Imagined Insecurities in Imagined Communities: Manufacturing the Ethnoreligious Others as Security Threats

M ICHAEL I NTAL M AGCAMIT

Queen Mary University of London

How does a once familiar and benign ethnoreligious community become a stranger and a threat? This article examines the underlying causal mechanisms driving rival ethnoreligious factions within pluralistic polities to frame each other as threats to their relative security, power, and status. Drawing on complementary theories from critical security, religious, and nationalism studies, I develop a framework that captures and explains the processes and dynamics through which threatening conceptions and narratives about the ethnoreligious others are constructed, socialized, and legitimized over time. To theoretically probe and empirically demonstrate the utility of this framework, I examine how the collective imagined insecurities among Muslim and Christian communities in Indonesia have crystallized into tangible security threats using the interpretive process tracing method. Evidences produced from my theoretical and empirical analyses using the novel qualitative data I gathered from my field research reveal that this chauvinistic, zero-sum phenomenon proceeds via a three-phase othering causal mechanism comprised of cultivation of hostile emotive effects of ethnoreligious nationalism, securitization of othered ethnoreligious groups using hostile symbolic predispositions, and sacralization of hostile perceptions of indivisible ethnoreligious identities and homelands.

Introduction

"Muslim power vanquishes the Nazarenes." "Christians conquer Muslim pigs." These were examples of the graffiti scrawled on the walls of ruined department stores in the capital city of Ambon in Maluku following the violent conflicts between Muslim and Christian communities in this eastern corner of Indonesia (Bräuchler 2003). For the outside observers, it was hard to imagine how a trivial argument between a Christian bus driver and a Muslim passenger that happened on January 19, 1999, could end the Ambonese people's long-standing practice of building mosques and churches together. In an instant, the once respected concept of *pela-gandong* (peaceful coexistence), which for generations united the Muslims and Christians throughout Maluku, got buried underneath the rubble (McCawley as cited in Bräuchler 2003, 123). The riots and clashes that ignited in the city on that day spread across the island at such a rapid pace and were characterized by "frenzied slaughter, savage mutilations, forced conversions, and the wanton destruction of property" (Schulze 2002, 57). Islamist militant groups and independent radical Muslims from different parts of Indonesia flocked to the region to wage *jihad* against the "Christian enemies." The war eventually claimed an estimated 10,000 lives and displaced half a million Christian and Muslim inhabitants (Van Klinken 2007).

Meanwhile, some 550 km from the provincial capital, a small clash erupted between the long-term migrant Makian and native Kao in Malifut on the night of August 18, 1999. After destroying the Kao village of Sosol, thousands of Makian proceeded to attack the neighboring Wangeotak village, killing three Kao locals (Wilson 2008). This marked the beginning of a series of fatal collisions throughout the entire North Maluku that eventually shattered half a century of peace and stability in the region. The predominantly Kao Christians retaliated by expelling the Makian Muslims out of Malifut and burning their villages. In retaliation, the Makian used a forged letter titled "Bloody Sosol" as a proof of the Kao's plan to Christianize the whole province, provoking the Muslims in Ternate and Tidore to attack the Christians who had been co-existing with them for decades (Bubandt 2008). Some of the most shocking incidents took place in Tobelo and Galela in Northern Halmahera where sights of disfigured corpses, mass graves, and stories about people consuming the body parts of dead enemies became a commonplace (Wilson 2008). By the time the battles ended in July 2000, around 3,500 were killed by the warring tribes and an estimated 370,000 people were forced to flee (Van Klinken 2007).

How does an ethnoreligious community that has once been seen as familiar and benign become a stranger and a threat? Drawing on interdisciplinary theories on critical security, religious, and nationalism studies, I develop a framework that traces and elucidates how collective imagined insecurities are transformed into tangible security threats. The othering framework being advanced here is anchored on complementary theoretical assumptions about the respective roles of emotions, symbolic predispositions, and perceptions in violent ethnoreligious conflicts. It consists of three main phases with each part logically leading to the next part: cultivating the hostile emotive effects of ethnoreligious nationalism; securitizing the other ethnoreligious categories using hostile symbolic predispositions; and sacralizing hostile perceptions of indivisible ethnoreligious identities and homelands. As I argue and illustrate throughout

the article, these constitutive structures of the othering framework—which are simultaneously generating and are being fueled by emotions, symbolic predispositions, and perceptions—collectively act as a vessel through which the prevailing relations and existing arrangements between the in-group and all other out-groups are either revised or reinforced. As such, they are fundamental to the reinvention of the "state of being" of all target ethnoreligious communities and the renegotiation of their respective positions within pluralistic imagined communities.

The study contributes to the existing scholarship on ethnoreligious conflicts in three ways. Theoretically, the development and application of the novel othering framework moves the discussion beyond an assessment of causes to enhancing our knowledge of the causal mechanisms that link the variety of causes examined in the literature to the emergence and recurrence of ethnoreligious conflicts. Drawing together previously isolated observations and analyses on security, religion, and nationalism, on the one hand, and emotions, symbolic predispositions, and perceptions, on the other hand, in a thematically oriented investigation significantly improves our understanding of these crucial interrelations vis-à-vis ethnoreligious conflicts. By integrating complementary insights from different strands of conflict theorizing within a single logic, the proposed framework links together multiple factors at every level of analysis, thereby enabling a more holistic, yet still systematic, accurate, and nuanced approach to studying ethnoreligious relations and conflicts.

Empirically, the interdisciplinary scope and treatment of the case study presented to demonstrate how the othering causal mechanism works using the proposed framework brings debates and perspectives from sociology, anthropology, and psychology into the study of international relations (IR), which has unduly ignored these elements. Rather than discounting their role and impact just because they cannot be concretely observed or accurately measured, the proposed framework enables broader and deeper empirical explanations of ethnoreligious conflicts by accounting for a wide range of insights on the interlinkages between hostile emotions and cultivation of ethnoreligious nationalism, hostile predispositions and securitization of ethnoreligious others, and hostile perceptions and sacralization of identities and homelands. Given that the "reality" in social sciences has distinct psychological, sociological, anthropological, and political layers, IR scholarship must come to terms with the fact that multiple causal logics typically operate at the same time (see Kaufman 2019).

Methodologically, the interpretive variant of process tracing (IPT) method adopted in the construction and application of the proposed framework helps break new grounds in IR research by demonstrating the compatibility between interpretive works and causal arguments. Specifically, the theoretical and empirical discussions provided show how a focus on mechanisms can be made to work with the meta-theoretical assumptions of interpretive research to provide causal explanations for ethnoreligious otherings and conflicts. Indeed, IPT is particularly instrumental in studying multifaceted, multilayered processes, especially those through which social institutions unravel or collapse, and through which conflicts erupt from previous stages of relative peace and stability (see Norman 2015). The article's theoretical framework and its empirical application underscore how interpretive research and method elevate and strengthen process tracing explanations by integrating context-specific intersubjective meanings into causal accounts, thus enabling the identification of causal processes and mechanisms rarely considered in IR.

The article proceeds as follows. In the next section, I discuss the limits of the available IR literature on ethnoreligious conflicts and explain how the present study improves our understanding of these events by focusing on the causal mechanisms triggering the "social re-engineering" of the othered groups as security threats. I then discuss how I develop the othering framework by outlining and fleshing out the three interrelated phases that capture and explain the dynamics underpinning each of these three causal mechanisms. After which, I explain how I apply the IPT method in empirically demonstrating how the three-phase othering causal mechanism works in an actual case. Using Indonesia as my primary case study, I then proceed to investigate the causal mechanisms facilitating the eruption and of ethnoreligious conflicts between its Muslim and Christian communities with the help of the othering framework. Finally, I conclude by reiterating the importance of recognizing and incorporating the crucial roles being played by emotions, symbolic predispositions, and perceptions in our analysis of violent ethnoreligious conflicts.

The Literature

Much of the available literature on ethnoreligious conflicts in IR scholarship has focused on identifying the most relevant factors that led to their emergence and/or why some disputes turned violent while others were settled without carnage. These can be classified into three general strands: material/rationalist, non-material/non-rationalist, and elite/instrumentalist. The first strand explored the materialistic considerations of ethnoreligious groups within a state and emphasized the actors' "rationalist" behaviors that influenced conflicts. Some of the principal findings from these studies showed that disproportionate levels of modernization and development among groups gave rise to violent conflicts (Wimmer 2002; Collier 2003; Walter 2004), that perceptions of relative economic and political disadvantages drove groups to violently mobilize against one another (Murdoch and Sandler 2004; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005; Esteban and Ray 2011), and that a group's loss of effective control over its claimed territories fueled aggressive actions to counter the resulting insecurities (Hassner 2003; Toft 2003, 2006; Wiegand 2011). Critics of material explanations, however, argued that such conclusions not only overestimated the actors' economic and strategic motives but also underestimated the power of ideas and biases on the individuals. Consequently, they were incapable of answering why some embattled ethnoreligious groups were willing to die for their invisible gods and barren lands, or why they chose to fight for sovereignty despite the expected outcomes being significantly worse than the status-quo arrangement.

Hence, the second strand investigated the non-material aspects of the conditions surrounding ethnoreligious groups and emphasized the actors' "non-rationalist" behaviors that motivated the conflicts. Some of the main findings from these studies revealed that ethnoreligious clashes emanated from the psychological partitions simultaneously built by the competing groups against each other (Kaufman 2001, 2006; Petersen 2002, 2011; Fattah and Fierke 2009; Ross 2013; Halperin 2016), and that an ethnoreligious group's attempts to enhance its own security and well-being were automatically deemed suspicious and threatening by the rival group (Roe 1999; Horowitz 2000; Rose 2000; Melander 2009). While these analyses recognized the centrality of individual persons and their ideas,

critics of non-material explanations rejected the notion that ethnoreligious conflicts could be simply attributed to some intangible and unmeasurable elements of human nature despite the presence of concrete and quantifiable factors that surely motivated the actors' interests and actions.

Accordingly, the third strand linked the first and second strands together by examining elite roles in mobilizing ethnoreligious factions, and emphasizing the instrumentalist functions of ethnicity and religion with respect to conflicts. Some of the core findings from these studies emphasized that both the material objects and non-material subjects of ethnoreligious conflicts were a function of elite motives and interests (Fearon and Laitin 2000; Kalyvas 2003; Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009), and that, in effect, ethnoreligious nationalism was a tool for preserving and legitimizing these actors' power and authority (Snyder and Ballentine 1996; Balcells 2010; Brubaker 2012). Such inferences were also questioned by critics of elite explanations who claimed that individuals and groups were not just passive entities easily manipulated by the cunning elites, and that ethnoreligious nationalism had real effect on those who genuinely believed in the symbols and narratives of their identity and homeland.

Despite providing valuable insights, determining the various causes of these clashes does not necessarily clarify how the very first stage of ethnoreligious conflicts—the manufacturing of ethnoreligious others as security threats—gets set in motion and crystallized. What is mostly missing are explanations on the underlying processes that link the causes to the outcome together. Hence, in this article, I uncover and explain the neglected underlying causal mechanisms that drive rival ethnoreligious groups within pluralistic polities to frame each other as threats to their relative security, power, and status. This conscious effort is informed by the significant incongruence that I have personally witnessed while conducting fieldwork across Southeast Asia: between how the actual actors involved in these clashes think and act, and the theories and models of how they are expected to behave.

Most of the people whom I have observed and interacted with over several years have lived through the horrific violence of ethnoreligious conflicts as targets, perpetrators, or both. These extraordinary experiences have left powerful emotional, symbolic, and perceptual "externalities" that prevent those who have been affected, whether directly or indirectly, from valuing the lives of ethnoreligious others in the same way that they value their own lives (see Petersen 2011). My goal is to systematically and realistically explain how these emotions, symbolic predispositions, and perceptions are simultaneously facilitating and are being produced by the causal mechanisms that facilitate the reimagination and reconstruction of the ethnoreligious others as security threats.

How Imagined Insecurities Become Security Threats: Propositions and Framework

Phase 1: Cultivating the Hostile Emotive Effects of Ethnoreligious Nationalism

Proposition 1. The two-way shared cultivation of chauvinistic ethnoreligious nationalism (emanating from the amalgamation of ethno-nationalist and religious factors and influences) between elite and non-elite actors (whether for tactical or substantive reasons) generates hostile emotive effects that induce rival groups within pluralistic polities to adopt a survivalist, zero-sum security logic vis-à-vis identity and territory.

Ethnoreligious nationalism refers to the merging of ethnicized religious cultures and ethno-nationalist ideologies that state and non-state actors cultivate and use not only for masking certain material interests but also for ascribing identity (Figure 1; Juergensmeyer 1993; Spohn 2003; Brubaker 2012). While nationalism articulates the necessity of binding the state, territory, and culture together without defining the exact method and content of this amalgamation, religion offers a distinct method and content by generating models of authority and imaginations of an ordering power affecting the various facets of life (Smith 1998, 2003; Friedland 2001). In this first phase of othering process, as Proposition 1 states, the competing ethnoreligious nationalisms emerging from the chauvinistic unions between particularistic tribes and faiths generate hostile emotive effects that compel rival groups to acquire a survivalist, zero-sum security logic in relation to their identities and territories.

This becomes particularly evident and salient amid structural changes precipitated by a myriad combination of material, non-material, and instrumental causes. Such episodes create conditions that initiate the process of cognitive–emotive sequence that underscores a "coherent flow among structure, cognition, the emotional mechanism, and the timing and target of action" (Petersen 2002, 30). When individuals develop beliefs that the new situation engenders discrepancies among groups and/or generates threats from another faction, certain types of emotions are activated and precipitate changes in the saliency of specific desires. As Roger Petersen (2002, 17–18) argued, emotions serve as "a mechanism that triggers action to satisfy a pressing concern," specifically by raising the value and importance of one desire/concern over the others, and heightening the required cognitive and physical capabilities to respond to the resulting situational challenges. Central to this conception is the understanding that individuals possess a repertoire of activation and deactivation mechanisms—emotions—that change readiness physically and cognitively by alerting individuals to modify their relationships in the environment (Mercer 2010; Crawford 2014; Hutchinson and Bleiker 2014; Halperin 2016).

For example, fear, hatred, and resentment can be examined in terms of action tendencies: "as processes centered on an emotional mechanism facilitating individual action to satisfy an identified desire/concern" (Petersen 2002, 19). Cognition is viewed as prior to the causal sequence for these three emotions, where "Beliefs about threat lead to fears; beliefs about status inconsistency lead to resentments; beliefs about history and vengeance lead to hatreds" (Petersen 2002, 21; see Fattah and Fierke 2009; Ahmed 2014; Åhäll and Gregory 2015). In other words, by conceptualizing a situation in a certain kind of way, the potential for a particular type of emotion exists. Such emotions are deemed "instrumental" as they are capable of generating actions by directly meeting urgent concerns in the form of threats: "fear prepares the individual to take action to reduce dangers in the environment; hatred prepares the individual to attack previously identified enemies; resentment prepares the individual to rectify perceived imbalances in group status hierarchies" (Petersen 2002, 29; see Bleiker and Hutchinson 2008; Ross 2013). Accordingly, cognitive processes are perceived to be capable of directing actions toward specific targets that are sources of concern (Petersen 2002, 30; see Crawford 2014; Mercer 2014). Once these instrumental emotions are produced, they create feedback effects that reinforce already established beliefs.

Figure 1. The three-phase othering causal mechanism framework.

It is worth emphasizing here that not all emotions require an instrumentalist feedback loop to impact cognition such as rage. While it also addresses pressing anxieties and concerns, rage produces "cognitive distortions" that result in irrelevant or counterproductive actions, including the search for scapegoats (Petersen 2002, 2011). This intense urge to perpetrate violence generates a need to process available information intended to designate another individual/group as the enemy, and justify the violence against that target. Moreover, the elites do not have absolute monopoly in deciding when and how to use these hostile emotive effects of ethnoreligious nationalism. While they certainly manipulate emotions to secure their own ends, their actions are also responses to mass emotions amid structural shifts rather than shaping those emotions (Petersen 2002). Ordinary individuals also carry out multiple plausible motivations (rational and non-rational) at different times based on these emotions that work like "a switch among a set of basic desires" (Petersen 2002, 37). The day-to-day exchanges and interactions among regular people, and the emotional content and weight of those lived experiences shape and guide elites' behavior and conduct, making the cultivation of chauvinistic ethnoreligious nationalism a two-way shared process. Hence, the elites are not just tactically (strategically) bound by ethnoreligious nationalism but can also be substantively (genuinely) influenced by it.

In many pluralistic polities, for instance, ethnie, faith, and the land are typically depicted as fixed and indivisible components of individual being and collective survival. Consequently, the hostile emotions cultivated from the chauvinistic narratives, myths, and images linked to ethnoreligious nationalism can engender a shared view or sense between the elites and ordinary members of a group that they are both responsible (tactically and/or substantively) for the survival and defense of their own identity and territory. As such, crafting an emotional language that revitalizes and protects these primary security referents becomes fundamental to the salvation of rival factions. Ethnoreligious leitmotifs and symbols are constantly mined to build and entrench the foundations of these imagined beings and communities (Anderson 1983; Smith 1998, 2003). To this end, ethnoreligious nationalism provides the necessary emotive lexicon that elite and non-elite actors jointly construct and exploit to initiate the othering of the target group(s) by serving as a fundamental reservoir of identity and morale, and frame and legitimize calls for group action to either amend or preserve the existing structural conditions affecting their relative security, power, and status (Juergensmeyer 1993; Anderson 2010; Brubaker 2012). The "security value" (toward insiders) and the "security curse" (against outsiders) simultaneously generated by chauvinistic ethnoreligious nationalism ultimately work to protect and preserve a referent group's identity and territory at the expense of the othered groups.

Phase 2: Securitizing the Othered Ethnoreligious Groups Using Hostile Symbolic Predispositions

Proposition 2. This survivalist, zero-sum security logic, in turn, motivates the relevant state and non-state elites (e.g., political officials, ethno-nationalist leaders, religious chiefs) to securitize rival factions as threats to their security, power, and status (whether for tactical or substantive reasons) based on their own symbolic predispositions informed by the hostile emotive effects of ethnoreligious nationalism, and with the active participation and consent of their respective constituencies.

In response to Matt McDonald's (2008, 13) critic of the "problematically narrow form, context, and nature of the act" in classical securitization theory, the securitization process is defined here as the discursive construction of security. First, focusing only on speech acts ignores other crucial and valid forms of representation such as images, symbols, and material practices (McDonald 2008; see Williams 2003; Åhäll 2009; Van Rythoven 2015). Exclusive reliance on language disregards bureaucratic practices or physical actions (both the mundane and the extraordinary) not triggered by securitization speech acts, but are integral components of the mechanism through which meanings/interpretations of security are conveyed and security itself is constructed (McDonald 2008; Huysmans 2011; Hameiri and Jones 2013). Consequently, state elites cannot be the only legitimate securitizing agents as other influential non-state actors including ethno-nationalist leaders, religious chiefs, and the media also take on this role.

Second, focusing only on the moment of intervention ignores the idea that security is constructed over time and via a series of incremental processes (McDonald 2008). This prevents us from clearly understanding why certain representations resonate with particular communities or how certain actors are either permitted or sidelined in speaking security (see Huysmans 2011; Fierke 2015). Negotiations between the securitizing actors and the constituencies for whom articulations are intended are necessary for securitization to be legitimate and effective, thereby making the act a two-way shared process (see Oren and Solomon 2015). Contextual factors such as the dominant narratives and symbols of ethnoreligious identity and territory cannot be dismissed given how they condition both patterns of securitization and the broader construction of security.

Third, defining the nature of security construction exclusively in terms of threat designation undermines the centrality of the manner in which security (as a normative agenda or an articulation of core values) is understood in specific contexts (McDonald 2008; see Hameiri and Jones 2013; Fierke 2015). Understanding why some ethnoreligious groups are more likely to perceive certain actors and

dynamics as threatening, and how historical narratives, cultural symbols, and identity images reinforce and legitimize particular forms of securitization, requires proper attention to the underlying contexts in which specific security discourses become possible (Van Rythoven 2015; Eroukhmanoff 2016).

In this second phase of othering process, as Proposition 2 states, when framing the certain targets as threats to group security, power, and status, the securitizing actors draw from the hostile symbolic predispositions of their constituencies informed by the hostile emotive effects of ethnoreligious nationalism. These symbolic predispositions can be viewed as "stable affective responses to particular symbols" that are "associated with different principled beliefs and different causal beliefs" (Kaufman 2019, 4; see Mercer 2010; Sasley 2011). For instance, the hostile biases (e.g., prejudices and ideologies) being held by the in-group amplify the othering of the out-group as sources of identity crisis and homeland instability. The zero-sum nature of these hostile predispositions generates a security dilemma in which the perceived power and status of the referent group ultimately depends on the marginalization and weakness of the target group. A fundamental assumption here, as Stuart Kaufman (2006, 2019) emphasized, is that most decision-making is done intuitively rather than rationally: it is emotion, as opposed to pure rational calculation, that is motivating people to act. This is not to deny the important role of rationality but "to explain why equally rational people given the same information frequently form opposing policy preferences for pursuing the interests of the same group or state" (Kaufman 2019, 4).

Indeed, symbols are powerful precisely because "they simultaneously refer to an interest and to an emotionally laden myth," enabling the framing of conflicts of interest as struggles against the hostile and evil subhuman forces to motivate actions (Kaufman 2006, 52). Since attitudes originally formed emotionally are more sensitive to emotional rather than intellectual appeals, ordinary people tend to decide and choose among opposing values and leaders by reacting to the most evocative and emotive symbols depicted to them (Westen 2007; Kaufman 2019). Rather than providing rational arguments based on facts, leaders are often forced to make emotional appeals to predispositions given that political opinions are shaped more by the latter than the former. Note, however, that predispositions have a two-way relationship with feelings of threat. Not only do the ambiguous behaviors by an out-group likely to threaten the in-group holding negative stereotypes about them, but even favorable predispositions toward the outsiders do not prevent the insiders from feeling threatened when facing obvious threats (Kaufman 2019). If members of the in-group feel under attack, that attack might just serve as a "psychological shock" that amplifies the hostile predispositions against the out-group (Kaufman 2019, 4). These perceived threats are not just physical but are also social in nature such as threats to resources, values, and group status that also influence attitudes and perceptions and, therefore, are just as crucial as physical threats (see Ahmed 2000; Butler 2009; Fierke 2015).

Since the most crucial judgments vis-à-vis the threat happen collectively, group dynamics are extremely vital (Kaufman 2019). Collective perceptions of threat proceed in three stages: diagnostic (where situation is identified, villains are labeled, and blame is projected); prognostic (where solutions are proposed to address the problem at strategic, tactical, or individual levels); and motivational (where collective action is mobilized by summoning the audience to participate in a movement) (Benford and Snow 2002; Liow 2016). Factors such as the credibility of the frames and their sources, together with the predispositions of the target audience, determine whether people will believe and accept the frames and consequently feel threatened (Kaufman 2019).

Phase 3: Sacralizing Hostile Perceptions of Indivisible Ethnoreligious Identities and Homelands

Proposition 3.
With the successful cultivation of the hostile emotive effects of ethnoreligious nationalism and effective securitization of the othered ethnoreligious group using hostile symbolic predispositions, the state and non-state elites are now better positioned to solidify their groups' legitimacy, authority, and primacy further (whether for tactical or substantive reasons) by sacralizing their claimed identities and homelands.

With the successful cultivation of ethnoreligious nationalisms and effective securitization of rival ethnoreligious groups, as Proposition 3 states, the state and non-state elites solidify their groups' legitimacy, authority, and primacy further by sacralizing their claimed ethnoreligious identities and homelands. They do this by attempting to embed their own ethnoreligious *substructures* (i.e., doctrines, myths, dogmas, and norms) within the underlying security *superstructures* (i.e., rhetoric, policies, strategies, and institutions) of the overarching state. This third phase of othering process underlines the focal referents of the emotions and predispositions cultivated and utilized in the first two parts: the sacred homelands that anchor sacred identities. In Monica Toft's (2003) theorization, the territory is both a material object that can be divided and exchanged and a non-material subject that cannot be split or traded. Controlling territory is crucial for ethnoreligious groups and states precisely because both parties believe that their survival ultimately depends on it. While their ontological views about territory and survival differ, as far as ethnoreligious groups are concerned, their territory is a defining feature of their identity: inseparable from their past and tied to their continued existence as a distinct tribe (Toft 2003, 19; see Smith 2003).

Indeed, territories are considered as homelands that seem fixed in time and in the imagination, taking on meanings beyond their material and objective descriptions. Notwithstanding the territory's objective worth, ethnoreligious groups rationally view the right to control their respective homelands as a survival issue (Hassner 2003, 2007; Johnson and Toft 2014). Having effective control over these homelands guarantees and protects not only their economic and political resources but also their rights to speak their own languages, express their own cultures, and practice their own faith (Smith 1998, 2003; Toft 2003, 2006). As such, cultural boundaries and boundedness must always be preserved. This helps explain why individual members are willing to sacrifice not only their lives but also the lives of their sons and daughters just to establish and retain control over these homelands (Hassner 2003; Johnson and Toft 2014; Marsden 2019). Many would rather risk death than live on without this concept and sense of identity, thereby transforming the deaths and failures of those who have sacrificed themselves into martyrdom and victory (Hafez 2006; Fierke 2009, 2012; Koschut 2016).

Given this intrinsic relationship between territory and identity, especially when the state is not an expression of the ethnoreligious group, strong attachments to the homeland cannot be simply dismissed as irrational. Self-sacrifice in expectation of proportionately larger and more

transcendent benefits can, and should, be seen as a logical act (Hafez 2006; Fierke 2009). As Karin Fierke (2012) puts it, the closer one identifies with a person and/or an object, the lesser "political self-sacrifices" are deemed illogical by others. What matters most is that the people who live there think of the land as a part of themselves: "Divide it or share its control and you may as well hack off an arm or leg: what survives would be qualitatively different" (Toft 2006, 4).

This situation is particularly relevant in countries that have relatively young and fragile territorial borders due to their experience with colonialism. In many of these polities, ethnoreligious elites are often seen as custodians of "national" identity and homeland. Views about right and wrong, good and evil, are guided by different ethnoreligious substructures that are continuously being observed by members of the rival groups. Since belief systems are deeply ingrained into individual thought process and societal consciousness, when confronted with issues that question a person's or a group's "constitution of being as such," those who are at risk cannot afford to be too rational with their response (Kinnvall 2004). This makes ethnoreligious elites seem more credible and trustworthy than their political counterparts, giving their rhetoric more weight than secular political discourses. By acting as powerful norm and discourse entrepreneurs, they are able to transform themselves into "divine" authority figures that can influence even the political actors responsible for crafting the state's security superstructures (Karyotis and Patrikios 2010; Bosco 2014; Bilgin 2018).

This indicates that state elites cannot be simply politicizing ethnoreligious substructures in pursuit of their own interests since their conduct of politics and the political channels through which they operate are also infiltrated and constrained by these instruments. While they certainly have strategic interests in mind, it is also highly plausible for them to be driven by some genuine motivations. One cannot simply assume that the political elites do not believe in their group's ethnoreligious causes or that the ordinary people are just passive victims of elite predation. Even when they manipulate and exploit these ethnoreligious substructures, their constructions "become embedded in history, perception, and interpretation," which means that they also become "beholden to this constructed reality if they want to stay in power" (Toft 2003, 9). To this extent, the sacralization of indivisible ethnoreligious identities and homeland is also a two-way shared process.

The situation becomes more serious and pronounced in pluralistic polities where "national identity" is conflated with the ethnicity and religion of the majority. On the one hand, the majority's ethnoreligious myths and doctrines heavily inform the security rhetoric and policies being crafted by the state elites. On the other, the security strategies and institutions that state officials end up implementing further legitimize and entrench the norms and dogmas of the majority ethnoreligious cluster. Here, rather than constructing their own ethnoreligious group's interests, state elites represent them, making them "captive to the policies and discourses that helped them gain power" (Toft 2003, 140). Over time, the ethnoreligious substructures of the majority and the security superstructures developed from these become axiomatic components of nation-state building. This makes the existing order seem right and natural, one that must be preserved at all costs despite the systematic marginalization of the others. Oppositions against this arrangement are easily construed as rebellions against "God" and its "chosen people" and, therefore, are frequently addressed through the logic of "just wars" (see Elshtain 1992; Hassner 2007).

Explaining the Othering Causal Mechanism Using the IPT Method

To provide a detailed, within-case empirical analysis of how the manufacturing of ethnoreligious others as security threats plays out in an actual case, I use the theory-building process tracing method, particularly its interpretivist variant. When discussing the standards for ensuring reliable process tracing, emphasis has traditionally been placed on deductive styles of inquiry, Bayesian procedures for developing and testing hypotheses, and large-N studies. However, as Ludvig Norman (2015, 4–6) pointed out, these efforts "tend to exclude context sensitive modes of inquiry that characterize interpretive research," even when process tracing itself "is highly consonant with the interpretivist tradition of providing inductive and contextually thick accounts of meaning making, as well as attending to the dynamics of social institutions." Similar to conventional process tracing accounts, IPT operates by seeking explanations for certain outcomes. What distinguishes it, however, is its effort to combine the study of intersubjective meanings with causal explanations of particular outcome. Studying intersubjective social institutions as part of causal processes forces researchers adopting this method to be "attentive to mechanisms that capture non-intentional/[non-rational], habitual action, and the importance of social identities for such action" (Norman 2015, 4).

With IPT, social systems are understood via a research design that is intended to account for causal processes that lead to more clearly defined outcomes. As the application of IPT in this study reveals, the constitutive explanations produced and favored by interpretive research can be utilized to inform and illuminate how causal mechanisms generate specific outcomes. Accordingly, the point of interpretation is not only to gain "access to the conceptual world in which our subjects live" (Geertz 1973, 24), but to help "capture the processes through which such worlds change and how these changes condition the emergence of some social and political effects rather than others" (Norman 2015, 4). Instead of focusing exclusively on the interpretations of local meanings and practices through which social institutions are constituted, IPT supplies the missing causal explanations by combining interpretive and inductive techniques with more deductive methods. To this extent, IPT goes beyond the implicit discussion of causal forces at meta-theoretical level by placing causality front and center and within the scope of the actual investigation.

These methodological implications are particularly relevant in relation to the overarching assumptions binding much of interpretivist work: the malleability of identities as relational constructs and the multiple self-understandings possessed by social agents actualized in particular settings (Norman 2015; Parson 2017). How these relational and situational components of identities are activated and, in turn, influence social action can be examined as part and parcel of specific processes. The incorporation of interpretive techniques when conducting process tracing allows the researcher to investigate situations in which nascent identities, institutional roles, and practices are precipitated and induce individual/collective action. This particular feature of IPT helps resolve a major weakness in historical institutionalism and constructivist theorization: the disregard for sudden, unforeseen changes and episodes of institutional breakdown. The method overcomes the predilection toward explaining continuity and self-reinforcing dynamics of patterned social action by incorporating mechanisms rooted on non-intentional/non-rational, habitual, and

norm-driven actions that help elucidate how collective self-understandings emerge, the necessary conditions that activate them, and how these inform preferences, strategies, and actions (Norman 2015).

Because the agents' intersubjective meanings are at the core of causal mechanisms that explain continuity and change in social institutions, agency and intentionality are understood as emergent properties of the agents that need to be explained rather than assumed (Norman 2015). Identifying the mechanisms operating in particular cases in an interpretive manner necessitates explicit accounts of "how such structures play out at the level of agents, how they are reproduced and transformed in specific situations, and how such actions in turn generate particular macro-level outcomes" (Norman 2015, 6). As such, the approach complements rather than undermines structure-level theories given how "the effects of macro-level mechanisms are always mediated through individual behaviors and associated micro-level mechanisms" (Wight 2004, 296).

Finally, although process tracing is a single-case method, there is the possibility that the patterns detected and established within a specific context are also relevant and portable to other settings, especially when finding explanations for certain outcomes in those settings. In other words, the contextually generated findings of particular processes can be taken outside of their context of discovery to enable more generalizable inferences. This requires the complementary use of comparative method that will determine whether similar mechanisms might be operating in disparate cases (Norman 2015; Beach and Pedersen 2019). By doing this, the particularities of a convoluted process are shed off, while the essential components are defined in analytically more general terms.

Manufacturing the Ethnoreligious Others as Security Threats: The Case of Indonesia

For the purpose of this study, I am specifically examining the mechanistic evidences I gathered from my investigation of Muslim–Christian conflicts in Indonesia to uncover and explain the causal mechanisms underpinning the (re)construction of ethnoreligious others as security threats. Between 2017 and 2019, I conducted fieldwork in Indonesia, interviewing seventy local Muslims and Christians (elites and non-elites) belonging to different ethnic groups, while observing the dynamics and relations between them. Of its more than 271 million population, 87.2 percent belong to the Islamic faith (mostly Sunnis), and only 10 percent come from Christian denominations. Despite this, Islam is not a state religion. This decision is consistent with the *Pancasila* principles that provided the normative bases for Indonesia's post-independence constitution, namely a belief in one and only God, a just and civilized humanity, the unity of Indonesia, consultative democracy, and social justice for all Indonesians (Sofjan 2018). Notwithstanding the perceived effectiveness and success of this domestic arrangement, the relations between Muslim and Christian communities have not necessarily been smooth sailing as periodic violent conflicts similar to the ones witnessed in Maluku and North Maluku still erupt from time to time. Indeed, those who trumpeted Indonesia as a textbook case for ethnoreligious peace and stability have had difficulties explaining how such incidents could still occur.

As such, Indonesia offers a "natural laboratory" for examining the unexplored othering causal mechanism that triggers the onset of ethnoreligious conflicts. To do this, I investigate how things work by analyzing the empirical mechanistic evidences left by the activities of entities in each of the three phases of the othering mechanism. As mentioned earlier, to enable generalizations about this causal process beyond Indonesia, IPT requires the complementary use of comparative methods. However, due to the nature and complexity of the exercise and space constraints, instead, I provide a detailed illustration and an in-depth analysis of the Indonesian case to more accurately and realistically explain how the othering causal mechanism works. The lessons and insights derived from this case serve as important bases and offer vital clues for a holistic yet still nuanced and systematic understanding of the recurring cycles of violent ethnoreligious conflict in other pluralistic polities.

Cultivating the Indonesian Islamic (versus Othered Christian) Nationalism

Despite the perceived strength of secularism in Indonesia, distinctive types of ethnoreligious nationalism have always been integral to the conception and construction of "Indonesian" identity and homeland. The absence of other unifying vehicles such as language, history, or a profound awareness of a common territory made ethnicity and religion the binding forces that gave form and substance to the struggles toward imagining and constructing Indonesia, particularly during its nesting years (Liow 2016). The following discussions demonstrate how the causal mechanism of othering process in Phase 1 facilitated the chauvinistic cultivation of Islamic and Christian nationalisms that invariably generated hostile emotive effects (Proposition 1). Amid the presence of these competing ethnoreligious nationalisms, the structural changes that occurred throughout the country's history—from the Dutch colonization to the rise and fall of Suharto's New Order, all the way to the *reformasi* period and the present era—compelled the members of rival factions to adopt a survivalist, zero-sum security logic vis-à-vis their ideal identity and homeland.

More specifically, the mutual fear between the Muslim and Christian communities prepared them to satisfy safety concerns, their mutual hatred prepared them to act on historical grievances, their mutual resentment prepared them to address status/self-esteem discrepancies, and their mutual rage drove them to seek outlets for their frustrations. Together, these hostile emotions functioned as a switch that heightened the saliency and urgency of their main security concern: the illegitimate, different, and impure ethnoreligious others. My discussions with a former member of the *Jemaah Islamiyah* group responsible for the Bali terror attack in 2002 demonstrates how such episodes of structural shift (precipitated by combinations of rational, non-rational, and instrumental factors) initiated a process of cognitive–emotive sequence that ultimately drove his group to decisively tackle the source of their concern:

Cultivating the Indonesian Islamic (versus Othered Christian) Nationalism

Interview 1

In Indonesia, the Christians have become very powerful because of the many historical events that took place in our country … Even though Indonesia is a majority Muslim country, many of us are poor, do not have jobs, are not educated and do not have power … Indonesia has always been an Islamic nation. But because of the Dutch colonizers, the natural balance changed and now the Christians gained so much at the expense of the Muslims. I felt that we needed to correct the situation and restore the original balance of power between the Muslims and the Christians … Many of

us have resented the rights and privileges that the Christians have been enjoying at our expense … we hated how the Muslims were being portrayed as the bad guys … We feared that if we didn't act and do something to save Islam and protect our honor as Muslims … we would eventually be defeated even in our own homeland. We had no choice but to fight back to save the Muslims in Indonesia from the threat of western Christianization.

- Author's interview with a former *Jemaah Islamiyah* member (Jakarta, 18 August 2017).

Here, we see how certain types of emotion can serve as mechanisms for shifting individual/group motivation by mediating between cognition and desire. More specifically, it underscores how the hostile emotions cultivated from Islamic nationalism can rally the Muslims into actions against other forms of identity and versions of the homeland that are deemed to undermine and delegitimize their own existence. Such attempts at producing a homogeneous Muslim identity and composing a grand narrative of the Islamic homeland necessitate the suppression of all other sources of histories, memories, and allegiances. Indeed, by constructing and propagating emotional ideations and discourses about the Indonesian Muslims with respect to the othered Christians, Islamic nationalism facilitates the differentiation and delineation between legitimate and illegitimate personas, and between lawful and unlawful inhabitants.

The emotional weight and content of everyday interactions and exchanges among the elite and non-elite members of Muslim communities determine and direct their hostile attitudes and actions toward the target ethnoreligious group. To this end, Islamic nationalism provides the necessary affective vernaculars that the Muslim state and non-state actors routinely access and utilize to secure their preferred conception of Indonesian identity and homeland, particularly in times of structural changes. The emotional impacts of this Islamic nationalism on many Indonesian Muslims are clearly exemplified in my interviews with ordinary citizens:

Interview 2

My faith in Allah and in Islam is encoded in my genes. It runs in my blood. It is hard to understand it if you refuse to be a part of this grand vision and mission, but to put it simply, it is my reason for living. I live and breathe because of Allah, and my hope is that Allah is living through me … I know deep down in my heart that I am destined to be a Muslim here in Indonesia and nowhere else.

- Author's interview with a Muslim hotel staff (Yogyakarta, 23 October 2019)

Being an Indonesian Muslim is one of the greatest gifts that any human being can ever receive from Allah in this lifetime. To be born as a Muslim in Indonesia is a tremendous honor … We believe that it is only through Islam that we can find genuine love, peace and security. Islam is the core foundation of our being Indonesians. Without Islam to guide us, we cannot fulfil our duties and our responsibilities as Indonesians.

- Author's interview with a Muslim taxi driver (Yogyakarta, 23 October 2019)

I do not know what I will do with my life if I am not a Muslim. The thought of being a member of a different religion like Christianity makes me uncomfortable and insecure. Islam gives me peace of mind and security. It is through Islam that I am able to live a happy and meaningful life. It is what defines me as a person and as an Indonesian. Through Islam, I am able to love Indonesia even more.

- Author's interview with a Muslim housewife (Yogyakarta, 22 October 2019)

The universal applicability of Islamic nationalism, however, was substantially undercut by Christianity's successful expansion in the eastern parts of the country. In fact, by the time Indonesia gained its independence on August 17, 1945, the fledgling government was split between two polarized factions. One group wanted a nationalist, secular state, while the other fought for a traditional, conservative Islamic state. The mounting antipathy between the two sides exploded when the latter demanded that the preamble of the Indonesian Constitution (the Jakarta Charter) should read as follows: a Republic founded on the principles of the Belief in One God, with the obligation for adherents of Islam to practice Islamic law. The conservatives also insisted on inserting additional clauses that would make Islam the only official religion and require that the president be a native-born Indonesian who is a Muslim. A correspondence with a Muslim political scientist who studied this event confirmed that the Christian politicians had been hostile to these proposals and accused their Muslim counterparts of attempting to form an Islamic state designed to suppress the rights and status of the non-Muslims (author's interview 2017; see Arifianto 2009). Fueled by their grievances toward Javanese dominance and paranoia over the looming *Islamisasi* (Islamization), they lobbied clandestinely against the Jakarta Charter by warning of possible secessions of Eastern Indonesian regions with huge Christian populations (Liow 2016).

After intense deliberations, the Jakarta Charter was adopted without the *Shari'a* clause in an attempt to recognize the desire of conservative Muslims to erect an unambiguously Islamic nation-state without unravelling the territory of the newly formed republic. Despite this intention, the rejection of pro-Muslim clauses engendered a deep sense of betrayal on the part of Islamist nationalist groups. The more radical camps decried the direction and legitimacy of the new government and embarked on armed rebellion to pursue their aspiration to establish an Islamic Republic. Considering Islam's significant role in the nationalist movements that gave Indonesia and her people their freedom, one of the Muslim government officials I interviewed asserted that Islam deserved to have a special privilege and position in the constitution (author's interview 2017; see Arifianto 2009; Sofjan 2018). My dialogues with young professional Muslims underscore these deeply entrenched sentiments that have lasted for generations and still persist today:

Interview 3

I also often ask that question to myself, how I would feel if tomorrow I wake up and realize that the Christians have outnumbered the Muslims in Indonesia. My honest answer is that I would definitely feel threatened, betrayed and enraged … Having been educated, I do not necessarily believe those stereotypes about the Christians, I think a lot of them are decent and conscientious people. But I value my own faith and my community more than anything else, so the idea that the Christians might outnumber us if we do not keep them in check is unsettling and upsetting for me.

- Author's interview with a Muslim physician (Jakarta, 4 October 2019)

… I come from a family of freedom fighters and so I grew up listening to these stories about how my grandparents and great grandparents were betrayed by their Christian neighbors. This is why I still feel some of kind of animosity and resentment towards them even though it did not happen to me personally. I still remember the hurt in the eyes of my grandfather every time he would recount his experiences during that time … Maybe they will not admit it but

if given the chance, I think many Christians would still want to Christianize the whole Indonesia. That possibility always makes me suspicious towards them despite wanting to see them differently.

- Author's interview with a Muslim political party member (Jakarta, 4 October 2019)

Here, we see how the hostile emotions emanating from Islamic nationalism can induce the members of Muslim communities to rethink the state of being of the othered Christians and re-adjust their relationships with them accordingly. The chauvinistic beliefs that arise from the new conditions engendered by structural shifts ultimately trigger hostile communal emotions that prepare the members to physically and cognitively satisfy their pressing concerns and address the resulting situational challenges. In this case, while the cultivation and propagation of Islamic nationalism provides the Muslims with greater sense of security and control over their preferred version of identity and homeland, it also creates a corresponding level of insecurity on the part of the othered Christians (and vice versa). My interviews with a Christian and a Muslim elder who have survived and continue to live through the horrors of violent conflicts in Ambon neatly summarize the lingering hostile emotions of ethnoreligious nationalism being harbored by those who have been directly affected by the conflicts:

Interview 4

I will never forgive the barbaric Muslims who mutilated the bodies of my parents. My hatred for the Muslims transcends this world and I will carry it with me in the afterlife. Only my own death can take away the pain that I have to go through each day of my remaining years. I pray and pray but the anger and pain still remain in my heart … But what hurts even more is that I have to pretend that I am happy living with them and forget about seeking justice for my parents to protect my own family. I am afraid that by bringing up that past, the same tragedy will happen to my children and grandchildren.

- Author's interview with a Christian elderly (Jakarta, 12 August 2017)

… After the Christian rebels violated and tortured my Muslim brothers and sisters during the conflicts in Ambon which they started, I became convinced that they are nothing but pests. They are like locusts, they destroy everything that they touch and they are very greedy. This is the truth. But today you cannot say the truth about them in public … I do not fear them, I hate and resent them. When I see their church, I still feel the rage that I felt in my body twenty years ago when I saw the bodies of my family members.

- Author's interview with a Muslim elderly (Yogyakarta, 16 August 2017)

In sum, the examination of emotive mechanistic evidences (Phase 1) of othering process in Indonesia demonstrates how ethnoreligious nationalism generates the affective lexicon that the elite and non-elite agents jointly cultivate and utilize in initiating the othering of the target group, as well as in framing and legitimizing the appeals for group mobilization. The hostile emotions that crystallize through this process engender a collective view among the members of rival ethnoreligious communities that they are all responsible for the security and survival of their own ethnie and faith. Accordingly, devising an emotive language and discourse designed to revitalize and reinforce the foundations of their respective identities and homelands becomes a crucial part of their defense strategy against the existential threats being posed by the ethnoreligious others. In doing so, it establishes the "chosen glories" and "chosen traumas" that are eulogized, stories and symbols that are

venerated, and relationships and loyalties that are preserved (see Volkan 2009).

Securitizing the Othered Christian (versus Indonesian Muslim) Threat

During the course of Dutch colonialism, the eastern province of Maluku (comprised of central and southern Maluku islands) developed along a strikingly different course from the main Indonesian islands of Java and Sumatra. Christianity (in particular, Calvinism) was resolutely promoted by the colonial rulers and proliferated at a much faster pace here than in other East Indies provinces. Instead of resisting, the native Maluku people provided the Dutch colonial army with a large number of well-trained soldiers and even fought alongside their European colonizers against the Japanese military forces during the Second World War (Schulze 2002; Van Klinken 2007). The following discussions demonstrate how the causal mechanism of othering process in Phase 2 facilitated the chauvinistic securitization of the target group as threat to the referent group's security, power, and status (Proposition 2). Efforts by state and non-state elites to frame the perceived *Kristenisasi* (Christianization) or Islamization of all Indonesia as an existential threat against Muslim and Christian communities, respectively, were intended to resonate strongly with the hostile predispositions of their target audiences to elicit actions.

This involved the simultaneous imagination of the self and reimagination of the others as strangers and enemies, based on the prevailing prejudices and ideologies informed by the hostile emotive effects of Islamic and Christian nationalisms. The mass hostility, ethnocentric mobilization, and security dilemma caused by the securitization of ethnoreligious others justified the chauvinistic solutions deemed necessary for the protection of identities and homelands at stake: the resort to violent Muslim–Christian wars that claimed thousands of lives. Separate group discussions with some Javanese Muslims and Papuan Christians reveal how these predispositions fuel the securitization of ethnoreligious others, and provide important clues about how the constituencies actively participate and consent to this process:

Interview 5

You have to understand that here in Indonesia, Islam and politics cannot be separated. We believe that just policies need to be based on Islam … we believe that the Muslims need to be prioritized more because we face more problems and challenges even though we are the majority. Developing policies that help the Muslims is necessary in preserving our Muslim identity and the Islamic values of this nation. And you cannot help in securing Islam and the Muslim identity if you are a Christian … Although we understand the importance of Pancasila, however, it should not be used to undermine the primacy and centrality of Islam in the Indonesian society and politics.

- Author's group discussion with Javanese Muslims (Jakarta, 8 October 2019)

Being born and raised as Christians in Papua, we have experienced so much discrimination from our fellow Indonesians who are Muslims. Two of us here witnessed how the Indonesian army killed our parents and siblings … We are being unfairly treated and many try to make us feel that we are the inferior Indonesians. Like what our parents and grandparents told us, the worst threats to our security and freedom as Papuans are not the foreigners but those Indonesian Muslims who only think of Papua as a piece of land that they can exploit … This is why the Christian rebels in Papua believe that we should have our own sovereignty

and our own independent country … Although most Papuans do not agree with their methods or their ultimate goal, we know that they are fighting for us and the future generations. Many from our tribe give at least their moral support to the group.

- Author's group discussion with Papuan Christians (Yogyakarta, 18 October 2019)

This intergenerational securitization of the ethnoreligious others needs to be explained in relation to the pivotal historical events in Indonesia to understand the process through which social institutions break down and collapse, and through which conflicts ignite from previous stages of relative peace and harmony. Specifically, the events following the country's independence provide crucial insights on how the securitization of the out-group had overpowered and trumped the more inclusive and pacifist narratives that were also present at the time of the conflicts, and how the more dominant elites from the politically influential group of the day developed and rationalized the security superstructures that secured and legitimized their own identity and homeland at the expense of the weaker group.

Based on the testimony of a former Muslim politician, the facilitation of the New Order (1966–1998) initially gave the Christian and moderate Muslim elites (*abangan*) preferential treatment in government and bureaucratic posts, while limiting the positions available for conservative Islamic groups (*santri*) (author's interview 2017; see Schulze 2002). This sense of Muslim discrimination fueled "Christian threat" narratives that denounced the Christians' involvement with the state as yet another form of neocolonialism. The irony of having less political power and economic resources despite being the majority, according to a veteran Christian journalist who covered these events, amplified the enmity and resentment harbored by the *santri* against the Christian populations (author's interview 2017; see Hefner 2011). Some of these anti-Christian biases are captured clearly in the following excerpts from my interview with a Muslim member of a local conservative party:

Interview 6

For decades since our independence, the Christians have not really exerted much efforts in contributing to nation-building in Indonesia … And […] because they are not Muslims, they do not have genuine interest in integrating into the Indonesian society. So, we think that one of the most effective ways to integrate them is by convincing them to convert to Islam. In fact, I think that Indonesia will be a lot more united and peaceful if there is only one religion and that is Islam … The spread of Christianity in Indonesia broke our country apart. It was a foreign religion that was used by our enemies to divide and colonize us … How can they believe and accept a religion that was used by the foreigners like the Dutch to colonize and treat their Muslim brothers and sisters like slaves? We all know that the main reason why they converted to Christianity was to get more power and wealth.

- Author's interview with a Muslim conservative party member (Jakarta, 11 August 2017)

Here, we see how some of the securitizing agents responsible for framing certain targets as prime suspects consistently make symbolic appeals to the prevailing chauvinistic biases of their audiences vis-à-vis the others, in the hope of convincing them to accept the reality of these threats. The zero-sum nature of hostile symbolic predispositions on which these securitizing frames are anchored induces a condition akin to a security dilemma. Accordingly, conflicts of interests between rival factions are regularly depicted as struggles for group security, power, and status against the menacing, evil, and subhuman others. And with the consent of their constituents, chauvinistic solutions are proposed and adopted to decisively defeat these threats. This whole dynamic was highly evident during and after the dramatic reorientation of Suharto's New Order amid the unforeseen resurgence of Islam and the revival of Muslim faith. As observed by a Christian religious scholar, the government policies rolled out from the late-1980s until his regime's demise in 1998 were designed to accommodate the demands of conservative Muslims, particularly their concerns over the threat of Christianization (author's interview 2017; see Crouch 2007).

Among these was a joint decree between the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Ministry of Home Affairs requiring religious organizations wanting to build new places of worship to secure written permits from the former and the heads of local governments who were predominantly Muslims. Complementary decrees that limited the activities of foreign missionaries, specifically the conversions of current members of other state-recognized religions, were also issued. More importantly, Suharto began replacing his Christian government ministers, military officers, and other chief bureaucrats with well-known *santri* Muslims. Such adjustments, however, did not prevent the horrific scale of violence that erupted between the Muslim and Christian communities in Maluku and North Maluku, immediately after the collapse of the New Order. On the contrary, they helped justify the mutually aggressive, intolerant, and ethnocentric measures employed by both camps throughout the conflicts, as evidenced by the arrival of external militant groups that resulted in more radicalized Islamic narratives of *jihad* and Christian discourses of crusades (Schulze 2002; Sholeh 2007; Wilson 2008). The rampant use of sacred imageries and symbols by the combatants from both quarters—the sightings of angels on battle horses by Muslim militants and the apparitions of Jesus and Mary to Christian fighters—created a sense of an impending apocalypse that further aggravated the surrounding condition (Bubandt 2001).

Moreover, the fact that these events happened at the same time as the violent clashes between the Indonesian military and the majority Catholic demanding freedom unfolded in East Timor amplified the hostile emotions and predispositions that besieged the two communities. The Christian nationalists in Maluku used the extremely brutal methods employed by the state in East Timor as rationalizations for their wars against the Muslim enemies. Narratives about the government's lack of genuine interest in imaginatively incorporating the "natural Indonesianness" of Christians and Catholics became widespread among those who joined the struggles (Anderson 2001; Bertrand 2004). Conversely, the Islamic forces in Maluku used the perceived ingratitude and betrayal of the Christians as justifications for attacking them. Rhetoric about the stubborn resistance of Maluku Christians and Timorese Catholics to accept Muslim-defined law and order became prevalent within the Islamic faction (Anderson 2001; Bertrand 2004). The accounts given by a Muslim *ulama* and a former Christian missionary who followed these violent clashes underscore the impact of hostile symbolic predispositions on the framing of others as strangers and enemies and how this othering, in turn, destroyed the socio-institutional fabrics that had been woven through and underpinned *pela-gandong* for decades:

Interview 7

For me, the killings and murders of many innocent people in Maluku showed how much pain and suffering we cause to other people because of our hatred, jealousy and

negative biases towards them. We let our human nature overpower our human conscience. Instead of finding a common ground through our common humanity, the Muslims and the Christians decided to murder and kill each other like animals. Both sides used their ethnicity and religion to justify their brutal actions. Both claimed that Allah or God was on their side, fighting with them against their enemies. Both used their being Javanese or Moluccan to carry out and excuse their cruel actions against each other … Our stereotypes towards the members of other religions transformed us into heartless monsters … We only have our insecurities and our unwillingness to let go of our prejudices against the Christians and Muslims to blame.

- Author's interview with a Muslim *ulama* (Jakarta, 14 August 2017)

Witnessing the violent conflicts in Ambon and seeing how both the Muslims and Christians violated the sacredness of human life, made me question myself and my work as a Christian missionary. My mind was telling me to hate the Muslims because of their crimes against the innocent Christians … I thought that I had to work much harder and faster in evangelizing the people, thinking that Christianity would be the cure to the madness being perpetrated by the extremist Muslims. But my heart was telling me not to take sides […] and think of what Jesus would have done instead … If we do not learn how to tame our human nature, then we will just kill each other whenever we are confronted by people whom we see as threats to our own survival … That is exactly what happened in Maluku. People started to view and treat each other as enemies just like in the jungle.

- Author's interview with a former Christian missionary (Yogyakarta, 16 August 2017)

Here, we see how by marking specific targets as enemies, the securitizing agents from rival factions are able to project the blame on to each other. By tapping into their groups' hostile predispositions, they are able to construct credible frames that resonate strongly and clearly with their respective audiences, thereby persuading them about the reality of the threats being posed by the ethnoreligious others. The negative biases being held by the in-group toward the out-group amplify the feelings of threat that it experiences when dealing with the latter's suspicious behaviors. In this case, when faced with what seemed like an obvious threat, the Muslims' more positive biases toward the Christians have not deterred them from feeling threatened but only reinforced their underlying hostile predispositions toward the latter (and vice versa). In navigating these new realities that emerged through this securitization process, aggression, intolerance, and ethnocentrism have become regular features of Muslim–Christian relations. Separate interviews with Christian and Muslim participants from the eastern provinces of Indonesia (including Maluku, East Nusa Tenggara, Kalimantan, and Sulawesi) expose the enduring emotional side effects of these brutal fights and their impact on intergroup predispositions:

Interview 8

Since we became conscious that we are Christians and not Muslims, we became a lot more sensitive to the negative traits and images that the Muslims associate with us. We are traitors, we are bastards, we are parasites. When these words are repeated to you over and over again, you start to think that they are true. But the only truth that matters most to us is that those fanatic Muslims attacked our villages, burned them to the grounds and killed as many Christians as they wanted, while the Indonesian government just stood there watching … Because of that we find it extremely difficult to

build strong and genuine relations with the Muslims. … We do not even talk about these things […] but by not talking about it, our negative images and perceptions about each other will remain in our hearts and minds for a long time, maybe forever.

- Author's interview with some Christians from Eastern Indonesia (Yogyakarta, 23 October 2019)

The Christians are not the only victims in those violent battles … The way that some Christians tell the story of what happened in Ambon or in Halmahera is very offensive because the Muslims are not murderers. We do not kill people. Our religion teaches us to always be at peace with each other and respect all people, even if they are not Muslims. No Muslim wants to kill or be killed. It takes an extraordinary event to convince a Muslim to kill a person and what they did in Ambon and in Halmahera was self-defense. We were defending our rights as Muslims and natives of Maluku … After what happened between the Muslims and Christians, it is difficult to restore the same trust and friendship that we used to share with them … Although we do not talk about these feelings out in the open, the conflicts proved many of the negative views and perceptions that we have towards the Christians.

- Author's interview with some Muslims from Eastern Indonesia (Jakarta, 9 October 2019)

In sum, the examination of symbolic mechanistic evidences (Phase 2) of othering process in Indonesia illustrates how the securitization of ethnoreligious others as existential threats actively (re)constructs the prevailing realities of the security contexts underpinning a pluralistic polity. In the process, collective self-understandings and "communities of recognition" are (re)constituted and, in turn, alter group assessments about the "actual" threats and the "real" victims (see Ahmed 2000; Fierke 2012). The hostile symbolic predispositions that are used in framing certain target groups as strangers and enemies justify their systematic debasement and dehumanization. Their resulting image as dirty, despicable, and worthless nonhumans gives the members of the referent group the assurance that they are inherently different and superior than the others, thus allowing them to feel more secure and less anxious about the nature and state of their being (see Kinnvall 2004; Butler 2009). In strengthening their walls against the enemies from the outside while weeding out the impostors from within, chauvinistic solutions are deployed and defended until they become natural and permanent features of the given order.

Sacralizing the Indonesian Muslim (versus Othered Christian) Identity and Homeland

With the successful cultivation of Islamic nationalism and effective securitization of the Christian threat, the Muslim political and ethnoreligious elites were now better positioned to further solidify the legitimacy, authority, and primacy of their group, by sacralizing their claimed identity and homeland. They did this by systematically ensconcing their own ethnoreligious substructures into the construction and implementation of the Indonesian state's security superstructures, thereby seizing significant control and leverage these instruments. The following discussions demonstrate how the causal mechanism of othering process in Phase 3 facilitated the chauvinistic sacralization of ethnoreligious identities and homelands (Proposition 3). The hostile perceptions that these primary security referents were meant to be pure and indivisible compelled state and non-state elites from the competing factions to try to influence the nature and content of the state's security

superstructures by implanting their own ethnoreligious substructures into these instruments. Failure to do so significantly endangers the rights and space of an ethnoreligious group within a pluralistic polity. In this case, the relegation of Christian elites to the sidelines significantly curtailed not only their personal capacity but also the capacity of their group's ethnoreligious substructures to induce the security superstructures necessary for the propagation and protection of their ideal "Indonesian" identity and homeland. My dialogues with a Muslim community leader and a Christian religious adviser provide a glimpse of the precarity of losing access and control over these security superstructures:

Interview 9

To be a true Indonesian is to be a true Muslim. Period. Members of other religions can claim to be Indonesians but when one chooses another religion like Christianity, that person diminishes his value and right as an Indonesian … There is no way that a Christian can become a president of this Muslim nation … That is the natural order of things and it is a sacred order that cannot be broken … I was born a Muslim and will die a Muslim. And if I were to be born again, I would still choose to be a Muslim here in Indonesia and nowhere else because this place is Allah's place for us … The Christians were never on the Muslims' side. They always fought on the side of our foreign enemies … They should accept that Indonesia is for Allah … It is not Indonesia anymore if there are more Christians than Muslims.

- Author's interview with a Muslim community leader (Jakarta, 7 October 2019)

Even Christians have a place in this country. We are just as Indonesians as the Muslims. We should have the same rights and privileges as them but I do not think that we actually do just because we believe in the Bible instead of the Quran. We may not pray to the same God or worship in the same temples, but we are just as humans as they are … It is hurtful to be considered as second-class citizens or be treated as traitors because of our religion and the way that Indonesian history was written by the Muslims. But because I was born a Christian, I will die a Christian … If you ask me what I want to be if I were born again, I still want to be a Christian here in Indonesia because this is our home too, our own promised land … We become good Indonesians by being good Christians.

- Author's interview with a Christian religious adviser (Yogyakarta, 18 October 2019)

According to a Muslim politician who shared his experiences in local politics, the implementation of Decentralization Laws in 1999 by then president B. J. Habibi gave regency/city governments the authority to pass and implement regional regulations (the *perda*), except in those areas that remained exclusively under the ambit of the central government such as religion (author's interview 2017; see Crouch 2007; Tyson 2010). Due to the country's weak system of checks and balances, however, local officials were still able to develop and execute certain religious regulations, including those that were not recognized in the Indonesian legal system. While some of these instruments facilitated the full implementation of *Shari'a* system like the *Qanun* adopted in Aceh, others were designed to incorporate Islamic values when developing regional governance systems such as those implemented in West Java (Crouch 2007). Regulations intended to strengthen orthodox forms of local government by denoting *Shari'a* either as a part of or in addition to Muslim customary practices and traditions (the *adat*) like those found in West Sumatra were also passed (Tyson 2010). Discussions with Catholic and Christian members of an interfaith organization highlight how such Muslim-centric security superstructures curtail their right and freedom to practice their own faith and culture, thereby undermining their sense of and control over their own ethnoreligious identity and homeland:

Interview 10

Many foreigners think that in Indonesia, everyone is free to follow and practice their own religion because of the Pancasila. But if you ask me, Pancasila is not that effective … In many parts of Indonesia, we cannot build many churches because the local government will not give us permits […] they would say it might create conflicts. But for them, they can always build a mosque in a Catholic or a Christian village. That means that many Muslims do not want us to have equal religious rights … They can protect their territory from Christianity, but we cannot protect our territory from Islam. Even today, there are many conservative Muslims who hate seeing a Catholic church, that is why sometimes they burn them. I have encountered a lot of Muslims who like to mock Jesus and call the Bible stupid, but we can never mock Prophet Mohammed or call the Qur'an stupid.

- Author's interview with a Christian CSO member (Jakarta, 10 October 2019)

The government in our province makes it hard for us to show our devotion and faith to the Catholic Church. Sometimes we feel like we are committing crimes by attending mass on Sundays or whenever we are celebrating our feasts and other important events in our religion like Christmas and Lenten Season … In the eyes of the Muslims, especially the more conservative ones, we are offending Islam and are not respecting their feelings. Even simple things like cooking and eating pork sometimes becomes a source of dispute with our neighbors. They feel that they are being attacked when they smell pork being cooked. They think that because we eat pigs, we have the attitude of a pig. So, to them we are dirty and sinners … Even though I am proud of being a Catholic, sometimes I try to hide it because of the discrimination that many of us still experience today.

- Author's interview with a Christian CSO member (Jakarta, 10 October 2019)

When I was a younger I used to wonder if our lives would have been a lot better and more peaceful if we were not Catholics. Would I have been happier as a child if I was born in a Muslim family? […] I experienced so much bullying and verbal abuse not only from my classmates but also from some of my teachers. For example, when I decided to run for class president, my teacher told my classmates that a Catholic cannot be a leader for Muslims because I have different values and beliefs. Even though I was qualified and I was one of the top students, I did not get the chance to serve in the student council because I am Christian. That particular incident scarred me and made me question my worth as a Christian. Now that I am older, I still carry some of that shame.

- Author's interview with a Christian CSO member (Jakarta, 10 October 2019)

Here, we see how the injection of Islamic substructures into the state's security superstructures has justified the existing arrangement between Muslim and Christian communities as being right and natural despite the methodical marginalization of the latter. The oppositions launched by the Christians against this Muslim-centric arrangement are treated as security threats not only to the "national" identity and homeland but also to the general cohesion and integrity of the overarching Indonesian nation-state. With the reduction of the weaker ethnoreligious others into strangers and threats, chauvinistic just wars that are believed

to prevent the dirty and evil outsiders from contaminating the pure and holy insiders have been regularly employed and legitimized, particularly by members of the more powerful group. This was clearly manifested in the manner by which the elite and ordinary Muslims behaved throughout the duration of the Maluku conflicts.

The state had virtually passed on the tremendous responsibility of settling the conflicts in the hands of the warring enclaves, letting itself to be usurped and used by militant Islamist groups such as the *Laskar Jihad*. The group, according to a Christian civil society leader and a Muslim sociologist familiar with the events, justified its waging of *jihad* in Ambon as a humanitarian mission to save Maluku and its people from Christianity's deceptions and distorted doctrines by converting them back to Islam (author's interview 2017; see Schulze 2002). The goal was to reform the entire country into a *Shari'a*-ruled Islamic state using Ambon as a litmus test for assessing the strength of non-Muslim resistance and the response of the government and the Muslim population (Wilson 2008). Meanwhile, several high-ranking politicians in Jakarta saw the situation as an opportunity to enhance their own popular appeal and secure their position by exploiting Islam's political currency.

A Yogyakarta-based think tank consulted in the study argued that the rekindling of Islamic national identity among Indonesian Muslims made it extremely difficult for officials to publicly condemn, let alone stop the *mujahideen's* activities in Maluku (author's interview 2017; see Hasan 2002). Those who tried to facilitate peace talks between Muslims and Christians on the grounds of equality and mutual tolerance were accused of being infidels and Christian sympathizers. The political costs of being labeled as an anti-Muslim and, conversely, the rewards for supporting and condoning the Islamists forestalled any meaningful conflict resolution plan. Mainstream Muslim organizations also helped legitimize the presence of Islamic militants in Maluku by not challenging the latter's extremist ideologies (Schulze 2002). All this silence and inaction led to the perception among many ordinary Indonesian Muslims that without the Islamist groups in Maluku, the entire region would have been vulnerable to Christian attacks. My correspondence with officials from an Islamist political organization helps explain the gravity of the threat of losing one's claimed identity and homeland, and the sacrifices that one is willing to make to protect these:

Interview 11

When we found out that the *Jemaah Islamiyah* and *Laskar Jihad* had finally arrived in Ambon, I felt a sense of relief and pride because we knew that our fellow Muslims would never let them down. Without them, maybe all the Muslims in Maluku and North Maluku would have all been killed or forced to accept Christianity. We are not sure which is worse between the two. The event was certainly regrettable, but the faith and dignity of our fellow Muslims were at stake. We cannot just surrender our homes and our territories to the enemies … In fact, the Christians at that time asked for help from other Christian nations. They wanted other Christians and Catholics to fight for them like the crusaders back in the day … Their hostile actions against us called for *jihad*, and we were prepared to fight for our Muslim brothers and sisters.

- Author's correspondence with an Islamist political organization (1 September 2017)

I remember watching the news about the Christian attacks in Maluku and feeling really angry not only with the Christians for were killing hundreds and hundreds of Muslims, but also with the government because they were not doing enough to protect the Muslims. I was a university student then and the members of my student organization became very absorbed and we thought of travelling to Ambon to help our Muslim brothers in their fight … We could not understand how the government could let those infidels terrorize our people. Looking back, I realized that even though we did not fully appreciate the extent of the situation then, we were ready to sacrifice our lives if we were only given the chance … The annoying thing is how the Muslims are being called terrorists, but if you study the history of Maluku conflict without any bias, you would discover that the Christians were the real terrorists.

- Author's correspondence with an Islamist political organization (29 August 2017)

Indeed, the decentralization of Indonesian government following the breakdown of the New Order had exposed the Muslims' fears over Christian pressures on the basic premises of Indonesian identity and homeland, as well as their desire to renegotiate and reconfigure the latter's identity and homeland. Rather than providing equal rights and protection for the Maluku Christians, the democratization process created new institutions and channels for the re-Islamization of Indonesia at their expense. The electoral cost/value of Islam-centric religious regulations made it difficult for national and local politicians to revoke them. As violent conflicts began to assume and crystallize around ethnoreligious identities, secular scenarios turned sectarian and thwarted whatever semblance of hitherto harmony and co-existence that might have bound Muslim and Christian constituencies together (Bubandt 2001; Liow 2016). A continuation of my interview with a former *Jemaah Islamiyah* member captures the very essence of sacralizing this ethnoreligious identity and homeland:

Interview 12

There is this saying that I learned during my training years in Afghanistan: One man's terrorist, is another man's freedom fighter. I do not mean to justify extremist violence and the killings of innocent people, but it is very important for Muslims to learn the value of protecting our Islamic identity, our own ummah and our own faith from those who want to destroy and conquer us … In protecting our Muslim people and our lands, that requires sacrifices on our part. We need to forget about our own selves and sometimes even our own families to achieve victory for the followers and believers of Islam. I believe that we have a higher purpose in this life, and that is to bring peace to as many people as we can through Islam. In my case, I do this by learning and helping spread the true and correct words of Prophet Mohammed. Unfortunately, peace is not always easy. Sometimes we commit mistakes like I did, but if we sincerely ask for forgiveness from Allah, He will forgive us and give us another chance to remain and serve in His paradise.

- Author's interview with a former *Jemaah Islamiyah* member (Jakarta, 18 August 2017)

In sum, the examination of perceptual mechanistic evidences (Phase 3) of othering process in Indonesia reveals how the perceived intrinsic connections between identity and homeland, on the one hand, and security and survival, on the other hand, make just war a viable option for rival ethnoreligious groups. War and bloodshed are seen as regrettable, albeit necessary solutions for protecting the "pureness" of the identity and the "sacredness" of the homeland. Determining the legitimate daughters and sons of the soil then becomes a paramount issue that leads to symbolic rejection and social expulsion of the "ungrievable" ethnoreligious others into the zone of killing (see Ahmed 2000; Butler 2009; Kinnvall 2004). These myths about

chosenness, pureness, and sacredness rationalize both the ideologies of the "necessary" just wars and the methods for waging these wars in order to preserve "bodies that matter, ways of living that count as 'life,' lives worth protecting, lives worth saving, lives worth grieving" (Butler 1993, 16). The ultimate goal of these is to perfectly align a group's ethnoreligious identity and homeland together, where all accepted and proven members could "sing the same hymns, listen to the same gospel, share the same emotions, linked not only to each other but to the dead beneath their feet" (Ignatieff 1994, 95).

Conclusions

How does a once familiar and benign ethnoreligious community become a stranger and a threat? In finding answers to this question, I have developed a framework that captures and explains the underlying causal mechanisms through which this very first stage of ethnoreligious conflict gets set in motion and crystallized. Synthesizing logically interdependent theories and assumptions on security, religion, and nationalism, on the one hand, and emotions, symbolic predispositions, and perceptions, on the other hand, this othering framework consists of and proceeds in three interrelated phases.

First, the two-way shared cultivation of chauvinistic ethnoreligious nationalisms by elite and non-elite actors generates hostile emotive effects that induce rival groups within pluralistic polities to adopt a survivalist, zero-sum security logic vis-à-vis their identities and homelands (Proposition 1). Second, this survivalist, zero-sum security logic, in turn, motivates the relevant state and non-state elites to securitize the rival factions as existential threats to group security, power, and status using hostile symbolic predispositions informed by the hostile emotive effects of ethnoreligious nationalisms, and with the active participation and consent of their respective constituencies (Proposition 2). Third, with the successful cultivation of ethnoreligious nationalisms and effective securitization of ethnoreligious others, state and non-state elites consolidate their groups' legitimacy, authority, and primacy further by sacralizing their claimed ethnoreligious identities and homelands (Proposition 3).

As I have argued and demonstrated throughout the article, this othering process is the motor driving the social re-engineering of certain ethnoreligious communities into strangers and threats. Its three constitutive structures—which are simultaneously emitting and are being powered by emotions, symbolic predispositions, and perceptions—collectively function as a channel through which the existing relations and prevailing arrangements between the "legitimate" self and the "illegitimate" others are either reinforced or reconfigured. Accordingly, these invisible causal mechanisms are pivotal to reimagining the state of being and renegotiating the respective positions of all target ethnoreligious groups not only in Indonesia, but, as the framework will suggest, also in other pluralistic imagined communities across the world. Overall, the theoretical, methodological, and empirical insights drawn from the study help in broadening the range and deepening the subject of causal processes and mechanisms that are currently being studied in IR scholarship.

References

Åhäll, Linda. 2009. "Images, Popular Culture, Aesthetics, Emotions: The Future of International Politics?" *Political Perspectives* 3 (1): 1–44.

Åhäll, Linda, and Thomas Gregory, eds. 2015. *Emotions, Politics, and War*. London: Routledge.

Ahmed, Sara. 2000. *Strange Encounters: Embodied Others in Post-Coloniality*. Abingdon: Routledge.

_____. 2014. *The Cultural Politics of Emotion*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Anderson, Benedict. 1983. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. New York: Verso.

_____. 2001. "Imagining East Timor." Lusotopie. http://www.lusotopie.sciencespobordeaux.fr/anderson.pdf.

Anderson, Ben. 2010. "Morale and the Affective Geographies of the 'War on Terror'." *Cultural Geographies* 17 (2): 219–36.

Arifianto, Alexander. 2009. "Explaining the Cause of Muslim–Christian Conflicts in Indonesia: Tracing the Origins of Kristenisasi and Islamisasi." *Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations* 20 (1): 73–89.

Balcells, Laia. 2010. "Rivalry and Revenge: Violence Against Civilians in Conventional Civil Wars." *International Studies Quarterly* 54 (2): 291–313.

Beach, Derek, and Rasmus Pedersen. 2019. *Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Benford, Robert, and David Snow. 2000. "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment." *Annual Review of Sociology* 26 (1): 611–39.

Bertrand, Jacques. 2004. *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bilgin, Pinar. 2018. "Sacralisation: Defying the Politicisation of Security in Turkey." *European Review of International Studies* 5 (3): 94–114.

Bleiker, Roland, and Emma Hutchison. 2008. "Fear No More: Emotions and World Politics." *Review of International Studies* 34 (1): 115–35.

Bosco, Robert. 2014. *Securing the Sacred: Religion, National Security, and the Western State*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Bräuchler, Birgit. 2003. "Cyberidentities at War: Religion, Identity, and the Internet in the Moluccan Conflict." *Indonesia* 75: 123–51.

Brubaker, Rogers. 2012. "Religion and Nationalism: Four Approaches." *Nations and Nationalism* 18 (1): 2–20.

Bubandt, Nils. 2001. "Malukan Apocalypse: Themes in the Dynamics of Violence in Eastern Indonesia." In *Violence in Indonesia*, edited by Ingrid Wessel and Georgia Wimhöfer, 243246. Hamburg: Abera-Verlag.

_____. 2008. "Rumors, Pamphlets, and the Politics of Paranoia in Indonesia." *Journal of Asian Studies* 67 (3): 789–817.

Butler, Judith. 1993. *Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of 'Sex'*. New York: Routledge.

_____. 2009. *Frames of War: When Is Life Grievable?* London: Verso Books.

Collier, Paul. 2003. *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Crawford, Neta. 2014. "Institutionalizing Passion in World Politics: Fear and Empathy." *International Theory* 6 (3): 535–57.

Crouch, Melissa. 2007. "Regulating Places of Worship in Indonesia: Upholding Freedom of Religion for Religious Minorities." *Singapore Journal of Legal Studies* 1 (1): 96–116.

Elshtain, Jean, ed. 1992. *Just War Theory*. New York: New York University Press.

Eroukhmanoff, Clara. 2016 "A Critical Contribution to the 'Security–Religion' Nexus: Going Beyond the Analytical." *International Studies Review* 18 (2): 366–78.

Esteban, Joan, and Debraj Ray. 2011. "A Model of Ethnic Conflict." *Journal of the European Economic Association* 9 (3): 496–521.

Fattah, Khaled, and Karin Fierke. 2009. "A Clash of Emotions: The Politics of Humiliation and Political Violence in the Middle East." *European Journal of International Relations* 15 (1): 67–93.

Fearon, James, and David Laitin. 2000. "Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity." *International Organization* 54 (4): 845–77.

Fierke, Karin. 2009. "Agents of Death: The Structural Logic of Suicide Terrorism and Martyrdom." *International Theory* 1 (1): 155–184.

_____. 2012. *Political Self-Sacrifice: Agency, Body and Emotion in International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

_____. 2015. *Critical Approaches to International Security*. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.

Friedland, Roger. 2001. "Religious Nationalism and the Problem of Collective Representation." *Annual Review of Sociology* 27 (1): 125–52.

Geertz, Clifford. 1973. *The Interpretation of Cultures*. New York: Basic Books.

Hafez, Mohammed. 2006. "Rationality, Culture, and Structure in the Making of Suicide Bombers." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 29 (2): 165–85.

HALPERIN, ERAN. 2016. *Emotions in Conflict: Inhibitors and Facilitators of Peace Making*. New York: Routledge.

HAMEIRI, SHAHAR, AND LEE JONES. 2013. "The Politics and Governance of Non-Traditional Security." *International Studies Quarterly* 57 (3): 462–73.

HASAN, NOORHAIDI. 2002. "Faith and Politics: The Rise of the *Laskar Jihad* in the Era of Transition in Indonesia." *Indonesia* 73: 145–69.

HASSNER, RON. 2003. "To Halve and to Hold: Conflicts over Sacred Space and the Problem of Indivisibility." *Security Studies* 12 (4): 1–33.

_____. 2007. "Islamic Just War Theory and the Challenge of Sacred Space in Iraq." *Journal of International Affairs* 61 (1): 131–52.

HEFNER, ROBERT. 2011. *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

HOROWITZ, DONALD. 2000. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

HUTCHISON, EMMA, AND ROLAND BLEIKER. 2014. "Theorizing Emotions in World Politics." *International Theory* 6 (3): 491–514.

HUYSMANS, JEF. 2011. "What's in an Act? On Security Speech Acts and Little Security Nothings." *Security Dialogue* 42 (4–5): 371–83.

IGNATIEFF, MICHAEL. 1994. *Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism*. London: Vintage.

JOHNSON, DOMINIC, AND MONICA TOFT. 2014. "Grounds for War: The Evolution of Territorial Conflict." *International Security* 38 (3): 7–38.

JUERGENSMEYER, MARK. 1993. *The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

KALYVAS, STATHIS. 2003. "The Ontology of Political Violence: Action and Identity in Civil Wars." *Perspectives on Politics* 1 (3): 475–94.

KARYOTIS, GEORGIOS, AND STRATOS PATRIKIOS. 2010. "Religion, Securitization and Anti-Immigration Attitudes: The Case of Greece." *Journal of Peace Research* 47 (1): 43–57.

KAUFMAN, STUART. 2001. *Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War*. New York: Cornell University Press.

_____. 2006. "Symbolic Politics or Rational Choice? Testing Theories of Extreme Ethnic Violence." *International Security* 30 (4): 45–86.

_____. 2019. "War as Symbolic Politics." *International Studies Quarterly* 63 (3): 614–25.

KINNVALL, CATARINA. 2004. "Globalization and Religious Nationalism: Self, Identity, and the Search for Ontological Security." *Political Psychology* 25 (5): 741–67.

KOSCHUT, SIMON. 2016. "The Structure of Feeling—Emotion Culture and National Self-Sacrifice in World Politics." *Millennium* 45 (2): 174–92.

LIOW, JOSEPH. 2016. *Religion and Nationalism in Southeast Asia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

MARSDEN, LEE. 2019. *Religion and International Security*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

MCDONALD, MATT. 2008 "Securitization and the Construction of Security." *European Journal of International Relations* 14 (4): 563–87.

MELANDER, ERIK. 2009. "The Geography of Fear: Regional Ethnic Diversity, the Security Dilemma and Ethnic War." *European Journal of International Relations* 15 (1): 95–124.

MERCER, JONATHAN. 2010. "Emotional Beliefs." *International Organization* 64 (1): 1–31.

_____. 2014. "Feeling Like a State: Social Emotion and Identity." *International Theory* 6 (3): 515–35.

MONTALVO, JOSÉ, AND MARTA REYNAL-QUEROL. 2005. "Ethnic Polarization, Potential Conflict, and Civil Wars." *American Economic Review* 95 (3): 796–816.

MURDOCH, JAMES, AND TODD SANDLER. 2004. "Civil Wars and Economic Growth: Spatial Dispersion." *American Journal of Political Science* 48 (1): 138–51.

NORMAN, LUDVIG. 2015. "Interpretive Process Tracing and Causal Explanations." *Qualitative and Multi-Method Research* 13 (2): 4–9.

OREN, IDO, AND TY SOLOMON. 2015. "WMD, WMD, WMD: Securitisation Through Ritualised Incantation of Ambiguous Phrases," *Review of International Studies* 41 (2): 313–36.

PARSONS, CRAIG. 2017. "Constructivism and Interpretive Theory." In *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, edited by Vivien Lowndes, David Marsh and Gerry Stoker, 75–91. London: Red Globe Press.

PETERSEN, ROGER. 2002. *Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred, and Resentment in Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

_____. 2011. *Western Intervention in the Balkans: The Strategic Use of Emotion in Conflict*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

ROE, PAUL. 1999. "The Intrastate Security Dilemma: Ethnic Conflict as a Tragedy?" *Journal of Peace Research* 36 (2): 183–202.

ROSE, WILLIAM. 2000. "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict: Some New Hypotheses." *Security Studies* 9 (4): 1–51.

ROSS, ANDREW. 2013. *Mixed Emotions: Beyond Fear and Hatred in International Conflict*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

SASLEY, BRENT. 2011. "Theorizing States' Emotions." *International Studies Review* 13 (3): 452–76.

SCHULZE, KIRSTEN. 2002. "Laskar Jihad and the Conflict in Ambon." *The Brown Journal of World Affairs* 9 (1): 57–69.

SHOLEH, BADRUS. 2007. "Jihad in Maluku." In *A Handbook of Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia*, edited by Andrew Tan, 146–66. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.

SMITH, ANTHONY. 1998. *Nationalism and Modernism*. New York: Routledge.

_____. 2003. *Chosen Peoples: Sacred Sources of National Identity*. New York: Oxford University Press.

SNYDER, JACK, AND KAREN BALLENTINE. 1996. "Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas." *International Security* 21 (2): 5–40.

SOFJAN, DICKY. 2018. "Pancasila and the Dignity of Humankind." *International Journal of Interreligious and Intercultural Studies* 1 (1): 1–3.

SPOHN, WILLFRIED. 2003. "Multiple Modernity, Nationalism and Religion: A Global Perspective." *Current Sociology* 51 (3–4): 265–86.

TOFT, MONICA. 2003. *The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and the Indivisibility of Territory*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

_____. 2006. "Issue Indivisibility and Time Horizons as Rationalist Explanations for War." *Security Studies* 15 (1): 34–69.

TYSON, ADAM. 2010. *Decentralization and Adat Revivalism in Indonesia: The Politics of Becoming Indigenous*. London: Routledge.

VAN KLINKEN, GERRY. 2007. *Communal Violence and Democratization in Indonesia: Small Town Wars*. London: Routledge.

VAN RYTHOVEN, ERIC. 2015. "Learning to Feel, Learning to Fear? Emotions, Imaginaries, and Limits in the Politics of Securitization." *Security Dialogue* 46 (5): 458–75.

VOLKAN, VAMIK. 2009. "Large-Group Identity: 'Us and Them' Polarizations in the International Arena." *Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society* 14 (1): 4–15.

WALTER, BARBARA. 2004. "Does Conflict Beget Conflict? Explaining Recurring Civil War." *Journal of Peace Research* 41 (3): 371–88.

WESTEN, DREW. 2007. *The Political Brain: The Role of Emotion in Deciding the Fate of the Nation*. New York: Public Affairs.

WIEGAND, KRISTA EILEEN. 2011. *Enduring Territorial Disputes: Strategies of Bargaining, Coercive Diplomacy, and Settlement*. Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press.

WIGHT, COLIN. 2004. "Theorizing the Mechanisms of Conceptual and Semiotic Space." *Philosophy of the Social Sciences* 34 (2): 283–99.

WILLIAMS, MICHAEL. 2003. "Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics." *International Studies Quarterly* 47 (4): 511–31.

WILSON, CHRIS. 2008. *Ethno-Religious Violence in Indonesia: From Soil to God*. New York: Routledge.

WIMMER, ANDREAS. 2002. *Nationalist Exclusion and Ethnic Conflict: Shadows of Modernity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

WIMMER, ANDREAS, LARS-ERIK CEDERMAN, AND BRIAN MIN. 2009. "Ethnic Politics and Armed Conflict: A Configurational Analysis of a New Global Data Set." *American Sociological Review* 74 (2): 316–37.