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Document 2: Kasumi specification (3GPP TS 35.202 version 12.0.0 Release 12)



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Foreword

This Technical Specification (TS) has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP).

The 3GPP Confidentiality and Integrity Algorithms f8 & f9 have been developed through the collaborative efforts of the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), the Association of Radio Industries and Businesses (ARIB), the Telecommunications Technology Association (TTA), the T1 Committee.

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Introduction

This specification has been prepared by the 3GPP Task Force, and gives a detailed specification of the 3GPP Algorithm KASUMI. KASUMI is a block cipher that forms the heart of the 3GPP confidentiality algorithm f8, and the 3GPP integrity algorithm f9.

This document is the second of four, which between them form the entire specification of the 3GPP Confidentiality and Integrity Algorithms:

- 3GPP TS 35.201: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G Security; Specification of the 3GPP Confidentiality and Integrity Algorithms; Document 1: f8 and f9 Specification".
- 3GPP TS 35.202: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G Security; Specification of the 3GPP Confidentiality and Integrity Algorithms; Document 2: KASUMI Specification".
- 3GPP TS 35.203: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G Security; Specification of the 3GPP Confidentiality and Integrity Algorithms; Document 3: Implementors" Test Data".

- 3GPP TS 35.204: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G Security; Specification of the 3GPP Confidentiality and Integrity Algorithms; Document 4: Design Conformance Test Data".

The normative part of the specification of **KASUMI** is in the main body of this document. The annexes to this document are purely informative. Annex 1 contains illustrations of functional elements of the algorithm, while Annex 2 contains an implementation program listing of the cryptographic algorithm specified in the main body of this document, written in the programming language C.

Similarly the normative part of the specification of the f8 (confidentiality) and the f9 (integrity) algorithms is in the main body of Document 1. The annexes of those documents, and Documents 3 and 4 above, are purely informative.

0 Scope

This specification gives a detailed specification of the 3GPP Algorithm KASUMI. KASUMI is a block cipher that forms the heart of the 3GPP confidentiality algorithm f8, and the 3GPP integrity algorithm f9.

NORMATIVE SECTION

This part of the document contains the normative specification of the KASUMI algorithm.

1 Outline of the normative part

Section 2 introduces the algorithm and describes the notation used in the subsequent sections.

Section 3 defines the algorithm structure and its operation.

Section 4 defines the basic components of the algorithm.

1.1 References

The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.

- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*.
- [1] 3GPP TS 33.102 version 3.2.0: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G Security; Security Architecture".
- [2] 3GPP TS 33.105 version 3.1.0: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G Security; Cryptographic Algorithm Requirements".
- [3] 3GPP TS 35.201: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G Security; Specification of the 3GPP Confidentiality and Integrity Algorithms; Document 1: f8 and f9 Specification".
- [4] 3GPP TS 35.202: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G Security; Specification of the 3GPP Confidentiality and Integrity Algorithms; Document 2: KASUMI Specification".
- [5] 3GPP TS 35.203: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G Security; Specification of the 3GPP Confidentiality and Integrity Algorithms; Document 3: Implementors" Test Data".
- [6] 3GPP TS 35.204: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G Security; Specification of the 3GPP Confidentiality and Integrity Algorithms; Document 4: Design Conformance Test Data".
- [7] ISO/IEC 9797-1:1999: "Information technology Security techniques Message Authentication Codes (MACs)".

2 Introductory information

2.1 Introduction

Within the security architecture of the 3GPP system there are two standardised algorithms: A confidentiality algorithm f8, and an integrity algorithm f9. These algorithms are fully specified in a companion document[3]. Each of these algorithms is based on the **KASUMI** algorithm that is specified here.

KASUMI is a block cipher that produces a 64-bit output from a 64-bit input under the control of a 128-bit key.

2.2 Notation

2.2.1 Radix

We use the prefix **0x** to indicate **hexadecimal** numbers.

2.2.2 Bit/Byte ordering

All data variables in this specification are presented with the most significant bit (or byte) on the left hand side and the least significant bit (or byte) on the right hand side. Where a variable is broken down into a number of sub-strings, the left most (most significant) sub-string consists of the most significant part of the original string and so on through to the least significant.

For example if a 64-bit value X is subdivided into four 16-bit substrings P, Q, R, S we have:

X = 0x0123456789ABCDEF

we have:

P = 0x0123, Q = 0x4567, R = 0x89AB, S = 0xCDEF.

In binary this would be:

with P = 000000100100011

Q = 0100010101100111 R = 100010011010101S = 1100110111101111

2.2.3 Conventions

We use the assignment operator "=", as used in several programming languages. When we write

<variable> = <expression>

we mean that *<variable>* assumes the value that *<expression>* had before the assignment took place. For instance,

$$x = x + y + 3$$

means

(new value of x) becomes (old value of x) + (old value of y) + 3.

2.2.4 Subfunctions

KASUMI decomposes into a number of subfunctions (FL, FO, FI) which are used in conjunction with associated subkeys (KL, KO, KI) in a Feistel structure comprising a number of rounds (and rounds within rounds for some subfunctions). Specific instances of the function and/or keys are represented by $XX_{i,j}$ where i is the outer round number of KASUMI and j is the inner round number.

For example the function FO comprises three rounds of the function FI, so we designate the third round of FI in the fifth round of KASUMI as $FI_{5,3}$.

2.2.5 List of Symbols

= The assignment operator.

 \oplus The bitwise exclusive-OR operation.

The concatenation of the two operands.

<<<n The left circular rotation of the operand by n bits.

ROL() The left circular rotation of the operand by one bit.

U The bitwise OR operation.

2.3 List of Functions and Variables

 $f_i()$ The round function for the ith round of **KASUMI**

FI() A subfunction within **KASUMI** that translates a 16-bit input to a 16-bit output using a 16-bit

subkey.

FL() A subfunction within **KASUMI** that translates a 32-bit input to a 32-bit output using a 32-bit

subkey.

FO() A subfunction within **KASUMI** that translates a 32-bit input to a 32-bit output using two 48-bit

subkeys.

K A 128-bit key.

KL_i,KO_i,KI_i subkeys used within the ith round of **KASUMI**.

S7[] An S-Box translating a 7-bit input to a 7-bit output.

S9[] An S-Box translating a 9-bit input to a 9-bit output.

3 KASUMI operation

3.1 Introduction

(See figure 1 in Annex 1)

KASUMI is a Feistel cipher with eight rounds. It operates on a 64-bit data block and uses a 128-bit key. In this section we define the basic eight-round operation. In section 4 we define in detail the make-up of the round function $f_i()$.

3.2 Encryption

KASUMI operates on a 64-bit input *I* using a 128-bit key *K* to produce a 64-bit output *OUTPUT*, as follows:

The input I is divided into two 32-bit strings L_{θ} and R_{θ} , where

$$I = L_0 \parallel R_0$$

Then for each integer i with $1 \le i \le 8$ we define:

$$R_i = L_{i-1}, L_i = R_{i-1} \oplus f_i(L_{i-1}, RK_i)$$

This constitutes the ith round function of **KASUMI**, where f_i denotes the round function with L_{i-1} and round key RK_i as inputs (see section 4 below).

The result *OUTPUT* is equal to the 64-bit string $(L_8 \parallel R_8)$ offered at the end of the eighth round. See figure 1 of Annex 1.

In the specifications for the f8 and f9 functions we represent this transformation by the term:

$$OUTPUT = KASUMI[I]_K$$

4 Components of KASUMI

4.1 Function f_i

(See figure 1 in Annex 1)

The function $f_i()$ takes a 32-bit input I and returns a 32-bit output O under the control of a round key RK_i , where the round key comprises the subkey triplet of (KL_i, KO_i, KI_i) . The function itself is constructed from two subfunctions; FL and FO with associated subkeys KL_i (used with FL) and subkeys KO_i and KI_i (used with FO).

The $f_i()$ function has two different forms depending on whether it is an even round or an odd round.

For rounds 1,3,5 and 7 we define:

$$f_i(I, RK_i) = FO(FL(I, KL_i), KO_i, KI_i)$$

and for rounds 2,4,6 and 8 we define:

$$f_i(I, RK_i) = FL(FO(I, KO_i, KI_i), KL_i)$$

i.e. For odd rounds the round data is passed through FL() and then FO(), whilst for even rounds it is passed through FO() and then FL().

4.2 Function FL

(See figure 4 in Annex 1)

The input to the function FL comprises a 32-bit data input I and a 32-bit subkey KL_i . The subkey is split into two 16-bit subkeys, $KL_{i,1}$ and $KL_{i,2}$ where

$$KL_i = KL_{i,1} \parallel KL_{i,2}$$
.

The input data I is split into two 16-bit halves, L and R where $I = L \parallel R$.

We define:

$$R' = R \oplus ROL(L \cap KL_{i,1})$$

 $L' = L \oplus ROL(R' \cup KL_{i,2})$

The 32-bit output value is $(L'/\!/R')$.

4.3 Function FO

(See figure 2 in Annex 1)

The input to the function FO comprises a 32-bit data input I and two sets of subkeys, a 48-bit subkey KO_i and 48-bit subkey KI_i .

The 32-bit data input is split into two halves, L_0 and R_0 where $I = L_0 // R_0$.

The 48-bit subkeys are subdivided into three 16-bit subkeys where

$$KO_i = KO_{i,1} \parallel KO_{i,2} \parallel KO_{i,3}$$
 and $KI_i = KI_{i,1} \parallel KI_{i,2} \parallel KI_{i,3}$.

Then for each integer j with $1 \le j \le 3$ we define:

$$R_j = FI(L_{j-1} \oplus KO_{i,j}, KI_{i,j}) \oplus R_{j-1}$$

 $L_i = R_{i-1}$

Finally we return the 32-bit value $(L_3 /\!\!/ R_3)$.

4.4 Function *FI*

(See figure 3 in Annex 1. The thick and thin lines in this diagram are used to emphasise the difference between the 9-bit and 7-bit data paths respectively).

The function FI takes a 16-bit data input I and 16-bit subkey $KI_{i,j}$. The input I is split into two unequal components, a 9-bit left half L_0 and a 7-bit right half R_0 where $I = L_0 // R_0$.

Similarly the key $KI_{i,j}$ is split into a 7-bit component $KI_{i,j,1}$ and a 9-bit component $KI_{i,j,2}$ where $KI_{i,j} = KI_{i,j,1} \parallel KI_{i,j,2}$.

The function uses two S-boxes, S7 which maps a 7-bit input to a 7-bit output, and S9 which maps a 9-bit input to a 9-bit output. These are fully defined in section 4.5. It also uses two additional functions which we designate ZE() and TR(). We define these as:

 $\mathbf{ZE}(x)$ takes the 7-bit value x and converts it to a 9-bit value by adding two zero bits to the most-significant end.

TR(x) takes the 9-bit value x and converts it to a 7-bit value by discarding the two most-significant bits.

We define the following series of operations:

$$L_{1} = R_{0} \qquad R_{1} = S9[L_{0}] \oplus ZE(R_{0})$$

$$L_{2} = R_{1} \oplus KI_{i,j,2} \qquad R_{2} = S7[L_{1}] \oplus TR(R_{1}) \oplus KI_{i,j,1}$$

$$L_{3} = R_{2} \qquad R_{3} = S9[L_{2}] \oplus ZE(R_{2})$$

$$L_{4} = S7[L_{3}] \oplus TR(R_{3}) \qquad R_{4} = R_{3}$$

The function returns the 16-bit value $(L_4 \parallel R_4)$.

4.5 S-boxes

The two S-boxes have been designed so that they may be easily implemented in combinational logic as well as by a look-up table. Both forms are given for each table.

The input x comprises either seven or nine bits with a corresponding number of bits in the output y. We therefore have:

$$x = x8 || x7 || x6 || x5 || x4 || x3 || x2 || x1 || x0$$

and

$$y = y8 || y7 || y6 || y5 || y4 || y3 || y2 || y1 || y0$$

where the x8, y8 and x7, y7 bits only apply to S9, and the x0 and y0 bits are the least significant bits.

In the logic equations:

```
x0x1x2 implies x0 \cap x1 \cap x2 where \cap is the AND operator. \oplus is the exclusive-OR operator.
```

Following the presentation of the logic equations and the equivalent look-up table an example is given of the use of each.

4.5.1 S7

Gate Logic:

Decimal Table:

```
54, 50, 62, 56, 22, 34, 94, 96, 38, 6, 63, 93, 2, 18,123, 33, 55,113, 39,114, 21, 67, 65, 12, 47, 73, 46, 27, 25,111,124, 81, 53, 9,121, 79, 52, 60, 58, 48,101,127, 40,120,104, 70, 71, 43, 20,122, 72, 61, 23,109, 13,100, 77, 1, 16, 7, 82, 10,105, 98, 117,116, 76, 11, 89,106, 0,125,118, 99, 86, 69, 30, 57,126, 87, 112, 51, 17, 5, 95, 14, 90, 84, 91, 8, 35,103, 32, 97, 28, 66, 102, 31, 26, 45, 75, 4, 85, 92, 37, 74, 80, 49, 68, 29,115, 44, 64,107,108, 24,110, 83, 36, 78, 42, 19, 15, 41, 88,119, 59, 3
```

Example:

If we have an input value = 38, then using the decimal table S7[38] = 58.

For the combinational logic we have:

$$38 = 0100110_2$$
 \Rightarrow $x6 = 0$, $x5=1$, $x4=0$, $x3=0$, $x2=1$, $x1=1$, $x0=0$

which gives us:

Thus $y = 0111010_2 = 58$

4.5.2 S9

Gate Logic:

Decimal Table:

```
167,239,161,379,391,334, 9,338, 38,226, 48,358,452,385, 90,397,
183,253,147,331,415,340, 51,362,306,500,262, 82,216,159,356,177,
175,241,489, 37,206, 17, 0,333, 44,254,378, 58,143,220, 81,400,
 95, 3,315,245, 54,235,218,405,472,264,172,494,371,290,399, 76,
165,197,395,121,257,480,423,212,240, 28,462,176,406,507,288,223,
501,407,249,265, 89,186,221,428,164, 74,440,196,458,421,350,163,
232,158,134,354, 13,250,491,142,191, 69,193,425,152,227,366,135,
344,300,276,242,437,320,113,278, 11,243, 87,317, 36, 93,496, 27, 487,446,482, 41, 68,156,457,131,326,403,339, 20, 39,115,442,124,
475,384,508, 53,112,170,479,151,126,169, 73,268,279,321,168,364,
363,292, 46,499,393,327,324, 24,456,267,157,460,488,426,309,229,
439,506,208,271,349,401,434,236, 16,209,359, 52, 56,120,199,277,
465,416,252,287,246, 6, 83,305,420,345,153,502, 65, 61,244,282,
173,222,418, 67,386,368,261,101,476,291,195,430, 49, 79,166,330,
280,383,373,128,382,408,155,495,367,388,274,107,459,417, 62,454,
132,225,203,316,234, 14,301, 91,503,286,424,211,347,307,140,374,
 35,103,125,427, 19,214,453,146,498,314,444,230,256,329,198,285,
 72, 26,342,150,313,490,431,238,411,325,149,473, 40,119,174,355,
185,233,389, 71,448,273,372, 55,110,178,322, 12,469,392,369,190,
1,109,375,137,181, 88, 75,308,260,484, 98,272,370,275,412,111,336,318, 4,504,492,259,304, 77,337,435, 21,357,303,332,483, 18,
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266,351,343,144,441,365,108,298,251, 34,182,509,138,210,335,133,
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284,353,105,390,299,471,470,184, 57,200,348, 63,204,188, 33,451,
 97\,,\ 30\,,310\,,219\,,\ 94\,,160\,,129\,,493\,,\ 64\,,179\,,263\,,102\,,189\,,207\,,114\,,402\,,
438,477,387,122,192, 42,381, 5,145,118,180,449,293,323,136,380,
 43, 66, 60,455,341,445,202,432, 8,237, 15,376,436,464, 59,461
```

Example:

If we have an input value = 138, then using the decimal table S9[138] = 339.

For the combinational logic we have:

$$138 = 010001010_2 \implies x8 = 0, x7 = 1, x6 = 0, x5 = 0, x4 = 0, x3 = 1, x2 = 0, x1 = 1, x0 = 0$$

which gives us:

= 1= 1=0=0 $y4 = 0 \oplus 1 \oplus 0 \oplus 0$ = 1=0= 1= 0= 1

Thus $y = 101010011_2 = 339$

4.6 Key Schedule

KASUMI has a 128-bit key K. Each round of KASUMI uses 128 bits of key that are derived from K. Before the round keys can be calculated two 16-bit arrays Kj and Kj' (j=1 to 8) are derived in the following manner:

The 128-bit key **K** is subdivided into eight 16-bit values **K1...K8** where

$$K = K1 \parallel K2 \parallel K3 \parallel ... \parallel K8.$$

A second array of subkeys, Kj' is derived from Kj by applying:

For each integer j with $1 \le j \le 8$

$$Kj' = Kj \oplus Cj$$

Where *Cj* is the constant value defined in table 2.

The round subkeys are then derived from Kj and Kj' in the manner defined in table 1.

Table 1: Round subkeys

| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 |
|-------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| $KL_{i,1}$ | K1<<<1 | K2<<<1 | K3<<<1 | K4<<<1 | K5<<<1 | K6<<<1 | K7<<<1 | K8<<<1 |
| KL _{i,2} | K3' | K4' | K5' | K6' | K7' | K8′ | K1′ | K2' |
| $KO_{i,1}$ | K2<<<5 | K3<<<5 | K4<<<5 | K5<<<5 | K6<<<5 | K7<<<5 | K8<<<5 | K1<<<5 |
| $KO_{i,2}$ | K6<<<8 | K7<<<8 | K8<<<8 | K1<<<8 | K2<<<8 | K3<<<8 | K4<<<8 | K5<<<8 |
| KO _{i,3} | K7<<<13 | K8<<<13 | K1<<<13 | K2<<<13 | K3<<<13 | K4<<<13 | K5<<<13 | K6<<<13 |
| $KI_{i,1}$ | K5' | K6' | K7' | K8' | K1' | K2' | K3' | K4' |
| $KI_{i,2}$ | K4' | K5' | K6' | K7' | K8' | K1' | K2' | K3' |
| $KI_{i,3}$ | K8' | K1' | K2' | K3' | K4' | K5' | K6' | K7' |


Table 2: Constants

| C1 | 0x0123 |
|----|--------|
| C2 | 0x4567 |
| C3 | 0x89AB |
| C4 | 0xCDEF |
| C5 | 0xFEDC |
| C6 | 0xBA98 |
| C7 | 0x7654 |
| C8 | 0x3210 |

INFORMATIVE SECTION


This part of the document is purely informative and does not form part of the normative specification of KASUMI.

Annex 1 (informative): Figures of the KASUMI Algorithm



KASUMI has a number of characteristics that may be exploited in a hardware implementation and these are highlighted here.

- The simple key schedule is easy to implement in hardware.
- The S-Boxes have been designed so that they may be implemented by a small amount of combinational logic rather than by large look-up tables.
- The S7-Box and S9-Box operations in the FI function may be carried out in parallel (see alternative presentation in figure 5).
- The FI_{i,1} and FI_{i,2} operations may be carried out in parallel (see alternative presentation in figure 6).



Annex 2 (informative): Simulation Program Listing

Header file

```
Kasumi.h
typedef unsigned char u8;
typedef unsigned short u16;
typedef unsigned long u32;
void KeySchedule( u8 *key );
void Kasumi( u8 *data );
C Code
                      Kasumi.c
   A sample implementation of KASUMI, the core algorithm for the
   3GPP Confidentiality and Integrity algorithms.
 * This has been coded for clarity, not necessarily for efficiency.
 * This will compile and run correctly on both Intel (little endian)
 * and Sparc (big endian) machines. (Compilers used supported 32-bit ints).
   Version 1.1
                   08 May 2000
#include "Kasumi.h"
/*-----16 bit rotate left -----*/
#define ROL16(a,b) (u16)((a << b) | (a >> (16-b)))
/*---- unions: used to remove "endian" issues -----*/
typedef union {
   u32 b32;
    u16 b16[2];
   u8 b8[4];
} DWORD;
typedef union {
   u16 b16;
   u8 b8[2];
} WORD;
/*----- globals: The subkey arrays -----*/
static ul6 KLi1[8], KLi2[8];
static u16 KOi1[8], KOi2[8], KOi3[8];
static u16 KIi1[8], KIi2[8], KIi3[8];
     The FI function (fig 3). It includes the S7 and S9 tables.
       Transforms a 16-bit value.
static ul6 FI( ul6 in, ul6 subkey )
    ul6 nine, seven;
    static u16 S7[] = {
        54, 50, 62, 56, 22, 34, 94, 96, 38, 6, 63, 93, 2, 18,123, 33,
        55,113, 39,114, 21, 67, 65, 12, 47, 73, 46, 27, 25,111,124, 81, 53, 9,121, 79, 52, 60, 58, 48,101,127, 40,120,104, 70, 71, 43,
        20,122, 72, 61, 23,109, 13,100, 77, 1, 16, 7, 82, 10,105, 98,
```

}

```
117,116, 76, 11, 89,106, 0,125,118, 99, 86, 69, 30, 57,126, 87,
        112, 51, 17, 5, 95, 14, 90, 84, 91, 8, 35,103, 32, 97, 28, 66, 102, 31, 26, 45, 75, 4, 85, 92, 37, 74, 80, 49, 68, 29,115, 44,
        64,107,108, 24,110, 83, 36, 78, 42, 19, 15, 41, 88,119, 59, 3};
    static u16 S9[] = {
       167,239,161,379,391,334, 9,338, 38,226, 48,358,452,385, 90,397, 183,253,147,331,415,340, 51,362,306,500,262, 82,216,159,356,177, 175,241,489, 37,206, 17, 0,333, 44,254,378, 58,143,220, 81,400,
        95, 3,315,245, 54,235,218,405,472,264,172,494,371,290,399, 76,
        165,197,395,121,257,480,423,212,240, 28,462,176,406,507,288,223,
        232,158,134,354, 13,250,491,142,191, 69,193,425,152,227,366,135,
        344,300,276,242,437,320,113,278, 11,243, 87,317, 36, 93,496, 27,
        487,446,482, 41, 68,156,457,131,326,403,339, 20, 39,115,442,124,
        475,384,508, 53,112,170,479,151,126,169, 73,268,279,321,168,364,
        363,292,\ 46,499,393,327,324,\ 24,456,267,157,460,488,426,309,229,
        439,506,208,271,349,401,434,236, 16,209,359, 52, 56,120,199,277,
        465,416,252,287,246, 6, 83,305,420,345,153,502, 65, 61,244,282,
        173,222,418, 67,386,368,261,101,476,291,195,430, 49, 79,166,330,
        280,383,373,128,382,408,155,495,367,388,274,107,459,417, 62,454,
        35,103,125,427, 19,214,453,146,498,314,444,230,256,329,198,285,
         50,116, 78,410, 10,205,510,171,231, 45,139,467, 29, 86,505, 32,
         72, 26,342,150,313,490,431,238,411,325,149,473, 40,119,174,355,
        185,233,389, 71,448,273,372, 55,110,178,322, 12,469,392,369,190,
         1,109,375,137,181, 88, 75,308,260,484, 98,272,370,275,412,111,
        336,318, 4,504,492,259,304, 77,337,435, 21,357,303,332,483, 18, 47, 85, 25,497,474,289,100,269,296,478,270,106, 31,104,433, 84,
        414,486,394, 96, 99,154,511,148,413,361,409,255,162,215,302,201,
        266,351,343,144,441,365,108,298,251, 34,182,509,138,210,335,133,
        311,352,328,141,396,346,123,319,450,281,429,228,443,481, 92,404,
        485,422,248,297, 23,213,130,466, 22,217,283, 70,294,360,419,127,
        312,377, 7,468,194, 2,117,295,463,258,224,447,247,187, 80,398,
        284,353,105,390,299,471,470,184, 57,200,348, 63,204,188, 33,451,
         97, 30,310,219, 94,160,129,493, 64,179,263,102,189,207,114,402,
        438,477,387,122,192, 42,381, 5,145,118,180,449,293,323,136,380,
         43, 66, 60, 455, 341, 445, 202, 432, 8, 237, 15, 376, 436, 464, 59, 461};
   /* The sixteen bit input is split into two unequal halves, *
    * nine bits and seven bits - as is the subkey
   nine = (u16)(in>>7);
   seven = (u16)(in&0x7F);
   /* Now run the various operations */
   nine = (u16)(S9[nine] ^ seven);
   seven = (u16)(S7[seven] ^ (nine & 0x7F));
   seven ^= (subkey>>9);
   nine ^= (subkey&0x1FF);
   nine = (u16)(S9[nine] ^ seven);
   seven = (u16)(S7[seven] ^ (nine & 0x7F));
   in = (u16)((seven << 9) + nine);
   return( in );
/*-----
       The FO() function.
       Transforms a 32-bit value. Uses <index> to identify the
       appropriate subkeys to use.
          -----*/
static u32 FO( u32 in, int index )
   ul6 left, right;
   /* Split the input into two 16-bit words */
   left = (u16)(in>>16);
   right = (u16) in;
   /* Now apply the same basic transformation three times
```

```
left ^= KOi1[index];
   left = FI( left, KIi1[index] );
left ^= right;
   right ^= KOi2[index];
   right = FI( right, KIi2[index] );
   right ^= left;
   left ^= KOi3[index];
    left = FI( left, KIi3[index] );
   left ^= right;
   in = (((u32)right) << 16) + left;
   return( in );
}
        The FL() function.
       Transforms a 32-bit value. Uses <index> to identify the
      appropriate subkeys to use.
static u32 FL( u32 in, int index )
{
    u16 l, r, a, b;
    /* split out the left and right halves */
    1 = (u16)(in >> 16);
    r = (u16)(in);
    /* do the FL() operations */
    a = (u16) (l & KLil[index]);
    r = ROL16(a,1);
   b = (u16)(r \mid KLi2[index]);
    1 ^= ROL16(b,1);
    /* put the two halves back together */
   in = (((u32)1) << 16) + r;
   return( in );
}
/*-----
 * Kasumi()
    the Main algorithm (fig 1). Apply the same pair of operations four times. Transforms the 64\text{-bit} input.
void Kasumi( u8 *data )
{
   u32 left, right, temp;
   DWORD *d;
   int n;
    /* Start by getting the data into two 32-bit words (endian corect) */
    d = (DWORD*)data;
    left = (((u32)d[0].b8[0]) << 24) + (((u32)d[0].b8[1]) << 16)
+(d[0].b8[2]<<8)+(d[0].b8[3]);
    right = (((u32)d[1].b8[0]) << 24) + (((u32)d[1].b8[1]) << 16)
+(d[1].b8[2]<<8)+(d[1].b8[3]);
   n = 0;
           temp = FL( left, n );
        temp = FO( temp, n++);
        right ^= temp;
        temp = FO( right, n );
        temp = FL( temp, n++);
        left ^= temp;
    \}while( n<=7 );
    /* return the correct endian result */
    d[0].b8[0] = (u8)(left>>24); d[1].b8[0] = (u8)(right>>24); d[0].b8[1] = (u8)(left>>16); d[1].b8[1] = (u8)(right>>16);
```

```
\label{eq:d0.b8[2] = (u8)(left>>8);} $$ d[1].b8[2] = (u8)(right>>8);
  d[0].b8[3] = (u8)(left);
                               d[1].b8[3] = (u8)(right);
}
* KeySchedule()
      Build the key schedule. Most "key" operations use 16-bit
     subkeys so we build ul6-sized arrays that are "endian" correct.
*----*/
void KeySchedule( u8 *k )
   u16 key[8], Kprime[8];
   WORD *k16;
   int n;
   /* Start by ensuring the subkeys are endian correct on a 16-bit basis */
   k16 = (WORD *)k;
   for( n=0; n<8; ++n )
      key[n] = (u16)((k16[n].b8[0] << 8) + (k16[n].b8[1]));
   /* Now build the K'[] keys */
   for( n=0; n<8; ++n )
      Kprime[n] = (u16)(key[n] ^ C[n]);
   /* Finally construct the various sub keys */
   for( n=0; n<8; ++n )
      KLi1[n] = ROL16(key[n],1);
      KLi2[n] = Kprime[(n+2)&0x7];
      KOi1[n] = ROL16(key[(n+1)&0x7],5);
      KOi2[n] = ROL16(key[(n+5)&0x7],8);
      KOi3[n] = ROL16(key[(n+6)&0x7],13);
      KIi1[n] = Kprime[(n+4)&0x7];
KIi2[n] = Kprime[(n+3)&0x7];
      KIi3[n] = Kprime[(n+7)&0x7];
 *_____
          end of kasumi.c
 *-----*/
```

Annex 3 (informative): Change history

| Change history | | | | | | | |
|----------------|-------|-----------|------|-----|---|--------|--------|
| Date | TSG # | TSG Doc. | CR | Rev | Subject/Comment Old New | | New |
| 12-1999 | - | - | - | - | ETSI SAGE Publication (restricted) | - | SAGE |
| | | | | | | | v1.0 |
| 05-2000 | - | - | - | - | ETSI SAGE update: Small change to sample code (portability | SAGE | SAGE |
| | | | | | issue) | v1.0 | v1.1 |
| 09-2000 | SA_07 | | | | Approved by TSG SA and placed under change control | | 3.1.0 |
| | | | | | | v1.1 | |
| 07-2001 | - | - | - | - | Word version received: Re-formatted into 3GPP TS format (MCC) No technical change from version 3.1.0. | 3.1.0 | 3.1.1 |
| 08-2001 | - | | | | Addition of Mitsubishi IPR information in | 3.1.1 | 3.1.2 |
| | | | | | Foreword and correction of reference titles. No technical change from version 3.1.0. | | |
| 08-2001 | - | - | - | - | Release 4 version created. | 3.1.2 | 4.0.0 |
| 06-2002 | - | - | - | - | Release 5 version created. | 4.0.0 | 5.0.0 |
| 12-2004 | SP-26 | - | - | - | Release 6 version created. | 5.0.0 | 6.0.0 |
| 2005-09 | SP-29 | SP-050564 | 0001 | - | Kasumi roundfunction, correction of formula | 6.0.0 | 6.1.0 |
| 06-2007 | SP-36 | [- | - | - | Release 7 version created. | 6.1.0 | 7.0.0 |
| 12-2008 | SP-32 | - | - | - | Release 8 version created. | 7.0.0 | 8.0.0 |
| 2009-12 | - | - | - | - | Rel-9 version created | 8.0.0 | 9.0.0 |
| 2011-03 | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-10 version (MCC) | 9.0.0 | 10.0.0 |
| 2012-09 | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-11 version (MCC) | 10.0.0 | 11.0.0 |
| 2014-09 | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-12 version (MCC) | 11.0.0 | 12.0.0 |

History

| Document history | | | | |
|------------------|--------------|-------------|--|--|
| V12.0.0 | October 2014 | Publication | | |
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