firstly, because they allow us to take into account Schulze's discussion of social milieux. Secondly, they are relevant indicators of how people see their place in society and there has been much cultural theorizing about how culture might (be used to) encourage social integration. But, of course, looking at other areas of life may yield quite different results.

Taking these reservations into account, we believe that the omnivorousness effects we found typically reflect combined effects of the cultural schemes of which a specific omnivorous taste pattern is made up. Attitudes related to social integration vary more with degrees of participation in certain specific schemes than with breadth of taste per se, as model 2 of Table 4 demonstrates. In most cases, it would be a mistake to interpret the general omnivorousness effects we found as relations between social integration attitudes and breadth of taste in itself. A broader taste typically means more involvement in highbrow culture or, to a lesser extent, folk or pop culture. Typically, these cultural schemes have different relations with our attitudes concerning social integration. Omnivorousness effects then reflect either the strongest effect of any of the schemes, or the effect of the (highbrow) scheme that is most closely related to omnivorousness and thus most prominent among the cultural omnivores.

In a few cases, relations with schemes seem contingent upon breadth of taste. For example, although the highbrow scheme in Table 3 is negatively related to social disorientation, we find no relation between being a highbrow univore and this indicator. Liking only highbrow culture is thus indicative of a more closed, nostalgic attitude than liking highbrow culture alongside other things. Similarly, folk participation only related negatively to social isolation and positively to communitarianism if one's taste is not limited to elements of the folk scheme. Thus, studying combinations of cultural schemes is more informative than studying isolated effects of involvement in highbrow, folk, or pop culture.

Only for utilitarian individualism did we find a relation with breadth of taste in itself, that is, independent of the specific combination of schemes constituting a broad taste patterns. Utilitarian individualism is, however, a concept indicative of a very selfish attitude and, therefore, the most serious impediment to social integration. In that case, virtually any type of cultural engagement will imply a diminishing of this attitude and the more one does so, the more likely one is to show at least some consideration for other people's interests. As such, musical interest of any kind does seem to encourage social integration, or vice versa, albeit at a very basic level. If we look at it in more detail, using more nuanced indicators, the scheme(s) in which one participates start making more of a difference and they largely account for the effects of omnivorousness that can be found. Cultural content is what matters most, and its relation to the attitudes we studied can vary with breadth of taste, but broad taste in itself is not a very strong determinant of attitudes related to social integration.

We have refrained from making any causal claims regarding the relations between taste patterns and social integration attitudes. One might be disappointed that we did not *explain* anything in this study. Given the complexity of the relation between taste, on the one hand, and social networks or attitudes regarding social integration, on the other, it will be virtually impossible to assess its causal nature without using longitudinal data. In addition, we cannot prove that the relations we found are not spurious. Thinking along the lines of Jeannotte (2003), we might argue that habitus lies at the base of both the attitudes and the taste patterns we have studied. They might be related because of social network characteristics, unmeasured aspects of

socio-economic background, personality traits, or other things we were not able to take into account. Although it would be very interesting to delve deeper into this matter, for now we are satisfied that we have been able to demonstrate that different types of cultural omnivores hold different values pertaining to the issue of social integration. Thus, different omnivore types have a different way of being in the world. In addition, most of the differences we found make sense in light of the theories we dealt with. And most of the differences were related to taste content rather than taste breadth. At the very least this proves that we must study cultural tastes in terms of actual patterns and that prevailing dichotomies like highbrow–lowbrow or omnivore–univore do not suffice if we want to understand what kind of people we are actually dealing with.

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