

Homework 2

Language Based Technology for Security

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Introduction

For this homework, i will present and discuss the paper "**MirChecker: Detecting Bugs in Rust Programs via Static Analysis**" by Zhuohua Li, Jincheng Wang, Mingshen Sun, and John C.S Lui [1]. This paper present a novel static analysis tool for the Rust programming language, focusing on detecting and preventing potential runtime crashes and memory safety bugs.

Paper Summary

We can divide the paper in four parts: at the beginning, all the necessary background knowledge about static analysis and Rust is established, and the main motivations for the tool development are explained. Then, the high level design of the tool is presented, and the reasoning behind all the relevant choices is given. After that, the authors delve deeper in the actual implementation, showing the algorithm used and giving all the important technical details. The last part is about a series of benchmark used to test both the efficacy and speed of the developed tool on target examples. Finally, the authors discuss the achieved results, limitations, and the potential future directions of their work.

Background Knowledge and Motivations

The paper begins by giving the basic knowledge needed to understand its results. The authors start by presenting all the necessary theory and concepts of abstract interpretation. They recall the notions of **lattice** and **abstract transfer functions**, showing how they are used to represent computations on abstract program states.

In the next part, there is an introduction on the main features of Rust, mainly about its powerful type and ownership system. It is mentioned how the restrictive rules for aliasing and mutability prevents many of the typical memory corruption problems. After, the main motivation for the work is presented: although Rust has very advanced tools for memory safety, their incomplete nature and the presence of the **unsafe** keyword can breach its safety promises, leading to undetected bugs or worse, undefined behavior. The paper focus on two classes of issues affecting the language:

- **Runtime panics.** Rust's type system cannot enforce all the security conditions statically. Some conditions such as array bounds checking or integer overflow detection are postponed until execution, with the compiler automatically instrumenting assertions that, when violated, halt the program. Although this is still a safe way to handle these issues (no memory corruption is possible), an attacker could still exploit this to cause denial of service.
- **Lifetime corruptions.** While classical memory corruption bugs such as use-after-free or dangling pointers are well managed in Rust, using **unsafe** and combining it with the ownership system may lead to lifetime bugs where, first the unsafe code causes invalid pointers or shared mutable memory, and then the ownership system automatically drops that memory, leading back to use after free bugs.

To prevent these issues, the authors decided to combine numerical static analysis to detect possible runtime panics generated by integer operations, and symbolic analysis to track heap memory ownership.

High level design

MirChecker performs static analysis on top of Rust’s Mid-level Intermediate Representation (MIR). MIR is produced as an intermediate step during normal compilation. It corresponds to a control flow graph (CFG) representation and borrow checking is performed on it. Traditionally, Rust static analysis tools reason on LLVM IR or a custom IR, but the authors decided to use MIR for two main reasons. First, while it reduces most of the complex syntax to a simpler core language, it preserves type information and debugging data, which is used to simplify the actual algorithm. Second, LLVM API targets directly C/C++ and are then ported to Rust. Many compatibility issues may arise, differently from using a native representation.

User interface MirChecker is shipped as a subcommand of Cargo, Rust’s official package manager. This makes it possible to reuse the entire Rust compiler toolchain for dependency resolving. Dependency information is used to distinguish between source files in the current crate (crates are how packages in Rust are called) and dependencies, which are ignored by MirChecker for efficiency purposes. Tool invocation is highly customizable, with many options to control the behavior of the analysis. Some of the options are shown in [Figure 1](#).

```
cargo mir-checker --\
--entry <entry-function-name>\
--domain <abstract-domain>\
--widening_delay <N>\
--narrowing_iteration <N>\
--suppress_warnings <S>
```

Figure 1: MirChecker example invocation

Static analyzer The analyzer is implemented as a custom callback function for the Rust compiler, and is automatically called after all the necessary data structures are built.

The actual algorithm uses standard techniques from Abstract Interpretation. The CFG is first preprocessed to create a topological ordering of the basic blocks. After, the algorithm traverse the CFG according to the ordering and iteratively executes *Abstract Interpretation* until the result reaches a fix-point. In the following step, several bug detectors are called. These bug detectors use constraint solving techniques to determine if some security conditions are violated or not. At the end, a series of diagnostics are emitted to the users, leveraging the compiler infrastructure to provide clear and informative messages. [Figure 2](#) provides a visualization of the entire process.




Figure 2: High level view of Mir-Checker architecture

Implementation

Benchmarks

MirChecker was thoroughly tested both in precision and efficiency. The evaluation was performed in two steps. First, it was evaluated in a "supervised" environment, testing its capacity on a synthetic dataset containing well known bugs. All the bugs (4 memory safety bugs, 6 runtime panics) were successfully detected.

In the second phase, MirChecker ability was judged in real life situations. A group of actual Rust crates was collected, with the requirement of having related code to the tool itself. This meant collecting crates that perform integer arithmetic and/or use unsafe Rust. The results were pretty interesting: the tool managed to find 17 real runtime panics and 16 real memory-safety problems.

On the bad side, it was noticed that most of the detected problems were false positives. Although this is expected in static analysis, in order to have a more reliable analysis, an option to suppress specific classes of warnings was implemented. It should be mentioned that, even after warning suppression, there were two outliers (the **brothli** and **runes** crates) where the rate of false positives stayed at 95%.

Efficiency In terms of efficiency, MirChecker was measured both in time and peak memory usage. It was observed that the main factor affecting performance is the number of security conditions checked, especially numerical conditions. The choice of the numerical abstract domain was found to be the critical tradeoff between efficiency and precision. Interval and linear congruence consumed less resources but were not as precise as constraint-based domains like octagon and polyhedra, which in turn required more memory and time. Another aspect tested was the dead variable cleaning mechanism employed by MirChecker. It was measured to improve performance by 10-15% for constraint-based domains, while having no major effect for linear congruence and interval domains.

Advantages

Cargo integration I think that integrating a static analysis tool inside a language toolchain is a great idea. Static analysis can benefit a lot from compilation information, as demonstrated by MirChecker dead variable analysis or its informative error messages. Other than that, it favours adoption by end users, who can benefit from the additional checks without having to modify their familiar workflow.

Using Z3 for bug detection The authors decided to use Z3 for the bug detection phase. I think this is a strong point of their work. Z3 is a powerful and industry tested SMT solver, featuring many different theories such as integer arithmetic, bit-vectors, uninterpreted functions and many others. By using this power, MirChecker can detect many bugs by simply converting its internal assertions to a Z3 formula and "outsourcing" the actual solving. Not only does this makes the bug solving more robust, it significantly simplifies MirChecker design, which can be focused on optimizing the fix-point algorithm, instead of having to add a custom internal solver.

Disadvantages

Memory model The memory model is, by admission of the authors, lightweight and syntax driven. MirChecker may distinguish two equivalent expressions used as memory addresses simply because they are syntactically different. This makes the analysis less precise, and it forced the authors to employ the reduction rules seen before to try and mitigate the issue. The development of an improved memory model, maybe adapting known formal models (e.g the concept of heaplets in separation logic), should be a top priority to increase the power of the analysis.

Ignoring Rust advanced features For simplicity, MirChecker does not check more advanced features of rust such as dynamic dispatch, concurrent code and many others. While this is understandable from a complexity point of view, i think it hinders the analyzer power and convenience. This is true especially for concurrency, where problems like deadlocks when using `Mutex<T>` or data races inside unsafe code could be automatically detected.

Possible Improvements

Increasing the number of problems checked Right now MirChecker checks only integer operations and possible lifetime issues. A first improvement would be to check for more problems. For example, the overflow analysis could be extended to floating point operations, which could be extremely valuable to analyze math-intensive crates such as **ndarray** or **nalgebra**. Another possibility would

Refinement To mitigate the problem of false positives, the authors could employ a refinement mechanism. Refinement techniques takes various

Under-approximation instead of over-approximation

References

- [1] Zhuohua Li, Jincheng Wang, Mingshen Sun, and John CS Lui. Mirchecker: Detecting bugs in rust programs via static analysis. In *Proceedings of the 2021 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security*, pages 2183–2196, 2021.