# The political economy of AI: Who controls the means of prediction?

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Al and its social impact in the news

Why it's so damn hard to make Al fair and unbiased

Why artificial intelligence design must prioritize data privacy

What Does It Mean to Align AI With Human Values?

How to Build Accountability into Your Al

Why 'the future of Al is the future of work'

# Steps toward regulating Al

- European Union:
  - Council of the EU Press release 6 December 2022 10:20

# Artificial Intelligence Act: Council calls for promoting safe AI that respects fundamental rights

United States:

# BLUEPRINT FOR AN AI BILL OF RIGHTS

MAKING AUTOMATED SYSTEMS WORK FOR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

#### Introduction

- Concerns about the impact of AI:
  - Fairness, discrimination, and inequality.
  - Privacy, data property rights, and data governance.
  - Value alignment and the impending robot apocalypse.
  - Explainability and accountability.
  - Automation and wage inequality.
- Efforts to regulate AI.
- How can we think systematically about these questions?

Kasy, M. (2023). The political economy of AI: Towards democratic control of the means of prediction.

# Key arguments

- 1. Al systems maximize a single, measurable objective.
- 2. In society, different individuals have different objectives. Al systems generate winners and losers.
- 3. Society-level assessments of AI require trading off individual gains and losses.
- Al requires democratic control of algorithms, data, and computational infrastructure, to align algorithm objectives and social welfare.

## Al is automated decisionmaking

• Al systems maximize measurable objectives:

Russell and Norvig (2016), chapter 2:

For each possible percept sequence, a rational agent should select an action that is expected to maximize its performance measure, given the evidence provided by the percept sequence and whatever built-in knowledge the agent has.

- Leading approach: Machine learning (ML):
  - Supervised learning. I(g(X), Y)
  - 2. Targeted treatment assignment.  $h(X) \cdot Y$

 $O(X_i, W_i) = E[Y_i + O(X_{i+1}, W_{i+1})|X_i, W_i]$ 

3. Multi-armed bandits.  $\sum_{t=1}^{T} Y_t$ 

#### Social welfare

Common presumption for many theories of justice:

- Normative statements about society are based on statements about individual welfare
- Formally:
  - Individuals  $i = 1, \dots, n$ .
  - Individual i's welfare  $v_i$ .
  - Social welfare is a function of individuals' welfare

$$F(v_1,\ldots,v_n).$$

# Agents of change

- How do we ensure that the objectives maximized by Al align with maximizing social welfare  $F(v_1, ..., v_n)$ ?
- Which agents have the interests, the values, and the capacity, to move technology and policy?
- Voluntary ethical behavior by corporate managers and engineers?
- Economics: Corporations are primarily profit maximizing.
  Profit maximization might not be aligned with social welfare maximization.
- Democratic control is necessary.
  Those affected by AI decisions need to have effective control over the objectives that are maximized.

# Using this framework to discuss the social impact of Al

STANDARD PERSPECTIVE

ALTERNATE PERSPECTIVE

### Fairness, discrimination, and inequality

Deviation from profit maximization Impact on social welfare

#### Privacy, data property rights, and data governance

Individual property rights Data externalities and democratic governance

## Value alignment and the impending robot apocalypse

Man vs. machine Corporate vs. social interests

#### **Explainability and accountability**

Individual recourse Public debate over objectives

#### Automation and wage inequality

# Thank you!