



Start off with looking at the end points statistics.



Click on Name Resolution check box at the bottom.



We see a popular router device manufacturer

Dell_c0:56:f0	164	62
HewlettP_bf:91:ee	112	45
Cisco_31:07:33	53	16
Broadcast	1	

Flag: 00:26:0b:31:07:33

DeVoe 2

50

What is the MAC address of the attacker?

Unlock Hint for 10 points

Filter: http

We see one device requesting a bunch of GET requests and the Attacker pc answering them with a bunch of JSON files.

http						
No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
6	0.000000	172.16.0.107	74.125.95.147	HTTP	684	GET / HTTP/1.1
16	0.065380	74.125.95.147	172.16.0.107	HTTP	1099	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html)
18	0.105938	172.16.0.107	74.125.95.147	HTTP	917	GET /csi?v=3&s=webhp&action=&e=17259
25	0.034716	172.16.0.107	74.125.95.147	HTTP	871	GET /csi?v=3&s=webhp&action=&e=17259
30	0.020339	74.125.95.147	172.16.0.107	HTTP	281	HTTP/1.1 204 No Content
39	0.034335	74.125.95.147	172.16.0.107	HTTP	281	HTTP/1.1 204 No Content
57	6.258259	172.16.0.107	74.125.95.147	HTTP	960	GET /complete/gsearch?hl=en&client=hj
60	0.160538	172.16.0.107	74.125.95.147	HTTP	1005	GET /complete/gsearch?hl=en&client=hj
61	0.029392	74.125.95.147	172.16.0.107	HTTP	86	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (application/json)
65	0.142946	74.125.95.147	172.16.0.107	HTTP	86	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (application/json)
67	0.432816	172.16.0.107	74.125.95.147	HTTP	1009	GET /complete/gsearch?hl=en&client=hj
70	0.150124	74.125.95.147	172.16.0.107	HTTP	86	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (application/json)

Ethernet II, Src: HewlettP_bf:91:ee (00:25:b3:bf:91:ee), Dst: Dell_c0:56:f0 (00:21:70:c0:56:f0)

- Destination: Dell_c0:56:f0 (00:21:70:c0:56:f0)
Address: Dell_c0:56:f0 (00:21:70:c0:56:f0)
.... ..0. = LG bit: Globally unique address (factory default)
.... ..0 = IG bit: Individual address (unicast)
- Source: HewlettP_bf:91:ee (00:25:b3:bf:91:ee)
Address: HewlettP_bf:91:ee (00:25:b3:bf:91:ee)
.... ..0. = LG bit: Globally unique address (factory default)
.... ..0 = IG bit: Individual address (unicast)

Flag: 00:25:b3:bf:91:ee

DeVoe 3

50

Which packet does the ARP poisoning occur?

Filter: arp

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
54	0.000000	HewlettP_bf:91:ee	Dell_c0:56:f0	ARP	60	Who has 172.16.0.107? Tell 172.16.0.1
55	0.000053	Dell_c0:56:f0	HewlettP_bf:91:ee	ARP	42	172.16.0.107 is at 00:21:70:c0:56:f0
56	0.00013	HewlettP_bf:91:ee	Dell_c0:56:f0	ARP	60	172.16.0.1 is at 00:25:b3:bf:91:ee
165	9.746104	HewlettP_bf:91:ee	Broadcast	ARP	60	Who has 172.16.0.1? Tell 172.16.0.105

In the shot above we see our attacker MAC address answering a request from the HP box.

Flag: 56

