

	Placement Director: Professor Alessandro Pavan 847-491-8266 <a href="mailto:alepavan@northwestern.edu">alepavan@northwestern.edu</a> Placement Administrator: Lola Ittner 847-491-8200 <a href="mailto:econjobmarket@northwestern.edu">econjobmarket@northwestern.edu</a>
<b>Contact Information</b>	Department of Economics Northwestern University 2211 Campus Drive Evanston, IL 60208 Mobile: 646-491-0173 <a href="mailto:mthomas@u.northwestern.edu">mthomas@u.northwestern.edu</a> <a href="http://www.sites.northwestern.edu/mtp3384">www.sites.northwestern.edu/mtp3384</a> Citizenship: United States
<b>Fields</b>	Research: Microeconomic Theory Teaching: Applied Microeconomics, Industrial Organization, Microeconomic Theory
<b>Education</b>	Ph.D., Economics, Northwestern University (anticipated) 2023 Committee: Asher Wolinsky (Chair), Wojciech Olszewski, Bruno Strulovici B.A., Mathematics and Economics, Williams College 2017
<b>Fellowships &amp; Awards</b>	Dissertation University Fellowship, Northwestern University 2022–2023 Carl Van Dyne Prize 2017 Sentinels Fellowship 2015
<b>Teaching Experience</b>	Teaching Assistant, Northwestern University 2018–Present Intro to Microeconomics, Introduction to Applied Econometrics, Natural Resource Economics, Economics of Education, Marketing Analytics (Kellogg), Business Strategy (Kellogg), Programming (Kellogg) Teaching Assistant, Williams College 2015–2016 Intro to Development Economics, Probability
<b>Research Experience</b>	Research Assistant, Ivan A. Canay, Northwestern University 2021
<b>Conferences</b>	Conference on “Contests: Theory and Evidence”
<b>Refereeing</b>	American Economic Review, Economics Letters, Journal of Open Source Software, Review of Economic Design
<b>Job Market Paper</b>	<b>“Robust Regulation of Wages and Hours”</b> <i>Abstract:</i> When workers’ hours and wages are bargained jointly, workers may not receive their preferred hours for their wage. This paper studies labor market regulation when it is known that workers prefer to work fewer hours (are overworked), but specific knowledge of production, labor disutility, and bargaining protocol is absent. We show that for a large class of bargaining protocols, there is regulation that robustly increases worker utility without sacrificing total surplus. We use this model to motivate the 1938 Fair Labor Standards Act.
<b>Other Papers</b>	<b>“Asymmetric All-Pay Contests with Spillovers”</b> with Maria Betto <i>Abstract:</i> When opposing parties compete for a prize, the sunk effort players exert during the conflict can affect the value of the winner’s reward. These <i>spillovers</i> can have substantial influence on the equilibrium behavior of participants in applications such as lobbying, warfare, labor tournaments, marketing, and R&D races. To understand this influence, we study a general class of asymmetric, two-player all-pay contests where we allow for spillovers in each player’s reward. The link between participants’ efforts and rewards yields

novel effects – in particular, players with higher costs and lower values than their opponent sometimes extract larger payoffs.

**“Choice over Assessments”** with Maria Betto

*Abstract:* There are many settings where agents with differing types choose among assessments that attempt to measure these types. For example, students may take either the SAT or ACT. Bond issuers may choose between the three main rating agencies. Assessments that provide higher ratings are obviously preferable to all agents. Preferences over risk are less obvious. Intuitively, low types prefer less accurate assessments because they can benefit more from mistakes. High types prefer more accurate assessments because they benefit from an accurate description of their type. We propose a condition on the assessments that ensures agents will choose them in an assortative manner. If the assessments have only two scores, this condition implies Blackwell’s informativeness criterion. However, this does not hold with three or more scores. When the assessments give the same unconditional distribution of scores, our condition implies the concordance order. We extend the analysis to repeated testing and mechanism design. We show that a principal can use menus of garbled assessments to increase assessment accuracy for high types.

**“Covert Discrimination in All-pay Contests”**

*Abstract:* Agents with similar skill may differ in their ability to self-promote. We consider the problem of a contest designer who intends to motivate equally productive workers who differ in their ability to win the contest. Full surplus extraction is always possible if the contest can be “unfair” in the sense that it (1) is not anonymous or (2) sometimes fails to award the prize. If the prize is fixed, the optimal contest is an all-pay auction with bid caps. If the designer is allowed to make the prize endogenous, full surplus extraction is possible in an all-pay auction so long as the marginal self-promotion abilities are not fully ranked. In the optimal contest, the player with the better self promotion technology is endogenously offered a lower prize in expectation. Because the contest is symmetric, this discrimination is *covert*.

**Languages**

English (native)

**References**

Professor Asher Wolinsky  
Department of Economics  
Northwestern University  
2211 Campus Drive  
Evanston, IL 60208  
847.491.4415  
[a-wolinsky@northwestern.edu](mailto:a-wolinsky@northwestern.edu)

Professor Wojciech Olszewski  
Department of Economics  
Northwestern University  
2211 Campus Drive  
Evanston, IL 60208  
847.491.8482  
[wo@kellogg.northwestern.edu](mailto:wo@kellogg.northwestern.edu)

Professor Bruno Strulovici  
Department of Economics  
Northwestern University  
2211 Campus Drive  
Evanston, IL 60208  
847.491.8233  
[b-strulovici@northwestern.edu](mailto:b-strulovici@northwestern.edu)