

The Fed-BioMed Project

Federated Learning Across Health Institutions in France

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IA in Healthcare need for large data repositories

SCIENCES • SANTÉ

—
TRIBUNE
Collectif

Partage



« Les données de santé servent l'intérêt public, il y a urgence à en faciliter l'accès »

Le retard pris dans le déploiement du Health Data Hub, infrastructure unique facilitant l'accès aux données de santé de façon sécurisée, est inquiétant, affirment les membres de son conseil scientifique consultatif dans une tribune au « Monde ».

Publié hier à 06h30, mis à jour hier à 07h20 | ⏱ Lecture 4 min.

Article réservé aux abonnés

Le Monde, 20/10/2021



Access and sharing of multiple centers data falls into General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR): Privacy, confidentiality, security, ...

The impact of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) on artificial intelligence



European Parliament

<https://bit.ly/3IyJFg7>

AI is not explicitly mentioned in the GDPR, but many provisions in the GDPR are relevant to AI, and some are indeed challenged by the new ways of processing personal data that are enabled by AI

- Ethical principles include autonomy, prevention of harm, fairness and explicability;
- legal principles (EU rights and social values, in the EU treaties, national constitutions).

The impact of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) on artificial intelligence



European Parliament

<https://bit.ly/3IyJFg7>

Purpose limitation

Compatible with AI and big data, through a flexible application of the idea of compatibility, which allows for the reuse of personal data

Data minimisation

Reducing, through measures such as pseudonymisation, the ease with which the data can be connected to individuals. Re-identification should indeed be strictly prohibited unless all conditions for the lawful collection of personal data are met.

Preventive measures

It needs to be clarified which AI applications present high risks and therefore require a preventive data protection assessment, and possibly the preventive involvement of data protection authorities.


The impact of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) on artificial intelligence



The inference of new personal data, as it is done in profiling, should be considered as creation of new personal data, when providing an input for making assessments and decisions. The same should apply to the re-identification of anonymous or pseudonymous data.



The risk with pseudo-anonymization



The impact of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) on artificial intelligence



European Parliament

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
Cambridge Analytica: how 50m Facebook records were hijacked

1
Approx. 320,000 US voters ('seeders') were paid \$2-5 to take a detailed personality/political test that required them to log in with their Facebook account

2
The app also collected data such as likes and personal information from the test-taker's Facebook account ...

3
The personality quiz results were paired with their Facebook data - such as likes - to seek out psychological patterns


4
Algorithms combined the data with other sources such as voter records to create a superior set of records (initially 2m people in 11 key states*), with hundreds of data points per person




These individuals could then be targeted with highly personalised advertising based on their personality data

Guardian graphic. *Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Louisiana, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina, West Virginia


A centralized paradigm?




Problem:
Developing AI requires
data access




The federated paradigm




Federated linear modeling




Federated linear modeling




Federated linear modeling



Federated Learning for Collaborative Data Science



From Ng et al, Quant Imaging Med Surg, 2021;



PubMed query “federated learning”
June 6th 2021


Table 1

Summary of recent work on federated learning for healthcare

| Problem | ML method | No. of clients | Data |
|--|-----------------|----------------|---|
| Patient similarity learning [62] | Hashing | 3 | MIMIC-III [50] |
| Patient similarity learning [108] | Hashing | 20 | MIMIC-III |
| Phenotyping [55] | TF | 1–5 | MIMIC-III, UCSD [104] |
| Phenotyping [67] | NLP | 10 | MIMIC-III |
| Representation learning [93] | PCA | 10–100 | ADNI, UK Biobank, PPMI, MIRIAD |
| Mortality prediction [45] | Autoencoder | 5–50 | eICU Collaborative Research Database [81] |
| Hospitalization prediction [10] | SVM | 5, 10 | Boston Medical Center |
| Preterm-birth prediction [2] | RNN | 50 | Cerner Health Facts |
| Mortality prediction [80] | LR, NN | 31 | eICU Collaborative Research Database |
| Mortality prediction [90] | LR, MLP | 2 | MIMIC-III |
| Activity recognition [16] | CNN | 5 | UCI Smartphone [4] |
| Adverse drug reactions Prediction [19, 20] | SVM, MLP, LR | 10 | LCED, MIMIC |
| Arrhythmia detection [110] | NN | 16, 32, 64 | PhysioNet Dataset [21] |
| Disease prediction [33] | NN | 5, 10 | Pima Indians Diabetes Dataset [95], Cleveland Heart Disease Database [23] |
| Imaging data analysis | VAE | 4 | MNIST, Brain Imaging Data |
| Mortality prediction [101] | LRR, MLP, LASSO | 5 | Mount Sinai COVID-19 Dataset |

From Xu et al. J Healthc Inform Res. 2020

Translation of Collaborative Medical Data Analysis



(some) Open FL software initiatives



Cointstac
coinstac.org



PySyft
github.com/OpenMined/PySyft



Flower
flower.dev



LEAF
leaf.cmu.edu



Tensor Flow Federated
www.tensorflow.org/federated




FedML
github.com/FedML-AI

FL Software Requirements and Challenges

- Lack of standards
- Scalability
- Portability
- Generalization to multiple ML frameworks
- Security
- Open technology
- Support for medical data analysis

OpenFL (Intel), IBM FL, NVFlare (NVIDIA), ...



Fed-BioMed

fedbiomed.gitlabpages.inria.fr

Funded by



3iA Côte d'Azur
Institut interdisciplinaire
d'intelligence artificielle



Support from
Inria National Plan for Artificial Intelligence
and
Accenture Labs Sophia Antipolis




LE GRAND PLAN
D'INVESTISSEMENT



Tailored for AI applications in healthcare

Simplified model development and deployment
Security and compatibility with hospital networks
Security/Governance

Framework architecture



Platform- and model- agnostic



FL Design choices: From research to real-life



Researchers


- Flexible experimentation environment
- Launching different experiment easily
- Control over experiment parameters
- Real-time feedback



Clients/Data owners

- Constraints
- Approval of an experiment
- Overwriting requests
- Privacy


Training Plan



- Managing training through parameters/arguments
- Multiple models and multiple experiments
- Allowing preprocessing
- Monitoring training/testing in real-time

A typical FL Strategy
(e.g. Fed-Avg, Fed-Prox, Scaffold)

- Pre-processing needed
- Privacy model
- Model to be deployed
- Quantities to aggregate
- Client sampling rule



Privilege to overwrite requests

Researcher



training/model/optimizer arguments
number of rounds
batch size
arguments specific to method
DP parameters


Client



allowed max rounds of training
force GPU/CPU usage
allowed number of samples
force private DP parameters


FL subject to dynamically changing conditions

Handling Heterogeneity



Generally limited interoperability with hospital database
Requires available local knowledge
Data preparation is time consuming

- System Interoperability, interface with PACS
- Standardization
- Handling Errors



FL Security






FIGURE 1. The lifecycle of FL process and the various sources of vulnerabilities.

From Bouacida et al. IEEE Access 2021

Low-level: Data Flow



Low-level: VPN



Protecting communications from
- External attackers
- Internal attackers (man-in-the-middle)

Control

A piece of software is going to be executed on the client where private data is stored



```
import torch
from fedblomed.common.training_plan import TorchTrainingPlan
from fedblomed.common.data import DataManager
from torchvision import datasets, transforms

# Here we define the model to be used,
# You can use any class name (here 'Net')
class MyTrainingPlan(TorchTrainingPlan):
    def __init__(self):
        super(MyTrainingPlan, self).__init__()
        self.conv1 = nn.Conv2d(1, 32, 3, 1)
        self.conv2 = nn.Conv2d(32, 64, 3, 1)
        self.dropout1 = nn.Dropout(0.25)
        self.dropout2 = nn.Dropout(0.5)
        self.fc1 = nn.Linear(9216, 128)
        self.fc2 = nn.Linear(128, 10)

        # Here we define the custom dependencies that will be needed by our custom Dataloader
        # It's important to inherit the torch DataLoader classes
        # Since we will train on MNIST, we need datasets and transform from torchvision
        deps = ["from torchvision import datasets, transforms"]
        self.add_dependency(deps)

    def forward(self, x):
        x = self.conv1(x)
        x = F.relu(x)
        x = self.conv2(x)
        x = F.relu(x)
        x = F.max_pool2d(x, 2)
        x = self.dropout1(x)
        x = torch.flatten(x, 1)
        x = self.fc1(x)
        x = F.relu(x)
        x = self.dropout2(x)
        x = self.fc2(x)

        output = F.log_softmax(x, dim=1)
        return output

    def training_data(self, batch_size=48):
        dataset = datasets.MNIST(root='./mnist', train=True, download=True, transform=transforms.Compose([transforms.ToTensor(),
            transforms.Normalize((0.1307,), (0.3088,))]))
        dataset = DataManager(dataset, batch_size=batch_size, shuffle=True)
        train_loader = torch.utils.data.DataLoader(dataset, batch_size=batch_size, shuffle=True)
        return DataManager(train_loader, **train_kwargs)

    def training_step(self, data, target):
        output = self.forward(data)
        loss = torch.nn.functional.nll_loss(output, target)
        return loss
```




FL code reviewer expert in:

-
- data science
 - programming
 - security
 - networking

ML-Level: Differential Privacy


<https://bit.ly/3IKJh4F>
from desfontain.es

The attacker knows *almost all elements*
Identifying the contribution of a single person



Dwork, Cynthia, and Aaron Roth. "The algorithmic foundations of differential privacy", 2014


ML-Level: Differential Privacy



Noise is added to the model parameters
before sharing with the server

ML-Level: Homomorphic Encryption

Encrypting the data compatibly with mathematical operations




Rivest, R. L., et al, On data banks and privacy homomorphisms, 1978

Gentry, C. A *fully homomorphic encryption scheme*. 2009

Yagisawa, M. Fully homomorphic encryption without bootstrapping. 2015


ML-Level: Multi-Party Computation

Encrypting the data compatibly with mathematical operations



$$3 = 10 - 7$$

$$5 = 1 + 4$$




Diffie et al. New directions in cryptography, 1976

Shamir et al. How to share a secret. 1979


Yao et al. How to generate and exchange secrets. 1986

ML-Level: Secure Aggregation



From Mansouri, Önen, Jaballah, Proc ACM Conference. 2017

Challenges



DP

Utility vs Security

Data dependency

Communication and acceptance of DP

Secure Aggregation

Guarantees on trusted parties within FL network

Multi-key frameworks, key generation

Communication Cost

Computational cost


Limited operations

Privacy Tailored to Medical Applications

Privacy Preserving Medical Image Registration


$$\text{SSD}(I, J, \mathbf{p}) = \operatorname{argmin}_{\mathbf{p}} \sum_{\mathbf{x}} \left[I(\mathbf{W}_p(\mathbf{x})) - J(\mathbf{x}) \right]^2$$

$$\Delta \mathbf{p} = H^{-1} \cdot \sum_{\mathbf{x}} S(\mathbf{x}) \cdot (I(\mathbf{W}_p(\mathbf{x})) - J(\mathbf{x}))$$



(a) Multi Party Computation

(b) Fully Homomorphic Encryption







Ethical and Legal Questions


- Who controls FL execution
- Responsibilities for security breach
- Who owns a FL infrastructure
- Who owns the results
- Reward scheme
- Exploitation of model and results
- Right to be forgotten: machine unlearning

Cost-Effectiveness



<https://github.com/owkin/FLamby>





Fed-BioMed

Federated Learning for Healthcare



<https://fedbiomed.gitlabpages.inria.fr/>

Security

- Clients authentication
- Secured communications
- Model verification
- Differential Privacy
- Secure aggregation (coming release)

Client control / Governance

- Experiment opt-in / -out
- Monitoring Tools
- Data verification/ pre-processing
- GUI
- Handling heterogeneous data types

Usability

- Numpy/Pytorch/MONAI/sklearn compatible
- Easy control with Jupyter notebook
- Breakpoints and control of experiment
- Error handling
- FL aggregation and sampling strategies
- FL simulator

Community-driven

- Roadmap inspired by collaborating hospitals
- Long term planning and institutional support
- Commercial-friendly license (Apache 2.0)

Supported by






Clinical Coordinator


3IA chair Prof. O. Humbert
Centre Antoine Lacassagne

Real-world deployment

18 FDG-PET Analysis for Predicting Treatment Response in Lung Cancer



Humbert et al. Eur J Nucl Med Mol Imaging. 2020



Multi-centric Neuroimaging Studies


Table 1. Demographics for each of the centers sharing brain-imaging data. MCI: Mild Cognitive Impairment; AD: Alzheimer's Disease.

| | France | US | UK | France 2 |
|------------------------------|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|------------|-----------|
| No. of participants (M/F) | 1 / 353 | 454 / 362 | 1070 / 930 | 573 / 780 |
| Clinical status | | | | |
| No. healthy | 175 | 816 | 2000 | 695 |
| No. MCI and AD | 621 | 0 | 0 | 358 |
| Age \pm sd (range) [years] | 73.74 \pm 7.23 [28.72 \pm 3.70] | 63.93 \pm 7.49 [67.58 \pm 10.04] | | |
| Age range [years] | 54 - 91 | 22 - 37 | 47 - 81 | 43 - 97 |

Silva, Altmann, Gutman and Lorenzi. DECAF MICCAI Workshop, 2020



Timeline





Samy Ayed
Irene Balelli
Francesco Cremonesi
Yann Fraboni
Santiago Silva
Riccardo Taiello



Marc Vesin
Yannick Bouillard
Sergen Cansiz
Paul Andrey
Aurélien Bellet
Marc Tommasi
Jean-Luc Szpyrka
Thibaud Kloczko



Olivier Humbert
Hamid Laceb



institut
Curie
Fanny Orlhac
Christophe Nioche



EURECOM
Sophia Antipolis

Melek Önen
Mohamad Mansouri



Bastien Houis
Nathan Lapel
Romain Modzelewski

accenture

Laetitia Kameni
Richard Vidal