bridge rxed packet on iface with own address as source address #4

twpedersen · 2012-03-09T21:58:26Z

When running a mesh gate, dmesg gives us strange messages:

[ 218.250000] br-lan: received packet on eth0 with own address as source address
[ 218.260000] br-lan: received packet on eth0 with own address as source address
[ 218.280000] br-lan: received packet on eth0 with own address as source address
[ 218.400000] br-lan: received packet on eth0 with own address as source address
[ 218.780000] br-lan: received packet on eth0 with own address as source address
[ 218.790000] br-lan: received packet on eth0 with own address as source address
[ 219.030000] br-lan: received packet on eth0 with own address as source address
[ 219.030000] br-lan: received packet on eth0 with own address as source address
[ 228.040000] br-lan: received packet on wlan0-1 with own address as source address
[ 233.230000] br-lan: received packet on wlan0-1 with own address as source address
[ 234.980000] br-lan: received packet on wlan0-1 with own address as source address
[ 245.010000] br-lan: received packet on eth0 with own address as source address
[ 245.250000] br-lan: received packet on eth0 with own address as source address
[ 246.060000] br-lan: received packet on eth0 with own address as source address
[ 246.360000] br-lan: received packet on eth0 with own address as source address
[ 246.540000] br-lan: received packet on eth0 with own address as source address
[ 246.680000] br-lan: received packet on eth0 with own address as source address
[ 246.860000] br-lan: received packet on eth0 with own address as source address
[ 246.970000] br-lan: received packet on eth0 with own address as source address
[ 247.080000] br-lan: received packet on eth0 with own address as source address
[ 247.240000] br-lan: received packet on eth0 with own address as source address

Investigate and resolve, if this is wrong.

Printing the "start_ip" for every secondary cpu is very noisy on a large system - and doesn't add any value. Drop this message. Console log before: Booting Node 0, Processors #1 smpboot cpu 1: start_ip = 96000 #2 smpboot cpu 2: start_ip = 96000 #3 smpboot cpu 3: start_ip = 96000 #4 smpboot cpu 4: start_ip = 96000 ... #31 smpboot cpu 31: start_ip = 96000 Brought up 32 CPUs Console log after: Booting Node 0, Processors #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 Ok. Booting Node 1, Processors #8 #9 #10 #11 #12 #13 #14 #15 Ok. Booting Node 0, Processors #16 #17 #18 #19 #20 #21 #22 #23 Ok. Booting Node 1, Processors #24 #25 #26 #27 #28 #29 #30 #31 Brought up 32 CPUs Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@amd64.org> Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/4f452eb42507460426@agluck-desktop.sc.intel.com Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>

Remove individual platform header files for dm365, dm355, dm644x and dm646x and consolidate it into a single and common header file davinci.h placed in arch/arm/mach-davinci. This reduces the pollution in the include/mach and is consistent with Russell's suggestions as part of his "pet peaves" mail. (See #4 in: http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/linux-arm-kernel/2011-November/071516.html) While at it, fix the forward declaration of spi_board_info, and include the right header file instead. The further patches in the series take advantage of this consolidation for easy implementation of IO_ADDRESS elimination. Signed-off-by: Manjunath Hadli <manjunath.hadli@ti.com> [nsekhar@ti.com: make davinci.h the first local include file, fix forward declaration of spi_board_info and add back Deep Root Systems, LLC copyright] Signed-off-by: Sekhar Nori <nsekhar@ti.com>

The <linux/device.h> header includes a lot of stuff, and it in turn gets a lot of use just for the basic "struct device" which appears so often. Clean up the users as follows: 1) For those headers only needing "struct device" as a pointer in fcn args, replace the include with exactly that. 2) For headers not really using anything from device.h, simply delete the include altogether. 3) For headers relying on getting device.h implicitly before being included themselves, now explicitly include device.h 4) For files in which doing #1 or #2 uncovers an implicit dependency on some other header, fix by explicitly adding the required header(s). Any C files that were implicitly relying on device.h to be present have already been dealt with in advance. Total removals from #1 and #2: 51. Total additions coming from #3: 9. Total other implicit dependencies from #4: 7. As of 3.3-rc1, there were 110, so a net removal of 42 gives about a 38% reduction in device.h presence in include/* Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>

The compiler does not conditionalize the assembly instructions for the tlb operations, which leads to sub-optimal code being generated when building a kernel for multiple CPUs. We can tweak things fairly simply as the code fragment below shows: 17f8: e3120001 tst r2, #1 ; 0x1 ... 1800: 0a000000 beq 1808 <handle_pte_fault+0x194> 1804: ee061f10 mcr 15, 0, r1, cr6, cr0, {0} 1808: e3120004 tst r2, #4 ; 0x4 180c: 0a000000 beq 1814 <handle_pte_fault+0x1a0> 1810: ee081f36 mcr 15, 0, r1, cr8, cr6, {1} becomes: 17f0: e3120001 tst r2, #1 ; 0x1 17f4: 1e063f10 mcrne 15, 0, r3, cr6, cr0, {0} 17f8: e3120004 tst r2, #4 ; 0x4 17fc: 1e083f36 mcrne 15, 0, r3, cr8, cr6, {1} Overall, for Realview with V6 and V7 CPUs configured: text data bss dec hex filename 4153998 207340 5371036 9732374 948116 ../build/realview/vmlinux.before 4153366 207332 5371036 9731734 947e96 ../build/realview/vmlinux.after Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>

The ID used for detection of the BenQ R55E actually identifies the Quanta TW3 ODM design, which is also used for the Gigabyte W551 laptop series. Schematics on the internet clearly indicate that the "Port C" (analog input connected to record source #4 and mixer input #4) is unconnected. Playing an audio CD through analog playback (using cdplay from cdtools) produces no sound, even with the mixer input labelled "CD" enabled, and the volume control in the CD drive set to maximum. This indicates the connection is really not present. Signed-off-by: Michael Karcher <kernel@mkarcher.dialup.fu-berlin.de> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>

The following lockdep problem was reported by Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>: [ INFO: possible recursive locking detected ] 3.3.0-32035-g1b2649e-dirty #4 Not tainted --------------------------------------------- kworker/5:1/418 is trying to acquire lock: (&id_priv->handler_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa0138a41>] rdma_destroy_i d+0x33/0x1f0 [rdma_cm] but task is already holding lock: (&id_priv->handler_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa0135130>] cma_disable_ca llback+0x24/0x45 [rdma_cm] other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&id_priv->handler_mutex); lock(&id_priv->handler_mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 3 locks held by kworker/5:1/418: #0: (ib_cm){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff81042ac1>] process_one_work+0x210/0x4a 6 #1: ((&(&work->work)->work)){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff81042ac1>] process_on e_work+0x210/0x4a6 #2: (&id_priv->handler_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa0135130>] cma_disab le_callback+0x24/0x45 [rdma_cm] stack backtrace: Pid: 418, comm: kworker/5:1 Not tainted 3.3.0-32035-g1b2649e-dirty #4 Call Trace: [<ffffffff8102b0fb>] ? console_unlock+0x1f4/0x204 [<ffffffff81068771>] __lock_acquire+0x16b5/0x174e [<ffffffff8106461f>] ? save_trace+0x3f/0xb3 [<ffffffff810688fa>] lock_acquire+0xf0/0x116 [<ffffffffa0138a41>] ? rdma_destroy_id+0x33/0x1f0 [rdma_cm] [<ffffffff81364351>] mutex_lock_nested+0x64/0x2ce [<ffffffffa0138a41>] ? rdma_destroy_id+0x33/0x1f0 [rdma_cm] [<ffffffff81065a78>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x11e/0x155 [<ffffffff81065abc>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0xf [<ffffffffa0138a41>] rdma_destroy_id+0x33/0x1f0 [rdma_cm] [<ffffffffa0139c02>] cma_req_handler+0x418/0x644 [rdma_cm] [<ffffffffa012ee88>] cm_process_work+0x32/0x119 [ib_cm] [<ffffffffa0130299>] cm_req_handler+0x928/0x982 [ib_cm] [<ffffffffa01302f3>] ? cm_req_handler+0x982/0x982 [ib_cm] [<ffffffffa0130326>] cm_work_handler+0x33/0xfe5 [ib_cm] [<ffffffff81065a78>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x11e/0x155 [<ffffffffa01302f3>] ? cm_req_handler+0x982/0x982 [ib_cm] [<ffffffff81042b6e>] process_one_work+0x2bd/0x4a6 [<ffffffff81042ac1>] ? process_one_work+0x210/0x4a6 [<ffffffff813669f3>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x2b/0x40 [<ffffffff8104316e>] worker_thread+0x1d6/0x350 [<ffffffff81042f98>] ? rescuer_thread+0x241/0x241 [<ffffffff81046a32>] kthread+0x84/0x8c [<ffffffff8136e854>] kernel_thread_helper+0x4/0x10 [<ffffffff81366d59>] ? retint_restore_args+0xe/0xe [<ffffffff810469ae>] ? __init_kthread_worker+0x56/0x56 [<ffffffff8136e850>] ? gs_change+0xb/0xb The actual locking is fine, since we're dealing with different locks, but from the same lock class. cma_disable_callback() acquires the listening id mutex, whereas rdma_destroy_id() acquires the mutex for the new connection id. To fix this, delay the call to rdma_destroy_id() until we've released the listening id mutex. Signed-off-by: Sean Hefty <sean.hefty@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>

platform_device pdev can be NULL if CONFIG_MMC_OMAP_HS is not set. Add check for NULL pointer. while at it move the duplicated functions to omap4-common.c Fixes the following boot crash seen with omap4sdp and omap4panda when MMC is disabled. Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000008c pgd = c0004000 [0000008c] *pgd=00000000 Internal error: Oops: 5 [#1] SMP ARM Modules linked in: CPU: 0 Not tainted (3.4.0-rc1-05971-ga4dfa82 #4) PC is at omap_4430sdp_init+0x184/0x410 LR is at device_add+0x1a0/0x664 Signed-off-by: Balaji T K <balajitk@ti.com> Reported-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@ti.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>

xfs_sync_worker checks the MS_ACTIVE flag in s_flags to avoid doing work during mount and unmount. This flag can be cleared by unmount after the xfs_sync_worker checks it but before the work is completed. The has caused crashes in the completion handler for the dummy transaction commited by xfs_sync_worker: PID: 27544 TASK: ffff88013544e040 CPU: 3 COMMAND: "kworker/3:0" #0 [ffff88016fdff930] machine_kexec at ffffffff810244e9 #1 [ffff88016fdff9a0] crash_kexec at ffffffff8108d053 #2 [ffff88016fdffa70] oops_end at ffffffff813ad1b8 #3 [ffff88016fdffaa0] no_context at ffffffff8102bd48 #4 [ffff88016fdffaf0] __bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff8102c04d #5 [ffff88016fdffb40] bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff8102c12e #6 [ffff88016fdffb50] do_page_fault at ffffffff813afaee #7 [ffff88016fdffc60] page_fault at ffffffff813ac635 [exception RIP: xlog_get_lowest_lsn+0x30] RIP: ffffffffa04a9910 RSP: ffff88016fdffd10 RFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: ffffc90014e48000 RBX: ffff88014d879980 RCX: ffff88014d879980 RDX: ffff8802214ee4c0 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff88016fdffd10 R8: ffff88014d879a80 R9: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8802214ee400 R13: ffff88014d879980 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff88022fd96605 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #8 [ffff88016fdffd18] xlog_state_do_callback at ffffffffa04aa186 [xfs] #9 [ffff88016fdffd98] xlog_state_done_syncing at ffffffffa04aa568 [xfs] Protect xfs_sync_worker by using the s_umount semaphore at the read level to provide exclusion with unmount while work is progressing. Reviewed-by: Mark Tinguely <tinguely@sgi.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>

While traversing the linked list of open file handles, if the identfied file handle is invalid, a reopen is attempted and if it fails, we resume traversing where we stopped and cifs can oops while accessing invalid next element, for list might have changed. So mark the invalid file handle and attempt reopen if no valid file handle is found in rest of the list. If reopen fails, move the invalid file handle to the end of the list and start traversing the list again from the begining. Repeat this four times before giving up and returning an error if file reopen keeps failing. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

Pull CIFS updates from Steve French. * 'for-next' of git://git.samba.org/sfrench/cifs-2.6: (29 commits) cifs: fix oops while traversing open file list (try #4) cifs: Fix comment as d_alloc_root() is replaced by d_make_root() CIFS: Introduce SMB2 mounts as vers=2.1 CIFS: Introduce SMB2 Kconfig option CIFS: Move add/set_credits and get_credits_field to ops structure CIFS: Move protocol specific demultiplex thread calls to ops struct CIFS: Move protocol specific part from cifs_readv_receive to ops struct CIFS: Move header_size/max_header_size to ops structure CIFS: Move protocol specific part from SendReceive2 to ops struct cifs: Include backup intent search flags during searches {try #2) CIFS: Separate protocol specific part from setlk CIFS: Separate protocol specific part from getlk CIFS: Separate protocol specific lock type handling CIFS: Convert lock type to 32 bit variable CIFS: Move locks to cifsFileInfo structure cifs: convert send_nt_cancel into a version specific op cifs: add a smb_version_operations/values structures and a smb_version enum cifs: remove the vers= and version= synonyms for ver= cifs: add warning about change in default cache semantics in 3.7 cifs: display cache= option in /proc/mounts ...

…condition When holding the mmap_sem for reading, pmd_offset_map_lock should only run on a pmd_t that has been read atomically from the pmdp pointer, otherwise we may read only half of it leading to this crash. PID: 11679 TASK: f06e8000 CPU: 3 COMMAND: "do_race_2_panic" #0 [f06a9dd8] crash_kexec at c049b5ec #1 [f06a9e2c] oops_end at c083d1c2 #2 [f06a9e40] no_context at c0433ded #3 [f06a9e64] bad_area_nosemaphore at c043401a #4 [f06a9e6c] __do_page_fault at c0434493 #5 [f06a9eec] do_page_fault at c083eb45 #6 [f06a9f04] error_code (via page_fault) at c083c5d5 EAX: 01fb470c EBX: fff35000 ECX: 00000003 EDX: 00000100 EBP: 00000000 DS: 007b ESI: 9e201000 ES: 007b EDI: 01fb4700 GS: 00e0 CS: 0060 EIP: c083bc14 ERR: ffffffff EFLAGS: 00010246 #7 [f06a9f38] _spin_lock at c083bc14 #8 [f06a9f44] sys_mincore at c0507b7d #9 [f06a9fb0] system_call at c083becd start len EAX: ffffffda EBX: 9e200000 ECX: 00001000 EDX: 6228537f DS: 007b ESI: 00000000 ES: 007b EDI: 003d0f00 SS: 007b ESP: 62285354 EBP: 62285388 GS: 0033 CS: 0073 EIP: 00291416 ERR: 000000da EFLAGS: 00000286 This should be a longstanding bug affecting x86 32bit PAE without THP. Only archs with 64bit large pmd_t and 32bit unsigned long should be affected. With THP enabled the barrier() in pmd_none_or_trans_huge_or_clear_bad() would partly hide the bug when the pmd transition from none to stable, by forcing a re-read of the *pmd in pmd_offset_map_lock, but when THP is enabled a new set of problem arises by the fact could then transition freely in any of the none, pmd_trans_huge or pmd_trans_stable states. So making the barrier in pmd_none_or_trans_huge_or_clear_bad() unconditional isn't good idea and it would be a flakey solution. This should be fully fixed by introducing a pmd_read_atomic that reads the pmd in order with THP disabled, or by reading the pmd atomically with cmpxchg8b with THP enabled. Luckily this new race condition only triggers in the places that must already be covered by pmd_none_or_trans_huge_or_clear_bad() so the fix is localized there but this bug is not related to THP. NOTE: this can trigger on x86 32bit systems with PAE enabled with more than 4G of ram, otherwise the high part of the pmd will never risk to be truncated because it would be zero at all times, in turn so hiding the SMP race. This bug was discovered and fully debugged by Ulrich, quote: ---- [..] pmd_none_or_trans_huge_or_clear_bad() loads the content of edx and eax. 496 static inline int pmd_none_or_trans_huge_or_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd) 497 { 498 /* depend on compiler for an atomic pmd read */ 499 pmd_t pmdval = *pmd; // edi = pmd pointer 0xc0507a74 <sys_mincore+548>: mov 0x8(%esp),%edi ... // edx = PTE page table high address 0xc0507a84 <sys_mincore+564>: mov 0x4(%edi),%edx ... // eax = PTE page table low address 0xc0507a8e <sys_mincore+574>: mov (%edi),%eax [..] Please note that the PMD is not read atomically. These are two "mov" instructions where the high order bits of the PMD entry are fetched first. Hence, the above machine code is prone to the following race. - The PMD entry {high|low} is 0x0000000000000000. The "mov" at 0xc0507a84 loads 0x00000000 into edx. - A page fault (on another CPU) sneaks in between the two "mov" instructions and instantiates the PMD. - The PMD entry {high|low} is now 0x00000003fda38067. The "mov" at 0xc0507a8e loads 0xfda38067 into eax. ---- Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com> Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Remove spinlock as atomic_t can be used instead. Note we use only 16 lower bits, upper bits are changed but we impilcilty cast to u16. This fix possible deadlock on IBSS mode reproted by lockdep: ================================= [ INFO: inconsistent lock state ] 3.4.0-wl+ #4 Not tainted --------------------------------- inconsistent {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} -> {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} usage. kworker/u:2/30374 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE1:SE1] takes: (&(&intf->seqlock)->rlock){+.?...}, at: [<f9979a20>] rt2x00queue_create_tx_descriptor+0x380/0x490 [rt2x00lib] {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} state was registered at: [<c04978ab>] __lock_acquire+0x47b/0x1050 [<c0498504>] lock_acquire+0x84/0xf0 [<c0835733>] _raw_spin_lock+0x33/0x40 [<f9979a20>] rt2x00queue_create_tx_descriptor+0x380/0x490 [rt2x00lib] [<f9979f2a>] rt2x00queue_write_tx_frame+0x1a/0x300 [rt2x00lib] [<f997834f>] rt2x00mac_tx+0x7f/0x380 [rt2x00lib] [<f98fe363>] __ieee80211_tx+0x1b3/0x300 [mac80211] [<f98ffdf5>] ieee80211_tx+0x105/0x130 [mac80211] [<f99000dd>] ieee80211_xmit+0xad/0x100 [mac80211] [<f9900519>] ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0x2d9/0x930 [mac80211] [<c0782e87>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x307/0x660 [<c079bb71>] sch_direct_xmit+0xa1/0x1e0 [<c0784bb3>] dev_queue_xmit+0x183/0x730 [<c078c27a>] neigh_resolve_output+0xfa/0x1e0 [<c07b436a>] ip_finish_output+0x24a/0x460 [<c07b4897>] ip_output+0xb7/0x100 [<c07b2d60>] ip_local_out+0x20/0x60 [<c07e01ff>] igmpv3_sendpack+0x4f/0x60 [<c07e108f>] igmp_ifc_timer_expire+0x29f/0x330 [<c04520fc>] run_timer_softirq+0x15c/0x2f0 [<c0449e3e>] __do_softirq+0xae/0x1e0 irq event stamp: 18380437 hardirqs last enabled at (18380437): [<c0526027>] __slab_alloc.clone.3+0x67/0x5f0 hardirqs last disabled at (18380436): [<c0525ff3>] __slab_alloc.clone.3+0x33/0x5f0 softirqs last enabled at (18377616): [<c0449eb3>] __do_softirq+0x123/0x1e0 softirqs last disabled at (18377611): [<c041278d>] do_softirq+0x9d/0xe0 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&(&intf->seqlock)->rlock); <Interrupt> lock(&(&intf->seqlock)->rlock); *** DEADLOCK *** 4 locks held by kworker/u:2/30374: #0: (wiphy_name(local->hw.wiphy)){++++.+}, at: [<c045cf99>] process_one_work+0x109/0x3f0 #1: ((&sdata->work)){+.+.+.}, at: [<c045cf99>] process_one_work+0x109/0x3f0 #2: (&ifibss->mtx){+.+.+.}, at: [<f98f005b>] ieee80211_ibss_work+0x1b/0x470 [mac80211] #3: (&intf->beacon_skb_mutex){+.+...}, at: [<f997a644>] rt2x00queue_update_beacon+0x24/0x50 [rt2x00lib] stack backtrace: Pid: 30374, comm: kworker/u:2 Not tainted 3.4.0-wl+ #4 Call Trace: [<c04962a6>] print_usage_bug+0x1f6/0x220 [<c0496a12>] mark_lock+0x2c2/0x300 [<c0495ff0>] ? check_usage_forwards+0xc0/0xc0 [<c04978ec>] __lock_acquire+0x4bc/0x1050 [<c0527890>] ? __kmalloc_track_caller+0x1c0/0x1d0 [<c0777fb6>] ? copy_skb_header+0x26/0x90 [<c0498504>] lock_acquire+0x84/0xf0 [<f9979a20>] ? rt2x00queue_create_tx_descriptor+0x380/0x490 [rt2x00lib] [<c0835733>] _raw_spin_lock+0x33/0x40 [<f9979a20>] ? rt2x00queue_create_tx_descriptor+0x380/0x490 [rt2x00lib] [<f9979a20>] rt2x00queue_create_tx_descriptor+0x380/0x490 [rt2x00lib] [<f997a5cf>] rt2x00queue_update_beacon_locked+0x5f/0xb0 [rt2x00lib] [<f997a64d>] rt2x00queue_update_beacon+0x2d/0x50 [rt2x00lib] [<f9977e3a>] rt2x00mac_bss_info_changed+0x1ca/0x200 [rt2x00lib] [<f9977c70>] ? rt2x00mac_remove_interface+0x70/0x70 [rt2x00lib] [<f98e4dd0>] ieee80211_bss_info_change_notify+0xe0/0x1d0 [mac80211] [<f98ef7b8>] __ieee80211_sta_join_ibss+0x3b8/0x610 [mac80211] [<c0496ab4>] ? mark_held_locks+0x64/0xc0 [<c0440012>] ? virt_efi_query_capsule_caps+0x12/0x50 [<f98efb09>] ieee80211_sta_join_ibss+0xf9/0x140 [mac80211] [<f98f0456>] ieee80211_ibss_work+0x416/0x470 [mac80211] [<c0496d8b>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xb/0x10 [<c077683b>] ? skb_dequeue+0x4b/0x70 [<f98f207f>] ieee80211_iface_work+0x13f/0x230 [mac80211] [<c045cf99>] ? process_one_work+0x109/0x3f0 [<c045d015>] process_one_work+0x185/0x3f0 [<c045cf99>] ? process_one_work+0x109/0x3f0 [<f98f1f40>] ? ieee80211_teardown_sdata+0xa0/0xa0 [mac80211] [<c045ed86>] worker_thread+0x116/0x270 [<c045ec70>] ? manage_workers+0x1e0/0x1e0 [<c0462f64>] kthread+0x84/0x90 [<c0462ee0>] ? __init_kthread_worker+0x60/0x60 [<c083d382>] kernel_thread_helper+0x6/0x10 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com> Acked-by: Helmut Schaa <helmut.schaa@googlemail.com> Acked-by: Gertjan van Wingerde <gwingerde@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>

The warning below triggers on AMD MCM packages because physical package IDs on the cores of a _physical_ socket are the same. I.e., this field says which CPUs belong to the same physical package. However, the same two CPUs belong to two different internal, i.e. "logical" nodes in the same physical socket which is reflected in the CPU-to-node map on x86 with NUMA. Which makes this check wrong on the above topologies so circumvent it. [ 0.444413] Booting Node 0, Processors #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 Ok. [ 0.461388] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 0.465997] WARNING: at arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c:310 topology_sane.clone.1+0x6e/0x81() [ 0.473960] Hardware name: Dinar [ 0.477170] sched: CPU #6's mc-sibling CPU #0 is not on the same node! [node: 1 != 0]. Ignoring dependency. [ 0.486860] Booting Node 1, Processors #6 [ 0.491104] Modules linked in: [ 0.494141] Pid: 0, comm: swapper/6 Not tainted 3.4.0+ #1 [ 0.499510] Call Trace: [ 0.501946] [<ffffffff8144bf92>] ? topology_sane.clone.1+0x6e/0x81 [ 0.508185] [<ffffffff8102f1fc>] warn_slowpath_common+0x85/0x9d [ 0.514163] [<ffffffff8102f2b7>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x46/0x48 [ 0.519881] [<ffffffff8144bf92>] topology_sane.clone.1+0x6e/0x81 [ 0.525943] [<ffffffff8144c234>] set_cpu_sibling_map+0x251/0x371 [ 0.532004] [<ffffffff8144c4ee>] start_secondary+0x19a/0x218 [ 0.537729] ---[ end trace 4eaa2a86a8e2da22 ]--- [ 0.628197] #7 #8 #9 #10 #11 Ok. [ 0.807108] Booting Node 3, Processors #12 #13 #14 #15 #16 #17 Ok. [ 0.897587] Booting Node 2, Processors #18 #19 #20 #21 #22 #23 Ok. [ 0.917443] Brought up 24 CPUs We ran a topology sanity check test we have here on it and it all looks ok... hopefully :). Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <borislav.petkov@amd.com> Cc: Andreas Herrmann <andreas.herrmann3@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120529135442.GE29157@aftab.osrc.amd.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

twpedersen · 2012-07-31T18:46:22Z

closing since you see these with STP off.

1. removed code replication for tov calculation for 1G, 10G and made is common for speed > 1G (1G, 10G, 40G, 100G). 2. defines values for #4 different 40G Phys (KR4, LF4, SR4, CR4) Signed-off-by: Parav Pandit <parav.pandit@emulex.com> Reviewed-by: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Jian found that when he ran fsx on a 32 bit arch with a large wsize the process and one of the bdi writeback kthreads would sometimes deadlock with a stack trace like this: crash> bt PID: 2789 TASK: f02edaa0 CPU: 3 COMMAND: "fsx" #0 [eed63cbc] schedule at c083c5b3 #1 [eed63d80] kmap_high at c0500ec8 #2 [eed63db0] cifs_async_writev at f7fabcd7 [cifs] #3 [eed63df0] cifs_writepages at f7fb7f5c [cifs] #4 [eed63e50] do_writepages at c04f3e32 #5 [eed63e54] __filemap_fdatawrite_range at c04e152a #6 [eed63ea4] filemap_fdatawrite at c04e1b3e #7 [eed63eb4] cifs_file_aio_write at f7fa111a [cifs] #8 [eed63ecc] do_sync_write at c052d202 #9 [eed63f74] vfs_write at c052d4ee #10 [eed63f94] sys_write at c052df4c #11 [eed63fb0] ia32_sysenter_target at c0409a98 EAX: 00000004 EBX: 00000003 ECX: abd73b73 EDX: 012a65c6 DS: 007b ESI: 012a65c6 ES: 007b EDI: 00000000 SS: 007b ESP: bf8db178 EBP: bf8db1f8 GS: 0033 CS: 0073 EIP: 40000424 ERR: 00000004 EFLAGS: 00000246 Each task would kmap part of its address array before getting stuck, but not enough to actually issue the write. This patch fixes this by serializing the marshal_iov operations for async reads and writes. The idea here is to ensure that cifs aggressively tries to populate a request before attempting to fulfill another one. As soon as all of the pages are kmapped for a request, then we can unlock and allow another one to proceed. There's no need to do this serialization on non-CONFIG_HIGHMEM arches however, so optimize all of this out when CONFIG_HIGHMEM isn't set. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reported-by: Jian Li <jiali@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

…d reasons We've had some reports of a deadlock where rpciod ends up with a stack trace like this: PID: 2507 TASK: ffff88103691ab40 CPU: 14 COMMAND: "rpciod/14" #0 [ffff8810343bf2f0] schedule at ffffffff814dabd9 #1 [ffff8810343bf3b8] nfs_wait_bit_killable at ffffffffa038fc04 [nfs] #2 [ffff8810343bf3c8] __wait_on_bit at ffffffff814dbc2f #3 [ffff8810343bf418] out_of_line_wait_on_bit at ffffffff814dbcd8 #4 [ffff8810343bf488] nfs_commit_inode at ffffffffa039e0c1 [nfs] #5 [ffff8810343bf4f8] nfs_release_page at ffffffffa038bef6 [nfs] #6 [ffff8810343bf528] try_to_release_page at ffffffff8110c670 #7 [ffff8810343bf538] shrink_page_list.clone.0 at ffffffff81126271 #8 [ffff8810343bf668] shrink_inactive_list at ffffffff81126638 #9 [ffff8810343bf818] shrink_zone at ffffffff8112788f #10 [ffff8810343bf8c8] do_try_to_free_pages at ffffffff81127b1e #11 [ffff8810343bf958] try_to_free_pages at ffffffff8112812f #12 [ffff8810343bfa08] __alloc_pages_nodemask at ffffffff8111fdad #13 [ffff8810343bfb28] kmem_getpages at ffffffff81159942 #14 [ffff8810343bfb58] fallback_alloc at ffffffff8115a55a #15 [ffff8810343bfbd8] ____cache_alloc_node at ffffffff8115a2d9 #16 [ffff8810343bfc38] kmem_cache_alloc at ffffffff8115b09b #17 [ffff8810343bfc78] sk_prot_alloc at ffffffff81411808 #18 [ffff8810343bfcb8] sk_alloc at ffffffff8141197c #19 [ffff8810343bfce8] inet_create at ffffffff81483ba6 #20 [ffff8810343bfd38] __sock_create at ffffffff8140b4a7 #21 [ffff8810343bfd98] xs_create_sock at ffffffffa01f649b [sunrpc] #22 [ffff8810343bfdd8] xs_tcp_setup_socket at ffffffffa01f6965 [sunrpc] #23 [ffff8810343bfe38] worker_thread at ffffffff810887d0 #24 [ffff8810343bfee8] kthread at ffffffff8108dd96 #25 [ffff8810343bff48] kernel_thread at ffffffff8100c1ca rpciod is trying to allocate memory for a new socket to talk to the server. The VM ends up calling ->releasepage to get more memory, and it tries to do a blocking commit. That commit can't succeed however without a connected socket, so we deadlock. Fix this by setting PF_FSTRANS on the workqueue task prior to doing the socket allocation, and having nfs_release_page check for that flag when deciding whether to do a commit call. Also, set PF_FSTRANS unconditionally in rpc_async_schedule since that function can also do allocations sometimes. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org

On architectures where cputime_t is 64 bit type, is possible to trigger divide by zero on do_div(temp, (__force u32) total) line, if total is a non zero number but has lower 32 bit's zeroed. Removing casting is not a good solution since some do_div() implementations do cast to u32 internally. This problem can be triggered in practice on very long lived processes: PID: 2331 TASK: ffff880472814b00 CPU: 2 COMMAND: "oraagent.bin" #0 [ffff880472a51b70] machine_kexec at ffffffff8103214b #1 [ffff880472a51bd0] crash_kexec at ffffffff810b91c2 #2 [ffff880472a51ca0] oops_end at ffffffff814f0b00 #3 [ffff880472a51cd0] die at ffffffff8100f26b #4 [ffff880472a51d00] do_trap at ffffffff814f03f4 #5 [ffff880472a51d60] do_divide_error at ffffffff8100cfff #6 [ffff880472a51e00] divide_error at ffffffff8100be7b [exception RIP: thread_group_times+0x56] RIP: ffffffff81056a16 RSP: ffff880472a51eb8 RFLAGS: 00010046 RAX: bc3572c9fe12d194 RBX: ffff880874150800 RCX: 0000000110266fad RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff880472a51eb8 RDI: 001038ae7d9633dc RBP: ffff880472a51ef8 R8: 00000000b10a3a64 R9: ffff880874150800 R10: 00007fcba27ab680 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: ffff880472a51f08 R13: ffff880472a51f10 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000007 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #7 [ffff880472a51f00] do_sys_times at ffffffff8108845d #8 [ffff880472a51f40] sys_times at ffffffff81088524 #9 [ffff880472a51f80] system_call_fastpath at ffffffff8100b0f2 RIP: 0000003808caac3a RSP: 00007fcba27ab6d8 RFLAGS: 00000202 RAX: 0000000000000064 RBX: ffffffff8100b0f2 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 00007fcba27ab6e0 RSI: 000000000076d58e RDI: 00007fcba27ab6e0 RBP: 00007fcba27ab700 R8: 0000000000000020 R9: 000000000000091b R10: 00007fcba27ab680 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007fff9ca41940 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007fcba27ac9c0 R15: 00007fff9ca41940 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000064 CS: 0033 SS: 002b Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120808092714.GA3580@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

If SMP fails, we should always cancel security_timer delayed work. Otherwise, security_timer function may run after l2cap_conn object has been freed. This patch fixes the following warning reported by ODEBUG: WARNING: at lib/debugobjects.c:261 debug_print_object+0x7c/0x8d() Hardware name: Bochs ODEBUG: free active (active state 0) object type: timer_list hint: delayed_work_timer_fn+0x0/0x27 Modules linked in: btusb bluetooth Pid: 440, comm: kworker/u:2 Not tainted 3.5.0-rc1+ #4 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81174600>] ? free_obj_work+0x4a/0x7f [<ffffffff81023eb8>] warn_slowpath_common+0x7e/0x97 [<ffffffff81023f65>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x41/0x43 [<ffffffff811746b1>] debug_print_object+0x7c/0x8d [<ffffffff810394f0>] ? __queue_work+0x241/0x241 [<ffffffff81174fdd>] debug_check_no_obj_freed+0x92/0x159 [<ffffffff810ac08e>] slab_free_hook+0x6f/0x77 [<ffffffffa0019145>] ? l2cap_conn_del+0x148/0x157 [bluetooth] [<ffffffff810ae408>] kfree+0x59/0xac [<ffffffffa0019145>] l2cap_conn_del+0x148/0x157 [bluetooth] [<ffffffffa001b9a2>] l2cap_recv_frame+0xa77/0xfa4 [bluetooth] [<ffffffff810592f9>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x112/0x1ad [<ffffffffa001c86c>] l2cap_recv_acldata+0xe2/0x264 [bluetooth] [<ffffffffa0002b2f>] hci_rx_work+0x235/0x33c [bluetooth] [<ffffffff81038dc3>] ? process_one_work+0x126/0x2fe [<ffffffff81038e22>] process_one_work+0x185/0x2fe [<ffffffff81038dc3>] ? process_one_work+0x126/0x2fe [<ffffffff81059f2e>] ? lock_acquired+0x1b5/0x1cf [<ffffffffa00028fa>] ? le_scan_work+0x11d/0x11d [bluetooth] [<ffffffff81036fb6>] ? spin_lock_irq+0x9/0xb [<ffffffff81039209>] worker_thread+0xcf/0x175 [<ffffffff8103913a>] ? rescuer_thread+0x175/0x175 [<ffffffff8103cfe0>] kthread+0x95/0x9d [<ffffffff812c5054>] kernel_threadi_helper+0x4/0x10 [<ffffffff812c36b0>] ? retint_restore_args+0x13/0x13 [<ffffffff8103cf4b>] ? flush_kthread_worker+0xdb/0xdb [<ffffffff812c5050>] ? gs_change+0x13/0x13 This bug can be reproduced using hctool lecc or l2test tools and bluetoothd not running. Signed-off-by: Andre Guedes <andre.guedes@openbossa.org> Signed-off-by: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo.padovan@collabora.co.uk>

Each page mapped in a process's address space must be correctly accounted for in _mapcount. Normally the rules for this are straightforward but hugetlbfs page table sharing is different. The page table pages at the PMD level are reference counted while the mapcount remains the same. If this accounting is wrong, it causes bugs like this one reported by Larry Woodman: kernel BUG at mm/filemap.c:135! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP CPU 22 Modules linked in: bridge stp llc sunrpc binfmt_misc dcdbas microcode pcspkr acpi_pad acpi] Pid: 18001, comm: mpitest Tainted: G W 3.3.0+ #4 Dell Inc. PowerEdge R620/07NDJ2 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8112cfed>] [<ffffffff8112cfed>] __delete_from_page_cache+0x15d/0x170 Process mpitest (pid: 18001, threadinfo ffff880428972000, task ffff880428b5cc20) Call Trace: delete_from_page_cache+0x40/0x80 truncate_hugepages+0x115/0x1f0 hugetlbfs_evict_inode+0x18/0x30 evict+0x9f/0x1b0 iput_final+0xe3/0x1e0 iput+0x3e/0x50 d_kill+0xf8/0x110 dput+0xe2/0x1b0 __fput+0x162/0x240 During fork(), copy_hugetlb_page_range() detects if huge_pte_alloc() shared page tables with the check dst_pte == src_pte. The logic is if the PMD page is the same, they must be shared. This assumes that the sharing is between the parent and child. However, if the sharing is with a different process entirely then this check fails as in this diagram: parent | ------------>pmd src_pte----------> data page ^ other--------->pmd--------------------| ^ child-----------| dst_pte For this situation to occur, it must be possible for Parent and Other to have faulted and failed to share page tables with each other. This is possible due to the following style of race. PROC A PROC B copy_hugetlb_page_range copy_hugetlb_page_range src_pte == huge_pte_offset src_pte == huge_pte_offset !src_pte so no sharing !src_pte so no sharing (time passes) hugetlb_fault hugetlb_fault huge_pte_alloc huge_pte_alloc huge_pmd_share huge_pmd_share LOCK(i_mmap_mutex) find nothing, no sharing UNLOCK(i_mmap_mutex) LOCK(i_mmap_mutex) find nothing, no sharing UNLOCK(i_mmap_mutex) pmd_alloc pmd_alloc LOCK(instantiation_mutex) fault UNLOCK(instantiation_mutex) LOCK(instantiation_mutex) fault UNLOCK(instantiation_mutex) These two processes are not poing to the same data page but are not sharing page tables because the opportunity was missed. When either process later forks, the src_pte == dst pte is potentially insufficient. As the check falls through, the wrong PTE information is copied in (harmless but wrong) and the mapcount is bumped for a page mapped by a shared page table leading to the BUG_ON. This patch addresses the issue by moving pmd_alloc into huge_pmd_share which guarantees that the shared pud is populated in the same critical section as pmd. This also means that huge_pte_offset test in huge_pmd_share is serialized correctly now which in turn means that the success of the sharing will be higher as the racing tasks see the pud and pmd populated together. Race identified and changelog written mostly by Mel Gorman. {akpm@linux-foundation.org: attempt to make the huge_pmd_share() comment comprehensible, clean up coding style] Reported-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com> Tested-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> Cc: Ken Chen <kenchen@google.com> Cc: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Cc: Hillf Danton <dhillf@gmail.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Fixes following lockdep splat : [ 1614.734896] ============================================= [ 1614.734898] [ INFO: possible recursive locking detected ] [ 1614.734901] 3.6.0-rc3+ #782 Not tainted [ 1614.734903] --------------------------------------------- [ 1614.734905] swapper/11/0 is trying to acquire lock: [ 1614.734907] (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffffa0209d72>] l2tp_xmit_skb+0x172/0xa50 [l2tp_core] [ 1614.734920] [ 1614.734920] but task is already holding lock: [ 1614.734922] (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff815fce23>] tcp_v4_err+0x163/0x6b0 [ 1614.734932] [ 1614.734932] other info that might help us debug this: [ 1614.734935] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 1614.734935] [ 1614.734937] CPU0 [ 1614.734938] ---- [ 1614.734940] lock(slock-AF_INET); [ 1614.734943] lock(slock-AF_INET); [ 1614.734946] [ 1614.734946] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 1614.734946] [ 1614.734949] May be due to missing lock nesting notation [ 1614.734949] [ 1614.734952] 7 locks held by swapper/11/0: [ 1614.734954] #0: (rcu_read_lock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff81592801>] __netif_receive_skb+0x251/0xd00 [ 1614.734964] #1: (rcu_read_lock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff815d319c>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x4c/0x4e0 [ 1614.734972] #2: (rcu_read_lock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff8160d116>] icmp_socket_deliver+0x46/0x230 [ 1614.734982] #3: (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff815fce23>] tcp_v4_err+0x163/0x6b0 [ 1614.734989] #4: (rcu_read_lock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff815da240>] ip_queue_xmit+0x0/0x680 [ 1614.734997] #5: (rcu_read_lock_bh){.+....}, at: [<ffffffff815d9925>] ip_finish_output+0x135/0x890 [ 1614.735004] #6: (rcu_read_lock_bh){.+....}, at: [<ffffffff81595680>] dev_queue_xmit+0x0/0xe00 [ 1614.735012] [ 1614.735012] stack backtrace: [ 1614.735016] Pid: 0, comm: swapper/11 Not tainted 3.6.0-rc3+ #782 [ 1614.735018] Call Trace: [ 1614.735020] <IRQ> [<ffffffff810a50ac>] __lock_acquire+0x144c/0x1b10 [ 1614.735033] [<ffffffff810a334b>] ? check_usage+0x9b/0x4d0 [ 1614.735037] [<ffffffff810a6762>] ? mark_held_locks+0x82/0x130 [ 1614.735042] [<ffffffff810a5df0>] lock_acquire+0x90/0x200 [ 1614.735047] [<ffffffffa0209d72>] ? l2tp_xmit_skb+0x172/0xa50 [l2tp_core] [ 1614.735051] [<ffffffff810a69ad>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10 [ 1614.735060] [<ffffffff81749b31>] _raw_spin_lock+0x41/0x50 [ 1614.735065] [<ffffffffa0209d72>] ? l2tp_xmit_skb+0x172/0xa50 [l2tp_core] [ 1614.735069] [<ffffffffa0209d72>] l2tp_xmit_skb+0x172/0xa50 [l2tp_core] [ 1614.735075] [<ffffffffa014f7f2>] l2tp_eth_dev_xmit+0x32/0x60 [l2tp_eth] [ 1614.735079] [<ffffffff81595112>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x502/0xa70 [ 1614.735083] [<ffffffff81594c6e>] ? dev_hard_start_xmit+0x5e/0xa70 [ 1614.735087] [<ffffffff815957c1>] ? dev_queue_xmit+0x141/0xe00 [ 1614.735093] [<ffffffff815b622e>] sch_direct_xmit+0xfe/0x290 [ 1614.735098] [<ffffffff81595865>] dev_queue_xmit+0x1e5/0xe00 [ 1614.735102] [<ffffffff81595680>] ? dev_hard_start_xmit+0xa70/0xa70 [ 1614.735106] [<ffffffff815b4daa>] ? eth_header+0x3a/0xf0 [ 1614.735111] [<ffffffff8161d33e>] ? fib_get_table+0x2e/0x280 [ 1614.735117] [<ffffffff8160a7e2>] arp_xmit+0x22/0x60 [ 1614.735121] [<ffffffff8160a863>] arp_send+0x43/0x50 [ 1614.735125] [<ffffffff8160b82f>] arp_solicit+0x18f/0x450 [ 1614.735132] [<ffffffff8159d9da>] neigh_probe+0x4a/0x70 [ 1614.735137] [<ffffffff815a191a>] __neigh_event_send+0xea/0x300 [ 1614.735141] [<ffffffff815a1c93>] neigh_resolve_output+0x163/0x260 [ 1614.735146] [<ffffffff815d9cf5>] ip_finish_output+0x505/0x890 [ 1614.735150] [<ffffffff815d9925>] ? ip_finish_output+0x135/0x890 [ 1614.735154] [<ffffffff815dae79>] ip_output+0x59/0xf0 [ 1614.735158] [<ffffffff815da1cd>] ip_local_out+0x2d/0xa0 [ 1614.735162] [<ffffffff815da403>] ip_queue_xmit+0x1c3/0x680 [ 1614.735165] [<ffffffff815da240>] ? ip_local_out+0xa0/0xa0 [ 1614.735172] [<ffffffff815f4402>] tcp_transmit_skb+0x402/0xa60 [ 1614.735177] [<ffffffff815f5a11>] tcp_retransmit_skb+0x1a1/0x620 [ 1614.735181] [<ffffffff815f7e93>] tcp_retransmit_timer+0x393/0x960 [ 1614.735185] [<ffffffff815fce23>] ? tcp_v4_err+0x163/0x6b0 [ 1614.735189] [<ffffffff815fd317>] tcp_v4_err+0x657/0x6b0 [ 1614.735194] [<ffffffff8160d116>] ? icmp_socket_deliver+0x46/0x230 [ 1614.735199] [<ffffffff8160d19e>] icmp_socket_deliver+0xce/0x230 [ 1614.735203] [<ffffffff8160d116>] ? icmp_socket_deliver+0x46/0x230 [ 1614.735208] [<ffffffff8160d464>] icmp_unreach+0xe4/0x2c0 [ 1614.735213] [<ffffffff8160e520>] icmp_rcv+0x350/0x4a0 [ 1614.735217] [<ffffffff815d3285>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x135/0x4e0 [ 1614.735221] [<ffffffff815d319c>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x4c/0x4e0 [ 1614.735225] [<ffffffff815d3ffa>] ip_local_deliver+0x4a/0x90 [ 1614.735229] [<ffffffff815d37b7>] ip_rcv_finish+0x187/0x730 [ 1614.735233] [<ffffffff815d425d>] ip_rcv+0x21d/0x300 [ 1614.735237] [<ffffffff81592a1b>] __netif_receive_skb+0x46b/0xd00 [ 1614.735241] [<ffffffff81592801>] ? __netif_receive_skb+0x251/0xd00 [ 1614.735245] [<ffffffff81593368>] process_backlog+0xb8/0x180 [ 1614.735249] [<ffffffff81593cf9>] net_rx_action+0x159/0x330 [ 1614.735257] [<ffffffff810491f0>] __do_softirq+0xd0/0x3e0 [ 1614.735264] [<ffffffff8109ed24>] ? tick_program_event+0x24/0x30 [ 1614.735270] [<ffffffff8175419c>] call_softirq+0x1c/0x30 [ 1614.735278] [<ffffffff8100425d>] do_softirq+0x8d/0xc0 [ 1614.735282] [<ffffffff8104983e>] irq_exit+0xae/0xe0 [ 1614.735287] [<ffffffff8175494e>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6e/0x99 [ 1614.735291] [<ffffffff81753a1c>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x6c/0x80 [ 1614.735293] <EOI> [<ffffffff810a14ad>] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0xd/0x10 [ 1614.735306] [<ffffffff81336f85>] ? intel_idle+0xf5/0x150 [ 1614.735310] [<ffffffff81336f7e>] ? intel_idle+0xee/0x150 [ 1614.735317] [<ffffffff814e6ea9>] cpuidle_enter+0x19/0x20 [ 1614.735321] [<ffffffff814e7538>] cpuidle_idle_call+0xa8/0x630 [ 1614.735327] [<ffffffff8100c1ba>] cpu_idle+0x8a/0xe0 [ 1614.735333] [<ffffffff8173762e>] start_secondary+0x220/0x222 Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Cancel work of the xfs_sync_worker before teardown of the log in xfs_unmountfs. This prevents occasional crashes on unmount like so: PID: 21602 TASK: ee9df060 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "kworker/0:3" #0 [c5377d28] crash_kexec at c0292c94 #1 [c5377d80] oops_end at c07090c2 #2 [c5377d98] no_context at c06f614e #3 [c5377dbc] __bad_area_nosemaphore at c06f6281 #4 [c5377df4] bad_area_nosemaphore at c06f629b #5 [c5377e00] do_page_fault at c070b0cb #6 [c5377e7c] error_code (via page_fault) at c070892c EAX: f300c6a8 EBX: f300c6a8 ECX: 000000c0 EDX: 000000c0 EBP: c5377ed0 DS: 007b ESI: 00000000 ES: 007b EDI: 00000001 GS: ffffad20 CS: 0060 EIP: c0481ad0 ERR: ffffffff EFLAGS: 00010246 #7 [c5377eb0] atomic64_read_cx8 at c0481ad0 #8 [c5377ebc] xlog_assign_tail_lsn_locked at f7cc7c6e [xfs] #9 [c5377ed4] xfs_trans_ail_delete_bulk at f7ccd520 [xfs] #10 [c5377f0c] xfs_buf_iodone at f7ccb602 [xfs] #11 [c5377f24] xfs_buf_do_callbacks at f7cca524 [xfs] #12 [c5377f30] xfs_buf_iodone_callbacks at f7cca5da [xfs] #13 [c5377f4c] xfs_buf_iodone_work at f7c718d0 [xfs] #14 [c5377f58] process_one_work at c024ee4c #15 [c5377f98] worker_thread at c024f43d #16 [c5377fbc] kthread at c025326b #17 [c5377fe8] kernel_thread_helper at c070e834 PID: 26653 TASK: e79143b0 CPU: 3 COMMAND: "umount" #0 [cde0fda0] __schedule at c0706595 #1 [cde0fe28] schedule at c0706b89 #2 [cde0fe30] schedule_timeout at c0705600 #3 [cde0fe94] __down_common at c0706098 #4 [cde0fec8] __down at c0706122 #5 [cde0fed0] down at c025936f #6 [cde0fee0] xfs_buf_lock at f7c7131d [xfs] #7 [cde0ff00] xfs_freesb at f7cc2236 [xfs] #8 [cde0ff10] xfs_fs_put_super at f7c80f21 [xfs] #9 [cde0ff1c] generic_shutdown_super at c0333d7a #10 [cde0ff38] kill_block_super at c0333e0f #11 [cde0ff48] deactivate_locked_super at c0334218 #12 [cde0ff58] deactivate_super at c033495d #13 [cde0ff68] mntput_no_expire at c034bc13 #14 [cde0ff7c] sys_umount at c034cc69 #15 [cde0ffa0] sys_oldumount at c034ccd4 #16 [cde0ffb0] system_call at c0707e66 commit 11159a0 added this to xfs_log_unmount and needs to be cleaned up at a later date. Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com> Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Mark Tinguely <tinguely@sgi.com>

This moves ARM over to the asm-generic/unaligned.h header. This has the benefit of better code generated especially for ARMv7 on gcc 4.7+ compilers. As Arnd Bergmann, points out: The asm-generic version uses the "struct" version for native-endian unaligned access and the "byteshift" version for the opposite endianess. The current ARM version however uses the "byteshift" implementation for both. Thanks to Nicolas Pitre for the excellent analysis: Test case: int foo (int *x) { return get_unaligned(x); } long long bar (long long *x) { return get_unaligned(x); } With the current ARM version: foo: ldrb r3, [r0, #2] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 2B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 2B] ldrb r1, [r0, #1] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 1B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 1B] ldrb r2, [r0, #0] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D)], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D)] mov r3, r3, asl #16 @ tmp154, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 2B], ldrb r0, [r0, #3] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 3B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 3B] orr r3, r3, r1, asl #8 @, tmp155, tmp154, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 1B], orr r3, r3, r2 @ tmp157, tmp155, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D)] orr r0, r3, r0, asl #24 @,, tmp157, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 3B], bx lr @ bar: stmfd sp!, {r4, r5, r6, r7} @, mov r2, #0 @ tmp184, ldrb r5, [r0, #6] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 6B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 6B] ldrb r4, [r0, #5] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 5B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 5B] ldrb ip, [r0, #2] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 2B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 2B] ldrb r1, [r0, #4] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 4B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 4B] mov r5, r5, asl #16 @ tmp175, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 6B], ldrb r7, [r0, #1] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 1B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 1B] orr r5, r5, r4, asl #8 @, tmp176, tmp175, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 5B], ldrb r6, [r0, #7] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 7B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 7B] orr r5, r5, r1 @ tmp178, tmp176, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 4B] ldrb r4, [r0, #0] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D)], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D)] mov ip, ip, asl #16 @ tmp188, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 2B], ldrb r1, [r0, #3] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 3B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 3B] orr ip, ip, r7, asl #8 @, tmp189, tmp188, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 1B], orr r3, r5, r6, asl #24 @,, tmp178, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 7B], orr ip, ip, r4 @ tmp191, tmp189, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D)] orr ip, ip, r1, asl #24 @, tmp194, tmp191, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 3B], mov r1, r3 @, orr r0, r2, ip @ tmp171, tmp184, tmp194 ldmfd sp!, {r4, r5, r6, r7} bx lr In both cases the code is slightly suboptimal. One may wonder why wasting r2 with the constant 0 in the second case for example. And all the mov's could be folded in subsequent orr's, etc. Now with the asm-generic version: foo: ldr r0, [r0, #0] @ unaligned @,* x bx lr @ bar: mov r3, r0 @ x, x ldr r0, [r0, #0] @ unaligned @,* x ldr r1, [r3, #4] @ unaligned @, bx lr @ This is way better of course, but only because this was compiled for ARMv7. In this case the compiler knows that the hardware can do unaligned word access. This isn't that obvious for foo(), but if we remove the get_unaligned() from bar as follows: long long bar (long long *x) {return *x; } then the resulting code is: bar: ldmia r0, {r0, r1} @ x,, bx lr @ So this proves that the presumed aligned vs unaligned cases does have influence on the instructions the compiler may use and that the above unaligned code results are not just an accident. Still... this isn't fully conclusive without at least looking at the resulting assembly fron a pre ARMv6 compilation. Let's see with an ARMv5 target: foo: ldrb r3, [r0, #0] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp139,* x ldrb r1, [r0, #1] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp140, ldrb r2, [r0, #2] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp143, ldrb r0, [r0, #3] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp146, orr r3, r3, r1, asl #8 @, tmp142, tmp139, tmp140, orr r3, r3, r2, asl #16 @, tmp145, tmp142, tmp143, orr r0, r3, r0, asl #24 @,, tmp145, tmp146, bx lr @ bar: stmfd sp!, {r4, r5, r6, r7} @, ldrb r2, [r0, #0] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp139,* x ldrb r7, [r0, #1] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp140, ldrb r3, [r0, #4] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp149, ldrb r6, [r0, #5] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp150, ldrb r5, [r0, #2] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp143, ldrb r4, [r0, #6] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp153, ldrb r1, [r0, #7] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp156, ldrb ip, [r0, #3] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp146, orr r2, r2, r7, asl #8 @, tmp142, tmp139, tmp140, orr r3, r3, r6, asl #8 @, tmp152, tmp149, tmp150, orr r2, r2, r5, asl #16 @, tmp145, tmp142, tmp143, orr r3, r3, r4, asl #16 @, tmp155, tmp152, tmp153, orr r0, r2, ip, asl #24 @,, tmp145, tmp146, orr r1, r3, r1, asl #24 @,, tmp155, tmp156, ldmfd sp!, {r4, r5, r6, r7} bx lr Compared to the initial results, this is really nicely optimized and I couldn't do much better if I were to hand code it myself. Signed-off-by: Rob Herring <rob.herring@calxeda.com> Reviewed-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org> Tested-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com> Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>

It seems we need to provide ability for stacked devices to use specific lock_class_key for sch->busylock We could instead default l2tpeth tx_queue_len to 0 (no qdisc), but a user might use a qdisc anyway. (So same fixes are probably needed on non LLTX stacked drivers) Noticed while stressing L2TPV3 setup : ====================================================== [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] 3.6.0-rc3+ #788 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------- netperf/4660 is trying to acquire lock: (l2tpsock){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffffa0208db2>] l2tp_xmit_skb+0x172/0xa50 [l2tp_core] but task is already holding lock: (&(&sch->busylock)->rlock){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff81596595>] dev_queue_xmit+0xd75/0xe00 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (&(&sch->busylock)->rlock){+.-...}: [<ffffffff810a5df0>] lock_acquire+0x90/0x200 [<ffffffff817499fc>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x4c/0x60 [<ffffffff81074872>] __wake_up+0x32/0x70 [<ffffffff8136d39e>] tty_wakeup+0x3e/0x80 [<ffffffff81378fb3>] pty_write+0x73/0x80 [<ffffffff8136cb4c>] tty_put_char+0x3c/0x40 [<ffffffff813722b2>] process_echoes+0x142/0x330 [<ffffffff813742ab>] n_tty_receive_buf+0x8fb/0x1230 [<ffffffff813777b2>] flush_to_ldisc+0x142/0x1c0 [<ffffffff81062818>] process_one_work+0x198/0x760 [<ffffffff81063236>] worker_thread+0x186/0x4b0 [<ffffffff810694d3>] kthread+0x93/0xa0 [<ffffffff81753e24>] kernel_thread_helper+0x4/0x10 -> #0 (l2tpsock){+.-...}: [<ffffffff810a5288>] __lock_acquire+0x1628/0x1b10 [<ffffffff810a5df0>] lock_acquire+0x90/0x200 [<ffffffff817498c1>] _raw_spin_lock+0x41/0x50 [<ffffffffa0208db2>] l2tp_xmit_skb+0x172/0xa50 [l2tp_core] [<ffffffffa021a802>] l2tp_eth_dev_xmit+0x32/0x60 [l2tp_eth] [<ffffffff815952b2>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x502/0xa70 [<ffffffff815b63ce>] sch_direct_xmit+0xfe/0x290 [<ffffffff81595a05>] dev_queue_xmit+0x1e5/0xe00 [<ffffffff815d9d60>] ip_finish_output+0x3d0/0x890 [<ffffffff815db019>] ip_output+0x59/0xf0 [<ffffffff815da36d>] ip_local_out+0x2d/0xa0 [<ffffffff815da5a3>] ip_queue_xmit+0x1c3/0x680 [<ffffffff815f4192>] tcp_transmit_skb+0x402/0xa60 [<ffffffff815f4a94>] tcp_write_xmit+0x1f4/0xa30 [<ffffffff815f5300>] tcp_push_one+0x30/0x40 [<ffffffff815e6672>] tcp_sendmsg+0xe82/0x1040 [<ffffffff81614495>] inet_sendmsg+0x125/0x230 [<ffffffff81576cdc>] sock_sendmsg+0xdc/0xf0 [<ffffffff81579ece>] sys_sendto+0xfe/0x130 [<ffffffff81752c92>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&(&sch->busylock)->rlock); lock(l2tpsock); lock(&(&sch->busylock)->rlock); lock(l2tpsock); *** DEADLOCK *** 5 locks held by netperf/4660: #0: (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff815e581c>] tcp_sendmsg+0x2c/0x1040 #1: (rcu_read_lock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff815da3e0>] ip_queue_xmit+0x0/0x680 #2: (rcu_read_lock_bh){.+....}, at: [<ffffffff815d9ac5>] ip_finish_output+0x135/0x890 #3: (rcu_read_lock_bh){.+....}, at: [<ffffffff81595820>] dev_queue_xmit+0x0/0xe00 #4: (&(&sch->busylock)->rlock){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff81596595>] dev_queue_xmit+0xd75/0xe00 stack backtrace: Pid: 4660, comm: netperf Not tainted 3.6.0-rc3+ #788 Call Trace: [<ffffffff8173dbf8>] print_circular_bug+0x1fb/0x20c [<ffffffff810a5288>] __lock_acquire+0x1628/0x1b10 [<ffffffff810a334b>] ? check_usage+0x9b/0x4d0 [<ffffffff810a3f44>] ? __lock_acquire+0x2e4/0x1b10 [<ffffffff810a5df0>] lock_acquire+0x90/0x200 [<ffffffffa0208db2>] ? l2tp_xmit_skb+0x172/0xa50 [l2tp_core] [<ffffffff817498c1>] _raw_spin_lock+0x41/0x50 [<ffffffffa0208db2>] ? l2tp_xmit_skb+0x172/0xa50 [l2tp_core] [<ffffffffa0208db2>] l2tp_xmit_skb+0x172/0xa50 [l2tp_core] [<ffffffffa021a802>] l2tp_eth_dev_xmit+0x32/0x60 [l2tp_eth] [<ffffffff815952b2>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x502/0xa70 [<ffffffff81594e0e>] ? dev_hard_start_xmit+0x5e/0xa70 [<ffffffff81595961>] ? dev_queue_xmit+0x141/0xe00 [<ffffffff815b63ce>] sch_direct_xmit+0xfe/0x290 [<ffffffff81595a05>] dev_queue_xmit+0x1e5/0xe00 [<ffffffff81595820>] ? dev_hard_start_xmit+0xa70/0xa70 [<ffffffff815d9d60>] ip_finish_output+0x3d0/0x890 [<ffffffff815d9ac5>] ? ip_finish_output+0x135/0x890 [<ffffffff815db019>] ip_output+0x59/0xf0 [<ffffffff815da36d>] ip_local_out+0x2d/0xa0 [<ffffffff815da5a3>] ip_queue_xmit+0x1c3/0x680 [<ffffffff815da3e0>] ? ip_local_out+0xa0/0xa0 [<ffffffff815f4192>] tcp_transmit_skb+0x402/0xa60 [<ffffffff815fa25e>] ? tcp_md5_do_lookup+0x18e/0x1a0 [<ffffffff815f4a94>] tcp_write_xmit+0x1f4/0xa30 [<ffffffff815f5300>] tcp_push_one+0x30/0x40 [<ffffffff815e6672>] tcp_sendmsg+0xe82/0x1040 [<ffffffff81614495>] inet_sendmsg+0x125/0x230 [<ffffffff81614370>] ? inet_create+0x6b0/0x6b0 [<ffffffff8157e6e2>] ? sock_update_classid+0xc2/0x3b0 [<ffffffff8157e750>] ? sock_update_classid+0x130/0x3b0 [<ffffffff81576cdc>] sock_sendmsg+0xdc/0xf0 [<ffffffff81162579>] ? fget_light+0x3f9/0x4f0 [<ffffffff81579ece>] sys_sendto+0xfe/0x130 [<ffffffff810a69ad>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10 [<ffffffff8174a0b0>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x30/0x50 [<ffffffff810757e3>] ? finish_task_switch+0x83/0xf0 [<ffffffff810757a6>] ? finish_task_switch+0x46/0xf0 [<ffffffff81752cb7>] ? sysret_check+0x1b/0x56 [<ffffffff81752c92>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Cancel work of the xfs_sync_worker before teardown of the log in xfs_unmountfs. This prevents occasional crashes on unmount like so: PID: 21602 TASK: ee9df060 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "kworker/0:3" #0 [c5377d28] crash_kexec at c0292c94 #1 [c5377d80] oops_end at c07090c2 #2 [c5377d98] no_context at c06f614e #3 [c5377dbc] __bad_area_nosemaphore at c06f6281 #4 [c5377df4] bad_area_nosemaphore at c06f629b #5 [c5377e00] do_page_fault at c070b0cb #6 [c5377e7c] error_code (via page_fault) at c070892c EAX: f300c6a8 EBX: f300c6a8 ECX: 000000c0 EDX: 000000c0 EBP: c5377ed0 DS: 007b ESI: 00000000 ES: 007b EDI: 00000001 GS: ffffad20 CS: 0060 EIP: c0481ad0 ERR: ffffffff EFLAGS: 00010246 #7 [c5377eb0] atomic64_read_cx8 at c0481ad0 #8 [c5377ebc] xlog_assign_tail_lsn_locked at f7cc7c6e [xfs] #9 [c5377ed4] xfs_trans_ail_delete_bulk at f7ccd520 [xfs] #10 [c5377f0c] xfs_buf_iodone at f7ccb602 [xfs] #11 [c5377f24] xfs_buf_do_callbacks at f7cca524 [xfs] #12 [c5377f30] xfs_buf_iodone_callbacks at f7cca5da [xfs] #13 [c5377f4c] xfs_buf_iodone_work at f7c718d0 [xfs] #14 [c5377f58] process_one_work at c024ee4c #15 [c5377f98] worker_thread at c024f43d #16 [c5377fbc] kthread at c025326b #17 [c5377fe8] kernel_thread_helper at c070e834 PID: 26653 TASK: e79143b0 CPU: 3 COMMAND: "umount" #0 [cde0fda0] __schedule at c0706595 #1 [cde0fe28] schedule at c0706b89 #2 [cde0fe30] schedule_timeout at c0705600 #3 [cde0fe94] __down_common at c0706098 #4 [cde0fec8] __down at c0706122 #5 [cde0fed0] down at c025936f #6 [cde0fee0] xfs_buf_lock at f7c7131d [xfs] #7 [cde0ff00] xfs_freesb at f7cc2236 [xfs] #8 [cde0ff10] xfs_fs_put_super at f7c80f21 [xfs] #9 [cde0ff1c] generic_shutdown_super at c0333d7a #10 [cde0ff38] kill_block_super at c0333e0f #11 [cde0ff48] deactivate_locked_super at c0334218 #12 [cde0ff58] deactivate_super at c033495d #13 [cde0ff68] mntput_no_expire at c034bc13 #14 [cde0ff7c] sys_umount at c034cc69 #15 [cde0ffa0] sys_oldumount at c034ccd4 #16 [cde0ffb0] system_call at c0707e66 commit 11159a0 added this to xfs_log_unmount and needs to be cleaned up at a later date. Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com> Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Mark Tinguely <tinguely@sgi.com>

As specified by ftrace-design.txt, TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT was added, as well as NR_syscalls in asm/unistd.h. Additionally, __sys_trace was modified to call trace_sys_enter and trace_sys_exit when appropriate. Tests #2 - #4 of "perf test" now complete successfully. Signed-off-by: Steven Walter <stevenrwalter@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Wade Farnsworth <wade_farnsworth@mentor.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>

The next step in reducing RCU's grace-period initialization latency on large systems will make this initialization preemptible. Unfortunately, making the grace-period initialization subject to interrupts (let alone preemption) exposes the following race on systems whose rcu_node tree contains more than one node: 1. CPU 31 starts initializing the grace period, including the first leaf rcu_node structures, and is then preempted. 2. CPU 0 refers to the first leaf rcu_node structure, and notes that a new grace period has started. It passes through a quiescent state shortly thereafter, and informs the RCU core of this rite of passage. 3. CPU 0 enters an RCU read-side critical section, acquiring a pointer to an RCU-protected data item. 4. CPU 31 takes an interrupt whose handler removes the data item referenced by CPU 0 from the data structure, and registers an RCU callback in order to free it. 5. CPU 31 resumes initializing the grace period, including its own rcu_node structure. In invokes rcu_start_gp_per_cpu(), which advances all callbacks, including the one registered in #4 above, to be handled by the current grace period. 6. The remaining CPUs pass through quiescent states and inform the RCU core, but CPU 0 remains in its RCU read-side critical section, still referencing the now-removed data item. 7. The grace period completes and all the callbacks are invoked, including the one that frees the data item that CPU 0 is still referencing. Oops!!! One way to avoid this race is to remove grace-period acceleration from rcu_start_gp_per_cpu(). Now, the only reason for this acceleration was to allow CPUs bringing RCU out of idle state to have their callbacks invoked after only one grace period, rather than the two grace periods that would otherwise be required. But this acceleration does not work when RCU grace-period initialization is moved to a kthread because the CPU posting the callback is no longer necessarily the CPU that is initializing the resulting grace period. This commit therefore removes this now-pointless (and soon to be dangerous) grace-period acceleration, thus avoiding the above race. Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

If a qdisc is installed on a bonding device, its possible to get following lockdep splat under stress : ============================================= [ INFO: possible recursive locking detected ] 3.6.0+ #211 Not tainted --------------------------------------------- ping/4876 is trying to acquire lock: (dev->qdisc_tx_busylock ?: &qdisc_tx_busylock){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8157a191>] dev_queue_xmit+0xe1/0x830 but task is already holding lock: (dev->qdisc_tx_busylock ?: &qdisc_tx_busylock){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8157a191>] dev_queue_xmit+0xe1/0x830 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(dev->qdisc_tx_busylock ?: &qdisc_tx_busylock); lock(dev->qdisc_tx_busylock ?: &qdisc_tx_busylock); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 6 locks held by ping/4876: #0: (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff815e5030>] raw_sendmsg+0x600/0xc30 #1: (rcu_read_lock_bh){.+....}, at: [<ffffffff815ba4bd>] ip_finish_output+0x12d/0x870 #2: (rcu_read_lock_bh){.+....}, at: [<ffffffff8157a0b0>] dev_queue_xmit+0x0/0x830 #3: (dev->qdisc_tx_busylock ?: &qdisc_tx_busylock){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8157a191>] dev_queue_xmit+0xe1/0x830 #4: (&bond->lock){++.?..}, at: [<ffffffffa02128c1>] bond_start_xmit+0x31/0x4b0 [bonding] #5: (rcu_read_lock_bh){.+....}, at: [<ffffffff8157a0b0>] dev_queue_xmit+0x0/0x830 stack backtrace: Pid: 4876, comm: ping Not tainted 3.6.0+ #211 Call Trace: [<ffffffff810a0145>] __lock_acquire+0x715/0x1b80 [<ffffffff810a256b>] ? mark_held_locks+0x9b/0x100 [<ffffffff810a1bf2>] lock_acquire+0x92/0x1d0 [<ffffffff8157a191>] ? dev_queue_xmit+0xe1/0x830 [<ffffffff81726b7c>] _raw_spin_lock+0x3c/0x50 [<ffffffff8157a191>] ? dev_queue_xmit+0xe1/0x830 [<ffffffff8106264d>] ? rcu_read_lock_bh_held+0x5d/0x90 [<ffffffff8157a191>] dev_queue_xmit+0xe1/0x830 [<ffffffff8157a0b0>] ? netdev_pick_tx+0x570/0x570 [<ffffffffa0212a6a>] bond_start_xmit+0x1da/0x4b0 [bonding] [<ffffffff815796d0>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x240/0x6b0 [<ffffffff81597c6e>] sch_direct_xmit+0xfe/0x2a0 [<ffffffff8157a249>] dev_queue_xmit+0x199/0x830 [<ffffffff8157a0b0>] ? netdev_pick_tx+0x570/0x570 [<ffffffff815ba96f>] ip_finish_output+0x5df/0x870 [<ffffffff815ba4bd>] ? ip_finish_output+0x12d/0x870 [<ffffffff815bb964>] ip_output+0x54/0xf0 [<ffffffff815bad48>] ip_local_out+0x28/0x90 [<ffffffff815bc444>] ip_send_skb+0x14/0x50 [<ffffffff815bc4b2>] ip_push_pending_frames+0x32/0x40 [<ffffffff815e536a>] raw_sendmsg+0x93a/0xc30 [<ffffffff8128d570>] ? selinux_file_send_sigiotask+0x1f0/0x1f0 [<ffffffff8109ddb4>] ? __lock_is_held+0x54/0x80 [<ffffffff815f6730>] ? inet_recvmsg+0x220/0x220 [<ffffffff8109ddb4>] ? __lock_is_held+0x54/0x80 [<ffffffff815f6855>] inet_sendmsg+0x125/0x240 [<ffffffff815f6730>] ? inet_recvmsg+0x220/0x220 [<ffffffff8155cddb>] sock_sendmsg+0xab/0xe0 [<ffffffff810a1650>] ? lock_release_non_nested+0xa0/0x2e0 [<ffffffff810a1650>] ? lock_release_non_nested+0xa0/0x2e0 [<ffffffff8155d18c>] __sys_sendmsg+0x37c/0x390 [<ffffffff81195b2a>] ? fsnotify+0x2ca/0x7e0 [<ffffffff811958e8>] ? fsnotify+0x88/0x7e0 [<ffffffff81361f36>] ? put_ldisc+0x56/0xd0 [<ffffffff8116f98a>] ? fget_light+0x3da/0x510 [<ffffffff8155f6c4>] sys_sendmsg+0x44/0x80 [<ffffffff8172fc22>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Avoid this problem using a distinct lock_class_key for bonding devices. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com> Cc: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

In an effort to get fewer checkpatch reviewer corrections, add a networking specific style test for the preferred networking comment style. /* The preferred style for block comments in * drivers/net/... and net/... is like this */ These tests are only used in net/ and drivers/net/ Tested with: $ cat drivers/net/t.c /* foo */ /* * foo */ /* foo */ /* foo * bar */ $ ./scripts/checkpatch.pl -f drivers/net/t.c WARNING: networking block comments don't use an empty /* line, use /* Comment... #4: FILE: net/t.c:4: + +/* WARNING: networking block comments put the trailing */ on a separate line #12: FILE: net/t.c:12: + * bar */ total: 0 errors, 2 warnings, 12 lines checked Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Cc: "Allan, Bruce W" <bruce.w.allan@intel.com> Cc: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

We met lockdep warning when enable and disable the bearer for commands such as: tipc-config -netid=1234 -addr=1.1.3 -be=eth:eth0 tipc-config -netid=1234 -addr=1.1.3 -bd=eth:eth0 --------------------------------------------------- [ 327.693595] ====================================================== [ 327.693994] [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] [ 327.694519] 3.11.0-rc3-wwd-default #4 Tainted: G O [ 327.694882] ------------------------------------------------------- [ 327.695385] tipc-config/5825 is trying to acquire lock: [ 327.695754] (((timer))#2){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8105be80>] del_timer_sync+0x0/0xd0 [ 327.696018] [ 327.696018] but task is already holding lock: [ 327.696018] (&(&b_ptr->lock)->rlock){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffffa02be58d>] bearer_disable+ 0xdd/0x120 [tipc] [ 327.696018] [ 327.696018] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 327.696018] [ 327.696018] [ 327.696018] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 327.696018] [ 327.696018] -> #1 (&(&b_ptr->lock)->rlock){+.-...}: [ 327.696018] [<ffffffff810b3b4d>] validate_chain+0x6dd/0x870 [ 327.696018] [<ffffffff810b40bb>] __lock_acquire+0x3db/0x670 [ 327.696018] [<ffffffff810b4453>] lock_acquire+0x103/0x130 [ 327.696018] [<ffffffff814d65b1>] _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x41/0x80 [ 327.696018] [<ffffffffa02c5d48>] disc_timeout+0x18/0xd0 [tipc] [ 327.696018] [<ffffffff8105b92a>] call_timer_fn+0xda/0x1e0 [ 327.696018] [<ffffffff8105bcd7>] run_timer_softirq+0x2a7/0x2d0 [ 327.696018] [<ffffffff8105379a>] __do_softirq+0x16a/0x2e0 [ 327.696018] [<ffffffff81053a35>] irq_exit+0xd5/0xe0 [ 327.696018] [<ffffffff81033005>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x45/0x60 [ 327.696018] [<ffffffff814df4af>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x6f/0x80 [ 327.696018] [<ffffffff8100b70e>] arch_cpu_idle+0x1e/0x30 [ 327.696018] [<ffffffff810a039d>] cpu_idle_loop+0x1fd/0x280 [ 327.696018] [<ffffffff810a043e>] cpu_startup_entry+0x1e/0x20 [ 327.696018] [<ffffffff81031589>] start_secondary+0x89/0x90 [ 327.696018] [ 327.696018] -> #0 (((timer))#2){+.-...}: [ 327.696018] [<ffffffff810b33fe>] check_prev_add+0x43e/0x4b0 [ 327.696018] [<ffffffff810b3b4d>] validate_chain+0x6dd/0x870 [ 327.696018] [<ffffffff810b40bb>] __lock_acquire+0x3db/0x670 [ 327.696018] [<ffffffff810b4453>] lock_acquire+0x103/0x130 [ 327.696018] [<ffffffff8105bebd>] del_timer_sync+0x3d/0xd0 [ 327.696018] [<ffffffffa02c5855>] tipc_disc_delete+0x15/0x30 [tipc] [ 327.696018] [<ffffffffa02be59f>] bearer_disable+0xef/0x120 [tipc] [ 327.696018] [<ffffffffa02be74f>] tipc_disable_bearer+0x2f/0x60 [tipc] [ 327.696018] [<ffffffffa02bfb32>] tipc_cfg_do_cmd+0x2e2/0x550 [tipc] [ 327.696018] [<ffffffffa02c8c79>] handle_cmd+0x49/0xe0 [tipc] [ 327.696018] [<ffffffff8143e898>] genl_family_rcv_msg+0x268/0x340 [ 327.696018] [<ffffffff8143ed30>] genl_rcv_msg+0x70/0xd0 [ 327.696018] [<ffffffff8143d4c9>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x89/0xb0 [ 327.696018] [<ffffffff8143e617>] genl_rcv+0x27/0x40 [ 327.696018] [<ffffffff8143d21e>] netlink_unicast+0x15e/0x1b0 [ 327.696018] [<ffffffff8143ddcf>] netlink_sendmsg+0x22f/0x400 [ 327.696018] [<ffffffff813f7836>] __sock_sendmsg+0x66/0x80 [ 327.696018] [<ffffffff813f7957>] sock_aio_write+0x107/0x120 [ 327.696018] [<ffffffff8117f76d>] do_sync_write+0x7d/0xc0 [ 327.696018] [<ffffffff8117fc56>] vfs_write+0x186/0x190 [ 327.696018] [<ffffffff811803e0>] SyS_write+0x60/0xb0 [ 327.696018] [<ffffffff814de852>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [ 327.696018] [ 327.696018] other info that might help us debug this: [ 327.696018] [ 327.696018] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 327.696018] [ 327.696018] CPU0 CPU1 [ 327.696018] ---- ---- [ 327.696018] lock(&(&b_ptr->lock)->rlock); [ 327.696018] lock(((timer))#2); [ 327.696018] lock(&(&b_ptr->lock)->rlock); [ 327.696018] lock(((timer))#2); [ 327.696018] [ 327.696018] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 327.696018] [ 327.696018] 5 locks held by tipc-config/5825: [ 327.696018] #0: (cb_lock){++++++}, at: [<ffffffff8143e608>] genl_rcv+0x18/0x40 [ 327.696018] #1: (genl_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff8143ed66>] genl_rcv_msg+0xa6/0xd0 [ 327.696018] #2: (config_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa02bf889>] tipc_cfg_do_cmd+0x39/ 0x550 [tipc] [ 327.696018] #3: (tipc_net_lock){++.-..}, at: [<ffffffffa02be738>] tipc_disable_bearer+ 0x18/0x60 [tipc] [ 327.696018] #4: (&(&b_ptr->lock)->rlock){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffffa02be58d>] bearer_disable+0xdd/0x120 [tipc] [ 327.696018] [ 327.696018] stack backtrace: [ 327.696018] CPU: 2 PID: 5825 Comm: tipc-config Tainted: G O 3.11.0-rc3-wwd- default #4 [ 327.696018] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2007 [ 327.696018] 00000000ffffffff ffff880037fa77a8 ffffffff814d03dd 0000000000000000 [ 327.696018] ffff880037fa7808 ffff880037fa77e8 ffffffff810b1c4f 0000000037fa77e8 [ 327.696018] ffff880037fa7808 ffff880037e4db40 0000000000000000 ffff880037e4e318 [ 327.696018] Call Trace: [ 327.696018] [<ffffffff814d03dd>] dump_stack+0x4d/0xa0 [ 327.696018] [<ffffffff810b1c4f>] print_circular_bug+0x10f/0x120 [ 327.696018] [<ffffffff810b33fe>] check_prev_add+0x43e/0x4b0 [ 327.696018] [<ffffffff810b3b4d>] validate_chain+0x6dd/0x870 [ 327.696018] [<ffffffff81087a28>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0xd8/0x110 [ 327.696018] [<ffffffff810b40bb>] __lock_acquire+0x3db/0x670 [ 327.696018] [<ffffffff810b4453>] lock_acquire+0x103/0x130 [ 327.696018] [<ffffffff8105be80>] ? try_to_del_timer_sync+0x70/0x70 [ 327.696018] [<ffffffff8105bebd>] del_timer_sync+0x3d/0xd0 [ 327.696018] [<ffffffff8105be80>] ? try_to_del_timer_sync+0x70/0x70 [ 327.696018] [<ffffffffa02c5855>] tipc_disc_delete+0x15/0x30 [tipc] [ 327.696018] [<ffffffffa02be59f>] bearer_disable+0xef/0x120 [tipc] [ 327.696018] [<ffffffffa02be74f>] tipc_disable_bearer+0x2f/0x60 [tipc] [ 327.696018] [<ffffffffa02bfb32>] tipc_cfg_do_cmd+0x2e2/0x550 [tipc] [ 327.696018] [<ffffffff81218783>] ? security_capable+0x13/0x20 [ 327.696018] [<ffffffffa02c8c79>] handle_cmd+0x49/0xe0 [tipc] [ 327.696018] [<ffffffff8143e898>] genl_family_rcv_msg+0x268/0x340 [ 327.696018] [<ffffffff8143ed30>] genl_rcv_msg+0x70/0xd0 [ 327.696018] [<ffffffff8143ecc0>] ? genl_lock+0x20/0x20 [ 327.696018] [<ffffffff8143d4c9>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x89/0xb0 [ 327.696018] [<ffffffff8143e608>] ? genl_rcv+0x18/0x40 [ 327.696018] [<ffffffff8143e617>] genl_rcv+0x27/0x40 [ 327.696018] [<ffffffff8143d21e>] netlink_unicast+0x15e/0x1b0 [ 327.696018] [<ffffffff81289d7c>] ? memcpy_fromiovec+0x6c/0x90 [ 327.696018] [<ffffffff8143ddcf>] netlink_sendmsg+0x22f/0x400 [ 327.696018] [<ffffffff813f7836>] __sock_sendmsg+0x66/0x80 [ 327.696018] [<ffffffff813f7957>] sock_aio_write+0x107/0x120 [ 327.696018] [<ffffffff813fe29c>] ? release_sock+0x8c/0xa0 [ 327.696018] [<ffffffff8117f76d>] do_sync_write+0x7d/0xc0 [ 327.696018] [<ffffffff8117fa24>] ? rw_verify_area+0x54/0x100 [ 327.696018] [<ffffffff8117fc56>] vfs_write+0x186/0x190 [ 327.696018] [<ffffffff811803e0>] SyS_write+0x60/0xb0 [ 327.696018] [<ffffffff814de852>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b ----------------------------------------------------------------------- The problem is that the tipc_link_delete() will cancel the timer disc_timeout() when the b_ptr->lock is hold, but the disc_timeout() still call b_ptr->lock to finish the work, so the dead lock occurs. We should unlock the b_ptr->lock when del the disc_timeout(). Remove link_timeout() still met the same problem, the patch: http://article.gmane.org/gmane.network.tipc.general/4380 fix the problem, so no need to send patch for fix link_timeout() deadlock warming. Signed-off-by: Wang Weidong <wangweidong1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Ding Tianhong <dingtianhong@huawei.com> Acked-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Fix a NULL pointer deference while removing an empty directory, which was introduced by commit 3704412 ("[readdir] convert ocfs2"). BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) IP: [<(null)>] (null) PGD 6da85067 PUD 6da89067 PMD 0 Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP CPU: 0 PID: 6564 Comm: rmdir Tainted: G O 3.11.0-rc1 #4 RIP: 0010:[<0000000000000000>] [< (null)>] (null) Call Trace: ocfs2_dir_foreach+0x49/0x50 [ocfs2] ocfs2_empty_dir+0x12c/0x3e0 [ocfs2] ocfs2_unlink+0x56e/0xc10 [ocfs2] vfs_rmdir+0xd5/0x140 do_rmdir+0x1cb/0x1e0 SyS_rmdir+0x16/0x20 system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Code: Bad RIP value. RIP [< (null)>] (null) RSP <ffff88006daddc10> CR2: 0000000000000000 [dan.carpenter@oracle.com: fix pointer math] Signed-off-by: Jie Liu <jeff.liu@oracle.com> Reported-by: David Weber <wb@munzinger.de> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Since commit 2025172 (spi/bitbang: Use core message pump), the following kernel crash is seen: Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000d pgd = 80004000 [0000000d] *pgd=00000000 Internal error: Oops: 5 [#1] SMP ARM Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 48 Comm: spi32766 Not tainted 3.11.0-rc1+ #4 task: bfa3e580 ti: bfb90000 task.ti: bfb90000 PC is at spi_bitbang_transfer_one+0x50/0x248 LR is at spi_bitbang_transfer_one+0x20/0x248 ... ,and also the following build warning: drivers/spi/spi-bitbang.c: In function 'spi_bitbang_start': drivers/spi/spi-bitbang.c:436:31: warning: assignment from incompatible pointer type [enabled by default] In order to fix it, we need to change the first parameter of spi_bitbang_transfer_one() to 'struct spi_master *master'. Tested on a mx6qsabrelite by succesfully probing a SPI NOR flash. Signed-off-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@freescale.com> Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@linaro.org>

Commits 6a1c068 and 9356b53, respectively 'tty: Convert termios_mutex to termios_rwsem' and 'n_tty: Access termios values safely' introduced a circular lock dependency with console_lock and termios_rwsem. The lockdep report [1] shows that n_tty_write() will attempt to claim console_lock while holding the termios_rwsem, whereas tty_do_resize() may already hold the console_lock while claiming the termios_rwsem. Since n_tty_write() and tty_do_resize() do not contend over the same data -- the tty->winsize structure -- correct the lock dependency by introducing a new lock which specifically serializes access to tty->winsize only. [1] Lockdep report ====================================================== [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] 3.10.0-0+tip-xeon+lockdep #0+tip Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------- modprobe/277 is trying to acquire lock: (&tty->termios_rwsem){++++..}, at: [<ffffffff81452656>] tty_do_resize+0x36/0xe0 but task is already holding lock: ((fb_notifier_list).rwsem){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff8107aac6>] __blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x56/0xc0 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 ((fb_notifier_list).rwsem){.+.+.+}: [<ffffffff810b6d62>] lock_acquire+0x92/0x1f0 [<ffffffff8175b797>] down_read+0x47/0x5c [<ffffffff8107aac6>] __blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x56/0xc0 [<ffffffff8107ab46>] blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x16/0x20 [<ffffffff813d7c0b>] fb_notifier_call_chain+0x1b/0x20 [<ffffffff813d95b2>] register_framebuffer+0x1e2/0x320 [<ffffffffa01043e1>] drm_fb_helper_initial_config+0x371/0x540 [drm_kms_helper] [<ffffffffa01bcb05>] nouveau_fbcon_init+0x105/0x140 [nouveau] [<ffffffffa01ad0af>] nouveau_drm_load+0x43f/0x610 [nouveau] [<ffffffffa008a79e>] drm_get_pci_dev+0x17e/0x2a0 [drm] [<ffffffffa01ad4da>] nouveau_drm_probe+0x25a/0x2a0 [nouveau] [<ffffffff813b13db>] local_pci_probe+0x4b/0x80 [<ffffffff813b1701>] pci_device_probe+0x111/0x120 [<ffffffff814977eb>] driver_probe_device+0x8b/0x3a0 [<ffffffff81497bab>] __driver_attach+0xab/0xb0 [<ffffffff814956ad>] bus_for_each_dev+0x5d/0xa0 [<ffffffff814971fe>] driver_attach+0x1e/0x20 [<ffffffff81496cc1>] bus_add_driver+0x111/0x290 [<ffffffff814982b7>] driver_register+0x77/0x170 [<ffffffff813b0454>] __pci_register_driver+0x64/0x70 [<ffffffffa008a9da>] drm_pci_init+0x11a/0x130 [drm] [<ffffffffa022a04d>] nouveau_drm_init+0x4d/0x1000 [nouveau] [<ffffffff810002ea>] do_one_initcall+0xea/0x1a0 [<ffffffff810c54cb>] load_module+0x123b/0x1bf0 [<ffffffff810c5f57>] SyS_init_module+0xd7/0x120 [<ffffffff817677c2>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b -> #1 (console_lock){+.+.+.}: [<ffffffff810b6d62>] lock_acquire+0x92/0x1f0 [<ffffffff810430a7>] console_lock+0x77/0x80 [<ffffffff8146b2a1>] con_flush_chars+0x31/0x50 [<ffffffff8145780c>] n_tty_write+0x1ec/0x4d0 [<ffffffff814541b9>] tty_write+0x159/0x2e0 [<ffffffff814543f5>] redirected_tty_write+0xb5/0xc0 [<ffffffff811ab9d5>] vfs_write+0xc5/0x1f0 [<ffffffff811abec5>] SyS_write+0x55/0xa0 [<ffffffff817677c2>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b -> #0 (&tty->termios_rwsem){++++..}: [<ffffffff810b65c3>] __lock_acquire+0x1c43/0x1d30 [<ffffffff810b6d62>] lock_acquire+0x92/0x1f0 [<ffffffff8175b724>] down_write+0x44/0x70 [<ffffffff81452656>] tty_do_resize+0x36/0xe0 [<ffffffff8146c841>] vc_do_resize+0x3e1/0x4c0 [<ffffffff8146c99f>] vc_resize+0x1f/0x30 [<ffffffff813e4535>] fbcon_init+0x385/0x5a0 [<ffffffff8146a4bc>] visual_init+0xbc/0x120 [<ffffffff8146cd13>] do_bind_con_driver+0x163/0x320 [<ffffffff8146cfa1>] do_take_over_console+0x61/0x70 [<ffffffff813e2b93>] do_fbcon_takeover+0x63/0xc0 [<ffffffff813e67a5>] fbcon_event_notify+0x715/0x820 [<ffffffff81762f9d>] notifier_call_chain+0x5d/0x110 [<ffffffff8107aadc>] __blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x6c/0xc0 [<ffffffff8107ab46>] blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x16/0x20 [<ffffffff813d7c0b>] fb_notifier_call_chain+0x1b/0x20 [<ffffffff813d95b2>] register_framebuffer+0x1e2/0x320 [<ffffffffa01043e1>] drm_fb_helper_initial_config+0x371/0x540 [drm_kms_helper] [<ffffffffa01bcb05>] nouveau_fbcon_init+0x105/0x140 [nouveau] [<ffffffffa01ad0af>] nouveau_drm_load+0x43f/0x610 [nouveau] [<ffffffffa008a79e>] drm_get_pci_dev+0x17e/0x2a0 [drm] [<ffffffffa01ad4da>] nouveau_drm_probe+0x25a/0x2a0 [nouveau] [<ffffffff813b13db>] local_pci_probe+0x4b/0x80 [<ffffffff813b1701>] pci_device_probe+0x111/0x120 [<ffffffff814977eb>] driver_probe_device+0x8b/0x3a0 [<ffffffff81497bab>] __driver_attach+0xab/0xb0 [<ffffffff814956ad>] bus_for_each_dev+0x5d/0xa0 [<ffffffff814971fe>] driver_attach+0x1e/0x20 [<ffffffff81496cc1>] bus_add_driver+0x111/0x290 [<ffffffff814982b7>] driver_register+0x77/0x170 [<ffffffff813b0454>] __pci_register_driver+0x64/0x70 [<ffffffffa008a9da>] drm_pci_init+0x11a/0x130 [drm] [<ffffffffa022a04d>] nouveau_drm_init+0x4d/0x1000 [nouveau] [<ffffffff810002ea>] do_one_initcall+0xea/0x1a0 [<ffffffff810c54cb>] load_module+0x123b/0x1bf0 [<ffffffff810c5f57>] SyS_init_module+0xd7/0x120 [<ffffffff817677c2>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &tty->termios_rwsem --> console_lock --> (fb_notifier_list).rwsem Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock((fb_notifier_list).rwsem); lock(console_lock); lock((fb_notifier_list).rwsem); lock(&tty->termios_rwsem); *** DEADLOCK *** 7 locks held by modprobe/277: #0: (&__lockdep_no_validate__){......}, at: [<ffffffff81497b5b>] __driver_attach+0x5b/0xb0 #1: (&__lockdep_no_validate__){......}, at: [<ffffffff81497b69>] __driver_attach+0x69/0xb0 #2: (drm_global_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa008a6dd>] drm_get_pci_dev+0xbd/0x2a0 [drm] #3: (registration_lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff813d93f5>] register_framebuffer+0x25/0x320 #4: (&fb_info->lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff813d8116>] lock_fb_info+0x26/0x60 #5: (console_lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff813d95a4>] register_framebuffer+0x1d4/0x320 #6: ((fb_notifier_list).rwsem){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff8107aac6>] __blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x56/0xc0 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 277 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 3.10.0-0+tip-xeon+lockdep #0+tip Hardware name: Dell Inc. Precision WorkStation T5400 /0RW203, BIOS A11 04/30/2012 ffffffff8213e5e0 ffff8802aa2fb298 ffffffff81755f19 ffff8802aa2fb2e8 ffffffff8174f506 ffff8802aa2fa000 ffff8802aa2fb378 ffff8802aa2ea8e8 ffff8802aa2ea910 ffff8802aa2ea8e8 0000000000000006 0000000000000007 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81755f19>] dump_stack+0x19/0x1b [<ffffffff8174f506>] print_circular_bug+0x1fb/0x20c [<ffffffff810b65c3>] __lock_acquire+0x1c43/0x1d30 [<ffffffff810b775e>] ? mark_held_locks+0xae/0x120 [<ffffffff810b78d5>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x105/0x1d0 [<ffffffff810b6d62>] lock_acquire+0x92/0x1f0 [<ffffffff81452656>] ? tty_do_resize+0x36/0xe0 [<ffffffff8175b724>] down_write+0x44/0x70 [<ffffffff81452656>] ? tty_do_resize+0x36/0xe0 [<ffffffff81452656>] tty_do_resize+0x36/0xe0 [<ffffffff8146c841>] vc_do_resize+0x3e1/0x4c0 [<ffffffff8146c99f>] vc_resize+0x1f/0x30 [<ffffffff813e4535>] fbcon_init+0x385/0x5a0 [<ffffffff8146a4bc>] visual_init+0xbc/0x120 [<ffffffff8146cd13>] do_bind_con_driver+0x163/0x320 [<ffffffff8146cfa1>] do_take_over_console+0x61/0x70 [<ffffffff813e2b93>] do_fbcon_takeover+0x63/0xc0 [<ffffffff813e67a5>] fbcon_event_notify+0x715/0x820 [<ffffffff81762f9d>] notifier_call_chain+0x5d/0x110 [<ffffffff8107aadc>] __blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x6c/0xc0 [<ffffffff8107ab46>] blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x16/0x20 [<ffffffff813d7c0b>] fb_notifier_call_chain+0x1b/0x20 [<ffffffff813d95b2>] register_framebuffer+0x1e2/0x320 [<ffffffffa01043e1>] drm_fb_helper_initial_config+0x371/0x540 [drm_kms_helper] [<ffffffff8173cbcb>] ? kmemleak_alloc+0x5b/0xc0 [<ffffffff81198874>] ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x104/0x290 [<ffffffffa01035e1>] ? drm_fb_helper_single_add_all_connectors+0x81/0xf0 [drm_kms_helper] [<ffffffffa01bcb05>] nouveau_fbcon_init+0x105/0x140 [nouveau] [<ffffffffa01ad0af>] nouveau_drm_load+0x43f/0x610 [nouveau] [<ffffffffa008a79e>] drm_get_pci_dev+0x17e/0x2a0 [drm] [<ffffffffa01ad4da>] nouveau_drm_probe+0x25a/0x2a0 [nouveau] [<ffffffff8175f162>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x42/0x80 [<ffffffff813b13db>] local_pci_probe+0x4b/0x80 [<ffffffff813b1701>] pci_device_probe+0x111/0x120 [<ffffffff814977eb>] driver_probe_device+0x8b/0x3a0 [<ffffffff81497bab>] __driver_attach+0xab/0xb0 [<ffffffff81497b00>] ? driver_probe_device+0x3a0/0x3a0 [<ffffffff814956ad>] bus_for_each_dev+0x5d/0xa0 [<ffffffff814971fe>] driver_attach+0x1e/0x20 [<ffffffff81496cc1>] bus_add_driver+0x111/0x290 [<ffffffffa022a000>] ? 0xffffffffa0229fff [<ffffffff814982b7>] driver_register+0x77/0x170 [<ffffffffa022a000>] ? 0xffffffffa0229fff [<ffffffff813b0454>] __pci_register_driver+0x64/0x70 [<ffffffffa008a9da>] drm_pci_init+0x11a/0x130 [drm] [<ffffffffa022a000>] ? 0xffffffffa0229fff [<ffffffffa022a000>] ? 0xffffffffa0229fff [<ffffffffa022a04d>] nouveau_drm_init+0x4d/0x1000 [nouveau] [<ffffffff810002ea>] do_one_initcall+0xea/0x1a0 [<ffffffff810c54cb>] load_module+0x123b/0x1bf0 [<ffffffff81399a50>] ? ddebug_proc_open+0xb0/0xb0 [<ffffffff813855ae>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x3a/0x3f [<ffffffff810c5f57>] SyS_init_module+0xd7/0x120 [<ffffffff817677c2>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Otherwise we get flooded by the kernel warning us that we are doing long sequences of IO without serialisation. For example, WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 11136 at drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_sideband.c:40 vlv_sideband_rw+0x48/0x1ef() Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 11136 Comm: kworker/u2:0 Tainted: G W 3.11.0-rc2+ #4 Call Trace: [<c2028564>] ? warn_slowpath_common+0x63/0x78 [<c227ad43>] ? vlv_sideband_rw+0x48/0x1ef [<c20285dd>] ? warn_slowpath_null+0xf/0x13 [<c227ad43>] ? vlv_sideband_rw+0x48/0x1ef [<c227b060>] ? vlv_dpio_write+0x1c/0x21 [<c2262b3b>] ? intel_dp_set_signal_levels+0x24a/0x385 [<c2264909>] ? intel_dp_complete_link_train+0x25/0x1d1 [<c2264c55>] ? intel_dp_check_link_status+0xf7/0x106 [<c2238ced>] ? i915_hotplug_work_func+0x17b/0x221 [<c203a204>] ? process_one_work+0x12e/0x210 [<c203a5e4>] ? worker_thread+0x116/0x1ad [<c203a4ce>] ? rescuer_thread+0x1cb/0x1cb [<c203d8f5>] ? kthread+0x67/0x6c [<c2457ebb>] ? ret_from_kernel_thread+0x1b/0x30 [<c203d88e>] ? init_completion+0x18/0x18 v2: Retire the locking in vlv_crtc_enable() and do it close to the meat. Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com> [danvet: Squash in a s/mutex_lock/mutex_unlock/ fixup spotted by the 0 day kernel build/coccinelle and reported by Dan Carpenter.] Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>

Since commit 29a241c (ACPICA: Add argument typechecking for all predefined ACPI names), _DSM parameters are validated which trigger the following warning: ACPI Warning: \_SB_.PCI0.GFX0._DSM: Argument #4 type mismatch - Found [Integer], ACPI requires [Package] (20130517/nsarguments-95) ACPI Warning: \_SB_.PCI0.GFX0._DSM: Argument #4 type mismatch - Found [Integer], ACPI requires [Package] (20130517/nsarguments-95) ACPI Warning: \_SB_.PCI0.P0P2.PEGP._DSM: Argument #4 type mismatch - Found [Integer], ACPI requires [Package] (20130517/nsarguments-95) ACPI Warning: \_SB_.PCI0.P0P2.PEGP._DSM: Argument #4 type mismatch - Found [Integer], ACPI requires [Package] (20130517/nsarguments-95) As the Intel _DSM method seems to ignore this parameter, let's comply to the ACPI spec and use a Package instead. Signed-off-by: Peter Wu <lekensteyn@gmail.com> Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32602 Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>

ACPI 5.0 specification requires the fourth parameter to the _DSM (Device Specific Method) to be of type package instead of integer. Failing to do that we get following warning on the console: ACPI Warning: \_SB_.PCI0.I2C1.TPL0._DSM: Argument #4 type mismatch - Found [Integer], ACPI requires [Package] (20130517/nsarguments-95) Fix this by passing an empty package to the _DSM method. The HID over I2C specification doesn't require any specific values to be passed with this parameter. Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>

When booting secondary CPUs, announce_cpu() is called to show which cpu has been brought up. For example: [ 0.402751] smpboot: Booting Node 0, Processors #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 OK [ 0.525667] smpboot: Booting Node 1, Processors #6 #7 #8 #9 #10 #11 OK [ 0.755592] smpboot: Booting Node 0, Processors #12 #13 #14 #15 #16 #17 OK [ 0.890495] smpboot: Booting Node 1, Processors #18 #19 #20 #21 #22 #23 But the last "OK" is lost, because 'nr_cpu_ids-1' represents the maximum possible cpu id. It should use the maximum present cpu id in case not all CPUs booted up. Signed-off-by: Libin <huawei.libin@huawei.com> Cc: <guohanjun@huawei.com> Cc: <wangyijing@huawei.com> Cc: <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1378378676-18276-1-git-send-email-huawei.libin@huawei.com [ tweaked the changelog, removed unnecessary line break, tweaked the format to align the fields vertically. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Not all I/O ASIC versions have the free-running counter implemented, an early revision used in the 5000/1xx models aka 3MIN and 4MIN did not have it. Therefore we cannot unconditionally use it as a clock source. Fortunately if not implemented its register slot has a fixed value so it is enough if we check for the value at the end of the calibration period being the same as at the beginning. This also means we need to look for another high-precision clock source on the systems affected. The 5000/1xx can have an R4000SC processor installed where the CP0 Count register can be used as a clock source. Unfortunately all the R4k DECstations suffer from the missed timer interrupt on CP0 Count reads erratum, so we cannot use the CP0 timer as a clock source and a clock event both at a time. However we never need an R4k clock event device because all DECstations have a DS1287A RTC chip whose periodic interrupt can be used as a clock source. This gives us the following four configuration possibilities for I/O ASIC DECstations: 1. No I/O ASIC counter and no CP0 timer, e.g. R3k 5000/1xx (3MIN). 2. No I/O ASIC counter but the CP0 timer, i.e. R4k 5000/150 (4MIN). 3. The I/O ASIC counter but no CP0 timer, e.g. R3k 5000/240 (3MAX+). 4. The I/O ASIC counter and the CP0 timer, e.g. R4k 5000/260 (4MAX+). For #1 and #2 this change stops the I/O ASIC free-running counter from being installed as a clock source of a 0Hz frequency. For #2 it also arranges for the CP0 timer to be used as a clock source rather than a clock event device, because having an accurate wall clock is more important than a high-precision interval timer. For #3 there is no change. For #4 the change makes the I/O ASIC free-running counter installed as a clock source so that the CP0 timer can be used as a clock event device. Unfortunately the use of the CP0 timer as a clock event device relies on a succesful completion of c0_compare_interrupt. That never happens, because while waiting for a CP0 Compare interrupt to happen the function spins in a loop reading the CP0 Count register. This makes the CP0 Count erratum trigger reliably causing the interrupt waited for to be lost in all cases. As a result #4 resorts to using the CP0 timer as a clock source as well, just as #2. However we want to keep this separate arrangement in case (hope) c0_compare_interrupt is eventually rewritten such that it avoids the erratum. Signed-off-by: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@linux-mips.org> Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/5825/ Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>

When parsing lines from objdump a line containing source code starting with a numeric label is mistaken for a line of disassembly starting with a memory address. Current validation fails to recognise that the "memory address" is out of range and calculates an invalid offset which later causes this segfault: Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x0000000000457315 in disasm__calc_percent (notes=0xc98970, evidx=0, offset=143705, end=2127526177, path=0x7fffffffbf50) at util/annotate.c:631 631 hits += h->addr[offset++]; (gdb) bt #0 0x0000000000457315 in disasm__calc_percent (notes=0xc98970, evidx=0, offset=143705, end=2127526177, path=0x7fffffffbf50) at util/annotate.c:631 #1 0x00000000004d65e3 in annotate_browser__calc_percent (browser=0x7fffffffd130, evsel=0xa01da0) at ui/browsers/annotate.c:364 #2 0x00000000004d7433 in annotate_browser__run (browser=0x7fffffffd130, evsel=0xa01da0, hbt=0x0) at ui/browsers/annotate.c:672 #3 0x00000000004d80c9 in symbol__tui_annotate (sym=0xc989a0, map=0xa02660, evsel=0xa01da0, hbt=0x0) at ui/browsers/annotate.c:962 #4 0x00000000004d7aa0 in hist_entry__tui_annotate (he=0xdf73f0, evsel=0xa01da0, hbt=0x0) at ui/browsers/annotate.c:823 #5 0x00000000004dd648 in perf_evsel__hists_browse (evsel=0xa01da0, nr_events=1, helpline= 0x58b768 "For a higher level overview, try: perf report --sort comm,dso", ev_name=0xa02cd0 "cycles", left_exits=false, hbt= 0x0, min_pcnt=0, env=0xa011e0) at ui/browsers/hists.c:1659 #6 0x00000000004de372 in perf_evlist__tui_browse_hists (evlist=0xa01520, help= 0x58b768 "For a higher level overview, try: perf report --sort comm,dso", hbt=0x0, min_pcnt=0, env=0xa011e0) at ui/browsers/hists.c:1950 #7 0x000000000042cf6b in __cmd_report (rep=0x7fffffffd6c0) at builtin-report.c:581 #8 0x000000000042e25d in cmd_report (argc=0, argv=0x7fffffffe4b0, prefix=0x0) at builtin-report.c:965 #9 0x000000000041a0e1 in run_builtin (p=0x801548, argc=1, argv=0x7fffffffe4b0) at perf.c:319 #10 0x000000000041a319 in handle_internal_command (argc=1, argv=0x7fffffffe4b0) at perf.c:376 #11 0x000000000041a465 in run_argv (argcp=0x7fffffffe38c, argv=0x7fffffffe380) at perf.c:420 #12 0x000000000041a707 in main (argc=1, argv=0x7fffffffe4b0) at perf.c:521 After the fix is applied the symbol can be annotated showing the problematic line "1: rep" copy_user_generic_string /usr/lib/debug/lib/modules/3.9.10-100.fc17.x86_64/vmlinux */ ENTRY(copy_user_generic_string) CFI_STARTPROC ASM_STAC andl %edx,%edx and %edx,%edx jz 4f je 37 cmpl $8,%edx cmp $0x8,%edx jb 2f /* less than 8 bytes, go to byte copy loop */ jb 33 ALIGN_DESTINATION mov %edi,%ecx and $0x7,%ecx je 28 sub $0x8,%ecx neg %ecx sub %ecx,%edx 1a: mov (%rsi),%al mov %al,(%rdi) inc %rsi inc %rdi dec %ecx jne 1a movl %edx,%ecx 28: mov %edx,%ecx shrl $3,%ecx shr $0x3,%ecx andl $7,%edx and $0x7,%edx 1: rep 100.00 rep movsq %ds:(%rsi),%es:(%rdi) movsq 2: movl %edx,%ecx 33: mov %edx,%ecx 3: rep rep movsb %ds:(%rsi),%es:(%rdi) movsb 4: xorl %eax,%eax 37: xor %eax,%eax data32 xchg %ax,%ax ASM_CLAC ret retq Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1379009721-27667-1-git-send-email-adrian.hunter@intel.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

…CIe cards The band selection and PE control code for the RT3593 chipsets only handles USB based devices currently. Due to this limitation RT3593 based PCIe cards are not working correctly. On PCIe cards band selection is controlled via GPIO #8 which is identical to the USB devices. The LNA PE control is slightly different, all LNA PEs are controlled by GPIO #4. Update the code to configure the GPIO_CTRL register correctly on PCIe devices. Cc: Steven Liu <steven.liu@mediatek.com> Cc: JasonYS Cheng <jasonys.cheng@mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: Gabor Juhos <juhosg@openwrt.org> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>

Michael Semon reported that xfs/299 generated this lockdep warning: ============================================= [ INFO: possible recursive locking detected ] 3.12.0-rc2+ #2 Not tainted --------------------------------------------- touch/21072 is trying to acquire lock: (&xfs_dquot_other_class){+.+...}, at: [<c12902fb>] xfs_trans_dqlockedjoin+0x57/0x64 but task is already holding lock: (&xfs_dquot_other_class){+.+...}, at: [<c12902fb>] xfs_trans_dqlockedjoin+0x57/0x64 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&xfs_dquot_other_class); lock(&xfs_dquot_other_class); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 7 locks held by touch/21072: #0: (sb_writers#10){++++.+}, at: [<c11185b6>] mnt_want_write+0x1e/0x3e #1: (&type->i_mutex_dir_key#4){+.+.+.}, at: [<c11078ee>] do_last+0x245/0xe40 #2: (sb_internal#2){++++.+}, at: [<c122c9e0>] xfs_trans_alloc+0x1f/0x35 #3: (&(&ip->i_lock)->mr_lock/1){+.+...}, at: [<c126cd1b>] xfs_ilock+0x100/0x1f1 #4: (&(&ip->i_lock)->mr_lock){++++-.}, at: [<c126cf52>] xfs_ilock_nowait+0x105/0x22f #5: (&dqp->q_qlock){+.+...}, at: [<c12902fb>] xfs_trans_dqlockedjoin+0x57/0x64 #6: (&xfs_dquot_other_class){+.+...}, at: [<c12902fb>] xfs_trans_dqlockedjoin+0x57/0x64 The lockdep annotation for dquot lock nesting only understands locking for user and "other" dquots, not user, group and quota dquots. Fix the annotations to match the locking heirarchy we now have. Reported-by: Michael L. Semon <mlsemon35@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com> (cherry picked from commit f112a04)

As the new x86 CPU bootup printout format code maintainer, I am taking immediate action to improve and clean (and thus indulge my OCD) the reporting of the cores when coming up online. Fix padding to a right-hand alignment, cleanup code and bind reporting width to the max number of supported CPUs on the system, like this: [ 0.074509] smpboot: Booting Node 0, Processors: #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 OK [ 0.644008] smpboot: Booting Node 1, Processors: #8 #9 #10 #11 #12 #13 #14 #15 OK [ 1.245006] smpboot: Booting Node 2, Processors: #16 #17 #18 #19 #20 #21 #22 #23 OK [ 1.864005] smpboot: Booting Node 3, Processors: #24 #25 #26 #27 #28 #29 #30 #31 OK [ 2.489005] smpboot: Booting Node 4, Processors: #32 #33 #34 #35 #36 #37 #38 #39 OK [ 3.093005] smpboot: Booting Node 5, Processors: #40 #41 #42 #43 #44 #45 #46 #47 OK [ 3.698005] smpboot: Booting Node 6, Processors: #48 #49 #50 #51 #52 #53 #54 #55 OK [ 4.304005] smpboot: Booting Node 7, Processors: #56 #57 #58 #59 #60 #61 #62 #63 OK [ 4.961413] Brought up 64 CPUs and this: [ 0.072367] smpboot: Booting Node 0, Processors: #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 OK [ 0.686329] Brought up 8 CPUs Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Libin <huawei.libin@huawei.com> Cc: wangyijing@huawei.com Cc: fenghua.yu@intel.com Cc: guohanjun@huawei.com Cc: paul.gortmaker@windriver.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20130927143554.GF4422@pd.tnic Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Michael Semon reported that xfs/299 generated this lockdep warning: ============================================= [ INFO: possible recursive locking detected ] 3.12.0-rc2+ #2 Not tainted --------------------------------------------- touch/21072 is trying to acquire lock: (&xfs_dquot_other_class){+.+...}, at: [<c12902fb>] xfs_trans_dqlockedjoin+0x57/0x64 but task is already holding lock: (&xfs_dquot_other_class){+.+...}, at: [<c12902fb>] xfs_trans_dqlockedjoin+0x57/0x64 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&xfs_dquot_other_class); lock(&xfs_dquot_other_class); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 7 locks held by touch/21072: #0: (sb_writers#10){++++.+}, at: [<c11185b6>] mnt_want_write+0x1e/0x3e #1: (&type->i_mutex_dir_key#4){+.+.+.}, at: [<c11078ee>] do_last+0x245/0xe40 #2: (sb_internal#2){++++.+}, at: [<c122c9e0>] xfs_trans_alloc+0x1f/0x35 #3: (&(&ip->i_lock)->mr_lock/1){+.+...}, at: [<c126cd1b>] xfs_ilock+0x100/0x1f1 #4: (&(&ip->i_lock)->mr_lock){++++-.}, at: [<c126cf52>] xfs_ilock_nowait+0x105/0x22f #5: (&dqp->q_qlock){+.+...}, at: [<c12902fb>] xfs_trans_dqlockedjoin+0x57/0x64 #6: (&xfs_dquot_other_class){+.+...}, at: [<c12902fb>] xfs_trans_dqlockedjoin+0x57/0x64 The lockdep annotation for dquot lock nesting only understands locking for user and "other" dquots, not user, group and quota dquots. Fix the annotations to match the locking heirarchy we now have. Reported-by: Michael L. Semon <mlsemon35@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>

Turn it into (for example): [ 0.073380] x86: Booting SMP configuration: [ 0.074005] .... node #0, CPUs: #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 [ 0.603005] .... node #1, CPUs: #8 #9 #10 #11 #12 #13 #14 #15 [ 1.200005] .... node #2, CPUs: #16 #17 #18 #19 #20 #21 #22 #23 [ 1.796005] .... node #3, CPUs: #24 #25 #26 #27 #28 #29 #30 #31 [ 2.393005] .... node #4, CPUs: #32 #33 #34 #35 #36 #37 #38 #39 [ 2.996005] .... node #5, CPUs: #40 #41 #42 #43 #44 #45 #46 #47 [ 3.600005] .... node #6, CPUs: #48 #49 #50 #51 #52 #53 #54 #55 [ 4.202005] .... node #7, CPUs: #56 #57 #58 #59 #60 #61 #62 #63 [ 4.811005] .... node #8, CPUs: #64 #65 #66 #67 #68 #69 #70 #71 [ 5.421006] .... node #9, CPUs: #72 #73 #74 #75 #76 #77 #78 #79 [ 6.032005] .... node #10, CPUs: #80 #81 #82 #83 #84 #85 #86 #87 [ 6.648006] .... node #11, CPUs: #88 #89 #90 #91 #92 #93 #94 #95 [ 7.262005] .... node #12, CPUs: #96 #97 #98 #99 #100 #101 #102 #103 [ 7.865005] .... node #13, CPUs: #104 #105 #106 #107 #108 #109 #110 #111 [ 8.466005] .... node #14, CPUs: #112 #113 #114 #115 #116 #117 #118 #119 [ 9.073006] .... node #15, CPUs: #120 #121 #122 #123 #124 #125 #126 #127 [ 9.679901] x86: Booted up 16 nodes, 128 CPUs and drop useless elements. Change num_digits() to hpa's division-avoiding, cell-phone-typed version which he went at great lengths and pains to submit on a Saturday evening. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: huawei.libin@huawei.com Cc: wangyijing@huawei.com Cc: fenghua.yu@intel.com Cc: guohanjun@huawei.com Cc: paul.gortmaker@windriver.com Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20130930095624.GB16383@pd.tnic Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Booting a mx6 with CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING we get: ====================================================== [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] 3.12.0-rc4-next-20131009+ #34 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------- swapper/0/1 is trying to acquire lock: (&imx_drm_device->mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<804575a8>] imx_drm_encoder_get_mux_id+0x28/0x98 but task is already holding lock: (&crtc->mutex){+.+...}, at: [<802fe778>] drm_modeset_lock_all+0x40/0x54 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (&crtc->mutex){+.+...}: [<800777d0>] __lock_acquire+0x18d4/0x1c24 [<80077fec>] lock_acquire+0x68/0x7c [<805ead5c>] _mutex_lock_nest_lock+0x58/0x3a8 [<802fec50>] drm_crtc_init+0x48/0xa8 [<80457c88>] imx_drm_add_crtc+0xd4/0x144 [<8045e2e8>] ipu_drm_probe+0x114/0x1fc [<80312278>] platform_drv_probe+0x20/0x50 [<80310c68>] driver_probe_device+0x110/0x22c [<80310e20>] __driver_attach+0x9c/0xa0 [<8030f218>] bus_for_each_dev+0x5c/0x90 [<80310750>] driver_attach+0x20/0x28 [<8031034c>] bus_add_driver+0xdc/0x1dc [<803114d8>] driver_register+0x80/0xfc [<80312198>] __platform_driver_register+0x50/0x64 [<808172fc>] ipu_drm_driver_init+0x18/0x20 [<800088c0>] do_one_initcall+0xfc/0x160 [<807e7c5c>] kernel_init_freeable+0x104/0x1d4 [<805e2930>] kernel_init+0x10/0xec [<8000ea68>] ret_from_fork+0x14/0x2c -> #1 (&dev->mode_config.mutex){+.+.+.}: [<800777d0>] __lock_acquire+0x18d4/0x1c24 [<80077fec>] lock_acquire+0x68/0x7c [<805eb100>] mutex_lock_nested+0x54/0x3a4 [<802fe758>] drm_modeset_lock_all+0x20/0x54 [<802fead4>] drm_encoder_init+0x20/0x7c [<80457ae4>] imx_drm_add_encoder+0x88/0xec [<80459838>] imx_ldb_probe+0x344/0x4fc [<80312278>] platform_drv_probe+0x20/0x50 [<80310c68>] driver_probe_device+0x110/0x22c [<80310e20>] __driver_attach+0x9c/0xa0 [<8030f218>] bus_for_each_dev+0x5c/0x90 [<80310750>] driver_attach+0x20/0x28 [<8031034c>] bus_add_driver+0xdc/0x1dc [<803114d8>] driver_register+0x80/0xfc [<80312198>] __platform_driver_register+0x50/0x64 [<8081722c>] imx_ldb_driver_init+0x18/0x20 [<800088c0>] do_one_initcall+0xfc/0x160 [<807e7c5c>] kernel_init_freeable+0x104/0x1d4 [<805e2930>] kernel_init+0x10/0xec [<8000ea68>] ret_from_fork+0x14/0x2c -> #0 (&imx_drm_device->mutex){+.+.+.}: [<805e510c>] print_circular_bug+0x74/0x2e0 [<80077ad0>] __lock_acquire+0x1bd4/0x1c24 [<80077fec>] lock_acquire+0x68/0x7c [<805eb100>] mutex_lock_nested+0x54/0x3a4 [<804575a8>] imx_drm_encoder_get_mux_id+0x28/0x98 [<80459a98>] imx_ldb_encoder_prepare+0x34/0x114 [<802ef724>] drm_crtc_helper_set_mode+0x1f0/0x4c0 [<802f0344>] drm_crtc_helper_set_config+0x828/0x99c [<802ff270>] drm_mode_set_config_internal+0x5c/0xdc [<802eebe0>] drm_fb_helper_set_par+0x50/0xb4 [<802af580>] fbcon_init+0x490/0x500 [<802dd104>] visual_init+0xa8/0xf8 [<802df414>] do_bind_con_driver+0x140/0x37c [<802df764>] do_take_over_console+0x114/0x1c4 [<802af65c>] do_fbcon_takeover+0x6c/0xd4 [<802b2b30>] fbcon_event_notify+0x7c8/0x818 [<80049954>] notifier_call_chain+0x4c/0x8c [<80049cd8>] __blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x50/0x68 [<80049d10>] blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x20/0x28 [<802a75f0>] fb_notifier_call_chain+0x1c/0x24 [<802a9224>] register_framebuffer+0x188/0x268 [<802ee994>] drm_fb_helper_initial_config+0x2bc/0x4b8 [<802f118c>] drm_fbdev_cma_init+0x7c/0xec [<80817288>] imx_fb_helper_init+0x54/0x90 [<800088c0>] do_one_initcall+0xfc/0x160 [<807e7c5c>] kernel_init_freeable+0x104/0x1d4 [<805e2930>] kernel_init+0x10/0xec [<8000ea68>] ret_from_fork+0x14/0x2c other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &imx_drm_device->mutex --> &dev->mode_config.mutex --> &crtc->mutex Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&crtc->mutex); lock(&dev->mode_config.mutex); lock(&crtc->mutex); lock(&imx_drm_device->mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** 6 locks held by swapper/0/1: #0: (registration_lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<802a90bc>] register_framebuffer+0x20/0x268 #1: (&fb_info->lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<802a7a90>] lock_fb_info+0x20/0x44 #2: (console_lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<802a9218>] register_framebuffer+0x17c/0x268 #3: ((fb_notifier_list).rwsem){.+.+.+}, at: [<80049cbc>] __blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x34/0x68 #4: (&dev->mode_config.mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<802fe758>] drm_modeset_lock_all+0x20/0x54 #5: (&crtc->mutex){+.+...}, at: [<802fe778>] drm_modeset_lock_all+0x40/0x54 In order to avoid this lockdep warning, remove the locking from imx_drm_encoder_get_mux_id() and imx_drm_crtc_panel_format_pins(). Tested on a mx6sabrelite and mx53qsb. Reported-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk> Tested-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@freescale.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

If EM Transmit bit is busy during init ata_msleep() is called. It is wrong - msleep() should be used instead of ata_msleep(), because if EM Transmit bit is busy for one port, it will be busy for all other ports too, so using ata_msleep() causes wasting tries for another ports. The most common scenario looks like that now (six ports try to transmit a LED meaasege): - port #0 tries for the 1st time and succeeds - ports #1-5 try for the 1st time and sleeps - port #1 tries for the 2nd time and succeeds - ports #2-5 try for the 2nd time and sleeps - port #2 tries for the 3rd time and succeeds - ports #3-5 try for the 3rd time and sleeps - port #3 tries for the 4th time and succeeds - ports #4-5 try for the 4th time and sleeps - port #4 tries for the 5th time and succeeds - port #5 tries for the 5th time and sleeps At this moment port #5 wasted all its five tries and failed to initialize. Because there are only 5 (EM_MAX_RETRY) tries available usually only five ports succeed to initialize. The sixth port and next ones usually will fail. If msleep() is used instead of ata_msleep() the first port succeeds to initialize in the first try and next ones usually succeed to initialize in the second try. tj: updated comment Signed-off-by: Lukasz Dorau <lukasz.dorau@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>

Andrey reported the following report: ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address ffff8800359c99f3 ffff8800359c99f3 is located 0 bytes to the right of 243-byte region [ffff8800359c9900, ffff8800359c99f3) Accessed by thread T13003: #0 ffffffff810dd2da (asan_report_error+0x32a/0x440) #1 ffffffff810dc6b0 (asan_check_region+0x30/0x40) #2 ffffffff810dd4d3 (__tsan_write1+0x13/0x20) #3 ffffffff811cd19e (ftrace_regex_release+0x1be/0x260) #4 ffffffff812a1065 (__fput+0x155/0x360) #5 ffffffff812a12de (____fput+0x1e/0x30) #6 ffffffff8111708d (task_work_run+0x10d/0x140) #7 ffffffff810ea043 (do_exit+0x433/0x11f0) #8 ffffffff810eaee4 (do_group_exit+0x84/0x130) #9 ffffffff810eafb1 (SyS_exit_group+0x21/0x30) #10 ffffffff81928782 (system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b) Allocated by thread T5167: #0 ffffffff810dc778 (asan_slab_alloc+0x48/0xc0) #1 ffffffff8128337c (__kmalloc+0xbc/0x500) #2 ffffffff811d9d54 (trace_parser_get_init+0x34/0x90) #3 ffffffff811cd7b3 (ftrace_regex_open+0x83/0x2e0) #4 ffffffff811cda7d (ftrace_filter_open+0x2d/0x40) #5 ffffffff8129b4ff (do_dentry_open+0x32f/0x430) #6 ffffffff8129b668 (finish_open+0x68/0xa0) #7 ffffffff812b66ac (do_last+0xb8c/0x1710) #8 ffffffff812b7350 (path_openat+0x120/0xb50) #9 ffffffff812b8884 (do_filp_open+0x54/0xb0) #10 ffffffff8129d36c (do_sys_open+0x1ac/0x2c0) #11 ffffffff8129d4b7 (SyS_open+0x37/0x50) #12 ffffffff81928782 (system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b) Shadow bytes around the buggy address: ffff8800359c9700: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd ffff8800359c9780: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa ffff8800359c9800: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa ffff8800359c9880: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa ffff8800359c9900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 =>ffff8800359c9980: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00[03]fb ffff8800359c9a00: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa ffff8800359c9a80: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa ffff8800359c9b00: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff8800359c9b80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff8800359c9c00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap redzone: fa Heap kmalloc redzone: fb Freed heap region: fd Shadow gap: fe The out-of-bounds access happens on 'parser->buffer[parser->idx] = 0;' Although the crash happened in ftrace_regex_open() the real bug occurred in trace_get_user() where there's an incrementation to parser->idx without a check against the size. The way it is triggered is if userspace sends in 128 characters (EVENT_BUF_SIZE + 1), the loop that reads the last character stores it and then breaks out because there is no more characters. Then the last character is read to determine what to do next, and the index is incremented without checking size. Then the caller of trace_get_user() usually nulls out the last character with a zero, but since the index is equal to the size, it writes a nul character after the allocated space, which can corrupt memory. Luckily, only root user has write access to this file. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20131009222323.04fd1a0d@gandalf.local.home Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>

…ux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 boot changes from Ingo Molnar: "Two changes that prettify and compactify the SMP bootup output from: smpboot: Booting Node 0, Processors #1 #2 #3 OK smpboot: Booting Node 1, Processors #4 #5 #6 #7 OK smpboot: Booting Node 2, Processors #8 #9 #10 #11 OK smpboot: Booting Node 3, Processors #12 #13 #14 #15 OK Brought up 16 CPUs to something like: x86: Booting SMP configuration: .... node #0, CPUs: #1 #2 #3 .... node #1, CPUs: #4 #5 #6 #7 .... node #2, CPUs: #8 #9 #10 #11 .... node #3, CPUs: #12 #13 #14 #15 x86: Booted up 4 nodes, 16 CPUs" * 'x86-boot-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/boot: Further compress CPUs bootup message x86: Improve the printout of the SMP bootup CPU table

As part of normal operaions, the hrtimer subsystem frequently calls into the timekeeping code, creating a locking order of hrtimer locks -> timekeeping locks clock_was_set_delayed() was suppoed to allow us to avoid deadlocks between the timekeeping the hrtimer subsystem, so that we could notify the hrtimer subsytem the time had changed while holding the timekeeping locks. This was done by scheduling delayed work that would run later once we were out of the timekeeing code. But unfortunately the lock chains are complex enoguh that in scheduling delayed work, we end up eventually trying to grab an hrtimer lock. Sasha Levin noticed this in testing when the new seqlock lockdep enablement triggered the following (somewhat abrieviated) message: [ 251.100221] ====================================================== [ 251.100221] [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] [ 251.100221] 3.13.0-rc2-next-20131206-sasha-00005-g8be2375-dirty #4053 Not tainted [ 251.101967] ------------------------------------------------------- [ 251.101967] kworker/10:1/4506 is trying to acquire lock: [ 251.101967] (timekeeper_seq){----..}, at: [<ffffffff81160e96>] retrigger_next_event+0x56/0x70 [ 251.101967] [ 251.101967] but task is already holding lock: [ 251.101967] (hrtimer_bases.lock#11){-.-...}, at: [<ffffffff81160e7c>] retrigger_next_event+0x3c/0x70 [ 251.101967] [ 251.101967] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 251.101967] [ 251.101967] [ 251.101967] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 251.101967] -> #5 (hrtimer_bases.lock#11){-.-...}: [snipped] -> #4 (&rt_b->rt_runtime_lock){-.-...}: [snipped] -> #3 (&rq->lock){-.-.-.}: [snipped] -> #2 (&p->pi_lock){-.-.-.}: [snipped] -> #1 (&(&pool->lock)->rlock){-.-...}: [ 251.101967] [<ffffffff81194803>] validate_chain+0x6c3/0x7b0 [ 251.101967] [<ffffffff81194d9d>] __lock_acquire+0x4ad/0x580 [ 251.101967] [<ffffffff81194ff2>] lock_acquire+0x182/0x1d0 [ 251.101967] [<ffffffff84398500>] _raw_spin_lock+0x40/0x80 [ 251.101967] [<ffffffff81153e69>] __queue_work+0x1a9/0x3f0 [ 251.101967] [<ffffffff81154168>] queue_work_on+0x98/0x120 [ 251.101967] [<ffffffff81161351>] clock_was_set_delayed+0x21/0x30 [ 251.101967] [<ffffffff811c4bd1>] do_adjtimex+0x111/0x160 [ 251.101967] [<ffffffff811e2711>] compat_sys_adjtimex+0x41/0x70 [ 251.101967] [<ffffffff843a4b49>] ia32_sysret+0x0/0x5 [ 251.101967] -> #0 (timekeeper_seq){----..}: [snipped] [ 251.101967] other info that might help us debug this: [ 251.101967] [ 251.101967] Chain exists of: timekeeper_seq --> &rt_b->rt_runtime_lock --> hrtimer_bases.lock#11 [ 251.101967] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 251.101967] [ 251.101967] CPU0 CPU1 [ 251.101967] ---- ---- [ 251.101967] lock(hrtimer_bases.lock#11); [ 251.101967] lock(&rt_b->rt_runtime_lock); [ 251.101967] lock(hrtimer_bases.lock#11); [ 251.101967] lock(timekeeper_seq); [ 251.101967] [ 251.101967] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 251.101967] [ 251.101967] 3 locks held by kworker/10:1/4506: [ 251.101967] #0: (events){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff81154960>] process_one_work+0x200/0x530 [ 251.101967] #1: (hrtimer_work){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff81154960>] process_one_work+0x200/0x530 [ 251.101967] #2: (hrtimer_bases.lock#11){-.-...}, at: [<ffffffff81160e7c>] retrigger_next_event+0x3c/0x70 [ 251.101967] [ 251.101967] stack backtrace: [ 251.101967] CPU: 10 PID: 4506 Comm: kworker/10:1 Not tainted 3.13.0-rc2-next-20131206-sasha-00005-g8be2375-dirty #4053 [ 251.101967] Workqueue: events clock_was_set_work So the best solution is to avoid calling clock_was_set_delayed() while holding the timekeeping lock, and instead using a flag variable to decide if we should call clock_was_set() once we've released the locks. This works for the case here, where the do_adjtimex() was the deadlock trigger point. Unfortuantely, in update_wall_time() we still hold the jiffies lock, which would deadlock with the ipi triggered by clock_was_set(), preventing us from calling it even after we drop the timekeeping lock. So instead call clock_was_set_delayed() at that point. Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com> Cc: Richard Cochran <richardcochran@gmail.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> #3.10+ Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Tested-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>

Hayes Wang says: ==================== support new chip Remove the trailing "/* CRC */" for patch #3. Change the return value type of rtl_ops_init() from int to boolean for patch #4. Replace VENDOR_ID_SAMSUNG with SAMSUNG_VENDOR_ID for patch #6. ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Use helper functions to simplify _DSM related code in TPM driver. This patch also help to get rid of following warning messages: [ 163.509575] ACPI Error: Incorrect return type [Buffer] requested [Package] (20130517/nsxfeval-135) But there is still an warning left. [ 181.637366] ACPI Warning: \_SB_.IIO0.LPC0.TPM_._DSM: Argument #4 type mismatch - Found [Buffer], ACPI requires [Package] (20130517/nsarguments-95) Signed-off-by: Jiang Liu <jiang.liu@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>

When a task enters call_refreshresult with status 0 from call_refresh and !rpcauth_uptodatecred(task) it enters call_refresh again with no rate-limiting or max number of retries. Instead of trying forever, make use of the retry path that other errors use. This only seems to be possible when the crrefresh callback is gss_refresh_null, which only happens when destroying the context. To reproduce: 1) mount with sec=krb5 (or sec=sys with krb5 negotiated for non FSID specific operations). 2) reboot - the client will be stuck and will need to be hard rebooted BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 22s! [kworker/0:2:46] Modules linked in: rpcsec_gss_krb5 nfsv4 nfs fscache ppdev crc32c_intel aesni_intel aes_x86_64 glue_helper lrw gf128mul ablk_helper cryptd serio_raw i2c_piix4 i2c_core e1000 parport_pc parport shpchp nfsd auth_rpcgss oid_registry exportfs nfs_acl lockd sunrpc autofs4 mptspi scsi_transport_spi mptscsih mptbase ata_generic floppy irq event stamp: 195724 hardirqs last enabled at (195723): [<ffffffff814a925c>] restore_args+0x0/0x30 hardirqs last disabled at (195724): [<ffffffff814b0a6a>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x6a/0x80 softirqs last enabled at (195722): [<ffffffff8103f583>] __do_softirq+0x1df/0x276 softirqs last disabled at (195717): [<ffffffff8103f852>] irq_exit+0x53/0x9a CPU: 0 PID: 46 Comm: kworker/0:2 Not tainted 3.13.0-rc3-branch-dros_testing+ #4 Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 07/31/2013 Workqueue: rpciod rpc_async_schedule [sunrpc] task: ffff8800799c4260 ti: ffff880079002000 task.ti: ffff880079002000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa0064fd4>] [<ffffffffa0064fd4>] __rpc_execute+0x8a/0x362 [sunrpc] RSP: 0018:ffff880079003d18 EFLAGS: 00000246 RAX: 0000000000000005 RBX: 0000000000000007 RCX: 0000000000000007 RDX: 0000000000000007 RSI: ffff88007aecbae8 RDI: ffff8800783d8900 RBP: ffff880079003d78 R08: ffff88006e30e9f8 R09: ffffffffa005a3d7 R10: ffff88006e30e7b0 R11: ffff8800783d8900 R12: ffffffffa006675e R13: ffff880079003ce8 R14: ffff88006e30e7b0 R15: ffff8800783d8900 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88007f200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f3072333000 CR3: 0000000001a0b000 CR4: 00000000001407f0 Stack: ffff880079003d98 0000000000000246 0000000000000000 ffff88007a9a4830 ffff880000000000 ffffffff81073f47 ffff88007f212b00 ffff8800799c4260 ffff8800783d8988 ffff88007f212b00 ffffe8ffff604800 0000000000000000 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81073f47>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x145/0x1a1 [<ffffffffa00652d3>] rpc_async_schedule+0x27/0x32 [sunrpc] [<ffffffff81052974>] process_one_work+0x211/0x3a5 [<ffffffff810528d5>] ? process_one_work+0x172/0x3a5 [<ffffffff81052eeb>] worker_thread+0x134/0x202 [<ffffffff81052db7>] ? rescuer_thread+0x280/0x280 [<ffffffff81052db7>] ? rescuer_thread+0x280/0x280 [<ffffffff810584a0>] kthread+0xc9/0xd1 [<ffffffff810583d7>] ? __kthread_parkme+0x61/0x61 [<ffffffff814afd6c>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0 [<ffffffff810583d7>] ? __kthread_parkme+0x61/0x61 Code: e8 87 63 fd e0 c6 05 10 dd 01 00 01 48 8b 43 70 4c 8d 6b 70 45 31 e4 a8 02 0f 85 d5 02 00 00 4c 8b 7b 48 48 c7 43 48 00 00 00 00 <4c> 8b 4b 50 4d 85 ff 75 0c 4d 85 c9 4d 89 cf 0f 84 32 01 00 00 And the output of "rpcdebug -m rpc -s all": RPC: 61 call_refresh (status 0) RPC: 61 call_refresh (status 0) RPC: 61 refreshing RPCSEC_GSS cred ffff88007a413cf0 RPC: 61 refreshing RPCSEC_GSS cred ffff88007a413cf0 RPC: 61 call_refreshresult (status 0) RPC: 61 refreshing RPCSEC_GSS cred ffff88007a413cf0 RPC: 61 call_refreshresult (status 0) RPC: 61 refreshing RPCSEC_GSS cred ffff88007a413cf0 RPC: 61 call_refresh (status 0) RPC: 61 call_refreshresult (status 0) RPC: 61 call_refresh (status 0) RPC: 61 call_refresh (status 0) RPC: 61 refreshing RPCSEC_GSS cred ffff88007a413cf0 RPC: 61 call_refreshresult (status 0) RPC: 61 call_refresh (status 0) RPC: 61 refreshing RPCSEC_GSS cred ffff88007a413cf0 RPC: 61 call_refresh (status 0) RPC: 61 refreshing RPCSEC_GSS cred ffff88007a413cf0 RPC: 61 refreshing RPCSEC_GSS cred ffff88007a413cf0 RPC: 61 call_refreshresult (status 0) RPC: 61 call_refresh (status 0) RPC: 61 call_refresh (status 0) RPC: 61 call_refresh (status 0) RPC: 61 call_refresh (status 0) RPC: 61 call_refreshresult (status 0) RPC: 61 refreshing RPCSEC_GSS cred ffff88007a413cf0 Signed-off-by: Weston Andros Adamson <dros@netapp.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 2.6.37+ Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>

Jon Maloy says: ==================== tipc: link setup and failover improvements This series consists of four unrelated commits with different purposes. - Commit #1 is purely cosmetic and pedagogic, hopefully making the failover/tunneling logics slightly easier to understand. - Commit #2 fixes a bug that has always been in the code, but was not discovered until very recently. - Commit #3 fixes a non-fatal race issue in the neighbour discovery code. - Commit #4 removes an unnecessary indirection step during link startup. ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Avoid circular mutex lock by pushing the dev->lock to the .fini callback on each extension. As em28xx-dvb, em28xx-alsa and em28xx-rc have their own data structures, and don't touch at the common structure during .fini, only em28xx-v4l needs to be locked. [ 90.994317] ====================================================== [ 90.994356] [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] [ 90.994395] 3.13.0-rc1+ #24 Not tainted [ 90.994427] ------------------------------------------------------- [ 90.994458] khubd/54 is trying to acquire lock: [ 90.994490] (&card->controls_rwsem){++++.+}, at: [<ffffffffa0177b08>] snd_ctl_dev_free+0x28/0x60 [snd] [ 90.994656] [ 90.994656] but task is already holding lock: [ 90.994688] (&dev->lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa040db81>] em28xx_close_extension+0x31/0x90 [em28xx] [ 90.994843] [ 90.994843] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 90.994843] [ 90.994874] [ 90.994874] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 90.994905] -> #1 (&dev->lock){+.+.+.}: [ 90.995057] [<ffffffff810b8fa3>] __lock_acquire+0xb43/0x1330 [ 90.995121] [<ffffffff810b9f82>] lock_acquire+0xa2/0x120 [ 90.995182] [<ffffffff816a5b6c>] mutex_lock_nested+0x5c/0x3c0 [ 90.995245] [<ffffffffa0422cca>] em28xx_vol_put_mute+0x1ba/0x1d0 [em28xx_alsa] [ 90.995309] [<ffffffffa017813d>] snd_ctl_elem_write+0xfd/0x140 [snd] [ 90.995376] [<ffffffffa01791c2>] snd_ctl_ioctl+0xe2/0x810 [snd] [ 90.995442] [<ffffffff811db8b0>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x300/0x520 [ 90.995504] [<ffffffff811dbb51>] SyS_ioctl+0x81/0xa0 [ 90.995568] [<ffffffff816b1929>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [ 90.995630] -> #0 (&card->controls_rwsem){++++.+}: [ 90.995780] [<ffffffff810b7a47>] check_prevs_add+0x947/0x950 [ 90.995841] [<ffffffff810b8fa3>] __lock_acquire+0xb43/0x1330 [ 90.995901] [<ffffffff810b9f82>] lock_acquire+0xa2/0x120 [ 90.995962] [<ffffffff816a762b>] down_write+0x3b/0xa0 [ 90.996022] [<ffffffffa0177b08>] snd_ctl_dev_free+0x28/0x60 [snd] [ 90.996088] [<ffffffffa017a255>] snd_device_free+0x65/0x140 [snd] [ 90.996154] [<ffffffffa017a751>] snd_device_free_all+0x61/0xa0 [snd] [ 90.996219] [<ffffffffa0173af4>] snd_card_do_free+0x14/0x130 [snd] [ 90.996283] [<ffffffffa0173f14>] snd_card_free+0x84/0x90 [snd] [ 90.996349] [<ffffffffa0423397>] em28xx_audio_fini+0x97/0xb0 [em28xx_alsa] [ 90.996411] [<ffffffffa040dba6>] em28xx_close_extension+0x56/0x90 [em28xx] [ 90.996475] [<ffffffffa040f639>] em28xx_usb_disconnect+0x79/0x90 [em28xx] [ 90.996539] [<ffffffff814a06e7>] usb_unbind_interface+0x67/0x1d0 [ 90.996620] [<ffffffff8142920f>] __device_release_driver+0x7f/0xf0 [ 90.996682] [<ffffffff814292a5>] device_release_driver+0x25/0x40 [ 90.996742] [<ffffffff81428b0c>] bus_remove_device+0x11c/0x1a0 [ 90.996801] [<ffffffff81425536>] device_del+0x136/0x1d0 [ 90.996863] [<ffffffff8149e0c0>] usb_disable_device+0xb0/0x290 [ 90.996923] [<ffffffff814930c5>] usb_disconnect+0xb5/0x1d0 [ 90.996984] [<ffffffff81495ab6>] hub_port_connect_change+0xd6/0xad0 [ 90.997044] [<ffffffff814967c3>] hub_events+0x313/0x9b0 [ 90.997105] [<ffffffff81496e95>] hub_thread+0x35/0x170 [ 90.997165] [<ffffffff8108ea2f>] kthread+0xff/0x120 [ 90.997226] [<ffffffff816b187c>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0 [ 90.997287] [ 90.997287] other info that might help us debug this: [ 90.997287] [ 90.997318] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 90.997318] [ 90.997348] CPU0 CPU1 [ 90.997378] ---- ---- [ 90.997408] lock(&dev->lock); [ 90.997497] lock(&card->controls_rwsem); [ 90.997607] lock(&dev->lock); [ 90.997697] lock(&card->controls_rwsem); [ 90.997786] [ 90.997786] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 90.997786] [ 90.997817] 5 locks held by khubd/54: [ 90.997847] #0: (&__lockdep_no_validate__){......}, at: [<ffffffff81496564>] hub_events+0xb4/0x9b0 [ 90.998025] #1: (&__lockdep_no_validate__){......}, at: [<ffffffff81493076>] usb_disconnect+0x66/0x1d0 [ 90.998204] #2: (&__lockdep_no_validate__){......}, at: [<ffffffff8142929d>] device_release_driver+0x1d/0x40 [ 90.998383] #3: (em28xx_devlist_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa040db77>] em28xx_close_extension+0x27/0x90 [em28xx] [ 90.998567] #4: (&dev->lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa040db81>] em28xx_close_extension+0x31/0x90 [em28xx] Reviewed-by: Frank Schäfer <fschaefer.oss@googlemail.com> Tested-by: Antti Palosaari <crope@iki.fi> Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <m.chehab@samsung.com>

Fix broken inline assembly contraints for cmpxchg64 on 32bit. Fixes this crash: specification exception: 0006 [#1] SMP CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 3.13.0 #4 task: 005a16c8 ti: 00592000 task.ti: 00592000 Krnl PSW : 070ce000 8029abd6 (lockref_get+0x3e/0x9c) ... Krnl Code: 8029abcc: a71a0001 ahi %r1,1 8029abd0: 1852 lr %r5,%r2 #8029abd2: bb40f064 cds %r4,%r0,100(%r15) >8029abd6: 1943 cr %r4,%r3 8029abd8: 1815 lr %r1,%r5 Call Trace: ([<0000000078e01870>] 0x78e01870) [<000000000021105a>] sysfs_mount+0xd2/0x1c8 [<00000000001b551e>] mount_fs+0x3a/0x134 [<00000000001ce768>] vfs_kern_mount+0x44/0x11c [<00000000001ce864>] kern_mount_data+0x24/0x3c [<00000000005cc4b8>] sysfs_init+0x74/0xd4 [<00000000005cb5b4>] mnt_init+0xe0/0x1fc [<00000000005cb16a>] vfs_caches_init+0xb6/0x14c [<00000000005be794>] start_kernel+0x318/0x33c [<000000000010001c>] _stext+0x1c/0x80 Reported-by: Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org> Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>

skb_kill_datagram() does not dequeue the skb when MSG_PEEK is unset. This leaves a free'd skb on the queue, resulting a double-free later. Without this, the following oops can occur: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000008 IP: [<ffffffff8154fcf7>] skb_dequeue+0x47/0x70 PGD 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: af_rxrpc ... CPU: 0 PID: 1191 Comm: listen Not tainted 3.12.0+ #4 Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 task: ffff8801183536b0 ti: ffff880035c92000 task.ti: ffff880035c92000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8154fcf7>] skb_dequeue+0x47/0x70 RSP: 0018:ffff880035c93db8 EFLAGS: 00010097 RAX: 0000000000000246 RBX: ffff8800d2754b00 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000202 RDI: ffff8800d254c084 RBP: ffff880035c93dd0 R08: ffff880035c93cf0 R09: ffff8800d968f270 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: ffff8800d254c070 R13: ffff8800d254c084 R14: ffff8800cd861240 R15: ffff880119b39720 FS: 00007f37a969d740(0000) GS:ffff88011fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 00000000d4413000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Stack: ffff8800d254c000 ffff8800d254c070 ffff8800d254c2c0 ffff880035c93df8 ffffffffa041a5b8 ffff8800cd844c80 ffffffffa04385a0 ffff8800cd844cb0 ffff880035c93e18 ffffffff81546cef ffff8800d45fea00 0000000000000008 Call Trace: [<ffffffffa041a5b8>] rxrpc_release+0x128/0x2e0 [af_rxrpc] [<ffffffff81546cef>] sock_release+0x1f/0x80 [<ffffffff81546d62>] sock_close+0x12/0x20 [<ffffffff811aaba1>] __fput+0xe1/0x230 [<ffffffff811aad3e>] ____fput+0xe/0x10 [<ffffffff810862cc>] task_work_run+0xbc/0xe0 [<ffffffff8106a3be>] do_exit+0x2be/0xa10 [<ffffffff8116dc47>] ? do_munmap+0x297/0x3b0 [<ffffffff8106ab8f>] do_group_exit+0x3f/0xa0 [<ffffffff8106ac04>] SyS_exit_group+0x14/0x20 [<ffffffff8166b069>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Signed-off-by: Tim Smith <tim@electronghost.co.uk> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

Given now we have 2 spinlock for management of delayed refs, CONFIG_DEBUG_SPINLOCK=y helped me find this, [ 4723.413809] BUG: spinlock wrong CPU on CPU#1, btrfs-transacti/2258 [ 4723.414882] lock: 0xffff880048377670, .magic: dead4ead, .owner: btrfs-transacti/2258, .owner_cpu: 2 [ 4723.417146] CPU: 1 PID: 2258 Comm: btrfs-transacti Tainted: G W O 3.12.0+ #4 [ 4723.421321] Call Trace: [ 4723.421872] [<ffffffff81680fe7>] dump_stack+0x54/0x74 [ 4723.422753] [<ffffffff81681093>] spin_dump+0x8c/0x91 [ 4723.424979] [<ffffffff816810b9>] spin_bug+0x21/0x26 [ 4723.425846] [<ffffffff81323956>] do_raw_spin_unlock+0x66/0x90 [ 4723.434424] [<ffffffff81689bf7>] _raw_spin_unlock+0x27/0x40 [ 4723.438747] [<ffffffffa015da9e>] btrfs_cleanup_one_transaction+0x35e/0x710 [btrfs] [ 4723.443321] [<ffffffffa015df54>] btrfs_cleanup_transaction+0x104/0x570 [btrfs] [ 4723.444692] [<ffffffff810c1b5d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0xfd/0x1c0 [ 4723.450336] [<ffffffff810c1c2d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10 [ 4723.451332] [<ffffffffa015e5ee>] transaction_kthread+0x22e/0x270 [btrfs] [ 4723.452543] [<ffffffffa015e3c0>] ? btrfs_cleanup_transaction+0x570/0x570 [btrfs] [ 4723.457833] [<ffffffff81079efa>] kthread+0xea/0xf0 [ 4723.458990] [<ffffffff81079e10>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x140/0x140 [ 4723.460133] [<ffffffff81692aac>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0 [ 4723.460865] [<ffffffff81079e10>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x140/0x140 [ 4723.496521] ------------[ cut here ]------------ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- The reason is that we get to call cond_resched_lock(&head_ref->lock) while still holding @delayed_refs->lock. So it's different with __btrfs_run_delayed_refs(), where we do drop-acquire dance before and after actually processing delayed refs. Here we don't drop the lock, others are not able to add new delayed refs to head_ref, so cond_resched_lock(&head_ref->lock) is not necessary here. Signed-off-by: Liu Bo <bo.li.liu@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>

Guenter Roeck has got the following call trace on a p2020 board: Kernel stack overflow in process eb3e5a00, r1=eb79df90 CPU: 0 PID: 2838 Comm: ssh Not tainted 3.13.0-rc8-juniper-00146-g19eca00 #4 task: eb3e5a00 ti: c0616000 task.ti: ef440000 NIP: c003a420 LR: c003a410 CTR: c0017518 REGS: eb79dee0 TRAP: 0901 Not tainted (3.13.0-rc8-juniper-00146-g19eca00) MSR: 00029000 <CE,EE,ME> CR: 24008444 XER: 00000000 GPR00: c003a410 eb79df90 eb3e5a00 00000000 eb05d900 00000001 65d87646 00000000 GPR08: 00000000 020b8000 00000000 00000000 44008442 NIP [c003a420] __do_softirq+0x94/0x1ec LR [c003a410] __do_softirq+0x84/0x1ec Call Trace: [eb79df90] [c003a410] __do_softirq+0x84/0x1ec (unreliable) [eb79dfe0] [c003a970] irq_exit+0xbc/0xc8 [eb79dff0] [c000cc1c] call_do_irq+0x24/0x3c [ef441f20] [c00046a8] do_IRQ+0x8c/0xf8 [ef441f40] [c000e7f4] ret_from_except+0x0/0x18 --- Exception: 501 at 0xfcda524 LR = 0x10024900 Instruction dump: 7c781b78 3b40000a 3a73b040 543c0024 3a800000 3b3913a0 7ef5bb78 48201bf9 5463103a 7d3b182e 7e89b92e 7c008146 <3ba00000> 7e7e9b78 48000014 57fff87f Kernel panic - not syncing: kernel stack overflow CPU: 0 PID: 2838 Comm: ssh Not tainted 3.13.0-rc8-juniper-00146-g19eca00 #4 Call Trace: The reason is that we have used the wrong register to calculate the ksp_limit in commit cbc9565 (powerpc: Remove ksp_limit on ppc64). Just fix it. As suggested by Benjamin Herrenschmidt, also add the C prototype of the function in the comment in order to avoid such kind of errors in the future. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.12 Reported-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by: Kevin Hao <haokexin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>

vmxnet3's netpoll driver is incorrectly coded. It directly calls vmxnet3_do_poll, which is the driver internal napi poll routine. As the netpoll controller method doesn't block real napi polls in any way, there is a potential for race conditions in which the netpoll controller method and the napi poll method run concurrently. The result is data corruption causing panics such as this one recently observed: PID: 1371 TASK: ffff88023762caa0 CPU: 1 COMMAND: "rs:main Q:Reg" #0 [ffff88023abd5780] machine_kexec at ffffffff81038f3b #1 [ffff88023abd57e0] crash_kexec at ffffffff810c5d92 #2 [ffff88023abd58b0] oops_end at ffffffff8152b570 #3 [ffff88023abd58e0] die at ffffffff81010e0b #4 [ffff88023abd5910] do_trap at ffffffff8152add4 #5 [ffff88023abd5970] do_invalid_op at ffffffff8100cf95 #6 [ffff88023abd5a10] invalid_op at ffffffff8100bf9b [exception RIP: vmxnet3_rq_rx_complete+1968] RIP: ffffffffa00f1e80 RSP: ffff88023abd5ac8 RFLAGS: 00010086 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88023b5dcee0 RCX: 00000000000000c0 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000000005f2 RDI: ffff88023b5dcee0 RBP: ffff88023abd5b48 R8: 0000000000000000 R9: ffff88023a3b6048 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: ffff8802398d4cd8 R13: ffff88023af35140 R14: ffff88023b60c890 R15: 0000000000000000 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #7 [ffff88023abd5b50] vmxnet3_do_poll at ffffffffa00f204a [vmxnet3] #8 [ffff88023abd5b80] vmxnet3_netpoll at ffffffffa00f209c [vmxnet3] #9 [ffff88023abd5ba0] netpoll_poll_dev at ffffffff81472bb7 The fix is to do as other drivers do, and have the poll controller call the top half interrupt handler, which schedules a napi poll properly to recieve frames Tested by myself, successfully. Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> CC: Shreyas Bhatewara <sbhatewara@vmware.com> CC: "VMware, Inc." <pv-drivers@vmware.com> CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Shreyas N Bhatewara <sbhatewara@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

twpedersen closed this as completed Jul 31, 2012

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bridge rxed packet on iface with own address as source address #4

bridge rxed packet on iface with own address as source address #4

twpedersen commented Mar 9, 2012

twpedersen commented Jul 31, 2012

bridge rxed packet on iface with own address as source address #4

bridge rxed packet on iface with own address as source address #4

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twpedersen commented Mar 9, 2012

twpedersen commented Jul 31, 2012