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[question] How is lklfuse.o linked with liblkl.a? #17
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When we compile the kernel object (lkl.o) we make all symbols private (with objcopy -G) except the ones define in LKL_ENTRY_POINTS in arch/lkl/Makefile. This way we can avoid name collisions with applications and other libraries and we can keep the entry points into lkl controlled (we don't want to export any random function due to relatively high changes in the API and the fact that we need a proper context to run the kernel functions anyway). All lkl_sys_ calls are then redirected to lkl_syscall via the static inline function definitions in arch/lkl/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h (see the LKL_SYSCALL*). |
Oh, right. That makes sense now. I got confused because Thanks for the explanation! |
Does it make sense to make |
if this is only the limitation of exposing random functions, then we may have to think about an alternate path to run in the proper context, though I have no idea at the moment. I still think that this is an open question: whether what kind of interfaces lkl wants to expose. if your objective is just avoiding symbol collisions between applications and kernel, there is alternate way to do that. below is the same way what rump kernel does: libos-nuse/net-next-nuse@751adb6 it is okay to make symbols to be private by objcopy because nobody uses an internal function of Linux kernel right now. but if somebody wants to use such random functions from an application, then exposing those symbols may be helpful. whitebox testing with LKL may benefit such more exposed api, for instance. |
While it's true that the internal kernel APIs change, that could be something for the application developer to consider when deciding whether or not to use them.
Aren't there useful functions that need no context? One example that comes to mind is crypto functions or implementations of various data structures.
namespacing all the symbols and letting the application developer choose what to use sounds like a good idea to me |
There already are dedicated userspace libraries for crypto functions and data structures, so I am not sure what purpose would that serve. For complex tasks such as filesystems manipulation and networking stack usage you need a proper context. |
There are no lkl_sys_ symbols exported from fs.c in liblkl.a. You should use nm not strings to see what symbols are exported. |
Indeed, using a dedicated crypto userspace library would be the sensible thing to do. But is everything in the kernel available as a userspace library? And even if it is, I don't see how more libraries or more choice for the application developer in general is a bad thing.
You're right and I don't have a solution for using these functions to manipulate a running kernel. But those functions can be useful for other uses. I know I had this need some time ago. I had a corrupted bcache disk and I was trying to read bcahce data structures in my application code in order to repair them. But since there was no userspace library for that I was forced to do a lot of manual porting. One particular example was that the in-kernel implementation of crc64 for bcache wasn't the same with other usespace libraries available. It would have been a great time saver if I could have used the exact same code used by bcache to parse the data structures in my program instead of re-implementing them on my own. I would expect most filesystem repair utilities to have similar needs.
You're right, thanks for explaining. |
Closing this issue as there was no follow up for some time and the underlying issue is tracked in #58. |
syzbot caught an infinite recursion in nsh_gso_segment(). Problem here is that we need to make sure the NSH header is of reasonable length. BUG: MAX_LOCK_DEPTH too low! turning off the locking correctness validator. depth: 48 max: 48! 48 locks held by syz-executor0/10189: #0: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x30f/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3517 #1: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #1: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #2: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #2: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #3: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #3: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #4: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #4: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 lkl#5: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] lkl#5: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 lkl#6: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] lkl#6: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 lkl#7: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] lkl#7: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 lkl#8: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] lkl#8: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 lkl#9: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] lkl#9: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 lkl#10: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] lkl#10: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 lkl#11: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] lkl#11: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 lkl#12: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] lkl#12: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 lkl#13: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] lkl#13: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 lkl#14: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] lkl#14: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 lkl#15: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] lkl#15: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 lkl#16: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] lkl#16: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 lkl#17: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] lkl#17: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 lkl#18: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] lkl#18: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 lkl#19: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] lkl#19: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 lkl#20: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] lkl#20: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 lkl#21: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] lkl#21: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 lkl#22: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] lkl#22: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 lkl#23: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] lkl#23: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 lkl#24: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] lkl#24: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 lkl#25: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] lkl#25: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 lkl#26: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] lkl#26: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 lkl#27: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] lkl#27: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 lkl#28: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] lkl#28: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 lkl#29: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] lkl#29: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 lkl#30: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] lkl#30: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 lkl#31: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] lkl#31: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 dccp_close: ABORT with 65423 bytes unread lkl#32: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] lkl#32: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 lkl#33: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] lkl#33: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 lkl#34: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] lkl#34: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 lkl#35: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] lkl#35: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 lkl#36: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] lkl#36: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 lkl#37: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] lkl#37: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 lkl#38: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] lkl#38: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 lkl#39: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] lkl#39: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 lkl#40: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] lkl#40: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 lkl#41: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] lkl#41: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 lkl#42: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] lkl#42: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 lkl#43: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] lkl#43: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 lkl#44: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] lkl#44: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 lkl#45: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] lkl#45: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 lkl#46: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] lkl#46: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 lkl#47: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] lkl#47: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 INFO: lockdep is turned off. CPU: 1 PID: 10189 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc2+ lkl#26 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x1b9/0x294 lib/dump_stack.c:113 __lock_acquire+0x1788/0x5140 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3449 lock_acquire+0x1dc/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3920 rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:246 [inline] rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:632 [inline] skb_mac_gso_segment+0x25b/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2789 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 __skb_gso_segment+0x3bb/0x870 net/core/dev.c:2865 skb_gso_segment include/linux/netdevice.h:4025 [inline] validate_xmit_skb+0x54d/0xd90 net/core/dev.c:3118 validate_xmit_skb_list+0xbf/0x120 net/core/dev.c:3168 sch_direct_xmit+0x354/0x11e0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:312 qdisc_restart net/sched/sch_generic.c:399 [inline] __qdisc_run+0x741/0x1af0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:410 __dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:3243 [inline] __dev_queue_xmit+0x28ea/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3551 dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3616 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2951 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x40f8/0x6070 net/packet/af_packet.c:2976 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x120 net/socket.c:639 __sys_sendto+0x3d7/0x670 net/socket.c:1789 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1801 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1797 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0xe1/0x1a0 net/socket.c:1797 do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Fixes: c411ed8 ("nsh: add GSO support") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Acked-by: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The table field in nft_obj_filter is not an array. In order to check tablename, we should check if the pointer is set. Test commands: %nft add table ip filter %nft add counter ip filter ct1 %nft reset counters Splat looks like: [ 306.510504] kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled [ 306.516184] kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access [ 306.524775] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN PTI [ 306.528284] Modules linked in: nft_objref nft_counter nf_tables nfnetlink ip_tables x_tables [ 306.528284] CPU: 0 PID: 1488 Comm: nft Not tainted 4.17.0-rc4+ lkl#17 [ 306.528284] Hardware name: To be filled by O.E.M. To be filled by O.E.M./Aptio CRB, BIOS 5.6.5 07/08/2015 [ 306.528284] RIP: 0010:nf_tables_dump_obj+0x52c/0xa70 [nf_tables] [ 306.528284] RSP: 0018:ffff8800b6cb7520 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 306.528284] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8800b6c49820 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 306.528284] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffffed0016d96e9a [ 306.528284] RBP: ffff8800b6cb75c0 R08: ffffed00236fce7c R09: ffffed00236fce7b [ 306.528284] R10: ffffffff9f6241e8 R11: ffffed00236fce7c R12: ffff880111365108 [ 306.528284] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8800b6c49860 R15: ffff8800b6c49860 [ 306.528284] FS: 00007f838b007700(0000) GS:ffff88011b600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 306.528284] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 306.528284] CR2: 00007ffeafabcf78 CR3: 00000000b6cbe000 CR4: 00000000001006f0 [ 306.528284] Call Trace: [ 306.528284] netlink_dump+0x470/0xa20 [ 306.528284] __netlink_dump_start+0x5ae/0x690 [ 306.528284] ? nf_tables_getobj+0x1b3/0x740 [nf_tables] [ 306.528284] nf_tables_getobj+0x2f5/0x740 [nf_tables] [ 306.528284] ? nft_obj_notify+0x100/0x100 [nf_tables] [ 306.528284] ? nf_tables_getobj+0x740/0x740 [nf_tables] [ 306.528284] ? nf_tables_dump_flowtable_done+0x70/0x70 [nf_tables] [ 306.528284] ? nft_obj_notify+0x100/0x100 [nf_tables] [ 306.528284] nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x8ff/0x932 [nfnetlink] [ 306.528284] ? nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x216/0x932 [nfnetlink] [ 306.528284] netlink_rcv_skb+0x1c9/0x2f0 [ 306.528284] ? nfnetlink_bind+0x1d0/0x1d0 [nfnetlink] [ 306.528284] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x270/0x270 [ 306.528284] ? netlink_ack+0x7a0/0x7a0 [ 306.528284] ? ns_capable_common+0x6e/0x110 [ ... ] Fixes: e46abbc ("netfilter: nf_tables: Allow table names of up to 255 chars") Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com> Acked-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Eric reported a syzbot warning: BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in nh_valid_get_del_req+0x6f1/0x8c0 net/ipv4/nexthop.c:1510 CPU: 0 PID: 11812 Comm: syz-executor444 Not tainted 5.3.0-rc3+ lkl#17 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x191/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 kmsan_report+0x162/0x2d0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_report.c:109 __msan_warning+0x75/0xe0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:294 nh_valid_get_del_req+0x6f1/0x8c0 net/ipv4/nexthop.c:1510 rtm_del_nexthop+0x1b1/0x610 net/ipv4/nexthop.c:1543 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x115a/0x1580 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5223 netlink_rcv_skb+0x431/0x620 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477 rtnetlink_rcv+0x50/0x60 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5241 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1302 [inline] netlink_unicast+0xf6c/0x1050 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1328 netlink_sendmsg+0x110f/0x1330 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1917 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:637 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:657 [inline] ___sys_sendmsg+0x14ff/0x1590 net/socket.c:2311 __sys_sendmmsg+0x53a/0xae0 net/socket.c:2413 __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2442 [inline] __se_sys_sendmmsg+0xbd/0xe0 net/socket.c:2439 __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x56/0x70 net/socket.c:2439 do_syscall_64+0xbc/0xf0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:297 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7 The root cause is nlmsg_parse calling __nla_parse which means the header struct size is not checked. nlmsg_parse should be a wrapper around __nlmsg_parse with NL_VALIDATE_STRICT for the validate argument very much like nlmsg_parse_deprecated is for NL_VALIDATE_LIBERAL. Fixes: 3de6440 ("netlink: re-add parse/validate functions in strict mode") Reported-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
[ Upstream commit e24c644 ] I compiled with AddressSanitizer and I had these memory leaks while I was using the tep_parse_format function: Direct leak of 28 byte(s) in 4 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fb07db49ffe in __interceptor_realloc (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0x10dffe) #1 0x7fb07a724228 in extend_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:985 #2 0x7fb07a724c21 in __read_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1140 #3 0x7fb07a724f78 in read_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1206 #4 0x7fb07a725191 in __read_expect_type /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1291 #5 0x7fb07a7251df in read_expect_type /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1299 #6 0x7fb07a72e6c8 in process_dynamic_array_len /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:2849 #7 0x7fb07a7304b8 in process_function /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3161 #8 0x7fb07a730900 in process_arg_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3207 #9 0x7fb07a727c0b in process_arg /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1786 #10 0x7fb07a731080 in event_read_print_args /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3285 lkl#11 0x7fb07a731722 in event_read_print /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3369 lkl#12 0x7fb07a740054 in __tep_parse_format /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:6335 lkl#13 0x7fb07a74047a in __parse_event /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:6389 lkl#14 0x7fb07a740536 in tep_parse_format /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:6431 lkl#15 0x7fb07a785acf in parse_event ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:251 lkl#16 0x7fb07a785ccd in parse_systems ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:284 lkl#17 0x7fb07a786fb3 in read_metadata ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:593 lkl#18 0x7fb07a78760e in ftrace_fs_source_init ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:727 lkl#19 0x7fb07d90c19c in add_component_with_init_method_data ../../../../src/lib/graph/graph.c:1048 lkl#20 0x7fb07d90c87b in add_source_component_with_initialize_method_data ../../../../src/lib/graph/graph.c:1127 lkl#21 0x7fb07d90c92a in bt_graph_add_source_component ../../../../src/lib/graph/graph.c:1152 lkl#22 0x55db11aa632e in cmd_run_ctx_create_components_from_config_components ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2252 lkl#23 0x55db11aa6fda in cmd_run_ctx_create_components ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2347 lkl#24 0x55db11aa780c in cmd_run ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2461 lkl#25 0x55db11aa8a7d in main ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2673 lkl#26 0x7fb07d5460b2 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x270b2) The token variable in the process_dynamic_array_len function is allocated in the read_expect_type function, but is not freed before calling the read_token function. Free the token variable before calling read_token in order to plug the leak. Signed-off-by: Philippe Duplessis-Guindon <pduplessis@efficios.com> Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-devel/20200730150236.5392-1-pduplessis@efficios.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
I got several memory leak reports from Asan with a simple command. It was because VDSO is not released due to the refcount. Like in __dsos_addnew_id(), it should put the refcount after adding to the list. $ perf record true [ perf record: Woken up 1 times to write data ] [ perf record: Captured and wrote 0.030 MB perf.data (10 samples) ] ================================================================= ==692599==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 439 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fea52341037 in __interceptor_calloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:154 #1 0x559bce4aa8ee in dso__new_id util/dso.c:1256 #2 0x559bce59245a in __machine__addnew_vdso util/vdso.c:132 #3 0x559bce59245a in machine__findnew_vdso util/vdso.c:347 #4 0x559bce50826c in map__new util/map.c:175 #5 0x559bce503c92 in machine__process_mmap2_event util/machine.c:1787 #6 0x559bce512f6b in machines__deliver_event util/session.c:1481 #7 0x559bce515107 in perf_session__deliver_event util/session.c:1551 #8 0x559bce51d4d2 in do_flush util/ordered-events.c:244 #9 0x559bce51d4d2 in __ordered_events__flush util/ordered-events.c:323 #10 0x559bce519bea in __perf_session__process_events util/session.c:2268 #11 0x559bce519bea in perf_session__process_events util/session.c:2297 #12 0x559bce2e7a52 in process_buildids /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/builtin-record.c:1017 #13 0x559bce2e7a52 in record__finish_output /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/builtin-record.c:1234 #14 0x559bce2ed4f6 in __cmd_record /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/builtin-record.c:2026 #15 0x559bce2ed4f6 in cmd_record /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/builtin-record.c:2858 #16 0x559bce422db4 in run_builtin /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:313 #17 0x559bce2acac8 in handle_internal_command /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:365 #18 0x559bce2acac8 in run_argv /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:409 #19 0x559bce2acac8 in main /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:539 #20 0x7fea51e76d09 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308 Indirect leak of 32 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fea52341037 in __interceptor_calloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:154 #1 0x559bce520907 in nsinfo__copy util/namespaces.c:169 #2 0x559bce50821b in map__new util/map.c:168 #3 0x559bce503c92 in machine__process_mmap2_event util/machine.c:1787 #4 0x559bce512f6b in machines__deliver_event util/session.c:1481 #5 0x559bce515107 in perf_session__deliver_event util/session.c:1551 #6 0x559bce51d4d2 in do_flush util/ordered-events.c:244 #7 0x559bce51d4d2 in __ordered_events__flush util/ordered-events.c:323 #8 0x559bce519bea in __perf_session__process_events util/session.c:2268 #9 0x559bce519bea in perf_session__process_events util/session.c:2297 #10 0x559bce2e7a52 in process_buildids /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/builtin-record.c:1017 #11 0x559bce2e7a52 in record__finish_output /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/builtin-record.c:1234 #12 0x559bce2ed4f6 in __cmd_record /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/builtin-record.c:2026 #13 0x559bce2ed4f6 in cmd_record /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/builtin-record.c:2858 #14 0x559bce422db4 in run_builtin /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:313 #15 0x559bce2acac8 in handle_internal_command /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:365 #16 0x559bce2acac8 in run_argv /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:409 #17 0x559bce2acac8 in main /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:539 #18 0x7fea51e76d09 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 471 byte(s) leaked in 2 allocation(s). Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210315045641.700430-1-namhyung@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
When bringing down the netdevice or system shutdown, a panic can be triggered while accessing the sysfs path because the device is already removed. [ 755.549084] mlx5_core 0000:12:00.1: Shutdown was called [ 756.404455] mlx5_core 0000:12:00.0: Shutdown was called ... [ 757.937260] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) [ 758.031397] IP: [<ffffffff8ee11acb>] dma_pool_alloc+0x1ab/0x280 crash> bt ... PID: 12649 TASK: ffff8924108f2100 CPU: 1 COMMAND: "amsd" ... #9 [ffff89240e1a38b0] page_fault at ffffffff8f38c778 [exception RIP: dma_pool_alloc+0x1ab] RIP: ffffffff8ee11acb RSP: ffff89240e1a3968 RFLAGS: 00010046 RAX: 0000000000000246 RBX: ffff89243d874100 RCX: 0000000000001000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000246 RDI: ffff89243d874090 RBP: ffff89240e1a39c0 R8: 000000000001f080 R9: ffff8905ffc03c00 R10: ffffffffc04680d4 R11: ffffffff8edde9fd R12: 00000000000080d0 R13: ffff89243d874090 R14: ffff89243d874080 R15: 0000000000000000 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #10 [ffff89240e1a39c8] mlx5_alloc_cmd_msg at ffffffffc04680f3 [mlx5_core] #11 [ffff89240e1a3a18] cmd_exec at ffffffffc046ad62 [mlx5_core] #12 [ffff89240e1a3ab8] mlx5_cmd_exec at ffffffffc046b4fb [mlx5_core] #13 [ffff89240e1a3ae8] mlx5_core_access_reg at ffffffffc0475434 [mlx5_core] #14 [ffff89240e1a3b40] mlx5e_get_fec_caps at ffffffffc04a7348 [mlx5_core] #15 [ffff89240e1a3bb0] get_fec_supported_advertised at ffffffffc04992bf [mlx5_core] #16 [ffff89240e1a3c08] mlx5e_get_link_ksettings at ffffffffc049ab36 [mlx5_core] #17 [ffff89240e1a3ce8] __ethtool_get_link_ksettings at ffffffff8f25db46 #18 [ffff89240e1a3d48] speed_show at ffffffff8f277208 #19 [ffff89240e1a3dd8] dev_attr_show at ffffffff8f0b70e3 #20 [ffff89240e1a3df8] sysfs_kf_seq_show at ffffffff8eedbedf #21 [ffff89240e1a3e18] kernfs_seq_show at ffffffff8eeda596 #22 [ffff89240e1a3e28] seq_read at ffffffff8ee76d10 #23 [ffff89240e1a3e98] kernfs_fop_read at ffffffff8eedaef5 #24 [ffff89240e1a3ed8] vfs_read at ffffffff8ee4e3ff #25 [ffff89240e1a3f08] sys_read at ffffffff8ee4f27f #26 [ffff89240e1a3f50] system_call_fastpath at ffffffff8f395f92 crash> net_device.state ffff89443b0c0000 state = 0x5 (__LINK_STATE_START| __LINK_STATE_NOCARRIER) To prevent this scenario, we also make sure that the netdevice is present. Signed-off-by: suresh kumar <suresh2514@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Calling btrfs_qgroup_reserve_meta_prealloc from btrfs_delayed_inode_reserve_metadata can result in flushing delalloc while holding a transaction and delayed node locks. This is deadlock prone. In the past multiple commits: * ae5e070 ("btrfs: qgroup: don't try to wait flushing if we're already holding a transaction") * 6f23277 ("btrfs: qgroup: don't commit transaction when we already hold the handle") Tried to solve various aspects of this but this was always a whack-a-mole game. Unfortunately those 2 fixes don't solve a deadlock scenario involving btrfs_delayed_node::mutex. Namely, one thread can call btrfs_dirty_inode as a result of reading a file and modifying its atime: PID: 6963 TASK: ffff8c7f3f94c000 CPU: 2 COMMAND: "test" #0 __schedule at ffffffffa529e07d #1 schedule at ffffffffa529e4ff #2 schedule_timeout at ffffffffa52a1bdd #3 wait_for_completion at ffffffffa529eeea <-- sleeps with delayed node mutex held #4 start_delalloc_inodes at ffffffffc0380db5 #5 btrfs_start_delalloc_snapshot at ffffffffc0393836 #6 try_flush_qgroup at ffffffffc03f04b2 #7 __btrfs_qgroup_reserve_meta at ffffffffc03f5bb6 <-- tries to reserve space and starts delalloc inodes. #8 btrfs_delayed_update_inode at ffffffffc03e31aa <-- acquires delayed node mutex #9 btrfs_update_inode at ffffffffc0385ba8 #10 btrfs_dirty_inode at ffffffffc038627b <-- TRANSACTIION OPENED #11 touch_atime at ffffffffa4cf0000 #12 generic_file_read_iter at ffffffffa4c1f123 #13 new_sync_read at ffffffffa4ccdc8a #14 vfs_read at ffffffffa4cd0849 #15 ksys_read at ffffffffa4cd0bd1 #16 do_syscall_64 at ffffffffa4a052eb #17 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffffa540008c This will cause an asynchronous work to flush the delalloc inodes to happen which can try to acquire the same delayed_node mutex: PID: 455 TASK: ffff8c8085fa4000 CPU: 5 COMMAND: "kworker/u16:30" #0 __schedule at ffffffffa529e07d #1 schedule at ffffffffa529e4ff #2 schedule_preempt_disabled at ffffffffa529e80a #3 __mutex_lock at ffffffffa529fdcb <-- goes to sleep, never wakes up. #4 btrfs_delayed_update_inode at ffffffffc03e3143 <-- tries to acquire the mutex #5 btrfs_update_inode at ffffffffc0385ba8 <-- this is the same inode that pid 6963 is holding #6 cow_file_range_inline.constprop.78 at ffffffffc0386be7 #7 cow_file_range at ffffffffc03879c1 #8 btrfs_run_delalloc_range at ffffffffc038894c #9 writepage_delalloc at ffffffffc03a3c8f #10 __extent_writepage at ffffffffc03a4c01 #11 extent_write_cache_pages at ffffffffc03a500b #12 extent_writepages at ffffffffc03a6de2 #13 do_writepages at ffffffffa4c277eb #14 __filemap_fdatawrite_range at ffffffffa4c1e5bb #15 btrfs_run_delalloc_work at ffffffffc0380987 <-- starts running delayed nodes #16 normal_work_helper at ffffffffc03b706c #17 process_one_work at ffffffffa4aba4e4 #18 worker_thread at ffffffffa4aba6fd #19 kthread at ffffffffa4ac0a3d #20 ret_from_fork at ffffffffa54001ff To fully address those cases the complete fix is to never issue any flushing while holding the transaction or the delayed node lock. This patch achieves it by calling qgroup_reserve_meta directly which will either succeed without flushing or will fail and return -EDQUOT. In the latter case that return value is going to be propagated to btrfs_dirty_inode which will fallback to start a new transaction. That's fine as the majority of time we expect the inode will have BTRFS_DELAYED_NODE_INODE_DIRTY flag set which will result in directly copying the in-memory state. Fixes: c53e965 ("btrfs: qgroup: try to flush qgroup space when we get -EDQUOT") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10+ Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
The evlist and the cpu/thread maps should be released together. Otherwise following error was reported by Asan. Note that this test still has memory leaks in DSOs so it still fails even after this change. I'll take a look at that too. # perf test -v 26 26: Object code reading : --- start --- test child forked, pid 154184 Looking at the vmlinux_path (8 entries long) symsrc__init: build id mismatch for vmlinux. symsrc__init: cannot get elf header. Using /proc/kcore for kernel data Using /proc/kallsyms for symbols Parsing event 'cycles' mmap size 528384B ... ================================================================= ==154184==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 439 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fcb66e77037 in __interceptor_calloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:154 #1 0x55ad9b7e821e in dso__new_id util/dso.c:1256 #2 0x55ad9b8cfd4a in __machine__addnew_vdso util/vdso.c:132 #3 0x55ad9b8cfd4a in machine__findnew_vdso util/vdso.c:347 #4 0x55ad9b845b7e in map__new util/map.c:176 #5 0x55ad9b8415a2 in machine__process_mmap2_event util/machine.c:1787 #6 0x55ad9b8fab16 in perf_tool__process_synth_event util/synthetic-events.c:64 #7 0x55ad9b8fab16 in perf_event__synthesize_mmap_events util/synthetic-events.c:499 #8 0x55ad9b8fbfdf in __event__synthesize_thread util/synthetic-events.c:741 #9 0x55ad9b8ff3e3 in perf_event__synthesize_thread_map util/synthetic-events.c:833 #10 0x55ad9b738585 in do_test_code_reading tests/code-reading.c:608 #11 0x55ad9b73b25d in test__code_reading tests/code-reading.c:722 #12 0x55ad9b6f28fb in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:428 #13 0x55ad9b6f28fb in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:458 #14 0x55ad9b6f4a53 in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:679 #15 0x55ad9b6f4a53 in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:825 #16 0x55ad9b760cc4 in run_builtin /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:313 #17 0x55ad9b5eaa88 in handle_internal_command /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:365 #18 0x55ad9b5eaa88 in run_argv /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:409 #19 0x55ad9b5eaa88 in main /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:539 #20 0x7fcb669acd09 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308 ... SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 471 byte(s) leaked in 2 allocation(s). test child finished with 1 ---- end ---- Object code reading: FAILED! Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Leo Yan <leo.yan@linaro.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210301140409.184570-6-namhyung@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Upon physical link change, firmware reports to the kernel about the change along with the details like speed, lmac_type_id, etc. Kernel derives lmac_type based on lmac_type_id received from firmware. In a few scenarios, firmware returns an invalid lmac_type_id, which is resulting in below kernel panic. This patch adds the missing validation of the lmac_type_id field. Internal error: Oops: 96000005 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 35.321595] Modules linked in: [ 35.328982] CPU: 0 PID: 31 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 5.4.210-g2e3169d8e1bc-dirty #17 [ 35.337014] Hardware name: Marvell CN103XX board (DT) [ 35.344297] Workqueue: events work_for_cpu_fn [ 35.352730] pstate: 40400089 (nZcv daIf +PAN -UAO) [ 35.360267] pc : strncpy+0x10/0x30 [ 35.366595] lr : cgx_link_change_handler+0x90/0x180 Fixes: 61071a8 ("octeontx2-af: Forward CGX link notifications to PFs") Signed-off-by: Hariprasad Kelam <hkelam@marvell.com> Signed-off-by: Sunil Kovvuri Goutham <sgoutham@marvell.com> Signed-off-by: Sai Krishna <saikrishnag@marvell.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
While building this project I noticed the following weird result. When I run
strings liblkl.a | grep lkl_sys | sort -u
I get the following syscalls:However,
lklfuce.c
refers to a lot of extralkl_sys_*
functions. One example islkl_sys_chown
. I ranfind -type f|xargs grep lkl_sys_chown
on the whole linux tree that includes my built objects and the only references to this function were inlklfuse.c
,lklfuse.o
andlklfuse
.How is this linking happening? And why only this specific set of syscalls appears in the output of
strings
? I couldn't find anything unique about their definition either.The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: