

To prove,

$$\Pr(\forall r_{fy}(\langle m, t \rangle); \text{st } m \notin Q) \leq \text{negl}(n)$$

proof:

r is reused from
the message which
was queried

new r is
used

$$\|m\| = \|m'\|$$

(after padding till
multiple of $n/4$)
where $m' \in Q$
and $m \in Q$

$$\|m\| \neq \|m'\|$$

(after padding till
multiple of $n/4$)
where $m' \notin Q$
and $m \in Q$

$\|m\| = \|m'\|$
(after padding till
multiple of $n/4$)
where $m' \in \mathcal{Q}$
and $m \in \mathcal{Q}$:

$m \neq m' \Rightarrow$ there exists a message
block i for which $m_i \neq m'_i$.

now, $t_i = F_k(r \| d \| i \| m_i)$, $t'_i = F_k(r \| d \| i \| m'_i)$

since m' is never queried we have
no way to know t'_i .

Assuming F_k is provably secure
PRF

$$\Rightarrow \Pr(t_i \neq t'_i) \leq \text{negl}(n)$$

$$\|m\| \neq \|m'\|$$

(after padding till
multiple of $n/4$)
where $m' \notin \mathcal{Q}$
and $m \in \mathcal{Q}$

Let the length of m' be l' ,

||y Here we don't know the value

$$t' = F(r \| d' \| \dots), \quad t = F(r \| d \| \dots)$$

Assuming F_K is provably secure
PRF

$$\Rightarrow \Pr(t = t') \leq \text{negl}(n)$$

New r is used

Let the length of m' be l' ,

||y, Here we don't have the
value,

$$t' = F(r' \| \dots)$$

$$t = F(r \| \dots)$$

Assuming F_k is provably secure
PRF

$$\Rightarrow \Pr(t=t') \leq \text{negl}(n)$$