# **ASPA-based AS path verification [1] examples**

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[1] "BGP AS\_PATH Verification Based on Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) Objects," <a href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification/">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification/</a>

C2P = Customer to Provider p2p = peer to peer (lateral peers)

### **ASPAs:**

 $A, \{C, D\}$ 

B, {E}

C, {F}

 $D, \{F, G\}$ 


G, {AS0}

#### E and F have no ASPAs

The topology shown is ground truth, not deduced from ASPAs.

If ASPA exists for an AS, it only asserts if another AS is its Provider or Not Provider.

## **Topology**




# **Table 1: Examples of Upstream Path Verification**

(BGP update received from a customer or lateral peer)

#	Receiving/ Verifying AS	AS path (unique ASes)	AS path length	max_up_ramp	min_up_ramp	Upstream Path Verification Result
1	G	FCA	3	3	3	Valid
2	G	DCA	3	2	2	Invalid
3	G	DFCA	4	4	3	Unknown
4	С	DEB	3	3	2	Unknown
5	С	ADEB	4	3	2	Invalid
6	С	ADGEB	5	3	2	Invalid
7	D	ACF	3	2	1	Invalid
8	D	ACFG	4	1	1	Invalid
9	D	EВ	2	2	2	Valid

# Working out example #2 in Table 1 for upstream path

(BGP update received from customer or lateral peer)




- G is the receiving/verifying AS
- G receives BGP update from D with AS path: D C A (simplified to contain only unique ASes)
- AS path length = 3
- Using the given ASPAs and the method in Section6.1 of [1]:
  - max\_up\_ramp = 2 (A C)
  - min\_up\_ramp = 2 (A C)
- Using the procedure in Section 6.2 of [1]:
  - max\_up\_ramp < AS path length; hence verification outcome: Invalid

E and F have no ASPAs

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# Working out example #4 in Table 1 for upstream path

(BGP update received from customer or lateral peer)



- C is the receiving/verifying AS
- C receives BGP update from D with AS path: D E B (simplified to contain only unique ASes)
- AS path length = 3
- Using the given ASPAs and the method in Section6.1 of [1]:
  - max\_up\_ramp = 3 (B E D)
  - min\_up\_ramp = 2 (B E)
- Using the procedure in Section 6.2 of [1]:
  - max\_up\_ramp is not less than AS path length;
     hence, AS path is not Invalid
  - min\_up\_ramp < AS path length; hence, verification outcome: Unknown

E and F have no ASPAs

### **Table 2: Examples of Downstream Path Verification**


(BGP update received from a provider)

#	Receiving /Verifying AS	AS path (unique ASes)	AS path length	max_up _ramp	max_ down _ramp	min_up _ramp	min_down _ramp	Downstream Path Verification Result
1	В	EGFCA	5	4	2	3	1	Unknown
2	В	EGDA	4	3	2	3	1	Valid
3	В	EDCA	4	2	2	2	1	Unknown
4	В	EGDCA	5	2	2	2	1	Invalid
5	А	CFDG	4	1	4	1	2	Unknown
6	А	DGEB	4	3	2	2	2	Valid
7	А	CDGEB	5	3	1	2	1	Invalid
8	D	FCA	3	3	2	3	1	Valid
9	В	ΕA	2	1	2	1	1	Valid*
10	В	ECA	3	2	2	2	1	Valid**

<sup>\*</sup>Forged-origin and \*\*forged-path-segment hijacks (path manipulations) by a provider (E) towards a customer (B) are undetectable by ASPA (see Section 8.2 "Security Considerations" in [1]).

# Working out example #1 in Table 2 for downstream path

(BGP update received from a provider)




E and F have no ASPAs

- B is the receiving/verifying AS
- B receives BGP update from E with AS path: E G F C A (simplified to contain only unique ASes)
- AS path length = 5
- Using the given ASPAs and the method in Section 6.1 of [1]:
  - max up ramp = 4 (A C F G)
  - max\_down\_ramp = 2 (E G)
  - min\_up\_ramp = 3 (A C F)
  - min\_down\_ramp = 1 (E)
- Using the procedure in Section 6.3 of [1]:
  - max\_up\_ramp + max\_down\_ramp is not less than
     AS path length; hence, AS path is not Invalid
  - min\_up\_ramp + min\_down\_ramp < AS path length; hence, verification outcome: Unknown

# Working out example #7 in Table 2 for downstream path

(BGP update received from a provider)



A is the receiving/verifying AS

- A receives BGP update from C with AS path: C D G E B (simplified to contain only unique ASes)
- AS path length = 5
- Using the given ASPAs and the method in Section 6.1 of [1]:
  - $max_up_ramp = 3 (B E G)$
  - $max_down_ramp = 1 (C)$
  - min up ramp = 2 (B E)
  - $min_down_ramp = 1 (C)$
- Using the procedure in Section 6.3 of [1]:
  - max\_up\_ramp + max\_down\_ramp < AS path length; hence, verification outcome: Invalid