

教育部先進資通安全實務人才培育計畫

112年度新型態資安實務暑期課程

軟體安全 S6

Fuzzing N-days in MiniWeb http server

林映辰、陳彥凱、黃晴威、李玟毅

目錄

- 研究動機
- 目標
- 背景知識
- CVE-2020-29596



研究動機

- 聽完 NiNi 講師講完 fuzzing 的主題後,想親自操作 fuzzer
- 使用 fuzzing 找(新)漏洞
- 重現漏洞,分析漏洞成因
- 修補漏洞



miniweb



Introduction

MiniWeb is a mini HTTP server implementation written in C language, featuring low system resource consumption, high efficiency, good flexibility and high portability. It is capable to serve multiple clients with a single thread, supporting GET and POST methods, authentication, dynamic contents (dynamic web page and page variable substitution) and file uploading. MiniWeb runs on POSIX completion OS, like Linux, as well as Microsoft Windows (Cygwin, MinGW and native build with Visual Studio). The binary size of MiniWeb can be as small as 20KB (on x86 Linux). The target of the project is to provide a fast, functional and low resource consuming HTTP server that is embeddable in other applications (as a static or dynamic library) as well as a standalone web server.

MiniWeb supports transparent 7-zip decompression. Web contents can be compressed into 7-zip archieves and clients can access the contents inside the 7-zip archive just like in a directory.

MiniWeb can also be used in audio/video streaming applications, or more specific, VOD (video-on-demand) service. Currently a VOD client/server is being developed on MiniWeb.

Source Code

The source code of MiniWeb is in SourceForge repository. You can view the the source code instantly here.

Links

MediaCoder - the universal media transcoder which uses MiniWeb as the built-in HTTP daemon.

MiniWeb (C) 2005-2012 All rights reserved by Stanley Huang

miniweb 簡介

- http server
- C 語言搭建的
- 有開源原始碼
- 有部分網站使用



miniweb 歷年漏洞

- CVE-2020-29596
 - allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (daemon crash) via a long name for the first parameter in a POST request.
- CVE-2008-0338
 - Directory traversal vulnerability allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files and list arbitrary directories
- CVE-2008-0337
 - Heap-based buffer overflow allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a long URI.

miniweb 歷年漏洞

- CVE-2007-3159
 - allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash)
 via a negative value in the Content-Length HTTP header.
- CVE-2002-0298
 - allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) via certain HTTP GET requests containing
 (1) a %2e%2e (encoded dot-dot), (2) several /../ (dot dot) sequences, (3) a missing URI, or (4) several ../
 in a URI that does not begin with a / (slash) character.
- CVE-2002-0297
 - Buffer overflow allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash)
 and possibly execute arbitrary code via a long URL in an HTTP request.

Credit

- 幫忙修漏洞
 - → 發 pr + 聯繫維護者/ 使用者
- shodan 發現使用 miniweb 的網站

背景知識

Boofuzz 簡介

- · 架構繼承自 Sulley (已停止維護)
- 改善 Sulley 功能並除錯, 並增加支持任何通訊媒介、內建支持 serial fuzzing, ethernet- and IP-layer, UDP broadcast 等


Boofuzz/ Sulley

- generation-based (with specified format)
 - pros: more efficient
 - cons: smaller input space
- mutate each field one at a time
- fuzz everything!

Boofuzz is a fork of and the successor to the venerable Sulley fuzzing framework. Besides numerous bug fixes, boofuzz aims for extensibility.

The goal: fuzz everything.

```
boofuzz Fuzz Control RUNNING
      Total:
                  16,084 of many
      [N/A]:
                         of 100
                                    0
      run time
                 0 sec
      exec speed 0/sec
      current
 Pause
Test Case #
                                    Crash Synopsis
                                                                 snap to current
                                16083
Test Case Log: 16083
[2023-07-27 14:34:05,406] Test Case: 16083: HTTP-Request:[HTTP-Request.Request-Line.Method:1, HTTP-Request.Request-Line.URI:98]
[2023-07-27 14:34:05,406]
                             Info: Type: String
 2023-07-27 14:34:05,406]
                             Info: Opening target connection (172.24.112.1:8000)...
[2023-07-27 14:34:05,406]
                             Info: Connection opened.
                            Test Step: Monitor CallbackMonitor#2012253679184[pre=[],post=[],restart=[],post_start_target=[]].pre_send()
 2023-07-27 14:34:05,407]
                            Test Step: Fuzzing Node 'HTTP-Request'
[2023-07-27 14:34:05,407]
                             Info: Sending 45 bytes...
[2023-07-27 14:34:05,407]
 2023-07-27 14:34:05,407]
                            Transmitted 45 bytes: 50 4f 53 54 20 7c 20 72 65 62 6f 6f 74 20 48 54 54 50 2f 31 2e 31 0d 0a 48 6f 73 74 3a 20 65 78 61 6d 70 6c 65 2e 63 6f 6d 0d 0a 0d 0a
  POST | reboot HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: example.com\r\n\r\n'
 2023-07-27 14:34:05,407]
                            Test Step: Contact target monitors
                            Test Step: Cleaning up connections from callbacks
 2023-07-27 14:34:05,408]
                               Check OK: No crash detected.
[2023-07-27 14:34:05,408]
                             Info: Closing target connection...
[2023-07-27 14:34:05,408]
                             Info: Connection closed.
[2023-07-27 14:34:05,408]
```



漏洞:CVE-2020-29596

漏洞說明

MiniWeb HTTP server 0.8.19 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (daemon crash) via a long name for the first parameter in a POST request.


漏洞重現

嘗試透過 fuzzing 重新找到這個漏洞



fuzzing 過程

使用 github 的範例腳本, 針對 POST request 去 fuzz



漏洞分析

使用 x32dbg 查看 crash 時的 call stack

🧼 miniweb.exe - PID: 5360 - 執	行緒: 主執行緒 18280 - x32dbg						
檔案(F) 檢視(V) 除錯(D) 追	蹤(N) 外掛程式(P) 最愛(I)	項(O) 幫助(H) May 12 202	3 (TitanEngine)				
n † ← ■ C ·	🕨 🐲 🛊 🛊 👊 🔞 🧳	📮 🥙 🥒 fx # A	z 🖺 📗 💆				
図 CPU D 日誌 □ £	筆記 * 中断點 == 記憶	體映射 🗐 呼叫堆疊	ሜ SEH鏈 ☑	腳本 🎴 符號	◇ 原始碼	❤️ 執行緒	📥 Handles
執行緒ID 位址	返回到	 來自	大小	Party	註解		
18280							
0019F8 0019F9 0019F9 0019F6 0019FF 0019FF 0019FF 0019FF	02C 00403585 0DC 00402B62 0FC 0040196F 0EC 0040A9F1 730 00410779 778 77317D59 7780B79B 7780B71F	41414141 7659687E 00403585 00402B62 0040196F 0040A9F1 00410779 77317D59 7780B79B 7780B71F	4C B0 20 2F0 244 48 10 58	☞★↓↓↓↓▼■·■·■·★ 系使使使使使更更系系系使 統用用用用用統統統統用 者者者者者	41414141 ws2_32.7659 miniweb.004 miniweb.004 miniweb.004 miniweb.004 miniweb.004 kernel32.77 ntdll.77808 ntdll.77808	03585 02B62 0196F 0A9F1 10779 317D59 79B	

漏洞分析

- 查看 call stack 發現呼叫路徑: main() -> _mwHttpLoop() -> _mwProcessReadSocket() -> _mwStartSendFile()
- 問題:_mwProcessReadSocket() 中未對
 phsSocket->dataLength 做檢查, 導致 heap overflow

漏洞分析

```
} else if (!phsSocket->request.pucPayload) {
       // first receive of payload, prepare for next receive
       if (phsSocket->request.payloadSize > MAX_POST_PAYLOAD_SIZE) phsSocket->request.payloadSize = MAX_POST_PAYLOAD_SIZE;
       phsSocket->bufferSize = phsSocket->request.payloadSize + 1;
        phsSocket->request.pucPayload = malloc(phsSocket->bufferSize);
       phsSocket->pucData = phsSocket->request.pucPayload;
       // payload length already received
       phsSocket->dataLength -= phsSocket->request.headerSize;
       // copy already received payload to payload buffer
       memcpy(phsSocket->request.pucPayload, phsSocket->buffer + phsSocket->request.headerSize, phsSocket->dataLength);
       phsSocket->request.pucPayload[phsSocket->dataLength]=0;
```


POC demo

```
[576] consection accepted
                                                         [836] IP: 169.284.96.235
                                                         Connected clients: 2
                                                         [584] 218 bytes sent (216 kB/s)
                                                         [230] request path: tago.peg.
                                                         [560] Sie bytee sont (žiu kū/s)
                                                         [564] sucket clased after responded for I requests
                                                         Community elients: 2
                                                         [$36] 218 bytes sent (218 kB/s)
                                                         [536] 2968 bytes ment [2968 WE/s]
                                                         [576] secket clased after responded for I requests
                                                         freewooted cliests: 1
                                                         [584] coenection accepted
                                                         (586) IP: 169.254.96.235
                                                         Democted clients: 1
                                                         [580] request path: faution.5co
                                                         [586] 233 bytes sent (233 kB/s)
                                                         [880] 3231 bytes sent (3232 WE/6)
                                                         [580] sucket classed after responded for I requests
                                                         Community Clients: 1
                                                         [565] connection accepted
                                                         [S68] IP: 180.154.00.235
                                                         Connected clients: 1
                                                         [868] request path; inder.html
                                                         [568] Http file not Feund
RELAMISERAMISERAMISERAMISERAMISERAMISERADO SE ANTO 1 SERVICE
                                                         [568] sucket classed after responded for 1 requests
samplyparam_data2
--- [mana sel_APTOP-k0025FV08] - [demo]
                                                         Connected clients: 1
                                                         PS [LAPTOP-ROODFWOR] >
                                           LOCOFOT-BUSIN
                          TO HE
```

漏洞修補

將漏洞修補並發 Pull Request

fix: heap overflow:CVE-2020-29596 #18



漏洞修補

```
// Fix heap overflow (CVE-2020-29596)
// We make sure that the length of phsSocket->dataLength doesn't exceed request.payloadSize
if (phsSocket->dataLength > phsSocket->request.payloadSize)
    phsSocket->dataLength = phsSocket->request.payloadSize;
phsSocket->dataLength -= phsSocket->request.headerSize;
```

結論

結論

- 透過 boofuzz 實作 fuzzing 的過程
- 透過 fuzzing 發現 N-day
- 分析漏洞並修補

收穫與心得

- 熟悉 fuzzing 的工具
- · 熟悉漏洞分析、debug 的技巧
- 修補漏洞、回饋社群

End

Any Questions?