

# Source Address Validation Using BGP UPDATES, ASPA, and ROA (BAR-SAV)

<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-sriram-sidrops-bar-sav-00>

Kotikalapudi Sriram, Igor Lubashev, and Doug Montgomery

Email: [ksriram@nist.gov](mailto:ksriram@nist.gov) [ilubashe@akamai.com](mailto:ilubashe@akamai.com) [dougmn@nist.gov](mailto:dougmn@nist.gov)

June 2022

# Motivation and Summary


- Much interest seen in the community to improve Source Address Validation (SAV) techniques (e.g., RFC 8704, SAVNET BOFs at IETF 113 and 114)
- There are attempts to further improve upon EFP-uRPF [RFC 8704]
- Proposed new BAR-SAV method makes complementary use of BGP UPDATES, ASPAs, and ROAs

New Draft: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-sriram-sidrops-bar-sav-00>

- BAR-SAV advances the technology for SAV filter design
  - ✓ Significantly improves the ability to detect hidden prefixes
  - ✓ Provides a solution to the CDN/Direct Server Return (DSR) problem
- No changes to protocol on the wire
- Offers immediate benefits to early adopters


# Goal: Construct Permissible Ingress Prefix List for SAV (at AS7)

The methodology is the same for a Customer or Lateral (i.e., non-transit) Peer\* Interface



# SAV Using Only ASPA and ROA (Procedure X)

## Construction of Permissible Ingress Prefix List for SAV (at AS7)



When ASPA and ROA adoption is ubiquitous (in the future)

Or an ISP may use Procedure X on customer interfaces if it requires all its customers to register ROAs and ASPAs

- Obtain the set of ASNs in the Customer's customer cone (CC) using ASPAs
- Gather all prefixes in ROAs associated with the ASNs found in Step A. Keep only the unique prefixes.
- The set computed in Step B is the permissible prefix list for SAV for the interface in consideration.

But there will be...


Partial deployment of ROAs and ASPAs for some time

- During that period...
  - ✓ BAR-SAV compensates
  - ✓ Makes complementary use of BGP UPDATES, ASPA, and ROA
    - Incorporates a refined version of EFP-uRPF\*

\* Enhanced Feasible Path uRPF (EFP-uRPF) [RFC 8704]

# SAV Using ASPA, ROA, and BGP UPDATE (BAR-SAV)

## Construction of Permissible Ingress Prefix List for SAV (at AS7)




Applicable in the period when ASPA and ROA adoption is not ubiquitous

- Obtain the set of ASNs in the Customer's customer cone (CC) using ASPAs and AS\_PATHs
- Gather all prefixes in ROAs associated with the ASNs found in Step A.
- Gather all prefixes in BGP UPDATE messages with originating ASN among ASNs found in Step A.
- Combine sets found in Steps B and C. Keep only the unique prefixes. This is the permissible prefix list for SAV for the interface in consideration.

# A Note on Customer Cone Computation


- One should *not* compute a customer cone by separately processing ASPA data and AS\_PATH data and then merging the two sets of ASes at the end. Doing so is likely to miss ASes from the customer cone.



- Instead, both ASPAs and AS\_PATHs should be used to iteratively expand the discovered customer cone. When new ASes are discovered, both ASPA and AS\_PATH data should be used to discover customers of those ASes. This process is repeated for newly discovered customer ASes until there are no new ASes to be found.

# Refined Version of Algorithm A of EFP-uRPF [RFC 8704] Incorporated into BAR-SAV

- Only **Q1** is detected by Alg. A of RFC 8704
- Both **Q1** and **P3** are detected by BAR-SAV



EFP-uRPF = Enhanced Feasible Path uRPF

- Much better detection of “Hidden” prefixes in multihoming scenarios by BAR-SAV




# Detailed Description of the BAR-SAV Procedure

1. Let the Customer or Lateral Peer ASN be denoted as AS-k.
2. Let  $i = 1$ . Initialize: AS-set  $Z(1) = \{AS-k\}$ .
3. Increment  $i$  to  $i+1$ .
4. Create AS-set  $A(i)$  of all ASNs whose ASPA data declares at least one ASN in AS-set  $Z(i-1)$  as a Provider.
5. Create AS-set  $B(i)$  of all “non-ASPA” customer ASNs each of which is a customer of at least one ASN in AS-set  $Z(i-1)$  according to unique AS\_PATHs in Adj-RIBs-In [RFC4271] of all interfaces at the BGP speaker computing the SAV filter. “Non-ASPA” ASN are ASNs that declare no provider in ASPA data.
6. Form the union of AS-sets  $A(i)$  and  $B(i)$  and call it AS-set C.  
From AS-set C, remove any ASNs that are present in  $Z(j)$ , for  $j=1$  to  $j=(i-1)$ . Call the resulting set  $Z(i)$ .
7. If AS-set  $Z(i)$  is null, then set  $i\_max = i - 1$  and go to Step 8. Else, go to Step 3.
8. Form the union of the AS-sets,  $Z(i)$ ,  $i = 1, 2, \dots, i\_max$ , and name this union as AS-set D.
9. Select all ROAs in which the authorized origin ASN is in AS-set D. Form the union of the sets of prefixes listed in the selected ROAs. Name this union set of prefixes as Prefix-set P1.
10. Using the routes in Adj-RIBs-In of all interfaces, create a list of all prefixes originated by any ASN in AS-set D. Name this set of prefixes as Prefix-set P2.
11. Form the union of Prefix-sets P1 and P2. Apply this union set as the list of permissible prefixes for SAV.

The next 4 slides illustrate the details  
of how BAR-SAV works

## How BAR-SAV Works

Finding All ASes and Prefixes in Customer's (or Peer's) Customer Cone  
Using BGP Announcements (as seen at AS4), ASPA, and ROA



# Finding All ASes in the CC using BGP AS\_PATH and ASPA

## INPUTS

### ASPAs:

AS3 {AS4}  
AS3 {AS9}  
AS5 {AS1}  
AS6 {AS1}  
AS8 {AS2}

### ROAs:

P2a AS2  
P5 AS5  
P6 AS6  
P8 AS8


### BGP UPDATE AS\_PATHs:

Interface in Consideration: **AS3**

P6 [**AS3** AS1 AS6]  
P7 [**AS3** AS1 AS7]

Other Interfaces:

P2 [AS9 AS3 AS2]



## OUTPUT

Iteration	Customer Cone	New ASes from ASPA	New ASes from AS_PATH
1	<b>AS3</b>	None	P6 [ <b>AS3</b> <u>AS1</u> AS6] → AS1 P7 [ <b>AS3</b> <u>AS1</u> AS7] → AS1 P2 [AS9 <b>AS3</b> <u>AS2</u> ] → AS2
2	AS3, <b>AS1</b> , <b>AS2</b>	AS5 { <b>AS1</b> } → AS5 AS6 { <b>AS1</b> } → AS6 AS8 { <b>AS2</b> } → AS8	P6 [AS3 <b>AS1</b> <u>AS6</u> ] → AS6 P7 [AS3 <b>AS1</b> <u>AS7</u> ] → AS7
3	AS3, AS1, AS2, <b>AS5</b> , <b>AS6</b> , <b>AS8</b> , <b>AS7</b>	None	None

# Finding All Prefixes in the CC using BGP Routes and ROA

## INPUTS

### ASPsAs:

AS3 {AS4}  
AS3 {AS9}  
AS5 {AS1}  
AS6 {AS1}  
AS8 {AS2}

### ROAs:

P2a AS2  
P5 AS5  
P6 AS6  
P8 AS8

### BGP UPDATE AS\_PATHs:



Interface in Consideration: AS3  
P6 [AS3 AS1 AS6]  
P7 [AS3 AS1 AS7]  
Other Interfaces:  
P2 [AS9 AS3 AS2]

### Customer Cone


AS1, AS2, AS3, AS5, AS6, AS7, AS8

## OUTPUT

ASN	Prefixes from ROA	Prefixes from BGP
AS1		
AS2	( <u>P2a</u> AS2) → P2a	<u>P2</u> [AS9 AS3 AS2] → P2
AS3		
AS5	( <u>P5</u> AS5) → P5	
AS6	( <u>P6</u> AS6) → P6	<u>P6</u> [AS3 AS1 AS6] → P6
AS7		<u>P7</u> [AS3 AS1 AS7] → P7
AS8	( <u>P8</u> AS8) → P8	




# Help from ASPA Data to Clean-Up Anomalies in AS\_PATH Data



# Content Delivery Network (CDN) Application

## Example of how the BAR-SAV method solves the DSR blocking problem



Backup slides



# Detailed Procedure X

Creating the Permissible Prefix List for SAV for a Customer or Lateral Peer using only ASPA and ROA

1. Let the Customer or Lateral Peer ASN be denoted as AS-k.
2. Let  $i = 1$ . Initialize: AS-set  $S(1) = \{AS-k\}$ .
3. Increment  $i$  to  $i+1$ .
4. Create AS-set  $S(i)$  of all ASNs whose ASPA data declares at least one ASN in AS-set  $S(i-1)$  as a Provider.
5. If AS-set  $S(i)$  is null, then set  $i\_max = i - 1$  and go to Step 6. Else, go to Step 3.
6. Form the union of the sets,  $S(i)$ ,  $i = 1, 2, \dots, i\_max$ , and name this union as AS-set A.
7. Select all ROAs in which the authorized origin ASN is equal to any ASN in AS-set A. Form the union of the sets of prefixes listed in the selected ROAs. Name this union set of prefixes as P-set.
8. Apply P-set as the list of permissible prefixes for SAV.

Note: Algorithm X is for future use when the deployment of ASPA and ROA is ubiquitous.

# Anycast/Edge Hybrid – Direct Server Return

1. Anycast POPs lookup “best” edge POP for each new connection (using the actual user IP)
2. Anycast POPs tunnel packets to edge POPs
3. Edge servers send data to users directly – Direct Server Return (DSR)

