#### Procuring innovation: evidence from the SBIR program

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October 20, 2025

# From Dept. of Defense to private houses



#### Research Questions

1. Does demand from the public sector **direct innovation**?

2. How does public procurement - on top of R&D grants - affect firms?

#### This paper

- Focus on the SBIR program, at the DoD
  - R&D grants (SBIR) are directed by the DoD according to their needs
  - On top of R&D grants, the DoD can buy the product
- Compare grant recipients to procurement winners
  - No difference in patenting (both number and quality)
  - Procurement winners get \$1M more per year in non-SBIR DoD contracts

#### Contribution to the Literature

- 1. Research grants (and SBIR) on innovation:
  - Sabrina T. Howell (2017), Myers and Lanahan (2022), S. Howell et al. (2021), and Bhattacharya (2021)
  - Procurement contracts do not increase patenting activity
- 2. Public procurement and firm performance
  - Belenzon and Cioaca (2022), Hvide and Meling (2022), Cappelletti and Giuffrida (2021), Sabrina T Howell and Brown (2022), and Lanahan, Joshi, and Johnson (2021)
  - Focus on military procurement: firms strengthen their ties to the public sector

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#### Data sources


- SBIR on government research grants:
  - title
  - abstract
  - awarded firm
  - agency (i.e. DoD) and branch (i.e. Army)
  - year
  - phase (I or II)
  - money awarded
  - type of grant (SBIR or STTR, competitive...)
- USAspending.gov on government contracts:
  - All SBIR contracts awarded by the DoD
  - SBIR-related procurement
  - Follow-on procurement contracts (non-SBIR related)
- PATSTAT on patents:
  - number and quality (i.e. forward citations) of patents
- ▶ Data Cleaning

#### SBIR-STTR and the DoD



- Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) and Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) programs
- Department of Defense (DoD) is the largest agency in the program, with subbranches (e.g. Army, Navy, Air Force)
- In the DoD the program is divided in three phases. The first two are grants, the third is a procurement contract

### Department of Defense, number of contracts




### Comparing SBIR and Phase III winners


$$\mathsf{y}_{i,t} = \sum_{\tau=-5}^{5} \beta_{\tau} \mathsf{YearsSinceProcurement}_{i,t+\tau} + \gamma_{i} + \delta_{t} + \epsilon_{i,t}$$

- y<sub>i,t</sub>: patents/contracts granted to firm i in year t
- YearsSinceProcurement<sub>i,t</sub>: years since the first Phase III contract
- $\gamma_i$ : firm fixed effects
- $\delta_t$ : year fixed effects


### Landing a Phase III contract does not increase patenting




## Landing a Phase III contract does not increase patent quality




## Phase III leads to more procurement contracts




## Phase III leads to more money in procurement contracts



### Competed contracts increase slightly



### Non-competed contracts increase more



#### Results and next steps

- 1. Does demand from the public sector direct innovation?
  - No difference in patenting activity between SBIR and Phase III winners
- 2. How does public procurement on top of R&D grants affect firms?
  - Phase III winners are more likely to get further non-SBIR DoD contracts
  - Most of the increase is driven by non-competed contracts

#### 3. Next steps:

- Add other dimensions of firm performance, such as M&A activity
- · Explore new identification strategies

#### Thank you for your attention!

Any questions?

#### References

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- Bhattacharya, Vivek (2021). "An empirical model of R&D procurement contests: An analysis of the DOD SBIR program". In: *Econometrica* 89.5. Publisher: Wiley Online Library, pp. 2189–2224.
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### Dataset from SBIR, post 2000

- Unique contracts: 66609 (45232 Phase I and 23441 Phase II)
- Plus, 17 contracts with no identifier. Those will be discarded
- Unique firms: 9298, identified by Duns
- 2747 contracts (4.12%) in which the Duns identifier is 0
- 4658 firms (52.27%) only one Phase I contract
- 2925 firms (52.84%) only one Phase II contract



### Dataset from USA Spending

- Unique contracts: 66340 (40206 Ph. I, 22401 Ph. II and 4219 Ph. III)
- Unique firms: 9819 (Duns) and 10555 (UEI)
- 4374 firms (55.13%) only one Phase I contract
- 2738 firms (53.67%) only one Phase II contract
- 1367 firms (70.98%) only one Phase III contract

→ Back to data section

### Dataset from USA Spending, without missing Duns

- Unique contracts: 60773 (36794 Ph. I, 20709 Ph. II and 3742 Ph. III)
- Unique firms: 9818 (Duns) and 9818 (UEI)
- 4398 firms (54.84%) only one Phase I contract
- 2782 firms (53.51%) only one Phase II contract
- 1390 firms (70.49%) only one Phase III contract


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### Merged dataset: SBIR and USA Spending


- Unique contracts: 48266 (31791 Ph. I and 16885 Ph. II)
- Unique firms: 7271 (Duns)
- 3607 firms (53.53%) only one Phase I contract
- 2283 firms (52.41%) only one Phase II contract

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
## Department of the Army, contracts




## Department of the Navy, contracts




#### Department of the Air Force, contracts




### Probability of getting to Phase II decreases over time




### Probability of getting to Phase III increases over time




## Navy lands more procurement contracts




### Ship-related products more likely to get procured




### Cumulative patenting




#### Cumulative patent quality




#### Non-SBIR contracts indicator




#### Competed non-SBIR contracts indicator




#### Non-competed non-SBIR contracts indicator




#### Phase I grants




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
# Phase II grants




#### Phase II grants indicator




#### **Patents**




### Citation-weighted patents




#### Non-Sbir contracts



#### Non-Sbir contracts value



#### Competed contracts



#### Non-competed contracts

