

Honey Badger 2-1

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To access this challenge, ssh to `volatility@forensics.5charlie.com` using the attached private key. You have been tasked to investigate a potentially compromised system. The collected sample is `hunter.vmem`, what is the Volatility profile (without any potential OS revision numbers)?

Pull the imageinfo off the file:

`vol.py -f hunter.vmem imageinfo`

```
forensicator@37ed8d93171c:/data$ vol.py -f hunter.vmem imageinfo
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
INFO      : volatility.debug      : Determining profile based on KDBG search...
           Suggested Profile(s) : Win7SP1x86_23418, Win7SP0x86, Win7SP1x86_24000, Win7SP1x86
           AS Layer1            : IA32PagedMemoryPae (Kernel AS)
           AS Layer2            : FileAddressSpace (/data/hunter.vmem)
           PAE type             : PAE
           DTB                  : 0x185000L
           KDBG                 : 0x82934c28L
           Number of Processors : 2
           Image Type (Service Pack) : 1
           KPCR for CPU 0       : 0x82935c00L
           KPCR for CPU 1       : 0x807c5000L
           KUSER_SHARED_DATA     : 0xffdf0000L
           Image date and time   : 2016-06-27 22:13:31 UTC+0000
           Image local date and time : 2016-06-27 18:13:31 -0400
```

Flag: Win7SP1x86

Honey Badger 2-2

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This system has initiated a suspicious connection to an unusual TCP port. What is the suspicious remote port?

Run the following to get a list of connections: vol.py -f hunter.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x86_24000 netscan

```
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
Offset(P)      Proto  Local Address      Foreign Address    State      Pid    Owner      Created
0x5c4045d8     UDPv4  0.0.0.0:0         *:*               *:*        912    svchost.exe 2016-06-10 20:09:24 UTC+0000
0x5c4045d8     UDPv6  :::0              *:*               *:*        912    svchost.exe 2016-06-10 20:09:24 UTC+0000
0x5c42d4e8     UDPv4  0.0.0.0:0         *:*               *:*        912    svchost.exe 2016-06-27 22:13:06 UTC+0000
0x5c42d4e8     UDPv6  :::0              *:*               *:*        912    svchost.exe 2016-06-27 22:13:06 UTC+0000
0x5c4c77b8     UDPv4  0.0.0.0:0         *:*               *:*        284    svchost.exe 2016-06-10 20:09:39 UTC+0000
0x5c4c8f50     UDPv4  0.0.0.0:0         *:*               *:*        284    svchost.exe 2016-06-10 20:09:39 UTC+0000
0x5c4c8f50     UDPv6  :::0              *:*               *:*        284    svchost.exe 2016-06-10 20:09:39 UTC+0000
0x5c510008     UDPv6  fe80::1080:bac4:2080:3ed1:546 *:*               *:*        824    svchost.exe 2016-06-27 22:11:52 UTC+0000
0x5c75f468     UDPv4  172.16.73.197:137 *:*               *:*        4      System     2016-06-27 22:12:36 UTC+0000
0x5c7ee830     UDPv4  0.0.0.0:4500      *:*               *:*        912    svchost.exe 2016-06-10 20:09:24 UTC+0000
0x5c7ee830     UDPv6  :::4500           *:*               *:*        912    svchost.exe 2016-06-10 20:09:24 UTC+0000
0x5c7f14a0     UDPv4  0.0.0.0:0         *:*               *:*        912    svchost.exe 2016-06-10 20:09:24 UTC+0000
0x5c7f19f8     UDPv4  0.0.0.0:4500      *:*               *:*        912    svchost.exe 2016-06-10 20:09:24 UTC+0000
0x5c7f1de0     UDPv4  0.0.0.0:500       *:*               *:*        912    svchost.exe 2016-06-10 20:09:24 UTC+0000
0x5c7f2f50     UDPv4  0.0.0.0:500       *:*               *:*        912    svchost.exe 2016-06-10 20:09:24 UTC+0000
0x5c7f2f50     UDPv6  :::500            *:*               *:*        912    svchost.exe 2016-06-10 20:09:24 UTC+0000
0x5c45e290     TCPv4  0.0.0.0:445       0.0.0.0:0        LISTENING   4      System     2016-06-10 20:09:24 UTC+0000
0x5c45e290     TCPv6  :::445            *:*               *:*        4      System     2016-06-10 20:09:24 UTC+0000
0x5c460138     TCPv4  0.0.0.0:49157     0.0.0.0:0        LISTENING   512    services.exe 2016-06-10 20:09:24 UTC+0000
0x5c460138     TCPv6  :::49157          *:*               *:*        512    services.exe 2016-06-10 20:09:24 UTC+0000
0x5c4601e0     TCPv4  0.0.0.0:49157     0.0.0.0:0        LISTENING   512    services.exe 2016-06-10 20:09:24 UTC+0000
0x5c4c6488     TCPv4  0.0.0.0:49158     0.0.0.0:0        LISTENING   284    svchost.exe 2016-06-10 20:09:24 UTC+0000
0x5c4c6678     TCPv4  0.0.0.0:49158     0.0.0.0:0        LISTENING   284    svchost.exe 2016-06-10 20:09:24 UTC+0000
0x5c4c6678     TCPv6  :::49158          *:*               *:*        284    svchost.exe 2016-06-10 20:09:24 UTC+0000
0x5c4ecc98     TCPv4  0.0.0.0:49159     0.0.0.0:0        LISTENING   524    lsass.exe   2016-06-10 20:09:24 UTC+0000
0x5c4ecc98     TCPv6  :::49159          *:*               *:*        524    lsass.exe   2016-06-10 20:09:24 UTC+0000
0x5c522060     TCPv4  0.0.0.0:49159     0.0.0.0:0        LISTENING   524    lsass.exe   2016-06-10 20:09:24 UTC+0000
0x5c549758     TCPv4  172.16.73.197:139 0.0.0.0:0        LISTENING   4      System     2016-06-10 20:09:24 UTC+0000
0x5c659770     TCPv4  0.0.0.0:49153     0.0.0.0:0        LISTENING   824    svchost.exe 2016-06-10 20:09:24 UTC+0000
0x5c673468     TCPv4  0.0.0.0:49152     0.0.0.0:0        LISTENING   404    wininit.exe 2016-06-10 20:09:24 UTC+0000
0x5c676b10     TCPv4  0.0.0.0:49152     0.0.0.0:0        LISTENING   404    wininit.exe 2016-06-10 20:09:24 UTC+0000
0x5c676b10     TCPv6  :::49152          *:*               *:*        404    wininit.exe 2016-06-10 20:09:24 UTC+0000
0x5c6c88d0     TCPv4  0.0.0.0:49153     0.0.0.0:0        LISTENING   824    svchost.exe 2016-06-10 20:09:24 UTC+0000
0x5c6c88d0     TCPv6  :::49153          *:*               *:*        824    svchost.exe 2016-06-10 20:09:24 UTC+0000
0x5c767158     TCPv4  0.0.0.0:49154     0.0.0.0:0        LISTENING   912    svchost.exe 2016-06-10 20:09:24 UTC+0000
0x5c767158     TCPv6  :::49154          *:*               *:*        912    svchost.exe 2016-06-10 20:09:24 UTC+0000
0x5c76b6b8     TCPv4  0.0.0.0:49154     0.0.0.0:0        LISTENING   912    svchost.exe 2016-06-10 20:09:24 UTC+0000
0x5c6fac98     TCPv4  172.16.73.197:49163 172.16.73.1:445  CLOSED     4      System     2016-06-10 20:09:24 UTC+0000
0x5c9fb300     TCPv4  0.0.0.0:135       0.0.0.0:0        LISTENING   708    svchost.exe 2016-06-10 20:09:24 UTC+0000
0x5c9fb300     TCPv6  :::135            *:*               *:*        708    svchost.exe 2016-06-10 20:09:24 UTC+0000
0x5c9fc9d8     TCPv4  0.0.0.0:135       0.0.0.0:0        LISTENING   708    svchost.exe 2016-06-10 20:09:24 UTC+0000
0x5d618788     UDPv4  0.0.0.0:0         *:*               *:*        1164   svchost.exe 2016-06-27 22:12:36 UTC+0000
0x5d618788     UDPv6  :::0              *:*               *:*        1164   svchost.exe 2016-06-27 22:12:36 UTC+0000
0x5d6189a8     UDPv4  0.0.0.0:5355      *:*               *:*        1164   svchost.exe 2016-06-27 22:12:39 UTC+0000
0x5d6189a8     UDPv6  :::5355           *:*               *:*        1164   svchost.exe 2016-06-27 22:12:39 UTC+0000
0x5d618de8     UDPv4  0.0.0.0:5355      *:*               *:*        1164   svchost.exe 2016-06-27 22:12:39 UTC+0000
0x5d698b30     UDPv4  172.16.73.197:138 *:*               *:*        4      System     2016-06-27 22:12:36 UTC+0000
0x5d600558     TCPv4  172.16.73.197:49164 175.165.44.151:5151 CLOSED     1572   oiwwsi.exe 2016-06-27 22:12:36 UTC+0000
0x5d61b280     TCPv4  172.16.73.197:49166 172.16.73.1:139  CLOSED     4      System     2016-06-27 22:12:36 UTC+0000
0x5d61b5f8     TCPv4  172.16.73.197:49168 175.165.44.151:5151 SYN_SENT    1572   oiwwsi.exe 2016-06-27 22:12:36 UTC+0000
```

We see the .exe at the bottom connected to a nonstandard ip and port.

Flag: 5151

Honey Badger 2-3

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This system has initiated a suspicious connection to an unusual TCP port. What is the suspicious remote IP?

vol.py -f hunter.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x86_24000 netscan

Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1							
Offset (P)	Proto	Local Address	Foreign Address	State	Pid	Owner	Created
0x5c4045d8	UDPv4	0.0.0.0:0	**:		912	svchost.exe	2016-06-10 20:09:24 UTC+0000
0x5c4045d8	UDPv6	:::0	**:		912	svchost.exe	2016-06-10 20:09:24 UTC+0000
0x5c42d4e8	UDPv4	0.0.0.0:0	**:		912	svchost.exe	2016-06-27 22:13:06 UTC+0000
0x5c42d4e8	UDPv6	:::0	**:		912	svchost.exe	2016-06-27 22:13:06 UTC+0000
0x5c4c77b8	UDPv4	0.0.0.0:0	**:		284	svchost.exe	2016-06-10 20:09:39 UTC+0000
0x5c4c8f50	UDPv4	0.0.0.0:0	**:		284	svchost.exe	2016-06-10 20:09:39 UTC+0000
0x5c4c8f50	UDPv6	:::0	**:		284	svchost.exe	2016-06-27 22:11:52 UTC+0000
0x5c510008	UDPv6	fe80::1080:bac4:2080:3ed1:546	**:		824	svchost.exe	2016-06-27 22:12:36 UTC+0000
0x5c75f468	UDPv4	172.16.73.197:137	**:		4	System	2016-06-10 20:09:24 UTC+0000
0x5c7ee830	UDPv4	0.0.0.0:4500	**:		912	svchost.exe	2016-06-10 20:09:24 UTC+0000
0x5c7ee830	UDPv6	:::4500	**:		912	svchost.exe	2016-06-10 20:09:24 UTC+0000
0x5c7f14a0	UDPv4	0.0.0.0:0	**:		912	svchost.exe	2016-06-10 20:09:24 UTC+0000
0x5c7f19f8	UDPv4	0.0.0.0:4500	**:		912	svchost.exe	2016-06-10 20:09:24 UTC+0000
0x5c7f1de0	UDPv4	0.0.0.0:500	**:		912	svchost.exe	2016-06-10 20:09:24 UTC+0000
0x5c7f2f50	UDPv4	0.0.0.0:500	**:		912	svchost.exe	2016-06-10 20:09:24 UTC+0000
0x5c7f2f50	UDPv6	:::500	**:		912	svchost.exe	2016-06-10 20:09:24 UTC+0000
0x5c45e290	TCPv4	0.0.0.0:445	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	4	System	
0x5c45e290	TCPv6	:::445	:::0	LISTENING	4	System	
0x5c460138	TCPv4	0.0.0.0:49157	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	512	services.exe	
0x5c460138	TCPv6	:::49157	:::0	LISTENING	512	services.exe	
0x5c4601e0	TCPv4	0.0.0.0:49157	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	512	services.exe	
0x5c4c6488	TCPv4	0.0.0.0:49158	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	284	svchost.exe	
0x5c4c6678	TCPv4	0.0.0.0:49158	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	284	svchost.exe	
0x5c4c6678	TCPv6	:::49158	:::0	LISTENING	284	svchost.exe	
0x5c4ecc98	TCPv4	0.0.0.0:49159	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	524	lsass.exe	
0x5c4ecc98	TCPv6	:::49159	:::0	LISTENING	524	lsass.exe	
0x5c522060	TCPv4	0.0.0.0:49159	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	524	lsass.exe	
0x5c549758	TCPv4	172.16.73.197:139	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	4	System	
0x5c659770	TCPv4	0.0.0.0:49153	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	824	svchost.exe	
0x5c673468	TCPv4	0.0.0.0:49152	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	404	wininit.exe	
0x5c676b10	TCPv4	0.0.0.0:49152	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	404	wininit.exe	
0x5c676b10	TCPv6	:::49152	:::0	LISTENING	404	wininit.exe	
0x5c6c88d0	TCPv4	0.0.0.0:49153	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	824	svchost.exe	
0x5c6c88d0	TCPv6	:::49153	:::0	LISTENING	824	svchost.exe	
0x5c767158	TCPv4	0.0.0.0:49154	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	912	svchost.exe	
0x5c767158	TCPv6	:::49154	:::0	LISTENING	912	svchost.exe	
0x5c76b6b8	TCPv4	0.0.0.0:49154	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	912	svchost.exe	
0x5c6fac98	TCPv4	172.16.73.197:49163	172.16.73.1:445	CLOSED	4	System	
0x5c9fb300	TCPv4	0.0.0.0:135	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	708	svchost.exe	
0x5c9fb300	TCPv6	:::135	:::0	LISTENING	708	svchost.exe	
0x5c9fc9d8	TCPv4	0.0.0.0:135	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	708	svchost.exe	
0x5d618788	UDPv4	0.0.0.0:0	**:		1164	svchost.exe	2016-06-27 22:12:36 UTC+0000
0x5d618788	UDPv6	:::0	**:		1164	svchost.exe	2016-06-27 22:12:36 UTC+0000
0x5d6189a8	UDPv4	0.0.0.0:5355	**:		1164	svchost.exe	2016-06-27 22:12:39 UTC+0000
0x5d6189a8	UDPv6	:::5355	**:		1164	svchost.exe	2016-06-27 22:12:39 UTC+0000
0x5d618de8	UDPv4	0.0.0.0:5355	**:		1164	svchost.exe	2016-06-27 22:12:39 UTC+0000
0x5d698b30	UDPv4	172.16.73.197:138	**:		4	System	2016-06-27 22:12:36 UTC+0000
0x5d600558	TCPv4	172.16.73.197:49164	175.165.44.151:5151	CLOSED	1572	oiwwsi.exe	
0x5d61b280	TCPv4	172.16.73.197:49166	172.16.73.1:139	CLOSED	4	System	
0x5d61b5f8	TCPv4	172.16.73.197:49168	175.165.44.151:5151	SYN_SENT	1572	oiwwsi.exe	

IP of the previous question.

Flag: 175.165.44.151

Honey Badger 2-4

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This system has initiated a suspicious connection to an unusual TCP port. What is the PID that initiated this connection?

Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1								
Offset(P)	Proto	Local Address	Foreign Address	State	Pid	Owner	Created	
0x5c4045d8	UDPv4	0.0.0.0:0	:::		912	svchost.exe	2016-06-10 20:09:24 UTC+0000	
0x5c4045d8	UDPv6	:::0	:::		912	svchost.exe	2016-06-10 20:09:24 UTC+0000	
0x5c42d4e8	UDPv4	0.0.0.0:0	:::		912	svchost.exe	2016-06-27 22:13:06 UTC+0000	
0x5c42d4e8	UDPv6	:::0	:::		912	svchost.exe	2016-06-27 22:13:06 UTC+0000	
0x5c4c77b8	UDPv4	0.0.0.0:0	:::		284	svchost.exe	2016-06-10 20:09:39 UTC+0000	
0x5c4c8f50	UDPv4	0.0.0.0:0	:::		284	svchost.exe	2016-06-10 20:09:39 UTC+0000	
0x5c4c8f50	UDPv6	:::0	:::		284	svchost.exe	2016-06-10 20:09:39 UTC+0000	
0x5c510008	UDPv6	fe80::1080:bac4:2080:3ed1:546	:::		824	svchost.exe	2016-06-27 22:11:52 UTC+0000	
0x5c75f468	UDPv4	172.16.73.197:137	:::		4	System	2016-06-27 22:12:36 UTC+0000	
0x5c7ee830	UDPv4	0.0.0.0:4500	:::4500		912	svchost.exe	2016-06-10 20:09:24 UTC+0000	
0x5c7ee830	UDPv6	:::4500	:::4500		912	svchost.exe	2016-06-10 20:09:24 UTC+0000	
0x5c7f14a0	UDPv4	0.0.0.0:0	:::		912	svchost.exe	2016-06-10 20:09:24 UTC+0000	
0x5c7f19f8	UDPv4	0.0.0.0:4500	:::4500		912	svchost.exe	2016-06-10 20:09:24 UTC+0000	
0x5c7f1de0	UDPv4	0.0.0.0:500	:::500		912	svchost.exe	2016-06-10 20:09:24 UTC+0000	
0x5c7f2f50	UDPv4	0.0.0.0:500	:::500		912	svchost.exe	2016-06-10 20:09:24 UTC+0000	
0x5c7f2f50	UDPv6	:::500	:::500		912	svchost.exe	2016-06-10 20:09:24 UTC+0000	
0x5c45e290	TCPv4	0.0.0.0:445	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	4	System		
0x5c45e290	TCPv6	:::445	:::0	LISTENING	4	System		
0x5c460138	TCPv4	0.0.0.0:49157	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	512	services.exe		
0x5c460138	TCPv6	:::49157	:::0	LISTENING	512	services.exe		
0x5c4601e0	TCPv4	0.0.0.0:49157	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	512	services.exe		
0x5c4c6488	TCPv4	0.0.0.0:49158	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	284	svchost.exe		
0x5c4c6678	TCPv4	0.0.0.0:49158	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	284	svchost.exe		
0x5c4c6678	TCPv6	:::49158	:::0	LISTENING	284	svchost.exe		
0x5c4ecc98	TCPv4	0.0.0.0:49159	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	524	lsass.exe		
0x5c4ecc98	TCPv6	:::49159	:::0	LISTENING	524	lsass.exe		
0x5c522060	TCPv4	0.0.0.0:49159	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	524	lsass.exe		
0x5c549758	TCPv4	172.16.73.197:139	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	4	System		
0x5c659770	TCPv4	0.0.0.0:49153	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	824	svchost.exe		
0x5c673468	TCPv4	0.0.0.0:49152	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	404	wininit.exe		
0x5c676b10	TCPv4	0.0.0.0:49152	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	404	wininit.exe		
0x5c676b10	TCPv6	:::49152	:::0	LISTENING	404	wininit.exe		
0x5c6c88d0	TCPv4	0.0.0.0:49153	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	824	svchost.exe		
0x5c6c88d0	TCPv6	:::49153	:::0	LISTENING	824	svchost.exe		
0x5c767158	TCPv4	0.0.0.0:49154	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	912	svchost.exe		
0x5c767158	TCPv6	:::49154	:::0	LISTENING	912	svchost.exe		
0x5c76b6b8	TCPv4	0.0.0.0:49154	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	912	svchost.exe		
0x5c66fac98	TCPv4	172.16.73.197:49163	172.16.73.1:445	CLOSED	4	System		
0x5c9fb300	TCPv4	0.0.0.0:135	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	708	svchost.exe		
0x5c9fb300	TCPv6	:::135	:::0	LISTENING	708	svchost.exe		
0x5c9fc9d8	TCPv4	0.0.0.0:135	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	708	svchost.exe		
0x5d618788	UDPv4	0.0.0.0:0	:::		1164	svchost.exe	2016-06-27 22:12:36 UTC+0000	
0x5d618788	UDPv6	:::0	:::		1164	svchost.exe	2016-06-27 22:12:36 UTC+0000	
0x5d6189a8	UDPv4	0.0.0.0:5355	:::		1164	svchost.exe	2016-06-27 22:12:39 UTC+0000	
0x5d6189a8	UDPv6	:::5355	:::		1164	svchost.exe	2016-06-27 22:12:39 UTC+0000	
0x5d618de8	UDPv4	0.0.0.0:5355	:::		1164	svchost.exe	2016-06-27 22:12:39 UTC+0000	
0x5d698b30	UDPv4	172.16.73.197:138	:::		4	System	2016-06-27 22:12:36 UTC+0000	
0x5d600558	TCPv4	172.16.73.197:49164	175.165.44.151:5151	CLOSED	1572	oiwwsi.exe		
0x5d61b280	TCPv4	172.16.73.197:49166	172.16.73.1:139	CLOSED	4	System		
0x5d61b5f8	TCPv4	172.16.73.197:49168	175.165.44.151:5151	SYN_SENT	1572	oiwwsi.exe		

Flag: 1572

Honey Badger 2-5

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This system has initiated a suspicious connection to an unusual TCP port. What is the start time for this suspicious process? FORMAT YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM:SS

We need to look at the pstree for pid 1572

vol.py -f hunter.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x86_24000 pstree

```
forensicator@37ed8d93171c:/data$ vol.py -f hunter.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x86_24000 pstree
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
Name                               Pid    PPid    Thds    Hnds    Time
-----
0x857d1030:wininit.exe              404     316      4       72  2016-06-10 20:09:23 UTC+0000
. 0x85813070:services.exe            512     404     14      221  2016-06-10 20:09:23 UTC+0000
.. 0x84777d40:svchost.exe            2304    512     14      335  2016-06-10 20:11:39 UTC+0000
.. 0x847789b8:svchost.exe            1288    512      5       69  2016-06-10 20:11:39 UTC+0000
.. 0x858d04c0:svchost.exe             912     512     45     1079  2016-06-10 20:09:23 UTC+0000
.. 0x85832c90:svchost.exe            1164    512     20      389  2016-06-10 20:09:24 UTC+0000
.. 0x8597c030:spoolsv.exe             1348    512     15      326  2016-06-10 20:09:24 UTC+0000
.. 0x859fa030:svchost.exe             284     512      7      104  2016-06-10 20:09:24 UTC+0000
.. 0x846cdc20:SearchIndexer.          2852    512     12      604  2016-06-10 20:09:56 UTC+0000
.. 0x85b54030:taskhost.exe            2352    512      8      194  2016-06-10 20:09:49 UTC+0000
.. 0x858a2d40:svchost.exe             824     512     22      491  2016-06-10 20:09:23 UTC+0000
... 0x85ae9148:audiodg.exe            1648    824      6      135  2016-06-27 22:10:34 UTC+0000
.. 0x85a21d40:vmtoolsd.exe            1600    512      8      282  2016-06-10 20:09:24 UTC+0000
.. 0x8580e1b8:svchost.exe             708     512      8      268  2016-06-10 20:09:23 UTC+0000
.. 0x85a61770:TPAutoConnSvc.          1872    512      9      136  2016-06-10 20:09:24 UTC+0000
... 0x85c04910:TPAutoConnect.          2784    1872     5      157  2016-06-10 20:09:52 UTC+0000
.. 0x84756d40:oiwwsi.exe             1572    512     11      174  2016-06-27 22:13:03 UTC+0000
.. 0x85a7db78:msdtc.exe               1632    512     12      145  2016-06-10 20:09:39 UTC+0000
.. 0x8597b5f8:svchost.exe            1380    512     19      317  2016-06-10 20:09:24 UTC+0000
.. 0x858cad40:svchost.exe             872     512     20      387  2016-06-10 20:09:23 UTC+0000
... 0x85b6b328:dwm.exe                2420    872      5      147  2016-06-10 20:09:49 UTC+0000
.. 0x85acbc40:dllhost.exe             1516    512     13      196  2016-06-10 20:09:39 UTC+0000
.. 0x85855030:svchost.exe             632     512     13      355  2016-06-10 20:09:23 UTC+0000
```

Flag: 2016-06-27 22:13:03

Honey Badger 2-6

50

What is the PPID of the suspicious process from Honey Badger 2-5?

vol.py -f hunter.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x86_24000 pstree

```
forensicator@37ed8d93171c:/data$ vol.py -f hunter.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x86_24000 pstree
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
Name                               Pid    PPid    Thds    Hnds    Time
-----
0x857d1030:wininit.exe             404    316     4      72  2016-06-10 20:09:23 UTC+0000
.. 0x85813070:services.exe         512    404     14     221  2016-06-10 20:09:23 UTC+0000
.. 0x84777d40:svchost.exe          2304    512     14     335  2016-06-10 20:11:39 UTC+0000
.. 0x847789b8:svchost.exe          1288    512      5      69  2016-06-10 20:11:39 UTC+0000
.. 0x858d04c0:svchost.exe           912    512     45    1079  2016-06-10 20:09:23 UTC+0000
.. 0x85832c90:svchost.exe          1164    512     20     389  2016-06-10 20:09:24 UTC+0000
.. 0x8597c030:spoolsv.exe           1348    512     15     326  2016-06-10 20:09:24 UTC+0000
.. 0x859fa030:svchost.exe           284    512      7     104  2016-06-10 20:09:24 UTC+0000
.. 0x846cdc20:SearchIndexer.       2852    512     12     604  2016-06-10 20:09:56 UTC+0000
.. 0x85b54030:taskhost.exe         2352    512      8     194  2016-06-10 20:09:49 UTC+0000
.. 0x858a2d40:svchost.exe           824    512     22     491  2016-06-10 20:09:23 UTC+0000
... 0x85ae9148:audiodg.exe          1648    824      6     135  2016-06-27 22:10:34 UTC+0000
.. 0x85a21d40:vmtoolsd.exe          1600    512      8     282  2016-06-10 20:09:24 UTC+0000
.. 0x8580e1b8:svchost.exe           708    512      8     268  2016-06-10 20:09:23 UTC+0000
.. 0x85a61770:TPAutoConnSvc.       1872    512      9     136  2016-06-10 20:09:24 UTC+0000
... 0x85c04910:TPAutoConnect.       2784    1872     5     157  2016-06-10 20:09:52 UTC+0000
.. 0x84756d40:oiwwsi.exe           1572    512     11     174  2016-06-27 22:13:03 UTC+0000
.. 0x85a7db78:msdtc.exe             1632    512     12     145  2016-06-10 20:09:39 UTC+0000
.. 0x8597b5f8:svchost.exe          1380    512     19     317  2016-06-10 20:09:24 UTC+0000
.. 0x858cad40:svchost.exe           872    512     20     387  2016-06-10 20:09:23 UTC+0000
... 0x85b6b328:dwm.exe              2420    872      5     147  2016-06-10 20:09:49 UTC+0000
.. 0x85acbc40:dlhhost.exe           1516    512     13     196  2016-06-10 20:09:39 UTC+0000
.. 0x85855030:svchost.exe           632    512     13     355  2016-06-10 20:09:23 UTC+0000
```

Flag: 512

Honey Badger 2-7

80

What is the full path for the suspicious process from Honey Badger 2-6?

`vol.py -f hunter.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x86_24000 cmdline -p 1572`

this will tell us the command that was used to launch the process.

```
forensicator@37ed8d93171c:/data$ vol.py -f hunter.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x86_24000 cmdline -p 1572
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
*****
oiwwsi.exe pid: 1572
Command line : C:\Windows\system32\oiwwsi.exe
```

Flag: C:\Windows\system32\oiwwsi.exe

Honey Badger 2-8

125

What was the original location (initial copy of the malware) based on additional evidence of execution?

For this question we want to follow a timeline of events on this, and this answer is not jumping out (Time Spent hunting this one down too long). But the hint said to follow GCFA processes, so we should look at file creation times. To get the file creation times lets create a file with all the mft data in this image.

```
vol.py -f hunter.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x86_24000 mftparser > /tmp/mft
```

Now that we have that created search for the oiwwsi.exe file, and we get a creation date of 2016-06-27 22:13:03

So now lets look for anything that happened on that day: `cat /tmp/mft | grep "2016-06-27 22:" | sort -u`

```
2016-06-27 22:10:59 UTC+0000 win7 x86 760\AppData\Local\Temp\VMWARE~1\29663db8
2016-06-27 22:11:00 UTC+0000 Content not indexed
2016-06-27 22:11:00 UTC+0000 NewAread.exe
2016-06-27 22:11:00 UTC+0000 Archive & Content not indexed
2016-06-27 22:11:54 UTC+0000 Archive
2016-06-27 22:11:54 UTC+0000 Windows\SOFTWA~1\DATAST~1\Logs\tmp.edb
2016-06-27 22:13:03 UTC+0000 Archive
2016-06-27 22:13:03 UTC+0000 Windows\System32\oiwwsi.exe
2016-06-27 22:13:04 UTC+0000 Archive & Content not indexed
2016-06-27 22:13:04 UTC+0000 Content not indexed
2016-06-27 22:13:04 UTC+0000 VMWare
```

Now we have a file there @ 22:11:00 NewAread.exe we need to find the location of that file.

There is no easy way to find this other than to strings the image. `strings hunter.vmem | grep -i NewAread -B 5`

```
/C:\
Users
win7 x86 760
Downloads
NewAread.exe
```

Flag: C:\Users\win7 x86 760\Downloads\NewAread.exe

Honey Badger 2-9

125

How many files have been accessed since the last time this system file has been flushed by the operating system?

```
cat /tmp/mft | grep "2016-06-27 22:" | sort -u
```

```
00 UTC+0000 2016-06-27 22:11:00 UTC+0000 Content not indexed
11 UTC+0000 2016-06-27 22:11:00 UTC+0000 NewAread.exe
00 UTC+0000 2016-06-27 22:11:00 UTC+0000 Archive & Content not indexed
54 UTC+0000 2016-06-27 22:11:54 UTC+0000 Archive
54 UTC+0000 2016-06-27 22:11:54 UTC+0000 Windows\SOFTWA~1\DATAST~1\Logs\tmp
00 UTC+0000 2016-06-27 22:13:03 UTC+0000 Archive
03 UTC+0000 2016-06-27 22:13:03 UTC+0000 Windows\System32\oiwvsi.exe
04 UTC+0000 2016-06-27 22:13:04 UTC+0000 Archive & Content not indexed
04 UTC+0000 2016-06-27 22:13:04 UTC+0000 Content not indexed
04 UTC+0000 2016-06-27 22:13:04 UTC+0000 VMware
04 UTC+0000 2016-06-27 22:13:04 UTC+0000 VMware\hgfs.dat
```

Flag: 12

Honey Badger 2-10

150

What is the Display Name of the persistence method of the malicious process?

We are going to use malfind to dump the process files, but we need to make the dir to dump to first:
mkdir /tmp/1572

vol.py -f hunter.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x86_24000 malfind -p 1572 --dump-dir=/tmp/1572/

```
forensicator@37ed8d93171c:/data$ ls /tmp/1572/  
process.0x84756d40.0x6e0000.dmp  process.0x84756d40.0x7e0000.dmp  
forensicator@37ed8d93171c:/data$
```

Then run strings on the 2 files:

First file returns no strings

Second file strings

strings /tmp/1572/process.0x84756d40.0x7e0000.dmp

```
^[U  
^_[3  
ihu.cn:5151  
Microsoft .NET COM+ Integrationr with SOAP  
Microsoft .Net Framework COM+ Supportr  
.Net CLRr  
0+070K0W0c0o0|0  
6%6+60686@6E6R6\6  
7?7`7q7  
8>808
```

Flag: Microsoft .Net Framework COM+ Supportr

Honey Badger 2-11

125

When was the persistent service created
for the malware from Honey Badger 2-10?
FORMAT YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM:SS

Run pstree and look at pid 1572, oiwwsi.exe

Flag: 2016-06-27 22:13:03

Honey Badger 2-12

125

What is the SID of the malicious process running account?

`vol.py -f hunter.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x86_24000 getsids -p 1572`

```
forensicator@091d204a63c8:/data$ vol.py -f hunter.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x86_24000 getsids -p 1572
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
oiwsi.exe (1572): S-1-5-18 (Local System)
oiwsi.exe (1572): S-1-5-32-544 (Administrators)
oiwsi.exe (1572): S-1-1-0 (Everyone)
oiwsi.exe (1572): S-1-5-11 (Authenticated Users)
oiwsi.exe (1572): S-1-16-16384 (System Mandatory Level)
```

Flag: S-1-5-18

Honey Badger 2-13

125

What domain is the malware connecting to? FORMAT www.[domain].[tld]:[port]

We are going to use malfind to dump the process files, but we need to make the dir to dump to first:
mkdir /tmp/1572

vol.py -f hunter.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x86_24000 malfind -p 1572 --dump-dir=/tmp/1572/

```
forensicator@37ed8d93171c:/data$ ls /tmp/1572/  
process.0x84756d40.0x6e0000.dmp process.0x84756d40.0x7e0000.dmp  
forensicator@37ed8d93171c:/data$
```

Then run strings on the 2 files:

First file returns no strings

Second file strings

strings /tmp/1572/process.0x84756d40.0x7e0000.dmp

```
^[U  
^_[3  
ihu.cn:5151  
Microsoft .NET COM+ Integrationr with SOAP  
Microsoft .Net Framework COM+ Supportr  
.Net CLRr  
0+070K0W0c0o0|0  
6%6+60686@6E6R6\6  
7?7`7q7  
8>808
```

Next we need to find the full web address as that only seems to be a partial.

strings hunter.vmem | grep -i ihu.cn:5151

```
Forensicator@37ed8d93171c:/data$ strings hunter.vmem | grep -i ihu.cn:5151  
www.zuimihu.cn:5151  
www.zuimihu.cn:5151  
www.zuimihu.cn:5151  
www.zuimihu.cn:5151  
www.zuimihu.cn:5151  
ihu.cn:5151  
www.zuimihu.cn:5151
```

Flag: www.zuimihu.cn:5151

Honey Badger 2-14

125

What IP is the malicious domain
`www.zuimihu.cn` associated with?

This goes back to 2-3 as we see the port 5151 again.

Flag: 175.165.44.151

Honey Badger 2-15

250

What executable is/was located in the user's \$Recycle.bin? FLAG is full path and executable name after converting URL % encodings to ASCII.

First, we need to get a list of stuff in the recycle bin: vol.py -f hunter.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x86_24000
filescan > /tmp/file

cat /tmp/file | grep -i recyc

```
forensicator@091d204a63c8:/data$ cat /tmp/file | grep -i recyc
0x000000005c5e6360      2      0 R--rwd \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Recycle.Bin\S-1-5-21-3762717408-486597418-3869343964-1000\desktop.ini
0x000000005c5e8678      2      0 R-Dr-d \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Recycle.Bin\S-1-5-21-3762717408-486597418-3869343964-1000\I17594I.exe
0x000000005c6648e8      2      0 -W---- \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Recycle.Bin\S-1-5-21-3762717408-486597418-3869343964-1000\I10FLV4
0x000000005c78db90      1      0 R-Dr-d \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Recycle.Bin\S-1-5-21-3762717408-486597418-3869343964-1000\I4GMIYZ.msi
0x000000005d8bd840      1      0 R-Dr-d \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Recycle.Bin\S-1-5-21-3762717408-486597418-3869343964-1000\IS6E668.msi
0x000000005d9f3b38      2      0 -W---- \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Recycle.Bin\S-1-5-21-3762717408-486597418-3869343964-1000\IXFPSRQ.5
```

D:\I17594I.exe

Turn this over to the mft file: cat /tmp/mft | grep -i I17594I.exe

```
2016-06-08 14:18:06 UTC+0000 2016-06-08 14:18:06 UTC+0000 2016-06-08 14:18:06 UTC+0000 2016-06-08 14:18:06 UTC+0000 $I17594I.exe
```

Now let's look at the data around this: cat /tmp/mft | grep -i I17594I.exe -A 20 -B 10

```
forensicator@091d204a63c8:/data$ cat /tmp/mft | grep -i I17594I.exe -A 20 -B 10

$STANDARD_INFORMATION
Creation              Modified              MFT Altered           Access Date           Type
-----
2016-06-08 14:18:06 UTC+0000 2016-06-08 14:18:06 UTC+0000 2016-06-08 14:18:06 UTC+0000 2016-06-08 14:18:06 UTC+0000 Archive

$FILE_NAME
Creation              Modified              MFT Altered           Access Date           Name/Path
-----
2016-06-08 14:18:06 UTC+0000 2016-06-08 14:18:06 UTC+0000 2016-06-08 14:18:06 UTC+0000 2016-06-08 14:18:06 UTC+0000 $I17594I.exe

$DATA
0000000000: 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 40 eb 93 02 00 00 00 00 .....@.....
0000000010: 40 3a a4 93 90 c1 d1 01 43 00 3a 00 5c 00 55 00 @:.....C:.\U.
0000000020: 73 00 65 00 72 00 73 00 5c 00 77 00 69 00 6e 00 s.e.r.s.\w.i.n.
0000000030: 37 00 20 00 78 00 38 00 36 00 20 00 37 00 36 00 7...x.8.6...7.6.
0000000040: 30 00 5c 00 44 00 65 00 73 00 6b 00 74 00 6f 00 0.\.D.e.s.k.t.o.
0000000050: 70 00 5c 00 41 00 63 00 63 00 65 00 73 00 73 00 p.\.A.c.c.e.s.s.
0000000060: 44 00 61 00 74 00 61 00 25 00 32 00 30 00 46 00 D.a.t.a.%2.0.F.
0000000070: 54 00 4b 00 25 00 32 00 30 00 49 00 6d 00 61 00 T.K.%2.0.I.m.a.
0000000080: 67 00 65 00 72 00 25 00 32 00 30 00 33 00 2e 00 g.e.r.%2.0.3...
0000000090: 34 00 2e 00 32 00 25 00 32 00 30 00 25 00 32 00 4...2.%2.0.%2.
00000000a0: 38 00 78 00 36 00 34 00 25 00 32 00 39 00 2e 00 8.x.6.4.%2.9...
00000000b0: 65 00 78 00 65 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 e.x.e.....
00000000c0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
```

&20 is space %28 is (and %29 is)

Flag C:\Users\win7 x86 760\Desktop\AccessData FTK Imager 3.4.2 (x64).exe