Lecture 9: Interpretation, causality, cautionary notes

BIO144 Data Analysis in Biology

Stephanie Muff, Owen Petchey, Erik Willems

University of Zurich

29 April, 2024

Recap of previous lecture

Statistical model

- Predictive → Predict future values of *y*
  - Can use automated model selection (AIC, AICc, BIC)
  - Collinearity not really an issue
- Explanatory
  - Confirmatory → Test hypotheses
  - Exploratory → Generate hypotheses
    - Don't use automated model selection
    - Collinearity a potential issue

Overview

- *P*-values: Interpretation and (mis-)use
- Statistical significance vs. biological relevance
- Relative importance of regression terms
- Causality vs. correlation
- Bradford-Hill criteria for causal inference
- Experimental vs. observational studies

Course material covered today

The lecture material of today is based, in part, on some of the literature you will find on OLAT (o.a. "The essential guide to effect sizes", by Ellis)

P-values

Recap:

P-values are often used for *statistical testing*, *e.g.* by checking if $p < 0.05$.

Examples:

- T-test for a difference between two groups
- χ^2-test for independence of two discrete distributions
- Test if a regression coefficient $\beta_x \neq 0$ in a regression model

Such tests might be useful whenever a **decision** needs to be made (*e.g.*, in clinical trials, intervention actions in ecology *etc.*).

P-values in regression models

In linear models, the *p*-value is often used as an indicator of explanatory model importance. Remember the mercury example:

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)	-0.682	0.113	-6.057	0.000
log10(Hg_soil)	0.030	0.043	0.691	0.491
vegetables	0.058	0.057	1.019	0.310
migration	-0.013	0.087	-0.150	0.881
smoking	0.351	0.116	3.014	0.003
sqrt(amalgam)	0.290	0.052	5.616	0.000
~~age~~	~~-0.041~~	~~0.013~~	~~-3.289~~	~~0.001~~
~~mother~~	~~-1.087~~	~~0.373~~	~~-2.912~~	~~0.004~~
sqrt(fish)	0.070	0.030	2.352	0.020
last_fish	0.311	0.081	3.844	0.000
age:mother	0.057	0.016	3.627	0.000

Value of y, when all $x = 0$

Interpret "bottom-up"

A common practice is to look only at the *p*-value and use $p < 0.05$ to decide whether a variable has an influence or not ("is significant or not").

P-values criticism

P-value **criticism is** as **old** as statistical significance testing (1920s!). Issues:

- The sharp line $p < 0.05$ is totally arbitrary and significance testing solely based on this leads to *mindless statistics* (Gigerenzer, 2004)
- *P*-hacking / data dredging: Search until you find a result with $p < 0.05$
- Publication bias: Studies with $p < 0.05$ are more likely to be published than "non-significant" results
- Recent articles in *Science*, *Nature* or a statement by the *American Statistical Associaton (ASA)* in March 2016 show that the debate still continues (Goodman, 2016; Wasserstein and Lazar, 2016; Amrhein et al. 2019)
- Model selection using *p*-values may lead to a model selection bias (see last week).

P-values even feature in the media (occasionally)

NZZ am Sonntag 3. April 2016 | Wissen | 61

Überschätzte Statistiken

Daten-Analysen entscheiden heute darüber, ob ein Medikament als wirksam gilt. Bloss verstehen viele Forscher die Bedeutung dieser Berechnungen gar nicht. **Von Patrick Imhasly**

Daten werden meist von Leuten analysiert, die nicht dafür ausgebildet sind.

Karriere machen können nicht nur Menschen, sondern auch statistische Grössen. Das gilt besonders für den sogenannten p-Wert, mit dem jeder Mittelschüler und jede Studentin in Kontakt kommt, vor allem aber jeder, der im weitesten Sinn etwas mit Statistik zu tun hat. Inzwischen ist der p-Wert indes auf die schiefe Bahn geraten. Denn was der Vater der modernen Statistik, der britische Genetiker Ronald Fisher, 1920 als eine Art informelles Sensorium für die Aussagekraft von Daten entwickelte, ist in der Praxis oftmals zu einem simplen Lackmustest verkommen.

Ergibt die statistische Analyse von Daten einen *p-Wert < 0,05 (5 Prozent)* oder noch *besser < 0,01 (1 Prozent)*, gelten diese als *signifikant – den Daten wird dann automatisch Beweiskraft zugestanden. Das entscheidet etwa darüber, ob ein neues Medikament* als wirksam eingestuft wird oder ob ein Forscher seine Studie in einem angesehenen Fachblatt publizieren kann. «Der p-Wert war aber nie dazu gedacht, wissenschaftliches Denken ausser Kraft zu setzen», hat sich Ron Wasserstein, der Direktor der Amerikanischen Statistischen Vereinigung (ASA), jüngst öffentlich beklagt.

Wissenschafter verwenden den p-Wert immer häufiger, ohne zu verstehen, was er bedeutet – das fördert schlechte Forschung und untergräbt die Glaubwürdigkeit der Wissenschaft. Der Mediziner und Epidemiologe John Ioannidis von der Universität Stanford sprach in einem Kommentar von «Drogen-abhängigen»: «Der falsche Gebrauch des [illegible] ist [illegible] einfach und erfolgt so automatisiert, dass manche süchtig werden danach – vor allem wenn sie mit Forschungsgeldern und Publikationen belohnt werden.» Angesichts der Missstände sah sich die ASA jetzt veranlasst, zum ersten Mal in ihrer fast 180-jährigen Geschichte Empfehlungen zu veröffentlichen, wie man mit einer statistischen Grösse vernünftig umgeht.

Wider die Null-Hypothese

«Der p-Wert sagt nicht das aus, was man gemeinhin von ihm erwartet», erklärt der Berner Epidemiologe Peter Jüni, der seit kurzem am Applied Health Research Centre der Universität Toronto tätig ist. Das bedeutet: Der p-Wert misst nicht die Wahrscheinlichkeit, ob eine bestimmte Hypothese zutrifft, und auch nicht, ob ein bestimmtes Resultat zufällig zustande gekommen ist, *wie die ASA* festhält. Vielmehr dienen p-Werte dazu, die sogenannte Null-Hypothese zu testen und möglichst zu verwerfen.

Die Hypothese in einer Patientenstudie könnte zum Beispiel lauten, dass ein Medikament A gegen Nierenprobleme besser wirkt als ein Medikament B. Die Null-Hypothese besagt dann genau das Gegenteil davon, nämlich dass das Medikament A nicht besser wirkt als das Medikament B. Beim Test berechnet der Forscher im Prinzip, wie gross die Wahrscheinlichkeit für das Auftreten eines tatsächlich festgestellten oder noch grösseren Unterschieds zwischen den beiden untersuchten Medikamenten ist – unter der Annahme, dass die Null-Hypothese stimmt. Diese Wahrscheinlichkeit ist der p-Wert, und je geringer er ist, desto weniger spricht für die Null-Hypothese. Ein p-Wert von 0,05 bedeutet, dass das festgestellte (oder ein noch extremeres) Resultat unter den Bedingungen der Null-Hypothese mit einer Wahrscheinlichkeit von lediglich 5 Prozent zustande kommen kann – und nicht, dass eine bestimmte Hypothese mit einer Sicherheit von 95 Prozent wahr ist.

«Studien führen heute zu dermassen vielen Daten, dass man allen Unfug testen kann und so zu Hunderten von p-Werten kommt.»

Über die eigentlich untersuchte Hypothese kann der p-Wert nur indirekt etwas aussagen, weil er über zwei Ecken gedacht ist. Der ominöse Wert liefert also keine ultimativen Beweise für einen postulierten Unterschied oder Zusammenhang. «Der p-Wert ist eine bedingte und nicht eine absolute Wahrscheinlichkeit», erklärt Peter Jüni. «Doch genau das verstehen viele Forscher nicht, und es interessiert sie auch nicht.»

Hinzu kommt, dass die Signifikanzgrenzen von 5 Prozent bzw. 1 Prozent historisch entstanden und keineswegs klar definierte Werte sind. Ronald Fisher, der Erfinder des p-Werts, überliess es jedenfalls ausdrücklich der Interpretation des einzelnen Forschers, ab welcher Grösse ein p-Wert in einer Untersuchung Aussagekraft haben soll. «Trotzdem haben sich die willkürlich gewählten Signifikanzgrenzen ins Gehirn von Generationen von Forschern gebrannt», sagt Leonhard Held vom Institut für Epidemiologie, Biostatistik und Prävention der Universität Zürich.

Die britischen Statistiker Jonathan Sterne und George Davey Smith haben schon vor 15 Jahren im «British Medical Journal» dazu aufgerufen, die Resultate von medizinischen Studien nicht mehr als «signifikant» oder «nichtsignifikant» darzustellen, sondern im Kontext der gesamten Untersuchung und anhand anderer Ergebnisse zu interpretieren. Genützt hat das herzlich wenig, wie das Team von John Ioannidis in einer soeben erschienenen Studie festgestellt hat. Demnach sind in den vergangenen 25 Jahren in der biomedizinischen Forschung immer mehr Studien erschienen, die p-Werte angeben, die zudem immer klarer signifikant ausfallen. Gleichzeitig werden Zusatzinformationen zu den festgestellten Effekten immer seltener («JAMA», Bd. 315, S. 1141).

5%

Kleiner als dieser Wert muss der sogenannte p-Wert in einem statistischen Test sein, dann gelten die Daten aus einer Studie als aussagekräftig. Doch die Grenze ist willkürlich gewählt. (pim.)

Es gibt Alternativen

Das Problem ist dabei nicht nur, dass der p-Wert ein trügerisch einfaches statistisches Instrument ist. «Studien führen heute zu dermassen vielen Daten, dass man allen Unfug testen kann und so zu Hunderten von p-Werten kommt», erklärt Leonhard Held. «Der eine oder andere fällt dann bestimmt signifikant aus, auch wenn kein Effekt vorhanden ist.» Leonhard Held und Peter Jüni verlassen sich deshalb bei der Planung und Auswertung von Studien schon lange nicht mehr nur auf die p-Werte.

Jüni empfiehlt, die Resultate von Studien mindestens mit Vertrauensintervallen zu versehen, die spezifische Aussagen über die Unsicherheit einer Schätzung machen. Und Held erforscht alternative Masse für statistische Evidenz – zum Beispiel Bayes-Faktoren. Mit ihrer Hilfe lässt sich die Wahrscheinlichkeit einer Hypothese anhand der Daten anpassen, statt dass diese wie beim p-Wert nach einem Schwarz-Weiss-Schema angenommen oder abgelehnt wird.

Note: R.A. Fisher, the "inventor" of the p-value (1920s) didn't ingtend the p-value to be used in the way it is today (which is: doing a single experiment and use $p < 0.05$ to arrive at a conclusion)!

From Goodman (2016):

> *Fisher used "significance" merely* **to indicate that an observation was worth following up, with refutation of the null hypothesis justified only if further experiments "rarely failed" to achieve significance.** *This is in stark contrast to the modern practice of making claims based on a single demonstration of statistical significance.*

The misuse of p-values has led to a reproducibility crisis in science!

(Ioannidis, 2005)

Essay

Why Most Published Research Findings Are False

John P. A. Ioannidis

Summary

There is increasing concern that most current published research findings are false. The probability that a research claim is true may depend on study power and bias, the number of other studies on the same question, and, importantly, the ratio of true to no relationships among the relationships probed in each scientific field. In this framework, a research finding is less likely to be true when the studies conducted in a field are smaller; when effect sizes are smaller; when there is a greater number and lesser preselection of tested relationships; where there is greater flexibility in designs, definitions, outcomes, and analytical modes; when there is greater financial and other interest and prejudice; and when more teams are involved in a scientific field in chase of statistical significance. Simulations show that for most study designs and settings, it is more likely for a research claim to be false than true. Moreover, for many current scientific fields, claimed research findings may often be simply accurate measures of the prevailing bias. In this essay, I discuss the implications of these problems for the conduct and interpretation of research.

factors that influence this problem and some corollaries thereof.

Modeling the Framework for False Positive Findings

Several methodologists have pointed out [9–11] that the high rate of nonreplication (lack of confirmation) of research discoveries is a consequence of the convenient, yet ill-founded strategy of claiming conclusive research findings solely on the basis of a single study assessed by formal statistical significance, typically for a *p*-value less than 0.05. Research is not most appropriately represented and summarized by *p*-values, but, unfortunately, there is a widespread notion that medical research articles

It can be proven that most claimed research findings are false.

should be interpreted based only on *p*-values. Research findings are defined here as any relationship reaching formal statistical significance, e.g., effective interventions, informative predictors, risk factors, or associations.

is characteristic of the field and can vary a lot depending on whether the field targets highly likely relationships or searches for only one or a few true relationships among thousands and millions of hypotheses that may be postulated. Let us also consider, for computational simplicity, circumscribed fields where either there is only one true relationship (among many that can be hypothesized) or the power is similar to find any of the several existing true relationships. The pre-study probability of a relationship being true is $R/(R+1)$. The probability of a study finding a true relationship reflects the power $1-\beta$ (one minus the Type II error rate). The probability of claiming a relationship when none truly exists reflects the Type I error rate, α. Assuming that c relationships are being probed in the field, the expected values of the 2×2 table are given in Table 1. After a research finding has been claimed based on achieving formal statistical significance, the post-study probability that it is true is the positive predictive value, PPV. The PPV is also the complementary probability of what Wacholder et al. have called the false positive report

What is the problem with the *p*-value?

Many applied researchers do not really understand what the *p*-value actually is.

The **formal definition of the *p*-value** is the probability to observe a summary statistic (e.g., an average) that is at least as extreme as the one observed, given that the Null Hypothesis is correct.



Non-directional hypothesis



Directional hypothesis

What is the problem with the p-value? II

- The p-value is often used to classify results into "significant" and "non-significant". Typically: $p < 0.05$ vs. $p \geq 0.05$.
- However, this is often too crude!
- It is better to have a more nuanced interpretation of the p-value (see slide 18).

Probably the most important point to remember:

The p-value is **not** the probability that the Null Hypothesis is true!!!

Science progresses through falsification

Quote from ASA statement:

In February, 2014, George Cobb, Professor Emeritus of Mathematics and Statistics at Mount Holyoke College, posed these questions to an ASA discussion forum:

Q: Why do so many colleges and grad schools teach $p < 0.05$?

A: Because that's still what the scientific community and journal editors use.

Q: Why do so many people still use $p < 0.05$?

A: Because that's what they were taught in college or grad school.

We're stuck in the *status quo*!

Significance vs. relevance

In linear models:

- A low p-value does not automatically imply that a variable is "important".
- "Is there an effect?" vs. "How much of an effect is there?".



from Goodman, 2008

In addition:

A large p-value (*e.g.*, $p > 0.05$) does not automatically imply that a variable is "unimportant".

Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence (Altman and Bland, 1995).

In other words:

One cannot prove the Null Hypothesis!!

Again:
science progresses through falsification

Some causes of non-informative *p*-values

Many factors can contribute to large *p*-values:

- Low sample size ($\rightarrow$ low power).
- The truth is not "far" from the null hypothesis. (*e.g.* small effect sizes in linear models)
- Collinear explanatory variables
- Incorrect fitting (*e.g.* non-linear explanatory variables)



So, shall we just abolish *p*-values?

No: *p*-values are not "good" or "bad". They contain important information, and have **strengths** and **weaknesses**.

Suggestions:

1. Use *p*-values, but don't over-interpret them, use them properly
2. Also look at effect sizes and associated confidence intervals
3. One could additionally look at the relative importance of explanatory variables
4. **NEVER use *p*-values for model selection**

Suggestion 1: Graded interpretation of p-values

Rather than a black-and-white decision ($p < 0.05$), Martin Bland suggests to regard p-values as continuous measures for statistical evidence (Introduction to Medical Statistics, 4th edition, Oxford University Press):

$p > 0.1$	little or no evidence against the null hypothesis
$0.1 > p > 0.05$	weak evidence
$0.05 > p > 0.01$	moderate evidence
$0.01 > p > 0.001$	strong evidence
$p < 0.001$	very strong evidence

But: The level of significance must also depend on the context!

A suggestion from 2017 by 72 authors in the field:

Redefine statistical significance

We propose to change the default *P*-value threshold for statistical significance from 0.05 to 0.005 for claims of new discoveries.

(Benjamin et al., 2017, Nature Human Behaviour)

However, equally arbitrary!

Their suggestion: replace $p < 0.05$ by $p < 0.005$. More precisely:

- Use $p < 0.005$ for **statistical significance.**
- Use $0.005 < p < 0.05$ as **suggestive evidence**.

Another recent suggestion, signed by $>$ 800 researchers:



Retire statistical significance

Valentin Amrhein, Sander Greenland, Blake McShane and more than 800 signatories call for an end to hyped claims and the dismissal of possibly crucial effects.

Amrhein et al., 2019, Nature: Do not use the term "statistical significance" at all.

In the Hg example:

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)	-0.682	0.113	-6.057	0.000
log10(Hg_soil)	0.030	0.043	0.691	0.491
vegetables	0.058	0.057	1.019	0.310
migration	-0.013	0.087	-0.150	0.881
smoking	0.351	0.116	3.014	0.003
sqrt(amalgam)	0.290	0.052	5.616	0.000
~~age~~	~~0.041~~	~~0.013~~	~~3.289~~	~~0.001~~
~~mother~~	~~-1.087~~	~~0.373~~	~~-2.912~~	~~0.004~~
sqrt(fish)	0.070	0.030	2.352	0.020
last_fish	0.311	0.081	3.844	0.000
age:mother	0.057	0.016	3.627	0.000

- **Little or no evidence**: Hg soil, vegetables from garden, migration background
- **Moderate evidence**: Monthly fish consumption
- **Strong evidence**: Smoking
- **Very strong evidence**: Amalgam, last fish, interaction between age and mother

Suggestion 2: Report effect sizes. . . .

Ask: **Is the effect size *relevant*?**

Example WHO recommendation concerning smoking and the consumption of processed meat. Both, smoking and meat consumption, "significantly" increase the probability to get cancer.

- 50g processed meat per day increases the risk of colon cancer by a factor of 1.18 (+18%).
- Smoking increases the risk to get any type of cancer by a factor of 3.6 (+260%).

Thus: Although both, meat consumption and smoking, are carcinogenic ("significant"), their **effect sizes are vastly different**!

Paul D. Ellis writes in his book *The Essential Guide to Effect Sizes* (2010, chapter 2):

> *Indeed, statistical significance, which partly reflects sample size, may say nothing at all about the practical significance of a result. [....] To extract meaning from their results [...] scientists need to look beyond p values and effect sizes and* **make informed judgments about what they see**.

. . . and 95% CIs

Ask: **Which range of true effects is statistically consistent with the observed data?**

Example

Body fat example, slide 40 of lecture 3.

The estimate for the slope of BMI in the regression for body fat is given as $\hat{\beta}_{BMI} = 1.82$, 95% CI from 1.61 to 2.03.

Interpretation: for an increase in the bmi by one index point, roughly 1.82% percentage points more bodyfat are expected, and all true values for β_{BMI} between 1.61 and 2.03 are **compatible with the observed data**.

However...

- The choice of the 95% is again arbitrary. We could also go for 90% or 99% or any other interval!

- The 95% CI should **not be misused for simple hypothesis testing** in the sense of

  "Is 0 in the confidence interval or not?"

  Because this boils down to checking whether $p < 0.05$ ...

Suggestion 3: Look at relative importances of explanatory variables

- Ultimately, the popularity of p-values in regression models is based on the wish to judge which explanatory variables are **relevant** in a model, particularly in observational studies.
- The problem with this: Low p-values do not automatically imply high relevance (Cox, 1982).
- Alternative: **relative relevance** of explanatory variables that measure the proportion (%) of the responses' variability explained by each variable.

Relative importance: Decomposing R^2

Remember: R^2 quantifies the proportion of variance explained by **all** explanatory variables in a model

$$y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_i^{(1)} + \beta_2 x_i^{(2)} + \ldots + \beta_2 x_i^{(m)} + \epsilon_i \ .$$

The aim of **relative importance** is to decompose R^2 such that

- each variable $x^{(j)}$ is attributed a fair share r_j.
- the sum of all importances sums up to R, that is, $\sum_{j=1}^{m} r_j = R^2$.

Further, it is required that

- all $r_j \geq 0$.

How would you define/calculate relative importance?

- **Idea 1:** Fit simple models including only one explanatory variable at the time, *i.e.*:

$$y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_j x_i^{(j)} + \epsilon_i$$

  for each variable $x^{(j)}$ and use the respective R^2 as r_j.

- **Idea 2:** Fit the linear model twice, once with and once without the explanatory variable of interest, and then take the increase of R^2 as r_j.

Problem: In practice, regressors $x^{(j)}$ are always correlated *to some extent*, thus both ideas lead to $\sum_j r_j \neq R^2$!



Total variability in y

Variability in y explained by x_1

Variability in y explained by x_2

To understand the problem of ideas 1 and 2, let us fit three models for $\log(Hg_{\text{urine}})$ with

- $x^{(1)} = \sqrt{\text{Number of monthly fish meals}}$
- $x^{(2)} =$ binary indicator of whether last fish meal was less than 3 days ago

These two variables are correlated (people who consume a lot of fish are more likely to have had fish within the last 3 days).

$$y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_i^{(1)} + \epsilon_i \qquad R^2 = 0.10 \qquad (1)$$

$$y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_2 x_i^{(2)} + \epsilon_i \qquad R^2 = 0.09 \qquad (2)$$

$$y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_i^{(1)} + \beta_2 x_i^{(2)} + \epsilon_i \qquad R^2 = 0.13 \qquad (3)$$

Note: The R^2 of model (3) with both explanatory variables is much less than the sum of the R^2 from models (1) and (2)!

$\Rightarrow$ The increase of R^2 upon inclusion of an explanatory variable depends on the explanatory variables already in the model!

A better way to calculate relative importance?

Various solutions to calculate relative importance (R^2 decomposition) have been proposed. The (currently) most useful is given by the following idea, called **LMG** (**L**indemann, **M**erenda and **G**old 1980):

- Fit the model for all possible orderings of the explanatory variables.
- Record the increase in R^2 each time a variable is included.
- Average over all orderings of the explanatory variables.

The `R`-package 'relaimpo' (Groemping 2006) contains the function `calc.relimp()` that does this for you.

Hg results

Which proportion (%) of variance in $\log(Hg_{\text{urine}})$ is explained by each explanatory variable? Interpret the table below:

Variable	Rel. imp. (%)	p-value
$\log(Hg_{\text{soil}})$	0.077	0.49
Vegetable	0.29	0.31
Migration	0.52	0.88
Smoking	2.00	0.003
Amalgam	13.56	<0.0001
Age	1.10	0.0013
Mother	1.01	0.0042
Fish	5.94	0.02
Last fish	7.49	<0.0001
Age:mother	6.53	0.0004

Similar p-value, yet different relative importance

Different p-value, yet similar relative importance

Several variables have very low p-values, but their relative importance differs clearly.

$\Rightarrow$ Relative importance gives complementary information to p-values, effect sizes and confidence intervals...

Does relative importance solve all problems?

Of course not...

Relative importance should be understood as a complement to standard statistical output.

There are several limitations to it:

- Rel.imp. of a variable may heavily depend on the other variables included in the model, especially when there are strongly correlated variables (see slide 34).
- Hard to generalize to other, non-linear regression models.

Example

Compare the estimated relative importance for the variable `fish` (monthly fish meals) for two cases:

Model 1
Original Hg model.

Model 2
Model without the variable `last_fish`.

- **Model 1:** Relative importance of `fish`: 5.94% (see slide 31).
- **Model 2:** Relative importance of `fish`: 9.07%

Interpretation: If two (somewhat) correlated variables feature in the same model, they "share" their chunk of relative importance.

Causality vs. correlation

In **explanatory models** the ultimate goal is to reveal causal relationships between the explanatory variables and the response.

Examples:

- Does Hg in the soil influence Hg-levels in humans?
- Does inbreeding negatively affect population growth of Swiss Alpine ibex (Steinbock)?
- Does exposure to Asbestos lead to illness or death?
- ...

However: Regression models can only reveal associations, that is, correlations between x and y!

Example: Breakfast eating and teen obesity

Please read the NZZ article on OLAT (Unit 9, Lecture 9), and answer the questions below.

Questions:

- Does the article show that people that eat breakfast are generally less obese?
- Does this automatically imply that eating breakfast **leads to** less obesity?

Look at a regression model including explanatory variable x and response y. If the coefficient β_x is "significant", there are several plausible scenario's:

1. x is a **cause** for y. Written as: $x \to y$

   Example: x is fish consumption and y is mercury concentration in the urine.

   This is the desired situation!

2. y (partially) causes x, that is $y \to x$.

   Example: x is *IQ* and y is *school education*.

   In that case, the model is not correctly specified!

3. There is another (unmeasured) variable z that influences both x and y

   $$z \to x \quad \text{and} \quad z \to y \,.$$

   $\to$ x and y **covary**, but there is no causal relationship between the two.

In the obesity example, all three scenario's are possible, perhaps even at the same time!

Ideas:

- No breakfast $(x) \rightarrow$ Obesity (y)
- Obesity $(y) \rightarrow$ No breakfast (x)
- Large dinner $(z) \rightarrow$ Obesity (y)

  and

  Large dinner $(z) \rightarrow$ No breakfast (x)

Many other scenario's are possible...

On the following website you find many "spurious correlations", where the **causality is very obviously missing**:

http://www.tylervigen.com/spurious-correlations

(More about this in the BC material of this unit)

Bradford-Hill-Criteria for causal inference I

In 1965 the epidemiologist Bradford Hill presented a list of criteria to assess whether there is some causality or not. However, he wrote "None of my nine viewpoints can bring indisputable evidence for or against the cause-and-effect hypothesis and none can be required *sina qua non*."

None of these are either *necessary*, or *sufficient*!
Still, useful considerations when interpreting your own results

Bradford-Hill Criteria:

1. **Strength:** A causal relationship is more likely when the observed association is strong.
2. **Consistency:** A causal relationship is more likely if multiple independent studies show similar associations.
3. **Specificity:** A causal relationship is more likely when an explanatory variable x is associated only with one potential outcome y and not with other outcomes.
4. **Temporality:** The effect has to occur after the cause.

Bradford-Hill-Criteria for causal inference II

5. **Biological gradient:** Greater exposure should generally lead to greater incidence of the effect.
6. **Plausibility:** A plausible mechanism is helpful.
7. **Coherence:** Coherence between findings in the lab and in the field / population increases the likelihood of an effect.
8. **Analogy:** Similar factors have a similar effect.
9. **Experiment:** Evidence from an experiment is valuable.

However, these criteria are perhaps a little outdated by now, and the study of causality and causal inference from statistical models is a very active field of current research.

Experimental vs. observational studies

Experimental studies are relevant in biology as well as medicine, perhaps especially in the context of clinical trials in which novel medication is tested.
Many obesity studies are **observational**:

- Study participants self-report on their behaviour.
- Are often not assigned to a treatment group.
- There is **no intervention**.

An observed effect is more likely to be *causal* if participants are *randomly assigned* to a group, here: breakfast eating yes/no.

Randomized Controlled Trial (RCT):
Considered by many to be the golden standard
with regard to causal inference

Observational study ("Erhebung"):

- Observation of subjects / objects in a real-world (existing) situation
- Variables are usually correlated
- Often more variables than can be included in the model
- **Examples**: Influence of pollutans (mercury) on humans, studies of wild animal populations, epidemiological studies, ...

Experimental study:

- Observation of subjects / objects in a constructed (experimental) situation
- Variables are controlled and uncorrelated (given a good study design!)
- Usually all variables enter the model, **no model selection**
- **Examples**: Field experiments; clinical studies; psychological or pedagogical experiments, ...

	Observational study	**Experiment**
Situation	Existing, cannot be influenced	Artificial, designed
Analysis	Difficult (model selection issues)	Simple no model selection
Interpretation	Difficult, especially w.r.t. causality	Clear, *if well-designed* causal inference is possible

Causality considerations for model building

It is **widely unknown** that a model can be broken by the inclusion of a "wrong" explanatory variable, which is causally associated in the wrong direction:

Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG):
schematic representation of the (assumed) causal structure among variables of interest



Common cause (a "fork"):
breaking the fork (including *C* in the model equation) removes any spurious association between *X* and *Y*

Common effect (a collider):
including *E* in the model equation, introduces a spurious association between *X* and *Y*

Remember: Avoid including explanatory variables in your model that are caused by the outcome!

Example: . . .



From D. Randall & C. Welser (2018). "The irreproducibility crisis of modern science", NAS report.

Summary

- Try to understand the definition and the meaning of p-values
- Correct understanding, use and interpretation of p-values: do not use the "mindless" $p < 0.05$ criterion!!
- Statistical significance vs. biological relevance: ask for the effect size and confidence interval, and reflect on what it means, instead of only reporting p-values
- The p-value is not "bad", it contains useful information, but it has to be used correctly
  $\rightarrow$ 3 suggestions (gradual interpretation of p-values, and report effect sizes, CIs, and relative importance)
- Correlation does not imply causation
- Experimental studies are often better suited to infer causality than observational studies

References

- Altman, D.G and J.M. Bland (1995). Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. *British Medical Journal 311,* 485.
- Amrhein, V., S. Greenland, and B. McShane (2019). Retire statistical significance. *Nature 567,* 305-307.
- Cox, D.R. (1982). Statistical significance tests. *British Journal of Clinical Pharmacology 14,* 325-331.
- Gigerenzer, G. (2004). Mindless statistics. *The Journal of Socio-Economics 33,* 587-606.
- Goodman, S.N. (2016). Aligning statistical and scientific reasoning. *Science 352,* 1180-1182.
- Ioannidis, J.P.A. (2005). Why most published research findings are false. *PLoS Medicine 2,* e124.
- Wasserstein, R.L. and N.A. Lazar (2016). The ASA's statement on p-values: context, process, and purpose. *The American Statistician.*