tls: emit session after verifying certificate

Prior to this patch `session` event was emitted after `secure` event on
TLSSocket, but before `secureConnect` event. This is problematic for
`https.Agent` because it must cache session only after verifying the
remote peer's certificate.

Connecting to a server that presents an invalid certificate resulted
in the session being cached after the handshake with the server and
evicted right after a certifiate validation error and socket's
destruction. A request initiated during this narrow window would pick
the faulty session, send it to the malicious server and skip the
verification of the server's certificate.

Fixes: https://hackerone.com/reports/811502
CVE-ID: CVE-2020-8172
PR-URL: nodejs-private/node-private#200
Reviewed-By: Sam Roberts <vieuxtech@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Matteo Collina <matteo.collina@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Ben Noordhuis <info@bnoordhuis.nl>
Reviewed-By: James M Snell <jasnell@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Colin Ihrig <cjihrig@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Michael Dawson <michael_dawson@ca.ibm.com>

lib/_tls_wrap.js

@@ -90,6 +90,8 @@ const kSNICallback = Symbol('snicallback');
 const kEnableTrace = Symbol('enableTrace');
 const kPskCallback = Symbol('pskcallback');
 const kPskIdentityHint = Symbol('pskidentityhint');
+const kPendingSession = Symbol('pendingSession');
+const kIsVerified = Symbol('verified');
 
 const noop = () => {};
 
@@ -273,7 +275,11 @@ function requestOCSPDone(socket) {
 function onnewsessionclient(sessionId, session) {
   debug('client emit session');
   const owner = this[owner_symbol];
-  owner.emit('session', session);
+  if (owner[kIsVerified]) {
+    owner.emit('session', session);
+  } else {
+    owner[kPendingSession] = session;
+  }
 }
 
 function onnewsession(sessionId, session) {
@@ -473,6 +479,8 @@ function TLSSocket(socket, opts) {
   this.authorized = false;
   this.authorizationError = null;
   this[kRes] = null;
+  this[kIsVerified] = false;
+  this[kPendingSession] = null;
 
   let wrap;
   if ((socket instanceof net.Socket && socket._handle) || !socket) {
@@ -643,6 +651,8 @@ TLSSocket.prototype._destroySSL = function _destroySSL() {
     this.ssl._secureContext.context = null;
   }
   this.ssl = null;
+  this[kPendingSession] = null;
+  this[kIsVerified] = false;
 };
 
 // Constructor guts, arbitrarily factored out.
@@ -1525,6 +1535,12 @@ function onConnectSecure() {
     this.emit('secureConnect');
   }
 
+  this[kIsVerified] = true;
+  const session = this[kPendingSession];
+  this[kPendingSession] = null;
+  if (session)
+    this.emit('session', session);
+
   this.removeListener('end', onConnectEnd);
 }
 

test/parallel/test-https-agent-session-injection.js

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+'use strict';
+const common = require('../common');
+const assert = require('assert');
+
+if (!common.hasCrypto)
+  common.skip('missing crypto');
+
+const https = require('https');
+const fixtures = require('../common/fixtures');
+
+const options = {
+  key: fixtures.readKey('agent1-key.pem'),
+
+  // NOTE: Certificate Common Name is 'agent1'
+  cert: fixtures.readKey('agent1-cert.pem'),
+
+  // NOTE: TLS 1.3 creates new session ticket **after** handshake so
+  // `getSession()` output will be different even if the session was reused
+  // during the handshake.
+  secureProtocol: 'TLSv1_2_method'
+};
+
+const ca = [ fixtures.readKey('ca1-cert.pem') ];
+
+const server = https.createServer(options, function(req, res) {
+  res.end('ok');
+}).listen(0, common.mustCall(function() {
+  const port = this.address().port;
+
+  const req = https.get({
+    port,
+    path: '/',
+    ca,
+    servername: 'nodejs.org',
+  }, common.mustNotCall(() => {}));
+
+  req.on('error', common.mustCall((err) => {
+    assert.strictEqual(
+      err.message,
+      'Hostname/IP does not match certificate\'s altnames: ' +
+        'Host: nodejs.org. is not cert\'s CN: agent1');
+
+    const second = https.get({
+      port,
+      path: '/',
+      ca,
+      servername: 'nodejs.org',
+    }, common.mustNotCall(() => {}));
+
+    second.on('error', common.mustCall((err) => {
+      server.close();
+
+      assert.strictEqual(
+        err.message,
+        'Hostname/IP does not match certificate\'s altnames: ' +
+          'Host: nodejs.org. is not cert\'s CN: agent1');
+    }));
+  }));
+}));

test/parallel/test-tls-secure-session.js

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+'use strict';
+const common = require('../common');
+if (!common.hasCrypto)
+  common.skip('missing crypto');
+const fixtures = require('../common/fixtures');
+const assert = require('assert');
+const tls = require('tls');
+
+const options = {
+  key: fixtures.readKey('agent1-key.pem'),
+
+  // NOTE: Certificate Common Name is 'agent1'
+  cert: fixtures.readKey('agent1-cert.pem'),
+
+  // NOTE: TLS 1.3 creates new session ticket **after** handshake so
+  // `getSession()` output will be different even if the session was reused
+  // during the handshake.
+  secureProtocol: 'TLSv1_2_method'
+};
+
+const server = tls.createServer(options, common.mustCall((socket) => {
+  socket.end();
+})).listen(0, common.mustCall(() => {
+  let connected = false;
+  let session = null;
+
+  const client = tls.connect({
+    rejectUnauthorized: false,
+    port: server.address().port,
+  }, common.mustCall(() => {
+    assert(!connected);
+    assert(!session);
+
+    connected = true;
+  }));
+
+  client.on('session', common.mustCall((newSession) => {
+    assert(connected);
+    assert(!session);
+
+    session = newSession;
+
+    client.end();
+    server.close();
+  }));
+}));