Problem reboot entri doze and disable any cpu core #9

tugagear · 2021-07-22T17:04:09Z

the kernel compiles perfectly but when starting it, it restarts several times in the Xiaomi logo and then it starts normally, it works but when it comes to turning off the screen at 10-15 seconds, probably at Entering doze mode the computer restarts, also if I want to disable any core of the processor, all this is restarted compiling for davinci

[ Upstream commit 24b5b19 ] Enabling the framebuffer leads to a system hang. Running, as a debug hack, the store_pan() function in drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbsysfs.c without taking the console_lock, allows to see the crash backtrace on the serial line. ~ # echo 0 0 > /sys/class/graphics/fb0/pan [ 9.719414] Unhandled exception: IPSR = 00000005 LR = fffffff1 [ 9.726937] CPU: 0 PID: 49 Comm: sh Not tainted 5.13.0-rc5 #9 [ 9.733008] Hardware name: STM32 (Device Tree Support) [ 9.738296] PC is at clk_gate_is_enabled+0x0/0x28 [ 9.743426] LR is at stm32f4_pll_div_set_rate+0xf/0x38 [ 9.748857] pc : [<0011e4be>] lr : [<0011f9e3>] psr: 0100000b [ 9.755373] sp : 00bc7be0 ip : 00000000 fp : 001f3ac4 [ 9.760812] r10: 002610d0 r9 : 01efe920 r8 : 00540560 [ 9.766269] r7 : 02e7ddb0 r6 : 0173eed8 r5 : 00000000 r4 : 004027c0 [ 9.773081] r3 : 0011e4bf r2 : 02e7ddb0 r1 : 0173eed8 r0 : 1d3267b8 [ 9.779911] xPSR: 0100000b [ 9.782719] CPU: 0 PID: 49 Comm: sh Not tainted 5.13.0-rc5 #9 [ 9.788791] Hardware name: STM32 (Device Tree Support) [ 9.794120] [<0000afa1>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<0000a33f>] (show_stack+0xb/0xc) [ 9.802421] [<0000a33f>] (show_stack) from [<0000a8df>] (__invalid_entry+0x4b/0x4c) The `pll_num' field in the post_div_data configuration contained a wrong value which also referenced an uninitialized hardware clock when clk_register_pll_div() was called. Fixes: 517633e ("clk: stm32f4: Add post divisor for I2S & SAI PLLs") Signed-off-by: Dario Binacchi <dariobin@libero.it> Reviewed-by: Gabriel Fernandez <gabriel.fernandez@st.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210725160725.10788-1-dariobin@libero.it Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit cca342d ] A different wait queue was used when removing ctrl_wait than when adding it. This effectively made the remove operation without locking compared to other operations on the wait queue ctrl_wait was part of. This caused issues like below where dead000000000100 is LIST_POISON1 and dead000000000200 is LIST_POISON2. list_add corruption. next->prev should be prev (ffffffc1b0a33a08), \ but was dead000000000200. (next=ffffffc03ac77de0). ------------[ cut here ]------------ CPU: 3 PID: 2138 Comm: bluetoothd Tainted: G O 4.4.238+ #9 ... ---[ end trace 0adc2158f0646eac ]--- Call trace: [<ffffffc000443f78>] __list_add+0x38/0xb0 [<ffffffc0000f0d04>] add_wait_queue+0x4c/0x68 [<ffffffc00020eecc>] __pollwait+0xec/0x100 [<ffffffc000d1556c>] bt_sock_poll+0x74/0x200 [<ffffffc000bdb8a8>] sock_poll+0x110/0x128 [<ffffffc000210378>] do_sys_poll+0x220/0x480 [<ffffffc0002106f0>] SyS_poll+0x80/0x138 [<ffffffc00008510c>] __sys_trace_return+0x0/0x4 Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address dead000000000100 ... CPU: 4 PID: 5387 Comm: kworker/u15:3 Tainted: G W O 4.4.238+ #9 ... Call trace: [<ffffffc0000f079c>] __wake_up_common+0x7c/0xa8 [<ffffffc0000f0818>] __wake_up+0x50/0x70 [<ffffffc000be11b0>] sock_def_wakeup+0x58/0x60 [<ffffffc000de5e10>] l2cap_sock_teardown_cb+0x200/0x224 [<ffffffc000d3f2ac>] l2cap_chan_del+0xa4/0x298 [<ffffffc000d45ea0>] l2cap_conn_del+0x118/0x198 [<ffffffc000d45f8c>] l2cap_disconn_cfm+0x6c/0x78 [<ffffffc000d29934>] hci_event_packet+0x564/0x2e30 [<ffffffc000d19b0c>] hci_rx_work+0x10c/0x360 [<ffffffc0000c2218>] process_one_work+0x268/0x460 [<ffffffc0000c2678>] worker_thread+0x268/0x480 [<ffffffc0000c94e0>] kthread+0x118/0x128 [<ffffffc000085070>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 ---[ end trace 0adc2158f0646ead ]--- Signed-off-by: Ole Bjørn Midtbø <omidtbo@cisco.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

In rtnl_newlink(), NULL check is performed on m_ops however member of ops is accessed. Fixed by accessing member of m_ops instead of ops. [ 345.432629] BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in rtnl_newlink+0x400/0x1110 [ 345.432629] Read of size 4 at addr 0000000000000088 by task ip/986 [ 345.432629] [ 345.432629] CPU: 1 PID: 986 Comm: ip Not tainted 4.17.0-rc6+ #9 [ 345.432629] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 [ 345.432629] Call Trace: [ 345.432629] dump_stack+0xc6/0x150 [ 345.432629] ? dump_stack_print_info.cold.0+0x1b/0x1b [ 345.432629] ? kasan_report+0xb4/0x410 [ 345.432629] kasan_report.cold.4+0x8f/0x91 [ 345.432629] ? rtnl_newlink+0x400/0x1110 [ 345.432629] rtnl_newlink+0x400/0x1110 [...] Fixes: ccf8dbc ("rtnetlink: Remove VLA usage") Signed-off-by: Prashant Bhole <bhole_prashant_q7@lab.ntt.co.jp> Tested-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> (cherry picked from commit ae0ea80f1502f5670f8d1df147cf7e92972b3a15) Signed-off-by: Panchajanya1999 <rsk52959@gmail.com>

commit 5d388fa upstream. If a cell has 'nbits' equal to a multiple of BITS_PER_BYTE the logic *p &= GENMASK((cell->nbits%BITS_PER_BYTE) - 1, 0); will become undefined behavior because nbits modulo BITS_PER_BYTE is 0, and we subtract one from that making a large number that is then shifted more than the number of bits that fit into an unsigned long. UBSAN reports this problem: UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in drivers/nvmem/core.c:1386:8 shift exponent 64 is too large for 64-bit type 'unsigned long' CPU: 6 PID: 7 Comm: kworker/u16:0 Not tainted 5.15.0-rc3+ #9 Hardware name: Google Lazor (rev3+) with KB Backlight (DT) Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x170 show_stack+0x24/0x30 dump_stack_lvl+0x64/0x7c dump_stack+0x18/0x38 ubsan_epilogue+0x10/0x54 __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x180/0x194 __nvmem_cell_read+0x1ec/0x21c nvmem_cell_read+0x58/0x94 nvmem_cell_read_variable_common+0x4c/0xb0 nvmem_cell_read_variable_le_u32+0x40/0x100 a6xx_gpu_init+0x170/0x2f4 adreno_bind+0x174/0x284 component_bind_all+0xf0/0x264 msm_drm_bind+0x1d8/0x7a0 try_to_bring_up_master+0x164/0x1ac __component_add+0xbc/0x13c component_add+0x20/0x2c dp_display_probe+0x340/0x384 platform_probe+0xc0/0x100 really_probe+0x110/0x304 __driver_probe_device+0xb8/0x120 driver_probe_device+0x4c/0xfc __device_attach_driver+0xb0/0x128 bus_for_each_drv+0x90/0xdc __device_attach+0xc8/0x174 device_initial_probe+0x20/0x2c bus_probe_device+0x40/0xa4 deferred_probe_work_func+0x7c/0xb8 process_one_work+0x128/0x21c process_scheduled_works+0x40/0x54 worker_thread+0x1ec/0x2a8 kthread+0x138/0x158 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Fix it by making sure there are any bits to mask out. Fixes: 69aba79 ("nvmem: Add a simple NVMEM framework for consumers") Cc: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <swboyd@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211013124511.18726-1-srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

In rtnl_newlink(), NULL check is performed on m_ops however member of ops is accessed. Fixed by accessing member of m_ops instead of ops. [ 345.432629] BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in rtnl_newlink+0x400/0x1110 [ 345.432629] Read of size 4 at addr 0000000000000088 by task ip/986 [ 345.432629] [ 345.432629] CPU: 1 PID: 986 Comm: ip Not tainted 4.17.0-rc6+ #9 [ 345.432629] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 [ 345.432629] Call Trace: [ 345.432629] dump_stack+0xc6/0x150 [ 345.432629] ? dump_stack_print_info.cold.0+0x1b/0x1b [ 345.432629] ? kasan_report+0xb4/0x410 [ 345.432629] kasan_report.cold.4+0x8f/0x91 [ 345.432629] ? rtnl_newlink+0x400/0x1110 [ 345.432629] rtnl_newlink+0x400/0x1110 [...] Fixes: ccf8dbc ("rtnetlink: Remove VLA usage") Signed-off-by: Prashant Bhole <bhole_prashant_q7@lab.ntt.co.jp> Tested-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> (cherry picked from commit ae0ea80f1502f5670f8d1df147cf7e92972b3a15) Signed-off-by: Panchajanya1999 <rsk52959@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit af68656d66eda219b7f55ce8313a1da0312c79e1 ] While handling PCI errors (AER flow) driver tries to disable NAPI [napi_disable()] after NAPI is deleted [__netif_napi_del()] which causes unexpected system hang/crash. System message log shows the following: ======================================= [ 3222.537510] EEH: Detected PCI bus error on PHB#384-PE#800000 [ 3222.537511] EEH: This PCI device has failed 2 times in the last hour and will be permanently disabled after 5 failures. [ 3222.537512] EEH: Notify device drivers to shutdown [ 3222.537513] EEH: Beginning: 'error_detected(IO frozen)' [ 3222.537514] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.0): Invoking bnx2x->error_detected(IO frozen) [ 3222.537516] bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_error_detected:14236(eth14)]IO error detected [ 3222.537650] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.0): bnx2x driver reports: 'need reset' [ 3222.537651] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.1): Invoking bnx2x->error_detected(IO frozen) [ 3222.537651] bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_error_detected:14236(eth13)]IO error detected [ 3222.537729] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.1): bnx2x driver reports: 'need reset' [ 3222.537729] EEH: Finished:'error_detected(IO frozen)' with aggregate recovery state:'need reset' [ 3222.537890] EEH: Collect temporary log [ 3222.583481] EEH: of node=0384:80:00.0 [ 3222.583519] EEH: PCI device/vendor: 168e14e4 [ 3222.583557] EEH: PCI cmd/status register: 00100140 [ 3222.583557] EEH: PCI-E capabilities and status follow: [ 3222.583744] EEH: PCI-E 00: 00020010 012c8da2 00095d5e 00455c82 [ 3222.583892] EEH: PCI-E 10: 10820000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.583893] EEH: PCI-E 20: 00000000 [ 3222.583893] EEH: PCI-E AER capability register set follows: [ 3222.584079] EEH: PCI-E AER 00: 13c10001 00000000 00000000 00062030 [ 3222.584230] EEH: PCI-E AER 10: 00002000 000031c0 000001e0 00000000 [ 3222.584378] EEH: PCI-E AER 20: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.584416] EEH: PCI-E AER 30: 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.584416] EEH: of node=0384:80:00.1 [ 3222.584454] EEH: PCI device/vendor: 168e14e4 [ 3222.584491] EEH: PCI cmd/status register: 00100140 [ 3222.584492] EEH: PCI-E capabilities and status follow: [ 3222.584677] EEH: PCI-E 00: 00020010 012c8da2 00095d5e 00455c82 [ 3222.584825] EEH: PCI-E 10: 10820000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.584826] EEH: PCI-E 20: 00000000 [ 3222.584826] EEH: PCI-E AER capability register set follows: [ 3222.585011] EEH: PCI-E AER 00: 13c10001 00000000 00000000 00062030 [ 3222.585160] EEH: PCI-E AER 10: 00002000 000031c0 000001e0 00000000 [ 3222.585309] EEH: PCI-E AER 20: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.585347] EEH: PCI-E AER 30: 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.586872] RTAS: event: 5, Type: Platform Error (224), Severity: 2 [ 3222.586873] EEH: Reset without hotplug activity [ 3224.762767] EEH: Beginning: 'slot_reset' [ 3224.762770] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.0): Invoking bnx2x->slot_reset() [ 3224.762771] bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_slot_reset:14271(eth14)]IO slot reset initializing... [ 3224.762887] bnx2x 0384:80:00.0: enabling device (0140 -> 0142) [ 3224.768157] bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_slot_reset:14287(eth14)]IO slot reset --> driver unload Uninterruptible tasks ===================== crash> ps | grep UN 213 2 11 c000000004c89e00 UN 0.0 0 0 [eehd] 215 2 0 c000000004c80000 UN 0.0 0 0 [kworker/0:2] 2196 1 28 c000000004504f00 UN 0.1 15936 11136 wickedd 4287 1 9 c00000020d076800 UN 0.0 4032 3008 agetty 4289 1 20 c00000020d056680 UN 0.0 7232 3840 agetty 32423 2 26 c00000020038c580 UN 0.0 0 0 [kworker/26:3] 32871 4241 27 c0000002609ddd00 UN 0.1 18624 11648 sshd 32920 10130 16 c00000027284a100 UN 0.1 48512 12608 sendmail 33092 32987 0 c000000205218b00 UN 0.1 48512 12608 sendmail 33154 4567 16 c000000260e51780 UN 0.1 48832 12864 pickup 33209 4241 36 c000000270cb6500 UN 0.1 18624 11712 sshd 33473 33283 0 c000000205211480 UN 0.1 48512 12672 sendmail 33531 4241 37 c00000023c902780 UN 0.1 18624 11648 sshd EEH handler hung while bnx2x sleeping and holding RTNL lock =========================================================== crash> bt 213 PID: 213 TASK: c000000004c89e00 CPU: 11 COMMAND: "eehd" #0 [c000000004d477e0] __schedule at c000000000c70808 #1 [c000000004d478b0] schedule at c000000000c70ee0 #2 [c000000004d478e0] schedule_timeout at c000000000c76dec #3 [c000000004d479c0] msleep at c0000000002120cc #4 [c000000004d479f0] napi_disable at c000000000a06448 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ #5 [c000000004d47a30] bnx2x_netif_stop at c0080000018dba94 [bnx2x] #6 [c000000004d47a60] bnx2x_io_slot_reset at c0080000018a551c [bnx2x] #7 [c000000004d47b20] eeh_report_reset at c00000000004c9bc #8 [c000000004d47b90] eeh_pe_report at c00000000004d1a8 #9 [c000000004d47c40] eeh_handle_normal_event at c00000000004da64 And the sleeping source code ============================ crash> dis -ls c000000000a06448 FILE: ../net/core/dev.c LINE: 6702 6697 { 6698 might_sleep(); 6699 set_bit(NAPI_STATE_DISABLE, &n->state); 6700 6701 while (test_and_set_bit(NAPI_STATE_SCHED, &n->state)) * 6702 msleep(1); 6703 while (test_and_set_bit(NAPI_STATE_NPSVC, &n->state)) 6704 msleep(1); 6705 6706 hrtimer_cancel(&n->timer); 6707 6708 clear_bit(NAPI_STATE_DISABLE, &n->state); 6709 } EEH calls into bnx2x twice based on the system log above, first through bnx2x_io_error_detected() and then bnx2x_io_slot_reset(), and executes the following call chains: bnx2x_io_error_detected() +-> bnx2x_eeh_nic_unload() +-> bnx2x_del_all_napi() +-> __netif_napi_del() bnx2x_io_slot_reset() +-> bnx2x_netif_stop() +-> bnx2x_napi_disable() +->napi_disable() Fix this by correcting the sequence of NAPI APIs usage, that is delete the NAPI after disabling it. Fixes: 7fa6f34 ("bnx2x: AER revised") Reported-by: David Christensen <drc@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Tested-by: David Christensen <drc@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Manish Chopra <manishc@marvell.com> Signed-off-by: Ariel Elior <aelior@marvell.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220426153913.6966-1-manishc@marvell.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=208565 PID: 257 TASK: ecdd0000 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "init" #0 [<c0b420ec>] (__schedule) from [<c0b423c8>] vantoman#1 [<c0b423c8>] (schedule) from [<c0b459d4>] vantoman#2 [<c0b459d4>] (rwsem_down_read_failed) from [<c0b44fa0>] vantoman#3 [<c0b44fa0>] (down_read) from [<c044233c>] vantoman#4 [<c044233c>] (f2fs_truncate_blocks) from [<c0442890>] vantoman#5 [<c0442890>] (f2fs_truncate) from [<c044d408>] vantoman#6 [<c044d408>] (f2fs_evict_inode) from [<c030be18>] vantoman#7 [<c030be18>] (evict) from [<c030a558>] vantoman#8 [<c030a558>] (iput) from [<c047c600>] vantoman#9 [<c047c600>] (f2fs_sync_node_pages) from [<c0465414>] vantoman#10 [<c0465414>] (f2fs_write_checkpoint) from [<c04575f4>] vantoman#11 [<c04575f4>] (f2fs_sync_fs) from [<c0441918>] vantoman#12 [<c0441918>] (f2fs_do_sync_file) from [<c0441098>] vantoman#13 [<c0441098>] (f2fs_sync_file) from [<c0323fa0>] vantoman#14 [<c0323fa0>] (vfs_fsync_range) from [<c0324294>] vantoman#15 [<c0324294>] (do_fsync) from [<c0324014>] vantoman#16 [<c0324014>] (sys_fsync) from [<c0108bc0>] This can be caused by flush_dirty_inode() in f2fs_sync_node_pages() where iput() requires f2fs_lock_op() again resulting in livelock. Reported-by: Zhiguo Niu <Zhiguo.Niu@unisoc.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>

This patch is to fix a crash: vantoman#3 [ffffb6580689f898] oops_end at ffffffffa2835bc2 vantoman#4 [ffffb6580689f8b8] no_context at ffffffffa28766e7 vantoman#5 [ffffb6580689f920] async_page_fault at ffffffffa320135e [exception RIP: f2fs_is_compressed_page+34] RIP: ffffffffa2ba83a2 RSP: ffffb6580689f9d8 RFLAGS: 00010213 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: fffffc0f50b34bc0 RCX: 0000000000002122 RDX: 0000000000002123 RSI: 0000000000000c00 RDI: fffffc0f50b34bc0 RBP: ffff97e815a40178 R8: 0000000000000000 R9: ffff97e83ffc9000 R10: 0000000000032300 R11: 0000000000032380 R12: ffffb6580689fa38 R13: fffffc0f50b34bc0 R14: ffff97e825cbd000 R15: 0000000000000c00 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 vantoman#6 [ffffb6580689f9d8] __is_cp_guaranteed at ffffffffa2b7ea98 vantoman#7 [ffffb6580689f9f0] f2fs_submit_page_write at ffffffffa2b81a69 vantoman#8 [ffffb6580689fa30] f2fs_do_write_meta_page at ffffffffa2b99777 vantoman#9 [ffffb6580689fae0] __f2fs_write_meta_page at ffffffffa2b75f1a vantoman#10 [ffffb6580689fb18] f2fs_sync_meta_pages at ffffffffa2b77466 vantoman#11 [ffffb6580689fc98] do_checkpoint at ffffffffa2b78e46 vantoman#12 [ffffb6580689fd88] f2fs_write_checkpoint at ffffffffa2b79c29 vantoman#13 [ffffb6580689fdd0] f2fs_sync_fs at ffffffffa2b69d95 vantoman#14 [ffffb6580689fe20] sync_filesystem at ffffffffa2ad2574 vantoman#15 [ffffb6580689fe30] generic_shutdown_super at ffffffffa2a9b582 vantoman#16 [ffffb6580689fe48] kill_block_super at ffffffffa2a9b6d1 vantoman#17 [ffffb6580689fe60] kill_f2fs_super at ffffffffa2b6abe1 #18 [ffffb6580689fea0] deactivate_locked_super at ffffffffa2a9afb6 #19 [ffffb6580689feb8] cleanup_mnt at ffffffffa2abcad4 #20 [ffffb6580689fee0] task_work_run at ffffffffa28bca28 #21 [ffffb6580689ff00] exit_to_usermode_loop at ffffffffa28050b7 #22 [ffffb6580689ff38] do_syscall_64 at ffffffffa280560e #23 [ffffb6580689ff50] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffffa320008c This occurred when umount f2fs if enable F2FS_FS_COMPRESSION with F2FS_IO_TRACE. Fixes it by adding IS_IO_TRACED_PAGE to check validity of pid for page_private. Signed-off-by: Yu Changchun <yuchangchun1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>

commit 42252d0d2aa9b94d168241710a761588b3959019 upstream. This patch fixes an invalid read showed by KASAN. A unlock will allocate a "struct plock_op" and a followed send_op() will append it to a global send_list data structure. In some cases a followed dev_read() moves it to recv_list and dev_write() will cast it to "struct plock_xop" and access fields which are only available in those structures. At this point an invalid read happens by accessing those fields. To fix this issue the "callback" field is moved to "struct plock_op" to indicate that a cast to "plock_xop" is allowed and does the additional "plock_xop" handling if set. Example of the KASAN output which showed the invalid read: [ 2064.296453] ================================================================== [ 2064.304852] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in dev_write+0x52b/0x5a0 [dlm] [ 2064.306491] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800ef227d8 by task dlm_controld/7484 [ 2064.308168] [ 2064.308575] CPU: 0 PID: 7484 Comm: dlm_controld Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.14.0+ #9 [ 2064.310292] Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011 [ 2064.311618] Call Trace: [ 2064.312218] dump_stack_lvl+0x56/0x7b [ 2064.313150] print_address_description.constprop.8+0x21/0x150 [ 2064.314578] ? dev_write+0x52b/0x5a0 [dlm] [ 2064.315610] ? dev_write+0x52b/0x5a0 [dlm] [ 2064.316595] kasan_report.cold.14+0x7f/0x11b [ 2064.317674] ? dev_write+0x52b/0x5a0 [dlm] [ 2064.318687] dev_write+0x52b/0x5a0 [dlm] [ 2064.319629] ? dev_read+0x4a0/0x4a0 [dlm] [ 2064.320713] ? bpf_lsm_kernfs_init_security+0x10/0x10 [ 2064.321926] vfs_write+0x17e/0x930 [ 2064.322769] ? __fget_light+0x1aa/0x220 [ 2064.323753] ksys_write+0xf1/0x1c0 [ 2064.324548] ? __ia32_sys_read+0xb0/0xb0 [ 2064.325464] do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x80 [ 2064.326387] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 2064.327606] RIP: 0033:0x7f807e4ba96f [ 2064.328470] Code: 89 54 24 18 48 89 74 24 10 89 7c 24 08 e8 39 87 f8 ff 48 8b 54 24 18 48 8b 74 24 10 41 89 c0 8b 7c 24 08 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 31 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 7c 87 f8 ff 48 [ 2064.332902] RSP: 002b:00007ffd50cfe6e0 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 [ 2064.334658] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055cc3886eb30 RCX: 00007f807e4ba96f [ 2064.336275] RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: 00007ffd50cfe7e0 RDI: 0000000000000010 [ 2064.337980] RBP: 00007ffd50cfe7e0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001 [ 2064.339560] R10: 000055cc3886eb30 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 000055cc3886eb80 [ 2064.341237] R13: 000055cc3886eb00 R14: 000055cc3886f590 R15: 0000000000000001 [ 2064.342857] [ 2064.343226] Allocated by task 12438: [ 2064.344057] kasan_save_stack+0x1c/0x40 [ 2064.345079] __kasan_kmalloc+0x84/0xa0 [ 2064.345933] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x13b/0x220 [ 2064.346953] dlm_posix_unlock+0xec/0x720 [dlm] [ 2064.348811] do_lock_file_wait.part.32+0xca/0x1d0 [ 2064.351070] fcntl_setlk+0x281/0xbc0 [ 2064.352879] do_fcntl+0x5e4/0xfe0 [ 2064.354657] __x64_sys_fcntl+0x11f/0x170 [ 2064.356550] do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x80 [ 2064.358259] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 2064.360745] [ 2064.361511] Last potentially related work creation: [ 2064.363957] kasan_save_stack+0x1c/0x40 [ 2064.365811] __kasan_record_aux_stack+0xaf/0xc0 [ 2064.368100] call_rcu+0x11b/0xf70 [ 2064.369785] dlm_process_incoming_buffer+0x47d/0xfd0 [dlm] [ 2064.372404] receive_from_sock+0x290/0x770 [dlm] [ 2064.374607] process_recv_sockets+0x32/0x40 [dlm] [ 2064.377290] process_one_work+0x9a8/0x16e0 [ 2064.379357] worker_thread+0x87/0xbf0 [ 2064.381188] kthread+0x3ac/0x490 [ 2064.383460] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 [ 2064.385588] [ 2064.386518] Second to last potentially related work creation: [ 2064.389219] kasan_save_stack+0x1c/0x40 [ 2064.391043] __kasan_record_aux_stack+0xaf/0xc0 [ 2064.393303] call_rcu+0x11b/0xf70 [ 2064.394885] dlm_process_incoming_buffer+0x47d/0xfd0 [dlm] [ 2064.397694] receive_from_sock+0x290/0x770 [dlm] [ 2064.399932] process_recv_sockets+0x32/0x40 [dlm] [ 2064.402180] process_one_work+0x9a8/0x16e0 [ 2064.404388] worker_thread+0x87/0xbf0 [ 2064.406124] kthread+0x3ac/0x490 [ 2064.408021] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 [ 2064.409834] [ 2064.410599] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800ef22780 [ 2064.410599] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-96 of size 96 [ 2064.416495] The buggy address is located 88 bytes inside of [ 2064.416495] 96-byte region [ffff88800ef22780, ffff88800ef227e0) [ 2064.422045] The buggy address belongs to the page: [ 2064.424635] page:00000000b6bef8bc refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0xef22 [ 2064.428970] flags: 0xfffffc0000200(slab|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) [ 2064.432515] raw: 000fffffc0000200 ffffea0000d68b80 0000001400000014 ffff888001041780 [ 2064.436110] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080200020 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 2064.439813] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 2064.442548] [ 2064.443310] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 2064.445988] ffff88800ef22680: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc [ 2064.449444] ffff88800ef22700: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc [ 2064.452941] >ffff88800ef22780: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc [ 2064.456383] ^ [ 2064.459386] ffff88800ef22800: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 2064.462788] ffff88800ef22880: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc [ 2064.466239] ================================================================== reproducer in python: import argparse import struct import fcntl import os parser = argparse.ArgumentParser() parser.add_argument('-f', '--file', help='file to use fcntl, must be on dlm lock filesystem e.g. gfs2') args = parser.parse_args() f = open(args.file, 'wb+') lockdata = struct.pack('hhllhh', fcntl.F_WRLCK,0,0,0,0,0) fcntl.fcntl(f, fcntl.F_SETLK, lockdata) lockdata = struct.pack('hhllhh', fcntl.F_UNLCK,0,0,0,0,0) fcntl.fcntl(f, fcntl.F_SETLK, lockdata) Fixes: 586759f ("gfs2: nfs lock support for gfs2") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Alexander Aring <aahringo@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Teigland <teigland@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

In rtnl_newlink(), NULL check is performed on m_ops however member of ops is accessed. Fixed by accessing member of m_ops instead of ops. [ 345.432629] BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in rtnl_newlink+0x400/0x1110 [ 345.432629] Read of size 4 at addr 0000000000000088 by task ip/986 [ 345.432629] [ 345.432629] CPU: 1 PID: 986 Comm: ip Not tainted 4.17.0-rc6+ vantoman#9 [ 345.432629] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 [ 345.432629] Call Trace: [ 345.432629] dump_stack+0xc6/0x150 [ 345.432629] ? dump_stack_print_info.cold.0+0x1b/0x1b [ 345.432629] ? kasan_report+0xb4/0x410 [ 345.432629] kasan_report.cold.4+0x8f/0x91 [ 345.432629] ? rtnl_newlink+0x400/0x1110 [ 345.432629] rtnl_newlink+0x400/0x1110 [...] Fixes: ccf8dbc ("rtnetlink: Remove VLA usage") Signed-off-by: Prashant Bhole <bhole_prashant_q7@lab.ntt.co.jp> Tested-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> (cherry picked from commit ae0ea80f1502f5670f8d1df147cf7e92972b3a15) Signed-off-by: Panchajanya1999 <rsk52959@gmail.com>

…g the sock [ Upstream commit 3cf7203ca620682165706f70a1b12b5194607dce ] There is a race condition in vxlan that when deleting a vxlan device during receiving packets, there is a possibility that the sock is released after getting vxlan_sock vs from sk_user_data. Then in later vxlan_ecn_decapsulate(), vxlan_get_sk_family() we will got NULL pointer dereference. e.g. #0 [ffffa25ec6978a38] machine_kexec at ffffffff8c669757 #1 [ffffa25ec6978a90] __crash_kexec at ffffffff8c7c0a4d #2 [ffffa25ec6978b58] crash_kexec at ffffffff8c7c1c48 #3 [ffffa25ec6978b60] oops_end at ffffffff8c627f2b #4 [ffffa25ec6978b80] page_fault_oops at ffffffff8c678fcb #5 [ffffa25ec6978bd8] exc_page_fault at ffffffff8d109542 #6 [ffffa25ec6978c00] asm_exc_page_fault at ffffffff8d200b62 [exception RIP: vxlan_ecn_decapsulate+0x3b] RIP: ffffffffc1014e7b RSP: ffffa25ec6978cb0 RFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000008 RBX: ffff8aa000888000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 000000000000000e RSI: ffff8a9fc7ab803e RDI: ffff8a9fd1168700 RBP: ffff8a9fc7ab803e R8: 0000000000700000 R9: 00000000000010ae R10: ffff8a9fcb748980 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8a9fd1168700 R13: ffff8aa000888000 R14: 00000000002a0000 R15: 00000000000010ae ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #7 [ffffa25ec6978ce8] vxlan_rcv at ffffffffc10189cd [vxlan] #8 [ffffa25ec6978d90] udp_queue_rcv_one_skb at ffffffff8cfb6507 #9 [ffffa25ec6978dc0] udp_unicast_rcv_skb at ffffffff8cfb6e45 #10 [ffffa25ec6978dc8] __udp4_lib_rcv at ffffffff8cfb8807 #11 [ffffa25ec6978e20] ip_protocol_deliver_rcu at ffffffff8cf76951 #12 [ffffa25ec6978e48] ip_local_deliver at ffffffff8cf76bde #13 [ffffa25ec6978ea0] __netif_receive_skb_one_core at ffffffff8cecde9b #14 [ffffa25ec6978ec8] process_backlog at ffffffff8cece139 #15 [ffffa25ec6978f00] __napi_poll at ffffffff8ceced1a #16 [ffffa25ec6978f28] net_rx_action at ffffffff8cecf1f3 #17 [ffffa25ec6978fa0] __softirqentry_text_start at ffffffff8d4000ca #18 [ffffa25ec6978ff0] do_softirq at ffffffff8c6fbdc3 Reproducer: https://github.com/Mellanox/ovs-tests/blob/master/test-ovs-vxlan-remove-tunnel-during-traffic.sh Fix this by waiting for all sk_user_data reader to finish before releasing the sock. Reported-by: Jianlin Shi <jishi@redhat.com> Suggested-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com> Fixes: 6a93cc9 ("udp-tunnel: Add a few more UDP tunnel APIs") Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 6c606e57eecc37d6b36d732b1ff7e55b7dc32dd4 ] It's unsafe to use rtas_busy_delay() to handle a busy status from the ibm,os-term RTAS function in rtas_os_term(): Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x0000000b BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c:618 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 1, name: swapper/0 preempt_count: 2, expected: 0 CPU: 7 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G D 6.0.0-rc5-02182-gf8553a572277-dirty #9 Call Trace: [c000000007b8f000] [c000000001337110] dump_stack_lvl+0xb4/0x110 (unreliable) [c000000007b8f040] [c0000000002440e4] __might_resched+0x394/0x3c0 [c000000007b8f0e0] [c00000000004f680] rtas_busy_delay+0x120/0x1b0 [c000000007b8f100] [c000000000052d04] rtas_os_term+0xb8/0xf4 [c000000007b8f180] [c0000000001150fc] pseries_panic+0x50/0x68 [c000000007b8f1f0] [c000000000036354] ppc_panic_platform_handler+0x34/0x50 [c000000007b8f210] [c0000000002303c4] notifier_call_chain+0xd4/0x1c0 [c000000007b8f2b0] [c0000000002306cc] atomic_notifier_call_chain+0xac/0x1c0 [c000000007b8f2f0] [c0000000001d62b8] panic+0x228/0x4d0 [c000000007b8f390] [c0000000001e573c] do_exit+0x140c/0x1420 [c000000007b8f480] [c0000000001e586c] make_task_dead+0xdc/0x200 Use rtas_busy_delay_time() instead, which signals without side effects whether to attempt the ibm,os-term RTAS call again. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221118150751.469393-5-nathanl@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit b18cba09e374637a0a3759d856a6bca94c133952 ] Commit 9130b8d ("SUNRPC: allow for upcalls for the same uid but different gss service") introduced `auth` argument to __gss_find_upcall(), but in gss_pipe_downcall() it was left as NULL since it (and auth->service) was not (yet) determined. When multiple upcalls with the same uid and different service are ongoing, it could happen that __gss_find_upcall(), which returns the first match found in the pipe->in_downcall list, could not find the correct gss_msg corresponding to the downcall we are looking for. Moreover, it might return a msg which is not sent to rpc.gssd yet. We could see mount.nfs process hung in D state with multiple mount.nfs are executed in parallel. The call trace below is of CentOS 7.9 kernel-3.10.0-1160.24.1.el7.x86_64 but we observed the same hang w/ elrepo kernel-ml-6.0.7-1.el7. PID: 71258 TASK: ffff91ebd4be0000 CPU: 36 COMMAND: "mount.nfs" #0 [ffff9203ca3234f8] __schedule at ffffffffa3b8899f #1 [ffff9203ca323580] schedule at ffffffffa3b88eb9 #2 [ffff9203ca323590] gss_cred_init at ffffffffc0355818 [auth_rpcgss] #3 [ffff9203ca323658] rpcauth_lookup_credcache at ffffffffc0421ebc [sunrpc] #4 [ffff9203ca3236d8] gss_lookup_cred at ffffffffc0353633 [auth_rpcgss] #5 [ffff9203ca3236e8] rpcauth_lookupcred at ffffffffc0421581 [sunrpc] #6 [ffff9203ca323740] rpcauth_refreshcred at ffffffffc04223d3 [sunrpc] #7 [ffff9203ca3237a0] call_refresh at ffffffffc04103dc [sunrpc] #8 [ffff9203ca3237b8] __rpc_execute at ffffffffc041e1c9 [sunrpc] #9 [ffff9203ca323820] rpc_execute at ffffffffc0420a48 [sunrpc] The scenario is like this. Let's say there are two upcalls for services A and B, A -> B in pipe->in_downcall, B -> A in pipe->pipe. When rpc.gssd reads pipe to get the upcall msg corresponding to service B from pipe->pipe and then writes the response, in gss_pipe_downcall the msg corresponding to service A will be picked because only uid is used to find the msg and it is before the one for B in pipe->in_downcall. And the process waiting for the msg corresponding to service A will be woken up. Actual scheduing of that process might be after rpc.gssd processes the next msg. In rpc_pipe_generic_upcall it clears msg->errno (for A). The process is scheduled to see gss_msg->ctx == NULL and gss_msg->msg.errno == 0, therefore it cannot break the loop in gss_create_upcall and is never woken up after that. This patch adds a simple check to ensure that a msg which is not sent to rpc.gssd yet is not chosen as the matching upcall upon receiving a downcall. Signed-off-by: minoura makoto <minoura@valinux.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Hiroshi Shimamoto <h-shimamoto@nec.com> Tested-by: Hiroshi Shimamoto <h-shimamoto@nec.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trondmy@hammerspace.com> Fixes: 9130b8d ("SUNRPC: allow for upcalls for same uid but different gss service") Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

commit 60eed1e3d45045623e46944ebc7c42c30a4350f0 upstream. code path: ocfs2_ioctl_move_extents ocfs2_move_extents ocfs2_defrag_extent __ocfs2_move_extent + ocfs2_journal_access_di + ocfs2_split_extent //sub-paths call jbd2_journal_restart + ocfs2_journal_dirty //crash by jbs2 ASSERT crash stacks: PID: 11297 TASK: ffff974a676dcd00 CPU: 67 COMMAND: "defragfs.ocfs2" #0 [ffffb25d8dad3900] machine_kexec at ffffffff8386fe01 vantoman#1 [ffffb25d8dad3958] __crash_kexec at ffffffff8395959d vantoman#2 [ffffb25d8dad3a20] crash_kexec at ffffffff8395a45d vantoman#3 [ffffb25d8dad3a38] oops_end at ffffffff83836d3f vantoman#4 [ffffb25d8dad3a58] do_trap at ffffffff83833205 vantoman#5 [ffffb25d8dad3aa0] do_invalid_op at ffffffff83833aa6 vantoman#6 [ffffb25d8dad3ac0] invalid_op at ffffffff84200d18 [exception RIP: jbd2_journal_dirty_metadata+0x2ba] RIP: ffffffffc09ca54a RSP: ffffb25d8dad3b70 RFLAGS: 00010207 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9706eedc5248 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffff97337029ea28 RDI: ffff9706eedc5250 RBP: ffff9703c3520200 R8: 000000000f46b0b2 R9: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 00000001000000fe R12: ffff97337029ea28 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff9703de59bf60 R15: ffff9706eedc5250 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 vantoman#7 [ffffb25d8dad3ba8] ocfs2_journal_dirty at ffffffffc137fb95 [ocfs2] vantoman#8 [ffffb25d8dad3be8] __ocfs2_move_extent at ffffffffc139a950 [ocfs2] vantoman#9 [ffffb25d8dad3c80] ocfs2_defrag_extent at ffffffffc139b2d2 [ocfs2] Analysis This bug has the same root cause of 'commit 7f27ec9 ("ocfs2: call ocfs2_journal_access_di() before ocfs2_journal_dirty() in ocfs2_write_end_nolock()")'. For this bug, jbd2_journal_restart() is called by ocfs2_split_extent() during defragmenting. How to fix For ocfs2_split_extent() can handle journal operations totally by itself. Caller doesn't need to call journal access/dirty pair, and caller only needs to call journal start/stop pair. The fix method is to remove journal access/dirty from __ocfs2_move_extent(). The discussion for this patch: https://oss.oracle.com/pipermail/ocfs2-devel/2023-February/000647.html Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230217003717.32469-1-heming.zhao@suse.com Signed-off-by: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn> Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com> Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit a154f5f643c6ecddd44847217a7a3845b4350003 ] The following call trace shows a deadlock issue due to recursive locking of mutex "device_mutex". First lock acquire is in target_for_each_device() and second in target_free_device(). PID: 148266 TASK: ffff8be21ffb5d00 CPU: 10 COMMAND: "iscsi_ttx" #0 [ffffa2bfc9ec3b18] __schedule at ffffffffa8060e7f vantoman#1 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ba0] schedule at ffffffffa8061224 vantoman#2 [ffffa2bfc9ec3bb8] schedule_preempt_disabled at ffffffffa80615ee vantoman#3 [ffffa2bfc9ec3bc8] __mutex_lock at ffffffffa8062fd7 vantoman#4 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c40] __mutex_lock_slowpath at ffffffffa80631d3 vantoman#5 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c50] mutex_lock at ffffffffa806320c vantoman#6 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c68] target_free_device at ffffffffc0935998 [target_core_mod] vantoman#7 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c90] target_core_dev_release at ffffffffc092f975 [target_core_mod] vantoman#8 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ca0] config_item_put at ffffffffa79d250f vantoman#9 [ffffa2bfc9ec3cd0] config_item_put at ffffffffa79d2583 vantoman#10 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ce0] target_devices_idr_iter at ffffffffc0933f3a [target_core_mod] vantoman#11 [ffffa2bfc9ec3d00] idr_for_each at ffffffffa803f6fc vantoman#12 [ffffa2bfc9ec3d60] target_for_each_device at ffffffffc0935670 [target_core_mod] vantoman#13 [ffffa2bfc9ec3d98] transport_deregister_session at ffffffffc0946408 [target_core_mod] vantoman#14 [ffffa2bfc9ec3dc8] iscsit_close_session at ffffffffc09a44a6 [iscsi_target_mod] vantoman#15 [ffffa2bfc9ec3df0] iscsit_close_connection at ffffffffc09a4a88 [iscsi_target_mod] vantoman#16 [ffffa2bfc9ec3df8] finish_task_switch at ffffffffa76e5d07 vantoman#17 [ffffa2bfc9ec3e78] iscsit_take_action_for_connection_exit at ffffffffc0991c23 [iscsi_target_mod] #18 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ea0] iscsi_target_tx_thread at ffffffffc09a403b [iscsi_target_mod] #19 [ffffa2bfc9ec3f08] kthread at ffffffffa76d8080 #20 [ffffa2bfc9ec3f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffffa8200364 Fixes: 36d4cb4 ("scsi: target: Avoid that EXTENDED COPY commands trigger lock inversion") Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230918225848.66463-1-junxiao.bi@oracle.com Reviewed-by: Mike Christie <michael.christie@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

@smb

[ Upstream commit b35858b3786ddbb56e1c35138ba25d6adf8d0bef ] Validate @smb->WordCount to avoid reading off the end of @smb and thus causing the following KASAN splat: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in smbCalcSize+0x32/0x40 [cifs] Read of size 2 at addr ffff88801c024ec5 by task cifsd/1328 CPU: 1 PID: 1328 Comm: cifsd Not tainted 6.7.0-rc5 vantoman#9 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.2-3-gd478f380-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x4a/0x80 print_report+0xcf/0x650 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? __phys_addr+0x46/0x90 kasan_report+0xd8/0x110 ? smbCalcSize+0x32/0x40 [cifs] ? smbCalcSize+0x32/0x40 [cifs] kasan_check_range+0x105/0x1b0 smbCalcSize+0x32/0x40 [cifs] checkSMB+0x162/0x370 [cifs] ? __pfx_checkSMB+0x10/0x10 [cifs] cifs_handle_standard+0xbc/0x2f0 [cifs] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 cifs_demultiplex_thread+0xed1/0x1360 [cifs] ? __pfx_cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x10/0x10 [cifs] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x136/0x210 ? __pfx_lock_release+0x10/0x10 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? mark_held_locks+0x1a/0x90 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x136/0x210 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? __kthread_parkme+0xce/0xf0 ? __pfx_cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x10/0x10 [cifs] kthread+0x18d/0x1d0 ? kthread+0xdb/0x1d0 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x34/0x60 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 </TASK> This fixes CVE-2023-6606. Reported-by: j51569436@gmail.com Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=218218 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) <pc@manguebit.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Harshit Mogalapalli <harshit.m.mogalapalli@oracle.com>

@smb

[ Upstream commit b35858b3786ddbb56e1c35138ba25d6adf8d0bef ] Validate @smb->WordCount to avoid reading off the end of @smb and thus causing the following KASAN splat: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in smbCalcSize+0x32/0x40 [cifs] Read of size 2 at addr ffff88801c024ec5 by task cifsd/1328 CPU: 1 PID: 1328 Comm: cifsd Not tainted 6.7.0-rc5 vantoman#9 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.2-3-gd478f380-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x4a/0x80 print_report+0xcf/0x650 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? __phys_addr+0x46/0x90 kasan_report+0xd8/0x110 ? smbCalcSize+0x32/0x40 [cifs] ? smbCalcSize+0x32/0x40 [cifs] kasan_check_range+0x105/0x1b0 smbCalcSize+0x32/0x40 [cifs] checkSMB+0x162/0x370 [cifs] ? __pfx_checkSMB+0x10/0x10 [cifs] cifs_handle_standard+0xbc/0x2f0 [cifs] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 cifs_demultiplex_thread+0xed1/0x1360 [cifs] ? __pfx_cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x10/0x10 [cifs] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x136/0x210 ? __pfx_lock_release+0x10/0x10 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? mark_held_locks+0x1a/0x90 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x136/0x210 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? __kthread_parkme+0xce/0xf0 ? __pfx_cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x10/0x10 [cifs] kthread+0x18d/0x1d0 ? kthread+0xdb/0x1d0 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x34/0x60 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 </TASK> This fixes CVE-2023-6606. Reported-by: j51569436@gmail.com Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=218218 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) <pc@manguebit.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Harshit Mogalapalli <harshit.m.mogalapalli@oracle.com>

[ Upstream commit f8bbc07ac535593139c875ffa19af924b1084540 ] vhost_worker will call tun call backs to receive packets. If too many illegal packets arrives, tun_do_read will keep dumping packet contents. When console is enabled, it will costs much more cpu time to dump packet and soft lockup will be detected. net_ratelimit mechanism can be used to limit the dumping rate. PID: 33036 TASK: ffff949da6f20000 CPU: 23 COMMAND: "vhost-32980" #0 [fffffe00003fce50] crash_nmi_callback at ffffffff89249253 vantoman#1 [fffffe00003fce58] nmi_handle at ffffffff89225fa3 vantoman#2 [fffffe00003fceb0] default_do_nmi at ffffffff8922642e vantoman#3 [fffffe00003fced0] do_nmi at ffffffff8922660d vantoman#4 [fffffe00003fcef0] end_repeat_nmi at ffffffff89c01663 [exception RIP: io_serial_in+20] RIP: ffffffff89792594 RSP: ffffa655314979e8 RFLAGS: 00000002 RAX: ffffffff89792500 RBX: ffffffff8af428a0 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 00000000000003fd RSI: 0000000000000005 RDI: ffffffff8af428a0 RBP: 0000000000002710 R8: 0000000000000004 R9: 000000000000000f R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffff8acbf64f R12: 0000000000000020 R13: ffffffff8acbf698 R14: 0000000000000058 R15: 0000000000000000 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 vantoman#5 [ffffa655314979e8] io_serial_in at ffffffff89792594 vantoman#6 [ffffa655314979e8] wait_for_xmitr at ffffffff89793470 vantoman#7 [ffffa65531497a08] serial8250_console_putchar at ffffffff897934f6 vantoman#8 [ffffa65531497a20] uart_console_write at ffffffff8978b605 vantoman#9 [ffffa65531497a48] serial8250_console_write at ffffffff89796558 vantoman#10 [ffffa65531497ac8] console_unlock at ffffffff89316124 vantoman#11 [ffffa65531497b10] vprintk_emit at ffffffff89317c07 vantoman#12 [ffffa65531497b68] printk at ffffffff89318306 vantoman#13 [ffffa65531497bc8] print_hex_dump at ffffffff89650765 vantoman#14 [ffffa65531497ca8] tun_do_read at ffffffffc0b06c27 [tun] vantoman#15 [ffffa65531497d38] tun_recvmsg at ffffffffc0b06e34 [tun] vantoman#16 [ffffa65531497d68] handle_rx at ffffffffc0c5d682 [vhost_net] vantoman#17 [ffffa65531497ed0] vhost_worker at ffffffffc0c644dc [vhost] #18 [ffffa65531497f10] kthread at ffffffff892d2e72 #19 [ffffa65531497f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff89c0022f Fixes: ef3db4a ("tun: avoid BUG, dump packet on GSO errors") Signed-off-by: Lei Chen <lei.chen@smartx.com> Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240415020247.2207781-1-lei.chen@smartx.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> (cherry picked from commit 68459b8e3ee554ce71878af9eb69659b9462c588) Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>

tugagear closed this as completed Jul 27, 2021

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Problem reboot entri doze and disable any cpu core #9

Problem reboot entri doze and disable any cpu core #9

tugagear commented Jul 22, 2021 •

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Problem reboot entri doze and disable any cpu core #9

Problem reboot entri doze and disable any cpu core #9

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tugagear commented Jul 22, 2021 • edited Loading

tugagear commented Jul 22, 2021 •

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