This repo is for review of requests for signing shim. To create a request for review:
- clone this repo
- edit the template below
- add the shim.efi to be signed
- add build logs
- add any additional binaries/certificates/SHA256 hashes that may be needed
- commit all of that
- tag it with a tag of the form "myorg-shim-arch-YYYYMMDD"
- push that to github
- file an issue at https://github.com/rhboot/shim-review/issues with a link to your tag
- approval is ready when the "accepted" label is added to your issue
Note that we really only have experience with using GRUB2 or systemd-boot on Linux, so asking us to endorse anything else for signing is going to require some convincing on your part.
Check the docs directory in this repo for guidance on submission and getting your shim signed.
Here's the template:
Virtuozzo Research https://www.virtuozzo.com/
Virtuozzo Hybrid Server is a bare-metal virtualization solution that includes system container virtualization, KVM-based virtual machines, software-defined storage and simplified hosting management.
What's the justification that this really does need to be signed for the whole world to be able to boot it?
As UEFI Secure Boot is more and more often considered mandatory feature of hardware, it is critical for Bare Metal Solutions to support the UEFI Secure Boot. Since we are enabling the massive hosting providers and Alternative Clouds, it is important to be secure and compliant.
We are using our custom kernel which enables some essential features for our products which is not provided by any other company.
The security contacts need to be verified before the shim can be accepted. For subsequent requests, contact verification is only necessary if the security contacts or their PGP keys have changed since the last successful verification.
An authorized reviewer will initiate contact verification by sending each security contact a PGP-encrypted email containing random words.
You will be asked to post the contents of these mails in your shim-review issue to prove ownership of the email addresses and PGP keys.
- Name: Artem Vasiliev
- Position: Build Systems TeamLead
- Email address: artem.vasiliev@virtuozzo.com
- PGP key fingerprint: AFE5 4587 9350 6517 6FFC 67C6 2D9D 190B CF62 D8C3 (https://keyserver.ubuntu.com/pks/lookup?search=AFE54587935065176FFC67C62D9D190BCF62D8C3&fingerprint=on&op=index)
- Name: Denis Lunev
- Position: Virtualisation Development TeamLead (OpenVz is our OpenSource fork)
- Email address: den@openvz.org
- PGP key fingerprint: 0BAE AA87 D302 0ADC 1150 E51F 5E07 71B6 CB66 6CAB (https://keyserver.ubuntu.com/pks/lookup?search=0BAEAA87D3020ADC1150E51F5E0771B6CB666CAB&fingerprint=on&op=index)
Please create your shim binaries starting with the 15.8 shim release tar file: https://github.com/rhboot/shim/releases/download/15.8/shim-15.8.tar.bz2
This matches https://github.com/rhboot/shim/releases/tag/15.8 and contains the appropriate gnu-efi source.
Yes
https://github.com/rhboot/shim/tree/15.8 Src RPM attached
No patches applied.
Do you have the NX bit set in your shim? If so, is your entire boot stack NX-compatible and what testing have you done to ensure such compatibility?
See https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/hardware-dev-center/nx-exception-for-shim-community/ba-p/3976522 for more details on the signing of shim without NX bit.
No, we don't set the NX bit.
If shim is loading GRUB2 bootloader what exact implementation of Secureboot in GRUB2 do you have? (Either Upstream GRUB2 shim_lock verifier or Downstream RHEL/Fedora/Debian/Canonical-like implementation)
RHEL Like
If shim is loading GRUB2 bootloader and your previously released shim booted a version of GRUB2 affected by any of the CVEs in the July 2020, the March 2021, the June 7th 2022, the November 15th 2022, or 3rd of October 2023 GRUB2 CVE list, have fixes for all these CVEs been applied?
- 2020 July - BootHole
- Details: https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2020-07/msg00034.html
- CVE-2020-10713
- CVE-2020-14308
- CVE-2020-14309
- CVE-2020-14310
- CVE-2020-14311
- CVE-2020-15705
- CVE-2020-15706
- CVE-2020-15707
- March 2021
- Details: https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html
- CVE-2020-14372
- CVE-2020-25632
- CVE-2020-25647
- CVE-2020-27749
- CVE-2020-27779
- CVE-2021-3418 (if you are shipping the shim_lock module)
- CVE-2021-20225
- CVE-2021-20233
- June 2022
- Details: https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2022-06/msg00035.html, SBAT increase to 2
- CVE-2021-3695
- CVE-2021-3696
- CVE-2021-3697
- CVE-2022-28733
- CVE-2022-28734
- CVE-2022-28735
- CVE-2022-28736
- CVE-2022-28737
- November 2022
- Details: https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2022-11/msg00059.html, SBAT increase to 3
- CVE-2022-2601
- CVE-2022-3775
- October 2023 - NTFS vulnerabilities
- Details: https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2023-10/msg00028.html, SBAT increase to 4
- CVE-2023-4693
- CVE-2023-4692
We are using the the same code as RHEL and those were mitigated by RHEL already.
If shim is loading GRUB2 bootloader, and if these fixes have been applied, is the upstream global SBAT generation in your GRUB2 binary set to 4?
The entry should look similar to: grub,4,Free Software Foundation,grub,GRUB_UPSTREAM_VERSION,https://www.gnu.org/software/grub/
Same source code as RHEL
No previous submissions were made
Is upstream commit 1957a85b0032a81e6482ca4aab883643b8dae06e "efi: Restrict efivar_ssdt_load when the kernel is locked down" applied?
Is upstream commit 75b0cea7bf307f362057cc778efe89af4c615354 "ACPI: configfs: Disallow loading ACPI tables when locked down" applied?
Is upstream commit eadb2f47a3ced5c64b23b90fd2a3463f63726066 "lockdown: also lock down previous kgdb use" applied?
Yes all 3
Yes, the main intention of the patches - provide the high density virtualisation. Support of system containers(OpenVZ), Perfomance optimization for Virtuozzo solutions.
If not, please describe how you ensure that one kernel build does not load modules built for another kernel.
Yes
If you use vendor_db functionality of providing multiple certificates and/or hashes please briefly describe your certificate setup.
If there are allow-listed hashes please provide exact binaries for which hashes are created via file sharing service, available in public with anonymous access for verification.
We don't use the vendor_db functionality.
If you are re-using a previously used (CA) certificate, you will need to add the hashes of the previous GRUB2 binaries exposed to the CVEs to vendor_dbx in shim in order to prevent GRUB2 from being able to chainload those older GRUB2 binaries. If you are changing to a new (CA) certificate, this does not apply.
We don't use vendor_dbx in this build. No previous CA certificates were submitted.
What OS and toolchain must we use to reproduce this build? Include where to find it, etc. We're going to try to reproduce your build as closely as possible to verify that it's really a build of the source tree you tell us it is, so these need to be fairly thorough. At the very least include the specific versions of gcc, binutils, and gnu-efi which were used, and where to find those binaries.
If the shim binaries can't be reproduced using the provided Dockerfile, please explain why that's the case and what the differences would be.
Any RHEL9.0 like OS. The Dockerfile in this repository can be used to launch an identical buildroot with Almalinux9.
This should include logs for creating the buildroots, applying patches, doing the build, creating the archives, etc.
root.log and build.log in this repo.
For example, signing new kernel's variants, UKI, systemd-boot, new certs, new CA, etc..
None, no previous SHIM signed.
fa7866274689d8cec54380183e6ebf46fa79c14bf39f4f88c6169a6c9de7834c shimx64.efi
Those are stored in protected centralized storage in Hashicorp Vault. Underlying HSM device is Safenet eToken 5110+ FIPS USB.
None
Do you add a vendor-specific SBAT entry to the SBAT section in each binary that supports SBAT metadata ( GRUB2, fwupd, fwupdate, systemd-boot, systemd-stub, UKI(s), shim + all child shim binaries )?
Please provide exact SBAT entries for all shim binaries as well as all SBAT binaries that shim will directly boot.
Where your code is only slightly modified from an upstream vendor's, please also preserve their SBAT entries to simplify revocation.
If you are using a downstream implementation of GRUB2 or systemd-boot (e.g. from Fedora or Debian), please preserve the SBAT entry from those distributions and only append your own. More information on how SBAT works can be found here.
shim: sbat,1,SBAT Version,sbat,1,https://github.com/rhboot/shim/blob/main/SBAT.md shim,4,UEFI shim,shim,1,https://github.com/rhboot/shim shim.virtuozzo,1,Virtuozzo,shim,15.8,security@virtuozzo.com
grub2: sbat,1,SBAT Version,sbat,1,https://github.com/rhboot/shim/blob/main/SBAT.md grub,3,Free Software Foundation,grub,2.02,https//www.gnu.org/software/grub/ grub.rh,2,Red Hat,grub2,2.06-70.el9,mailto:secalert@redhat.com grub.virtuozzo,1,Virtuozzo,grub2,2.06-70.vl9,mailto:security@virtuozzo.com
fwupd: sbat,1,UEFI shim,sbat,1,https://github.com/rhboot/shim/blob/main/SBAT.md fwupd-efi,1,Firmware update daemon,fwupd-efi,1.4,https://github.com/fwupd/fwupd fwupd-efi.rhel,1,Red Hat Enterprise Linux,fwupd,1.8.16,mail:secalert@redhat.com fwupd-efi.virtuozzo,1,Virtuozzo,fwupd,1.8.16,mail:security@virtuozzo.com
UKI(not currently built but estimated as): sbat,1,SBAT Version,sbat,1,https://github.com/rhboot/shim/blob/main/SBAT.md systemd,1,The systemd Developers,systemd,252,https://systemd.io/ systemd.rhel,1,Red Hat Enterprise Linux,systemd,252-18.el9,https://bugzilla.redhat.com/ systemd.virtuozzo,1,Virtuozzo,systemd,systemd-252-18.vl9,mail:security@virtuozzo.com linux,1,Red Hat,linux,5.14.0-362.18.1.el9_3.x86_64,https://bugzilla.redhat.com/ linux.rhel,1,Red Hat,linux,5.14.0-362.18.1.el9_3.x86_64,https://bugzilla.redhat.com/ linux.virtuozzo,1,Virtuozzo,5.14.0-362.18.1.vz9,https://bugzilla.redhat.com/ kernel-uki-virt.rhel,1,Red Hat,kernel-uki-virt,5.14.0-362.18.1.el9_3.x86_64,https://bugzilla.redhat.com/ kernel-uki-virt.virtuozzo,1,Virtuozzo,kernel-uki-virt,5.14.0-362.18.1.vz9,mail:security@virtuozzo.com
all_video boot blscfg cat configfile cryptodisk echo ext2 f2fs fat font gcry_rijndael gcry_rsa gcry_serpent gcry_sha256 gcry_twofish gcry_whirlpool gfxmenu gfxterm gzio halt http increment iso9660 jpeg loadenv loopback linux lvm luks luks2 mdraid09 mdraid1x minicmd net normal part_apple part_msdos part_gpt password_pbkdf2 pgp png reboot regexp search search_fs_uuid search_fs_file search_label serial sleep syslinuxcfg test tftp version video xfs zstd efi_netfs efifwsetup efinet lsefi lsefimmap connectefi backtrace chain tpm usb usbserial_common usbserial_pl2303 usbserial_ftdi usbserial_usbdebug keylayouts at_keyboard
If you are using systemd-boot on arm64 or riscv, is the fix for unverified Devicetree Blob loading included?
No arm64 or riscv fork in the distro.
RHEL 9 downstream, grub2-2.06-70.el9.2
Shim launches only GRUB, no other components.
If your GRUB2 or systemd-boot launches any other binaries that are not the Linux kernel in SecureBoot mode, please provide further details on what is launched and how it enforces Secureboot lockdown.
GRUB will launch only linux kernel, no other components. However we are keeping in mind probable necessity in future to use fwupd for firmware updates.
All the standard builtin checks.
No.
Currently it is current RHEL 9.3 based kernel-5.14.0-425.vz9. With all recent patches included.
Not sure there is exists any. However please don't hesitate to contact in need.