



Tools for Proofs

Tools and Methodologies for Formal Specifications and Proofs

TLA+

Formal specification language for hardware and software

The Logic

- First-order logic and set theory.
- A small amount of temporal logic.
- The set of states is described by a formula.
- The set of transitions is described by another formula.
- Specifications can be incrementally refined to low-level designs.
- Can be used both for high and low level specifications and to prove the link between them.

An example

- **Init** specifies possible initial values of state variables **hr** and **min**.
- **Hr** and **Min** specify transitions for state variables in terms of their values in the current and next state.
- **Next** is a composite transition for both variables.
- **Clock** is a temporal specification of a clock that starts in the state specified by **Init** and whose state-changing transitions are specified by **Next**.

```

Init  ≡ hr ∈ {0, ..., 23} ∧ min ∈ {0, ..., 59}
Hr   ≡ hr' = hr ∧ min' = min + 1
Min  ≡ hr' = hr + 1 ∧ min' = 0
Next ≡ min(59 ∧ Hr
          ∨ min = 59 ∧ Min
Clock ≡ Clockini ∧ [Clocknext]_{(hr,min)}

```

The proof language

A human-readable proof language for TLA+ specifications

Hierarchical proofs

- Explicit hierarchical structure using level numbering.
- High-level proofs => human readable.
- The current context and assertion are declaratively specified in the structure of the proof.
- A sequence of proof steps ends with a **QED** step that proves the current assertion using earlier steps.
- Obvious low level sub-proofs are marked **OBVIOUS**.
- Explicit uses of facts and definitions are marked with **BY**.

```

Range(f) ≡ {f[x] : x ∈ DOMAIN f}
Surj(f, S) ≡ Range(f) ⊆ S
THEOREM Cantor ≡ ∀S : ¬ ∃f ∈ [S → SUBSET S] : Surj(f, SUBSET S)
(1).1. ASSUME: NEW S.
            ∃f ∈ [S → SUBSET S] : Surj(f, SUBSET S)
PROVE FALSE
(2).2. PICK f ∈ [S → SUBSET S] : Surj(f, SUBSET S)
            OBVIOUS
(2).2.1. Surj(f, SUBSET S)
            (3).1. DEFINE D ≡ x ∈ S : x ∉ f[x]
            (3).2. D ∈ SUBSET S
            OBVIOUS
(3).3. D ∉ Range f
            BY DEF Range
(3).4. QED BY (3).2, (3).3 DEF Surj
(2).3. QED BY (2).2
(1).2. QED BY (1).1

```


How it works

Graphical User Interface (ToolBox)

An eclipse-based GUI which gives access to the TLA+ tools.

Syntax Analyzer (SANY)

- Parser and syntax checker for TLA+ specifications.
- Implemented in Java.
- Has been extended to handle the TLA+ proof language.



Proof Manager (tlpm)

- Keystone of the proof system.
- Implemented in OCaml.
- Links the ToolBox with backend provers and ensures confidence of the whole proving process.
- Converts TLA+ proofs into equivalent proof obligations.
- Obligations are generated for **OBVIOUS** and **BY** declarations (leaf proofs).
- Each obligation represents a low level detail needed to complete the high level proof.
- To control the search space, most definitions and facts are hidden by default and made usable explicitly with **BY** (or a **USE** declaration). Hidden facts and definitions are removed from obligations by the Proof Manager.
- Obligations are sent to backend theorem provers to prove and, possibly, a verifier to check the proof generated by the backend prover to provide complete machine-checking of TLA+ proofs.

Model Checker (TLC)

- Brute-force model checker.
- Checks invariants.
- Exhaustive checking of small enough models.
- Random testing for larger models.
- Trace output gives precise error explanations.

Backend Provers (Zenon, Isabelle/TLA+, VeriT...)

- #### Zenon
- Tableaux prover for classical first-order logic with equality.
 - Generates proofs checkable by Isabelle/TLA+.
 - Highly tuned to the TLA+ logic .
- (set theory, functions and function spaces, TLA+ specific constructs)

Isabelle/TLA+

- Formal faithful axiomatization of TLA+
- Can be used as a prover via Isabelle's automatic tactics.

SMT-solvers

- VeriT, cvc, z3...
- For specific domains like arithmetic.

Machine-checked !

- Peterson algorithm (7 proof-steps - 127 proof obligations)
- Atomic Bakery algorithm (230 ps - 506 ps)
- Byzantine Paxos algorithm (1791 ps - 3956 ps)
- Memoir system (by J. Douceur (MSR) and al.) (5816 proof-steps)

People & References

Damien Doligez, INRIA
Leslie Lamport, MSR
Stephan Merz, INRIA
with Georges Gonthier, MSR

Kaustuv Chaudhuri, INRIA
Denis Cousineau, INRIA
Daniel Ricketts, INRIA
Jean-Baptiste Tristan, INRIA
Hernán Vanzetto, INRIA
Simon Zambrowski, MSR

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- A TLA+ Proof System. KC, DD, LL, SM. KEEPPA 2008.
- Specifying systems. Leslie Lamport. Addison-Wesley 2003

Download



<http://www.tlaplus.net>

Get the ToolBox !

<http://www.msr-inria.inria.fr/~doligez/tlaps>