
# ASPA Path Verification at RS-clients and Other Down-Path ASes (Scenarios involving transparent/non-transparent IXP RS)

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### ASPA Verification Draft v-11 Correctness about IXP RS

- ASPA verification draft v-11 is correct about ASPA path verification at RS-clients and other down-path ASes (for scenarios involving transparent/non-transparent IXP RS)
- See Sections 5.1.1 and 5.2
  - Remove the RS ASN from the AS Path in case of a non-transparent AS
  - Apply the Algorithm for Upstream Paths (for transp. and non-transp. RS)
- The draft requires that
  - > IXP RS must register an AS 0 ASPA (like Tier-1 AS)
  - RS-client must register an ASPA including the RS AS in both transparent and non-transparent cases
- Fresh discussions with Claudio point to a relaxation for an RS-client of a transparent RS:
  - Such an RS-client must have an ASPA but it is not necessary that the RS AS be included in the SPAS.
  - It is sufficient if the RS-client has an ASPA in one of the following ways:
    - An AS 0 ASPA (e.g., RS-client is a Tier-1 AS)
    - An ASPA with the SPAS including its direct transit providers (if any)
    - An ASPA with SPAS including the RS AS
- Question: How would an RS know about the type of RS it is connected to?
  - From out of band communication?
  - Deduce it from BGP Updates received from the RS?
  - To keep it simple, should an RS-client be required to include the ASN of the RS in the SPAS regardless of whether the RS is transparent or non-transparent?




- AS4 is the validating AS
- AS4 receives AS\_PATH: AS3 AS1
- AS4 applies Algorithm for Upstream Paths (Sec. 5.2)
- AS1 to AS3 hop is Unknown (i.e., could be any type of Role)
- Outcome: The AS\_PATH is Unknown
- ➤ AS\_PATH {AS3 AS1} is clearly a route leak based the topology
- > But the route leak is not detectable because AS1 has no ASPA

- Even if AS3 has an ASPA that does not include AS1 in the SPAS, that ASPA is not helpful.
- It only says that AS1 is either a customer or lateral peer of AS3. If customer, the path is Valid and if lateral peer, the path is Invalid. Not conclusive.
- The above is a reason why the upstream algorithm need not look for ASPAs in the direction opposite to the update path.

### Scenario 2:

AS1 has an ASPA -
(a) an AS 0 ASPA (RS client AS1 is also a Tier-1 AS),

or, (b) ASPA: (AS1, AS8) -- AS8 is the only transit provider of AS1, or, (c) ASPA: (AS1, AS2) - RS AS2 is included in the SPAS.




- AS4 is the validating AS
- AS4 receives AS PATH: AS3 AS1
- AS4 applies Algorithm for Upstream Paths (Sec. 5.2)
- AS1 to AS3 hop is Invalid (i.e., not Provider)
- Outcome: The AS\_PATH is Invalid (i.e., Route Leak)
  - ➤ AS\_PATH {AS3 AS1} is a route leak based the topology
  - > It is detectable because AS1 has an ASPA (not necessary that it should include AS2 in the SPAS)

**BGP** Update flow

# Scenario 3: AS1 has ASPA: (AS1, AS2) or none AS4 has ASPA: (AS4, AS10) Receiver/ Validating AS RS-client Transp. RS AS Provider AS1 AS1 AS3 p2p AS4

- AS1 is the validating AS
- AS1 receives AS\_PATH: AS3 AS4
- AS1 applies Algorithm for Upstream Paths (Sec. 5.2)
- AS4 to AS3 hop is Invalid (i.e., not Provider)
- Outcome: The AS\_PATH is Invalid (i.e., Route Leak)
  - > AS\_PATH {AS3 AS4} is a route leak based the topology in the figure
  - > It is detectable because AS4 has an ASPA
  - > The outcome is independent of whether AS2 and AS3 have ASPA or not

BGP Update flow



v-11 verification draft uses
Method B (reason: nontransparent RS AS are rare;
minimizes processing)

Keep the AS path as is

• Apply the Algorithm for Upstream Paths if the RS is transparent

Apply the Algorithm for Downstream Paths if the RS is non-transparent

## Backup slides

