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rln_relay.nim
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{.push raises: [].}
import
std/[sequtils, tables, times, deques],
chronicles,
options,
chronos,
stint,
web3,
json,
web3/eth_api_types,
eth/keys,
libp2p/protocols/pubsub/rpc/messages,
libp2p/protocols/pubsub/pubsub,
results,
stew/[byteutils, arrayops]
import
./group_manager,
./rln,
./conversion_utils,
./constants,
./protocol_types,
./protocol_metrics,
./nonce_manager
import
../common/error_handling,
../waku_relay, # for WakuRelayHandler
../waku_core,
../waku_keystore
logScope:
topics = "waku rln_relay"
type WakuRlnConfig* = object
rlnRelayDynamic*: bool
rlnRelayCredIndex*: Option[uint]
rlnRelayEthContractAddress*: string
rlnRelayEthClientAddress*: string
rlnRelayChainId*: uint
rlnRelayCredPath*: string
rlnRelayCredPassword*: string
rlnRelayTreePath*: string
rlnEpochSizeSec*: uint64
onFatalErrorAction*: OnFatalErrorHandler
rlnRelayUserMessageLimit*: uint64
proc createMembershipList*(
rln: ptr RLN, n: int
): RlnRelayResult[(seq[RawMembershipCredentials], string)] =
## createMembershipList produces a sequence of identity credentials in the form of (identity trapdoor, identity nullifier, identity secret hash, id commitment) in the hexadecimal format
## this proc also returns the root of a Merkle tree constructed out of the identity commitment keys of the generated list
## the output of this proc is used to initialize a static group keys (to test waku-rln-relay in the off-chain mode)
## Returns an error if it cannot create the membership list
var output = newSeq[RawMembershipCredentials]()
var idCommitments = newSeq[IDCommitment]()
for i in 0 .. n - 1:
# generate an identity credential
let idCredentialRes = rln.membershipKeyGen()
if idCredentialRes.isErr():
return
err("could not generate an identity credential: " & idCredentialRes.error())
let idCredential = idCredentialRes.get()
let idTuple = (
idCredential.idTrapdoor.inHex(),
idCredential.idNullifier.inHex(),
idCredential.idSecretHash.inHex(),
idCredential.idCommitment.inHex(),
)
output.add(idTuple)
idCommitments.add(idCredential.idCommitment)
# Insert members into tree
let membersAdded = rln.insertMembers(0, idCommitments)
if not membersAdded:
return err("could not insert members into the tree")
let root = rln.getMerkleRoot().value().inHex()
return ok((output, root))
type WakuRLNRelay* = ref object of RootObj
# the log of nullifiers and Shamir shares of the past messages grouped per epoch
nullifierLog*: OrderedTable[Epoch, Table[Nullifier, ProofMetadata]]
lastEpoch*: Epoch # the epoch of the last published rln message
rlnEpochSizeSec*: uint64
rlnMaxEpochGap*: uint64
groupManager*: GroupManager
onFatalErrorAction*: OnFatalErrorHandler
nonceManager*: NonceManager
proc calcEpoch*(rlnPeer: WakuRLNRelay, t: float64): Epoch =
## gets time `t` as `flaot64` with subseconds resolution in the fractional part
## and returns its corresponding rln `Epoch` value
let e = uint64(t / rlnPeer.rlnEpochSizeSec.float64)
return toEpoch(e)
proc stop*(rlnPeer: WakuRLNRelay) {.async: (raises: [Exception]).} =
## stops the rln-relay protocol
## Throws an error if it cannot stop the rln-relay protocol
# stop the group sync, and flush data to tree db
info "stopping rln-relay"
await rlnPeer.groupManager.stop()
proc hasDuplicate*(
rlnPeer: WakuRLNRelay, epoch: Epoch, proofMetadata: ProofMetadata
): RlnRelayResult[bool] =
## returns true if there is another message in the `nullifierLog` of the `rlnPeer` with the same
## epoch and nullifier as `proofMetadata`'s epoch and nullifier
## otherwise, returns false
## Returns an error if it cannot check for duplicates
# check if the epoch exists
let nullifier = proofMetadata.nullifier
if not rlnPeer.nullifierLog.hasKey(epoch):
return ok(false)
try:
if rlnPeer.nullifierLog[epoch].hasKey(nullifier):
# there is an identical record, mark it as spam
return ok(true)
# there is no duplicate
return ok(false)
except KeyError:
return err("the epoch was not found: " & getCurrentExceptionMsg())
proc updateLog*(
rlnPeer: WakuRLNRelay, epoch: Epoch, proofMetadata: ProofMetadata
): RlnRelayResult[void] =
## saves supplied proofMetadata `proofMetadata`
## in the `nullifierLog` of the `rlnPeer`
## Returns an error if it cannot update the log
# check if the epoch exists
if not rlnPeer.nullifierLog.hasKeyOrPut(
epoch, {proofMetadata.nullifier: proofMetadata}.toTable()
):
return ok()
try:
# check if an identical record exists
if rlnPeer.nullifierLog[epoch].hasKeyOrPut(proofMetadata.nullifier, proofMetadata):
# the above condition could be `discarded` but it is kept for clarity, that slashing will
# be implemented here
# TODO: slashing logic
return ok()
return ok()
except KeyError:
return
err("the epoch was not found: " & getCurrentExceptionMsg()) # should never happen
proc getCurrentEpoch*(rlnPeer: WakuRLNRelay): Epoch =
## gets the current rln Epoch time
return rlnPeer.calcEpoch(epochTime())
proc absDiff*(e1, e2: Epoch): uint64 =
## returns the absolute difference between the two rln `Epoch`s `e1` and `e2`
## i.e., e1 - e2
# convert epochs to their corresponding unsigned numerical values
let
epoch1 = fromEpoch(e1)
epoch2 = fromEpoch(e2)
# Manually perform an `abs` calculation
if epoch1 > epoch2:
return epoch1 - epoch2
else:
return epoch2 - epoch1
proc validateMessage*(
rlnPeer: WakuRLNRelay, msg: WakuMessage, timeOption = none(float64)
): MessageValidationResult =
## validate the supplied `msg` based on the waku-rln-relay routing protocol i.e.,
## the `msg`'s epoch is within MaxEpochGap of the current epoch
## the `msg` has valid rate limit proof
## the `msg` does not violate the rate limit
## `timeOption` indicates Unix epoch time (fractional part holds sub-seconds)
## if `timeOption` is supplied, then the current epoch is calculated based on that
let decodeRes = RateLimitProof.init(msg.proof)
if decodeRes.isErr():
return MessageValidationResult.Invalid
let proof = decodeRes.get()
# track message count for metrics
waku_rln_messages_total.inc()
# checks if the `msg`'s epoch is far from the current epoch
# it corresponds to the validation of rln external nullifier
var epoch: Epoch
if timeOption.isSome():
epoch = rlnPeer.calcEpoch(timeOption.get())
else:
# get current rln epoch
epoch = rlnPeer.getCurrentEpoch()
let
msgEpoch = proof.epoch
# calculate the gaps
gap = absDiff(epoch, msgEpoch)
trace "epoch info", currentEpoch = fromEpoch(epoch), msgEpoch = fromEpoch(msgEpoch)
# validate the epoch
if gap > rlnPeer.rlnMaxEpochGap:
# message's epoch is too old or too ahead
# accept messages whose epoch is within +-MaxEpochGap from the current epoch
warn "invalid message: epoch gap exceeds a threshold",
gap = gap, payloadLen = msg.payload.len, msgEpoch = fromEpoch(proof.epoch)
waku_rln_invalid_messages_total.inc(labelValues = ["invalid_epoch"])
return MessageValidationResult.Invalid
let rootValidationRes = rlnPeer.groupManager.validateRoot(proof.merkleRoot)
if not rootValidationRes:
warn "invalid message: provided root does not belong to acceptable window of roots",
provided = proof.merkleRoot.inHex(),
validRoots = rlnPeer.groupManager.validRoots.mapIt(it.inHex())
waku_rln_invalid_messages_total.inc(labelValues = ["invalid_root"])
return MessageValidationResult.Invalid
# verify the proof
let
contentTopicBytes = msg.contentTopic.toBytes
input = concat(msg.payload, contentTopicBytes)
waku_rln_proof_verification_total.inc()
waku_rln_proof_verification_duration_seconds.nanosecondTime:
let proofVerificationRes = rlnPeer.groupManager.verifyProof(input, proof)
if proofVerificationRes.isErr():
waku_rln_errors_total.inc(labelValues = ["proof_verification"])
warn "invalid message: proof verification failed", payloadLen = msg.payload.len
return MessageValidationResult.Invalid
if not proofVerificationRes.value():
# invalid proof
warn "invalid message: invalid proof", payloadLen = msg.payload.len
waku_rln_invalid_messages_total.inc(labelValues = ["invalid_proof"])
return MessageValidationResult.Invalid
# check if double messaging has happened
let proofMetadataRes = proof.extractMetadata()
if proofMetadataRes.isErr():
waku_rln_errors_total.inc(labelValues = ["proof_metadata_extraction"])
return MessageValidationResult.Invalid
let hasDup = rlnPeer.hasDuplicate(msgEpoch, proofMetadataRes.get())
if hasDup.isErr():
waku_rln_errors_total.inc(labelValues = ["duplicate_check"])
elif hasDup.value == true:
trace "invalid message: message is spam", payloadLen = msg.payload.len
waku_rln_spam_messages_total.inc()
return MessageValidationResult.Spam
trace "message is valid", payloadLen = msg.payload.len
let rootIndex = rlnPeer.groupManager.indexOfRoot(proof.merkleRoot)
waku_rln_valid_messages_total.observe(rootIndex.toFloat())
return MessageValidationResult.Valid
proc validateMessageAndUpdateLog*(
rlnPeer: WakuRLNRelay, msg: WakuMessage, timeOption = none(float64)
): MessageValidationResult =
## validates the message and updates the log to prevent double messaging
## in future messages
let isValidMessage = rlnPeer.validateMessage(msg, timeOption)
let decodeRes = RateLimitProof.init(msg.proof)
if decodeRes.isErr():
return MessageValidationResult.Invalid
let msgProof = decodeRes.get()
let proofMetadataRes = msgProof.extractMetadata()
if proofMetadataRes.isErr():
return MessageValidationResult.Invalid
# insert the message to the log (never errors) only if the
# message is valid.
if isValidMessage == MessageValidationResult.Valid:
discard rlnPeer.updateLog(msgProof.epoch, proofMetadataRes.get())
return isValidMessage
proc toRLNSignal*(wakumessage: WakuMessage): seq[byte] =
## it is a utility proc that prepares the `data` parameter of the proof generation procedure i.e., `proofGen` that resides in the current module
## it extracts the `contentTopic` and the `payload` of the supplied `wakumessage` and serializes them into a byte sequence
let
contentTopicBytes = wakumessage.contentTopic.toBytes()
output = concat(wakumessage.payload, contentTopicBytes)
return output
proc appendRLNProof*(
rlnPeer: WakuRLNRelay, msg: var WakuMessage, senderEpochTime: float64
): RlnRelayResult[void] =
## returns true if it can create and append a `RateLimitProof` to the supplied `msg`
## returns false otherwise
## `senderEpochTime` indicates the number of seconds passed since Unix epoch. The fractional part holds sub-seconds.
## The `epoch` field of `RateLimitProof` is derived from the provided `senderEpochTime` (using `calcEpoch()`)
let input = msg.toRLNSignal()
let epoch = rlnPeer.calcEpoch(senderEpochTime)
let nonce = rlnPeer.nonceManager.getNonce().valueOr:
return err("could not get new message id to generate an rln proof: " & $error)
let proof = rlnPeer.groupManager.generateProof(input, epoch, nonce).valueOr:
return err("could not generate rln-v2 proof: " & $error)
msg.proof = proof.encode().buffer
return ok()
proc clearNullifierLog*(rlnPeer: WakuRlnRelay) =
# clear the first MaxEpochGap epochs of the nullifer log
# if more than MaxEpochGap epochs are in the log
let currentEpoch = fromEpoch(rlnPeer.getCurrentEpoch())
var epochsToRemove: seq[Epoch] = @[]
for epoch in rlnPeer.nullifierLog.keys():
let epochInt = fromEpoch(epoch)
# clean all epochs that are +- rlnMaxEpochGap from the current epoch
if (currentEpoch + rlnPeer.rlnMaxEpochGap) <= epochInt or
epochInt <= (currentEpoch - rlnPeer.rlnMaxEpochGap):
epochsToRemove.add(epoch)
for epochRemove in epochsToRemove:
trace "clearing epochs from the nullifier log",
currentEpoch = currentEpoch, cleanedEpoch = fromEpoch(epochRemove)
rlnPeer.nullifierLog.del(epochRemove)
proc generateRlnValidator*(
wakuRlnRelay: WakuRLNRelay, spamHandler = none(SpamHandler)
): WakuValidatorHandler =
## this procedure is a thin wrapper for the pubsub addValidator method
## it sets a validator for waku messages, acting in the registered pubsub topic
## the message validation logic is according to https://rfc.vac.dev/spec/17/
proc validator(
topic: string, message: WakuMessage
): Future[pubsub.ValidationResult] {.async.} =
trace "rln-relay topic validator is called"
wakuRlnRelay.clearNullifierLog()
let decodeRes = RateLimitProof.init(message.proof)
if decodeRes.isErr():
trace "generateRlnValidator reject", error = decodeRes.error
return pubsub.ValidationResult.Reject
let msgProof = decodeRes.get()
# validate the message and update log
let validationRes = wakuRlnRelay.validateMessageAndUpdateLog(message)
let
proof = toHex(msgProof.proof)
epoch = fromEpoch(msgProof.epoch)
root = inHex(msgProof.merkleRoot)
shareX = inHex(msgProof.shareX)
shareY = inHex(msgProof.shareY)
nullifier = inHex(msgProof.nullifier)
payload = string.fromBytes(message.payload)
case validationRes
of Valid:
trace "message validity is verified, relaying:",
proof = proof,
root = root,
shareX = shareX,
shareY = shareY,
nullifier = nullifier
return pubsub.ValidationResult.Accept
of Invalid:
trace "message validity could not be verified, discarding:",
proof = proof,
root = root,
shareX = shareX,
shareY = shareY,
nullifier = nullifier
return pubsub.ValidationResult.Reject
of Spam:
trace "A spam message is found! yay! discarding:",
proof = proof,
root = root,
shareX = shareX,
shareY = shareY,
nullifier = nullifier
if spamHandler.isSome():
let handler = spamHandler.get()
handler(message)
return pubsub.ValidationResult.Reject
return validator
proc mount(
conf: WakuRlnConfig, registrationHandler = none(RegistrationHandler)
): Future[RlnRelayResult[WakuRlnRelay]] {.async.} =
var
groupManager: GroupManager
wakuRlnRelay: WakuRLNRelay
# create an RLN instance
let rlnInstance = createRLNInstance(tree_path = conf.rlnRelayTreePath).valueOr:
return err("could not create RLN instance: " & $error)
if not conf.rlnRelayDynamic:
# static setup
let parsedGroupKeys = StaticGroupKeys.toIdentityCredentials().valueOr:
return err("could not parse static group keys: " & $error)
groupManager = StaticGroupManager(
groupSize: StaticGroupSize,
groupKeys: parsedGroupKeys,
membershipIndex: conf.rlnRelayCredIndex,
rlnInstance: rlnInstance,
onFatalErrorAction: conf.onFatalErrorAction,
)
# we don't persist credentials in static mode since they exist in ./constants.nim
else:
# dynamic setup
proc useValueOrNone(s: string): Option[string] =
if s == "":
none(string)
else:
some(s)
let
rlnRelayCredPath = useValueOrNone(conf.rlnRelayCredPath)
rlnRelayCredPassword = useValueOrNone(conf.rlnRelayCredPassword)
groupManager = OnchainGroupManager(
ethClientUrl: string(conf.rlnRelayethClientAddress),
ethContractAddress: $conf.rlnRelayEthContractAddress,
chainId: conf.rlnRelayChainId,
rlnInstance: rlnInstance,
registrationHandler: registrationHandler,
keystorePath: rlnRelayCredPath,
keystorePassword: rlnRelayCredPassword,
membershipIndex: conf.rlnRelayCredIndex,
onFatalErrorAction: conf.onFatalErrorAction,
)
# Initialize the groupManager
(await groupManager.init()).isOkOr:
return err("could not initialize the group manager: " & $error)
# Start the group sync
(await groupManager.startGroupSync()).isOkOr:
return err("could not start the group sync: " & $error)
return ok(
WakuRLNRelay(
groupManager: groupManager,
nonceManager:
NonceManager.init(conf.rlnRelayUserMessageLimit, conf.rlnEpochSizeSec.float),
rlnEpochSizeSec: conf.rlnEpochSizeSec,
rlnMaxEpochGap: max(uint64(MaxClockGapSeconds / float64(conf.rlnEpochSizeSec)), 1),
onFatalErrorAction: conf.onFatalErrorAction,
)
)
proc isReady*(rlnPeer: WakuRLNRelay): Future[bool] {.async: (raises: [Exception]).} =
## returns true if the rln-relay protocol is ready to relay messages
## returns false otherwise
# could be nil during startup
if rlnPeer.groupManager == nil:
return false
try:
return await rlnPeer.groupManager.isReady()
except CatchableError:
error "could not check if the rln-relay protocol is ready",
err = getCurrentExceptionMsg()
return false
proc new*(
T: type WakuRlnRelay,
conf: WakuRlnConfig,
registrationHandler = none(RegistrationHandler),
): Future[RlnRelayResult[WakuRlnRelay]] {.async.} =
## Mounts the rln-relay protocol on the node.
## The rln-relay protocol can be mounted in two modes: on-chain and off-chain.
## Returns an error if the rln-relay protocol could not be mounted.
try:
return await mount(conf, registrationHandler)
except CatchableError:
return err("could not mount the rln-relay protocol: " & getCurrentExceptionMsg())