

Attacking Samsung Galaxy A* Boot Chain

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Quarkslab

Who we are

- Maxime Rossi Bellom [@max_r_b](https://twitter.com/max_r_b)
- Security researcher and R&D leader @ Quarkslab
- Working on mobile and embedded software security

- Damiano Melotti [@DamianoMelotti](https://twitter.com/DamianoMelotti)
- Ex security researcher @ Quarkslab
- Interested in low-level mobile security and fuzzing

- Gabrielle Viala [@pwissenlit](https://twitter.com/pwissenlit)
- Security researcher and R&D leader @ Quarkslab
- Playing with low-level stuff

- Raphaël Neveu
- Security researcher @ Quarkslab
- Working on low-level mobile security

Dissecting the Modern Android Data Encryption Scheme


Maxime Rossi Bellom
Damiano Melotti



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Attacking SP derivation

- Need to target the TEE
- Two alternatives
 - Keymaster TA (accessing the first AES key)
 - Gatekeeper TA (validating credentials and minting auth tokens)



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Bruteforce of the password

1. `pwd = generate new password`
2. `token = scrypt(pwd, R, N, P, Salt)`
3. `Application_id = token || Prehashed value`
4. `Key = SHA512("application_id" || application_id)`
5. `AES_Decrypt(value_from_keymaster, key)`

```
$ python3 bruteforce-tee.py
workers will cycle through the last 5 chars
Found it: 1234
the plaintext is '1234'
Done in 18.031058311462402s
Throughput: 1478.448992816657 tries/s
```

```
Preloader - HW version: 0x0
Preloader - WDT: 0x10007000
Preloader - Uart: 0x11002000
Preloader - Brom payload addr: 0x100a000
Preloader - Dm payload addr: 0x1001000
Preloader - CQ_DWA addr: 0x10212000
Preloader - Vari: 0x25
Preloader - Disabling Watchdog...
Preloader - HM code: 0x707
Preloader - Target config: 0x5
Preloader - SBC enabled: True
Preloader - SLA enabled: False
Preloader - DAA enabled: True
Preloader - SWI2TAG enabled: True
Preloader - SPIR boot at 0x600 after SMC_BOOT/SDMMC_BOOT: False
Preloader - Root cert required: False
Preloader - Mem read auth: True
Preloader - Mem write auth: True
Preloader - Cmd 0xC81 blocked: True
Preloader - Get TEE info...
Preloader - BBROM mode detected.
Preloader - HM subcode: 0x8000
Preloader - HM Ver: 0xc000
Preloader - SW Ver: 0x0
Preloader - HE_ID: 3AC0889C3AC60179BF870155591927F9
Preloader - SOC ID: 8EDAEF3C1CTf12c4BC410E3D879F30CD02348AC1C0CBFEBDCDF33658D3F18D
PLTools - Loading payload from mt6768_payload.bin, 0x264 bytes
PLTools - Kamakiri / DA Run
Kamakiri - Trying Kamakiri...
Kamakiri - Done with Kamakiri...
PLTools - Successfully sent payload: /home/maxime/tools/mtkclient/mtkclient/payments/mt6768_payload.bin
Port - Device detected :)
Main - Connected to device, loading
Main - Using custom preloader: preloader_k69v1_64_titan.buffalo.bin
Mtk - Validated secure boot
Mtk - Patched "seclib_sec_ushld_enabled" in preloader
Mtk - Patched "sec_imq_auth" in preloader
Mtk - Patched "get_vfy_policy" in preloader
Main - Sent preloader to 0x201000, length 0x3ff24
Preloader - Jumping to 0x201000
Preloader - Jumping to 0x201000: ok.
Main - PL Jumped to daaddr 0x201000.
Main - Keep pressed power button to boot.
[] Waiting for device to boot
```



Our Device


■ Samsung Galaxy A225F

- Cheap (~300€)
- Mediatek SoC MT6769V
- Main OS: Android
- Mix of Mediatek and Samsung code
- Trustzone OS: TEEGRIS
- Secure Boot Bypass using MTKClient¹
 - making debugging easier




[1]: <https://github.com/bkerler/mtkclient>

Mediatek Secure Boot Process



Mediatek Secure Boot Process



Android partitions

- boot.img
 - Kernel and ramdisk
- vbmeta.img
 - For verified boot
- super.img
 - Dynamic partition combining system, vendor, and more
- ... many more...

Little Kernel (LK)

- Open-source OS²
- Common as bootloader in the Android world
- Allows to boot Android or other modes
(Recovery)
- Implements **A**ndroid **V**erified **B**oot v2
 - Verification of Android images
 - Involving boot and vbmeta partitions
 - Anti-rollback



Little Kernel by Samsung

- Samsung modified LK to include:
 - The Odin recovery protocol
 - Knox Security Bit
 - Etc...
 - And a JPEG parser/renderer
- This version is closed source



Why Targeting the JPEG Loader/Parser

- JPEGs are placed in a TAR archive in the *up_param* partition
- The archive is signed... but the signature is not checked at boot
 - ! Anyone able to write the flash can modify these JPEGs
- Parsing JPEG is known to be hard (cf. LogoFail³)

[3]: <https://www.binarly.io/blog/inside-the-logofail-poc-from-integer-overflow-to-arbitrary-code-execution>

Why Targeting the JPEG Loader/Parser

- JPEGs are placed in a TAR archive in the *up_param* partition
- The archive is signed... but the signature is not checked at boot
 - ! Anyone able to write the flash can modify these JPEGs
- Parsing JPEG is known to be hard (cf. LogoFail³)

How are these JPEGs loaded by LK?

Heap Overflow in JPEG Loading

```
_JPEG_BUF = alloc(0x100000);
if (_JPEG_BUF == 0) {
    log("%s: img buf alloc fail\n", "drawimg");
    uVar2 = 0xffffffff;
}
else {
    memset(_JPEG_BUF, 0, 0x100000);
    iVar1 = read_jpeg_file(file_name, _JPEG_BUF, 0);
    if (iVar1 == 0) {
        log("%s: read %s from up_param as 0, size\n", "drawimg", file_name);
        uVar2 = 0xffffffff;
    }
// ...

pimage(*(undefined4 *)(&DAT_4c5107fc + param_1 * 0x3c),
        *(undefined4 *)(&DAT_4c510800 + param_1 * 0x3c),
        0x2d0, 0x640, 1, _JPEG_BUF, iVar1);
```

Heap Overflow in JPEG Loading

Heap allocation of constant size for the buffer



```
_JPEG_BUF = alloc(0x100000);
if (_JPEG_BUF == 0) {
    log("%s: img buf alloc fail\n", "drawimg");
    uVar2 = 0xffffffff;
}
else {
    memset(_JPEG_BUF, 0, 0x100000);
    iVar1 = read_jpeg_file(file_name, _JPEG_BUF, 0);
    if (iVar1 == 0) {
        log("%s: read %s from up_param as 0, size\n", "drawimg", file_name);
        uVar2 = 0xffffffff;
    }
    // ...
}

pimage(*(undefined4 *)(&DAT_4c5107fc + param_1 * 0x3c),
        *(undefined4 *)(&DAT_4c510800 + param_1 * 0x3c),
        0x2d0, 0x640, 1, _JPEG_BUF, iVar1);
```

Heap Overflow in JPEG Loading

Read the JPEG in
the buffer

```
_JPEG_BUF = alloc(0x100000);
if (_JPEG_BUF == 0) {
    log("%s: img buf alloc fail\n", "drawimg");
    uVar2 = 0xffffffff;
}
else {
    memset(_JPEG_BUF, 0, 0x100000);
    iVar1 = read_jpeg_file(file_name, _JPEG_BUF, 0);
    if (iVar1 == 0) {
        log("%s: read %s from up_param as 0, size\n", "drawimg", file_name);
        uVar2 = 0xffffffff;
    }
    // ...

pimage(*(undefined4 *)(&DAT_4c5107fc + param_1 * 0x3c),
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        0x2d0, 0x640, 1, _JPEG_BUF, iVar1);
```

Heap Overflow in JPEG Loading


```
_JPEG_BUF = alloc(0x100000);
if (_JPEG_BUF == 0) {
    log("%s: img buf alloc fail\n", "drawimg");
    uVar2 = 0xffffffff;
}
else {
    memset(_JPEG_BUF, 0, 0x100000);
    iVar1 = read_jpeg_file(file_name, _JPEG_BUF, 0);
    if (iVar1 == 0) {
        log("%s: read %s from up_param as 0, size\n", "drawimg", file_name);
        uVar2 = 0xffffffff;
    }
// ...
pimage(*(undefined4 *)(&DAT_4c5107fc + param_1 * 0x3c),
        *(undefined4 *)(&DAT_4c510800 + param_1 * 0x3c),
        0x2d0, 0x640, 1, _JPEG_BUF, iVar1);
```

Parse and render
the JPEG



Heap Overflow in JPEG Loading

```
_JPEG_BUF = alloc(0x100000);
if (_JPEG_BUF == 0) {
    log("%s: img buf alloc fail\n", "drawimg");
    uVar2 = 0xffffffff;
}
else {
    memset(_JPEG_BUF, 0, 0x100000);
    iVar1 = read_jpeg_file(file_name, _JPEG_BUF 0);
    if (iVar1 == 0) {
        log("%s: read %s from up_param as 0, size\n", "drawimg", file_name);
        uVar2 = 0xffffffff;
    }
// ...
pimage(*(undefined4 *)(&DAT_4c5107fc + param_1 * 0x3c),
        *(undefined4 *)(&DAT_4c510800 + param_1 * 0x3c),
        0x2d0, 0x640, 1, _JPEG_BUF, iVar1);
```



Heap Overflow in JPEG Loading

- `read_jpeg_file` takes a size as 3rd argument
- It triggers an error if the file does not fit the size provided

```
file_size = string_to_int(tar_header_file.size, 0, 8);
if (size != 0 && size < file_size) {
    file_size = print("read fail! (%d < %d)\n", size, file_size, size);
    return file_size;
}
iVar1 = read(data_addr, index + 1, file_size, outbuf);
```

Heap Overflow in JPEG Loading

- `read_jpeg_file` takes a size as 3rd argument
- It triggers an error if the file does not fit the size provided
 - 👉 Unless the size provided is 0...


```
file_size = string_to_int(tar_header_file.size, 0, 8);
if (size != 0 && size < file_size) { ←
    file_size = print("read fail! (%d < %d)\n", size, file_size, size);
    return file_size;
}
iVar1 = read(data_addr, index + 1, file_size, outbuf);
```

Is it exploitable?

Exploiting a Heap Overflow in Little Kernel

- The heap algorithm is *miniheap*
 - It relies on a doubly linked list
- Chunks are in a unique memory pool
 - An overflow may overwrite the metadata of next chunk

```
struct free_chunk_head {  
    struct free_chunk_head *prev;  
    struct free_chunk_head *next;  
    size_t len;  
}
```



From Heap Overflow to Arbitrary Write

- After allocation, a chunk is removed from the free list
- `next` and `prev` are dereferenced to change the corresponding nodes
⇒ Controlling a free chunk leads to a write-what-where

```
node->next->prev = node->prev;  
node->prev->next = node->next;  
node->prev = node->next = 0;
```

From Heap Overflow to Arbitrary Write

- After allocation, a chunk is removed from the free list
- `next` and `prev` are dereferenced to change the corresponding nodes
 - ⇒ Controlling a free chunk leads to a write-what-where
 - ! Both values must writable addresses

```
node->next->prev = node->prev;  
node->prev->next = node->next;  
node->prev = node->next = 0;
```

From Arbitrary Write to Code Execution

Important details about LK

- ✗ No ASLR
- ✗ No canaries
- ✗ No bounds checks in the heap algorithm
- ✗ Heap is executable!

From Arbitrary Write to Code Execution

Important details about LK



- ✗ No ASLR
- ✗ No canaries
- ✗ No bounds checks in the heap algorithm
- ✗ Heap is executable!

Exploit strategy becomes simple:

1. Overwrite a pointer that the code will jump to
👉 the return address in the stack
2. Make it point to a shellcode in our JPEG buffer

Exploiting a Heap Overflow in Little Kernel



Step 1
JPEG Buffer
Allocation



Exploiting a Heap Overflow in Little Kernel

Step 2
Reading The Jpeg



Stack



Exploiting a Heap Overflow in Little Kernel



Step 2
Reading The Jpeg

Stack



Exploiting a Heap Overflow in Little Kernel



Step 2
Reading The Jpeg




Exploiting a Heap Overflow in Little Kernel

Step 2


Reading The Jpeg
And overwriting next chunk



Exploiting a Heap Overflow in Little Kernel



Exploiting a Heap Overflow in Little Kernel



Emulating and Debugging our Exploit

- We used Unicorn
 - Emulates CPU only
 - We do not care about full-system emulation
 - Easy to setup & tweak
- ✓ Exploiting the vulnerability is quite straightforward in the emulator
- ✗ But the same exploit does not work on the real device



Emulating and Debugging our Exploit

What can go wrong?

Emulating and Debugging our Exploit

What can go wrong?

- ✖ Heap and stack are different from the ones IRL

Emulating and Debugging our Exploit

What can go wrong?

-  Heap and stack are different from the ones IRL
-  Dump it from the device

Emulating and Debugging our Exploit

What can go wrong?

-  Heap and stack are different from the ones IRL
-  Dump it from the device
-  Memory state (addresses, sizes) is the same every boots

Emulating and Debugging our Exploit

What can go wrong?

- ✗ Heap and stack are different from the ones IRL
- ✓ Dump it from the device
- ✗ Heap algo writes something at the address $*(shellcode+4)$

Emulating and Debugging our Exploit

What can go wrong?

- ✗ Heap and stack are different from the ones IRL
- ✓ Dump it from the device
- ✗ Heap algo writes something at the address $*(shellcode+4)$

```
node->next->prev = node->prev;  
node->prev->next = node->next;  
node->prev = node->next = 0;
```

Emulating and Debugging our Exploit

What can go wrong?

- X Heap and stack are different from the ones IRL
- ✓ Dump it from the device
- X Heap algo writes something at the address $*(shellcode+4)$
- ✓ Skip the next instruction in the shellcode

```
add pc, pc, 0x4;  
nop  
nop
```

Emulating and Debugging our Exploit

What can go wrong?

- ✗ Heap and stack are different from the ones IRL
- ✓ Dump it from the device
- ✗ Heap algo writes something at the address $*(shellcode+4)$
- ✓ Skip the next instruction in the shellcode
- ✗ Heap after exploitation may crash during the next allocation

Emulating and Debugging our Exploit

What can go wrong?

- X Heap and stack are different from the ones IRL
- ✓ Dump it from the device
- X Heap algo writes something at the address $*(shellcode+4)$
- ✓ Skip the next instruction in the shellcode
- X Heap after exploitation may crash during the next allocation
- ✓ Restore the heap in a working state


To sum-up

- SVE-2023-2079/CVE-2024-20832
 - ✓ Leads to code execution
 - ✓ Persistent (it survives reboots and factory reset)
 - ✓ Gives full control over Normal World EL1/0
 - ✓ Impacts Samsung devices based on Mediatek SoCs
 - Including those for which MTKClient does not work
 - ✗ Requires to flash the *up_param* partition

*How to write our JPEGs in the
up_param partition?*

Odin: Samsung's recovery protocol

- Odin is implemented in LK
- It is available through the *Download Mode*
 - It allows to flash partitions over USB
- The Odin official client is closed source
- There is an open-source client: Heimdall⁴



[4]: <https://github.com/Benjamin-Dobell/Heimdall>

Odin: Samsung's recovery protocol

- Images are authenticated and contain a footer signature
- Two internal structures indicate which partitions to flash
 - The *Partition Information Table* (PIT)
 - A global structure indicating which partitions to authenticate

53	69	67	6E	65	72	56	65	72	30	32	00	00	00	00	00	SignerVer02.....
36	35	37	33	31	38	36	36	52	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	65731866R.....
41	32	32	35	46	58	58	55	36	44	57	45	33	00	00	00	A225FXXU6DWE3...
00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
32	30	32	33	30	35	32	34	31	32	34	37	30	30	00	00	20230524124700..
53	4D	2D	41	32	32	35	46	5F	43	49	53	5F	53	45	52	SM-A225F_CIS_SER
5F	4D	4B	45	59	30	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	_MKEY0.....
53	52	50	55	42	31	35	42	30	30	36	00	00	00	00	00	SRPUB15B006.....

Odin: Partition Information Table

- PIT is retrieved statically from the eMMC
- It indicates where partitions are stored
 - Memory type, block count, etc
- A partition not present in PIT can't be flashed
- PIT can be updated, but requires a signed image

--- Entry #1 ---

Binary Type: 0 (AP)

Device Type: 2 (MMC)

Identifier: 70

Attributes: Read/Write

Update Attributes: 1

Block Size/Offset: 0

Block Count: 34

Partition Name: pgpt

...

Odin: Image Authentication


- A global array indicates how an image should be authenticated
- An image not present in this array will not be authenticated
 - (Except for some specific images)
- Comparing this array with PIT gives a set of images flashable without authentication

md5hdr, md_udc, pgpt, sgpt, and vbmeta_vendor

GPT: GUID Partition Table

- **pgpt** points to the Primary GPT Header
- **sgpt** points to the Secondary GPT Header
- Similarly to the PIT, it describes the partitions
 - (Names, sizes, addresses, etc)
- Any GPT can be flashed through Odin
! No authentication required

GUID Partition Table Scheme



GPT vs PIT

- **PIT** and **GPT** are used for the same thing: to describe partitions
 - **PIT** is mainly used for Samsung features in LK
 - Odin, JPEGs loading, etc
 - And **GPT** is used the rest of the time
-
- ! We can't just rename a partition to *up_param* to flash our JPEGs

PIT Loading

```
pit_address = 0x4400;
exist = get_part_table("pit");
if (exist == 0) {
    pit_address = get_partition_offset("pit");
}
type = storage(3);
iVar1 = storage_read(type, 0x4000, (int)pit_address,
                      (int)((ulonglong)pit_address >> 0x20),
                      &ODIN_TEMP_BUF_PIT, 0x4000);
```

PIT Loading

```
pit_address = 0x4400;
exist = get_part_table("pit");
if (exist == 0) {
    pit_address = get_partition_offset("pit");
}
type = storage(3);
iVar1 = storage_read(type, 0x4000, (int)pit_address,
                     (int)((ulonglong)pit_address >> 0x20),
                     &ODIN_TEMP_BUF_PIT, 0x4000);
```

PIT default address



PIT Loading

```
pit_address = 0x4400;  
exist = get_part_table("pit");  
if (exist == 0) {  
    pit_address = get_partition_offset("pit");  
}  
type = storage(3);  
iVar1 = storage_read(type, 0x4000, (int)pit_address,  
                     (int)((ulonglong)pit_address >> 0x20),  
                     &ODIN_TEMP_BUF_PIT, 0x4000);
```

PIT default address

Check for pit partition
And use it if it exists

PIT Loading


```
pit_address = 0x4400;
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    pit_address = get_partition_offset("pit");
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type = storage(3);
iVar1 = storage_read(type, 0x4000, (int)pit_address,
                     (int)((ulonglong)pit_address >> 0x20),
                     &ODIN_TEMP_BUF_PIT, 0x4000);
```

PIT default address


Uses GPT table 😈




Strategy to Bypass Odin Authentication




Strategy to Bypass Odin Authentication




Strategy to Bypass Odin Authentication



Strategy to Bypass Odin Authentication



Strategy to Bypass Odin Authentication




Strategy to Bypass Odin Authentication




- ✓ It works (new jpegs are loaded)
- ✗ Android won't boot without the *vbmeta_vendor* partition

Strategy to Bypass Odin Authentication




Strategy to Bypass Odin Authentication



To sum up

- SVE-2024-0234/CVE-2024-20865
 - ✓ Can bypass authentication in Odin
 - ✓ We can flash anything in the eMMC
 - ✓ Including our *up_param* partition
 - ✓ Seems to impact most Samsung using Mediatek and Qualcomm SoCs




Post Exploitation: bypassing Android Verified Boot

- Our ultimate goal is to bypass AVB checks in LK to load a modified Android
 - We patch LK code from our shellcode
 - Memory already writable → no need to play with MMU

```
26 iVar1 = do_hash(param_1,param_2,DAT_4c6463e0 - param_2,&hash,0x20);
27 if (iVar1 == 0) {
28     iVar2 = memcmp(&STORED_HASH,&hash,0x20);
29     if (iVar2 == 0) {
30         print("[%s][oem] img auth pass\n",&s_SBC_030151a8);
31         goto LAB_02ff82e0;
32     }
33     iVar1 = 0x7021;
34 }
35 print("[%s][oem] img auth fail (0x%x)\n",&s_SBC_030151a8,iVar1);
```


Chaining Everything Together




To Conclude

- Chain based on 2 vulnerabilities
 - ✓ Leads to code execution in LK
 - ✓ Persistent (it survives reboots and factory reset)
 - ✓ Impacts Samsung devices based on Mediatek SoCs
 - Including those for which MTKClient does not work
 - ✓ Can be triggered over USB thanks to Odin authentication bypass
 - ✓ Gives full control over Normal World EL1/0
 - ✗ Still no access to secrets stored in Secure World


Targeting ARM Trusted Firmware



Targeting ARM Trusted Firmware



Communication between NSW and SW



Vulnerability Research on ATF

- Motivation:
 - Highest privilege level → A bug here can be devastating
 - Reachable from Normal World through SMCs
- Code is simple
- Interacts a lot with HW through unknown registers
 - Fuzzing not particularly interesting in this case
- Our approach: focus on static analysis

Few Words about TEEGRIS

- Trustzone OS designed by Samsung
- ROM images:
 - tee-verified.img: ATF, TEEGRIS kernel, userboot.so
 - tzar.img: TEE root filesystem
 - super.img: Android system, Trusted Applications and Drivers
- Excellent references online⁷

TEEgris

Extracting ATF

6

2

00026df0	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00026e00	88 16 88 58 ad 06 00 00 63 65 72 74 31 00 00 00X..... cert1X..... cert1
00026e10	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00026e20	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 78 56 34 12 ff ff ff ffxV4.....
00026e30	89 16 89 58 00 02 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 02X.....X.....
00026e40	00 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 78 56 34 22xV4"
00026e50	ff

SMC Handlers

```
if ((is_secure & 1) == 0) {
    puVar1 = mediatek_plat_sip_handler_secure(smc_id,arg1,arg2,arg3
                                                ,arg4,arg5,output);
    return puVar1;
}
[...]
if ((origin < 2) && (IN_BOOTLOADER == 0)) {
    puVar1 = mediatek_plat_sip_handler_kernel(smc_id,arg1,arg2,arg3
                                                ,arg4,arg5,output);
    return puVar1;
}
```

SMC Handlers

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if ((is_secure & 1) == 0) {  
    puVar1 = mediatek_plat_sip_handler_secure(smc_id, arg1, arg2, arg3  
                                                , arg4, arg5, output);  
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[...]  
if ((origin < 2) && (IN_BOOTLOADER == 0)) {  
    puVar1 = mediatek_plat_sip_handler_kernel(smc_id, arg1, arg2, arg3  
                                                , arg4, arg5, output);  
    return puVar1;  
}
```

Arguments of SMC

Leaking from Virtual Address Space

```
uint* global_array = (uint *)0x4ce2f578;
[...]
if (smcid == 0x82000526) {
    out_value = global_array[arg1 * 4];
    goto exit;
}
[...]
    output[2] = out_value;
    output[1] = arg1;
    *output = 0;
return output;
```

Leaking from Virtual Address Space

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[...]  
if (smcid == 0x82000526) {  
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```

Fully controlled by
attacker

Leaking from Virtual Address Space

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
Fully controlled by
attacker... And never
checked



SVE-2023-2215 (CVE-2024-20820)

- In `mediatek_plat_sip_handler_kernel`, reachable from Linux Kernel
- To exploit it, send the SMC `0x82000526` with
 - `(arbitrary_address - 0x4ce2f578) / 4`
- Bug introduced by Samsung only in some devices (including A225F)
- It leaks 4 bytes from ATF virtual address space
 - We can read all the internal data of ATF
 - But we can't leak anything from other SW components

SVE-2023-2215 (CVE-2024-20820)



Mapping Any Physical Address in ATF

SMC 0x8200022A calls function spm_actions

```
if (smc_id == 0x8200022a) {  
    spm_actions(arg1,arg2,arg3);
```

Mapping Any Physical Address in ATF

SMC 0x8200022A calls function spm_actions

```
undefined * spm_actions(ulong cmdid,undefined *addr,ulong size) {  
    switch(cmdid & 0xffffffff) {  
        [...]  
        case 1:  
            if (size < 0x100001) {  
                mmap_wrap(addr,size);  
            }  
        [...]  
    }  
}
```

Mapping Any Physical Address in ATF

SMC 0x8200022A calls function spm_actions

```
undefined * spm_actions(ulong cmdid,undefined *addr, ulong size) {  
    switch(cmdid & 0xffffffff) {  
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```

Arguments fully
controlled

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            }  
        [...]  
    }  
}
```

Arguments fully controlled

And still no checks on the address

Mapping Any Physical Address in ATF

SMC 0x8200022A calls function spm_actions

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undefined * spm_actions(ulong cmdid,undefined *addr, ulong size) {  
    switch(cmdid & 0xffffffff) {  
        [...]  
        case 1:  
            if (size < 0x100001) {  
                mmap_wrap(addr,size);  
            }  
        [...]  
    }  
}
```

Physical Address

And still no checks on the address

CVE-2024-20021


- Also in mediatek_plat_sip_handler_kernel
- Will mmap with physical base address to the same virtual address
 - ... however we can't munmap
 - So we are limited to 8 consecutives mmaps
 - Meaning we can leak up to **8MB** of data
- Introduced by Mediatek (impacts plenty of Mediatek SoCs)
- Chained to our leak, we can read everything in Secure World
 - Including TEEGRIS

*Can we use this vulnerability to leak
Keystore keys?*

Android Keystore system

- Key storage and crypto services
- Keys are stored as *key blobs*
- Three protection levels:
 - Software only
 - TEE (default)
 - Hardware-backed (StrongBox)
- Raw key should never leave protected environment

Android Keystore system



Where to leak?

```
a22:/ # cat /proc/last_kmsg
[...]
[4425] mblock_reserve-R[5].start: 0x4ce00000, size: 0x60000 map:0
, name:atf-reserved
[...]
[4426] mblock_reserve-R[8].start: 0x7ac00000, size: 0x400000 map:0
, name:tee-secmem
[4426] mblock_reserve-R[9].start: 0x7f300000, size: 0xc0000 map:0
, name:SSPM-reserved
[4426] mblock_reserve-R[10].start: 0x7b200000, size: 0x4000000
, map:0 name:tee-reserved
[...]
[4436] 1k finished --> jump to linux kernel 64Bit
```

Where to leak?

```
a22:/ # cat /proc/last_kmsg
[...]
[4425] mblock_reserve-R[5].start: 0x4ce00000, size: 0x60000 map:0
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[4426] mblock_reserve-R[10].start: 0x7b200000, size: 0x4000000
, map:0 name:tee-reserved
[...]
[4436] 1k finished --> jump to linux kernel 64Bit
```

Where to leak?

- TAs should be part of the *tee-reserved* (`0x7b200000`) memory block
- Keymaster TA binary contains many strings
 - (path in Android fs: `/vendor/tee/00000000-0000-0000-0000-4b45594d5354`)
- Try to find these strings in memory
 - Usually present around `0x7c200000`


Our PoC

1. **Import** a key into the Android Keystore
2. **Encrypt** using that key
3. **Stop the execution** after Begin0peration is called
 - To makes sure the key stays in memory
4. **Leak** the identified region of memory


A Simple PoC

```
byte[ ] key = "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA".getBytes();
SecretKey yourKey = (SecretKey) new SecretKeySpec(key, 0, key.length,
"AES");
[...]
keyStore = KeyStore.getInstance("AndroidKeystore");
keyStore.load(null);
keyStore.setEntry("key1", new KeyStore.SecretKeyEntry(yourKey), new
KeyProtection.Builder(KeyProperties.PURPOSE_ENCRYPT |
KeyProperties.PURPOSE_DECRYPT)
    .setBlockModes(KeyProperties.BLOCK_MODE_CBC)
    .setEncryptionPaddings(KeyProperties.ENCRYPTION_PADDING_NONE)
    .build());
keyStoreKey = (SecretKey) keyStore.getKey("key1", null);
```

Communication between NSW and SW



Hooking Keystore HAL Deamon



The result

4:8760h	00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 1C 00 00 00 00 1C 00 00 000..I0..I
4:8770h	08 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 30 00 02 CF 30 00 02 CF0..I0..I
4:8780h	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 1C 00 00 00 14 00 00 00
4:8790h	08 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 10 00 00 02 10 00 00 02
4:87A0h	14 00 00 00 0C 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
4:87B0h	80 00 00 00 2C 00 00 00 21 00 00 00 94 B8 9C 19	€...,!...”,æ.
4:87C0h	41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41	AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
4:87D0h	41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41	AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
4:87E0h	00 00 00 00 2C 00 00 00 20 00 00 00 FC A3 9C 19,... .üfæ.
4:87F0h	FF 00 00 00 00	ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿ....
4:8800h	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 FF FF FF FFÿÿÿ
4:8810h	2C 00 00 00 24 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 FC B5 9C 19	,...\$.üμæ.
4:8820h	40 A1 9C 19 00 00 00 00 38 97 9C 19 02 00 00 00	@jæ....8–æ....
4:8830h	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 24 00 00 00 14 00 00 00\$....
4:8840h	08 00 00 00 1C 81 9C 19 30 00 02 CF 30 00 02 CFæ.0..I0..I
4:8850h	00 00 00 00 1C 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 1C 81 9C 19æ.
4:8860h	04 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 80 88 9C 19 00 00 00 00€^æ....
4:8870h	00 00 00 00 14 00 00 00 05 00 00 00 1C 81 9C 19æ.
4:8880h	01 34 B1 C9 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 1C 00 00 00	.4±É....
4:8890h	18 00 00 00 16 81 9C 19 B8 00 00 00 18 00 00 00


The result



Our PoC

1. **Import** a key into the Android Keystore
2. **Encrypt** using that key
3. **Stop the execution** after Begin0peration is called
 - To makes sure the key stays in memory
4. **Leak** the identified region of memory
5. Try all possible keys from leak to decrypt ciphertext

Demo



Conclusion

- We presented 4 vulnerabilities leading to
 - Authentication bypass in Odin
 - Code execution with persistence in LK
 - Leak of SW memory, including Keystore keys
- Impact low/middle end Samsung devices
 - Vulnerabilities are simple, and yet super impactful
 - No mitigations in LK nor ATF
- All the vulnerabilities are now fixed

Thank you!

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Quarkslab



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