

Cryptographic Basics

Cryptographic Hash Functions and Merkle Trees

Alice and Bob want to play rock-paper-scissors over a peer-to-peer connection. To prevent cheating, they want to use their knowledge of cryptography to devise a commitment scheme based on hashing. To start out, they consider possible hash functions.

| 1. | At one point, Bob proposes the following function: | |
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| | h(x) = x + 17 | |
| | Explain why this function is not a hash function. | |
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| 2. | Next, they fix Bob's mistake and consider the following simple hash function: | |
| | $g(x) = (x+17) \bmod 1024$ | |
| | Still, they deem it unsuitable. Recall the key properties of cryptographic hash functions from lecture. Name the property this function violates and briefly explain why. | n th |
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| | Given some time, Alice and Bob come up with some arbitrary cryptographic hash function h an following scheme. One round looks like this: | d th |
| | (a) Both secretly choose one option: rock, paper, or scissors. | |
| | (b) Both compute the hash $h_i = h(choice_i)$ and send it to each other. | |
| | (c) When they reveal their choice to the other, the other can verify that the commitment was a before the reveal by hashing the revealed choice and comparing to the previously received hashing the revealed choice and comparing to the previously received hashing the revealed choice and comparing to the previously received hashing the revealed choice and comparing to the previously received hashing the revealed choice and comparing to the previously received hashing the revealed choice and comparing to the previously received hashing the revealed choice and comparing to the previously received hashing the revealed choice and comparing to the previously received hashing the revealed choice and comparing to the previously received hashing the revealed choice and comparing to the previously received hashing the revealed choice and comparing to the previously received hashing the revealed choice and comparing to the previously received hashing the revealed choice and comparing the revealed choice and choice are considered to the revealed choice and choice are choice are choice and choice are choice and choice are choice are choice are choice are choice and choice are ch | |
| 3. | Where is the flaw in this scheme? | |
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| 4. | Propose a way to fix this scheme. |
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| | Since Alice and Bob are busy students, they decide to save time and expand their scheme to support playing multiple games per round of their scheme. Naively sending n commitments at once leads to a linear increase in required hashes and thus an increase in network traffic. Well versed in cryptography they want to decrease the required network traffic by using Merkle trees. |
| 5. | Given the use of Merkle trees, what is the minimum number of hashes Alice has to send to Bob to commit to rock, paper, scissors for a round consisting of 16 games. |
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| 6. | Alice and Bob agree to play a round consisting of 3 games. Draw the Merkle tree over Alice's thre hashes $h(c_1) = 1, h(c_2) = 3, and h(c_3) = 7$. For this construction assume: |
| | $h(x) = x \bmod 8$ |
| | and use addition to combine hashes (instead of concatenation). |
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Search Puzzle

We want to design a search puzzle using the puzzle ID "BBSE_E01" and the SHA_256 hash function. Assume that the target difficulty $d=2^{240}$ (i.e., the accepted solution space is defined in $[0,2^{240}-1]$).

| Hint: Think a | oout Bernoul | li Trials an | d Geomet | ric Distril | oution. | | | | |
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| 4. Suggest possible ways for the losing computers to change their own strategy in order to i chances of winning. 5. In this part, assume that the computers did not change their strategies. How can the puzzl so participants can win according to their hash power? | per second) e: increment |
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| 5. In this part, assume that the computers did not change their strategies. How can the puzzl | |
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Quantum Resistance

Shor's algorithm and extensions to it will break some cryptographic mechanisms that are important to a blockchain's operation as soon as quantum computing hardware advances.

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