BACKDOORS TO THE KINGDOM:

CHANGING THE WAY YOU THINK ABOUT ORGANIZATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE

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WHOAMI



David Westcott:

- Finder of things
- Attack surface aficionado
- Android RE
- OSINT/ HUMINT
- iDefense THOR TAA Team

AGENDA

- Why?
- Certificate Transparency (CT)
- Start of Authority (SOA)
- Sender Policy Framework (SPF)
- Border Gateway Protocol (BGP)
- Q/A

WHY?

- DNS Enumeration is LOUD
- GDPR COMPLICATED WHOIS
- The "Cloud" (aka: off-prem) is MASSIVE



CERTIFICATE TRANSPARENCY

(CT) CAVEAT?

- Doesn't capture (most) self-signed*
- Visibility gap without scan data
- Supplementary data is needed to show where the certs are used



(CT) CAVEAT?

32,581,124 (Self-Signed) 26,109,510 (^ & Unexpired)

Source: shodan.io



(CT) CAVEAT?

238,694,349 (Unexpired, not Pre-Cert) 166,355,708 (Unexpired, Pre-cert)

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13,642,992 not in CT logs, but in scans

Source: censys.io



(CT) TERMS

- OID: Object identifier
- Pre-certificate: OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.11129.2.4.3
 - AKA Certificate Poison AKA Pre-Cert
- SCT: Signed Certificate Timestamp
- **CRL:** Certificate Revocation List
- AIA Path: Authority Information Access Path
- CN: Common Name
- SAN: Subject Alternative Name
- CA: Certificate Authority



(CT) RFC & LOGS

Operators:

 Google, Cloudflare, DigiCert, CNNIC, Sectigo (Comodo), Certly, Izenpe, WoSign, Venafi, StartCom, Wang Shengnan, GDCA, Beijing PuChuangSiDa Technology Ltd., NORDUnet, SHECA, Akamai, Matt Palmer, Let's Encrypt, Up In The Air Consulting

RFC 6962 (Certificate Transparency) | June 2013

- http://www.certificate-transparency.org/known-logs
- https://www.gstatic.com/ct/log_list/log_list.json
- https://github.com/chromium/ct-policy
- https://github.com/chromium/ct-policy/blob/master/log_policy.md
- https://www.gstatic.com/ct/log_list/all_logs_list.json



(CT) CONTENTS

- AIA/CRL Paths!
- IP Addresses
- Email Addresses
- Domains
- SANs
- Certificate Authorities
- Serial Numbers
- Issuers
- Fingerprint
- Pre-Cert!



(CT) AIA/CRL PATH

Constraints Is CA: False

AIA Paths OCSP: http://ocsp.comodoca.com

Issuer: http://crt.comodoca.com/COMODORSAOrganizationValidationSecureServerCA.crt

- Issuer AIA: CN, DC, LDAP String
- Issuer AIA ~= "Idap", Not Expired, Not Pre-Cert == ~444,000+
 - Source: Censys




(CT) DATA

- Current CT entry count: <u>~2,924,366,030</u> (as of Feb. 12, 19)
 - Google:
 - Argon2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, Aviator, Icarus, Pilot, Rocketeer, Skydiver
 - Cloudflare:
 - Nimbus2018, 2019, 2020, 2021





(CT) MAPPING





++: Email Addresses, Names, CAs, Internal Naming Syntax, IPs







(CT) GETTING STARTED

- Censys
- Binaryedge
- Shodan
- crt.sh (Sectigo)
- Google Transparency Report
- Facebook CT
- Axeman (Cali Dog Security; Ryan Sears)
- CertStream (Cali Dog Security; Ryan Sears)
- Rapid7 Open Data
- scans.io (Censys)



START OF AUTHORITY

(SOA)

- MNAME (Primary Master NS)
- RNAME (Email Address)
- SERIAL
- REFRESH
- RETRY
- EXPIRE
- MINIMUM
- · \$TTL



;; QUESTION SECTION:
;google.com. IN SOA

;; ANSWER SECTION:
google.com. 5 IN SOA ns1.google.com. dns-admin.google.com. 233668052 900 900 1800 60





SENDER POLICY FRAMEWORK

(SPF)

- ALL
- A
- IP4 -> ASN/pDNS/Certs -> Off-Prem, Friends, Providers
- IP6 -> ASN/pDNS/Certs -> Off-Prem, Friends, Providers
- MX -> ReverseMX -> Sibling Domain(s)
- PTR
- EXISTS
- INCLUDE -> Off-Prem, Friends, Providers







BORDER GATEWAY PROTOCOL

(BGP) ASN/RANGES

bgpview.io (indexed by Google, has API)

rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/ID-ARIN (not indexed)

- Name, Email, Address, Phone # (vcard)
- Status of PoC (w/ dates)



(BGP) CLIENTS

- RDAP (Registration Data Access Protocol)
 - nicinfo (client | Ruby)
 - DNSBelgium (client | Java)
 - CNNIC (client | Java)
 - CentralNIC "rdapper" (client | Perl)







Questions?

accenturesecurity

Questions?