ETSI TS 135 206 V8.0.0 (2009-02)


Technical Specification

Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS);

LTE;

3G Security;

Specification of the MILENAGE algorithm set: An example algorithm set for the 3GPP authentication and key generation functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5*; Document 2: Algorithm specification (3GPP TS 35.206 version 8.0.0 Release 8)



Reference RTS/TSGS-0335206v800 Keywords LTE, SECURITY, UMTS

ETSI

650 Route des Lucioles F-06921 Sophia Antipolis Cedex - FRANCE

Tel.: +33 4 92 94 42 00 Fax: +33 4 93 65 47 16

Siret N° 348 623 562 00017 - NAF 742 C Association à but non lucratif enregistrée à la Sous-Préfecture de Grasse (06) N° 7803/88

Important notice

Individual copies of the present document can be downloaded from: http://www.etsi.org

The present document may be made available in more than one electronic version or in print. In any case of existing or perceived difference in contents between such versions, the reference version is the Portable Document Format (PDF). In case of dispute, the reference shall be the printing on ETSI printers of the PDF version kept on a specific network drive within ETSI Secretariat.

Users of the present document should be aware that the document may be subject to revision or change of status.

Information on the current status of this and other ETSI documents is available at

http://portal.etsi.org/tb/status/status.asp

Copyright Notification

No part may be reproduced except as authorized by written permission. The copyright and the foregoing restriction extend to reproduction in all media.

© European Telecommunications Standards Institute 2009. All rights reserved.

DECTTM, **PLUGTESTS**TM, **UMTS**TM, **TIPHON**TM, the TIPHON logo and the ETSI logo are Trade Marks of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members.

3GPP[™] is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members and of the 3GPP Organizational Partners. **LTE**[™] is a Trade Mark of ETSI currently being registered

for the benefit of its Members and of the 3GPP Organizational Partners.

 $\textbf{GSM} \\ \textbf{@} \text{ and the GSM logo are Trade Marks registered and owned by the GSM Association}.$

Intellectual Property Rights

IPRs essential or potentially essential to the present document may have been declared to ETSI. The information pertaining to these essential IPRs, if any, is publicly available for **ETSI members and non-members**, and can be found in ETSI SR 000 314: "Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs); Essential, or potentially Essential, IPRs notified to ETSI in respect of ETSI standards", which is available from the ETSI Secretariat. Latest updates are available on the ETSI Web server (http://webapp.etsi.org/IPR/home.asp).

Pursuant to the ETSI IPR Policy, no investigation, including IPR searches, has been carried out by ETSI. No guarantee can be given as to the existence of other IPRs not referenced in ETSI SR 000 314 (or the updates on the ETSI Web server) which are, or may be, or may become, essential to the present document.

Foreword

This Technical Specification (TS) has been produced by ETSI 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP).

The present document may refer to technical specifications or reports using their 3GPP identities, UMTS identities or GSM identities. These should be interpreted as being references to the corresponding ETSI deliverables.

The cross reference between GSM, UMTS, 3GPP and ETSI identities can be found under http://webapp.etsi.org/key/queryform.asp.

Contents

Intell	ectual Property Rights	2
Forev	vord	2
Forev	ord	
	uction	
	The name "MILENAGE"	
0		
1 1.1	Outline of the document	
2 2.1	INTRODUCTORY INFORMATION	
2.2	Notation	
2.2.1	Radix	
2.2.2	Conventions	
2.2.3	Bit/Byte ordering	
2.2.4	List of Symbols.	
2.3 2.4	List of Variables	
3		
	The algorithm framework and the specific example algorithms	
4 4.1	Definition of the example algorithms	
4.1	Specific Example Algorithms	
5	Implementation considerations	
5.1	OP _C computed on or off the USIM?	
5.2 5.3	Customising the choice of block cipher	
5.4	Resistance to side channel attacks	
Anne		
Anne	x 2: Specification of the Block Cipher Algorithm Rijndael	13
A2.1	Introduction	13
A2.2	The State and External Interfaces of Rijndael	13
A2.3	Internal Structure	14
A2.4	The Byte Substitution Transformation	14
A2.5	The Shift Row Transformation	15
A2.6	The Mix Column Transformation	15
A2.7	The Round Key addition	16
A2.8	Key schedule	16
A2.9	The Rijndael S-box	17
Anne	x 3: Simulation Program Listing - Byte Oriented	18
Anne		
Anne Histor	· ·	31 32
H1Sto	\mathbf{V}	3 0

Foreword

This Technical Specification (TS) has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP).

The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows:

Version x.y.z

where:

- x the first digit:
 - 1 presented to TSG for information;
 - 2 presented to TSG for approval;
 - 3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control.
- y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc.
- z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document.

Introduction

This document has been prepared by the 3GPP Task Force, and contains an example set of algorithms which may be used as the authentication and key generation functions f1, $f1^*$, f2, f3, f4, f5 and $f5^*$. (It is not mandatory that the particular algorithms specified in this document are used — all seven functions are operator-specifiable rather than being fully standardised). This document is one five, which between them form the entire specification of the example algorithms, entitled:

- 3GPP TS 35.205: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G Security; Specification of the MILENAGE Algorithm Set: An example algorithm set for the 3GPP authentication and key generation functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5*; Document 1: General".
- 3GPP TS 35.206: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G Security; Specification of the MILENAGE Algorithm Set: An example algorithm set for the 3GPP authentication and key generation functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5*; **Document 2: Algorithm Specification**".
- 3GPP TS 35.207: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G Security; Specification of the MILENAGE Algorithm Set: An example algorithm set for the 3GPP authentication and key generation functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5*; Document 3: Implementors' Test Data".
- 3GPP TS 35.208: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G Security; Specification of the MILENAGE Algorithm Set: An example algorithm set for the 3GPP authentication and key generation functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5*; Document 4: Design Conformance Test Data".
- 3GPP TR 35.909: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G Security; Specification of the MILENAGE Algorithm Set: An example algorithm set for the 3GPP authentication and key generation functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5*; Document 5: Summary and results of design and evaluation".

0 The name "MILENAGE"

The name of this algorithm set is "MILENAGE". It should be pronounced like a French word — something like "**mi-le-nahj**".

1 Outline of the document

Section 2 introduces the algorithms and describes the notation used in the subsequent sections.

Section 3 explains how the algorithms are designed as a framework in such a way that various "customising components" can be selected in order to customise the algorithm for a particular operator.

Section 4 defines the example algorithms. The algorithm framework is defined in section 4.1; in section 4.2, specific instances of the components are selected to define the specific example algorithm set.

Section 5 explains various options and considerations for implementation of the algorithms, including considerations to be borne in mind when modifying the customising components.

Illustrative pictures are given in Annex 1. Annex 2 gives a specification of the block cipher algorithm which is used as a cryptographic kernel in the definition of the example algorithms. Annexes 3 and 4 contain source code in the C programming language: Annex 3 gives a complete and straightforward implementation of the algorithm set, while Annex 4 gives an example of an alternative high-performance implementation just of the kernel function.

1.1 References

The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.

- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*.
- [1] 3GPP TS 33.102 v3.5.0: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G Security; Security Architecture".
- [2] 3GPP TS 33.105 v3.4.0: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G Security; Cryptographic Algorithm Requirements".
- [3] 3GPP TS 35.206: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G Security; Specification of the MILENAGE Algorithm Set: An example algorithm set for the 3GPP authentication and key generation functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5*; Document 2: Algorithm Specification" (this document).
- [4] 3GPP TS 35.207: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G Security; Specification of the MILENAGE Algorithm Set: An example algorithm set for the 3GPP authentication and key generation functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5*; Document 3: Implementors' Test Data".
- [5] 3GPP TS 35.208: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G Security; Specification of the MILENAGE Algorithm Set: An example algorithm set for the 3GPP authentication and key generation functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5*; Document 4: Design Conformance Test Data".

[6]	Joan Daemen and Vincent Rijmen: "AES Proposal: Rijndael", available at http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/aes/round2/AESAlgs/Rijndael/Rijndael.pdf or http://www.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/~rijmen/rijndael/rijndaeldocV2.zip
[7]	http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/aes/
[8]	Thomas S. Messerges, "Securing the AES finalists against Power Analysis Attacks", in FSE 2000, Seventh Fast Software Encryption Workshop, ed. Schneier, Springer Verlag, 2000.
[9]	P. C. Kocher, "Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems", in CRYPTO'96, Lecture Notes in Computer Science #1109, Springer Verlag, 1996.
[10]	J. Kelsey, B. Schneier, D. Wagner, C. Hall, "Side Channel Cryptanalysis of Product Ciphers", in ESORICS'98, Lecture Notes in Computer Science #1485, Springer Verlag, 1998.
[11]	L. Goubin, J. Patarin, "DES and differential power analysis", in CHES'99, Lecture Notes in Computer Science #1717, Springer Verlag, 1999.
[12]	P. Kocher, J. Jaffe, B. Jun, "Differential Power Analysis", in CRYPTO'99, Lecture Notes in Computer Science #1666, Springer Verlag, 1999.
[13]	L. Goubin, JS. Coron, "On boolean and arithmetic masking against differential power analysis", in CHES'00, Lecture Notes in Computer Science series, Springer Verlag (to appear).

2 INTRODUCTORY INFORMATION

2.1 Introduction

Within the security architecture of the 3GPP system there are seven security functions $f1, f1^*, f2, f3, f4, f5$ and $f5^*$. The operation of these functions falls within the domain of one operator, and the functions are therefore to be specified by each operator rather than being fully standardised. The algorithms specified in this document are examples that may be used by an operator who does not wish to design his own.

The inputs and outputs of all seven algorithms are defined in section 2.4.

2.2 Notation

2.2.1 Radix

We use the prefix 0x to indicate hexadecimal numbers.

2.2.2 Conventions

We use the assignment operator '=', as used in several programming languages. When we write

we mean that <variable> assumes the value that <expression> had before the assignment took place. For instance,

$$x = x + y + 3$$

means

(new value of x) becomes (old value of x) + (old value of y) + 3.

2.2.3 Bit/Byte ordering

All data variables in this specification are presented with the most significant bit (or byte) on the left hand side and the least significant bit (or byte) on the right hand side. Where a variable is broken down into a number of substrings, the

leftmost (most significant) substring is numbered 0, the next most significant is numbered 1, and so on through to the least significant.

2.2.4 List of Symbols

= The assignment operator.

The bitwise exclusive-OR operationThe concatenation of the two operands.

 $E[x]_k$ The result of applying a block cipher encryption to the input value **x** using the key **k**.

rot(x,r) The result of cyclically rotating the 128-bit value **x** by **r** bit positions towards the most significant

bit. If $\mathbf{x} = \mathbf{x}[\mathbf{0}] \parallel \mathbf{x}[\mathbf{1}] \parallel \dots \mathbf{x}[\mathbf{127}]$, and $\mathbf{y} = \mathrm{rot}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{r})$,

then $y = x[r] \| x[r+1] \| ... x[127] \| x[0] \| x[1] \| x[r-1]$. X[i] The ith bit of the variable X. $(X = X[0] \| X[1] \| X[2] \|)$.

2.3 List of Variables

AK a 48-bit anonymity key that is the output of either of the functions f5 and f5*.

AMF a 16-bit authentication management field that is an input to the functions f1 and f1*.

c1,c2,c3,c4,c5
CK
a 128-bit constants, which are XORed onto intermediate variables.
a 128-bit confidentiality key that is the output of the function *f3*.
IX
a 128-bit integrity key that is the output of the function *f4*.

IN1 a 128-bit value constructed from \mathbf{SQN} and \mathbf{AMF} and used in the computation of the functions $\mathbf{f1}$

and *f1**.

K a 128-bit subscriber key that is an input to the functions $f1, f1^*, f2, f3, f4, f5$ and $f5^*$.

MAC-A a 64-bit network authentication code that is the output of the function fI.

MAC-S a 64-bit resynchronisation authentication code that is the output of the function fI^* .

OP a 128-bit Operator Variant Algorithm Configuration Field that is a component of the functions f1,

f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5*.

 OP_C a 128-bit value derived from OP and K and used within the computation of the functions.

OUT1,OUT2,OUT3,OUT4,OUT5

128-bit computed values from which the outputs of the functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5* are

obtained.

r1,r2,r3,r4,r5 integers in the range 0-127 inclusive, which define amounts by which intermediate variables are

cyclically rotated.

RAND a 128-bit random challenge that is an input to the functions $f1, f1^*, f2, f3, f4, f5$ and $f5^*$.

RES a 64-bit signed response that is the output of the function f2.

SQN a 48-bit sequence number that is an input to either of the functions f1 and f1*. (For f1* this input

is more precisely called SQN_{MS} .)

TEMP a 128-bit value used within the computation of the functions.

2.4 Algorithm Inputs and Outputs

The inputs to the algorithms are given in tables 1 and 2, the outputs in tables 3–9 below.

Table 1: inputs to f1 and f1*

Parameter	Size (bits)	Comment	
K	128	Subscriber key K[0]K[127]	
RAND	128	Random challenge RAND[0]RAND[127]	
SQN	48	Sequence number SQN[0]SQN[47]. (For f1* this input is	
		more precisely called SQN _{Ms} .)	
AMF	16	Authentication management field AMF[0]AMF[15]	

Table 2: inputs to *f*2, *f*3, *f*4, *f*5 **and** *f*5*

Parameter	Size (bits)	Comment	
K	128	Subscriber key K[0]K[127]	
RAND	128	Random challenge RAND[0]RAND[127]	

Table 3: f1 output

Parameter	Size (bits)	Comment	
MAC-A	64	Network authentication code MAC-A[0]MAC-A[63]	

Table 4: f1* output

Parameter	Size (bits)	Comment	
MAC-S 64		Resynch authentication code MAC-S[0]MAC-S[63]	

Table 5. f2 output

Parameter	Size (bits)	Comment	
RES	64	Response RES[0]RES[63]	

Table 6. f3 output

Parameter	Size (bits)	Comment
CK	128	Confidentiality key CK[0]CK[127]

Table 7. f4 output

Parameter	Size (bits)	Comment	
IK	128	Integrity key IK[0]IK[127]	

Table 8. f5 output

Parameter	Size (bits)	Comment	
AK	48	Anonymity key AK[0]AK[47]	

Table 9. f5* output

Parameter	Size (bits)	Comment
AK	48	Resynch anonymity key AK[0]AK[47]

Note: Both f5 and f5* outputs are called AK according to reference [2]. In practice only one of them will be calculated in each instance of the authentication and key agreement procedure.

The algorithm framework and the specific example algorithms

The example algorithm set makes use of the following components:

- A block cipher encryption function, which takes a 128-bit input and a 128-bit key and returns a 128-bit output. If the input is \mathbf{x} , the key is \mathbf{k} and the output is \mathbf{y} , we write $\mathbf{y} = E[\mathbf{x}]_{\mathbf{k}}$.
- A 128-bit value **OP**. This is an Operator Variant Algorithm Configuration Field, which the Task Force was asked to include as a simple means to provide separation between the functionality of the algorithms when used by different operators. It is left to each operator to select a value for **OP**. The algorithm set is designed to be secure whether or not **OP** is publicly known; however, operators may see some advantage in keeping their value of **OP** secret. This and other aspects of the use of **OP** are discussed further in section 5.

In the specific example algorithm set, a particular block cipher is used. But the algorithms have been designed so that this component can be replaced by any operator who wishes to create his own customised algorithm set. In that sense this document defines an algorithm framework, and the example algorithm set is one that fits within the framework. This is how the algorithm set is defined in section 4: in section 4.1 the framework is defined in terms of the block cipher, and then in section 4.2 a block cipher is selected to give a fully specified algorithm set.

4 Definition of the example algorithms

4.1 Algorithm Framework

A 128-bit value $\mathbf{OP}_{\mathbf{C}}$ is derived from \mathbf{OP} and \mathbf{K} as follows:

```
\mathbf{OP_C} = \mathbf{OP} \oplus \mathbf{E[OP]_K}.
```

An intermediate 128-bit value **TEMP** is computed as follows:

```
TEMP = E[RAND ⊕ OP<sub>C</sub>]<sub>K</sub>.
A 128-bit value IN1 is constructed as follows: IN1[0] .. IN1[47] = SQN[0] .. SQN[47] IN1[48] .. IN1[63] = AMF[0] .. AMF[15] IN1[64] .. IN1[111] = SQN[0] .. SQN[47] IN1[112] .. IN1[127] = AMF[0] .. AMF[15]
```

Five 128-bit constants c1, c2, c3, c4, c5 are defined as follows:

```
c1[i] = 0 for 0 \le i \le 127

c2[i] = 0 for 0 \le i \le 127, except that c2[127] = 1

c3[i] = 0 for 0 \le i \le 127, except that c3[126] = 1

c4[i] = 0 for 0 \le i \le 127, except that c4[125] = 1

c5[i] = 0 for 0 \le i \le 127, except that c5[124] = 1

Five integers c1, c2, c3, c4, c5 are defined as follows:

c4, c4, c5, c5, c7, c7
```

Five 128-bit blocks **OUT1**, **OUT2**, **OUT3**, **OUT4**, **OUT5** are computed as follows:

```
\begin{aligned} \mathbf{OUT1} &= \mathrm{E}[\mathbf{TEMP} \oplus \mathrm{rot}(\mathbf{IN1} \oplus \mathbf{OP_C}, \mathbf{r1}) \oplus \mathbf{c1}]_K \oplus \mathbf{OP_C} \\ \mathbf{OUT2} &= \mathrm{E}[\mathrm{rot}(\mathbf{TEMP} \oplus \mathbf{OP_C}, \mathbf{r2}) \oplus \mathbf{c2}]_K \oplus \mathbf{OP_C} \\ \mathbf{OUT3} &= \mathrm{E}[\mathrm{rot}(\mathbf{TEMP} \oplus \mathbf{OP_C}, \mathbf{r3}) \oplus \mathbf{c3}]_K \oplus \mathbf{OP_C} \\ \mathbf{OUT4} &= \mathrm{E}[\mathrm{rot}(\mathbf{TEMP} \oplus \mathbf{OP_C}, \mathbf{r4}) \oplus \mathbf{c4}]_K \oplus \mathbf{OP_C} \\ \mathbf{OUT5} &= \mathrm{E}[\mathrm{rot}(\mathbf{TEMP} \oplus \mathbf{OP_C}, \mathbf{r5}) \oplus \mathbf{c5}]_K \oplus \mathbf{OP_C} \end{aligned}
```

The outputs of the various functions are then defined as follows:

```
Output of fI = \text{MAC-A}, where MAC-A[0] .. MAC-A[63] = OUT1[0] .. OUT1[63] Output of fI^* = \text{MAC-S}, where MAC-S[0] .. MAC-S[63] = OUT1[64] .. OUT1[127] Output of f2 = \text{RES}, where RES[0] .. RES[63] = OUT2[64] .. OUT2[127] Output of f3 = \text{CK}, where CK[0] .. CK[127] = OUT3[0] .. OUT3[127] Output of f4 = \text{IK}, where IK[0] .. IK[127] = OUT4[0] .. OUT4[127] Output of f5 = \text{AK}, where AK[0] .. AK[47] = OUT2[0] .. OUT5[47] Output of f5^* = \text{AK}, where AK[0] .. AK[47] = OUT5[0] .. OUT5[47]
```

(The repeated reference to AK is not a mistake: AK is the name of the output of either f5 or f5*, and these two functions will not in practice be computed simultaneously.)

4.2 Specific Example Algorithms

The specific example algorithm set is defined by specifying the block cipher encryption function E[], which we do in this section. (It is left to each operator to specify the Operator Variant Algorithm Configuration Field \mathbf{OP} .)

The block cipher selected is Rijndael [6]. This is the algorithm proposed as the Advanced Encryption Standard [7]. More precisely, it is Rijndael with 128-bit key and 128-bit block size.

 $E[\mathbf{x}]_{\mathbf{k}}$ = the result of applying the Rijndael encryption algorithm to the 128-bit value \mathbf{x} under the 128-bit key \mathbf{k} .

Although the definitive specification of Rijndael is in [6], a complete specification of Rijndael with 128-bit key and 128-bit block size is also given in Annex 2 of this document.

The inputs to and output of Rijndael are defined as strings of bytes. The 128-bit string $\mathbf{x} = \mathbf{x}[0] \parallel \mathbf{x}[1] \parallel \dots \mathbf{x}[127]$ is treated as a string of bytes by taking $\mathbf{x}[0] \parallel \mathbf{x}[1] \parallel \dots \mathbf{x}[7]$ as the first byte, $\mathbf{x}[8] \parallel \mathbf{x}[9] \parallel \dots \mathbf{x}[15]$ as the second byte, and so on. The key and output string are converted in the same way.

Note that the following patent statement has been made publicly (and included in [6]) by the authors of the Rijndael algorithm: "Rijndael or any of its implementations is not and will not be subject to patents."

5 Implementation considerations

5.1 OP_C computed on or off the USIM?

Recall that **OP** is an Operator Variant Algorithm Configuration Field. It is expected that each operator will define a value of **OP** which will then be used for all its subscribers. (It is up to operators to decide how to manage **OP**. The value of **OP** used for new batches of USIMs could be changed occasionally; or perhaps a different value could be given to each different USIM supplier. **OP** could even be given a different value for every subscriber if desired, but that is not really the intention.)

It will be seen in section 4.1 that $\mathbf{OP_C}$ is computed from \mathbf{OP} and \mathbf{K} , and that it is only $\mathbf{OP_C}$, not \mathbf{OP} , that is ever used in subsequent computations. This gives two alternative options for implementation of the algorithms on the USIM:

- (a) OP_C computed off the USIM: OP_C is computed as part of the USIM prepersonalisation process, and OP_C is stored on the USIM. OP itself is not stored on the USIM.
- **(b) OP**_C **computed on the USIM: OP** is stored on the USIM (it may be considered as a hard-coded part of the algorithm if preferred). **OP**_C is recomputed each time the algorithms are called.

The SAGE Task Force recommends that $\mathbf{OP}_{\mathbb{C}}$ be computed off the USIM if possible, since this gives the following benefits:

- The complexity of the algorithms run on the USIM is reduced.
- It is more likely that **OP** can be kept secret. (If **OP** is stored on the USIM, it only takes one USIM to be reverse engineered for **OP** to be discovered and published. But it should be difficult for someone who has discovered even a large number of (**OP**_C, **K**) pairs to deduce **OP**. That means that the **OP**_C associated with any other value of **K** will be unknown, which may make it harder to mount some kinds of cryptanalytic and forgery attacks. The algorithms are designed to be secure whether or not **OP** is known to the attacker, but a secret **OP** is one more hurdle in the attacker's path.)

5.2 Customising the choice of block cipher

It was explained in section 3 that an operator may create a variant algorithm set by selecting a block cipher other than Rijndael. It is vitally important that whatever block cipher is chosen is one that has been extensively analysed and is still believed to be secure. The security of the authentication and key generation functions is crucially dependent on the strength of the block cipher.

Strictly speaking, in fact, the kernel function does not have to be a block cipher; it just has to be a keyed function (with 128-bit input, key and output) satisfying the following cryptographic requirement:

- Let the key be fixed. Without initial knowledge of the key, but with a large number of pairs of chosen input and resulting output, it must be infeasible to determine the key, and also infeasible to predict the output for any other chosen input with probability significantly greater than 2⁻¹²⁸.

See also section 5.4 about protecting against side channel attacks; this will need to be borne in mind when selecting/implementing a replacement kernel function.

5.3 Further customisation


If an operator wishes to customise the algorithms still further, a simple approach is to select different values for the constants c1-c5 and r1-r5. If this is done, the pairs (ci, ri) must all be different. It must not be the case that both ci = cj and ri = rj for $i \neq j$. For instance, it must not be the case that both c2 = c4 and c3 = c4. Additionally it is recommended that the following restrictions are applied:

- c1 has even parity. (A 128-bit value has even parity if the number of '1's in its binary representation is even.)
- c2-c5 all have odd parity.

5.4 Resistance to side channel attacks

When these algorithms are implemented on a USIM, consideration should be given to protecting them against side channel attacks such as differential power analysis (DPA). [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13] may be useful references.

Annex 1: Figure of the Algorithms



Annex 2: Specification of the Block Cipher Algorithm Rijndael

A2.1 Introduction

This section provides a specification for the example kernel function. The block cipher used is Rijndael. The complete specification of Rijndael is given elsewhere [6]. To quote from [6]:

"Rijndael is an iterated block cipher with a variable block length and a variable key length. The block length and the key length can be independently specified to 128, 192 or 256 bits."

For 3GPP purpose, Rijndael is used only in encryption mode and has the block and key length both set to 128 bits. For the rest of this section, when we refer to Rijndael we mean Rijndael with 128-bit block and key length. This document describes a simple byte oriented implementation of the encryption mode of Rijndael. Readers wishing more detail on the design of the cipher or implementation speed-ups are referred to the original document [6].

A2.2 The State and External Interfaces of Rijndael

Rijndael is composed of a series of rounds that transform the input into the output. An intermediate result is called the **State**. The **State** can be pictured as a 4x4 rectangular array of bytes (128 bits in total). The Cipher Key is similarly pictured as a 4x4 rectangular array. These representations are illustrated in Figure 1.

$a_{0,0}$	a _{0,1}	a _{0,2}	$a_{0,3}$
a _{1,0}	a _{1,1}	a _{1,2}	a _{1,3}
a _{2,0}	a _{2,1}	a _{2,2}	a _{2,3}
a _{3.0}	a _{3.1}	a _{3.2}	a _{3.3}

k _{0,0}	k _{0,1}	k _{0,2}	k _{0,3}
k _{1,0}	k _{1,1}	k _{1,2}	k _{1,3}
k _{2,0}	k _{2,1}	k _{2,2}	k _{2,3}
k _{3,0}	k _{3,1}	k _{3,2}	k _{3,3}

Figure 1: Example of State and Cipher Key layout

Rijndael takes plaintext bytes P_0 , P_1 , ..., P_{15} and key bytes K_0 , K_1 , ... K_{15} as input and ciphertext bytes C_0 , C_1 , ..., C_{15} as output. The plaintext bytes are mapped onto the state bytes in the order $a_{0,0}$, $a_{1,0}$, $a_{2,0}$, $a_{3,0}$, $a_{0,1}$, $a_{1,1}$, $a_{2,1}$, $a_{3,1}$,... and the key bytes in the order $k_{0,0}$, $k_{1,0}$, $k_{2,0}$, $k_{3,0}$, $k_{0,1}$, $k_{1,1}$, $k_{2,1}$, $k_{3,1}$,... At the end of the cipher operation, the ciphertext is extracted from the **State** by taking the **State** bytes in the same order.

Hence if the one-dimensional index of a byte within a block is \mathbf{n} and the two dimensional index is (\mathbf{i}, \mathbf{j}) , we have:

$$\mathbf{i} = \mathbf{n} \mod 4$$
; $\mathbf{j} = \lfloor \mathbf{n}/4 \rfloor$; $\mathbf{n} = \mathbf{i} + 4 * \mathbf{j}$

A2.3 Internal Structure

Rijndael consists of the following operations:

- an initial Round Key addition
- 9 rounds, numbered 1-9, each consisting of
 - a byte substitution transformation
 - a shift row transformation
 - a mix column transformation
 - a Round Key addition
- A final round (round 10) consisting of
 - a byte substitution transformation
 - a shift row transformation
 - a Round Key addition

The component transformations and how the Round Keys are derived from the cipher keys are specified in the following subsections.

A2.4 The Byte Substitution Transformation

The byte substitution transformation is a non-linear byte substitution, operating on each of the **State** bytes independently. The substitution table (S-box) is given in section A2.9.

Figure 2 illustrates the effect of the byte substitution transformation on the **State**.




Figure 2: Byte substitution acts on the individual bytes of the State

So, for every element of **State**, we apply the transformation:

$$\mathbf{b}_{i,j} = \text{S-box}[\mathbf{a}_{i,j}]$$

Where $a_{i,j}$ is the initial value of the element in **State**, and $b_{i,j}$ is the output value of the element in **State**.

A2.5 The Shift Row Transformation

In the shift row transformation, the rows of the **State** are cyclically left shifted by different amounts. Row 0 is not shifted, row 1 is shifted by 1 byte, row 2 by 2 bytes and row 3 by 3 bytes.

Figure 3 illustrates the effect of the shift row transformation on the **State**.




Figure 3: Shift Row operates on the rows of the State

A2.6 The Mix Column Transformation

The mix column transformation operates on each column of the **State** independently. For column j, we have

$$\begin{aligned} & \mathbf{b_{0,j}} = T_2(\mathbf{a_{0,j}}) \oplus T_3(\mathbf{a_{1,j}}) \oplus \mathbf{a_{2,j}} \oplus \mathbf{a_{3,j}} \\ & \mathbf{b_{1,j}} = \mathbf{a_{0,j}} \oplus T_2(\mathbf{a_{1,j}}) \oplus T_3(\mathbf{a_{2,j}}) \oplus \mathbf{a_{3,j}} \\ & \mathbf{b_{2,j}} = \mathbf{a_{0,j}} \oplus \mathbf{a_{1,j}} \oplus T_2(\mathbf{a_{2,j}}) \oplus T_3(\mathbf{a_{3,j}}) \\ & \mathbf{b_{3,j}} = T_3(\mathbf{a_{0,j}}) \oplus \mathbf{a_{1,j}} \oplus \mathbf{a_{2,j}} \oplus T_2(\mathbf{a_{3,j}}) \end{aligned}$$

where:

$$\begin{split} T_2(\mathbf{a}) &= 2*\mathbf{a} & \text{if } \mathbf{a} < 128 \\ \text{or } T_2(\mathbf{a}) &= (2*\mathbf{a}) \oplus 283 & \text{if } \mathbf{a} \geq 128 \\ \text{and } T_3(\mathbf{a}) &= T_2(\mathbf{a}) \oplus \mathbf{a}. \end{split}$$

For example:

If
$$\mathbf{a} = 63$$
 then $T_2(63) = 126$; $T_3(63) = T_2(63) \oplus 63 = 65$
If $\mathbf{a} = 143$ then $T_2(143) = 5$; $T_3(143) = T_2(143) \oplus 143 = 138$.

Figure 4 illustrates the effect of the mix column transformation on the **State**.




Figure 4: Mix Column operates on the columns of the State

A2.7 The Round Key addition

In this operation, a Round Key is applied to the **State** by a simple bitwise exclusive-or. The Round Key is derived from the Cipher Key by means of the key schedule. The Round Key length is equal to the block length.

This transformation is illustrated in Figure 5.




Figure 5: In the key addition the Round Key is bitwise XORed to the State

So, for every element of **State**, we have:

$$\mathbf{b}_{\mathbf{i},\mathbf{j}} = \mathbf{a}_{\mathbf{i},\mathbf{j}} \oplus \mathbf{r} \mathbf{k}_{\mathbf{i},\mathbf{j}}$$

Where

a_{i,i} is the initial value of the element in **State**,

 $\boldsymbol{b}_{i,j}$ is the output value of the element in $\boldsymbol{State},$ and

rk_{i,i} is the round key byte.

A2.8 Key schedule

Rijndael has 11 Round Keys, numbered 0-10, that are each 4x4 rectangular arrays of bytes. The Round Keys are derived from the Cipher Key by means of the key schedule. The initial Round Key (thought of as the zeroth Round Key) is formed directly from the cipher key. This zeroth Round Key is used unaltered for the initial key addition. The remaining Round Keys are used in the ten rounds. Each new round key is derived from the previous round key. Note: It is possible to run the key schedule round by round on an "as required" basis and so only use a total of 16 bytes to store the Round Key.

Let $\mathbf{rk_{r,i,j}}$ be the value of the \mathbf{r}^{th} Round Key at position $(\mathbf{i,j})$ in the array and $\mathbf{k_{i,j}}$ be the cipher key loaded into a 4x4 array.

Intialisation: $\mathbf{r}\mathbf{k}_{0,i,j} = \mathbf{k}_{i,j}$ for all i and j.

The other Round Keys (r=1 to 10 inclusive) are calculated from the previous one as follows. First the 0th column is constructed:

```
\begin{split} \mathbf{rk_{r,0,0}} &= \mathbf{rk_{r-1,0,0}} \oplus \text{S-box}[\mathbf{rk_{r-1,1,3}}] \oplus \text{round\_const}[\mathbf{r}] \\ \mathbf{rk_{r,1,0}} &= \mathbf{rk_{r-1,1,0}} \oplus \text{S-box}[\mathbf{rk_{r-1,2,3}}] \\ \mathbf{rk_{r,2,0}} &= \mathbf{rk_{r-1,2,0}} \oplus \text{S-box}[\mathbf{rk_{r-1,3,3}}] \\ \mathbf{rk_{r,3,0}} &= \mathbf{rk_{r-1,3,0}} \oplus \text{S-box}[\mathbf{rk_{r-1,0,3}}] \end{split}
```

where round_const[1] = 1 and round_const[\mathbf{r}] = T_2 (round_const[\mathbf{r} -1]), and S-box is the previously mentioned byte substitution.

Then the remaining three columns are constructed in turn from the corresponding column of the previous Round Key and the previous column of the current Round Key:

```
\mathbf{rk_{r,i,j}} = \mathbf{rk_{r-1,i,j}} \oplus \mathbf{rk_{r,i,j-1}} for \mathbf{i} = 0,1,2,3 and \mathbf{j} = 1,2,3.
```

Note: The ten round constants computed from the equations:

```
round_const[1] = 1
round_const[\mathbf{r}] = T_2(round_const[\mathbf{r}-1]) r=2,3...,10
```

are: 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128, 27, 54.

A2.9 The Rijndael S-box

```
Sbox[256] = {
   99,124,119,123,242,107,111,197, 48, 1,103, 43,254,215,171,118,
202,130,201,125,250, 89, 71,240,173,212,162,175,156,164,114,192,
183,253,147, 38, 54, 63,247,204, 52,165,229,241,113,216, 49, 21,
   4,199, 35,195, 24,150, 5,154, 7, 18,128,226,235, 39,178,117,
   9,131, 44, 26, 27,110, 90,160, 82, 59,214,179, 41,227, 47,132,
83,209, 0,237, 32,252,177, 91,106,203,190, 57, 74, 76, 88,207,
208,239,170,251, 67, 77, 51,133, 69,249, 2,127, 80, 60,159,168,
81,163, 64,143,146,157, 56,245,188,182,218, 33, 16,255,243,210,
205, 12, 19,236, 95,151, 68, 23,196,167,126, 61,100, 93, 25,115,
96,129, 79,220, 34, 42,144,136, 70,238,184, 20,222, 94, 11,219,
224, 50, 58, 10, 73, 6, 36, 92,194,211,172, 98,145,149,228,121,
231,200, 55,109,141,213, 78,169,108, 86,244,234,101,122,174, 8,
186,120, 37, 46, 28,166,180,198,232,221,116, 31, 75,189,139,138,
112, 62,181,102, 72, 3,246, 14, 97, 53, 87,185,134,193, 29,158,
225,248,152, 17,105,217,142,148,155, 30,135,233,206, 85, 40,223,
140,161,137, 13,191,230, 66,104, 65,153, 45, 15,176, 84,187, 22};
```

Annex 3: Simulation Program Listing - Byte Oriented

```
Example algorithms f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5, f5*
   A sample implementation of the example 3GPP authentication and
   key agreement functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5*. This is
   a byte-oriented implementation of the functions, and of the block
   cipher kernel function Rijndael.
 * This has been coded for clarity, not necessarily for efficiency.
  The functions f2, f3, f4 and f5 share the same inputs and have been coded together as a single function. f1, f1* and f5* are
 * all coded separately.
typedef unsigned char u8;
/*----*/ Operator Variant Algorithm Configuration Field -----*/
            /\!\star\!-\!-\!-\!- Insert your value of OP here -----\!\star/
u8 OP[16] = {0x63, 0xbf, 0xa5, 0x0e, 0xe6, 0x52, 0x33, 0x65, 0xff, 0x14, 0xc1, 0xf4, 0x5f, 0x88, 0x73, 0x7d};
/*----- Insert your value of OP here -----*/
/*----*/
         ( u8 k[16], u8 rand[16], u8 sqn[6], u8 amf[2],
void f1
            u8 mac_a[8] );
void f2345 ( u8 k[16], u8 rand[16],
            u8 res[8], u8 ck[16], u8 ik[16], u8 ak[6] );
void f1star( u8 k[16], u8 rand[16], u8 sqn[6], u8 amf[2],
            u8 mac s[8] );
void f5star( u8 k[16], u8 rand[16],
            u8 ak[6]);
void ComputeOPc( u8 op_c[16] );
void RijndaelKeySchedule( u8 key[16] );
void RijndaelEncrypt( u8 input[16], u8 output[16] );
/*-----
                           Algorithm f1
   Computes network authentication code MAC-A from key K, random
   challenge RAND, sequence number SQN and authentication management
 * field AMF.
 *-----*/
void f1 ( u8 k[16], u8 rand[16], u8 sqn[6], u8 amf[2],
           u8 mac a[8] )
  u8 op_c[16];
  u8 temp[16];
  u8 in1[16];
  u8 out1[16];
  u8 rijndaelInput[16];
  u8 i;
  RijndaelKeySchedule( k );
  ComputeOPc( op_c );
  for (i=0; i<16; i++)
    rijndaelInput[i] = rand[i] ^ op_c[i];
  RijndaelEncrypt( rijndaelInput, temp );
```

```
for (i=0; i<6; i++)
   in1[i] = sqn[i];
   in1[i+8] = sqn[i];
  for (i=0; i<2; i++)
   in1[i+6] = amf[i];
   in1[i+14] = amf[i];
  /\star XOR op_c and in1, rotate by r1=64, and XOR \star
  * on the constant c1 (which is all zeroes) */
  for (i=0; i<16; i++)
   rijndaelInput[(i+8) % 16] = in1[i] ^ op_c[i];
  /* XOR on the value temp computed before */
  for (i=0; i<16; i++)
   rijndaelInput[i] ^= temp[i];
  RijndaelEncrypt( rijndaelInput, out1 );
 for (i=0; i<16; i++)
out1[i] ^= op_c[i];
  for (i=0; i<8; i++)
   mac a[i] = out1[i];
  return;
} /* end of function f1 */
/*-----
                            Algorithms f2-f5
 * Takes key K and random challenge RAND, and returns response RES,
 * confidentiality key CK, integrity key IK and anonymity key AK.
void f2345 ( u8 k[16], u8 rand[16],
           u8 res[8], u8 ck[16], u8 ik[16], u8 ak[6])
 u8 op_c[16];
  u8 temp[16];
  u8 out[16];
  u8 rijndaelInput[16];
  u8 i:
  RijndaelKeySchedule( k );
  ComputeOPc( op c );
  for (i=0; i<16; i++)
   rijndaelInput[i] = rand[i] ^ op_c[i];
  RijndaelEncrypt( rijndaelInput, temp );
  /* To obtain output block OUT2: XOR OPc and TEMP,
  * rotate by r2=0, and XOR on the constant c2 (which *
  * is all zeroes except that the last bit is 1).
  for (i=0; i<16; i++)
  rijndaelInput[i] = temp[i] ^ op_c[i];
rijndaelInput[15] ^= 1;
  RijndaelEncrypt( rijndaelInput, out );
  for (i=0; i<16; i++)
out[i] ^= op_c[i];
  for (i=0; i<8; i++)
   res[i] = out[i+8];
  for (i=0; i<6; i++)
   ak[i] = out[i];
  /* To obtain output block OUT3: XOR OPc and TEMP,
```

```
* rotate by r3=32, and XOR on the constant c3 (which
   * is all zeroes except that the next to last bit is 1). */
  for (i=0; i<16; i++)
  rijndaelInput[(i+12) % 16] = temp[i] ^ op_c[i];
rijndaelInput[15] ^= 2;
  RijndaelEncrypt( rijndaelInput, out );
  for (i=0; i<16; i++)
out[i] ^= op_c[i];
  for (i=0; i<16; i++)
   ck[i] = out[i];
  /* To obtain output block OUT4: XOR OPc and TEMP,
  * rotate by r4=64, and XOR on the constant c4 (which
  \star is all zeroes except that the 2nd from last bit is 1). \star/
  for (i=0; i<16; i++)
  rijndaelInput[(i+8) % 16] = temp[i] ^ op_c[i];
rijndaelInput[15] ^= 4;
  RijndaelEncrypt( rijndaelInput, out );
 for (i=0; i<16; i++)
out[i] ^= op_c[i];
  for (i=0; i<16; i++)
   ik[i] = out[i];
  return;
} /* end of function f2345 */
/*-----
                            Algorithm f1*
 * Computes resynch authentication code MAC-S from key K, random
   challenge RAND, sequence number SQN and authentication management
 * field AMF.
 *-----*/
void f1star( u8 k[16], u8 rand[16], u8 sqn[6], u8 amf[2],
           u8 mac_s[8] )
 u8 op_c[16];
 u8 temp[16];
  u8 in1[16];
 u8 out1[16];
  u8 rijndaelInput[16];
  u8 i;
  RijndaelKeySchedule( k );
  ComputeOPc( op_c );
  for (i=0; i<16; i++)
  rijndaelInput[i] = rand[i] ^ op_c[i];
RijndaelEncrypt( rijndaelInput, temp );
  for (i=0; i<6; i++)
    in1[i]
             = san[i];
    in1[i+8] = sqn[i];
  for (i=0; i<2; i++)
  {
    in1[i+6] = amf[i];
    in1[i+14] = amf[i];
  /* XOR op_c and in1, rotate by r1=64, and XOR *
   * on the constant c1 (which is all zeroes) */
  for (i=0; i<16; i++)
   rijndaelInput[(i+8) % 16] = in1[i] ^ op_c[i];
```

```
/* XOR on the value temp computed before */
 for (i=0; i<16; i++)
   rijndaelInput[i] ^= temp[i];
 RijndaelEncrypt( rijndaelInput, out1 );
 for (i=0; i<16; i++)
out1[i] ^= op_c[i];
 for (i=0; i<8; i++)
   mac_s[i] = out1[i+8];
 return;
} /* end of function flstar */
/*-----
                          Algorithm f5*
 \mbox{\scriptsize \star} Takes key K and random challenge RAND, and returns resynch
 * anonymity key AK.
 *----*/
void f5star( u8 k[16], u8 rand[16],
           u8 ak[6] )
 u8 op c[16];
 u8 temp[16];
 u8 out[16];
 u8 rijndaelInput[16];
 u8 i;
 RijndaelKeySchedule( k );
 ComputeOPc( op c );
 for (i=0; i<16; i++)
   rijndaelInput[i] = rand[i] ^ op_c[i];
 RijndaelEncrypt( rijndaelInput, temp );
 /\star To obtain output block OUT5: XOR OPc and TEMP,
  * rotate by r5=96, and XOR on the constant c5 (which
  \star is all zeroes except that the 3rd from last bit is 1). \star/
 for (i=0; i<16; i++)
 rijndaelInput[(i+4) % 16] = temp[i] ^ op_c[i];
rijndaelInput[15] ^= 8;
 RijndaelEncrypt( rijndaelInput, out );
 for (i=0; i<16; i++)
out[i] ^= op_c[i];
 for (i=0; i<6; i++)
   ak[i] = out[i];
} /* end of function f5star */
 * Function to compute OPc from OP and K. Assumes key schedule has
  already been performed.
 *-----*/
void ComputeOPc( u8 op_c[16] )
 u8 i;
 RijndaelEncrypt( OP, op c );
 for (i=0; i<16; i++)
op_c[i] ^= OP[i];
} /* end of function ComputeOPc */
```

```
/*----- Rijndael round subkeys -----*/
u8 roundKeys[11][4][4];
/*----*/
u8 S[256] = {
 99,124,119,123,242,107,111,197, 48, 1,103, 43,254,215,171,118,
202,130,201,125,250, 89, 71,240,173,212,162,175,156,164,114,192,
183, 253, 147, \ 38, \ 54, \ 63, 247, 204, \ 52, 165, 229, 241, 113, 216, \ 49, \ 21, \\
  4,199, 35,195, 24,150, 5,154, 7, 18,128,226,235, 39,178,117, 9,131, 44, 26, 27,110, 90,160, 82, 59,214,179, 41,227, 47,132,
 83,209, 0,237, 32,252,177, 91,106,203,190, 57, 74, 76, 88,207,
208,239,170,251, 67, 77, 51,133, 69,249, 2,127, 80, 60,159,168,
 81,163, 64,143,146,157, 56,245,188,182,218, 33, 16,255,243,210,
205, 12, 19,236, 95,151, 68, 23,196,167,126, 61,100, 93, 25,115,
 96,129, 79,220, 34, 42,144,136, 70,238,184, 20,222, 94, 11,219,
224, 50, 58, 10, 73, 6, 36, 92,194,211,172, 98,145,149,228,121, 231,200, 55,109,141,213, 78,169,108, 86,244,234,101,122,174, 8,
186,120, 37, 46, 28,166,180,198,232,221,116, 31, 75,189,139,138,
112,\ 62,181,102,\ 72,\quad 3,246,\ 14,\ 97,\ 53,\ 87,185,134,193,\ 29,158,
225,248,152, 17,105,217,142,148,155, 30,135,233,206, 85, 40,223,
140,161,137, 13,191,230, 66,104, 65,153, 45, 15,176, 84,187, 22,
};
/*---- This array does the multiplication by x in GF(2^8) -----*/
u8 Xtime[256] = {
  0, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20, 22, 24, 26, 28, 30,
 32, 34, 36, 38, 40, 42, 44, 46, 48, 50, 52, 54, 56, 58, 60, 62, 64, 66, 68, 70, 72, 74, 76, 78, 80, 82, 84, 86, 88, 90, 92, 94,
 96, 98,100,102,104,106,108,110,112,114,116,118,120,122,124,126,
128, 130, 132, 134, 136, 138, 140, 142, 144, 146, 148, 150, 152, 154, 156, 158,
160,162,164,166,168,170,172,174,176,178,180,182,184,186,188,190,
192,194,196,198,200,202,204,206,208,210,212,214,216,218,220,222,
224\,, 226\,, 228\,, 230\,, 232\,, 234\,, 236\,, 238\,, 240\,, 242\,, 244\,, 246\,, 248\,, 250\,, 252\,, 254\,,
 27, 25, 31, 29, 19, 17, 23, 21, 11, 9, 15, 13, 3, 1, 7, 5,
 59, 57, 63, 61, 51, 49, 55, 53, 43, 41, 47, 45, 35, 33, 39, 37,
 91, 89, 95, 93, 83, 81, 87, 85, 75, 73, 79, 77, 67, 65, 71, 69,
123,121,127,125,115,113,119,117,107,105,111,109, 99, 97,103,101,
155, 153, 159, 157, 147, 145, 151, 149, 139, 137, 143, 141, 131, 129, 135, 133,
187, 185, 191, 189, 179, 177, 183, 181, 171, 169, 175, 173, 163, 161, 167, 165,
219,217,223,221,211,209,215,213,203,201,207,205,195,193,199,197,
251, 249, 255, 253, 243, 241, 247, 245, 235, 233, 239, 237, 227, 225, 231, 229
 * Rijndael key schedule function. Takes 16-byte key and creates
 * all Rijndael's internal subkeys ready for encryption.
void RiindaelKevSchedule( u8 kev[16] )
  u8 roundConst;
  int i, j;
  /* first round key equals key */
  for (i=0; i<16; i++)
    roundKeys[0][i & 0x03][i>>2] = key[i];
  roundConst = 1:
  /* now calculate round keys */
  for (i=1; i<11; i++)
    roundKeys[i][1][0] = S[roundKeys[i-1][2][3]]
                            roundKeys[i-1][1][0];
    roundKeys[i][3][0] = S[roundKeys[i-1][0][3]]
                            roundKeys[i-1][3][0];
    for (j=0; j<4; j++)
      roundKeys[i][j][1] = roundKeys[i-1][j][1] ^ roundKeys[i][j][0];
      roundKeys[i][j][2] = roundKeys[i-1][j][2] ^ roundKeys[i][j][1];
roundKeys[i][j][3] = roundKeys[i-1][j][3] ^ roundKeys[i][j][2];
```

```
/* update round constant */
   roundConst = Xtime[roundConst];
  return;
} /* end of function RijndaelKeySchedule */
/* Round key addition function */
void KeyAdd(u8 state[4][4], u8 roundKeys[11][4][4], int round)
  int i, j;
  for (i=0; i<4; i++)
   for (j=0; j<4; j++)
   state[i][j] ^= roundKeys[round][i][j];</pre>
  return;
/* Byte substitution transformation */
int ByteSub(u8 state[4][4])
  int i, j;
  for (i=0; i<4; i++)
   for (j=0; j<4; j++)
      state[i][j] = S[state[i][j]];
 return 0;
/* Row shift transformation */
void ShiftRow(u8 state[4][4])
  u8 temp;
  /* left rotate row 1 by 1 */
  temp = state[1][0];
  state[1][0] = state[1][1];
  state[1][1] = state[1][2];
  state[1][2] = state[1][3];
state[1][3] = temp;
  /* left rotate row 2 by 2 */
  temp = state[2][0];
  state[2][0] = state[2][2];
  state[2][2] = temp;
  temp = state[2][1];
  state[2][1] = state[2][3];
state[2][3] = temp;
  /* left rotate row 3 by 3 */
  temp = state[3][0];
  state[3][0] = state[3][3];
  state[3][3] = state[3][2];
  state[3][2] = state[3][1];
  state[3][1] = temp;
 return:
}
/* MixColumn transformation*/
void MixColumn(u8 state[4][4])
  u8 temp, tmp, tmp0;
  int i;
  /* do one column at a time */
  for (i=0; i<4;i++)
    temp = state[0][i] ^ state[1][i] ^ state[2][i] ^ state[3][i];
    tmp0 = state[0][i];
```

```
/* Xtime array does multiply by x in GF2^8 */ tmp = Xtime[state[0][i] ^ state[1][i]];
    state[0][i] ^= temp ^ tmp;
    tmp = Xtime[state[1][i] ^ state[2][i]];
    state[1][i] ^= temp ^ tmp;
    tmp = Xtime[state[2][i] ^ state[3][i]];
state[2][i] ^= temp ^ tmp;
    tmp = Xtime[state[3][i] ^ tmp0];
state[3][i] ^= temp ^ tmp;
  return;
}
 * Rijndael encryption function. Takes 16-byte input and creates
 \star 16-byte output (using round keys already derived from 16-byte
void RijndaelEncrypt( u8 input[16], u8 output[16] )
  u8 state[4][4];
  int i, r;
  /* initialise state array from input byte string */
  for (i=0; i<16; i++)
    state[i & 0x3][i>>2] = input[i];
  /* add first round_key */
  KeyAdd(state, roundKeys, 0);
  /* do lots of full rounds */
  for (r=1; r<=9; r++)
    ByteSub(state);
   ShiftRow(state);
   MixColumn(state);
   KeyAdd(state, roundKeys, r);
  /* final round */
  ByteSub(state);
  ShiftRow(state);
  KeyAdd(state, roundKeys, r);
  /* produce output byte string from state array */
  for (i=0; i<16; i++)
    output[i] = state[i & 0x3][i>>2];
} /* end of function RijndaelEncrypt */
```

Annex 4: Rijndael Listing - 32-Bit Word Oriented

```
Rijndael Implementation
  A sample 32-bit orientated implementation of Rijndael, the
 * suggested kernel for the example 3GPP authentication and key
   agreement functions.
 {\boldsymbol \star} This implementation draws on the description in section 5.2 of
 \mbox{\scriptsize \star} the AES proposal and also on the implementation by
 * Dr B. R. Gladman <br/> brg@gladman.uk.net> 9th October 2000.
 * It uses a number of large (4k) lookup tables to implement the
   algorithm in an efficient manner.
 * Note: in this implementation the State is stored in four 32-bit
 * words, one per column of the State, with the top byte of the
   column being the _least_ significant byte of the word.
#define LITTLE_ENDIAN /* For INTEL architecture */
typedef unsigned char
                       u8;
typedef unsigned int
/* Circular byte rotates of 32 bit values */
\#define rot1(x) ((x << 8) | (x >> 24))
#define rot2(x) ((x << 16) | (x >> 16))
#define rot3(x) ((x << 24) (x >> 8))
/* Extract a byte from a 32-bit u32 */
#define byte0(x)
                   ((u8)(x))
#define byte1(x) ((u8)(x >> 8))
#define byte2(x) ((u8)(x >> 16))
#define byte3(x) ((u8)(x >> 24))
/* Put or get a 32 bit u32 (v) in machine order from a byte * \,
* address in (x)
#ifdef LITTLE_ENDIAN
#define u32_in(x)
                     (*(u32*)(x))
#define u32_{out}(x,y) (*(u32*)(x) = y)
#else
/* Invert byte order in a 32 bit variable */
  _inline u32 byte_swap(const u32 x)
    return rot1(x) & 0x00ff00ff | rot3(x) & 0xff00ff00;
  inline u32 u32_in(const u8 x[])
  return byte_swap(*(u32*)x);
  inline void u32 out(u8 x[], const u32 v)
  *(u32*)x = byte_swap(v);
#endif
/*----*/
static u32 rnd_con[10] =
 0x01, 0x02, 0x04, 0x08, 0x10, 0x20, 0x40, 0x80, 0x1B, 0x36
```

```
};
 static u32 ft_tab[4][256] =
                0xA56363C6,0x847C7CF8,0x997777EE,0x8D7B7BF6,0x0DF2F2FF,0xBD6B6BD6,0xB16F6FDE,0x54C5C591,
                0x50303060,0x03010102,0xA96767CE,0x7D2B2B56,0x19FEFEE7,0x62D7D7B5,0xE6ABAB4D,0x9A7676EC,
                0 \times C2B7B775, 0 \times 1CFDFDE1, 0 \times AE939333D, 0 \times 6A26264C, 0 \times 5A36366C, 0 \times 413F3F7E, 0 \times 02F7F7F5, 0 \times 4FCCCC83, 0 \times 10^{-1} \times 10^{-1}
                0x5C343468,0xF4A5A551,0x34E5E5D1,0x08F1F1F9,0x937171E2,0x73D8D8AB,0x53313162,0x3F15152A,
                0 \\ x \\ 0 \\ y \\ 0 \\ x \\ 36121224 \\ , 0 \\ x \\ 9B80801B \\ , 0 \\ x \\ 3DE2E2DF \\ , 0 \\ x \\ 26EBEBCD \\ , 0 \\ x \\ 6927274E \\ , 0 \\ x \\ CDB2B27F \\ , 0 \\ x \\ 9F7575EA \\ , 0 \\ x \\ CDB2B27F \\ , 0 \\ x \\ 2000 \\ x \\ 3000 \\ x \\ 3000
                0 \\ \\ x18090912, 0 \\ x9E83831D, 0 \\ x742C2C58, 0 \\ x2E1A1A34, 0 \\ x2D1B1B36, 0 \\ xB26E6EDC, 0 \\ xEE5A5AB4, 0 \\ xFBA0A05B, 0 
                0xF55353A6,0x68D1D1B9,0000000000,0x2CEDEDC1,0x60202040,0x1FFCFCE3,0xC8B1B179,0xED5B5BB6,
                0x6BD0D0BB,0x2AEFEFC5,0xE5AAAA4F,0x16FBFBED,0xC5434386,0xD74D4D9A,0x55333366,0x94858511,
                0xCF45458A,0x10F9F9E9,0x06020204,0x817F7FFE,0xF05050A0,0x443C3C78,0xBA9F9F25,0xE3A8A84B,
                0xF35151A2,0xFEA3A35D,0xC0404080,0x8A8F8F05,0xAD92923F,0xBC9D9D21,0x48383870,0x04F5F5F1,
                0 \\ x \\ DFBCBC63, 0 \\ x \\ C1B6B677, 0 \\ x \\ 75DADAAF, 0 \\ x \\ 63212142, 0 \\ x \\ 30101020, 0 \\ x \\ 1AFFFFE5, 0 \\ x \\ 0 \\ EF3F3FD, 0 \\ x \\ 6DD2D2BF, 0 \\ x \\ 0
                0 \times 57C4C493, 0 \times F2A7A755, 0 \times 827E7EFC, 0 \times 473D3D7A, 0 \times AC6464C8, 0 \times E75D5DBA, 0 \times 2B191932, 0 \times 957373E6, 0 \times 2B191932, 0 \times 2B19192, 0 \times 
                0xA06060C0,0x98818119,0xD14F4F9E,0x7FDCDCA3,0x66222244,0x7E2A2A54,0xAB90903B,0x8388880B,
                0xCA46468C,0x29EEEEC7,0xD3B8B86B,0x3C141428,0x79DEDEA7,0xE25E5EBC,0x1D0B0B16,0x76DBDBAD,
                0 \times 3 \\ BE 0 E 0 D B , 0 \times 5 \\ 6 3 2 3 2 6 4 , 0 \times 4 E 3 \\ A 3 A 7 4 , 0 \times 1 E 0 \\ A 0 A 1 4 , 0 \times D B 4 \\ 9 4 9 9 2 , 0 \times 0 \\ A 0 6 0 6 0 \\ C , 0 \times 6 \\ C 2 4 2 4 4 4 8 , 0 \times E 4 \\ 5 C 5 C B 8 , 0 \times 1 \\ C 1 + C 1 \\ C 2 + C 2 \\ C 3 + C 2 \\ C 4 + C 2 \\ C 4 + C 2 \\ C 5 + C 2 \\ C 5 + C 2 \\ C 6 + C 2 \\ C 7 \\ C 7 \\ C 7 \\ C 8 + C 2 \\ C 8 \\ C 9 \\
                0x32E7E7D5,0x43C8C88B,0x5937376E,0xB76D6DDA,0x8C8D8D01,0x64D5D5B1,0xD24E4E9C,0xE0A9A949,
                0xB46C6CD8,0xFA5656AC,0x07F4F4F3,0x25EAEACF,0xAF6565CA,0x8E7A7AF4,0xE9AEAE47,0x18080810,
                0 \times D5BABA6F, 0 \times 887878F0, 0 \times 6F25254A, 0 \times 722E2E5C, 0 \times 241C1C38, 0 \times F1A6A657, 0 \times C7B4B473, 0 \times 51C6C697, 0 \times C7B4B473, 0 \times 51C6C6697, 0 \times C7B4B473, 0 \times C7B4B474, 0
                0 \times 23 \\ E8 \\ E8 \\ CB, 0 \times 7 \\ CDDDDDA1, 0 \times 9 \\ C7474 \\ E8, 0 \times 211 \\ F1 \\ F3 \\ E, 0 \times DD4 \\ B4 \\ B96, 0 \times DCB \\ DBD61, 0 \times 868 \\ B8 \\ B0D, 0 \times 858 \\ A8 \\ A0F, 0 \times DCB \\ DBD61, 0 \times 868 \\ B8 \\ D0, 0 \times 858 \\ A0F, 0 \times DCB \\ DBD61, 0 \times 868 \\ B8 \\ D0, 0 \times 858 \\ A0F, 0 \times DCB \\ DBD61, 0 \times 868 \\ B8 \\ D0, 0 \times 858 \\ A0F, 0 \times DCB \\ DBD61, 0 \times 868 \\ B8 \\ D0, 0 \times 858 \\ A0F, 0 \times DCB \\ DBD61, 0 \times 868 \\ B8 \\ D0, 0 \times 858 \\ A0F, 0 \times DCB \\ DBD61, 0 \times 868 \\ A0F, 0 \times DCB \\ DBD61, 0 \times 868 \\ A0F, 0 \times DCB \\ DBD61, 0 \times 868 \\ A0F, 0 \times DCB \\ DBD61, 0 \times 868 \\ A0F, 0 \times DCB \\ DBD61, 0 \times 868 \\ A0F, 0 \times DCB \\ DBD61, 0 \times DCB \\ DCB1, 0 \times DCB \\ DCB1, 0 \times DCB 
                0 \\ \\ \text{x} 907070 \\ \text{E0}, 0 \\ \text{x} 423 \\ \text{E3E7C}, 0 \\ \text{x} C4858571, 0 \\ \text{x} AA66666 \\ \text{CC}, 0 \\ \text{x} D8484890, 0 \\ \text{x} 05030306, 0 \\ \text{x} 01F6F6F7, 0 \\ \text{x} 120 \\ \text{E0E1C}, 0 \\ \text{x} 120 \\ \text{
                0 \times A 36161C2 + 0 \times 5F35356A + 0 \times F95757AE + 0 \times D0B9B969 + 0 \times 91868617 + 0 \times 58C1C199 + 0 \times 271D1D3A + 0 \times B99E9E27 + 0 \times B99E9E9E27 + 0 \times B99E9E27 + 0
                0 \times 38 \\ \text{E1E1D9}, 0 \times 13 \\ \text{F8} \\ \text{F8} \\ \text{EB}, 0 \times \\ \text{B3} \\ \text{98} \\ \text{98} \\ \text{2B}, 0 \times \\ \text{33} \\ \text{111122}, 0 \times \\ \text{BB} \\ \text{69} \\ \text{69D2}, 0 \times \\ \text{70D9D9A9}, 0 \times \\ \text{89} \\ \text{8E8E07}, 0 \times \\ \text{A7949433}, 0 \times \\ \text{89} \\ \text{8E8E07}, 0 \times \\ \text{88} \\ \text{8E8E07}, 0 \times \\ \text{8E8E0
                0x8F8C8C03,0xF8AlA159,0x80898909,0x170D0D1A,0xDABFBF65,0x31E6E6D7,0xC6424284,0xB86868D0,
                0xC3414182,0xB0999929,0x772D2D5A,0x110F0F1E,0xCBB0B07B,0xFC5454A8,0xD6BBBB6D,0x3A16162C
                0 \times 6363C6A5, 0 \times 7C7CF884, 0 \times 7777EE99, 0 \times 7B7BF68D, 0 \times F2F2FF0D, 0 \times 6B6BD6BD, 0 \times 6F6FDEB1, 0 \times C5C59154, 
                0x30306050,0x01010203,0x6767CEA9,0x2B2B567D,0xFEFEE719,0xD7D7B562,0xABAB4DE6,0x7676EC9A,
                0xCACA8F45,0x82821F9D,0xC9C98940,0x7D7DFA87,0xFAFAEF15,0x5959B2EB,0x47478EC9,0xF0F0FB0B,
                0xB7B775C2,0xFDFDE11C,0x93933DAE,0x26264C6A,0x36366C5A,0x3F3F7E41,0xF7F7F502,0xCCCC834F,
                0 \times 3434685C, 0 \times A5A551F4, 0 \times E5E5D134, 0 \times F1F1F908, 0 \times 7171E293, 0 \times D8D8AB73, 0 \times 31316253, 0 \times 15152A3F, 0 \times 15152A5F, 
                0 \\ x \\ 0 \\ x \\ 0 \\ x \\ C \\ 7 \\ 9 \\ 5 \\ 2 \\ 0 \\ x \\ 23 \\ 23 \\ 4665 \\ 0 \\ x \\ C \\ 3 \\ C \\ 3 \\ 9 \\ D \\ 5 \\ 0 \\ x \\ 18183028 \\ 0 \\ x \\ 969637 \\ A1, \\ 0 \\ x \\ 050500 \\ A0F, \\ 0 \\ x \\ 9A \\ 9A \\ 2FB \\ 5, \\ 0 \\ x \\ 18183028 \\ 0 \\ x \\ 969637 \\ A1, \\ 0 \\ x \\ 0 \\ 5 \\ 0 \\ x \\ 0 
                0 \times 5252 \\ 244 \\ F6, 0 \times 383 \\ 8764 \\ D, 0 \times D6D6B761, 0 \times 83837 \\ DCE, 0 \times 2929527 \\ B, 0 \times E3E3 \\ DD3E, 0 \times 2F2F5E71, 0 \times 84841397, 0 \times 10^{-10} \\ DCE, 0 \times 2929527 \\ DCE, 0 \times 29295
                0x5353A6F5,0xD1D1B968,0000000000,0xEDEDC12C,0x20204060,0xFCFCE31F,0xB1B179C8,0x5B5BB6ED,
                0 x 6 A 6 A D 4 B E, 0 x C B C B 8 D 4 6, 0 x B E B E 6 7 D 9, 0 x 3 9 3 9 7 2 4 B, 0 x 4 A 4 A 9 4 D E, 0 x 4 C 4 C 9 8 D 4, 0 x 5 8 5 8 B 0 E 8, 0 x C F C F 8 5 4 A, 0 x 5 B 0 E 8, 0 x C F C F 8 5 4 A, 0 x 5 B 0 E 8, 0 x C F C F 8 5 4 A, 0 x 5 B 0 E 8, 0 x C F C F 8 5 4 A, 0 x 5 B 0 E 8, 0 x C F C F 8 5 4 A, 0 x 5 B 0 E 8, 0 x C F C F 8 5 4 A, 0 x 5 B 0 E 8, 0 x C F C F 8 5 4 A, 0 x 5 B 0 E 8, 0 x C F C F 8 5 4 A, 0 x 5 B 0 E 8, 0 x C F C F 8 5 4 A, 0 x 5 B 0 E 8, 0 x C F C F 8 5 4 A, 0 x 5 B 0 E 8, 0 x C F C F 8 5 4 A, 0 x 5 B 0 E 8, 0 x C F C F 8 5 4 A, 0 x 5 B 0 E 8, 0 x C F C F 8 5 4 A, 0 x 5 B 0 E 8, 0 x C F C F 8 5 4 A, 0 x 5 B 0 E 8, 0 x C F C F 8 5 4 A, 0 x 5 B 0 E 8, 0 x C F C F 8 5 4 A, 0 x 5 B 0 E 8, 0 x C F C F 8 5 4 A, 0 x 5 B 0 E 8, 0 x C F C F 8 5 4 A, 0 x 5 B 0 E 8, 0 x C F C F 8 5 4 A, 0 x 5 B 0 E 8, 0 x C F C F 8 5 4 A, 0 x 5 B 0 E 8, 0 x C F C F 8 5 4 A, 0 x 5 B 0 E 8, 0 x C F C F 8 5 4 A, 0 x 5 B 0 E 8, 0 x C F C F 8 5 4 A, 0 x 5 B 0 E 8, 0 x 
                0 \\ x 45458 \\ A \\ CF, 0 \\ x F \\ 9 F \\ 9 E \\ 9 10, 0 \\ x 0 \\ 2 0 2 0 4 \\ 0 6, 0 \\ x \\ 7 F \\ 7 F \\ E \\ 8 1, 0 \\ x 5050 \\ 0 \\ A \\ 0 F \\ 0, 0 \\ x \\ 3 \\ C \\ 3 \\ C \\ 7 E \\ 4 \\ 4, 0 \\ x \\ 9 F \\ 9 F \\ 2 5 \\ B \\ 4, 0 \\ x \\ 8 B \\ 8 \\ 4 \\ B \\ 2 \\ 3, 0 \\ x \\ 4 \\ 4, 0 \\ x \\ 9 F \\ 9 F \\ 2 5 \\ B \\ 4, 0 \\ x \\ 8 \\ 4 \\ B \\ 2 \\ 3, 0 \\ x \\ 4 \\ 4, 0 \\ x \\ 4, 0 \\
                0x5151A2F3,0xA3A35DFE,0x404080C0,0x8F8F058A,0x92923FAD,0x9D9D21BC,0x38387048,0xF5F5F104,
                0xBCBC63DF,0xB6B677C1,0xDADAAF75,0x21214263,0x10102030,0xFFFFE51A,0xF3F3FD0E,0xD2D2BF6D,
                0 \times CDCD814C, 0 \times 0C0C1814, 0 \times 13132635, 0 \times ECECC32F, 0 \times 5F5FBEE1, 0 \times 979735A2, 0 \times 444488CC, 0 \times 17172E39, 
                0 \times 6060C0A0, 0 \times 81811998, 0 \times 4F4F9ED1, 0 \times DCDCA37F, 0 \times 22224466, 0 \times 2A2A547E, 0 \times 90903BAB, 0 \times 88880B83, 0 \times 2A2A547E, 0 \times 90903BAB, 
                0 \\ \text{x46468CCA, 0} \\ \text{xEEEEC729, 0} \\ \text{xB8B86BD3, 0} \\ \text{x1414283C, 0} \\ \text{xDEDEA779, 0} \\ \text{x5E5EBCE2, 0} \\ \text{x0B0B161D, 0} \\ \text{xDBDBAD76, 0} \\ \text{x1414283C, 0} \\ \text{x0B0B161D, 0} \\ \text{x0BDBAD76, 0} \\ \text{x1414283C, 0} \\ \text{x141
                0xE0E0DB3B, 0x32326456, 0x3A3A744E, 0x0A0A141E, 0x494992DB, 0x06060C0A, 0x2424486C, 0x5C5CB8E4, 0x6C60B2B, 0x6C60BB, 0x6C6BB, 0x6C6BB
                0 \times E7E7D532, 0 \times C8C88B43, 0 \times 37376E59, 0 \times 6D6DDAB7, 0 \times 8D8D018C, 0 \times D5D5B164, 0 \times 4E4E9CD2, 0 \times A9A949E0, 0 \times A9A9A949E0, 0 \times A9A9A949
                0x6C6CD8B4,0x5656ACFA,0xF4F4F307,0xEAEACF25,0x6565CAAF,0x7A7AF48E,0xAEAE47E9,0x08081018,
                0xBABA6FD5,0x7878F088,0x25254A6F,0x2E2E5C72,0x1C1C3824,0xA6A657F1,0xB4B473C7,0xC6C69751,
                0xE8E8CB23, 0xDDDDA17C, 0x7474E89C, 0x1F1F3E21, 0x4B4B96DD, 0xBDBD61DC, 0x8B8B0D86, 0x8A8A0F85, 0x8B8B0D86, 0x8A8A0F85, 0x8A8A0F85, 0x8B8B0D86, 0x8A8A0F85, 0x8B8B0D86, 0x8A8A0F85, 0x8B8B0D86, 0x8B8B0D86, 0x8A8A0F85, 0x8B8B0D86, 0x8A8A0F85, 0x8B8B0D86, 0x8B8B0D86, 0x8A8A0F85, 0x8B8B0D86, 0x8B8B0D86, 0x8B8B0D86, 0x8A8A0F85, 0x8B8B0D86, 0x8BB0D86, 0x8B8B0D86, 0x8BB0D86, 0
                0 \\ x \\ 7070 \\ E090, 0 \\ x \\ 3E3E7C42, 0 \\ x \\ B5B571C4, 0 \\ x \\ 6666CCAA, 0 \\ x \\ 484890D8, 0 \\ x \\ 0303030605, 0 \\ x \\ F6F6F701, 0 \\ x \\ 0E0E1C12, 0 \\ x \\ 0 \\ x \\
                0 \\ \text{x} \\ 6161C2\\ \text{A3}, 0 \\ \text{x} \\ 953556\\ \text{A5F}, 0 \\ \text{x} \\ 9757\\ \text{AEF9}, 0 \\ \text{x} \\ \text{B9B969D0}, 0 \\ \text{x} \\ 86861791, 0 \\ \text{x} \\ \text{C1C19958}, 0 \\ \text{x} \\ \text{1D1D3A27}, 0 \\ \text{x} \\ \text{9E9E27B9}, 0 \\ \text{x} \\ \text{1D1D3A27}, 0 \\ \text{x} \\ \text{
                0xE1E1D938, 0xF8F8EB13, 0x98982BB3, 0x11112233, 0x6969D2BB, 0xD9D9A970, 0x8E8E0789, 0x949433A7, 0x6969D2BB, 0xD9D9A970, 0x8E8E0789, 0x94943A8, 0x6969D2BB, 0xD9D9A970, 0x8E8E0789, 0x94943A8, 0x6969D2BB, 0xD9D9A970, 0x8E8E0789, 0x6969D2BB, 0x6969
                0 \times 8 \\ \text{C8C038F, } 0 \times \text{A1A159F8, } 0 \times 8 \\ \text{9890980, } 0 \times \text{0D0D1A17, } 0 \times \text{BFBF65DA, } 0 \times \text{E6E6D731, } 0 \times 4 \\ \text{24284C6, } 0 \times \text{6868D0B8, } 0 \times \text{C8C038F, } 0 \times 
                0 \times 414182C3, 0 \times 999929B0, 0 \times 2D2D5A77, 0 \times 0F0F1E11, 0 \times B0B07BCB, 0 \times 5454A8FC, 0 \times BBBB6DD6, 0 \times 16162C3ABBB6DD6, 0 \times 16162C3ABBB6D6, 0 \times 16162C3ABBB6D6,
                0x30605030,0x01020301,0x67CEA967,0x2B567D2B,0xFEE719FE,0xD7B562D7,0xAB4DE6AB,0x76EC9A76,
                0xCA8F45CA,0x821F9D82,0xC98940C9,0x7DFA877D,0xFAEF15FA,0x59B2EB59,0x478EC947,0xF0FB0BF0,
                0 \\ x \\ B \\ 775 \\ C2 \\ B \\ 7, 0 \\ x \\ F \\ DE \\ 11 \\ CF \\ D, 0 \\ x \\ 933 \\ DAE \\ 93, 0 \\ x \\ 264 \\ C6A \\ 26, 0 \\ x \\ 366 \\ C5A \\ 36, 0 \\ x \\ 3F \\ 7E4 \\ 13F, 0 \\ x \\ F7F \\ 50 \\ 2F7, 0 \\ x \\ CC8 \\ 34F \\ CC, 0 \\ x \\ 10 \\
```

```
0 \times 34685 \\ \text{C34}, 0 \times \text{A551F4A5}, 0 \times \text{E5D134E5}, 0 \times \text{F1F908F1}, 0 \times 71 \\ \text{E29371}, 0 \times \text{D8AB73D8}, 0 \times 31625331, 0 \times 152 \\ \text{A3F15}, 0 \times \text{D8AB73D8}, 0 \times \text{D8AB73D8}
         0x04080C04, 0xC79552C7, 0x23466523, 0xC39D5EC3, 0x18302818, 0x9637A196, 0x050A0F05, 0x9A2FB59A, 0x050A0F05, 0x05
         0 \\  \times 070 \\  E0907, 0 \\  \times 12243612, 0 \\  \times 801 \\  B9B80, 0 \\  \times E2DF3 \\  DE2, 0 \\  \times EBCD26EB, 0 \\  \times 274E6927, 0 \\  \times B27FCDB2, 0 \\  \times 75EA9F75, 0 \\  \times 12243612, 0 \\  \times 12
         0x52A4F652,0x3B764D3B,0xD6B761D6,0xB37DCEB3,0x29527B29,0xE3DD3EE3,0x2F5E712F,0x84139784,
         0x53A6F553,0xD1B968D1,0000000000,0xEDC12CED,0x20406020,0xFCE31FFC,0xB179C8B1,0x5BB6ED5B,
         0x6AD4BE6A,0xCB8D46CB,0xBE67D9BE,0x39724B39,0x4A94DE4A,0x4C98D44C,0x58B0E858,0xCF854ACF,
         0 \\ x 458 A C F 45, 0 \\ x F 9 E 9 10 F 9, 0 \\ x 0 2 0 4 0 6 0 2, 0 \\ x 7 F F E 8 17 F, 0 \\ x 5 0 A 0 F 0 5 0, 0 \\ x 3 C 7 8 4 4 3 C, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x A 8 4 B E 3 A 8, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x A 8 4 B E 3 A 8, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x A 8 4 B E 3 A 8, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x A 8 4 B E 3 A 8, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x A 8 4 B E 3 A 8, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 8 4 B E 3 A 8, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 8 4 B E 3 A 8, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 8 4 B E 3 A 8, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 8 4 B E 3 A 8, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 8 4 B E 3 A 8, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 5 B A 9 F, 0 \\ x 9 F 2 
         0 \times BC63DFBC, 0 \times B677C1B6, 0 \times DAAF75DA, 0 \times 21426321, 0 \times 10203010, 0 \times FFE51AFF, 0 \times F3FD0EF3, 0 \times D2BF6DD2, 0 \times D2BF6D2, 0 \times D2BF6D2
         0 \times C49357C4, 0 \times A755F2A7, 0 \times 7EFC827E, 0 \times 3D7A473D, 0 \times 64C8AC64, 0 \times 5DBAE75D, 0 \times 19322B19, 0 \times 73E69573, 0 \times 19322B19, 
         0x468CCA46,0xEEC729EE,0xB86BD3B8,0x14283C14,0xDEA779DE,0x5EBCE25E,0x0B161D0B,0xDBAD76DB,
         0xE0DB3BE0,0x32645632,0x3A744E3A,0x0A141E0A,0x4992DB49,0x060C0A06,0x24486C24,0x5CB8E45C,
         0xE7D532E7,0xC88B43C8,0x376E5937,0x6DDAB76D,0x8D018C8D,0xD5B164D5,0x4E9CD24E,0xA949E0A9,
         0x6CD8B46C,0x56ACFA56,0xF4F307F4,0xEACF25EA,0x65CAAF65,0x7AF48E7A,0xAE47E9AE,0x08101808,
         0xBA6FD5BA,0x78F08878,0x254A6F25,0x2E5C722E,0x1C38241C,0xA657F1A6,0xB473C7B4,0xC69751C6,
         0 \times E8CB23E8, 0 \times DDA17CDD, 0 \times 74E89C74, 0 \times 1F3E211F, 0 \times 4B96DD4B, 0 \times BD61DCBD, 0 \times 8B0D868B, 0 \times 8A0F858A, 0 \times BD61DCBD, 
         0 \\ x \\ 70 \\ E09070 \\ , 0 \\ x \\ 3E7C423E \\ , 0 \\ x \\ B571C4B5 \\ , 0 \\ x \\ 66CCAA66 \\ , 0 \\ x \\ 4890D848 \\ , 0 \\ x \\ 03060503 \\ , 0 \\ x \\ F6F701F6 \\ , 0 \\ x \\ 0E1C120E \\ , 0 \\ x \\ 0
         0 \times 61 \times 22 \times 361, 0 \times 356 \times 615735, 0 \times 57 \times 61579186, 0 \times 6179186, 0 \times 6179186,
         0xE1D938E1,0xF8EB13F8,0x982BB398,0x11223311,0x69D2BB69,0xD9A970D9,0x8E07898E,0x9433A794,
         0x8C038F8C,0xA159F8A1,0x89098089,0x0D1A170D,0xBF65DABF,0xE6D731E6,0x4284C642,0x68D0B868,
         0 \\ x \\ 4182C341, 0 \\ x \\ 9929B099, 0 \\ x \\ 2D5A772D, 0 \\ x \\ 0 \\ F1E110F, 0 \\ x \\ B07BCBB0, 0 \\ x \\ 54A8FC54, 0 \\ x \\ BB6DD6BB, 0 \\ x \\ 162C3A16
         0x60503030,0x02030101,0xCEA96767,0x567D2B2B,0xE719FEFE,0xB562D7D7,0x4DE6ABAB,0xEC9A7676,
         0 \times 75 \\ \text{C2B7B7}, 0 \times \text{E11CFDFD}, 0 \times 30 \\ \text{AE9393}, 0 \times 4 \\ \text{C6A2626}, 0 \times 6 \\ \text{C5A3636}, 0 \times 7 \\ \text{E413F3F}, 0 \times \text{F502F7F7}, 0 \times 834 \\ \text{FCCCC}, 0 \times 6 \\ \text{C5A3636}, 0 \times 7 \\ \text{C6A3636}, 0 \times 7 \\ \text{
         0 \times 685 \\ \text{C3434}, 0 \times 51 \\ \text{F4A5A5}, 0 \times \text{D134E5E5}, 0 \times \text{F908F1F1}, 0 \times \text{E2937171}, 0 \times \text{AB73D8D8}, 0 \times 62533131, 0 \times 2 \\ \text{A3F1515}, 0 \times \text{C4A3F1515}, 0 \times \text{C4A3F1
         0 \\ x \\ 0 \\ 
         0x0E090707,0x24361212,0x1B9B8080,0xDF3DE2E2,0xCD26EBEB,0x4E692727,0x7FCDB2B2,0xEA9F7575,
         {\tt 0x121B0909,0x1D9E8383,0x58742C2C,0x342E1A1A,0x362D1B1B,0xDCB26E6E,0xB4EE5A5A,0x5BFBA0A0,0x121B0909,0x1D9E8383,0x58742C2C,0x342E1A1A,0x362D1B1B,0xDCB26E6E,0xB4EE5A5A,0x5BFBA0A0,0x362D1B1B,0xDCB26E6E,0xB4EE5A5A,0x5BFBA0A0,0x362D1B1B,0xDCB26E6E,0xB4EE5A5A,0x5BFBA0A0,0x362D1B1B,0xDCB26E6E,0xB4EE5A5A,0x5BFBA0A0,0x362D1B1B,0xDCB26E6E,0xB4EE5A5A,0x5BFBA0A0,0x362D1B1B,0xDCB26E6E,0xB4EE5A5A,0x5BFBA0A0,0x362D1B1B,0xDCB26E6E,0xB4EE5A5A,0x5BFBA0A0,0x362D1B1B,0xDCB26E6E,0xB4EE5A5A,0x5BFBA0A0,0x362D1B1B,0xDCB26E6E,0xB4EE5A5A,0x5BFBA0A0,0x362D1B1B,0xDCB26E6E,0xB4EE5A5A,0x5BFBA0A0,0x362D1B1B,0xDCB26E6E,0xB4EE5A5A,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFBA0A0,0x5BFB
         0 \times A4F65252, 0 \times 764D3B3B, 0 \times B761D6D6, 0 \times 7DCEB3B3, 0 \times 527B2929, 0 \times DD3EE3E3, 0 \times 5E712F2F, 0 \times 13978484, 0 \times 5E712F2F, 0 \times 1397848, 0 \times 5E712F2F, 0 \times 5E712
         0xBB6BD0D0,0xC52AEFEF,0x4FE5AAAA,0xED16FBFB,0x86C54343,0x9AD74D4D,0x66553333,0x11948585,
         0 \times 8 \text{ACF4} \\ 545, 0 \times \text{E910F9F9}, 0 \times 04060202, 0 \times \text{FE817F7F}, 0 \times \text{A0F05050}, 0 \times 78443 \\ \text{C3C}, 0 \times 258 \\ \text{A9F9F}, 0 \times 48 \\ \text{E3A8A8}, 0 \times 10000 \\ \text{E3A9A}, 0 \times 100000 \\ \text{E3A9A}, 0 \times 10000 \\ \text{E3A9A}, 0 \times 10000 \\ \text{E3A9A}, 0 \times 100000 \\ \text{E3A9A}, 0 \times 
         0 \times 63 \\ DFBCBC, 0 \times 77 \\ C1B6B6, 0 \times AF75 \\ DADA, 0 \times 42632121, 0 \times 20301010, 0 \times E51 \\ AFFFF, 0 \times FD0 \\ EF3F3, 0 \times BF6 \\ DD2D2, 0 \times E51 \\ AFFFF, 0 \times FD0 \\ EF3F3, 0 \times BF6 \\ DD2D2, 0 \times E51 \\ AFFFF, 0 \times FD0 \\ EF3F3, 0 \times BF6 \\ DD2D2, 0 \times E51 \\ AFFFF, 0 \times FD0 \\ EF3F3, 0 \times BF6 \\ DD2D2, 0 \times E51 \\ AFFFFF, 0 \times FD0 \\ EF3F3, 0 \times BF6 \\ DD2D2, 0 \times E51 \\ AFFFFF, 0 \times FD0 \\ EF3F3, 0 \times BF6 \\ DD2D2, 0 \times E51 \\ EF3F3, 0 \times BF6 \\ DD2D2, 0 \times E51 \\ EF3F3, 0 \times BF6 \\ DD2D2, 0 \times BF6 \\ DD3D2, 0 \times BF6 
         0x814CCDCD, 0x18140C0C, 0x26351313, 0xC32FECEC, 0xBEE15F5F, 0x35A29797, 0x88CC4444, 0x2E391717,
         0x9357C4C4,0x55F2A7A7,0xFC827E7E,0x7A473D3D,0xC8AC6464,0xBAE75D5D,0x322B1919,0xE6957373,
         0 \times C0A06060, 0 \times 19988181, 0 \times 9ED14F4F, 0 \times A37FDCDC, 0 \times 44662222, 0 \times 547E2A2A, 0 \times 3BAB9090, 0 \times 0B838888, 0 \times 19988181, 0 \times 9ED14F4F, 0 \times 19988181, 0 \times 1998818, 0 \times 
         0x8CCA4646,0xC729EEEE,0x6BD3B8B8,0x283C1414,0xA779DEDE,0xBCE25E5E,0x161D0B0B,0xAD76DBDB,
          \texttt{0xDB3BE0E0,0x64563232,0x744E3A3A,0x141E0A0A,0x92DB4949,0x0C0A0606,0x486C2424,0xB8E45C5C, } \\
         0xD532E7E7,0x8B43C8C8,0x6E593737,0xDAB76D6D,0x018C8D8D,0xB164D5D5,0x9CD24E4E,0x49E0A9A9,
         0x6FD5BABA,0xF0887878,0x4A6F2525,0x5C722E2E,0x38241C1C,0x57F1A6A6,0x73C7B4B4,0x9751C6C6,
         0xCB23E8E8,0xA17CDDDD,0xE89C7474,0x3E211F1F,0x96DD4B4B,0x61DCBDBD,0x0D868B8B,0x0F858A8A,
         0 \times C2A36161, 0 \times 6A5F3535, 0 \times AEF95757, 0 \times 69D0B9B9, 0 \times 17918686, 0 \times 9958C1C1, 0 \times 3A271D1D, 0 \times 27B99E9E, 0 \times 17918686, 0 \times 17918686, 0 \times 19958C1C1, 0 \times 19958C1C1,
          \texttt{0xD938E1E1,0xEB13F8F8,0x2BB39898,0x22331111,0xD2BB6969,0xA970D9D9,0x07898E8E,0x33A79494,0x2BB6969,0xB970D9D9,0x07898E8E,0x33A79494,0xB870D9D9,0xD9B6969,0xB970D9D9,0xD9B6969,0xB970D9D9,0xD9B6969,0xB970D9D9,0xD9B6969,0xB970D9D9,0xD9B6969,0xB970D9D9,0xD9B6969,0xB970D9D9,0xD9B6969,0xB970D9D9,0xD9B6969,0xB970D9D9,0xD9B6969,0xB970D9D9,0xD9B6969,0xB970D9D9,0xD9B6969,0xB970D9D9,0xD9B6969,0xB970D9D9,0xD9B6969,0xB970D9D9,0xD9B6969,0xB970D9D9,0xD9B6969,0xB970D9D9,0xD9B6969,0xB970D9D9,0xD9B6969,0xB970D9D9,0xD9B6969,0xB970D9D9,0xD9B6969,0xB970D9D9,0xD9B6969,0xB970D9D9,0xD9B6969,0xB970D9D9,0xD9B6969,0xB970D9D9,0xD9B6969,0xB970D9D9,0xD9B6969,0xB970D9D9,0xD9B6969,0xB970D9D9,0xD9B6969,0xB970D9D9,0xD9B6969,0xB970D9D9,0xD9B6969,0xB970D9D9,0xD9B6969,0xB970D9D9,0xD9B6969,0xB970D9D9,0xD9B6969,0xB970D9D9,0xD9B6969,0xB970D9D9,0xD9B6969,0xB970D9D9,0xD9B6969,0xB970D9D9,0xD9B6969,0xB970D9D9,0xD9B6969,0xB970D9D9,0xD9B6969,0xB970D9D9,0xD9B6969,0xB970D9D9,0xD9B6969,0xB970D9D9,0xD9B6969,0xB970D9D9,0xD9B6969,0xB970D9D9,0xD9B6960,0xB970D9D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0xD90D9,0
         0x038F8C8C.0x59F8A1A1.0x09808989.0x1A170D0D.0x65DABFBF.0xD731E6E6.0x84C64242.0xD0B86868.
         };
static u32 fl_tab[4][256] =
         0x00000063,0x0000007C,0x00000077,0x0000007B,0x000000F2,0x0000006B,0x0000006F,0x000000C5,
         0x000000B7,0x000000FD,0x00000093,0x00000026,0x00000036,0x0000003F,0x000000F7,0x000000CC,
         0x00000053,0x000000D1,0x00000000,0x000000ED,0x000000020,0x000000FC,0x000000B1,0x0000005B,
```

```
0 \\ \\ \text{$0$} \\ \text{$0
0x000000D0,0x000000EF,0x000000AA,0x000000FB,0x0000004D,0x0000004D,0x00000033,0x00000085,
0x000000BC,0x000000B6,0x000000DA,0x000000021,0x000000010,0x000000FF,0x000000F3,0x000000D2,
0 \times 000000070, 0 \times 00000003E, 0 \times 000000085, 0 \times 000000066, 0 \times 000000048, 0 \times 00000003, 0 \times 0000000F6, 0 \times 00000000E,
0x00006C00,0x00005600,0x0000F400,0x0000EA00,0x00006500,0x00007A00,0x0000AE00,0x00000800,
0x0000E100,0x0000F800,0x00009800,0x00001100,0x00006900,0x0000D900,0x00008E00,0x00009400,
0 \times 00300000, 0 \times 00010000, 0 \times 00670000, 0 \times 00280000, 0 \times 00760000, 0 \times 00D70000, 0 \times 00A80000, 0 \times 00760000,
0 \\ \\ \text{$\times$000CD0000,} \\ 0 \\ \text{$\times$000C00000,} \\ 0 \\ \text{$\times$00130000,} \\ 0 \\ \text{$\times$00EC0000,} \\ 0 \\ \text{$\times$005F0000,} \\ 0 \\ \text{$\times$00970000,} \\ 0 \\ \text{$\times$00440000,} \\ 0 \\ \text{$\times$00170000,} \\ 0 \\ \text{$\times$0017000,} \\ 0 \\ \text{$\times$001700,} \\
0 \times 0 0 = 0 0 0 0 0, 0 \times 0 0 3 2 0 0 0 0, 0 \times 0 0 3 A 0 0 0 0, 0 \times 0 0 0 A 0 0 0 0, 0 \times 0 0 4 9 0 0 0 0, 0 \times 0 0 0 6 0 0 0, 0 \times 0 0 2 4 0 0 0, 0 \times 0 0 5 C 0 0 0,
```

```
0 \\ \\ \\ x04000000, 0 \\ \\ xC70000000, 0 \\ \\ x230000000, 0 \\ xC30000000, 0 \\ x180000000, 0 \\ \\ x960000000, 0 \\ x050000000, 0 \\ x9A0000000, 0 \\ x9A000000, 0 \\ x9A00000, 0 \\ x9A0000, 0 \\ x9A00000, 0 \\ x9A00000, 0 \\ x9A0000, 0 \\ x9A00
 0x07000000,0x12000000,0x80000000,0xE2000000,0xEB000000,0x27000000,0xB2000000,0x75000000,
 0x53000000,0xD1000000,0000000000,0xED0000000,0x20000000,0xFC000000,0xB1000000,0x5B000000,
 0 \\ \text{x} \\ \text{5} \\ 10000000, 0 \\ \text{x} \\ \text{4} \\ 0000000, 0 \\ \text{x} \\ \text{4} \\ 0000000, 0 \\ \text{x} \\ \text{8} \\ 0000000, 0 \\ \text{x} \\ \text{9} \\ 20000000, 0 \\ \text{x} \\ \text{9} \\ \text{2} \\ 0000000, 0 \\ \text{x} \\ \text{3} \\ 80000000, 0 \\ \text{x} \\ \text{F} \\ \text{5} \\ 0000000, 0 \\ \text{x} \\ \text{7} \\ \text{7} \\ \text{8} \\ \text{8} \\ \text{7} \\ \text{8} \\ \text{8} \\ \text{7} \\ \text{8} \\ \text
 0xBC000000,0xB6000000,0xDA000000,0x21000000,0x10000000,0xFF000000,0xF3000000,0xD2000000,
 /*----*/
                                  /* The expanded key */
static u32 Ekey[44];
/*---- The round Function. 4 table lookups and 4 Exors -----*/
#define f rnd(x, n)
  ( ft_tab[0][byte0(x[n])]
     ft_{tab}[1][byte1(x[(n + 1) & 3])]
  ^ ft_tab[2][byte2(x[(n + 2) & 3])]
  ^ ft_tab[3][byte3(x[(n + 3) & 3])] )
#define f_round(bo, bi, k)
     bo[0] = f_rnd(bi, 0) ^ k[0];
     bo[1] = f_rnd(bi, 1) ^ k[1];
     bo[2] = f_{rnd}(bi, 2) ^{k[1]};
     bo[3] = f_rnd(bi, 3) ^k[3];
     k += 4
/*--- The S Box lookup used in constructing the Key schedule ---*/
#define ls box(x)
 ( fl_tab[0][byte0(x)] \
  fl_tab[1][byte1(x)] \
  ^ fl_tab[2][byte2(x)] \
  ^ fl tab[3][byte3(x)] )
/*----* The last round function (no MixColumn) -----*/
#define lf rnd(x, n)
  ( fl_tab[0][byte0(x[n])]
  ^ fl_tab[1][byte1(x[(n + 1) & 3])]
^ fl_tab[2][byte2(x[(n + 2) & 3])]
```

```
^ fl_tab[3][byte3(x[(n + 3) & 3])] )
/*----
 * RijndaelKeySchedule
 * Initialise the key schedule from a supplied key
void RijndaelKeySchedule(u8 key[16])
     u32 t;
    u32 *ek=Ekey, /* pointer to the expanded key */
*rc=rnd_con; /* pointer to the round constant */
     Ekey[0] = u32_in(key
     Ekey[0] = u32_in(key );

Ekey[1] = u32_in(key + 4);

Ekey[2] = u32_in(key + 8);
     Ekey[3] = u32_{in}(key + 12);
     while(ek < Ekey + 40)
         t = rot3(ek[3]);
ek[4] = ek[0] ^ ls_box(t) ^ *rc++;
ek[5] = ek[1] ^ ek[4];
ek[6] = ek[2] ^ ek[5];
         ek[7] = ek[3] ^ ek[6];

ek += 4;
}
/*-----
 * RijndaelEncrypt
 * Encrypt an input block
void RijndaelEncrypt(u8 in[16], u8 out[16])
             b0[4], b1[4], *kp = Ekey;
    b0[0] = u32_in(in ) ^ *kp++;
b0[1] = u32_in(in + 4) ^ *kp++;
b0[2] = u32_in(in + 8) ^ *kp++;
    b0[3] = u32 in(in + 12) ^ *kp++;
    f_round(b1, b0, kp);
f_round(b0, b1, kp);
     f_round(b1, b0, kp);
     f_round(b0, b1, kp);
f_round(b1, b0, kp);
     f_round(b0, b1, kp);
f_round(b1, b0, kp);
     f_round(b0, b1, kp);
     f_round(b1, b0, kp);
    u32_out(out, lf_rnd(b1, 0) ^ kp[0]);
u32_out(out + 4, lf_rnd(b1, 1) ^ kp[1]);
u32_out(out + 8, lf_rnd(b1, 2) ^ kp[2]);
    u32_out(out + 12, lf_rnd(b1, 3) ^ kp[3]);
}
```

Annex A (informative): Change history

Change history						
TSG SA #	Version	CR	Tdoc SA	New Version	Subject/Comment	
SP-10	SAGE v 1.1	-	SP-010673	3.0.0	Approved as Release 1999	
SP-11	3.0.0	-	-	4.0.0	Updated to Release 4	
SP-16	4.0.0	-	-	5.0.0	Updated to Release 5	
SP-20	5.0.0	001	SP-030226	5.1.0	Addition of missing line to Rijndael S-box listing	
SP-26	5.0.0	-	-	6.0.0	Updated to Release 6	
SP-36	6.0.0	-	-	7.0.0	Updated to Release 7	
SP-42	7.0.0	-	-	8.0.0	Updated to Release 8	

History

Document history					
V8.0.0	February 2009	Publication			