libp2p · jacobheun · Nov 19, 2020 · Oct 4, 2019 · Oct 21, 2019 · Oct 21, 2019
diff --git a/RFC/0002-signed-envelopes.md b/RFC/0002-signed-envelopes.md
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+# RFC 0002 - Signed Envelopes
+
+- Start Date: 2019-10-21
+- Related RFC: [0003 Address Records][addr-records-rfc]
+
+## Abstract
+
+This RFC proposes a "signed envelope" structure that contains an arbitrary byte
+string payload, a signature of the payload, and the public key that can be used
+to verify the signature.
+
+This was spun out of an earlier draft of the [address records
+RFC][addr-records-rfc], since it's generically useful.
+
+## Problem Statement
+
+Sometimes we'd like to store some data in a public location (e.g. a DHT, etc),
+or make use of potentially untrustworthy intermediaries to relay information. It
+would be nice to have an all-purpose data container that includes a signature of
+the data, so we can verify that the data came from a specific peer and that it hasn't
+been tampered with.
+
+## Domain Separation
+
+Signatures can be used for a variety of purposes, and a signature made for a
+specific purpose MUST NOT be considered valid for a different purpose.
+
+Without this property, an attacker could convince a peer to sign a payload in
+one context and present it as valid in another, for example, presenting a signed
+address record as a pubsub message.
+
+We separate signatures into "domains" by prefixing the data to be signed with a
+string unique to each domain. This string is not contained within the payload or
+the outer envelope structure. Instead, each libp2p subsystem that makes use of
+signed envelopes will provide their own domain string when constructing the
+envelope, and again when validating the envelope. If the domain string used to
+validate is different from the one used to sign, the signature validation will
+fail.
+
+Domain strings may be any valid UTF-8 string, but should be fairly short and
+descriptive of their use case, for example `"libp2p-routing-record"`.
+
+## Payload Type Information
+
+The envelope record can contain an arbitrary byte string payload, which will
+need to be interpreted in the context of a specific use case. To assist in
+"hydrating" the payload into an appropriate domain object, we include a "payload
+type" field. This field consists of a [multicodec][multicodec] code,
+optionally followed by an arbitrary byte sequence.
+
+This allows very compact type hints that contain just a multicodec, as well as
+"path" multicodecs of the form `/some/thing`, using the ["namespace"
+multicodec](https://github.com/multiformats/multicodec/blob/master/table.csv#L23),
+whose binary value is equivalent to the UTF-8 `/` character.
+
+Use of the payload type field is encouraged, but the field may be left empty
+without invalidating the envelope.
+
+## Wire Format
+
+Since we already have a [protobuf definition for public keys][peer-id-spec], we
+can use protobuf for this as well and easily embed the key in the envelope:
+
+
+```protobuf
+message Envelope {
+  PublicKey public_key = 1; // see peer id spec for definition
+  bytes payload_type = 2;   // payload type indicator
+  bytes payload = 3;        // opaque binary payload
+  bytes signature = 5;      // see below for signing rules
+}
+```
+
+The `public_key` field contains the public key whose secret counterpart was used
+to sign the message. This MUST be consistent with the peer id of the signing
+peer, as the recipient will derive the peer id of the signer from this key.
+
+The `payload_type` field contains a [multicodec][multicodec]-prefixed type
+indicator as described in the [Payload Type Information
+section](#payload-type-information).
+
+The `payload` field contains the arbitrary byte string payload.
+
+The `signature` field contains a signature of all fields except `public_key`,
+generated as described below.
+
+## Signature Production / Verification
+
+When signing, a peer will prepare a buffer by concatenating the following:
+
+- The length of the [domain separation string](#domain-separation) string in
+  bytes
+- The domain separation string, encoded as UTF-8
+- The length of the `payload_type` field in bytes
+- The value of the `payload_type` field
+- The length of the `payload` field in bytes
+- The value of the `payload` field
+
+The length values for each field are encoded as unsigned variable-length
+integers as defined in the [multiformats uvarint spec][uvarint].
+
+Then they will sign the buffer according to the rules in the [peer id
+spec][peer-id-spec] and set the `signature` field accordingly.
+
+To verify, a peer will "inflate" the `public_key` into a domain object that can
+verify signatures, prepare a buffer as above and verify the `signature` field
+against it.
+
+[addr-records-rfc]: ./0003-routing-records.md
+[peer-id-spec]: ../peer-ids/peer-ids.md
+[multicodec]: https://github.com/multiformats/multicodec
+[uvarint]: https://github.com/multiformats/unsigned-varint
diff --git a/RFC/0003-routing-records.md b/RFC/0003-routing-records.md
@@ -0,0 +1,277 @@
+# RFC 0003 - Peer Routing Records
+
+- Start Date: 2019-10-04
+- Related Issues:
+  - [libp2p/issues/47](https://github.com/libp2p/libp2p/issues/47)
+  - [go-libp2p/issues/436](https://github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/issues/436)
+
+## Abstract
+
+This RFC proposes a method for distributing peer routing records, which contain
+a peer's publicly reachable listen addresses, and may be extended in the future
+to contain additional metadata relevant to routing. This serves a similar
+purpose to [Ethereum Node Records][eip-778]. Like ENR records, libp2p routing
+records should be extensible, so that we can add information relevant to as-yet
+unknown use cases.
+
+The record described here does not include a signature, but it is expected to
+be serialized and wrapped in a [signed envelope][envelope-rfc], which will
+prove the identity of the issuing peer. The dialer can then prioritize
+self-certified addresses over addresses from an unknown origin.
+
+## Problem Statement
+
+All libp2p peers keep a "peer store", which maps [peer ids][peer-id-spec] to a
+set of known addresses for each peer. When the application layer wants to
+contact a peer, the dialer will pull addresses from the peer store and try to
+initiate a connection on one or more addresses.
+
+Addresses for a peer can come from a variety of sources. If we have already made
+a connection to a peer, the libp2p [identify protocol][identify-spec] will
+inform us of other addresses that they are listening on. We may also discover
+their address by querying the DHT, checking a fixed "bootstrap list", or perhaps
+through a pubsub message or an application-specific protocol.
+
+In the case of the identify protocol, we can be fairly certain that the
+addresses originate from the peer we're speaking to, assuming that we're using a
+secure, authenticated communication channel. However, more "ambient" discovery
+methods such as DHT traversal and pubsub depend on potentially untrustworthy
+third parties to relay address information.
+
+Even in the case of receiving addresses via the identify protocol, our
+confidence that the address came directly from the peer is not actionable, because
+the peer store does not track the origin of an address. Once added to the peer
+store, all addresses are considered equally valid, regardless of their source.
+
+We would like to have a means of distributing _verifiable_ address records,
+which we can prove originated from the addressed peer itself. We also need a way to
+track the "provenance" of an address within libp2p's internal components such as
+the peer store. Once those pieces are in place, we will also need a way to
+prioritize addresses based on their authenticity, with the most strict strategy
+being to only dial certified addresses.
+
+### Complications
+
+While producing a signed record is fairly trivial, there are a few aspects to
+this problem that complicate things.
+
+1. Addresses are not static. A given peer may have several addresses at any given
+   time, and the set of addresses can change at arbitrary times.
+2. Peers may not know their own addresses. It's often impossible to automatically
+   infer one's own public address, and peers may need to rely on third party
+   peers to inform them of their observed public addresses.
+3. A peer may inadvertently or maliciously sign an address that they do not
+   control. In other words, a signature isn't a guarantee that a given address is
+   valid.
+4. Some addresses may be ambiguous. For example, addresses on a private subnet
+   are valid within that subnet but are useless on the public internet.
+
+The first point can be addressed by having records contain a sequence number
+that increases monotonically when new records are issued, and by having newer
+records replace older ones.
+
+The other points, while worth thinking about, are out of scope for this RFC.
+However, we can take care to make our records extensible so that we can add
+additional metadata in the future. Some thoughts along these lines are in the
+[Future Work section below](#future-work).
+
+## Address Record Format
+
+Here's a protobuf that might work:
+
+```protobuf
+
+// PeerRecord contains the listen addresses for a peer at a particular point in time.
+message PeerRecord {
+  // AddressInfo wraps a multiaddr. In the future, it may be extended to
+  // contain additional metadata, such as "routability" (whether an address is
+  // local or global, etc).
+  message AddressInfo {
+    bytes multiaddr = 1;
+  }
+
+  // the peer id of the subject of the record (who these addresses belong to).
+  bytes peer_id = 1;
+
+  // A monotonically increasing sequence number, used for record ordering.
+  uint64 seq = 2;
+
+  // All current listen addresses
+  repeated AddressInfo addresses = 3;
+}
+```
+
+The `AddressInfo` wrapper message is used instead of a bare multiaddr to allow
+us to extend addresses with additional metadata [in the future](#future-work).
+
+The `seq` field contains a sequence number that MUST increase monotonically as
+new records are created. Newer records MUST have a higher `seq` value than older
+records. To avoid persisting state across restarts, implementations MAY use unix
+epoch time as the `seq` value, however they MUST NOT attempt to interpret a
+`seq` value from another peer as a valid timestamp.
+
+#### Example
+
+```javascript
+  {
+    peer_id: "QmAlice...",
+    seq: 1570215229,
+    addresses: [
+      {
+        multiaddr: "/ip4/1.2.3.4/tcp/42/p2p/QmAlice",
+      },
+      {
+        multiaddr: "/ip4/10.0.1.2/tcp/42/p2p/QmAlice",
+      }
+    ]
+  }
+```
+
+A peer SHOULD only include addresses that it believes are routable via the
+public internet, ideally having confirmed that this is the case via some
+external mechanism such as a successful AutoNAT dial-back.
+
+In some cases we may want to include localhost or LAN-local address; for
+example, when testing the DHT using many processes on a single machine. To
+support this, implementations may use a global runtime configuration flag or
+environment variable to control whether local addresses will be included.
+
+## Certification / Verification
+
+This structure can be serialized and contained in a [signed
+envelope][envelope-rfc], which lets us issue "self-certified" address records
+that are signed by the peer that the addresses belong to.
+
+To produce a "self-certified" address, a peer will construct a `RoutingState`
+containing their listen addresses and serialize it to a byte array using a
+protobuf encoder. The serialized records will then be wrapped in a [signed
+envelope][envelope-rfc], which is signed with the libp2p peer's private host
+key. The corresponding public key MUST be included in the envelope's
+`public_key` field.
+
+When receiving a `RoutingState` wrapped in a signed envelope, a peer MUST
+validate the signature before deserializing the `RoutingState` record. If the
+signature is invalid, the envelope MUST be discarded without deserializing the
+envelope payload.
+
+Once the signature has been verified and the `RoutingState` has been
+deserialized, the receiving peer MUST verify that the `peer_id` contained in the
+`RoutingState` matches the `public_key` from the envelope. If the public key in
+the envelope cannot derive the peer id contained in the routing state record,
+the `RoutingState` MUST be discarded.
+
+### Signed Envelope Domain
+
+Signed envelopes require a "domain separation" string that defines the scope
+or purpose of a signature.
+
+When wrapping a `RoutingState` in a signed envelope, the domain string MUST be
+`libp2p-routing-state`.
+
+### Signed Envelope Payload Type
+
+Signed envelopes contain a `payload_type` field that indicates how to interpret
+the contents of the envelope.
+
+Ideally, we should define a new multicodec for routing records, so that we can
+identify them in a few bytes. While we're still spec'ing and working on the
+initial implementation, we can use the UTF-8 string
+`"/libp2p/routing-state-record"` as the `payload_type` value.
+
+## Peer Store APIs
+
+We will need to add a few methods to the peer store:
+
+- `AddCertifiedAddrs(envelope) -> Maybe<Error>`
+  - Add a self-certified address, wrapped in a signed envelope. This should
+    validate the envelope signature & store the envelope for future reference.
+    If any certified addresses already exist for the peer, only accept the new
+    envelope if it has a greater `seq` value than existing envelopes.
+
+- `CertifiedAddrs(peer_id) -> Set<Multiaddr>`
+  - return the set of self-certified addresses for the given peer id
+
+- `SignedRoutingState(peer_id) -> Maybe<SignedEnvelope>`
+  - retrieve the signed envelope that was most recently added to the peerstore
+    for the given peer, if any exists.
+
+And possibly:
+
+- `IsCertified(peer_id, multiaddr) -> Boolean`
+  - has a particular address been self-certified by the given peer?
+
+
+We'll also need a method that constructs a new `RoutingState` containing our
+listen addresses and wraps it in a signed envelope. This may belong on the Host
+instead of the peer store, since it needs access to the private signing key.
+
+When adding records to the peerstore, a receiving peer MUST keep track of the
+latest `seq` value received for each peer and reject incoming `RoutingState`
+messages unless they contain a greater `seq` value than the last received.
+
+After integrating the information from the `RoutingState` into the peerstore,
+implementations SHOULD retain the original signed envelope. This will allow
+other libp2p systems to share signed `RoutingState` records with other peers in
+the network, preserving the signature of the issuing peer. The [Exchanging
+Records section](#exchanging-records) section lists some systems that would need
+to retrieve the original signed record from the peerstore.
+
+## Dialing Strategies
+
+Once self-certified addresses are available via the peer store, we can update
+the dialer to prefer using them when possible. Some systems may want to _only_
+dial self-certified addresses, so we should include some configuration options
+to control whether non-certified addresses are acceptable.
+
+## Exchanging Records
+
+We currently have several systems in libp2p that deal with peer addressing and
+which could be updated to use signed routing records:
+
+- Public peer discovery using [libp2p's DHT][dht-spec]
+- Local peer discovery with [mDNS][mdns-spec]
+- Direct exchange using the [identify protocol][identify-spec]
+- Service discovery via the [rendezvous protocol][rendezvous-spec]
+- A proposal for [a public peer exchange protocol][pex-proposal]
+
+Of these, the highest priority for updating seems to be the DHT, since it's
+actively used by several deployed systems and is vulnerable to routing attacks
+by malicious peers. We should work on extending the `FIND_NODE`, `ADD_PROVIDER`,
+and `GET_PROVIDERS` RPC messages to support returning signed records in addition
+to the current unsigned address information they currently support.
+
+We should also either define a new "secure peer routing" interface or extend the
+existing peer routing interfaces to support signed records, so that we don't end
+up with a bunch of similar but incompatible APIs for exchanging signed address
+records.
+
+## Future Work
+
+Some things that were originally considered in this RFC were trimmed so that we
+can focus on delivering a basic self-certified record, which is a pressing need.
+
+This includes a notion of "routability", which could be used to communicate
+whether a given address is global (reachable via the public internet),
+LAN-local, etc. We may also want to include some kind of confidence score or
+priority ranking, so that peers can communicate which addresses they would
+prefer other peers to use.
+
+To allow these fields to be added in the future, we wrap multiaddrs in the
+`AddressInfo` message instead of having the `addresses` field be a list of "raw"
+multiaddrs.
+
+Another potentially useful extension would be a compact protocol table or bloom
+filter that could be used to test whether a peer supports a given protocol
+before interacting with them directly. This could be added as a new field in the
+`RoutingState` message.
+
+
+
+[identify-spec]: ../identify/README.md
+[peer-id-spec]: ../peer-ids/peer-ids.md
+[mdns-spec]: ../discovery/mdns.md
+[rendezvous-spec]: ../rendezvous/README.md
+[pex-proposal]: https://github.com/libp2p/notes/issues/7
+[autonat]: https://github.com/libp2p/specs/issues/180
+[envelope-rfc]: ./0002-signed-envelopes.md
+[eip-778]: https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-778