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su without password via /proc/pid/mem write #2
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Small code refactoring to ease the real fix in patch raspberrypi#2. Signed-off-by: Arvid Brodin <arvid.brodin@enea.com> Tested-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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abort all active commands from eh_host_reset in-case of ql4xdontresethba=1 Fix following call trace:- Nov 21 14:50:47 172.17.140.111 qla4xxx 0000:13:00.4: qla4_8xxx_disable_msix: qla4xxx (rsp_q) Nov 21 14:50:47 172.17.140.111 qla4xxx 0000:13:00.4: PCI INT A disabled Nov 21 14:50:47 172.17.140.111 slab error in kmem_cache_destroy(): cache `qla4xxx_srbs': Can't free all objects Nov 21 14:50:47 172.17.140.111 Pid: 9154, comm: rmmod Tainted: G O 3.2.0-rc2+ raspberrypi#2 Nov 21 14:50:47 172.17.140.111 Call Trace: Nov 21 14:50:47 172.17.140.111 [<c051231a>] ? kmem_cache_destroy+0x9a/0xb0 Nov 21 14:50:47 172.17.140.111 [<c0489c4a>] ? sys_delete_module+0x14a/0x210 Nov 21 14:50:47 172.17.140.111 [<c04fd552>] ? do_munmap+0x202/0x280 Nov 21 14:50:47 172.17.140.111 [<c04a6d4e>] ? audit_syscall_entry+0x1ae/0x1d0 Nov 21 14:50:47 172.17.140.111 [<c083019f>] ? sysenter_do_call+0x12/0x28 Nov 21 14:51:50 172.17.140.111 SLAB: cache with size 64 has lost its name Nov 21 14:51:50 172.17.140.111 iscsi: registered transport (qla4xxx) Nov 21 14:51:50 172.17.140.111 qla4xxx 0000:13:00.4: PCI INT A -> GSI 28 (level, low) -> IRQ 28 Signed-off-by: Sarang Radke <sarang.radke@qlogic.com> Signed-off-by: Vikas Chaudhary <vikas.chaudhary@qlogic.com> Reviewed-by: Mike Christie <michaelc@cs.wisc.edu> Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <JBottomley@Parallels.com>
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commit cc77245 [S390] fix list corruption in gmap reverse mapping added a potential dead lock: BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at mm/page_alloc.c:2260 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 1108, name: qemu-system-s39 3 locks held by qemu-system-s39/1108: #0: (&kvm->slots_lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<000003e004866542>] kvm_set_memory_region+0x3a/0x6c [kvm] raspberrypi#1: (&mm->mmap_sem){++++++}, at: [<0000000000123790>] gmap_map_segment+0x9c/0x298 raspberrypi#2: (&(&mm->page_table_lock)->rlock){+.+.+.}, at: [<00000000001237a8>] gmap_map_segment+0xb4/0x298 CPU: 0 Not tainted 3.1.3 raspberrypi#45 Process qemu-system-s39 (pid: 1108, task: 00000004f8b3cb30, ksp: 00000004fd5978d0) 00000004fd5979a0 00000004fd597920 0000000000000002 0000000000000000 00000004fd5979c0 00000004fd597938 00000004fd597938 0000000000617e96 0000000000000000 00000004f8b3cf58 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 000000000000000d 000000000000000c 00000004fd597988 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000100a18 00000004fd597920 00000004fd597960 Call Trace: ([<0000000000100926>] show_trace+0xee/0x144) [<0000000000131f3a>] __might_sleep+0x12a/0x158 [<0000000000217fb4>] __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x224/0xadc [<0000000000123086>] gmap_alloc_table+0x46/0x114 [<000000000012395c>] gmap_map_segment+0x268/0x298 [<000003e00486b014>] kvm_arch_commit_memory_region+0x44/0x6c [kvm] [<000003e004866414>] __kvm_set_memory_region+0x3b0/0x4a4 [kvm] [<000003e004866554>] kvm_set_memory_region+0x4c/0x6c [kvm] [<000003e004867c7a>] kvm_vm_ioctl+0x14a/0x314 [kvm] [<0000000000292100>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x94/0x588 [<0000000000292688>] SyS_ioctl+0x94/0xac [<000000000061e124>] sysc_noemu+0x22/0x28 [<000003fffcd5e7ca>] 0x3fffcd5e7ca 3 locks held by qemu-system-s39/1108: #0: (&kvm->slots_lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<000003e004866542>] kvm_set_memory_region+0x3a/0x6c [kvm] raspberrypi#1: (&mm->mmap_sem){++++++}, at: [<0000000000123790>] gmap_map_segment+0x9c/0x298 raspberrypi#2: (&(&mm->page_table_lock)->rlock){+.+.+.}, at: [<00000000001237a8>] gmap_map_segment+0xb4/0x298 Fix this by freeing the lock on the alloc path. This is ok, since the gmap table is never freed until we call gmap_free, so the table we are walking cannot go. Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
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mempool_alloc/free() use undocumented smp_mb()'s. The code is slightly broken and misleading. The lockless part is in mempool_free(). It wants to determine whether the item being freed needs to be returned to the pool or backing allocator without grabbing pool->lock. Two things need to be guaranteed for correct operation. 1. pool->curr_nr + #allocated should never dip below pool->min_nr. 2. Waiters shouldn't be left dangling. For raspberrypi#1, The only necessary condition is that curr_nr visible at free is from after the allocation of the element being freed (details in the comment). For most cases, this is true without any barrier but there can be fringe cases where the allocated pointer is passed to the freeing task without going through memory barriers. To cover this case, wmb is necessary before returning from allocation and rmb is necessary before reading curr_nr. IOW, ALLOCATING TASK FREEING TASK update pool state after alloc; wmb(); pass pointer to freeing task; read pointer; rmb(); read pool state to free; The current code doesn't have wmb after pool update during allocation and may theoretically, on machines where unlock doesn't behave as full wmb, lead to pool depletion and deadlock. smp_wmb() needs to be added after successful allocation from reserved elements and smp_mb() in mempool_free() can be replaced with smp_rmb(). For raspberrypi#2, the waiter needs to add itself to waitqueue and then check the wait condition and the waker needs to update the wait condition and then wake up. Because waitqueue operations always go through full spinlock synchronization, there is no need for extra memory barriers. Furthermore, mempool_alloc() is already holding pool->lock when it decides that it needs to wait. There is no reason to do unlock - add waitqueue - test condition again. It can simply add itself to waitqueue while holding pool->lock and then unlock and sleep. This patch adds smp_wmb() after successful allocation from reserved pool, replaces smp_mb() in mempool_free() with smp_rmb() and extend pool->lock over waitqueue addition. More importantly, it explains what memory barriers do and how the lockless testing is correct. -v2: Oleg pointed out that unlock doesn't imply wmb. Added explicit smp_wmb() after successful allocation from reserved pool and updated comments accordingly. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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There is a case in __sk_mem_schedule(), where an allocation is beyond the maximum, but yet we are allowed to proceed. It happens under the following condition: sk->sk_wmem_queued + size >= sk->sk_sndbuf The network code won't revert the allocation in this case, meaning that at some point later it'll try to do it. Since this is never communicated to the underlying res_counter code, there is an inbalance in res_counter uncharge operation. I see two ways of fixing this: 1) storing the information about those allocations somewhere in memcg, and then deducting from that first, before we start draining the res_counter, 2) providing a slightly different allocation function for the res_counter, that matches the original behavior of the network code more closely. I decided to go for raspberrypi#2 here, believing it to be more elegant, since raspberrypi#1 would require us to do basically that, but in a more obscure way. Signed-off-by: Glauber Costa <glommer@parallels.com> Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> CC: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> CC: Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com> CC: Laurent Chavey <chavey@google.com> Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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There is no reason to hold hiddev->existancelock before calling usb_deregister_dev, so move it out of the lock. The patch fixes the lockdep warning below. [ 5733.386271] ====================================================== [ 5733.386274] [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] [ 5733.386278] 3.2.0-custom-next-20120111+ raspberrypi#1 Not tainted [ 5733.386281] ------------------------------------------------------- [ 5733.386284] khubd/186 is trying to acquire lock: [ 5733.386288] (minor_rwsem){++++.+}, at: [<ffffffffa0011a04>] usb_deregister_dev+0x37/0x9e [usbcore] [ 5733.386311] [ 5733.386312] but task is already holding lock: [ 5733.386315] (&hiddev->existancelock){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffffa0094d17>] hiddev_disconnect+0x26/0x87 [usbhid] [ 5733.386328] [ 5733.386329] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 5733.386330] [ 5733.386333] [ 5733.386334] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 5733.386336] [ 5733.386337] -> raspberrypi#1 (&hiddev->existancelock){+.+...}: [ 5733.386346] [<ffffffff81082d26>] lock_acquire+0xcb/0x10e [ 5733.386357] [<ffffffff813df961>] __mutex_lock_common+0x60/0x465 [ 5733.386366] [<ffffffff813dfe4d>] mutex_lock_nested+0x36/0x3b [ 5733.386371] [<ffffffffa0094ad6>] hiddev_open+0x113/0x193 [usbhid] [ 5733.386378] [<ffffffffa0011971>] usb_open+0x66/0xc2 [usbcore] [ 5733.386390] [<ffffffff8111a8b5>] chrdev_open+0x12b/0x154 [ 5733.386402] [<ffffffff811159a8>] __dentry_open.isra.16+0x20b/0x355 [ 5733.386408] [<ffffffff811165dc>] nameidata_to_filp+0x43/0x4a [ 5733.386413] [<ffffffff81122ed5>] do_last+0x536/0x570 [ 5733.386419] [<ffffffff8112300b>] path_openat+0xce/0x301 [ 5733.386423] [<ffffffff81123327>] do_filp_open+0x33/0x81 [ 5733.386427] [<ffffffff8111664d>] do_sys_open+0x6a/0xfc [ 5733.386431] [<ffffffff811166fb>] sys_open+0x1c/0x1e [ 5733.386434] [<ffffffff813e7c79>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [ 5733.386441] [ 5733.386441] -> #0 (minor_rwsem){++++.+}: [ 5733.386448] [<ffffffff8108255d>] __lock_acquire+0xa80/0xd74 [ 5733.386454] [<ffffffff81082d26>] lock_acquire+0xcb/0x10e [ 5733.386458] [<ffffffff813e01f5>] down_write+0x44/0x77 [ 5733.386464] [<ffffffffa0011a04>] usb_deregister_dev+0x37/0x9e [usbcore] [ 5733.386475] [<ffffffffa0094d2d>] hiddev_disconnect+0x3c/0x87 [usbhid] [ 5733.386483] [<ffffffff8132df51>] hid_disconnect+0x3f/0x54 [ 5733.386491] [<ffffffff8132dfb4>] hid_device_remove+0x4e/0x7a [ 5733.386496] [<ffffffff812c0957>] __device_release_driver+0x81/0xcd [ 5733.386502] [<ffffffff812c09c3>] device_release_driver+0x20/0x2d [ 5733.386507] [<ffffffff812c0564>] bus_remove_device+0x114/0x128 [ 5733.386512] [<ffffffff812bdd6f>] device_del+0x131/0x183 [ 5733.386519] [<ffffffff8132def3>] hid_destroy_device+0x1e/0x3d [ 5733.386525] [<ffffffffa00916b0>] usbhid_disconnect+0x36/0x42 [usbhid] [ 5733.386530] [<ffffffffa000fb60>] usb_unbind_interface+0x57/0x11f [usbcore] [ 5733.386542] [<ffffffff812c0957>] __device_release_driver+0x81/0xcd [ 5733.386547] [<ffffffff812c09c3>] device_release_driver+0x20/0x2d [ 5733.386552] [<ffffffff812c0564>] bus_remove_device+0x114/0x128 [ 5733.386557] [<ffffffff812bdd6f>] device_del+0x131/0x183 [ 5733.386562] [<ffffffffa000de61>] usb_disable_device+0xa8/0x1d8 [usbcore] [ 5733.386573] [<ffffffffa0006bd2>] usb_disconnect+0xab/0x11f [usbcore] [ 5733.386583] [<ffffffffa0008aa0>] hub_thread+0x73b/0x1157 [usbcore] [ 5733.386593] [<ffffffff8105dc0f>] kthread+0x95/0x9d [ 5733.386601] [<ffffffff813e90b4>] kernel_thread_helper+0x4/0x10 [ 5733.386607] [ 5733.386608] other info that might help us debug this: [ 5733.386609] [ 5733.386612] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 5733.386613] [ 5733.386615] CPU0 CPU1 [ 5733.386618] ---- ---- [ 5733.386620] lock(&hiddev->existancelock); [ 5733.386625] lock(minor_rwsem); [ 5733.386630] lock(&hiddev->existancelock); [ 5733.386635] lock(minor_rwsem); [ 5733.386639] [ 5733.386640] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 5733.386641] [ 5733.386644] 6 locks held by khubd/186: [ 5733.386646] #0: (&__lockdep_no_validate__){......}, at: [<ffffffffa00084af>] hub_thread+0x14a/0x1157 [usbcore] [ 5733.386661] raspberrypi#1: (&__lockdep_no_validate__){......}, at: [<ffffffffa0006b77>] usb_disconnect+0x50/0x11f [usbcore] [ 5733.386677] raspberrypi#2: (hcd->bandwidth_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa0006bc8>] usb_disconnect+0xa1/0x11f [usbcore] [ 5733.386693] raspberrypi#3: (&__lockdep_no_validate__){......}, at: [<ffffffff812c09bb>] device_release_driver+0x18/0x2d [ 5733.386704] raspberrypi#4: (&__lockdep_no_validate__){......}, at: [<ffffffff812c09bb>] device_release_driver+0x18/0x2d [ 5733.386714] raspberrypi#5: (&hiddev->existancelock){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffffa0094d17>] hiddev_disconnect+0x26/0x87 [usbhid] [ 5733.386727] [ 5733.386727] stack backtrace: [ 5733.386731] Pid: 186, comm: khubd Not tainted 3.2.0-custom-next-20120111+ raspberrypi#1 [ 5733.386734] Call Trace: [ 5733.386741] [<ffffffff81062881>] ? up+0x34/0x3b [ 5733.386747] [<ffffffff813d9ef3>] print_circular_bug+0x1f8/0x209 [ 5733.386752] [<ffffffff8108255d>] __lock_acquire+0xa80/0xd74 [ 5733.386756] [<ffffffff810808b4>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x15d/0x1a3 [ 5733.386763] [<ffffffff81043a3f>] ? vprintk+0x3f4/0x419 [ 5733.386774] [<ffffffffa0011a04>] ? usb_deregister_dev+0x37/0x9e [usbcore] [ 5733.386779] [<ffffffff81082d26>] lock_acquire+0xcb/0x10e [ 5733.386789] [<ffffffffa0011a04>] ? usb_deregister_dev+0x37/0x9e [usbcore] [ 5733.386797] [<ffffffff813e01f5>] down_write+0x44/0x77 [ 5733.386807] [<ffffffffa0011a04>] ? usb_deregister_dev+0x37/0x9e [usbcore] [ 5733.386818] [<ffffffffa0011a04>] usb_deregister_dev+0x37/0x9e [usbcore] [ 5733.386825] [<ffffffffa0094d2d>] hiddev_disconnect+0x3c/0x87 [usbhid] [ 5733.386830] [<ffffffff8132df51>] hid_disconnect+0x3f/0x54 [ 5733.386834] [<ffffffff8132dfb4>] hid_device_remove+0x4e/0x7a [ 5733.386839] [<ffffffff812c0957>] __device_release_driver+0x81/0xcd [ 5733.386844] [<ffffffff812c09c3>] device_release_driver+0x20/0x2d [ 5733.386848] [<ffffffff812c0564>] bus_remove_device+0x114/0x128 [ 5733.386854] [<ffffffff812bdd6f>] device_del+0x131/0x183 [ 5733.386859] [<ffffffff8132def3>] hid_destroy_device+0x1e/0x3d [ 5733.386865] [<ffffffffa00916b0>] usbhid_disconnect+0x36/0x42 [usbhid] [ 5733.386876] [<ffffffffa000fb60>] usb_unbind_interface+0x57/0x11f [usbcore] [ 5733.386882] [<ffffffff812c0957>] __device_release_driver+0x81/0xcd [ 5733.386886] [<ffffffff812c09c3>] device_release_driver+0x20/0x2d [ 5733.386890] [<ffffffff812c0564>] bus_remove_device+0x114/0x128 [ 5733.386895] [<ffffffff812bdd6f>] device_del+0x131/0x183 [ 5733.386905] [<ffffffffa000de61>] usb_disable_device+0xa8/0x1d8 [usbcore] [ 5733.386916] [<ffffffffa0006bd2>] usb_disconnect+0xab/0x11f [usbcore] [ 5733.386921] [<ffffffff813dff82>] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x130/0x141 [ 5733.386929] [<ffffffffa0008aa0>] hub_thread+0x73b/0x1157 [usbcore] [ 5733.386935] [<ffffffff8106a51d>] ? finish_task_switch+0x78/0x150 [ 5733.386941] [<ffffffff8105e396>] ? __init_waitqueue_head+0x4c/0x4c [ 5733.386950] [<ffffffffa0008365>] ? usb_remote_wakeup+0x56/0x56 [usbcore] [ 5733.386955] [<ffffffff8105dc0f>] kthread+0x95/0x9d [ 5733.386961] [<ffffffff813e90b4>] kernel_thread_helper+0x4/0x10 [ 5733.386966] [<ffffffff813e24b8>] ? retint_restore_args+0x13/0x13 [ 5733.386970] [<ffffffff8105db7a>] ? __init_kthread_worker+0x55/0x55 [ 5733.386974] [<ffffffff813e90b0>] ? gs_change+0x13/0x13 Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
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CC: stable@kernel.org raspberrypi#2.6.37 and onwards Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
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…S block during isolation for migration When isolating for migration, migration starts at the start of a zone which is not necessarily pageblock aligned. Further, it stops isolating when COMPACT_CLUSTER_MAX pages are isolated so migrate_pfn is generally not aligned. This allows isolate_migratepages() to call pfn_to_page() on an invalid PFN which can result in a crash. This was originally reported against a 3.0-based kernel with the following trace in a crash dump. PID: 9902 TASK: d47aecd0 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "memcg_process_s" #0 [d72d3ad0] crash_kexec at c028cfdb raspberrypi#1 [d72d3b24] oops_end at c05c5322 raspberrypi#2 [d72d3b38] __bad_area_nosemaphore at c0227e60 raspberrypi#3 [d72d3bec] bad_area at c0227fb6 raspberrypi#4 [d72d3c00] do_page_fault at c05c72ec raspberrypi#5 [d72d3c80] error_code (via page_fault) at c05c47a4 EAX: 00000000 EBX: 000c0000 ECX: 00000001 EDX: 00000807 EBP: 000c0000 DS: 007b ESI: 00000001 ES: 007b EDI: f3000a80 GS: 6f50 CS: 0060 EIP: c030b15a ERR: ffffffff EFLAGS: 00010002 raspberrypi#6 [d72d3cb4] isolate_migratepages at c030b15a raspberrypi#7 [d72d3d14] zone_watermark_ok at c02d26cb raspberrypi#8 [d72d3d2c] compact_zone at c030b8de raspberrypi#9 [d72d3d68] compact_zone_order at c030bba1 raspberrypi#10 [d72d3db4] try_to_compact_pages at c030bc84 raspberrypi#11 [d72d3ddc] __alloc_pages_direct_compact at c02d61e7 raspberrypi#12 [d72d3e08] __alloc_pages_slowpath at c02d66c7 raspberrypi#13 [d72d3e78] __alloc_pages_nodemask at c02d6a97 raspberrypi#14 [d72d3eb8] alloc_pages_vma at c030a845 raspberrypi#15 [d72d3ed4] do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page at c03178eb raspberrypi#16 [d72d3f00] handle_mm_fault at c02f36c6 raspberrypi#17 [d72d3f30] do_page_fault at c05c70ed raspberrypi#18 [d72d3fb0] error_code (via page_fault) at c05c47a4 EAX: b71ff00 EBX: 00000001 ECX: 00001600 EDX: 00000431 DS: 007b ESI: 08048950 ES: 007b EDI: bfaa3788 SS: 007b ESP: bfaa36e0 EBP: bfaa3828 GS: 6f50 CS: 0073 EIP: 080487c8 ERR: ffffffff EFLAGS: 00010202 It was also reported by Herbert van den Bergh against 3.1-based kernel with the following snippet from the console log. BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 01c00008 IP: [<c0522399>] isolate_migratepages+0x119/0x390 *pdpt = 000000002f7ce001 *pde = 0000000000000000 It is expected that it also affects 3.2.x and current mainline. The problem is that pfn_valid is only called on the first PFN being checked and that PFN is not necessarily aligned. Lets say we have a case like this H = MAX_ORDER_NR_PAGES boundary | = pageblock boundary m = cc->migrate_pfn f = cc->free_pfn o = memory hole H------|------H------|----m-Hoooooo|ooooooH-f----|------H The migrate_pfn is just below a memory hole and the free scanner is beyond the hole. When isolate_migratepages started, it scans from migrate_pfn to migrate_pfn+pageblock_nr_pages which is now in a memory hole. It checks pfn_valid() on the first PFN but then scans into the hole where there are not necessarily valid struct pages. This patch ensures that isolate_migratepages calls pfn_valid when necessary. Reported-by: Herbert van den Bergh <herbert.van.den.bergh@oracle.com> Tested-by: Herbert van den Bergh <herbert.van.den.bergh@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Acked-by: Michal Nazarewicz <mina86@mina86.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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…git/tiwai/sound sound fixes raspberrypi#2 for 3.3-rc3 A collection of small fixes, mostly for regressions. In addition, a few ASoC wm8994 updates are included, too. * tag 'sound-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tiwai/sound: ASoC: wm8994: Disable line output discharge prior to ramping VMID ASoC: wm8994: Fix typo in VMID ramp setting ALSA: oxygen, virtuoso: fix exchanged L/R volumes of aux and CD inputs ALSA: usb-audio: add Edirol UM-3G support ALSA: hda - add support for Uniwill ECS M31EI notebook ALSA: hda - Fix error handling in patch_ca0132.c ASoC: wm8994: Enabling VMID should take a runtime PM reference ALSA: hda/realtek - Fix a wrong condition ALSA: emu8000: Remove duplicate linux/moduleparam.h include from emu8000_patch.c ALSA: hda/realtek - Add missing Bass and CLFE as vmaster slaves ASoC: wm_hubs: Correct line input to line output 2 paths ASoC: cs42l73: Fix Output [X|A|V]SP_SCLK Sourcing Mode setting for master mode ASoC: wm8962: Fix word length configuration ASoC: core: Better support for idle_bias_off suspend ignores ASoC: wm8994: Remove ASoC level register cache sync ASoC: wm_hubs: Fix routing of input PGAs to line output mixer
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Mar 6, 2012
If the netdev is already in NETREG_UNREGISTERING/_UNREGISTERED state, do not update the real num tx queues. netdev_queue_update_kobjects() is already called via remove_queue_kobjects() at NETREG_UNREGISTERING time. So, when upper layer driver, e.g., FCoE protocol stack is monitoring the netdev event of NETDEV_UNREGISTER and calls back to LLD ndo_fcoe_disable() to remove extra queues allocated for FCoE, the associated txq sysfs kobjects are already removed, and trying to update the real num queues would cause something like below: ... PID: 25138 TASK: ffff88021e64c440 CPU: 3 COMMAND: "kworker/3:3" #0 [ffff88021f007760] machine_kexec at ffffffff810226d9 raspberrypi#1 [ffff88021f0077d0] crash_kexec at ffffffff81089d2d raspberrypi#2 [ffff88021f0078a0] oops_end at ffffffff813bca78 raspberrypi#3 [ffff88021f0078d0] no_context at ffffffff81029e72 raspberrypi#4 [ffff88021f007920] __bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff8102a155 raspberrypi#5 [ffff88021f0079f0] bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff8102a23e raspberrypi#6 [ffff88021f007a00] do_page_fault at ffffffff813bf32e raspberrypi#7 [ffff88021f007b10] page_fault at ffffffff813bc045 [exception RIP: sysfs_find_dirent+17] RIP: ffffffff81178611 RSP: ffff88021f007bc0 RFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: ffff88021e64c440 RBX: ffffffff8156cc63 RCX: 0000000000000004 RDX: ffffffff8156cc63 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff88021f007be0 R8: 0000000000000004 R9: 0000000000000008 R10: ffffffff816fed00 R11: 0000000000000004 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffffffff8156cc63 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8802222a0000 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 raspberrypi#8 [ffff88021f007be8] sysfs_get_dirent at ffffffff81178c07 raspberrypi#9 [ffff88021f007c18] sysfs_remove_group at ffffffff8117ac27 raspberrypi#10 [ffff88021f007c48] netdev_queue_update_kobjects at ffffffff813178f9 raspberrypi#11 [ffff88021f007c88] netif_set_real_num_tx_queues at ffffffff81303e38 raspberrypi#12 [ffff88021f007cc8] ixgbe_set_num_queues at ffffffffa0249763 [ixgbe] raspberrypi#13 [ffff88021f007cf8] ixgbe_init_interrupt_scheme at ffffffffa024ea89 [ixgbe] raspberrypi#14 [ffff88021f007d48] ixgbe_fcoe_disable at ffffffffa0267113 [ixgbe] raspberrypi#15 [ffff88021f007d68] vlan_dev_fcoe_disable at ffffffffa014fef5 [8021q] raspberrypi#16 [ffff88021f007d78] fcoe_interface_cleanup at ffffffffa02b7dfd [fcoe] raspberrypi#17 [ffff88021f007df8] fcoe_destroy_work at ffffffffa02b7f08 [fcoe] raspberrypi#18 [ffff88021f007e18] process_one_work at ffffffff8105d7ca raspberrypi#19 [ffff88021f007e68] worker_thread at ffffffff81060513 raspberrypi#20 [ffff88021f007ee8] kthread at ffffffff810648b6 raspberrypi#21 [ffff88021f007f48] kernel_thread_helper at ffffffff813c40f4 Signed-off-by: Yi Zou <yi.zou@intel.com> Tested-by: Ross Brattain <ross.b.brattain@intel.com> Tested-by: Stephen Ko <stephen.s.ko@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com>
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Mar 6, 2012
We don't need to use the _sync variant in hci_conn_hold and hci_conn_put to cancel conn->disc_work delayed work. This way we avoid potential deadlocks like this one reported by lockdep. ====================================================== [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] 3.2.0+ raspberrypi#1 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------- kworker/u:1/17 is trying to acquire lock: (&hdev->lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa0041155>] hci_conn_timeout+0x62/0x158 [bluetooth] but task is already holding lock: ((&(&conn->disc_work)->work)){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff81035751>] process_one_work+0x11a/0x2bf which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> raspberrypi#2 ((&(&conn->disc_work)->work)){+.+...}: [<ffffffff81057444>] lock_acquire+0x8a/0xa7 [<ffffffff81034ed1>] wait_on_work+0x3d/0xaa [<ffffffff81035b54>] __cancel_work_timer+0xac/0xef [<ffffffff81035ba4>] cancel_delayed_work_sync+0xd/0xf [<ffffffffa00554b0>] smp_chan_create+0xde/0xe6 [bluetooth] [<ffffffffa0056160>] smp_conn_security+0xa3/0x12d [bluetooth] [<ffffffffa0053640>] l2cap_connect_cfm+0x237/0x2e8 [bluetooth] [<ffffffffa004239c>] hci_proto_connect_cfm+0x2d/0x6f [bluetooth] [<ffffffffa0046ea5>] hci_event_packet+0x29d1/0x2d60 [bluetooth] [<ffffffffa003dde3>] hci_rx_work+0xd0/0x2e1 [bluetooth] [<ffffffff810357af>] process_one_work+0x178/0x2bf [<ffffffff81036178>] worker_thread+0xce/0x152 [<ffffffff81039a03>] kthread+0x95/0x9d [<ffffffff812e7754>] kernel_thread_helper+0x4/0x10 -> raspberrypi#1 (slock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_L2CAP){+.+...}: [<ffffffff81057444>] lock_acquire+0x8a/0xa7 [<ffffffff812e553a>] _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x36/0x6a [<ffffffff81244d56>] lock_sock_nested+0x24/0x7f [<ffffffffa004d96f>] lock_sock+0xb/0xd [bluetooth] [<ffffffffa0052906>] l2cap_chan_connect+0xa9/0x26f [bluetooth] [<ffffffffa00545f8>] l2cap_sock_connect+0xb3/0xff [bluetooth] [<ffffffff81243b48>] sys_connect+0x69/0x8a [<ffffffff812e6579>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b -> #0 (&hdev->lock){+.+.+.}: [<ffffffff81056d06>] __lock_acquire+0xa80/0xd74 [<ffffffff81057444>] lock_acquire+0x8a/0xa7 [<ffffffff812e3870>] __mutex_lock_common+0x48/0x38e [<ffffffff812e3c75>] mutex_lock_nested+0x2a/0x31 [<ffffffffa0041155>] hci_conn_timeout+0x62/0x158 [bluetooth] [<ffffffff810357af>] process_one_work+0x178/0x2bf [<ffffffff81036178>] worker_thread+0xce/0x152 [<ffffffff81039a03>] kthread+0x95/0x9d [<ffffffff812e7754>] kernel_thread_helper+0x4/0x10 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &hdev->lock --> slock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_L2CAP --> (&(&conn->disc_work)->work) Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock((&(&conn->disc_work)->work)); lock(slock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_L2CAP); lock((&(&conn->disc_work)->work)); lock(&hdev->lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 2 locks held by kworker/u:1/17: #0: (hdev->name){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff81035751>] process_one_work+0x11a/0x2bf raspberrypi#1: ((&(&conn->disc_work)->work)){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff81035751>] process_one_work+0x11a/0x2bf stack backtrace: Pid: 17, comm: kworker/u:1 Not tainted 3.2.0+ raspberrypi#1 Call Trace: [<ffffffff812e06c6>] print_circular_bug+0x1f8/0x209 [<ffffffff81056d06>] __lock_acquire+0xa80/0xd74 [<ffffffff81021ef2>] ? arch_local_irq_restore+0x6/0xd [<ffffffff81022bc7>] ? vprintk+0x3f9/0x41e [<ffffffff81057444>] lock_acquire+0x8a/0xa7 [<ffffffffa0041155>] ? hci_conn_timeout+0x62/0x158 [bluetooth] [<ffffffff812e3870>] __mutex_lock_common+0x48/0x38e [<ffffffffa0041155>] ? hci_conn_timeout+0x62/0x158 [bluetooth] [<ffffffff81190fd6>] ? __dynamic_pr_debug+0x6d/0x6f [<ffffffffa0041155>] ? hci_conn_timeout+0x62/0x158 [bluetooth] [<ffffffff8105320f>] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0xd/0xf [<ffffffff812e3c75>] mutex_lock_nested+0x2a/0x31 [<ffffffffa0041155>] hci_conn_timeout+0x62/0x158 [bluetooth] [<ffffffff810357af>] process_one_work+0x178/0x2bf [<ffffffff81035751>] ? process_one_work+0x11a/0x2bf [<ffffffff81055af3>] ? lock_acquired+0x1d0/0x1df [<ffffffffa00410f3>] ? hci_acl_disconn+0x65/0x65 [bluetooth] [<ffffffff81036178>] worker_thread+0xce/0x152 [<ffffffff810407ed>] ? finish_task_switch+0x45/0xc5 [<ffffffff810360aa>] ? manage_workers.isra.25+0x16a/0x16a [<ffffffff81039a03>] kthread+0x95/0x9d [<ffffffff812e7754>] kernel_thread_helper+0x4/0x10 [<ffffffff812e5db4>] ? retint_restore_args+0x13/0x13 [<ffffffff8103996e>] ? __init_kthread_worker+0x55/0x55 [<ffffffff812e7750>] ? gs_change+0x13/0x13 Signed-off-by: Andre Guedes <andre.guedes@openbossa.org> Signed-off-by: Vinicius Costa Gomes <vinicius.gomes@openbossa.org> Reviewed-by: Ulisses Furquim <ulisses@profusion.mobi> Acked-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
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Under the spinlock we call request_irq(), which allocates memory with GFP_KERNEL, This causes the following trace when DEBUG_SPINLOCK is enabled, it can cause the following trace: BUG: spinlock wrong CPU on CPU#2, ethtool/2595 lock: ffff8801f9cbc2b0, .magic: dead4ead, .owner: ethtool/2595, .owner_cpu: 0 Pid: 2595, comm: ethtool Not tainted 3.0.18 raspberrypi#2 Call Trace: spin_bug+0xa2/0xf0 do_raw_spin_unlock+0x71/0xa0 _raw_spin_unlock+0xe/0x10 mlx4_assign_eq+0x12b/0x190 [mlx4_core] mlx4_en_activate_cq+0x252/0x2d0 [mlx4_en] ? mlx4_en_activate_rx_rings+0x227/0x370 [mlx4_en] mlx4_en_start_port+0x189/0xb90 [mlx4_en] mlx4_en_set_ringparam+0x29a/0x340 [mlx4_en] dev_ethtool+0x816/0xb10 ? dev_get_by_name_rcu+0xa4/0xe0 dev_ioctl+0x2b5/0x470 handle_mm_fault+0x1cd/0x2d0 sock_do_ioctl+0x5d/0x70 sock_ioctl+0x79/0x2f0 do_vfs_ioctl+0x8c/0x340 sys_ioctl+0xa1/0xb0 system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Replacing with mutex, which is enough in this case. Signed-off-by: Yevgeny Petrilin <yevgenyp@mellanox.co.il> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
bootc
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May 8, 2012
…S block during isolation for migration commit 0bf380b upstream. When isolating for migration, migration starts at the start of a zone which is not necessarily pageblock aligned. Further, it stops isolating when COMPACT_CLUSTER_MAX pages are isolated so migrate_pfn is generally not aligned. This allows isolate_migratepages() to call pfn_to_page() on an invalid PFN which can result in a crash. This was originally reported against a 3.0-based kernel with the following trace in a crash dump. PID: 9902 TASK: d47aecd0 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "memcg_process_s" #0 [d72d3ad0] crash_kexec at c028cfdb raspberrypi#1 [d72d3b24] oops_end at c05c5322 raspberrypi#2 [d72d3b38] __bad_area_nosemaphore at c0227e60 raspberrypi#3 [d72d3bec] bad_area at c0227fb6 raspberrypi#4 [d72d3c00] do_page_fault at c05c72ec raspberrypi#5 [d72d3c80] error_code (via page_fault) at c05c47a4 EAX: 00000000 EBX: 000c0000 ECX: 00000001 EDX: 00000807 EBP: 000c0000 DS: 007b ESI: 00000001 ES: 007b EDI: f3000a80 GS: 6f50 CS: 0060 EIP: c030b15a ERR: ffffffff EFLAGS: 00010002 raspberrypi#6 [d72d3cb4] isolate_migratepages at c030b15a raspberrypi#7 [d72d3d14] zone_watermark_ok at c02d26cb raspberrypi#8 [d72d3d2c] compact_zone at c030b8de raspberrypi#9 [d72d3d68] compact_zone_order at c030bba1 raspberrypi#10 [d72d3db4] try_to_compact_pages at c030bc84 raspberrypi#11 [d72d3ddc] __alloc_pages_direct_compact at c02d61e7 raspberrypi#12 [d72d3e08] __alloc_pages_slowpath at c02d66c7 raspberrypi#13 [d72d3e78] __alloc_pages_nodemask at c02d6a97 raspberrypi#14 [d72d3eb8] alloc_pages_vma at c030a845 raspberrypi#15 [d72d3ed4] do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page at c03178eb raspberrypi#16 [d72d3f00] handle_mm_fault at c02f36c6 raspberrypi#17 [d72d3f30] do_page_fault at c05c70ed raspberrypi#18 [d72d3fb0] error_code (via page_fault) at c05c47a4 EAX: b71ff00 EBX: 00000001 ECX: 00001600 EDX: 00000431 DS: 007b ESI: 08048950 ES: 007b EDI: bfaa3788 SS: 007b ESP: bfaa36e0 EBP: bfaa3828 GS: 6f50 CS: 0073 EIP: 080487c8 ERR: ffffffff EFLAGS: 00010202 It was also reported by Herbert van den Bergh against 3.1-based kernel with the following snippet from the console log. BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 01c00008 IP: [<c0522399>] isolate_migratepages+0x119/0x390 *pdpt = 000000002f7ce001 *pde = 0000000000000000 It is expected that it also affects 3.2.x and current mainline. The problem is that pfn_valid is only called on the first PFN being checked and that PFN is not necessarily aligned. Lets say we have a case like this H = MAX_ORDER_NR_PAGES boundary | = pageblock boundary m = cc->migrate_pfn f = cc->free_pfn o = memory hole H------|------H------|----m-Hoooooo|ooooooH-f----|------H The migrate_pfn is just below a memory hole and the free scanner is beyond the hole. When isolate_migratepages started, it scans from migrate_pfn to migrate_pfn+pageblock_nr_pages which is now in a memory hole. It checks pfn_valid() on the first PFN but then scans into the hole where there are not necessarily valid struct pages. This patch ensures that isolate_migratepages calls pfn_valid when necessary. Reported-by: Herbert van den Bergh <herbert.van.den.bergh@oracle.com> Tested-by: Herbert van den Bergh <herbert.van.den.bergh@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Acked-by: Michal Nazarewicz <mina86@mina86.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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andatche
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May 29, 2012
commit b704871 upstream. coretemp tries to access core_data array beyond bounds on cpu unplug if core id of the cpu if more than NUM_REAL_CORES-1. BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 000000000000013c IP: [<ffffffffa00159af>] coretemp_cpu_callback+0x93/0x1ba [coretemp] PGD 673e5a067 PUD 66e9b3067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [raspberrypi#1] SMP CPU 79 Modules linked in: sunrpc cpufreq_ondemand acpi_cpufreq freq_table mperf bnep bluetooth rfkill ip6t_REJECT nf_conntrack_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6 ip6table_filter nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 ip6_tables xt_state nf_conntrack coretemp crc32c_intel asix tpm_tis pcspkr usbnet iTCO_wdt i2c_i801 microcode mii joydev tpm i2c_core iTCO_vendor_support tpm_bios i7core_edac igb ioatdma edac_core dca megaraid_sas [last unloaded: oprofile] Pid: 3315, comm: set-cpus Tainted: G W 3.4.0-rc5+ raspberrypi#2 QCI QSSC-S4R/QSSC-S4R RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa00159af>] [<ffffffffa00159af>] coretemp_cpu_callback+0x93/0x1ba [coretemp] RSP: 0018:ffff880472fb3d48 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000124 RBX: 0000000000000034 RCX: 00000000ffffffff RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000046 RDI: 0000000000000246 RBP: ffff880472fb3d88 R08: ffff88077fcd36c0 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: ffffffff8184bc48 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff880273095800 R13: 0000000000000013 R14: ffff8802730a1810 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f694a20f720(0000) GS:ffff88077fcc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b CR2: 000000000000013c CR3: 000000067209b000 CR4: 00000000000007e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Process set-cpus (pid: 3315, threadinfo ffff880472fb2000, task ffff880471fa0000) Stack: ffff880277b4c308 0000000000000003 ffff880472fb3d88 0000000000000005 0000000000000034 00000000ffffffd1 ffffffff81cadc70 ffff880472fb3e14 ffff880472fb3dc8 ffffffff8161f48d ffff880471fa0000 0000000000000034 Call Trace: [<ffffffff8161f48d>] notifier_call_chain+0x4d/0x70 [<ffffffff8107f1be>] __raw_notifier_call_chain+0xe/0x10 [<ffffffff81059d30>] __cpu_notify+0x20/0x40 [<ffffffff815fa251>] _cpu_down+0x81/0x270 [<ffffffff815fa477>] cpu_down+0x37/0x50 [<ffffffff815fd6a3>] store_online+0x63/0xc0 [<ffffffff813c7078>] dev_attr_store+0x18/0x30 [<ffffffff811f02cf>] sysfs_write_file+0xef/0x170 [<ffffffff81180443>] vfs_write+0xb3/0x180 [<ffffffff8118076a>] sys_write+0x4a/0x90 [<ffffffff816236a9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Code: 48 c7 c7 94 60 01 a0 44 0f b7 ac 10 ac 00 00 00 31 c0 e8 41 b7 5f e1 41 83 c5 02 49 63 c5 49 8b 44 c4 10 48 85 c0 74 56 45 31 ff <39> 58 18 75 4e eb 1f 49 63 d7 4c 89 f7 48 89 45 c8 48 6b d2 28 RIP [<ffffffffa00159af>] coretemp_cpu_callback+0x93/0x1ba [coretemp] RSP <ffff880472fb3d48> CR2: 000000000000013c Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <guenter.roeck@ericsson.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
erique
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Jul 16, 2012
There is a potential deadlock scenario when the ks8851 driver is removed. The interrupt handler schedules a workqueue which acquires a mutex that ks8851_net_stop() also acquires before flushing the workqueue. Previously lockdep wouldn't be able to find this problem but now that it has the support we can trigger this lockdep warning by rmmoding the driver after an ifconfig up. Fix the possible deadlock by disabling the interrupts in the chip and then release the lock across the workqueue flushing. The mutex is only there to proect the registers anyway so this should be ok. ======================================================= [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] 3.0.21-00021-g8b33780-dirty raspberrypi#2911 ------------------------------------------------------- rmmod/125 is trying to acquire lock: ((&ks->irq_work)){+.+...}, at: [<c019e0b8>] flush_work+0x0/0xac but task is already holding lock: (&ks->lock){+.+...}, at: [<bf00b850>] ks8851_net_stop+0x64/0x138 [ks8851] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> raspberrypi#1 (&ks->lock){+.+...}: [<c01b89c8>] __lock_acquire+0x940/0x9f8 [<c01b9058>] lock_acquire+0x10c/0x130 [<c083dbec>] mutex_lock_nested+0x68/0x3dc [<bf00bd48>] ks8851_irq_work+0x24/0x46c [ks8851] [<c019c580>] process_one_work+0x2d8/0x518 [<c019cb98>] worker_thread+0x220/0x3a0 [<c01a2ad4>] kthread+0x88/0x94 [<c0107008>] kernel_thread_exit+0x0/0x8 -> #0 ((&ks->irq_work)){+.+...}: [<c01b7984>] validate_chain+0x914/0x1018 [<c01b89c8>] __lock_acquire+0x940/0x9f8 [<c01b9058>] lock_acquire+0x10c/0x130 [<c019e104>] flush_work+0x4c/0xac [<bf00b858>] ks8851_net_stop+0x6c/0x138 [ks8851] [<c06b209c>] __dev_close_many+0x98/0xcc [<c06b2174>] dev_close_many+0x68/0xd0 [<c06b22ec>] rollback_registered_many+0xcc/0x2b8 [<c06b2554>] rollback_registered+0x28/0x34 [<c06b25b8>] unregister_netdevice_queue+0x58/0x7c [<c06b25f4>] unregister_netdev+0x18/0x20 [<bf00c1f4>] ks8851_remove+0x64/0xb4 [ks8851] [<c049ddf0>] spi_drv_remove+0x18/0x1c [<c0468e98>] __device_release_driver+0x7c/0xbc [<c0468f64>] driver_detach+0x8c/0xb4 [<c0467f00>] bus_remove_driver+0xb8/0xe8 [<c01c1d20>] sys_delete_module+0x1e8/0x27c [<c0105ec0>] ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x3c other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&ks->lock); lock((&ks->irq_work)); lock(&ks->lock); lock((&ks->irq_work)); *** DEADLOCK *** 4 locks held by rmmod/125: #0: (&__lockdep_no_validate__){+.+.+.}, at: [<c0468f44>] driver_detach+0x6c/0xb4 raspberrypi#1: (&__lockdep_no_validate__){+.+.+.}, at: [<c0468f50>] driver_detach+0x78/0xb4 raspberrypi#2: (rtnl_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<c06b25e8>] unregister_netdev+0xc/0x20 raspberrypi#3: (&ks->lock){+.+...}, at: [<bf00b850>] ks8851_net_stop+0x64/0x138 [ks8851] Cc: Ben Dooks <ben-linux@fluff.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Jul 16, 2012
There are exactly four users of __monitor and __mwait: - cstate.c (which allows acpi_processor_ffh_cstate_enter to be called when the cpuidle API drivers are used. However patch "cpuidle: replace xen access to x86 pm_idle and default_idle" provides a mechanism to disable the cpuidle and use safe_halt. - smpboot (which allows mwait_play_dead to be called). However safe_halt is always used so we skip that. - intel_idle (same deal as above). - acpi_pad.c. This the one that we do not want to run as we will hit the below crash. Why do we want to expose MWAIT_LEAF in the first place? We want it for the xen-acpi-processor driver - which uploads C-states to the hypervisor. If MWAIT_LEAF is set, the cstate.c sets the proper address in the C-states so that the hypervisor can benefit from using the MWAIT functionality. And that is the sole reason for using it. Without this patch, if a module performs mwait or monitor we get this: invalid opcode: 0000 [raspberrypi#1] SMP CPU 2 .. snip.. Pid: 5036, comm: insmod Tainted: G O 3.4.0-rc2upstream-dirty raspberrypi#2 Intel Corporation S2600CP/S2600CP RIP: e030:[<ffffffffa000a017>] [<ffffffffa000a017>] mwait_check_init+0x17/0x1000 [mwait_check] RSP: e02b:ffff8801c298bf18 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: ffff8801c298a010 RBX: ffffffffa03b2000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff8801c29800d8 RDI: ffff8801ff097200 RBP: ffff8801c298bf18 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffffffffa000a000 R14: 0000005148db7294 R15: 0000000000000003 FS: 00007fbb364f2700(0000) GS:ffff8801ff08c000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: e033 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b CR2: 000000000179f038 CR3: 00000001c9469000 CR4: 0000000000002660 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Process insmod (pid: 5036, threadinfo ffff8801c298a000, task ffff8801c29cd7e0) Stack: ffff8801c298bf48 ffffffff81002124 ffffffffa03b2000 00000000000081fd 000000000178f010 000000000178f030 ffff8801c298bf78 ffffffff810c41e6 00007fff3fb30db9 00007fff3fb30db9 00000000000081fd 0000000000010000 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81002124>] do_one_initcall+0x124/0x170 [<ffffffff810c41e6>] sys_init_module+0xc6/0x220 [<ffffffff815b15b9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Code: <0f> 01 c8 31 c0 0f 01 c9 c9 c3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 RIP [<ffffffffa000a017>] mwait_check_init+0x17/0x1000 [mwait_check] RSP <ffff8801c298bf18> ---[ end trace 16582fc8a3d1e29a ]--- Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception With this module (which is what acpi_pad.c would hit): MODULE_AUTHOR("Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>"); MODULE_DESCRIPTION("mwait_check_and_back"); MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); MODULE_VERSION(); static int __init mwait_check_init(void) { __monitor((void *)¤t_thread_info()->flags, 0, 0); __mwait(0, 0); return 0; } static void __exit mwait_check_exit(void) { } module_init(mwait_check_init); module_exit(mwait_check_exit); Reported-by: Liu, Jinsong <jinsong.liu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
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coretemp tries to access core_data array beyond bounds on cpu unplug if core id of the cpu if more than NUM_REAL_CORES-1. BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 000000000000013c IP: [<ffffffffa00159af>] coretemp_cpu_callback+0x93/0x1ba [coretemp] PGD 673e5a067 PUD 66e9b3067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [raspberrypi#1] SMP CPU 79 Modules linked in: sunrpc cpufreq_ondemand acpi_cpufreq freq_table mperf bnep bluetooth rfkill ip6t_REJECT nf_conntrack_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6 ip6table_filter nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 ip6_tables xt_state nf_conntrack coretemp crc32c_intel asix tpm_tis pcspkr usbnet iTCO_wdt i2c_i801 microcode mii joydev tpm i2c_core iTCO_vendor_support tpm_bios i7core_edac igb ioatdma edac_core dca megaraid_sas [last unloaded: oprofile] Pid: 3315, comm: set-cpus Tainted: G W 3.4.0-rc5+ raspberrypi#2 QCI QSSC-S4R/QSSC-S4R RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa00159af>] [<ffffffffa00159af>] coretemp_cpu_callback+0x93/0x1ba [coretemp] RSP: 0018:ffff880472fb3d48 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000124 RBX: 0000000000000034 RCX: 00000000ffffffff RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000046 RDI: 0000000000000246 RBP: ffff880472fb3d88 R08: ffff88077fcd36c0 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: ffffffff8184bc48 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff880273095800 R13: 0000000000000013 R14: ffff8802730a1810 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f694a20f720(0000) GS:ffff88077fcc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b CR2: 000000000000013c CR3: 000000067209b000 CR4: 00000000000007e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Process set-cpus (pid: 3315, threadinfo ffff880472fb2000, task ffff880471fa0000) Stack: ffff880277b4c308 0000000000000003 ffff880472fb3d88 0000000000000005 0000000000000034 00000000ffffffd1 ffffffff81cadc70 ffff880472fb3e14 ffff880472fb3dc8 ffffffff8161f48d ffff880471fa0000 0000000000000034 Call Trace: [<ffffffff8161f48d>] notifier_call_chain+0x4d/0x70 [<ffffffff8107f1be>] __raw_notifier_call_chain+0xe/0x10 [<ffffffff81059d30>] __cpu_notify+0x20/0x40 [<ffffffff815fa251>] _cpu_down+0x81/0x270 [<ffffffff815fa477>] cpu_down+0x37/0x50 [<ffffffff815fd6a3>] store_online+0x63/0xc0 [<ffffffff813c7078>] dev_attr_store+0x18/0x30 [<ffffffff811f02cf>] sysfs_write_file+0xef/0x170 [<ffffffff81180443>] vfs_write+0xb3/0x180 [<ffffffff8118076a>] sys_write+0x4a/0x90 [<ffffffff816236a9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Code: 48 c7 c7 94 60 01 a0 44 0f b7 ac 10 ac 00 00 00 31 c0 e8 41 b7 5f e1 41 83 c5 02 49 63 c5 49 8b 44 c4 10 48 85 c0 74 56 45 31 ff <39> 58 18 75 4e eb 1f 49 63 d7 4c 89 f7 48 89 45 c8 48 6b d2 28 RIP [<ffffffffa00159af>] coretemp_cpu_callback+0x93/0x1ba [coretemp] RSP <ffff880472fb3d48> CR2: 000000000000013c Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.0+ Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <guenter.roeck@ericsson.com>
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All PA1.1 systems have been oopsing on boot since commit f311847 Author: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Date: Wed Dec 22 10:22:11 2010 -0600 parisc: flush pages through tmpalias space because a PA2.0 instruction was accidentally introduced into the PA1.1 TLB insertion interruption path when it was consolidated with the do_alias macro. Fix the do_alias macro only to use PA2.0 instructions if compiled for 64 bit. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org raspberrypi#2.6.39+ Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <JBottomley@Parallels.com>
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As pointed out by serveral people, PA1.1 only has a type 26 instruction meaning that the space register must be explicitly encoded. Not giving an explicit space means that the compiler uses the type 24 version which is PA2.0 only resulting in an illegal instruction crash. This regression was caused by commit f311847 Author: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Date: Wed Dec 22 10:22:11 2010 -0600 parisc: flush pages through tmpalias space Reported-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: John David Anglin <dave.anglin@bell.net> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org raspberrypi#2.6.39+ Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <JBottomley@Parallels.com>
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…condition commit 26c1917 upstream. When holding the mmap_sem for reading, pmd_offset_map_lock should only run on a pmd_t that has been read atomically from the pmdp pointer, otherwise we may read only half of it leading to this crash. PID: 11679 TASK: f06e8000 CPU: 3 COMMAND: "do_race_2_panic" #0 [f06a9dd8] crash_kexec at c049b5ec raspberrypi#1 [f06a9e2c] oops_end at c083d1c2 raspberrypi#2 [f06a9e40] no_context at c0433ded raspberrypi#3 [f06a9e64] bad_area_nosemaphore at c043401a raspberrypi#4 [f06a9e6c] __do_page_fault at c0434493 raspberrypi#5 [f06a9eec] do_page_fault at c083eb45 raspberrypi#6 [f06a9f04] error_code (via page_fault) at c083c5d5 EAX: 01fb470c EBX: fff35000 ECX: 00000003 EDX: 00000100 EBP: 00000000 DS: 007b ESI: 9e201000 ES: 007b EDI: 01fb4700 GS: 00e0 CS: 0060 EIP: c083bc14 ERR: ffffffff EFLAGS: 00010246 raspberrypi#7 [f06a9f38] _spin_lock at c083bc14 raspberrypi#8 [f06a9f44] sys_mincore at c0507b7d raspberrypi#9 [f06a9fb0] system_call at c083becd start len EAX: ffffffda EBX: 9e200000 ECX: 00001000 EDX: 6228537f DS: 007b ESI: 00000000 ES: 007b EDI: 003d0f00 SS: 007b ESP: 62285354 EBP: 62285388 GS: 0033 CS: 0073 EIP: 00291416 ERR: 000000da EFLAGS: 00000286 This should be a longstanding bug affecting x86 32bit PAE without THP. Only archs with 64bit large pmd_t and 32bit unsigned long should be affected. With THP enabled the barrier() in pmd_none_or_trans_huge_or_clear_bad() would partly hide the bug when the pmd transition from none to stable, by forcing a re-read of the *pmd in pmd_offset_map_lock, but when THP is enabled a new set of problem arises by the fact could then transition freely in any of the none, pmd_trans_huge or pmd_trans_stable states. So making the barrier in pmd_none_or_trans_huge_or_clear_bad() unconditional isn't good idea and it would be a flakey solution. This should be fully fixed by introducing a pmd_read_atomic that reads the pmd in order with THP disabled, or by reading the pmd atomically with cmpxchg8b with THP enabled. Luckily this new race condition only triggers in the places that must already be covered by pmd_none_or_trans_huge_or_clear_bad() so the fix is localized there but this bug is not related to THP. NOTE: this can trigger on x86 32bit systems with PAE enabled with more than 4G of ram, otherwise the high part of the pmd will never risk to be truncated because it would be zero at all times, in turn so hiding the SMP race. This bug was discovered and fully debugged by Ulrich, quote: ---- [..] pmd_none_or_trans_huge_or_clear_bad() loads the content of edx and eax. 496 static inline int pmd_none_or_trans_huge_or_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd) 497 { 498 /* depend on compiler for an atomic pmd read */ 499 pmd_t pmdval = *pmd; // edi = pmd pointer 0xc0507a74 <sys_mincore+548>: mov 0x8(%esp),%edi ... // edx = PTE page table high address 0xc0507a84 <sys_mincore+564>: mov 0x4(%edi),%edx ... // eax = PTE page table low address 0xc0507a8e <sys_mincore+574>: mov (%edi),%eax [..] Please note that the PMD is not read atomically. These are two "mov" instructions where the high order bits of the PMD entry are fetched first. Hence, the above machine code is prone to the following race. - The PMD entry {high|low} is 0x0000000000000000. The "mov" at 0xc0507a84 loads 0x00000000 into edx. - A page fault (on another CPU) sneaks in between the two "mov" instructions and instantiates the PMD. - The PMD entry {high|low} is now 0x00000003fda38067. The "mov" at 0xc0507a8e loads 0xfda38067 into eax. ---- Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com> Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Aug 16, 2012
commit 3cf003c upstream. Jian found that when he ran fsx on a 32 bit arch with a large wsize the process and one of the bdi writeback kthreads would sometimes deadlock with a stack trace like this: crash> bt PID: 2789 TASK: f02edaa0 CPU: 3 COMMAND: "fsx" #0 [eed63cbc] schedule at c083c5b3 raspberrypi#1 [eed63d80] kmap_high at c0500ec8 raspberrypi#2 [eed63db0] cifs_async_writev at f7fabcd7 [cifs] raspberrypi#3 [eed63df0] cifs_writepages at f7fb7f5c [cifs] raspberrypi#4 [eed63e50] do_writepages at c04f3e32 raspberrypi#5 [eed63e54] __filemap_fdatawrite_range at c04e152a raspberrypi#6 [eed63ea4] filemap_fdatawrite at c04e1b3e raspberrypi#7 [eed63eb4] cifs_file_aio_write at f7fa111a [cifs] raspberrypi#8 [eed63ecc] do_sync_write at c052d202 raspberrypi#9 [eed63f74] vfs_write at c052d4ee raspberrypi#10 [eed63f94] sys_write at c052df4c raspberrypi#11 [eed63fb0] ia32_sysenter_target at c0409a98 EAX: 00000004 EBX: 00000003 ECX: abd73b73 EDX: 012a65c6 DS: 007b ESI: 012a65c6 ES: 007b EDI: 00000000 SS: 007b ESP: bf8db178 EBP: bf8db1f8 GS: 0033 CS: 0073 EIP: 40000424 ERR: 00000004 EFLAGS: 00000246 Each task would kmap part of its address array before getting stuck, but not enough to actually issue the write. This patch fixes this by serializing the marshal_iov operations for async reads and writes. The idea here is to ensure that cifs aggressively tries to populate a request before attempting to fulfill another one. As soon as all of the pages are kmapped for a request, then we can unlock and allow another one to proceed. There's no need to do this serialization on non-CONFIG_HIGHMEM arches however, so optimize all of this out when CONFIG_HIGHMEM isn't set. Reported-by: Jian Li <jiali@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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…d reasons commit 5cf02d0 upstream. We've had some reports of a deadlock where rpciod ends up with a stack trace like this: PID: 2507 TASK: ffff88103691ab40 CPU: 14 COMMAND: "rpciod/14" #0 [ffff8810343bf2f0] schedule at ffffffff814dabd9 raspberrypi#1 [ffff8810343bf3b8] nfs_wait_bit_killable at ffffffffa038fc04 [nfs] raspberrypi#2 [ffff8810343bf3c8] __wait_on_bit at ffffffff814dbc2f raspberrypi#3 [ffff8810343bf418] out_of_line_wait_on_bit at ffffffff814dbcd8 raspberrypi#4 [ffff8810343bf488] nfs_commit_inode at ffffffffa039e0c1 [nfs] raspberrypi#5 [ffff8810343bf4f8] nfs_release_page at ffffffffa038bef6 [nfs] raspberrypi#6 [ffff8810343bf528] try_to_release_page at ffffffff8110c670 raspberrypi#7 [ffff8810343bf538] shrink_page_list.clone.0 at ffffffff81126271 raspberrypi#8 [ffff8810343bf668] shrink_inactive_list at ffffffff81126638 raspberrypi#9 [ffff8810343bf818] shrink_zone at ffffffff8112788f raspberrypi#10 [ffff8810343bf8c8] do_try_to_free_pages at ffffffff81127b1e raspberrypi#11 [ffff8810343bf958] try_to_free_pages at ffffffff8112812f raspberrypi#12 [ffff8810343bfa08] __alloc_pages_nodemask at ffffffff8111fdad raspberrypi#13 [ffff8810343bfb28] kmem_getpages at ffffffff81159942 raspberrypi#14 [ffff8810343bfb58] fallback_alloc at ffffffff8115a55a raspberrypi#15 [ffff8810343bfbd8] ____cache_alloc_node at ffffffff8115a2d9 raspberrypi#16 [ffff8810343bfc38] kmem_cache_alloc at ffffffff8115b09b raspberrypi#17 [ffff8810343bfc78] sk_prot_alloc at ffffffff81411808 raspberrypi#18 [ffff8810343bfcb8] sk_alloc at ffffffff8141197c raspberrypi#19 [ffff8810343bfce8] inet_create at ffffffff81483ba6 raspberrypi#20 [ffff8810343bfd38] __sock_create at ffffffff8140b4a7 raspberrypi#21 [ffff8810343bfd98] xs_create_sock at ffffffffa01f649b [sunrpc] raspberrypi#22 [ffff8810343bfdd8] xs_tcp_setup_socket at ffffffffa01f6965 [sunrpc] raspberrypi#23 [ffff8810343bfe38] worker_thread at ffffffff810887d0 raspberrypi#24 [ffff8810343bfee8] kthread at ffffffff8108dd96 raspberrypi#25 [ffff8810343bff48] kernel_thread at ffffffff8100c1ca rpciod is trying to allocate memory for a new socket to talk to the server. The VM ends up calling ->releasepage to get more memory, and it tries to do a blocking commit. That commit can't succeed however without a connected socket, so we deadlock. Fix this by setting PF_FSTRANS on the workqueue task prior to doing the socket allocation, and having nfs_release_page check for that flag when deciding whether to do a commit call. Also, set PF_FSTRANS unconditionally in rpc_async_schedule since that function can also do allocations sometimes. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
The kernel update to 3.2.27 should have solved this. Please reopen if you don't think this is fixed. |
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We don't need to use the _sync variant in hci_conn_hold and hci_conn_put to cancel conn->disc_work delayed work. This way we avoid potential deadlocks like this one reported by lockdep. ====================================================== [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] 3.2.0+ #1 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------- kworker/u:1/17 is trying to acquire lock: (&hdev->lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa0041155>] hci_conn_timeout+0x62/0x158 [bluetooth] but task is already holding lock: ((&(&conn->disc_work)->work)){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff81035751>] process_one_work+0x11a/0x2bf which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 ((&(&conn->disc_work)->work)){+.+...}: [<ffffffff81057444>] lock_acquire+0x8a/0xa7 [<ffffffff81034ed1>] wait_on_work+0x3d/0xaa [<ffffffff81035b54>] __cancel_work_timer+0xac/0xef [<ffffffff81035ba4>] cancel_delayed_work_sync+0xd/0xf [<ffffffffa00554b0>] smp_chan_create+0xde/0xe6 [bluetooth] [<ffffffffa0056160>] smp_conn_security+0xa3/0x12d [bluetooth] [<ffffffffa0053640>] l2cap_connect_cfm+0x237/0x2e8 [bluetooth] [<ffffffffa004239c>] hci_proto_connect_cfm+0x2d/0x6f [bluetooth] [<ffffffffa0046ea5>] hci_event_packet+0x29d1/0x2d60 [bluetooth] [<ffffffffa003dde3>] hci_rx_work+0xd0/0x2e1 [bluetooth] [<ffffffff810357af>] process_one_work+0x178/0x2bf [<ffffffff81036178>] worker_thread+0xce/0x152 [<ffffffff81039a03>] kthread+0x95/0x9d [<ffffffff812e7754>] kernel_thread_helper+0x4/0x10 -> #1 (slock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_L2CAP){+.+...}: [<ffffffff81057444>] lock_acquire+0x8a/0xa7 [<ffffffff812e553a>] _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x36/0x6a [<ffffffff81244d56>] lock_sock_nested+0x24/0x7f [<ffffffffa004d96f>] lock_sock+0xb/0xd [bluetooth] [<ffffffffa0052906>] l2cap_chan_connect+0xa9/0x26f [bluetooth] [<ffffffffa00545f8>] l2cap_sock_connect+0xb3/0xff [bluetooth] [<ffffffff81243b48>] sys_connect+0x69/0x8a [<ffffffff812e6579>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b -> #0 (&hdev->lock){+.+.+.}: [<ffffffff81056d06>] __lock_acquire+0xa80/0xd74 [<ffffffff81057444>] lock_acquire+0x8a/0xa7 [<ffffffff812e3870>] __mutex_lock_common+0x48/0x38e [<ffffffff812e3c75>] mutex_lock_nested+0x2a/0x31 [<ffffffffa0041155>] hci_conn_timeout+0x62/0x158 [bluetooth] [<ffffffff810357af>] process_one_work+0x178/0x2bf [<ffffffff81036178>] worker_thread+0xce/0x152 [<ffffffff81039a03>] kthread+0x95/0x9d [<ffffffff812e7754>] kernel_thread_helper+0x4/0x10 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &hdev->lock --> slock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_L2CAP --> (&(&conn->disc_work)->work) Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock((&(&conn->disc_work)->work)); lock(slock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_L2CAP); lock((&(&conn->disc_work)->work)); lock(&hdev->lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 2 locks held by kworker/u:1/17: #0: (hdev->name){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff81035751>] process_one_work+0x11a/0x2bf #1: ((&(&conn->disc_work)->work)){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff81035751>] process_one_work+0x11a/0x2bf stack backtrace: Pid: 17, comm: kworker/u:1 Not tainted 3.2.0+ #1 Call Trace: [<ffffffff812e06c6>] print_circular_bug+0x1f8/0x209 [<ffffffff81056d06>] __lock_acquire+0xa80/0xd74 [<ffffffff81021ef2>] ? arch_local_irq_restore+0x6/0xd [<ffffffff81022bc7>] ? vprintk+0x3f9/0x41e [<ffffffff81057444>] lock_acquire+0x8a/0xa7 [<ffffffffa0041155>] ? hci_conn_timeout+0x62/0x158 [bluetooth] [<ffffffff812e3870>] __mutex_lock_common+0x48/0x38e [<ffffffffa0041155>] ? hci_conn_timeout+0x62/0x158 [bluetooth] [<ffffffff81190fd6>] ? __dynamic_pr_debug+0x6d/0x6f [<ffffffffa0041155>] ? hci_conn_timeout+0x62/0x158 [bluetooth] [<ffffffff8105320f>] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0xd/0xf [<ffffffff812e3c75>] mutex_lock_nested+0x2a/0x31 [<ffffffffa0041155>] hci_conn_timeout+0x62/0x158 [bluetooth] [<ffffffff810357af>] process_one_work+0x178/0x2bf [<ffffffff81035751>] ? process_one_work+0x11a/0x2bf [<ffffffff81055af3>] ? lock_acquired+0x1d0/0x1df [<ffffffffa00410f3>] ? hci_acl_disconn+0x65/0x65 [bluetooth] [<ffffffff81036178>] worker_thread+0xce/0x152 [<ffffffff810407ed>] ? finish_task_switch+0x45/0xc5 [<ffffffff810360aa>] ? manage_workers.isra.25+0x16a/0x16a [<ffffffff81039a03>] kthread+0x95/0x9d [<ffffffff812e7754>] kernel_thread_helper+0x4/0x10 [<ffffffff812e5db4>] ? retint_restore_args+0x13/0x13 [<ffffffff8103996e>] ? __init_kthread_worker+0x55/0x55 [<ffffffff812e7750>] ? gs_change+0x13/0x13 Signed-off-by: Andre Guedes <andre.guedes@openbossa.org> Signed-off-by: Vinicius Costa Gomes <vinicius.gomes@openbossa.org> Reviewed-by: Ulisses Furquim <ulisses@profusion.mobi> Acked-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
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Printing the "start_ip" for every secondary cpu is very noisy on a large system - and doesn't add any value. Drop this message. Console log before: Booting Node 0, Processors #1 smpboot cpu 1: start_ip = 96000 #2 smpboot cpu 2: start_ip = 96000 #3 smpboot cpu 3: start_ip = 96000 #4 smpboot cpu 4: start_ip = 96000 ... #31 smpboot cpu 31: start_ip = 96000 Brought up 32 CPUs Console log after: Booting Node 0, Processors #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 Ok. Booting Node 1, Processors #8 #9 #10 #11 #12 #13 #14 #15 Ok. Booting Node 0, Processors #16 #17 #18 #19 #20 #21 #22 #23 Ok. Booting Node 1, Processors #24 #25 #26 #27 #28 #29 #30 #31 Brought up 32 CPUs Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@amd64.org> Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/4f452eb42507460426@agluck-desktop.sc.intel.com Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
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Oct 13, 2012
Until all sas_tasks are known to no longer be in-flight this flag gates late completions from colliding with error handling. However, it must be cleared prior to the submission of scsi_send_eh_cmnd() requests, otherwise those commands will never be completed correctly. This was spotted by slub debug: ============================================================================= BUG sas_task: Objects remaining on kmem_cache_close() ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- INFO: Slab 0xffffea001f0eba00 objects=34 used=1 fp=0xffff8807c3aecb00 flags=0x8000000000004080 Pid: 22919, comm: modprobe Not tainted 3.2.0-isci+ #2 Call Trace: [<ffffffff810fcdcd>] slab_err+0xb0/0xd2 [<ffffffff810e1c50>] ? free_percpu+0x31/0x117 [<ffffffff81100122>] ? kzalloc+0x14/0x16 [<ffffffff81100122>] ? kzalloc+0x14/0x16 [<ffffffff81100486>] kmem_cache_destroy+0x11d/0x270 [<ffffffffa0112bdc>] sas_class_exit+0x10/0x12 [libsas] [<ffffffff81078fba>] sys_delete_module+0x1c4/0x23c [<ffffffff814797ba>] ? sysret_check+0x2e/0x69 [<ffffffff8126479e>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x3a/0x3f [<ffffffff81479782>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b INFO: Object 0xffff8807c3aed280 @offset=21120 INFO: Allocated in sas_alloc_task+0x22/0x90 [libsas] age=4615311 cpu=2 pid=12966 __slab_alloc.clone.3+0x1d1/0x234 kmem_cache_alloc+0x52/0x10d sas_alloc_task+0x22/0x90 [libsas] sas_queuecommand+0x20e/0x230 [libsas] scsi_send_eh_cmnd+0xd1/0x30c scsi_eh_try_stu+0x4f/0x6b scsi_eh_ready_devs+0xba/0x6ef sas_scsi_recover_host+0xa35/0xab1 [libsas] scsi_error_handler+0x14b/0x5fa kthread+0x9d/0xa5 kernel_thread_helper+0x4/0x10 Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <JBottomley@Parallels.com>
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… update The rule activity update delayed work periodically traverses the list of configured rules and queries their activity from the device. As part of this task it accesses the entry pointed by 'ventry->entry', but this entry can be changed concurrently by the rehash delayed work, leading to a use-after-free [1]. Fix by closing the race and perform the activity query under the 'vregion->lock' mutex. [1] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_flower_rule_activity_get+0x121/0x140 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881054ed808 by task kworker/0:18/181 CPU: 0 PID: 181 Comm: kworker/0:18 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc2-custom-00781-gd5ab772d32f7 #2 Hardware name: Mellanox Technologies Ltd. MSN3700/VMOD0005, BIOS 5.11 01/06/2019 Workqueue: mlxsw_core mlxsw_sp_acl_rule_activity_update_work Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0xc6/0x120 print_report+0xce/0x670 kasan_report+0xd7/0x110 mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_flower_rule_activity_get+0x121/0x140 mlxsw_sp_acl_rule_activity_update_work+0x219/0x400 process_one_work+0x8eb/0x19b0 worker_thread+0x6c9/0xf70 kthread+0x2c9/0x3b0 ret_from_fork+0x4d/0x80 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> Allocated by task 1039: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0x8f/0xa0 __kmalloc+0x19c/0x360 mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_entry_create+0x7b/0x1f0 mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_vchunk_migrate_all+0x30d/0xb50 mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_vregion_rehash_work+0x157/0x1300 process_one_work+0x8eb/0x19b0 worker_thread+0x6c9/0xf70 kthread+0x2c9/0x3b0 ret_from_fork+0x4d/0x80 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 Freed by task 1039: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60 poison_slab_object+0x102/0x170 __kasan_slab_free+0x14/0x30 kfree+0xc1/0x290 mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_vchunk_migrate_all+0x3d7/0xb50 mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_vregion_rehash_work+0x157/0x1300 process_one_work+0x8eb/0x19b0 worker_thread+0x6c9/0xf70 kthread+0x2c9/0x3b0 ret_from_fork+0x4d/0x80 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 Fixes: 2bffc53 ("mlxsw: spectrum_acl: Don't take mutex in mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_vregion_rehash_work()") Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com> Tested-by: Alexander Zubkov <green@qrator.net> Reviewed-by: Petr Machata <petrm@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Petr Machata <petrm@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1fcce0a60b231ebeb2515d91022284ba7b4ffe7a.1713797103.git.petrm@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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9f74a3d ("ice: Fix VF Reset paths when interface in a failed over aggregate"), the ice driver has acquired the LAG mutex in ice_reset_vf(). The commit placed this lock acquisition just prior to the acquisition of the VF configuration lock. If ice_reset_vf() acquires the configuration lock via the ICE_VF_RESET_LOCK flag, this could deadlock with ice_vc_cfg_qs_msg() because it always acquires the locks in the order of the VF configuration lock and then the LAG mutex. Lockdep reports this violation almost immediately on creating and then removing 2 VF: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.8.0-rc6 #54 Tainted: G W O ------------------------------------------------------ kworker/60:3/6771 is trying to acquire lock: ff40d43e099380a0 (&vf->cfg_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ice_reset_vf+0x22f/0x4d0 [ice] but task is already holding lock: ff40d43ea1961210 (&pf->lag_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ice_reset_vf+0xb7/0x4d0 [ice] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (&pf->lag_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x4f8/0xb40 lock_acquire+0xd4/0x2d0 __mutex_lock+0x9b/0xbf0 ice_vc_cfg_qs_msg+0x45/0x690 [ice] ice_vc_process_vf_msg+0x4f5/0x870 [ice] __ice_clean_ctrlq+0x2b5/0x600 [ice] ice_service_task+0x2c9/0x480 [ice] process_one_work+0x1e9/0x4d0 worker_thread+0x1e1/0x3d0 kthread+0x104/0x140 ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 -> #0 (&vf->cfg_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: check_prev_add+0xe2/0xc50 validate_chain+0x558/0x800 __lock_acquire+0x4f8/0xb40 lock_acquire+0xd4/0x2d0 __mutex_lock+0x9b/0xbf0 ice_reset_vf+0x22f/0x4d0 [ice] ice_process_vflr_event+0x98/0xd0 [ice] ice_service_task+0x1cc/0x480 [ice] process_one_work+0x1e9/0x4d0 worker_thread+0x1e1/0x3d0 kthread+0x104/0x140 ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&pf->lag_mutex); lock(&vf->cfg_lock); lock(&pf->lag_mutex); lock(&vf->cfg_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 4 locks held by kworker/60:3/6771: #0: ff40d43e05428b38 ((wq_completion)ice){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x176/0x4d0 #1: ff50d06e05197e58 ((work_completion)(&pf->serv_task)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x176/0x4d0 #2: ff40d43ea1960e50 (&pf->vfs.table_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ice_process_vflr_event+0x48/0xd0 [ice] #3: ff40d43ea1961210 (&pf->lag_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ice_reset_vf+0xb7/0x4d0 [ice] stack backtrace: CPU: 60 PID: 6771 Comm: kworker/60:3 Tainted: G W O 6.8.0-rc6 #54 Hardware name: Workqueue: ice ice_service_task [ice] Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x4a/0x80 check_noncircular+0x12d/0x150 check_prev_add+0xe2/0xc50 ? save_trace+0x59/0x230 ? add_chain_cache+0x109/0x450 validate_chain+0x558/0x800 __lock_acquire+0x4f8/0xb40 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7d/0x100 lock_acquire+0xd4/0x2d0 ? ice_reset_vf+0x22f/0x4d0 [ice] ? lock_is_held_type+0xc7/0x120 __mutex_lock+0x9b/0xbf0 ? ice_reset_vf+0x22f/0x4d0 [ice] ? ice_reset_vf+0x22f/0x4d0 [ice] ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0x50 ? ice_reset_vf+0x22f/0x4d0 [ice] ice_reset_vf+0x22f/0x4d0 [ice] ? process_one_work+0x176/0x4d0 ice_process_vflr_event+0x98/0xd0 [ice] ice_service_task+0x1cc/0x480 [ice] process_one_work+0x1e9/0x4d0 worker_thread+0x1e1/0x3d0 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0x104/0x140 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 </TASK> To avoid deadlock, we must acquire the LAG mutex only after acquiring the VF configuration lock. Fix the ice_reset_vf() to acquire the LAG mutex only after we either acquire or check that the VF configuration lock is held. Fixes: 9f74a3d ("ice: Fix VF Reset paths when interface in a failed over aggregate") Signed-off-by: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Dave Ertman <david.m.ertman@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Mateusz Polchlopek <mateusz.polchlopek@intel.com> Tested-by: Przemek Kitszel <przemyslaw.kitszel@intel.com> Tested-by: Rafal Romanowski <rafal.romanowski@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240423182723.740401-5-anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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…nix_gc(). syzbot reported a lockdep splat regarding unix_gc_lock and unix_state_lock(). One is called from recvmsg() for a connected socket, and another is called from GC for TCP_LISTEN socket. So, the splat is false-positive. Let's add a dedicated lock class for the latter to suppress the splat. Note that this change is not necessary for net-next.git as the issue is only applied to the old GC impl. [0]: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.9.0-rc5-syzkaller-00007-g4d2008430ce8 #0 Not tainted ----------------------------------------------------- kworker/u8:1/11 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88807cea4e70 (&u->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] ffff88807cea4e70 (&u->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: __unix_gc+0x40e/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:302 but task is already holding lock: ffffffff8f6ab638 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] ffffffff8f6ab638 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: __unix_gc+0x117/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:261 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}: lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:133 [inline] _raw_spin_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] unix_notinflight+0x13d/0x390 net/unix/garbage.c:140 unix_detach_fds net/unix/af_unix.c:1819 [inline] unix_destruct_scm+0x221/0x350 net/unix/af_unix.c:1876 skb_release_head_state+0x100/0x250 net/core/skbuff.c:1188 skb_release_all net/core/skbuff.c:1200 [inline] __kfree_skb net/core/skbuff.c:1216 [inline] kfree_skb_reason+0x16d/0x3b0 net/core/skbuff.c:1252 kfree_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1262 [inline] manage_oob net/unix/af_unix.c:2672 [inline] unix_stream_read_generic+0x1125/0x2700 net/unix/af_unix.c:2749 unix_stream_splice_read+0x239/0x320 net/unix/af_unix.c:2981 do_splice_read fs/splice.c:985 [inline] splice_file_to_pipe+0x299/0x500 fs/splice.c:1295 do_splice+0xf2d/0x1880 fs/splice.c:1379 __do_splice fs/splice.c:1436 [inline] __do_sys_splice fs/splice.c:1652 [inline] __se_sys_splice+0x331/0x4a0 fs/splice.c:1634 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f -> #0 (&u->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline] validate_chain+0x18cb/0x58e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869 __lock_acquire+0x1346/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137 lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:133 [inline] _raw_spin_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] __unix_gc+0x40e/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:302 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3254 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xa10/0x17c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3335 worker_thread+0x86d/0xd70 kernel/workqueue.c:3416 kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:388 ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(unix_gc_lock); lock(&u->lock); lock(unix_gc_lock); lock(&u->lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by kworker/u8:1/11: #0: ffff888015089148 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline] #0: ffff888015089148 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x8e0/0x17c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3335 #1: ffffc90000107d00 (unix_gc_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3230 [inline] #1: ffffc90000107d00 (unix_gc_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x91b/0x17c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3335 #2: ffffffff8f6ab638 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] #2: ffffffff8f6ab638 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: __unix_gc+0x117/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:261 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 11 Comm: kworker/u8:1 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc5-syzkaller-00007-g4d2008430ce8 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024 Workqueue: events_unbound __unix_gc Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114 check_noncircular+0x36a/0x4a0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2187 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline] validate_chain+0x18cb/0x58e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869 __lock_acquire+0x1346/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137 lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:133 [inline] _raw_spin_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] __unix_gc+0x40e/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:302 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3254 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xa10/0x17c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3335 worker_thread+0x86d/0xd70 kernel/workqueue.c:3416 kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:388 ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 </TASK> Fixes: 47d8ac0 ("af_unix: Fix garbage collector racing against connect()") Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+fa379358c28cc87cc307@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=fa379358c28cc87cc307 Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240424170443.9832-1-kuniyu@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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…git/netfilter/nf Pablo Neira Ayuso says: ==================== Netfilter/IPVS fixes for net The following patchset contains two Netfilter/IPVS fixes for net: Patch #1 fixes SCTP checksumming for IPVS with gso packets, from Ismael Luceno. Patch #2 honor dormant flag from netdev event path to fix a possible double hook unregistration. * tag 'nf-24-04-25' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netfilter/nf: netfilter: nf_tables: honor table dormant flag from netdev release event path ipvs: Fix checksumming on GSO of SCTP packets ==================== Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240425090149.1359547-1-pablo@netfilter.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Some combinations of Pi 4Bs and Ethernet switches don't reliably get a DCHP-assigned IP address, leaving the unit with a self=assigned 169.254 address. In the failure case, the Pi is left able to receive packets but not send them, suggesting that the MAC<->PHY link is getting into a bad state. It has been found empirically that skipping a reset step by the genet driver prevents the failures. No downsides have been discovered yet, and unlike the forced renegotiation it doesn't increase the time to get an IP address, so the workaround is enabled by default; add genet.skip_umac_reset=n to the command line to disable it. See: #3108 Signed-off-by: Phil Elwell <phil@raspberrypi.org>
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[ Upstream commit fef9657 ] When disabling aRFS under the `priv->state_lock`, any scheduled aRFS works are canceled using the `cancel_work_sync` function, which waits for the work to end if it has already started. However, while waiting for the work handler, the handler will try to acquire the `state_lock` which is already acquired. The worker acquires the lock to delete the rules if the state is down, which is not the worker's responsibility since disabling aRFS deletes the rules. Add an aRFS state variable, which indicates whether the aRFS is enabled and prevent adding rules when the aRFS is disabled. Kernel log: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.7.0-rc4_net_next_mlx5_5483eb2 #1 Tainted: G I ------------------------------------------------------ ethtool/386089 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88810f21ce68 ((work_completion)(&rule->arfs_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0x74/0x4e0 but task is already holding lock: ffff8884a1808cc0 (&priv->state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5e_ethtool_set_channels+0x53/0x200 [mlx5_core] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (&priv->state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x80/0xc90 arfs_handle_work+0x4b/0x3b0 [mlx5_core] process_one_work+0x1dc/0x4a0 worker_thread+0x1bf/0x3c0 kthread+0xd7/0x100 ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 -> #0 ((work_completion)(&rule->arfs_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x17b4/0x2c80 lock_acquire+0xd0/0x2b0 __flush_work+0x7a/0x4e0 __cancel_work_timer+0x131/0x1c0 arfs_del_rules+0x143/0x1e0 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_arfs_disable+0x1b/0x30 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_ethtool_set_channels+0xcb/0x200 [mlx5_core] ethnl_set_channels+0x28f/0x3b0 ethnl_default_set_doit+0xec/0x240 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xd0/0x120 genl_rcv_msg+0x188/0x2c0 netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0x100 genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 netlink_unicast+0x1a1/0x270 netlink_sendmsg+0x214/0x460 __sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x60 __sys_sendto+0x113/0x170 __x64_sys_sendto+0x20/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x40/0xe0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&priv->state_lock); lock((work_completion)(&rule->arfs_work)); lock(&priv->state_lock); lock((work_completion)(&rule->arfs_work)); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by ethtool/386089: #0: ffffffff82ea7210 (cb_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: genl_rcv+0x15/0x40 #1: ffffffff82e94c88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ethnl_default_set_doit+0xd3/0x240 #2: ffff8884a1808cc0 (&priv->state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5e_ethtool_set_channels+0x53/0x200 [mlx5_core] stack backtrace: CPU: 15 PID: 386089 Comm: ethtool Tainted: G I 6.7.0-rc4_net_next_mlx5_5483eb2 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0xa0 check_noncircular+0x144/0x160 __lock_acquire+0x17b4/0x2c80 lock_acquire+0xd0/0x2b0 ? __flush_work+0x74/0x4e0 ? save_trace+0x3e/0x360 ? __flush_work+0x74/0x4e0 __flush_work+0x7a/0x4e0 ? __flush_work+0x74/0x4e0 ? __lock_acquire+0xa78/0x2c80 ? lock_acquire+0xd0/0x2b0 ? mark_held_locks+0x49/0x70 __cancel_work_timer+0x131/0x1c0 ? mark_held_locks+0x49/0x70 arfs_del_rules+0x143/0x1e0 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_arfs_disable+0x1b/0x30 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_ethtool_set_channels+0xcb/0x200 [mlx5_core] ethnl_set_channels+0x28f/0x3b0 ethnl_default_set_doit+0xec/0x240 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xd0/0x120 genl_rcv_msg+0x188/0x2c0 ? ethnl_ops_begin+0xb0/0xb0 ? genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit+0xf0/0xf0 netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0x100 genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 netlink_unicast+0x1a1/0x270 netlink_sendmsg+0x214/0x460 __sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x60 __sys_sendto+0x113/0x170 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x53f/0x8f0 __x64_sys_sendto+0x20/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x40/0xe0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e </TASK> Fixes: 45bf454 ("net/mlx5e: Enabling aRFS mechanism") Signed-off-by: Carolina Jubran <cjubran@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@nvidia.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240411115444.374475-7-tariqt@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit f8bbc07 ] vhost_worker will call tun call backs to receive packets. If too many illegal packets arrives, tun_do_read will keep dumping packet contents. When console is enabled, it will costs much more cpu time to dump packet and soft lockup will be detected. net_ratelimit mechanism can be used to limit the dumping rate. PID: 33036 TASK: ffff949da6f20000 CPU: 23 COMMAND: "vhost-32980" #0 [fffffe00003fce50] crash_nmi_callback at ffffffff89249253 #1 [fffffe00003fce58] nmi_handle at ffffffff89225fa3 #2 [fffffe00003fceb0] default_do_nmi at ffffffff8922642e #3 [fffffe00003fced0] do_nmi at ffffffff8922660d #4 [fffffe00003fcef0] end_repeat_nmi at ffffffff89c01663 [exception RIP: io_serial_in+20] RIP: ffffffff89792594 RSP: ffffa655314979e8 RFLAGS: 00000002 RAX: ffffffff89792500 RBX: ffffffff8af428a0 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 00000000000003fd RSI: 0000000000000005 RDI: ffffffff8af428a0 RBP: 0000000000002710 R8: 0000000000000004 R9: 000000000000000f R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffff8acbf64f R12: 0000000000000020 R13: ffffffff8acbf698 R14: 0000000000000058 R15: 0000000000000000 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #5 [ffffa655314979e8] io_serial_in at ffffffff89792594 #6 [ffffa655314979e8] wait_for_xmitr at ffffffff89793470 #7 [ffffa65531497a08] serial8250_console_putchar at ffffffff897934f6 #8 [ffffa65531497a20] uart_console_write at ffffffff8978b605 #9 [ffffa65531497a48] serial8250_console_write at ffffffff89796558 #10 [ffffa65531497ac8] console_unlock at ffffffff89316124 #11 [ffffa65531497b10] vprintk_emit at ffffffff89317c07 #12 [ffffa65531497b68] printk at ffffffff89318306 #13 [ffffa65531497bc8] print_hex_dump at ffffffff89650765 #14 [ffffa65531497ca8] tun_do_read at ffffffffc0b06c27 [tun] #15 [ffffa65531497d38] tun_recvmsg at ffffffffc0b06e34 [tun] #16 [ffffa65531497d68] handle_rx at ffffffffc0c5d682 [vhost_net] #17 [ffffa65531497ed0] vhost_worker at ffffffffc0c644dc [vhost] #18 [ffffa65531497f10] kthread at ffffffff892d2e72 #19 [ffffa65531497f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff89c0022f Fixes: ef3db4a ("tun: avoid BUG, dump packet on GSO errors") Signed-off-by: Lei Chen <lei.chen@smartx.com> Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240415020247.2207781-1-lei.chen@smartx.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 9e985cb upstream. Drop support for virtualizing adaptive PEBS, as KVM's implementation is architecturally broken without an obvious/easy path forward, and because exposing adaptive PEBS can leak host LBRs to the guest, i.e. can leak host kernel addresses to the guest. Bug #1 is that KVM doesn't account for the upper 32 bits of IA32_FIXED_CTR_CTRL when (re)programming fixed counters, e.g fixed_ctrl_field() drops the upper bits, reprogram_fixed_counters() stores local variables as u8s and truncates the upper bits too, etc. Bug #2 is that, because KVM _always_ sets precise_ip to a non-zero value for PEBS events, perf will _always_ generate an adaptive record, even if the guest requested a basic record. Note, KVM will also enable adaptive PEBS in individual *counter*, even if adaptive PEBS isn't exposed to the guest, but this is benign as MSR_PEBS_DATA_CFG is guaranteed to be zero, i.e. the guest will only ever see Basic records. Bug #3 is in perf. intel_pmu_disable_fixed() doesn't clear the upper bits either, i.e. leaves ICL_FIXED_0_ADAPTIVE set, and intel_pmu_enable_fixed() effectively doesn't clear ICL_FIXED_0_ADAPTIVE either. I.e. perf _always_ enables ADAPTIVE counters, regardless of what KVM requests. Bug #4 is that adaptive PEBS *might* effectively bypass event filters set by the host, as "Updated Memory Access Info Group" records information that might be disallowed by userspace via KVM_SET_PMU_EVENT_FILTER. Bug #5 is that KVM doesn't ensure LBR MSRs hold guest values (or at least zeros) when entering a vCPU with adaptive PEBS, which allows the guest to read host LBRs, i.e. host RIPs/addresses, by enabling "LBR Entries" records. Disable adaptive PEBS support as an immediate fix due to the severity of the LBR leak in particular, and because fixing all of the bugs will be non-trivial, e.g. not suitable for backporting to stable kernels. Note! This will break live migration, but trying to make KVM play nice with live migration would be quite complicated, wouldn't be guaranteed to work (i.e. KVM might still kill/confuse the guest), and it's not clear that there are any publicly available VMMs that support adaptive PEBS, let alone live migrate VMs that support adaptive PEBS, e.g. QEMU doesn't support PEBS in any capacity. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240306230153.786365-1-seanjc@google.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZeepGjHCeSfadANM@google.com Fixes: c59a1f1 ("KVM: x86/pmu: Add IA32_PEBS_ENABLE MSR emulation for extended PEBS") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Like Xu <like.xu.linux@gmail.com> Cc: Mingwei Zhang <mizhang@google.com> Cc: Zhenyu Wang <zhenyuw@linux.intel.com> Cc: Zhang Xiong <xiong.y.zhang@intel.com> Cc: Lv Zhiyuan <zhiyuan.lv@intel.com> Cc: Dapeng Mi <dapeng1.mi@intel.com> Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Acked-by: Like Xu <likexu@tencent.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240307005833.827147-1-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 1983184 upstream. When I did hard offline test with hugetlb pages, below deadlock occurs: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.8.0-11409-gf6cef5f8c37f #1 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ bash/46904 is trying to acquire lock: ffffffffabe68910 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: static_key_slow_dec+0x16/0x60 but task is already holding lock: ffffffffabf92ea8 (pcp_batch_high_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: zone_pcp_disable+0x16/0x40 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (pcp_batch_high_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x6c/0x770 page_alloc_cpu_online+0x3c/0x70 cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x397/0x5f0 __cpuhp_invoke_callback_range+0x71/0xe0 _cpu_up+0xeb/0x210 cpu_up+0x91/0xe0 cpuhp_bringup_mask+0x49/0xb0 bringup_nonboot_cpus+0xb7/0xe0 smp_init+0x25/0xa0 kernel_init_freeable+0x15f/0x3e0 kernel_init+0x15/0x1b0 ret_from_fork+0x2f/0x50 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #0 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x1298/0x1cd0 lock_acquire+0xc0/0x2b0 cpus_read_lock+0x2a/0xc0 static_key_slow_dec+0x16/0x60 __hugetlb_vmemmap_restore_folio+0x1b9/0x200 dissolve_free_huge_page+0x211/0x260 __page_handle_poison+0x45/0xc0 memory_failure+0x65e/0xc70 hard_offline_page_store+0x55/0xa0 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x12c/0x1d0 vfs_write+0x387/0x550 ksys_write+0x64/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0xca/0x1e0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(pcp_batch_high_lock); lock(cpu_hotplug_lock); lock(pcp_batch_high_lock); rlock(cpu_hotplug_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 5 locks held by bash/46904: #0: ffff98f6c3bb23f0 (sb_writers#5){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x64/0xe0 #1: ffff98f6c328e488 (&of->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0xf8/0x1d0 #2: ffff98ef83b31890 (kn->active#113){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x100/0x1d0 #3: ffffffffabf9db48 (mf_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: memory_failure+0x44/0xc70 #4: ffffffffabf92ea8 (pcp_batch_high_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: zone_pcp_disable+0x16/0x40 stack backtrace: CPU: 10 PID: 46904 Comm: bash Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.8.0-11409-gf6cef5f8c37f #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0xa0 check_noncircular+0x129/0x140 __lock_acquire+0x1298/0x1cd0 lock_acquire+0xc0/0x2b0 cpus_read_lock+0x2a/0xc0 static_key_slow_dec+0x16/0x60 __hugetlb_vmemmap_restore_folio+0x1b9/0x200 dissolve_free_huge_page+0x211/0x260 __page_handle_poison+0x45/0xc0 memory_failure+0x65e/0xc70 hard_offline_page_store+0x55/0xa0 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x12c/0x1d0 vfs_write+0x387/0x550 ksys_write+0x64/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0xca/0x1e0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75 RIP: 0033:0x7fc862314887 Code: 10 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b7 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 48 89 54 24 18 48 89 74 24 RSP: 002b:00007fff19311268 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000000000c RCX: 00007fc862314887 RDX: 000000000000000c RSI: 000056405645fe10 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: 000056405645fe10 R08: 00007fc8623d1460 R09: 000000007fffffff R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000000000c R13: 00007fc86241b780 R14: 00007fc862417600 R15: 00007fc862416a00 In short, below scene breaks the lock dependency chain: memory_failure __page_handle_poison zone_pcp_disable -- lock(pcp_batch_high_lock) dissolve_free_huge_page __hugetlb_vmemmap_restore_folio static_key_slow_dec cpus_read_lock -- rlock(cpu_hotplug_lock) Fix this by calling drain_all_pages() instead. This issue won't occur until commit a6b4085 ("mm: hugetlb: replace hugetlb_free_vmemmap_enabled with a static_key"). As it introduced rlock(cpu_hotplug_lock) in dissolve_free_huge_page() code path while lock(pcp_batch_high_lock) is already in the __page_handle_poison(). [linmiaohe@huawei.com: extend comment per Oscar] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: reflow block comment] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240407085456.2798193-1-linmiaohe@huawei.com Fixes: a6b4085 ("mm: hugetlb: replace hugetlb_free_vmemmap_enabled with a static_key") Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Acked-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Jane Chu <jane.chu@oracle.com> Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <nao.horiguchi@gmail.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Some combinations of Pi 4Bs and Ethernet switches don't reliably get a DCHP-assigned IP address, leaving the unit with a self=assigned 169.254 address. In the failure case, the Pi is left able to receive packets but not send them, suggesting that the MAC<->PHY link is getting into a bad state. It has been found empirically that skipping a reset step by the genet driver prevents the failures. No downsides have been discovered yet, and unlike the forced renegotiation it doesn't increase the time to get an IP address, so the workaround is enabled by default; add genet.skip_umac_reset=n to the command line to disable it. See: #3108 Signed-off-by: Phil Elwell <phil@raspberrypi.org>
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[ Upstream commit fef9657 ] When disabling aRFS under the `priv->state_lock`, any scheduled aRFS works are canceled using the `cancel_work_sync` function, which waits for the work to end if it has already started. However, while waiting for the work handler, the handler will try to acquire the `state_lock` which is already acquired. The worker acquires the lock to delete the rules if the state is down, which is not the worker's responsibility since disabling aRFS deletes the rules. Add an aRFS state variable, which indicates whether the aRFS is enabled and prevent adding rules when the aRFS is disabled. Kernel log: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.7.0-rc4_net_next_mlx5_5483eb2 #1 Tainted: G I ------------------------------------------------------ ethtool/386089 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88810f21ce68 ((work_completion)(&rule->arfs_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0x74/0x4e0 but task is already holding lock: ffff8884a1808cc0 (&priv->state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5e_ethtool_set_channels+0x53/0x200 [mlx5_core] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (&priv->state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x80/0xc90 arfs_handle_work+0x4b/0x3b0 [mlx5_core] process_one_work+0x1dc/0x4a0 worker_thread+0x1bf/0x3c0 kthread+0xd7/0x100 ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 -> #0 ((work_completion)(&rule->arfs_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x17b4/0x2c80 lock_acquire+0xd0/0x2b0 __flush_work+0x7a/0x4e0 __cancel_work_timer+0x131/0x1c0 arfs_del_rules+0x143/0x1e0 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_arfs_disable+0x1b/0x30 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_ethtool_set_channels+0xcb/0x200 [mlx5_core] ethnl_set_channels+0x28f/0x3b0 ethnl_default_set_doit+0xec/0x240 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xd0/0x120 genl_rcv_msg+0x188/0x2c0 netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0x100 genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 netlink_unicast+0x1a1/0x270 netlink_sendmsg+0x214/0x460 __sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x60 __sys_sendto+0x113/0x170 __x64_sys_sendto+0x20/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x40/0xe0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&priv->state_lock); lock((work_completion)(&rule->arfs_work)); lock(&priv->state_lock); lock((work_completion)(&rule->arfs_work)); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by ethtool/386089: #0: ffffffff82ea7210 (cb_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: genl_rcv+0x15/0x40 #1: ffffffff82e94c88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ethnl_default_set_doit+0xd3/0x240 #2: ffff8884a1808cc0 (&priv->state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5e_ethtool_set_channels+0x53/0x200 [mlx5_core] stack backtrace: CPU: 15 PID: 386089 Comm: ethtool Tainted: G I 6.7.0-rc4_net_next_mlx5_5483eb2 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0xa0 check_noncircular+0x144/0x160 __lock_acquire+0x17b4/0x2c80 lock_acquire+0xd0/0x2b0 ? __flush_work+0x74/0x4e0 ? save_trace+0x3e/0x360 ? __flush_work+0x74/0x4e0 __flush_work+0x7a/0x4e0 ? __flush_work+0x74/0x4e0 ? __lock_acquire+0xa78/0x2c80 ? lock_acquire+0xd0/0x2b0 ? mark_held_locks+0x49/0x70 __cancel_work_timer+0x131/0x1c0 ? mark_held_locks+0x49/0x70 arfs_del_rules+0x143/0x1e0 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_arfs_disable+0x1b/0x30 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_ethtool_set_channels+0xcb/0x200 [mlx5_core] ethnl_set_channels+0x28f/0x3b0 ethnl_default_set_doit+0xec/0x240 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xd0/0x120 genl_rcv_msg+0x188/0x2c0 ? ethnl_ops_begin+0xb0/0xb0 ? genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit+0xf0/0xf0 netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0x100 genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 netlink_unicast+0x1a1/0x270 netlink_sendmsg+0x214/0x460 __sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x60 __sys_sendto+0x113/0x170 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x53f/0x8f0 __x64_sys_sendto+0x20/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x40/0xe0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e </TASK> Fixes: 45bf454 ("net/mlx5e: Enabling aRFS mechanism") Signed-off-by: Carolina Jubran <cjubran@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@nvidia.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240411115444.374475-7-tariqt@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit f8bbc07 ] vhost_worker will call tun call backs to receive packets. If too many illegal packets arrives, tun_do_read will keep dumping packet contents. When console is enabled, it will costs much more cpu time to dump packet and soft lockup will be detected. net_ratelimit mechanism can be used to limit the dumping rate. PID: 33036 TASK: ffff949da6f20000 CPU: 23 COMMAND: "vhost-32980" #0 [fffffe00003fce50] crash_nmi_callback at ffffffff89249253 #1 [fffffe00003fce58] nmi_handle at ffffffff89225fa3 #2 [fffffe00003fceb0] default_do_nmi at ffffffff8922642e #3 [fffffe00003fced0] do_nmi at ffffffff8922660d #4 [fffffe00003fcef0] end_repeat_nmi at ffffffff89c01663 [exception RIP: io_serial_in+20] RIP: ffffffff89792594 RSP: ffffa655314979e8 RFLAGS: 00000002 RAX: ffffffff89792500 RBX: ffffffff8af428a0 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 00000000000003fd RSI: 0000000000000005 RDI: ffffffff8af428a0 RBP: 0000000000002710 R8: 0000000000000004 R9: 000000000000000f R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffff8acbf64f R12: 0000000000000020 R13: ffffffff8acbf698 R14: 0000000000000058 R15: 0000000000000000 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #5 [ffffa655314979e8] io_serial_in at ffffffff89792594 #6 [ffffa655314979e8] wait_for_xmitr at ffffffff89793470 #7 [ffffa65531497a08] serial8250_console_putchar at ffffffff897934f6 #8 [ffffa65531497a20] uart_console_write at ffffffff8978b605 #9 [ffffa65531497a48] serial8250_console_write at ffffffff89796558 #10 [ffffa65531497ac8] console_unlock at ffffffff89316124 #11 [ffffa65531497b10] vprintk_emit at ffffffff89317c07 #12 [ffffa65531497b68] printk at ffffffff89318306 #13 [ffffa65531497bc8] print_hex_dump at ffffffff89650765 #14 [ffffa65531497ca8] tun_do_read at ffffffffc0b06c27 [tun] #15 [ffffa65531497d38] tun_recvmsg at ffffffffc0b06e34 [tun] #16 [ffffa65531497d68] handle_rx at ffffffffc0c5d682 [vhost_net] #17 [ffffa65531497ed0] vhost_worker at ffffffffc0c644dc [vhost] #18 [ffffa65531497f10] kthread at ffffffff892d2e72 #19 [ffffa65531497f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff89c0022f Fixes: ef3db4a ("tun: avoid BUG, dump packet on GSO errors") Signed-off-by: Lei Chen <lei.chen@smartx.com> Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240415020247.2207781-1-lei.chen@smartx.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 9e985cb upstream. Drop support for virtualizing adaptive PEBS, as KVM's implementation is architecturally broken without an obvious/easy path forward, and because exposing adaptive PEBS can leak host LBRs to the guest, i.e. can leak host kernel addresses to the guest. Bug #1 is that KVM doesn't account for the upper 32 bits of IA32_FIXED_CTR_CTRL when (re)programming fixed counters, e.g fixed_ctrl_field() drops the upper bits, reprogram_fixed_counters() stores local variables as u8s and truncates the upper bits too, etc. Bug #2 is that, because KVM _always_ sets precise_ip to a non-zero value for PEBS events, perf will _always_ generate an adaptive record, even if the guest requested a basic record. Note, KVM will also enable adaptive PEBS in individual *counter*, even if adaptive PEBS isn't exposed to the guest, but this is benign as MSR_PEBS_DATA_CFG is guaranteed to be zero, i.e. the guest will only ever see Basic records. Bug #3 is in perf. intel_pmu_disable_fixed() doesn't clear the upper bits either, i.e. leaves ICL_FIXED_0_ADAPTIVE set, and intel_pmu_enable_fixed() effectively doesn't clear ICL_FIXED_0_ADAPTIVE either. I.e. perf _always_ enables ADAPTIVE counters, regardless of what KVM requests. Bug #4 is that adaptive PEBS *might* effectively bypass event filters set by the host, as "Updated Memory Access Info Group" records information that might be disallowed by userspace via KVM_SET_PMU_EVENT_FILTER. Bug #5 is that KVM doesn't ensure LBR MSRs hold guest values (or at least zeros) when entering a vCPU with adaptive PEBS, which allows the guest to read host LBRs, i.e. host RIPs/addresses, by enabling "LBR Entries" records. Disable adaptive PEBS support as an immediate fix due to the severity of the LBR leak in particular, and because fixing all of the bugs will be non-trivial, e.g. not suitable for backporting to stable kernels. Note! This will break live migration, but trying to make KVM play nice with live migration would be quite complicated, wouldn't be guaranteed to work (i.e. KVM might still kill/confuse the guest), and it's not clear that there are any publicly available VMMs that support adaptive PEBS, let alone live migrate VMs that support adaptive PEBS, e.g. QEMU doesn't support PEBS in any capacity. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240306230153.786365-1-seanjc@google.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZeepGjHCeSfadANM@google.com Fixes: c59a1f1 ("KVM: x86/pmu: Add IA32_PEBS_ENABLE MSR emulation for extended PEBS") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Like Xu <like.xu.linux@gmail.com> Cc: Mingwei Zhang <mizhang@google.com> Cc: Zhenyu Wang <zhenyuw@linux.intel.com> Cc: Zhang Xiong <xiong.y.zhang@intel.com> Cc: Lv Zhiyuan <zhiyuan.lv@intel.com> Cc: Dapeng Mi <dapeng1.mi@intel.com> Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Acked-by: Like Xu <likexu@tencent.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240307005833.827147-1-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 1983184 upstream. When I did hard offline test with hugetlb pages, below deadlock occurs: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.8.0-11409-gf6cef5f8c37f #1 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ bash/46904 is trying to acquire lock: ffffffffabe68910 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: static_key_slow_dec+0x16/0x60 but task is already holding lock: ffffffffabf92ea8 (pcp_batch_high_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: zone_pcp_disable+0x16/0x40 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (pcp_batch_high_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x6c/0x770 page_alloc_cpu_online+0x3c/0x70 cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x397/0x5f0 __cpuhp_invoke_callback_range+0x71/0xe0 _cpu_up+0xeb/0x210 cpu_up+0x91/0xe0 cpuhp_bringup_mask+0x49/0xb0 bringup_nonboot_cpus+0xb7/0xe0 smp_init+0x25/0xa0 kernel_init_freeable+0x15f/0x3e0 kernel_init+0x15/0x1b0 ret_from_fork+0x2f/0x50 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #0 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x1298/0x1cd0 lock_acquire+0xc0/0x2b0 cpus_read_lock+0x2a/0xc0 static_key_slow_dec+0x16/0x60 __hugetlb_vmemmap_restore_folio+0x1b9/0x200 dissolve_free_huge_page+0x211/0x260 __page_handle_poison+0x45/0xc0 memory_failure+0x65e/0xc70 hard_offline_page_store+0x55/0xa0 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x12c/0x1d0 vfs_write+0x387/0x550 ksys_write+0x64/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0xca/0x1e0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(pcp_batch_high_lock); lock(cpu_hotplug_lock); lock(pcp_batch_high_lock); rlock(cpu_hotplug_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 5 locks held by bash/46904: #0: ffff98f6c3bb23f0 (sb_writers#5){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x64/0xe0 #1: ffff98f6c328e488 (&of->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0xf8/0x1d0 #2: ffff98ef83b31890 (kn->active#113){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x100/0x1d0 #3: ffffffffabf9db48 (mf_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: memory_failure+0x44/0xc70 #4: ffffffffabf92ea8 (pcp_batch_high_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: zone_pcp_disable+0x16/0x40 stack backtrace: CPU: 10 PID: 46904 Comm: bash Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.8.0-11409-gf6cef5f8c37f #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0xa0 check_noncircular+0x129/0x140 __lock_acquire+0x1298/0x1cd0 lock_acquire+0xc0/0x2b0 cpus_read_lock+0x2a/0xc0 static_key_slow_dec+0x16/0x60 __hugetlb_vmemmap_restore_folio+0x1b9/0x200 dissolve_free_huge_page+0x211/0x260 __page_handle_poison+0x45/0xc0 memory_failure+0x65e/0xc70 hard_offline_page_store+0x55/0xa0 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x12c/0x1d0 vfs_write+0x387/0x550 ksys_write+0x64/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0xca/0x1e0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75 RIP: 0033:0x7fc862314887 Code: 10 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b7 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 48 89 54 24 18 48 89 74 24 RSP: 002b:00007fff19311268 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000000000c RCX: 00007fc862314887 RDX: 000000000000000c RSI: 000056405645fe10 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: 000056405645fe10 R08: 00007fc8623d1460 R09: 000000007fffffff R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000000000c R13: 00007fc86241b780 R14: 00007fc862417600 R15: 00007fc862416a00 In short, below scene breaks the lock dependency chain: memory_failure __page_handle_poison zone_pcp_disable -- lock(pcp_batch_high_lock) dissolve_free_huge_page __hugetlb_vmemmap_restore_folio static_key_slow_dec cpus_read_lock -- rlock(cpu_hotplug_lock) Fix this by calling drain_all_pages() instead. This issue won't occur until commit a6b4085 ("mm: hugetlb: replace hugetlb_free_vmemmap_enabled with a static_key"). As it introduced rlock(cpu_hotplug_lock) in dissolve_free_huge_page() code path while lock(pcp_batch_high_lock) is already in the __page_handle_poison(). [linmiaohe@huawei.com: extend comment per Oscar] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: reflow block comment] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240407085456.2798193-1-linmiaohe@huawei.com Fixes: a6b4085 ("mm: hugetlb: replace hugetlb_free_vmemmap_enabled with a static_key") Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Acked-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Jane Chu <jane.chu@oracle.com> Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <nao.horiguchi@gmail.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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… update [ Upstream commit 79b5b4b ] The rule activity update delayed work periodically traverses the list of configured rules and queries their activity from the device. As part of this task it accesses the entry pointed by 'ventry->entry', but this entry can be changed concurrently by the rehash delayed work, leading to a use-after-free [1]. Fix by closing the race and perform the activity query under the 'vregion->lock' mutex. [1] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_flower_rule_activity_get+0x121/0x140 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881054ed808 by task kworker/0:18/181 CPU: 0 PID: 181 Comm: kworker/0:18 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc2-custom-00781-gd5ab772d32f7 #2 Hardware name: Mellanox Technologies Ltd. MSN3700/VMOD0005, BIOS 5.11 01/06/2019 Workqueue: mlxsw_core mlxsw_sp_acl_rule_activity_update_work Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0xc6/0x120 print_report+0xce/0x670 kasan_report+0xd7/0x110 mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_flower_rule_activity_get+0x121/0x140 mlxsw_sp_acl_rule_activity_update_work+0x219/0x400 process_one_work+0x8eb/0x19b0 worker_thread+0x6c9/0xf70 kthread+0x2c9/0x3b0 ret_from_fork+0x4d/0x80 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> Allocated by task 1039: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0x8f/0xa0 __kmalloc+0x19c/0x360 mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_entry_create+0x7b/0x1f0 mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_vchunk_migrate_all+0x30d/0xb50 mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_vregion_rehash_work+0x157/0x1300 process_one_work+0x8eb/0x19b0 worker_thread+0x6c9/0xf70 kthread+0x2c9/0x3b0 ret_from_fork+0x4d/0x80 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 Freed by task 1039: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60 poison_slab_object+0x102/0x170 __kasan_slab_free+0x14/0x30 kfree+0xc1/0x290 mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_vchunk_migrate_all+0x3d7/0xb50 mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_vregion_rehash_work+0x157/0x1300 process_one_work+0x8eb/0x19b0 worker_thread+0x6c9/0xf70 kthread+0x2c9/0x3b0 ret_from_fork+0x4d/0x80 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 Fixes: 2bffc53 ("mlxsw: spectrum_acl: Don't take mutex in mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_vregion_rehash_work()") Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com> Tested-by: Alexander Zubkov <green@qrator.net> Reviewed-by: Petr Machata <petrm@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Petr Machata <petrm@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1fcce0a60b231ebeb2515d91022284ba7b4ffe7a.1713797103.git.petrm@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 96fdd1f ] 9f74a3d ("ice: Fix VF Reset paths when interface in a failed over aggregate"), the ice driver has acquired the LAG mutex in ice_reset_vf(). The commit placed this lock acquisition just prior to the acquisition of the VF configuration lock. If ice_reset_vf() acquires the configuration lock via the ICE_VF_RESET_LOCK flag, this could deadlock with ice_vc_cfg_qs_msg() because it always acquires the locks in the order of the VF configuration lock and then the LAG mutex. Lockdep reports this violation almost immediately on creating and then removing 2 VF: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.8.0-rc6 #54 Tainted: G W O ------------------------------------------------------ kworker/60:3/6771 is trying to acquire lock: ff40d43e099380a0 (&vf->cfg_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ice_reset_vf+0x22f/0x4d0 [ice] but task is already holding lock: ff40d43ea1961210 (&pf->lag_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ice_reset_vf+0xb7/0x4d0 [ice] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (&pf->lag_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x4f8/0xb40 lock_acquire+0xd4/0x2d0 __mutex_lock+0x9b/0xbf0 ice_vc_cfg_qs_msg+0x45/0x690 [ice] ice_vc_process_vf_msg+0x4f5/0x870 [ice] __ice_clean_ctrlq+0x2b5/0x600 [ice] ice_service_task+0x2c9/0x480 [ice] process_one_work+0x1e9/0x4d0 worker_thread+0x1e1/0x3d0 kthread+0x104/0x140 ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 -> #0 (&vf->cfg_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: check_prev_add+0xe2/0xc50 validate_chain+0x558/0x800 __lock_acquire+0x4f8/0xb40 lock_acquire+0xd4/0x2d0 __mutex_lock+0x9b/0xbf0 ice_reset_vf+0x22f/0x4d0 [ice] ice_process_vflr_event+0x98/0xd0 [ice] ice_service_task+0x1cc/0x480 [ice] process_one_work+0x1e9/0x4d0 worker_thread+0x1e1/0x3d0 kthread+0x104/0x140 ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&pf->lag_mutex); lock(&vf->cfg_lock); lock(&pf->lag_mutex); lock(&vf->cfg_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 4 locks held by kworker/60:3/6771: #0: ff40d43e05428b38 ((wq_completion)ice){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x176/0x4d0 #1: ff50d06e05197e58 ((work_completion)(&pf->serv_task)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x176/0x4d0 #2: ff40d43ea1960e50 (&pf->vfs.table_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ice_process_vflr_event+0x48/0xd0 [ice] #3: ff40d43ea1961210 (&pf->lag_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ice_reset_vf+0xb7/0x4d0 [ice] stack backtrace: CPU: 60 PID: 6771 Comm: kworker/60:3 Tainted: G W O 6.8.0-rc6 #54 Hardware name: Workqueue: ice ice_service_task [ice] Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x4a/0x80 check_noncircular+0x12d/0x150 check_prev_add+0xe2/0xc50 ? save_trace+0x59/0x230 ? add_chain_cache+0x109/0x450 validate_chain+0x558/0x800 __lock_acquire+0x4f8/0xb40 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7d/0x100 lock_acquire+0xd4/0x2d0 ? ice_reset_vf+0x22f/0x4d0 [ice] ? lock_is_held_type+0xc7/0x120 __mutex_lock+0x9b/0xbf0 ? ice_reset_vf+0x22f/0x4d0 [ice] ? ice_reset_vf+0x22f/0x4d0 [ice] ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0x50 ? ice_reset_vf+0x22f/0x4d0 [ice] ice_reset_vf+0x22f/0x4d0 [ice] ? process_one_work+0x176/0x4d0 ice_process_vflr_event+0x98/0xd0 [ice] ice_service_task+0x1cc/0x480 [ice] process_one_work+0x1e9/0x4d0 worker_thread+0x1e1/0x3d0 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0x104/0x140 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 </TASK> To avoid deadlock, we must acquire the LAG mutex only after acquiring the VF configuration lock. Fix the ice_reset_vf() to acquire the LAG mutex only after we either acquire or check that the VF configuration lock is held. Fixes: 9f74a3d ("ice: Fix VF Reset paths when interface in a failed over aggregate") Signed-off-by: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Dave Ertman <david.m.ertman@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Mateusz Polchlopek <mateusz.polchlopek@intel.com> Tested-by: Przemek Kitszel <przemyslaw.kitszel@intel.com> Tested-by: Rafal Romanowski <rafal.romanowski@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240423182723.740401-5-anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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May 2, 2024
…nix_gc(). [ Upstream commit 1971d13 ] syzbot reported a lockdep splat regarding unix_gc_lock and unix_state_lock(). One is called from recvmsg() for a connected socket, and another is called from GC for TCP_LISTEN socket. So, the splat is false-positive. Let's add a dedicated lock class for the latter to suppress the splat. Note that this change is not necessary for net-next.git as the issue is only applied to the old GC impl. [0]: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.9.0-rc5-syzkaller-00007-g4d2008430ce8 #0 Not tainted ----------------------------------------------------- kworker/u8:1/11 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88807cea4e70 (&u->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] ffff88807cea4e70 (&u->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: __unix_gc+0x40e/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:302 but task is already holding lock: ffffffff8f6ab638 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] ffffffff8f6ab638 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: __unix_gc+0x117/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:261 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}: lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:133 [inline] _raw_spin_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] unix_notinflight+0x13d/0x390 net/unix/garbage.c:140 unix_detach_fds net/unix/af_unix.c:1819 [inline] unix_destruct_scm+0x221/0x350 net/unix/af_unix.c:1876 skb_release_head_state+0x100/0x250 net/core/skbuff.c:1188 skb_release_all net/core/skbuff.c:1200 [inline] __kfree_skb net/core/skbuff.c:1216 [inline] kfree_skb_reason+0x16d/0x3b0 net/core/skbuff.c:1252 kfree_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1262 [inline] manage_oob net/unix/af_unix.c:2672 [inline] unix_stream_read_generic+0x1125/0x2700 net/unix/af_unix.c:2749 unix_stream_splice_read+0x239/0x320 net/unix/af_unix.c:2981 do_splice_read fs/splice.c:985 [inline] splice_file_to_pipe+0x299/0x500 fs/splice.c:1295 do_splice+0xf2d/0x1880 fs/splice.c:1379 __do_splice fs/splice.c:1436 [inline] __do_sys_splice fs/splice.c:1652 [inline] __se_sys_splice+0x331/0x4a0 fs/splice.c:1634 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f -> #0 (&u->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline] validate_chain+0x18cb/0x58e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869 __lock_acquire+0x1346/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137 lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:133 [inline] _raw_spin_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] __unix_gc+0x40e/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:302 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3254 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xa10/0x17c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3335 worker_thread+0x86d/0xd70 kernel/workqueue.c:3416 kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:388 ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(unix_gc_lock); lock(&u->lock); lock(unix_gc_lock); lock(&u->lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by kworker/u8:1/11: #0: ffff888015089148 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline] #0: ffff888015089148 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x8e0/0x17c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3335 #1: ffffc90000107d00 (unix_gc_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3230 [inline] #1: ffffc90000107d00 (unix_gc_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x91b/0x17c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3335 #2: ffffffff8f6ab638 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] #2: ffffffff8f6ab638 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: __unix_gc+0x117/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:261 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 11 Comm: kworker/u8:1 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc5-syzkaller-00007-g4d2008430ce8 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024 Workqueue: events_unbound __unix_gc Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114 check_noncircular+0x36a/0x4a0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2187 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline] validate_chain+0x18cb/0x58e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869 __lock_acquire+0x1346/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137 lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:133 [inline] _raw_spin_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] __unix_gc+0x40e/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:302 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3254 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xa10/0x17c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3335 worker_thread+0x86d/0xd70 kernel/workqueue.c:3416 kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:388 ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 </TASK> Fixes: 47d8ac0 ("af_unix: Fix garbage collector racing against connect()") Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+fa379358c28cc87cc307@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=fa379358c28cc87cc307 Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240424170443.9832-1-kuniyu@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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…"RESET" [ Upstream commit de120e1 ] Set the enable bits for general purpose counters in IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL when refreshing the PMU to emulate the MSR's architecturally defined post-RESET behavior. Per Intel's SDM: IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL: Sets bits n-1:0 and clears the upper bits. and Where "n" is the number of general-purpose counters available in the processor. AMD also documents this behavior for PerfMonV2 CPUs in one of AMD's many PPRs. Do not set any PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL bits if there are no general purpose counters, although a literal reading of the SDM would require the CPU to set either bits 63:0 or 31:0. The intent of the behavior is to globally enable all GP counters; honor the intent, if not the letter of the law. Leaving PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL '0' effectively breaks PMU usage in guests that haven't been updated to work with PMUs that support PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL. This bug was recently exposed when KVM added supported for AMD's PerfMonV2, i.e. when KVM started exposing a vPMU with PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL to guest software that only knew how to program v1 PMUs (that don't support PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL). Failure to emulate the post-RESET behavior results in such guests unknowingly leaving all general purpose counters globally disabled (the entire reason the post-RESET value sets the GP counter enable bits is to maintain backwards compatibility). The bug has likely gone unnoticed because PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL has been supported on Intel CPUs for as long as KVM has existed, i.e. hardly anyone is running guest software that isn't aware of PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL on Intel PMUs. And because up until v6.0, KVM _did_ emulate the behavior for Intel CPUs, although the old behavior was likely dumb luck. Because (a) that old code was also broken in its own way (the history of this code is a comedy of errors), and (b) PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL was documented as having a value of '0' post-RESET in all SDMs before March 2023. Initial vPMU support in commit f5132b0 ("KVM: Expose a version 2 architectural PMU to a guests") *almost* got it right (again likely by dumb luck), but for some reason only set the bits if the guest PMU was advertised as v1: if (pmu->version == 1) { pmu->global_ctrl = (1 << pmu->nr_arch_gp_counters) - 1; return; } Commit f19a0c2 ("KVM: PMU emulation: GLOBAL_CTRL MSR should be enabled on reset") then tried to remedy that goof, presumably because guest PMUs were leaving PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL '0', i.e. weren't enabling counters. pmu->global_ctrl = ((1 << pmu->nr_arch_gp_counters) - 1) | (((1ull << pmu->nr_arch_fixed_counters) - 1) << X86_PMC_IDX_FIXED); pmu->global_ctrl_mask = ~pmu->global_ctrl; That was KVM's behavior up until commit c49467a ("KVM: x86/pmu: Don't overwrite the pmu->global_ctrl when refreshing") removed *everything*. However, it did so based on the behavior defined by the SDM , which at the time stated that "Global Perf Counter Controls" is '0' at Power-Up and RESET. But then the March 2023 SDM (325462-079US), stealthily changed its "IA-32 and Intel 64 Processor States Following Power-up, Reset, or INIT" table to say: IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL: Sets bits n-1:0 and clears the upper bits. Note, kvm_pmu_refresh() can be invoked multiple times, i.e. it's not a "pure" RESET flow. But it can only be called prior to the first KVM_RUN, i.e. the guest will only ever observe the final value. Note #2, KVM has always cleared global_ctrl during refresh (see commit f5132b0 ("KVM: Expose a version 2 architectural PMU to a guests")), i.e. there is no danger of breaking existing setups by clobbering a value set by userspace. Reported-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Cc: Sandipan Das <sandipan.das@amd.com> Cc: Like Xu <like.xu.linux@gmail.com> Cc: Mingwei Zhang <mizhang@google.com> Cc: Dapeng Mi <dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Dapeng Mi <dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com> Tested-by: Dapeng Mi <dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240309013641.1413400-2-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Some combinations of Pi 4Bs and Ethernet switches don't reliably get a DCHP-assigned IP address, leaving the unit with a self=assigned 169.254 address. In the failure case, the Pi is left able to receive packets but not send them, suggesting that the MAC<->PHY link is getting into a bad state. It has been found empirically that skipping a reset step by the genet driver prevents the failures. No downsides have been discovered yet, and unlike the forced renegotiation it doesn't increase the time to get an IP address, so the workaround is enabled by default; add genet.skip_umac_reset=n to the command line to disable it. See: #3108 Signed-off-by: Phil Elwell <phil@raspberrypi.org>
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… update [ Upstream commit 79b5b4b ] The rule activity update delayed work periodically traverses the list of configured rules and queries their activity from the device. As part of this task it accesses the entry pointed by 'ventry->entry', but this entry can be changed concurrently by the rehash delayed work, leading to a use-after-free [1]. Fix by closing the race and perform the activity query under the 'vregion->lock' mutex. [1] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_flower_rule_activity_get+0x121/0x140 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881054ed808 by task kworker/0:18/181 CPU: 0 PID: 181 Comm: kworker/0:18 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc2-custom-00781-gd5ab772d32f7 #2 Hardware name: Mellanox Technologies Ltd. MSN3700/VMOD0005, BIOS 5.11 01/06/2019 Workqueue: mlxsw_core mlxsw_sp_acl_rule_activity_update_work Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0xc6/0x120 print_report+0xce/0x670 kasan_report+0xd7/0x110 mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_flower_rule_activity_get+0x121/0x140 mlxsw_sp_acl_rule_activity_update_work+0x219/0x400 process_one_work+0x8eb/0x19b0 worker_thread+0x6c9/0xf70 kthread+0x2c9/0x3b0 ret_from_fork+0x4d/0x80 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> Allocated by task 1039: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0x8f/0xa0 __kmalloc+0x19c/0x360 mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_entry_create+0x7b/0x1f0 mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_vchunk_migrate_all+0x30d/0xb50 mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_vregion_rehash_work+0x157/0x1300 process_one_work+0x8eb/0x19b0 worker_thread+0x6c9/0xf70 kthread+0x2c9/0x3b0 ret_from_fork+0x4d/0x80 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 Freed by task 1039: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60 poison_slab_object+0x102/0x170 __kasan_slab_free+0x14/0x30 kfree+0xc1/0x290 mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_vchunk_migrate_all+0x3d7/0xb50 mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_vregion_rehash_work+0x157/0x1300 process_one_work+0x8eb/0x19b0 worker_thread+0x6c9/0xf70 kthread+0x2c9/0x3b0 ret_from_fork+0x4d/0x80 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 Fixes: 2bffc53 ("mlxsw: spectrum_acl: Don't take mutex in mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_vregion_rehash_work()") Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com> Tested-by: Alexander Zubkov <green@qrator.net> Reviewed-by: Petr Machata <petrm@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Petr Machata <petrm@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1fcce0a60b231ebeb2515d91022284ba7b4ffe7a.1713797103.git.petrm@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 96fdd1f ] 9f74a3d ("ice: Fix VF Reset paths when interface in a failed over aggregate"), the ice driver has acquired the LAG mutex in ice_reset_vf(). The commit placed this lock acquisition just prior to the acquisition of the VF configuration lock. If ice_reset_vf() acquires the configuration lock via the ICE_VF_RESET_LOCK flag, this could deadlock with ice_vc_cfg_qs_msg() because it always acquires the locks in the order of the VF configuration lock and then the LAG mutex. Lockdep reports this violation almost immediately on creating and then removing 2 VF: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.8.0-rc6 #54 Tainted: G W O ------------------------------------------------------ kworker/60:3/6771 is trying to acquire lock: ff40d43e099380a0 (&vf->cfg_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ice_reset_vf+0x22f/0x4d0 [ice] but task is already holding lock: ff40d43ea1961210 (&pf->lag_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ice_reset_vf+0xb7/0x4d0 [ice] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (&pf->lag_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x4f8/0xb40 lock_acquire+0xd4/0x2d0 __mutex_lock+0x9b/0xbf0 ice_vc_cfg_qs_msg+0x45/0x690 [ice] ice_vc_process_vf_msg+0x4f5/0x870 [ice] __ice_clean_ctrlq+0x2b5/0x600 [ice] ice_service_task+0x2c9/0x480 [ice] process_one_work+0x1e9/0x4d0 worker_thread+0x1e1/0x3d0 kthread+0x104/0x140 ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 -> #0 (&vf->cfg_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: check_prev_add+0xe2/0xc50 validate_chain+0x558/0x800 __lock_acquire+0x4f8/0xb40 lock_acquire+0xd4/0x2d0 __mutex_lock+0x9b/0xbf0 ice_reset_vf+0x22f/0x4d0 [ice] ice_process_vflr_event+0x98/0xd0 [ice] ice_service_task+0x1cc/0x480 [ice] process_one_work+0x1e9/0x4d0 worker_thread+0x1e1/0x3d0 kthread+0x104/0x140 ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&pf->lag_mutex); lock(&vf->cfg_lock); lock(&pf->lag_mutex); lock(&vf->cfg_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 4 locks held by kworker/60:3/6771: #0: ff40d43e05428b38 ((wq_completion)ice){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x176/0x4d0 #1: ff50d06e05197e58 ((work_completion)(&pf->serv_task)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x176/0x4d0 #2: ff40d43ea1960e50 (&pf->vfs.table_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ice_process_vflr_event+0x48/0xd0 [ice] #3: ff40d43ea1961210 (&pf->lag_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ice_reset_vf+0xb7/0x4d0 [ice] stack backtrace: CPU: 60 PID: 6771 Comm: kworker/60:3 Tainted: G W O 6.8.0-rc6 #54 Hardware name: Workqueue: ice ice_service_task [ice] Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x4a/0x80 check_noncircular+0x12d/0x150 check_prev_add+0xe2/0xc50 ? save_trace+0x59/0x230 ? add_chain_cache+0x109/0x450 validate_chain+0x558/0x800 __lock_acquire+0x4f8/0xb40 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7d/0x100 lock_acquire+0xd4/0x2d0 ? ice_reset_vf+0x22f/0x4d0 [ice] ? lock_is_held_type+0xc7/0x120 __mutex_lock+0x9b/0xbf0 ? ice_reset_vf+0x22f/0x4d0 [ice] ? ice_reset_vf+0x22f/0x4d0 [ice] ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0x50 ? ice_reset_vf+0x22f/0x4d0 [ice] ice_reset_vf+0x22f/0x4d0 [ice] ? process_one_work+0x176/0x4d0 ice_process_vflr_event+0x98/0xd0 [ice] ice_service_task+0x1cc/0x480 [ice] process_one_work+0x1e9/0x4d0 worker_thread+0x1e1/0x3d0 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0x104/0x140 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 </TASK> To avoid deadlock, we must acquire the LAG mutex only after acquiring the VF configuration lock. Fix the ice_reset_vf() to acquire the LAG mutex only after we either acquire or check that the VF configuration lock is held. Fixes: 9f74a3d ("ice: Fix VF Reset paths when interface in a failed over aggregate") Signed-off-by: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Dave Ertman <david.m.ertman@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Mateusz Polchlopek <mateusz.polchlopek@intel.com> Tested-by: Przemek Kitszel <przemyslaw.kitszel@intel.com> Tested-by: Rafal Romanowski <rafal.romanowski@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240423182723.740401-5-anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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…nix_gc(). [ Upstream commit 1971d13 ] syzbot reported a lockdep splat regarding unix_gc_lock and unix_state_lock(). One is called from recvmsg() for a connected socket, and another is called from GC for TCP_LISTEN socket. So, the splat is false-positive. Let's add a dedicated lock class for the latter to suppress the splat. Note that this change is not necessary for net-next.git as the issue is only applied to the old GC impl. [0]: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.9.0-rc5-syzkaller-00007-g4d2008430ce8 #0 Not tainted ----------------------------------------------------- kworker/u8:1/11 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88807cea4e70 (&u->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] ffff88807cea4e70 (&u->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: __unix_gc+0x40e/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:302 but task is already holding lock: ffffffff8f6ab638 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] ffffffff8f6ab638 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: __unix_gc+0x117/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:261 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}: lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:133 [inline] _raw_spin_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] unix_notinflight+0x13d/0x390 net/unix/garbage.c:140 unix_detach_fds net/unix/af_unix.c:1819 [inline] unix_destruct_scm+0x221/0x350 net/unix/af_unix.c:1876 skb_release_head_state+0x100/0x250 net/core/skbuff.c:1188 skb_release_all net/core/skbuff.c:1200 [inline] __kfree_skb net/core/skbuff.c:1216 [inline] kfree_skb_reason+0x16d/0x3b0 net/core/skbuff.c:1252 kfree_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1262 [inline] manage_oob net/unix/af_unix.c:2672 [inline] unix_stream_read_generic+0x1125/0x2700 net/unix/af_unix.c:2749 unix_stream_splice_read+0x239/0x320 net/unix/af_unix.c:2981 do_splice_read fs/splice.c:985 [inline] splice_file_to_pipe+0x299/0x500 fs/splice.c:1295 do_splice+0xf2d/0x1880 fs/splice.c:1379 __do_splice fs/splice.c:1436 [inline] __do_sys_splice fs/splice.c:1652 [inline] __se_sys_splice+0x331/0x4a0 fs/splice.c:1634 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f -> #0 (&u->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline] validate_chain+0x18cb/0x58e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869 __lock_acquire+0x1346/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137 lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:133 [inline] _raw_spin_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] __unix_gc+0x40e/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:302 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3254 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xa10/0x17c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3335 worker_thread+0x86d/0xd70 kernel/workqueue.c:3416 kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:388 ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(unix_gc_lock); lock(&u->lock); lock(unix_gc_lock); lock(&u->lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by kworker/u8:1/11: #0: ffff888015089148 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline] #0: ffff888015089148 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x8e0/0x17c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3335 #1: ffffc90000107d00 (unix_gc_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3230 [inline] #1: ffffc90000107d00 (unix_gc_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x91b/0x17c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3335 #2: ffffffff8f6ab638 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] #2: ffffffff8f6ab638 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: __unix_gc+0x117/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:261 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 11 Comm: kworker/u8:1 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc5-syzkaller-00007-g4d2008430ce8 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024 Workqueue: events_unbound __unix_gc Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114 check_noncircular+0x36a/0x4a0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2187 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline] validate_chain+0x18cb/0x58e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869 __lock_acquire+0x1346/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137 lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:133 [inline] _raw_spin_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] __unix_gc+0x40e/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:302 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3254 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xa10/0x17c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3335 worker_thread+0x86d/0xd70 kernel/workqueue.c:3416 kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:388 ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 </TASK> Fixes: 47d8ac0 ("af_unix: Fix garbage collector racing against connect()") Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+fa379358c28cc87cc307@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=fa379358c28cc87cc307 Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240424170443.9832-1-kuniyu@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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…"RESET" [ Upstream commit de120e1 ] Set the enable bits for general purpose counters in IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL when refreshing the PMU to emulate the MSR's architecturally defined post-RESET behavior. Per Intel's SDM: IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL: Sets bits n-1:0 and clears the upper bits. and Where "n" is the number of general-purpose counters available in the processor. AMD also documents this behavior for PerfMonV2 CPUs in one of AMD's many PPRs. Do not set any PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL bits if there are no general purpose counters, although a literal reading of the SDM would require the CPU to set either bits 63:0 or 31:0. The intent of the behavior is to globally enable all GP counters; honor the intent, if not the letter of the law. Leaving PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL '0' effectively breaks PMU usage in guests that haven't been updated to work with PMUs that support PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL. This bug was recently exposed when KVM added supported for AMD's PerfMonV2, i.e. when KVM started exposing a vPMU with PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL to guest software that only knew how to program v1 PMUs (that don't support PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL). Failure to emulate the post-RESET behavior results in such guests unknowingly leaving all general purpose counters globally disabled (the entire reason the post-RESET value sets the GP counter enable bits is to maintain backwards compatibility). The bug has likely gone unnoticed because PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL has been supported on Intel CPUs for as long as KVM has existed, i.e. hardly anyone is running guest software that isn't aware of PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL on Intel PMUs. And because up until v6.0, KVM _did_ emulate the behavior for Intel CPUs, although the old behavior was likely dumb luck. Because (a) that old code was also broken in its own way (the history of this code is a comedy of errors), and (b) PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL was documented as having a value of '0' post-RESET in all SDMs before March 2023. Initial vPMU support in commit f5132b0 ("KVM: Expose a version 2 architectural PMU to a guests") *almost* got it right (again likely by dumb luck), but for some reason only set the bits if the guest PMU was advertised as v1: if (pmu->version == 1) { pmu->global_ctrl = (1 << pmu->nr_arch_gp_counters) - 1; return; } Commit f19a0c2 ("KVM: PMU emulation: GLOBAL_CTRL MSR should be enabled on reset") then tried to remedy that goof, presumably because guest PMUs were leaving PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL '0', i.e. weren't enabling counters. pmu->global_ctrl = ((1 << pmu->nr_arch_gp_counters) - 1) | (((1ull << pmu->nr_arch_fixed_counters) - 1) << X86_PMC_IDX_FIXED); pmu->global_ctrl_mask = ~pmu->global_ctrl; That was KVM's behavior up until commit c49467a ("KVM: x86/pmu: Don't overwrite the pmu->global_ctrl when refreshing") removed *everything*. However, it did so based on the behavior defined by the SDM , which at the time stated that "Global Perf Counter Controls" is '0' at Power-Up and RESET. But then the March 2023 SDM (325462-079US), stealthily changed its "IA-32 and Intel 64 Processor States Following Power-up, Reset, or INIT" table to say: IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL: Sets bits n-1:0 and clears the upper bits. Note, kvm_pmu_refresh() can be invoked multiple times, i.e. it's not a "pure" RESET flow. But it can only be called prior to the first KVM_RUN, i.e. the guest will only ever observe the final value. Note #2, KVM has always cleared global_ctrl during refresh (see commit f5132b0 ("KVM: Expose a version 2 architectural PMU to a guests")), i.e. there is no danger of breaking existing setups by clobbering a value set by userspace. Reported-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Cc: Sandipan Das <sandipan.das@amd.com> Cc: Like Xu <like.xu.linux@gmail.com> Cc: Mingwei Zhang <mizhang@google.com> Cc: Dapeng Mi <dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Dapeng Mi <dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com> Tested-by: Dapeng Mi <dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240309013641.1413400-2-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Lockdep detects a possible deadlock as listed below. This is because it detects the IA55 interrupt controller .irq_eoi() API is called from interrupt context while configuration-specific API (e.g., .irq_enable()) could be called from process context on resume path (by calling rzg2l_gpio_irq_restore()). To avoid this, protect the call of rzg2l_gpio_irq_enable() with spin_lock_irqsave()/spin_unlock_irqrestore(). With this the same approach that is available in __setup_irq() is mimicked to pinctrl IRQ resume function. Below is the lockdep report: WARNING: inconsistent lock state 6.8.0-rc5-next-20240219-arm64-renesas-00030-gb17a289abf1f #90 Not tainted -------------------------------- inconsistent {IN-HARDIRQ-W} -> {HARDIRQ-ON-W} usage. str_rwdt_t_001./159 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE1:SE1] takes: ffff00000b001d70 (&rzg2l_irqc_data->lock){?...}-{2:2}, at: rzg2l_irqc_irq_enable+0x60/0xa4 {IN-HARDIRQ-W} state was registered at: lock_acquire+0x1e0/0x310 _raw_spin_lock+0x44/0x58 rzg2l_irqc_eoi+0x2c/0x130 irq_chip_eoi_parent+0x18/0x20 rzg2l_gpio_irqc_eoi+0xc/0x14 handle_fasteoi_irq+0x134/0x230 generic_handle_domain_irq+0x28/0x3c gic_handle_irq+0x4c/0xbc call_on_irq_stack+0x24/0x34 do_interrupt_handler+0x78/0x7c el1_interrupt+0x30/0x5c el1h_64_irq_handler+0x14/0x1c el1h_64_irq+0x64/0x68 _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x34/0x70 __setup_irq+0x4d4/0x6b8 request_threaded_irq+0xe8/0x1a0 request_any_context_irq+0x60/0xb8 devm_request_any_context_irq+0x74/0x104 gpio_keys_probe+0x374/0xb08 platform_probe+0x64/0xcc really_probe+0x140/0x2ac __driver_probe_device+0x74/0x124 driver_probe_device+0x3c/0x15c __driver_attach+0xec/0x1c4 bus_for_each_dev+0x70/0xcc driver_attach+0x20/0x28 bus_add_driver+0xdc/0x1d0 driver_register+0x5c/0x118 __platform_driver_register+0x24/0x2c gpio_keys_init+0x18/0x20 do_one_initcall+0x70/0x290 kernel_init_freeable+0x294/0x504 kernel_init+0x20/0x1cc ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 irq event stamp: 69071 hardirqs last enabled at (69071): [<ffff800080e0dafc>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x6c/0x70 hardirqs last disabled at (69070): [<ffff800080e0cfec>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x7c/0x80 softirqs last enabled at (67654): [<ffff800080010614>] __do_softirq+0x494/0x4dc softirqs last disabled at (67645): [<ffff800080015238>] ____do_softirq+0xc/0x14 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&rzg2l_irqc_data->lock); <Interrupt> lock(&rzg2l_irqc_data->lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 4 locks held by str_rwdt_t_001./159: #0: ffff00000b10f3f0 (sb_writers#4){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: vfs_write+0x1a4/0x35c #1: ffff00000e43ba88 (&of->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0xe8/0x1a8 #2: ffff00000aa21dc8 (kn->active#40){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0xf0/0x1a8 #3: ffff80008179d970 (system_transition_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: pm_suspend+0x9c/0x278 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 159 Comm: str_rwdt_t_001. Not tainted 6.8.0-rc5-next-20240219-arm64-renesas-00030-gb17a289abf1f #90 Hardware name: Renesas SMARC EVK version 2 based on r9a08g045s33 (DT) Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x94/0xe8 show_stack+0x14/0x1c dump_stack_lvl+0x88/0xc4 dump_stack+0x14/0x1c print_usage_bug.part.0+0x294/0x348 mark_lock+0x6b0/0x948 __lock_acquire+0x750/0x20b0 lock_acquire+0x1e0/0x310 _raw_spin_lock+0x44/0x58 rzg2l_irqc_irq_enable+0x60/0xa4 irq_chip_enable_parent+0x1c/0x34 rzg2l_gpio_irq_enable+0xc4/0xd8 rzg2l_pinctrl_resume_noirq+0x4cc/0x520 pm_generic_resume_noirq+0x28/0x3c genpd_finish_resume+0xc0/0xdc genpd_resume_noirq+0x14/0x1c dpm_run_callback+0x34/0x90 device_resume_noirq+0xa8/0x268 dpm_noirq_resume_devices+0x13c/0x160 dpm_resume_noirq+0xc/0x1c suspend_devices_and_enter+0x2c8/0x570 pm_suspend+0x1ac/0x278 state_store+0x88/0x124 kobj_attr_store+0x14/0x24 sysfs_kf_write+0x48/0x6c kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x118/0x1a8 vfs_write+0x270/0x35c ksys_write+0x64/0xec __arm64_sys_write+0x18/0x20 invoke_syscall+0x44/0x108 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xb4/0xd4 do_el0_svc+0x18/0x20 el0_svc+0x3c/0xb8 el0t_64_sync_handler+0xb8/0xbc el0t_64_sync+0x14c/0x150 Fixes: 254203f ("pinctrl: renesas: rzg2l: Add suspend/resume support") Signed-off-by: Claudiu Beznea <claudiu.beznea.uj@bp.renesas.com> Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240320104230.446400-2-claudiu.beznea.uj@bp.renesas.com Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
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…active The default nna (node_nr_active) is used when the pool isn't tied to a specific NUMA node. This can happen in the following cases: 1. On NUMA, if per-node pwq init failure and the fallback pwq is used. 2. On NUMA, if a pool is configured to span multiple nodes. 3. On single node setups. 5797b1c ("workqueue: Implement system-wide nr_active enforcement for unbound workqueues") set the default nna->max to min_active because only #1 was being considered. For #2 and #3, using min_active means that the max concurrency in normal operation is pushed down to min_active which is currently 8, which can obviously lead to performance issues. exact value nna->max is set to doesn't really matter. #2 can only happen if the workqueue is intentionally configured to ignore NUMA boundaries and there's no good way to distribute max_active in this case. #3 is the default behavior on single node machines. Let's set it the default nna->max to max_active. This fixes the artificially lowered concurrency problem on single node machines and shouldn't hurt anything for other cases. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Reported-by: Shinichiro Kawasaki <shinichiro.kawasaki@wdc.com> Fixes: 5797b1c ("workqueue: Implement system-wide nr_active enforcement for unbound workqueues") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/dm-devel/20240410084531.2134621-1-shinichiro.kawasaki@wdc.com/ Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
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One of my CI runs popped the following lockdep splat ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.9.0-rc4+ #1 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ btrfs/471533 is trying to acquire lock: ffff92ba46980850 (&fs_info->cleaner_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_quota_disable+0x54/0x4c0 but task is already holding lock: ffff92ba46980bd0 (&fs_info->subvol_sem){++++}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_ioctl+0x1c8f/0x2600 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (&fs_info->subvol_sem){++++}-{3:3}: down_read+0x42/0x170 btrfs_rename+0x607/0xb00 btrfs_rename2+0x2e/0x70 vfs_rename+0xaf8/0xfc0 do_renameat2+0x586/0x600 __x64_sys_rename+0x43/0x50 do_syscall_64+0x95/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #1 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#16){++++}-{3:3}: down_write+0x3f/0xc0 btrfs_inode_lock+0x40/0x70 prealloc_file_extent_cluster+0x1b0/0x370 relocate_file_extent_cluster+0xb2/0x720 relocate_data_extent+0x107/0x160 relocate_block_group+0x442/0x550 btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x2cb/0x4b0 btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x50/0x1b0 btrfs_balance+0x92f/0x13d0 btrfs_ioctl+0x1abf/0x2600 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x97/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x95/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #0 (&fs_info->cleaner_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x13e7/0x2180 lock_acquire+0xcb/0x2e0 __mutex_lock+0xbe/0xc00 btrfs_quota_disable+0x54/0x4c0 btrfs_ioctl+0x206b/0x2600 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x97/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x95/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &fs_info->cleaner_mutex --> &sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#16 --> &fs_info->subvol_sem Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&fs_info->subvol_sem); lock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#16); lock(&fs_info->subvol_sem); lock(&fs_info->cleaner_mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** 2 locks held by btrfs/471533: #0: ffff92ba4319e420 (sb_writers#14){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: btrfs_ioctl+0x3b5/0x2600 #1: ffff92ba46980bd0 (&fs_info->subvol_sem){++++}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_ioctl+0x1c8f/0x2600 stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 471533 Comm: btrfs Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.9.0-rc4+ #1 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x77/0xb0 check_noncircular+0x148/0x160 ? lock_acquire+0xcb/0x2e0 __lock_acquire+0x13e7/0x2180 lock_acquire+0xcb/0x2e0 ? btrfs_quota_disable+0x54/0x4c0 ? lock_is_held_type+0x9a/0x110 __mutex_lock+0xbe/0xc00 ? btrfs_quota_disable+0x54/0x4c0 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? lock_acquire+0xcb/0x2e0 ? btrfs_quota_disable+0x54/0x4c0 ? btrfs_quota_disable+0x54/0x4c0 btrfs_quota_disable+0x54/0x4c0 btrfs_ioctl+0x206b/0x2600 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? __do_sys_statfs+0x61/0x70 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x97/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x95/0x180 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? reacquire_held_locks+0xd1/0x1f0 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x307/0x8a0 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? lock_acquire+0xcb/0x2e0 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? lock_release+0xca/0x2a0 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? do_user_addr_fault+0x35c/0x8a0 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? trace_hardirqs_off+0x4b/0xc0 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xde/0x190 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f This happens because when we call rename we already have the inode mutex held, and then we acquire the subvol_sem if we are a subvolume. This makes the dependency inode lock -> subvol sem When we're running data relocation we will preallocate space for the data relocation inode, and we always run the relocation under the ->cleaner_mutex. This now creates the dependency of cleaner_mutex -> inode lock (from the prealloc) -> subvol_sem Qgroup delete is doing this in the opposite order, it is acquiring the subvol_sem and then it is acquiring the cleaner_mutex, which results in this lockdep splat. This deadlock can't happen in reality, because we won't ever rename the data reloc inode, nor is the data reloc inode a subvolume. However this is fairly easy to fix, simply take the cleaner mutex in the case where we are disabling qgroups before we take the subvol_sem. This resolves the lockdep splat. Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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Merge series from Jerome Brunet <jbrunet@baylibre.com>: This patchset fixes 2 problems on TDM which both find a solution by properly implementing the .trigger() callback for the TDM backend. ATM, enabling the TDM formatters is done by the .prepare() callback because handling the formatter is slow due to necessary calls to CCF. The first problem affects the TDMIN. Because .prepare() is called on DPCM backend first, the formatter are started before the FIFOs and this may cause a random channel shifts if the TDMIN use multiple lanes with more than 2 slots per lanes. Using trigger() allows to set the FE/BE order, solving the problem. There has already been an attempt to fix this 3y ago [1] and reverted [2] It triggered a 'sleep in irq' error on the period IRQ. The solution is to just use the bottom half of threaded IRQ. This is patch #1. Patch #2 and #3 remain mostly the same as 3y ago. For TDMOUT, the problem is on pause. ATM pause only stops the FIFO and the TDMOUT just starves. When it does, it will actually repeat the last sample continuously. Depending on the platform, if there is no high-pass filter on the analog path, this may translate to a constant position of the speaker membrane. There is no audible glitch but it may damage the speaker coil. Properly stopping the TDMOUT in pause solves the problem. There is behaviour change associated with that fix. Clocks used to be continuous on pause because of the problem above. They will now be gated on pause by default, as they should. The last change introduce the proper support for continuous clocks, if needed. [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-amlogic/20211020114217.133153-1-jbrunet@baylibre.com [2]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-amlogic/20220421155725.2589089-1-narmstrong@baylibre.com
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…kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD KVM/arm64 fixes for 6.9, part #2 - Fix + test for a NULL dereference resulting from unsanitised user input in the vgic-v2 device attribute accessors
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Some combinations of Pi 4Bs and Ethernet switches don't reliably get a DCHP-assigned IP address, leaving the unit with a self=assigned 169.254 address. In the failure case, the Pi is left able to receive packets but not send them, suggesting that the MAC<->PHY link is getting into a bad state. It has been found empirically that skipping a reset step by the genet driver prevents the failures. No downsides have been discovered yet, and unlike the forced renegotiation it doesn't increase the time to get an IP address, so the workaround is enabled by default; add genet.skip_umac_reset=n to the command line to disable it. See: #3108 Signed-off-by: Phil Elwell <phil@raspberrypi.org>
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http://blog.zx2c4.com/749
your fs/proc/base.c is vulnerable too
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