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Fields

Research: Microeconomic Theory
 Teaching: Applied Microeconomics, Industrial Organization, Microeconomic Theory

Education

Ph.D., Economics, Northwestern University (anticipated) 2023
 Committee: Asher Wolinsky (Chair), Wojciech Olszewski, Bruno Strulovici
 B.A., Mathematics and Economics, Williams College 2017

Fellowships & Awards

Dissertation University Fellowship, Northwestern University 2022–2023
 Carl Van Dyne Prize 2017
 Sentinels Fellowship 2015

Teaching Experience

Teaching Assistant, Northwestern University 2018–Present
 Intro to Microeconomics, Introduction to Applied Econometrics, Natural Resource Economics, Economics of Education, Marketing Analytics (Kellogg), Business Strategy (Kellogg), Programming (Kellogg)
 Teaching Assistant, Williams College 2015–2016
 Intro to Development Economics, Probability

Research Experience

Research Assistant, Ivan A. Canay, Northwestern University 2021

Conferences

Conference on “Contests: Theory and Evidence”

Refereeing

American Economic Review, Economics Letters, Review of Economic Design, Journal of Open Source Software

Job Market Paper**“Robust Regulation of Wages and Hours”**

Abstract: When workers’ hours and wages are bargained jointly, workers may not receive their preferred hours for their wage. This paper studies labor market regulation when it is known that workers prefer to work fewer hours (are overworked), but specific knowledge of production, labor disutility, and bargaining protocol is absent. We show that for a large class of bargaining protocols, there is regulation that robustly increases worker utility without sacrificing total surplus. We use this model to motivate the 1938 Fair Labor Standards Act.

Other Papers**“Asymmetric All-Pay Contests with Spillovers”** with Maria Betto
R&R at Theoretical Economics, 2022

Abstract: When opposing parties compete for a prize, the sunk effort players exert during the conflict can affect the value of the winner’s reward. These *spillovers* can have substantial influence on the equilibrium behavior of participants in applications such as lobbying, warfare, labor tournaments, marketing, and R&D races. To understand this influence, we study a general class of asymmetric, two-player all-pay contests where we allow for

spillovers in each player's reward. The link between participants' efforts and rewards yields novel effects – in particular, players with higher costs and lower values than their opponent sometimes extract larger payoffs.

“Choice over Assessments” with Maria Betto

Abstract: There are many settings where agents with differing types choose among assessments that attempt to measure these types. For example, students may take either the SAT or ACT. Bond issuers may choose between the three main rating agencies. Assessments that provide higher ratings are obviously preferable to all agents. Preferences over risk are less obvious. Intuitively, low types prefer less accurate assessments because they can benefit more from mistakes. High types prefer more accurate assessments because they benefit from an accurate description of their type. We propose a condition on the assessments that ensures agents will choose them in an assortative manner. If the assessments have only two scores, this condition implies Blackwell's informativeness criterion. However, this does not hold with three or more scores. When the assessments give the same unconditional distribution of scores, our condition implies the concordance order. We extend the analysis to repeated testing and mechanism design. We show that a principal can use menus of garbled assessments to improve the informativeness of high scores.

“Covert Discrimination and Self-promotion”

Abstract: Agents with similar skill may differ in their ability to self-promote. We consider the problem of a manager who uses an efficient, anonymous contest to extract effort from equally productive workers who differ in their ability to win the contest. If the prize is fixed, it is often possible to discriminate against the stronger player despite anonymity. However, full surplus extraction is not typically possible. If the designer can endogenize the prize, full surplus extraction is possible in an all-pay auction as long as a single-crossing condition is met. In the optimal contest, the worker with the better self-promotion technology is endogenously offered a lower expected prize. Because the contest is anonymous, this discrimination is *covert*.

“Note on Symmetric Contest Design”

Abstract: We show that any efficient two-player symmetric allocation rule between risk neutral, heterogeneous players generates weakly less revenue than one of two contests. The revenue maximizing symmetric, efficient contest is an all-pay auction with bid caps when heterogeneity is low and a difference form contest when heterogeneity is high. If the contest may be either inefficient or asymmetric, even at a single point, full surplus extraction is possible.

Languages

English (native)

References

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