

INCOMPLETENESS FOR STABLY COMPUTABLE THEORIES

YASHA SAVELYEV

ABSTRACT. Using the theory of Turing machines, we give a set theoretic reframing of Gödel's first and second incompleteness theorems, and its extension to Σ_2 definable theories (with further extension to Σ_n indicated). In the main results there is no meta-logic at all, it is all *ZFC*. Moreover, in the proofs the usual Hilbert–Bernays provability conditions, and the diagonal lemma are absent. Our argument is from first principles (assuming the basic theory of Turing machines), and given that it is concise. To this end, we partially categorify the theory Gödel encodings, which might be of independent interest. There are various upshots. We show that Gödel sentence (even in the Σ_2 case) is computably constructive. Moreover, our set theory reframed version of second incompleteness looks to be stronger (even in the base Σ_1 case) than the classical analogue. As a philosophical ramification, we are also lead to a formalization of a version of the argument of Roger Penrose.

1. INTRODUCTION

For an introduction/motivation based around physical ideas the reader may see Appendix A. We begin by quickly introducing the notion of stable computability, in a specific context of theories of arithmetic.

Let \mathcal{A} denote the set of first order sentences of arithmetic (in any formal language sufficiently expressive for Peano axioms e.g. $\{0, +, \times, s, <\}$).¹ And suppose we are given a map

$$M : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathcal{A} \times \{\pm\},$$

for $\{\pm\}$ denoting a set with two elements $+$, $-$.

Definition 1.1.

- $\alpha \in \mathcal{A}$ is **M -stable** if there is an m with $M(m) = (\alpha, +)$ s.t. there is no $n > m$ with $M(n) = (\alpha, -)$. Let $M^s \subset \mathcal{A}$ denote the set of M -stable α , called **the stabilization of M** .

Remark 1.2. For an informal motivation of how such an M may appear in practice consider the following. With \mathbb{N} playing the role of time, M might be a device producing sentences of arithmetic that it believes to be true, at each moment $n \in \mathbb{N}$. But M is also allowed to correct itself in the following sense.

- $M(n) = (\alpha, +)$, only if at the moment n M decides that α is true.
- $M(m) = (\alpha, -)$, only if at the moment m , M no longer asserts that α is true, either because at this moment M is no longer able to decide α , or because it has decided it to be false.

Definition 1.3. A subset $S \subset \mathcal{A}$, is called **stably computably enumerable** or **stably c.e.** if there is a computable map (see Definition 2.2) $T : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathcal{A} \times \{\pm\}$ so that $S = T^s$. In this case, we will say that T **stably computes S** .

It is fairly immediate that a stably computable S is Σ_2 definable. The converse is also true, every Σ_2 definable set is stably computable. To prove this we may build on Example 3.3, to construct an oracle and then use the theorems of Post, (see [13]), relating the arithmetic hierarchy with the theory of Turing degrees. We omit the details as this will not be used.

¹We allow the empty sentence denoted by ϵ .

Let Q denote Robinson arithmetic that is Peano arithmetic PA without induction. Let \mathcal{F}_0 denote the set of Q -decidable formulas ϕ in arithmetic with one free variable. In what follows, by a **theory** in the language of arithmetic, we just mean a subset $F \subset \mathcal{A}$. We write $F \vdash \alpha$ to mean that the theory F proves α , we write $F \not\vdash \alpha$ to mean that F does not prove α .

We recall, see for instance [5], the following:

Definition 1.4. *Given a theory F , we say that it is **1-consistent**,*

if it is consistent and if for any formula $\phi \in \mathcal{F}_0$ the following holds:

$$(F \vdash \exists m \phi(m)) \implies (\exists m F \not\vdash \neg \phi(m)).$$

*We say that it is **2-consistent** if the same holds for Π_1 formulas ϕ with one free variable, more specifically formulas $\phi = \forall n g(m, n)$, with g Q -decidable.*

The following are theorems of ZFC , with provability predicates being naturally interpreted.

Theorem 1.5. *There is a computable (partial) map $\mathcal{G} : \mathcal{T} \rightarrow \mathcal{A}$, where the domain is the set of Turing machines $\mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$, satisfying the following. Suppose T that computes $T' : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathcal{A} \times \{\pm\}$, and T' is total, see Definition 2.2. Let $F = (T')^s$. Then we have:*

(1) *Then $F \not\vdash \mathcal{G}(T)$ if F is 1-consistent.*

(2) *$F \not\vdash \neg \mathcal{G}(T)$ if F is 2-consistent.*

(3)

$$(1.6) \quad (F \text{ is 1-consistent}) \implies \mathcal{G}(T),$$

is a theorem of PA . More formally stated, the sentence (1.6) is equivalent in ZFC to an arithmetic sentence provable by PA . In particular, $\mathcal{G}(T)$ is true in the standard model of arithmetic whenever F is 1-consistent.

Furthermore, \mathcal{G} is total on the subset of total Turing machines and the Turing machine computing \mathcal{G} can itself be given constructively.

The above leads to set theory based versions of Gödel's second incompleteness theorem.

Theorem 1.7. *Let F be a definable theory in the language of set theory s.t. $F \vdash ZFC$. (As before interpreted in ZFC itself.) Let $F_{\mathcal{A}}$ be the set of first order sentences of arithmetic provable by F . Then if F is strongly consistent, (see Definition 5.11) we have:*

$$(1.8) \quad (F \not\vdash F_{\mathcal{A}} \text{ is 1-consistent}) \vee (F \not\vdash F_{\mathcal{A}} \text{ is stably computable}).$$

The following reframes the original second incompleteness theorem of Gödel:

Theorem 1.9. *Let F be a theory in the language of set theory s.t. $F \vdash ZFC$. Let $F_{\mathcal{A}}$ be the set of first order sentences of arithmetic provable by F . Then if F is strongly consistent (see Definition 5.11):*

$$(1.10) \quad (F \not\vdash F_{\mathcal{A}} \text{ is consistent}) \vee (F \not\vdash F_{\mathcal{A}} \text{ is computable}).$$

This is proved by the same argument.

1.1. Generalizations to Σ_n . There are natural candidates for how to generalize the theorem above. We may replace $M : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathcal{A} \times \{\pm\}$ by $M : \mathbb{N}^n \rightarrow \mathcal{A} \times \{\pm\}$, using this we can define a notion of n -stable computability, specializing to stable computability for $n = 1$. In terms of arithmetic complexity this should be exactly the class Σ_{n+1} . We leave this for future developments.

2. SOME PRELIMINARIES

2.1. Abstractly encoded sets and abstract Turing machines. The material of this section will be used in the main argument. Working with encoded sets/maps as opposed to concrete subsets of \mathbb{N} /functions will have some advantages as we can construct computable maps axiomatically. This approach is in essence the *standard* approach, but in the latter such encoding systems are usually implicit. We need to make it explicit, due to much greater complexity of the kind encodings we need to use. (We make explicit the axioms for the encodings, the latter themselves are still left implicit, as this is well understood.)

Definition 2.1. We denote by \mathcal{T} the set of all Turing machines $T : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$. We write $*T(n)$ for the computation sequence of the Turing machine T with input n . As usual, for $T \in \mathcal{T}$, T also denotes the underlying partial function with $T(n) = m$ if $*T(n)$ halts with output m , and undefined otherwise.

An **encoding** of a set A is at the moment just an injective set map $e : A \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$. But we will need to axiomatize this further. We extend the collection of encodings to a structure of a category we call the **Turing category \mathcal{S}** .

In what follows, a map is a partial map, unless we specify that it is total. The category \mathcal{S} will be a certain small “arrow category” whose objects are maps $e_A : A \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$, for e_A an embedding called **encoding map of A** , determined by a set A . More explicitly, the set of objects $\text{obj } \mathcal{S}$ of \mathcal{S} consists of some set of pairs (A, e_A) where A is a set, and $e_A : A \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ an embedding, determined by A . We may denote $e_A(A)$ by A_e .

We now describe the morphisms of \mathcal{S} .

Definition 2.2. For $(N, e_N), (M, e_M)$ in $\text{obj } \mathcal{S}$. We say that $T \in \mathcal{T}$ **computes** a map $f : N \rightarrow M$ if T fits into a commutative diagram:

$$\begin{array}{ccc} N & \xrightarrow{f} & M \\ \downarrow e_N & & \downarrow e_M \\ \mathbb{N} & \xrightarrow{T} & \mathbb{N}. \end{array}$$

We say that $f : N \rightarrow M$ is **computable** if there exists a $T \in \mathcal{T}$ which computes f .

Notation 1. We may just write $A \in \mathcal{S}$ for an object, with e_A implicit.

We call such an $A \in \mathcal{S}$ an **abstractly encoded set**. Then we set $\text{hom}_{\mathcal{S}}(N, M)$ to be the set of computable maps as above. Clearly, the composition of computable maps is computable so that \mathcal{S} is a category.

In addition, we ask that \mathcal{S} satisfies the following axioms.

- (1) For $A \in \mathcal{S}$, the set A_e is computable (recursive). Here, as is standard, a set $S \subset \mathbb{N}$ is called *computable* if both S and its complement are computably enumerable, with S called *computably enumerable* if there is a computable partial function $\mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ with range S .
- (2) If $A, B \in \mathcal{S}$ then $A \times B \in \mathcal{S}$ and the projection maps $pr^A : A \times B \rightarrow A$, $pr^B : A \times B \rightarrow B$ are computable. Similarly for pr^B .
- (3) If $f : A \rightarrow B$ is computable, and $g : A \rightarrow C$ is computable then $A \rightarrow B \times C$, $a \mapsto (f(a), g(a))$ is computable. This combined with Axiom 2 implies that if $f : A \rightarrow B$, $g : C \rightarrow D$ is computable then the map $A \times B \rightarrow C \times D$, $(a, b) \mapsto (f(a), g(b))$ is computable.
- (4) The set \mathbb{N} has the identity encoding $e_{\mathbb{N}} : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$.

- (5) The set \mathcal{T} is encoded. The partial map

$$U : \mathcal{T} \times \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N},$$

$U(T, \Sigma) := T(\Sigma)$ whenever $*T(\Sigma)$ halts and undefined otherwise, is computable. We can understand a Turing machine computing U as the “universal Turing machine”.

- (6) The next axiom gives a prescription for construction of Turing machines. Let $A, B, C \in \mathcal{S}$, and suppose that $f : A \times B \rightarrow C$ is computable. Let $f^a : B \rightarrow C$ be the map $f^a(b) = f(a, b)$. Then there is a computable map

$$s : A \rightarrow \mathcal{T}$$

so that for each a $s(a)$ computes f^a .

- (7) The final axiom is for utility. If $A \in \mathcal{S}$ then $L(A) \in \mathcal{S}$, where

$$L(A) = \bigcup_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \text{Maps}(\{0, \dots, n\}, A),$$

and $\text{Maps}(\{0, \dots, n\}, A)$ denotes the set of total maps. We also have:

- (a) Let $A \in \mathcal{S}$ and let

$$\text{length} : L(A) \rightarrow \mathbb{N},$$

be the length function, s.t. for $l \in L(A)$, $l : \{0, \dots, n\} \rightarrow A$, $\text{length}(l) = n$. Then length is computable.

- (b) Define

$$P : L(A) \times \mathbb{N} \rightarrow A,$$

$$P(l, i) := \begin{cases} l(i), & \text{if } 0 \leq i \leq \text{length}(l) \\ \text{undefined}, & \text{for } i > \text{length}(l). \end{cases}$$

Then P is computable.

- (c) For $A, B \in \mathcal{S}$ and $f : A \rightarrow L(B)$ a partial map, suppose that:

- The partial map $A \times \mathbb{N} \rightarrow B$, $(a, n) \mapsto P(f(a), n)$ is computable.
- The partial map $A \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$, $a \mapsto \text{length}(f(a))$ is computable.

Then f is computable.

Lemma 2.3. *If $f : A \rightarrow B$ is computable then the map $L(f) : L(A) \rightarrow L(B)$,*

$$l \mapsto \begin{cases} i \mapsto f(l(i)), & \text{if } f(l(i)) \text{ is defined for all } 0 \leq i \leq \text{length}(l) \\ \text{undefined}, & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases}$$

is computable. Also, the map $LU : \mathcal{T} \times L(\mathcal{U}) \rightarrow L(\mathcal{U})$,

$$l \mapsto \begin{cases} i \mapsto U(T, (l(i))), & \text{if } U(T, (l(i))) \text{ is defined for all } 0 \leq i \leq \text{length}(l) \\ \text{undefined}, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

is computable.

Proof. This is just a straightforward application of the axioms and Axiom 7 in particular. We leave the details as an exercise. \square

The above axioms suffice for our purposes, but there are a number of possible extensions (dealing with other set theoretic constructions like the set theoretic sum). The specific such category \mathcal{S} that we need will be clear from context later on. We only need to encode finitely many basic types sets. (The rest are determined from the product, and list constructors, etc.) For example, aside from \mathbb{N}, \mathcal{T} , the category \mathcal{S} should contain $\mathcal{A}, \{\pm\}$, with $\{\pm\}$ a set with two elements $+, -$. The main naturality properties for the encoding of \mathcal{T} are already stated as Axioms 5, 6. We fix the standard Gödel encoding of \mathcal{A} . The only naturality property for \mathcal{A} that we need is that a certain map (4.8) is computable. This is satisfied for the standard encoding.

The fact that such Turing categories \mathcal{S} exist is a folklore theorem of computer science starting with the foundational work of Gödel, Turing and others. For example, Axiom 6, in classical terms, just reformulates the following elementary fact, which follows by the “s-m-n theorem” Soare [13, Theorem 1.5.5]. Given a classical 2-input Turing machine

$$T : \mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N},$$

there is a Turing machine $s_T : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ s.t. for each m $s_T(m)$ is the Turing-Gödel encoding natural, of a Turing machine computing the map $n \mapsto T(m, n)$.

In modern terms, the construction of \mathcal{S} is essentially a part of a definition of a computer programming language (with algebraic data types, e.g. Haskell.)

3. STABLE COMPUTABILITY AND ARITHMETIC

In this section, general sets, often denoted as B , are intended to be encoded. And all maps are partial maps, unless specified otherwise.

Definition 3.1. *Given a map:*

$$M : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow B \times \{\pm\},$$

*We say that $b \in B$ is **M-stable** if there is an m with $M(m) = (b, +)$ and there is no $n > m$ with $M(n) = (b, -)$.*

Definition 3.2. *Given a map*

$$M : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow B \times \{\pm\},$$

we define

$$M^s \subset B$$

*to be the set of all the M-stable b . We call this the **stabilization of M** . When M is morphism in \mathcal{S} , we say that $S \subset B$ is **stably c.e.** if $S = M^s$. We say that $T \in \mathcal{T}$ **stably computes** $M : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow B \times \{\pm\}$, if it computes $N : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow B \times \{\pm\}$, s.t. $M^s = N^s$.*

In general M^s may not be computable even if M is computable. Explicit examples of this sort can be readily constructed as shown in the following.

Example 3.3. Let Pol denote the set of all Diophantine polynomials, abstractly encoded. We can construct a total computable map

$$A : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow Pol \times \{\pm\}$$

whose stabilization consists of all Diophantine (integer coefficients) polynomials with no integer roots. Similarly, we can construct a computable map D whose stabilization consists of pairs (T, n) for $T : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ a Turing machine and $n \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $*T(n)$ does not halt.

In the case of Diophantine polynomials, here is an (inefficient) example. Fixing a suitable encoding of \mathbb{Z} . Let

$$Z : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow Pol, \quad N : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}$$

be total bijective computable maps. The encoding of Pol, \mathbb{Z} should be suitably natural so that in particular the map

$$E : \mathbb{Z} \times Pol \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}, \quad (n, p) \mapsto p(n)$$

is computable. In what follows, for each $n \in \mathbb{N}$, $A_n \in L(Pol \times \{\pm\})$. \cup will be here and elsewhere in the paper the natural list union operation. More specifically, if

$$l_1 : \{0, \dots, n\} \rightarrow B, \quad l_2 : \{0, \dots, m\} \rightarrow B$$

are two lists then $l_1 \cup l_2$ is defined by:

$$(3.4) \quad l_1 \cup l_2(i) = \begin{cases} l_1(i), & \text{if } i \in \{0, \dots, n\} \\ l_2(i - n - 1), & \text{if } i \in \{n + 1, \dots, n + m + 1\} \end{cases}.$$

If $B \in \mathcal{S}$, it is easy to see by the axioms of \mathcal{S} that

$$\cup : L(B) \times L(B) \rightarrow L(B), \quad (l, l') \mapsto l \cup l'$$

is computable.

For $n \in \mathbb{N}$ define A_n recursively by: $A_0 := \emptyset$,

$$A_{n+1} := A_n \cup \bigcup_{m=0}^n (Z(m), d^n(Z(m))),$$

where $d^n(p) = +$ if none of $\{N(0), \dots, N(n)\}$ are roots of p , $d^n(p) = -$ otherwise.

Note that

$$(\forall n \in \mathbb{N}) A_{n+1}|_{\text{domain } A_n} = A_n, \text{ and } \text{length}(A_{n+1}) > \text{length}(A_n),$$

so we may define $A(n) := A_{n+1}(n)$. With this definition $A(\mathbb{N}) = \cup_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \text{image}(A_n)$.

Since E is computable, utilizing the axioms, and the recursive program above, it can be explicitly verified that A is computable. Moreover, by construction the stabilization A^s consists of all Diophantine polynomials that have no integer roots.

3.1. Decision maps. By a *decision map*, we mean a map of the form:

$$D : B \times \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \{\pm\}.$$

This kind of maps will play a role in our arithmetic incompleteness theorems, and we now develop some of their theory.

Definition 3.5. Let $B \in \mathcal{S}$, define \mathcal{D}_B to be the set of $T \in \mathcal{T}$ s.t. exists $T' : B \times \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \pm$, and a commutative diagram:

$$\begin{array}{ccc} B \times \mathbb{N} & \xrightarrow{T'} & \{\pm\} \\ \downarrow e_{B \times \mathbb{N}} & & \downarrow e_{\{\pm\}} \\ \mathbb{N} & \xrightarrow{T} & \mathbb{N}. \end{array}$$

More concretely, this is the set of T s.t.:

$$(\forall n \in \text{image}_{B \times \mathbb{N}} \subset \mathbb{N}) T(n) \in \text{image}_{e_{B \times \{\pm\}}} \text{ or } T(n) \text{ is undefined.}$$

As $e_{\{\pm\}}$ is injective, T' above is uniquely determined if it exists. From now on, for $T \in \mathcal{D}_B$, when we write T' it is meant to be of the form above.

First we will explain construction of elements of \mathcal{D}_B from Turing machines of the following form.

Definition 3.6. Let $B \in \mathcal{S}$. Define \mathcal{T}_B to be the set of $T \in \mathcal{T}$ s.t. exists $T' : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow B \times \{\pm\}$, and a commutative diagram:

$$\begin{array}{ccc} \mathbb{N} & \xrightarrow{T'} & B \times \{\pm\} \\ \downarrow e_{\mathbb{N}} & & \downarrow e_{B \times \{\pm\}} \\ \mathbb{N} & \xrightarrow{T} & \mathbb{N}. \end{array}$$

From now on, given $T \in \mathcal{T}_B$, if we write T' then it is will be assumed to be of the form above. As before, it is uniquely determined when exists.

Lemma 3.7. Let \mathcal{A} be as before. There is a computable total map

$$K_{\mathcal{A}} : \mathcal{T} \rightarrow \mathcal{T},$$

with the properties:

- (1) For each T , $K_{\mathcal{A}}(T) \in \mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{A}}$ and is total if T it total.
- (2) If $T \in \mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{A}}$ and T' is total then $K_{\mathcal{A}}(T)$ and T encode the same maps $\mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathcal{A} \times \{\pm\}$.

Proof. Let $G : \mathcal{T} \times \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathcal{A} \times \{\pm\}$ be the composition of the sequence of maps

$$\mathcal{T} \times \mathbb{N} \xrightarrow{U} \mathbb{N} \xrightarrow{e_{\mathcal{A} \times \{\pm\}}^{-1}} \mathcal{A} \times \{\pm\},$$

where the last map $e_{\mathcal{A} \times \{\pm\}}^{-1}$ is defined by:

$$n \mapsto \begin{cases} e_{\mathcal{A} \times \{\pm\}}^{-1}(n), & \text{if } n \in (\mathcal{A} \times \{\pm\})_e \\ (\epsilon, +), & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases}$$

where $\epsilon \in \mathcal{A}$ denotes the empty sentence. In particular, this last map is computable as $(\mathcal{A} \times \{\pm\})_e$ is by assumption computable/decidable. Hence, G is a composition of computable maps and so is computable. By Axiom 6 there is an induced computable map $K_{\mathcal{A}} : \mathcal{T} \rightarrow \mathcal{T}$ so that $K_{\mathcal{A}}(T)$ is the encoding of $G^T : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathcal{A} \times \{\pm\}$, $G^T(n) = G(T, n)$. By construction, if $T \in \mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{A}}$ then $T' = (K_{\mathcal{A}}(T))'$, so that we are done. \square

3.1.1. Constructing decision Turing machines.

Definition 3.8. Let $l \in L(\mathcal{A} \times \{\pm\})$. Define $b \in \mathcal{A}$ to be **l -stable** if there is an $m \leq \text{length}(l)$ s.t. $l(m) = (b, +)$ and there is no $m < k \leq \text{length}(l)$ s.t. $l(k) = (b, -)$.

Define

$$G : \mathcal{A} \times \mathcal{T} \times \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \{\pm\}$$

to be the map:

$$G(b, T, n) = \begin{cases} +, & b \text{ is } l\text{-stable for } l = \{(K_{\mathcal{A}}(T))'(0), \dots, (K_{\mathcal{A}}(T))'(n)\} \\ -, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Let

$$(3.9) \quad g : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow L(\mathbb{N})$$

be the map $g(n) = \{0, \dots, n\}$, it is clearly computable directly by the Axiom 7. Then we can express G as the composition of the sequence of maps:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{A} \times \mathcal{T} \times \mathbb{N} &\xrightarrow{id \times K_{\mathcal{A}} \times g} \mathcal{A} \times \mathcal{T} \times L(\mathbb{N}) \xrightarrow{id \times LU} \mathcal{A} \times L(\mathbb{N}) \\ &\xrightarrow{id \times L(e_{\mathcal{A} \times \{\pm\}}^{-1})} \mathcal{A} \times L(\mathcal{A} \times \{\pm\}) \rightarrow \{\pm\}, \end{aligned}$$

where the last map is:

$$(b, l) \mapsto \begin{cases} +, & \text{if } b \text{ is } l\text{-stable} \\ -, & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases}$$

which is computable by explicit verification, utilizing the axioms. And where $L(e_{\mathbb{N}}), L(e_{\mathcal{A} \times \{\pm\}}^{-1})$ and LU are as in Lemma 2.3. In particular all the maps in the composition are computable and so G is computable.

Let

$$(3.10) \quad Dec_{\mathcal{A}} : \mathcal{T} \rightarrow \mathcal{T},$$

be the computable map corresponding G via Axiom 6, so that $Dec_{\mathcal{A}}(T)$ is the Turing machine computing

$$G^T : \mathcal{A} \times \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \{\pm\}, \quad G^T(b, n) = G(b, T, n).$$

The following is immediate:

Lemma 3.11. *$Dec_{\mathcal{A}}(T)$ has the property:*

$$\forall T \in \mathcal{T} \quad Dec_{\mathcal{A}}(T) \in \mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{A}}.$$

Furthermore, $Dec_{\mathcal{A}}(T)$ is total if T is total.

Definition 3.12. *For a map $D : B \times N \rightarrow \{\pm\}$, we say that $b \in B$ is **D -decided** if there is an m s.t. $D(b, m) = +$ and for all $n \geq m$ $D(b, n) \neq -$. Likewise, for $T \in \mathcal{D}_B$ we say that $b \in B$ is **T -decided** if it is T' -decided. Also for $T \in \mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{A}}$ we say that b is **T -stable** if it is T' -stable in the sense of Definition 3.1.*

Lemma 3.13. *Suppose that $T \in \mathcal{T}_B$ and T' is total then b is T -stable iff b is $Dec_B(T)$ -decided.*

Proof. Suppose that b is T -stable. In particular, there is an $m \in \mathbb{N}$ so that b is l -stable for $l = \{T'(0), \dots, T'(n)\}$ for all $n \geq m$. Thus, by construction

$$(\forall n \geq m) \quad G(b, T, n) = +,$$

and so b is G^T -decided (this is as above), and so $Dec_B(T)$ -decided.

Similarly, suppose that b is $Dec_B(T)$ -decided, then there is an m s.t. $G(b, T, m) = +$ and there is no $n > m$ s.t. $G(b, T, n) = -$. It follows, since $T' = (K_B(T))'$, that $\exists m' \leq m$ $T'(m') = (b, +)$ and there is no $n > m'$ s.t. $T'(n) = (b, -)$. And so b is T -stable. □

Example 3.14. By the Example 3.3 above there is a computable map

$$P = Dec_{\mathcal{A}}(A) : Pol \times \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \{\pm\}$$

that stably soundly decides if a Diophantine polynomial has integer roots, meaning:

$$p \text{ is } P\text{-decided} \iff p \text{ has no integer roots.}$$

We may similarly, stably solve the halting problem, in this sense.

Definition 3.15. *Given a pair of maps*

$$M_0 : B \times \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \{\pm\}$$

$$M_1 : B \times \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \{\pm\},$$

*we say that they are **stably equivalent** if*

$$b \text{ is } M\text{-decided} \iff b \text{ is } M'\text{-decided.}$$

If $T \in \mathcal{D}_B$ then we say that T stably computes M iff T' is stably equivalent to M .

3.2. Arithmetic decision maps. Let \mathcal{A} be as in the introduction the set of sentences of arithmetic. Let $\mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{A}}$ be as in Definition 3.6 with respect to $B = \mathcal{A}$. The following is a version for stably c.e. theories of the classical fact, going back to Gödel, that for a theory with a c.e. set of axioms we may computably enumerate its theorems. Moreover, the procedure to obtain the corresponding Turing machine is computably constructive.

Notation 2. Note that each $T \in \mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{A}}$, determines the set

$$(T')^s \subset \mathcal{A},$$

called the stabilization of T' , we hereby abbreviate the notation for this set as T^s .

Lemma 3.16. *There is a computable total map:*

$$C : \mathcal{T} \rightarrow \mathcal{T}$$

so that $\forall T \in \mathcal{T} : C(T) \in \mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{A}}$. If in addition $T \in \mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{A}}$ and T' is total then $(C(T))^s$ is the deductive closure of T^s .

Proof. Let $L(\mathcal{A})$ be the list construction on \mathcal{A} as previously. The following lemma is classical and its proof is omitted.

Lemma 3.17. *There is a total computable map:*

$$\Phi : L(\mathcal{A}) \times \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathcal{A}$$

with the following property. For each $l \in L(\mathcal{A})$, $\Phi(\{l\} \times \mathbb{N})$ is the set of all sentences provable by the theory $F_l = \text{image } l$.

Define a map

$$\zeta : L(\mathcal{A}) \times L(\mathcal{A} \times \{\pm\}) \rightarrow \{\pm\}$$

by

$$\zeta(l, l') = \begin{cases} +, & \text{if for each } 0 \leq i \leq \text{length}(l), l(i) \text{ is } l'\text{-stable.} \\ -, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Utilizing Axiom 7, we readily see that ζ is computable. Now define G to be the composition of the sequence of maps:

$$\mathcal{T} \times L(\mathbb{N}) \xrightarrow{K_{\mathcal{A}} \times \text{id}} \mathcal{T} \times L(\mathbb{N}) \xrightarrow{LU} L(\mathbb{N}) \xrightarrow{L(e_{\mathcal{A} \times \{\pm\}}^{-1})} L(\mathcal{A} \times \{\pm\}).$$

All the maps in the composition are computable directly by the axioms of \mathcal{S} and so G is computable.

We may now construct our map C . In what follows \cup will be the natural list union operation as previously in (3.4). Set

$$L_n(\mathbb{N}) := \{l \in L(\mathbb{N}) \mid \max l \leq n, \max l \text{ the maximum of } l \text{ as a map}\}.$$

Let $pr_{\mathcal{A}} : \mathcal{A} \times \{\pm\} \rightarrow \mathcal{A}$ be the natural projection. For $n \in \mathbb{N}$, define $U_n^T \in L(\mathcal{A} \times \{\pm\})$ recursively by $U_0^T := \emptyset$,

$$U_{n+1}^T := U_n^T \cup \bigcup_{l \in L_{n+1}(\mathbb{N})} \bigcup_{0 \leq m \leq n+1} (\Phi(L_{pr_{\mathcal{A}}} \circ G(T, l), m), \zeta(L_{pr_{\mathcal{A}}} \circ G(T, l), G(T, \{0, \dots, n+1\}))).$$

As in Example 3.3 we define

$$U^T : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathcal{A} \times \{\pm\}, \quad U^T(n) := U_{n+1}^T(n),$$

note that the right-hand side may be undefined since G is only a partial map. So U^T is a partial map. And this induces a partial map

$$U : \mathcal{T} \times \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathcal{A} \times \{\pm\},$$

$U(T, n) := U^T(n)$. U is computable by explicit verification, utilizing the axioms of \mathcal{S} , and the recursive program for $\{U_n^T\}$. Hence, by the Axiom 6 there is an induced by U computable map:

$$C : \mathcal{T} \rightarrow \mathcal{T},$$

s.t. for each $T \in \mathcal{T}$ $C(T)$ computes U^T . If $T \in \mathcal{T}_A$ and is total then $(U^T)^s$ is by construction the deductive closure of $(K_A(T))^s = T^s$. So the map C has the needed property, and we are done. \square

Definition 3.18. Let \mathcal{F}_0 , as in the introduction, denote the set of formulas ϕ of arithmetic with one free variable so that $\phi(n)$ is an Q -decidable sentence for each n . Let $M : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathcal{A} \times \{\pm\}$ be a map. The notation $M \vdash \alpha$ will be short for $M^s \vdash \alpha$. We say that M is **speculative** if the following holds. Let $\phi \in \mathcal{F}_0$, and set

$$(3.19) \quad \alpha_\phi = \forall m \phi(m),$$

then

$$(\forall m Q \vdash \phi(m)) \implies M \vdash \alpha_\phi.$$

Note that of course the left-hand side is not the same as $Q \vdash \alpha_\phi$.

Remark 3.20. In a more broad context this condition is sometimes called the ω -rule for the theory.

We may informally interpret this condition as saying that M initially outputs α as a hypothesis, and removes α from its list (that is α will not be in M^s) only if for some m , $Q \vdash \neg\phi(m)$. Note that we previously constructed an Example 3.3 of a Turing machine, with an analogue of this speculative property. Moreover, we have the following crucial result, which to paraphrase states that there is an operation *Spec* that converts a stably c.e. theory to a speculative stably c.e. theory, at a certain loss of consistency.

Theorem 3.21. There is a computable total map $\text{Spec} : \mathcal{T} \rightarrow \mathcal{T}$, with the following properties:

- (1) $\text{image Spec} \subset \mathcal{T}_A$.
- (2) Let $T \in \mathcal{T}_A$. Set $T_{\text{spec}} = \text{Spec}(T)$ then T'_{spec} is speculative, moreover if T' is total then so is T'_{spec} .
- (3) Using Notation 2, if $T \in \mathcal{T}_A$ then $T_{\text{spec}}^s \supset T^s$
- (4) If $T \in \mathcal{T}_A$ and T^s is 1-consistent then T_{spec}^s is consistent.

Proof. $\mathcal{F}_0, \mathcal{A}$ are assumed to be encoded so that the map

$$ev : \mathcal{F}_0 \times \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathcal{A}, \quad (\phi, m) \mapsto \phi(m)$$

is computable. We then need:

Lemma 3.22. There is a total computable map $F : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathcal{F}_0 \times \{\pm\}$ with the property:

$$F^s = G := \{\phi \in \mathcal{F}_0 \mid \forall m Q \vdash \phi(m)\}.$$

Proof. The construction is analogous to the construction in the Example 3.3 above. Fix any total, bijective, Turing machine

$$Z : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathcal{F}_0.$$

For a $\phi \in \mathcal{F}_0$ we will say that it is *n-decided* if

$$(\forall m \in \{0, \dots, n\}) Q \vdash \phi(m).$$

In what follows each F_n has the type of ordered finite list of elements of $\mathcal{F}_0 \times \{\pm\}$, and \cup will be the natural list union operation, as previously. Define $\{F_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ recursively by $F_0 := \emptyset$,

$$F_{n+1} := F_n \cup \bigcup_{\phi \in \{Z(0), \dots, Z(n)\}} (\phi, d^n(\phi)),$$

where $d^n(\phi) = +$ if ϕ is n -decided and $d^n(\phi) = -$ otherwise.

We set $F(n) := F_{n+1}(n)$. This is a total map

$$F : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathcal{F}_0 \times \{\pm\},$$

having the property $F(\mathbb{N}) = \cup_n \text{image}(F_n)$. F is computable by explicit verification, using the axioms of \mathcal{S} . \square

Returning to the proof of the theorem. Let $K = K_{\mathcal{A}} : \mathcal{T} \rightarrow \mathcal{T}$ be as in Lemma 3.7. For $\phi \in \mathcal{F}_0$ let α_ϕ be as in (3.19). Define: $H : \mathcal{T} \times \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathcal{A} \times \{\pm\}$ by

$$H(T, n) := \begin{cases} (K_{\mathcal{A}}(T))'(k), & \text{if } n = 2k + 1 \\ (\alpha_{pr_{\mathcal{F}_0} \circ F(k)}, pr_{\pm} \circ F(k)), & \text{if } n = 2k, \end{cases}$$

where $pr_{\mathcal{F}_0} : \mathcal{F}_0 \times \{\pm\} \rightarrow \mathcal{F}$, and $pr_{\pm} : \mathcal{F}_0 \times \{\pm\} \rightarrow \{\pm\}$ are the natural projections. H is computable directly by the axioms of \mathcal{S} . (Factor H as a composition of computable maps as previously.)

Let $Spec : \mathcal{T} \rightarrow \mathcal{T}$ be the computable map corresponding to H via Axiom 6. In particular, for each $T \in \mathcal{T}$, $Spec(T)$ computes the map

$$T'_{spec} := H^T : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathcal{A} \times \{\pm\}, \quad H^T(n) = H(T, n),$$

which by construction is speculative. Now, $Spec(T)$ satisfies the Properties 1, 2, 3 immediately by construction. It only remains to check Property 4.

Lemma 3.23. *Let $T \in \mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{A}}$, then T^s_{spec} is consistent unless for some $\phi \in G$*

$$T^s \vdash \neg \forall m \phi(m).$$

Proof. Suppose that T^s_{spec} is inconsistent so that:

$$T^s \cup \{\alpha_{\phi_1}, \dots, \alpha_{\phi_n}\} \vdash \alpha \wedge \neg \alpha$$

for some $\alpha \in \mathcal{A}$, and some $\phi_1, \dots, \phi_n \in G$. Hence,

$$T^s \vdash \neg(\alpha_{\phi_1} \wedge \dots \wedge \alpha_{\phi_n}).$$

But

$$\alpha_{\phi_1} \wedge \dots \wedge \alpha_{\phi_n} \iff \forall m \phi(m),$$

where ϕ is the formula with one free variable: $\phi(m) := \phi_1(m) \wedge \dots \wedge \phi_n(m)$. Clearly $\phi \in G$, since $\phi_i \in G$, $i = 1, \dots, n$. Hence, the conclusion follows. \square

Suppose that T^s_{spec} inconsistent, then by the lemma above for some $\phi \in G$:

$$T^s \vdash \exists m \neg \phi(m).$$

Since T^s is 1-consistent:

$$\exists m T^s \not\vdash \phi(m).$$

But ϕ is in G , and $T^s \vdash Q$ so that $\forall m T^s \vdash \phi(m)$ and so

$$\exists m T^s \vdash \neg \phi(m) \wedge \phi(m).$$

So T^s is inconsistent, a contradiction, so T^s_{spec} is consistent. \square

4. THE STABLE HALTING PROBLEM

Let $\mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{T}} \subset \mathcal{T}$ be as in Definition 3.5 with respect to $B = \mathcal{T}$.

Definition 4.1. For $T \in \mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{T}}$, T is T -decided, is a special case of Definition 3.12. Or more specifically, it means that the element $T \in \mathcal{T}$ is T' -decided. We also say that T is not T -decided, when $\neg(T \text{ is } T\text{-decided})$ holds.

We call a map $D : \mathcal{T} \times \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \{\pm\}$ a **Turing decision map**. In what follows, denote by $s(T)$ the sentence:

$$(T \in \mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{T}}) \wedge (T \text{ is not } T\text{-decided}).^2$$

Definition 4.2. We say a Turing decision map D is **stably sound** on $T \in \mathcal{T}$ if

$$(T \text{ is } D\text{-decided}) \implies s(T).$$

We say that D is **stably sound** if it is stably sound on all T . We say that D **stably decides** T if:

$$s(T) \implies T \text{ is } D\text{-decided}.$$

We say that D **stably soundly decides** T if D is stably sound on T and D stably decides T . We say that D is **stably sound and complete** if D stably soundly decides T for all $T \in \mathcal{T}$.

The informal interpretation of the above is that each such D is understood as an operation with the properties:

- For each T, n $D(T, n) = +$ if and only if D “decides” the sentence $s(T)$ is true, at the moment n .
- For each T, n $D(T, n) = -$ if and only if D cannot “decide” the sentence $s(T)$ at the moment n , or D “decides” that $s(T)$ is false.

In what follows for $T \in \mathcal{T}$, and D as above, $\Theta_{D,T}$ is shorthand for the sentence:

$$T \text{ stably computes } D.$$

Lemma 4.3. If D is stably sound on $T \in \mathcal{T}$ then

$$\neg\Theta_{D,T} \vee \neg(T \text{ is } D\text{-decided}).$$

Proof. If T is D -decided then since D is stably sound on T , $T \in \mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{T}}$ and T is not T -decided. So if in addition $\Theta_{D,T}$ then T is not D -decided a contradiction. \square

The following is the “stable” analogue of Turing’s halting theorem.

Theorem 4.4. There is no (stably) computable Turing decision map D that is stably sound and complete.

Proof. Let D be stably sound and complete. Then by the above lemma we obtain:

$$(4.5) \quad \forall T \in \mathcal{T} : \Theta_{D,T} \vdash \neg(T \text{ is } D\text{-decided}).$$

But it is immediate:

$$(4.6) \quad \forall T \in \mathcal{T} (\Theta_{D,T} \implies (\neg(T \text{ is } D\text{-decided})) \implies \neg(T \text{ is } T\text{-decided})).$$

So combining (4.5), (4.6) above we obtain

$$\forall T \in \mathcal{T} (\Theta_{D,T} \implies \neg(T \text{ is } T\text{-decided})).$$

²Written more formally this is the sentence $(T \in \mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{T}}) \wedge ((T \in \mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{T}}) \implies (T \text{ is not } T\text{-decided}))$, we will often use this kind of contraction, and this will no longer be mentioned.

But D is complete so $(T \in \mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{T}}) \wedge \neg(T \text{ is } T\text{-decided}) \implies T \text{ is } D\text{-decided}$ and so:

$$\forall T \in \mathcal{T} (\Theta_{D,T} \implies (T \text{ is } D\text{-decided})).$$

Combining with (4.5) we get

$$\forall T \in \mathcal{T} \neg \Theta_{D,T},$$

which is what we wanted to prove. \square

Theorem 4.7. *Suppose $F \subset \mathcal{A}$ is stably c.e. and sound theory, then there is a constructible (given a Turing machine stably computing F) true in the standard model of arithmetic sentence $\alpha(F)$, which F does not prove.*

The fact that such an $\alpha(F)$ exists, can be immediately deduced from Tarski undecidability of truth, as the set F must be definable in first order arithmetic by the condition that F is stably c.e. However, our sentence is constructible and elementary. Moreover, the basic form of this sentence will be used in the next section. The above theorem is partly based on meta logic. This is in sharp contrast to the syntactic incompleteness theorems in the following section which are actual theorems of ZFC .

Proof of Theorem 4.7. Suppose that F is stably c.e. and is sound. Let $M : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathcal{A} \times \{\pm\}$ be a total computable map s.t. $F = M^s(N)$. Let $C(M_e)$ be as in Lemma 3.16, where M_e computes M . If we understand arithmetic as being embedded in set theory ZFC in the standard way, then for each $T \in \mathcal{T}$ the sentence $s(T)$ is logically equivalent in ZFC to a first order sentence in arithmetic, that we also call $s(T)$, slightly abusing notation. The corresponding translation map

$$(4.8) \quad s : \mathcal{T} \rightarrow \mathcal{A}, T \mapsto s(T)$$

is computable. Indeed, this kind of translation already appears in the original work of Turing [1].

Define a Turing decision map D by

$$D(T, n) := (Dec_{\mathcal{A}}(C(M_e)))'(s(T), n)$$

for $Dec_{\mathcal{A}}$ as in (3.10) defined with respect to $B = \mathcal{A}$, and where C is as in Section 3. Then by construction, and by Axiom 3 in particular, D is computable by some Turing machine D_e , we make this more constructively explicit in the following Section 5.

Now D is stably sound by Lemma 3.13 and the assumption that F is sound. So by Lemma 4.3:

$$\neg(D_e \text{ is } D\text{-decided}).$$

In particular, $s(D_e)$ is not $Dec_{\mathcal{A}}(C(M_e))$ -decided, and so $s(D_e)$ is not $C(M_e)$ -stable (Lemma 3.13), i.e. $M \not\models s(D_e)$.

On the other hand,

$$\neg(D_e \text{ is } D\text{-decided}) \models \neg(D_e \text{ is } D_e\text{-decided}),$$

by definition. And so since $D_e \in \mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{T}}$ by construction, $s(D_e)$ is satisfied. Set $\alpha(M) := s(D_e)$ and we are done. \square

5. SYNTACTIC INCOMPLETENESS FOR STABLY COMPUTABLE THEORIES

Let $s : \mathcal{T} \rightarrow \mathcal{A}, T \mapsto s(T)$ be as in the previous section. Define

$$H : \mathcal{T} \times \mathcal{T} \times \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \{\pm\},$$

by $H(K, T, n) := (Dec_{\mathcal{A}}(C(Spec(K))))'(s(T), n)$. We can express H as the composition of the sequence of maps:

$$(5.1) \quad \mathcal{T} \times \mathcal{T} \times \mathbb{N} \xrightarrow{(Dec_{\mathcal{A}} \circ C \circ Spec) \times s \times id} \mathcal{T} \times \mathcal{A} \times \mathbb{N} \xrightarrow{id \times e_{\mathcal{A} \times \mathbb{N}}} \mathcal{T} \times \mathbb{N} \xrightarrow{U} \mathbb{N} \xrightarrow{e_{\{\pm\}}^{-1}} \{\pm\},$$

where the last map is:

$$\Sigma \mapsto \begin{cases} \text{undefined,} & \text{if } \Sigma \notin \{\pm\}_e \\ e_{\{\pm\}}^{-1}(\Sigma), & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

So H is a composition of maps that are computable by the axioms of \mathcal{S} and so H is computable. Hence, by Axiom 6 there is an associated total computable map:

$$(5.2) \quad \text{Tur} : \mathcal{T} \rightarrow \mathcal{T},$$

s.t. for each $K \in \mathcal{T}$, $\text{Tur}(K)$ computes the map

$$D^K : \mathcal{T} \times \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \{\pm\}, \quad D^K(T, n) = H(K, T, n).$$

In what follows, M_e will be a Turing machine computing some $M : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathcal{A} \times \{\pm\}$. We abbreviate D^{M_e} by D and $\text{Tur}(M_e)$ by D_e . As usual, notation of the form $M \vdash \alpha$ means $M^s \vdash \alpha$.

Proposition 5.3. *For (M, M_e) as above:*

$$M^s \text{ is 1-consistent} \implies M \not\vdash s(D_e).$$

$$M^s \text{ is 2-consistent} \implies M \not\vdash \neg s(D_e).$$

Moreover, the sentence:

$$M^s \text{ is 1-consistent} \implies s(D_e)$$

is a theorem of PA under standard interpretation of all terms, (this will be further formalized in the course of the proof).

Proof. This proposition is meant to just be a theorem of set theory ZFC , however we of course avoid complete set theoretic formalization, as is common. Arithmetic is interpreted in set theory the standard way, using the standard set \mathbb{N} of natural numbers. So for example, for $M : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathcal{A} \times \{\pm\}$ a sentence of the form $M \vdash \alpha$ is a priori interpreted as a sentence of ZFC , however if M is a Turing machine this also can be interpreted as a sentence of PA , once Gödel encodings (the category \mathcal{S}) are invoked.

Set $N := (\text{Spec}(M_e))'$, in particular this is a total speculative map $\mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathcal{A} \times \{\pm\}$. Set $s := s(D_e)$. Suppose that $M \vdash s$. Hence, $N \vdash s$ and so s is $C(\text{Spec}(M_e))$ -stable, and so by Lemma 3.13 s is $\text{Dec}_{\mathcal{A}}(C(\text{Spec}(M_e)))$ -decided, and so D_e is D -decided by definition. More explicitly, we deduce the sentence η_{M_e} :

$$\begin{aligned} \exists m (\forall n \geq m) (\text{Tur}(M_e))'(\text{Tur}(M_e), m) = +. \\ \text{i.e. } \exists m \forall n \geq m D(D_e, m) = +. \end{aligned}$$

In other words:

$$(5.4) \quad (M \vdash s) \implies \eta_{M_e}$$

is a theorem of ZFC .

If we translate η_{M_e} to an arithmetic sentence we just call η , then η can be chosen to have the form:

$$\exists m \forall n \gamma(m, n),$$

where $\gamma(m, n)$ is Q -decidable. The sentence $s = s(D_e)$ is assumed to be of the form $\beta(M_e) \wedge \neg \eta(M_e)$, where $\beta(M_e)$ is the arithmetic sentence equivalent in ZFC to $\text{Tur}(M_e) \in \mathcal{D}_T$. Clearly, the translation maps $\mathcal{T} \rightarrow \mathcal{A}$, $T \mapsto \beta(T)$, $T \mapsto \eta(T)$ are computable. Moreover, applying Lemma 3.11 (interpreted as a Theorem of PA): we get

$$(5.5) \quad PA \vdash \forall T \in \mathcal{T} \beta(T).$$

And so

$$(5.6) \quad PA \vdash (\eta(M_e) \implies \neg s(D_e)).$$

Moreover, ZFC proves:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \eta_{M_e} &\implies \exists m \forall n Q \vdash \gamma(m, n), \quad \text{trivially} \\
 &\implies \exists m : N \vdash \forall n \gamma(m, n), \quad \text{since } N \text{ is speculative} \\
 &\implies N \vdash \eta, \\
 &\implies N \vdash \neg s, \quad \text{by (5.6) and since } N^s \supset PA.
 \end{aligned}$$

And so combining with (5.4), (5.6) ZFC proves:

$$(M \vdash s) \implies (N \vdash s) \wedge (N \vdash \neg s).$$

Since by Theorem 3.21

$$M^s \text{ is 1-consistent} \implies N^s \text{ is consistent},$$

it follows:

$$(5.7) \quad ZFC \vdash (M^s \text{ is 1-consistent} \implies M \not\vdash s \quad (\text{moreover } N \not\vdash s)).$$

Now suppose

$$(M^s \text{ is 2-consistent}) \wedge (M \vdash \neg s).$$

Since we have (5.5), and since $M \vdash PA$ it follows that $M \vdash \eta$.

Set

$$\phi(m) = \forall n \gamma(m, n).$$

Now,

$$\begin{aligned}
 M \vdash \eta &\iff M \vdash \exists m \phi(m), \\
 &\implies \exists m M \not\vdash \neg \phi(m) \quad \text{by 2-consistency.} \\
 &\implies \exists m \forall n Q \vdash \gamma(m, n), \quad \text{as } M^s \supset Q \text{ and } \gamma(m, n) \text{ is } Q\text{-decidable.}
 \end{aligned}$$

In other words, ZFC proves:

$$(M^s \text{ is 2-consistent} \wedge (M \vdash \neg s)) \implies \eta.$$

And ZFC proves:

$$\eta \implies N \vdash s,$$

by definitions. So ZFC proves:

$$\begin{aligned}
 (M^s \text{ is 2-consistent} \wedge (M \vdash \neg s)) &\implies N \vdash s \\
 &\implies N^s \text{ is inconsistent} \\
 &\implies M^s \text{ is not 1-consistent, by Theorem 3.21} \\
 &\implies M^s \text{ is not 2-consistent.}
 \end{aligned}$$

And so ZFC proves:

$$M^s \text{ is 2-consistent} \implies M \not\vdash \neg s.$$

Now for the last part of the proposition. We essentially just further formalize (5.7) and its consequences in PA . In what follows by equivalence of sentences we mean equivalence in ZFC . The correspondence of sentences under equivalence is the standard kind of correspondence assigning predicates involving Turing machines predicates in PA . The basic form of such correspondences is already constructed by Turing [1], so that we will not elaborate. In particular, the correspondences are computable, which just means that the corresponding maps $\mathcal{T} \rightarrow \mathcal{A}$ are computable.

Definition 5.8. We say that $T \in \mathcal{T}$ is **stably 1-consistent** if $T \in \mathcal{T}_A$, T' is total and T^s is 1-consistent, (Notation 2). The sentence “ T^s is 1-consistent”, can specifically be taken to be the arithmetic sentence $Con_{\sigma,1}$ for σ the natural Σ_2 definition of T^s and $Con_{\sigma,1}$ the consistency sentence as in [7, Section 5].

Then the sentence:

$$T \text{ is stably 1-consistent}$$

is equivalent to an arithmetic sentence we denote:

$$1 - con^s(T).$$

The sentence $Spec(T) \not\vdash s(Tur(T))$ is equivalent to an arithmetic sentence we call:

$$\omega(T).$$

By the proof of the first part of the proposition, that is by (5.7),

$$(5.9) \quad ZFC \vdash \forall T \in \mathcal{T} (1 - con^s(T) \implies \omega(T)).$$

But we also have:

$$(5.10) \quad PA \vdash \forall T \in \mathcal{T} (1 - con^s(T) \implies \omega(T)),$$

since the first part of the proposition can be formalized in PA , in fact the only interesting theorems we used are Lemma 3.13, and Theorem 3.21 which are obviously theorems of PA .

Now, by Lemma 3.13 and the construction of H :

$$PA \vdash \forall T \in \mathcal{T} \omega(T) \iff \neg \eta(T).$$

So:

$$PA \vdash \forall T \in \mathcal{T} (\beta(T) \wedge \omega(T) \iff s(Tur(T))),$$

Combining with (5.5) and with (5.10) we get:

$$PA \vdash \forall T \in \mathcal{T} (1 - con^s(T) \implies s(Tur(T))).$$

So if we formally interpret the sentence “ M^s is 1-consistent” as the arithmetic sentence $1 - con^s(M_e)$, then this formalizes and proves the last part of the proposition. \square

Proof of Theorem 1.5. The computable map \mathcal{G} is defined to be $T \mapsto s(Tur(T))$. Then the theorem follow by the proposition above, applied to the pair $((K_A(T))', K_A(T))$. \square

Definition 5.11. Given a theory F in the language of set theory, we say that it is **strongly consistent** if for any formula ϕ with one free variable, and any term S (i.e. a ‘set’) the following holds:

$$(F \vdash \exists x \in S \phi(x)) \implies \exists x \in S F \not\vdash \neg \phi(x).$$

Remark 5.12. There is possibly a more standardized name for this, but I am not aware of it. This appears to be stronger than ω -consistency of Gödel, since the sentences $\phi(x)$ are not required to be arithmetic. Clearly, any sound theory F is strongly consistent.

Proof of Theorem 1.7. Let F, F_A be as in the hypothesis. By (5.7), and by (5.5)

$$(5.13) \quad ZFC \vdash \forall T \in \mathcal{T}_A (T' \text{ is total and } (T')^s \text{ is 1-consistent}) \implies s(Tur(T)).$$

Lemma 5.14. ZFC proves:

$$\forall T \in \mathcal{T} (F \not\vdash T \text{ stably computes } F_A).$$

Proof. Suppose otherwise that

$$\exists T (F \vdash T \text{ stably computes } F_{\mathcal{A}}.)$$

Then also for some $T_0 \in \mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{A}}$

$$F \vdash T'_0 \text{ is total and } T_0 \text{ stably computes } F_{\mathcal{A}},$$

where T_0 is such that:

$$(5.15) \quad ZFC \vdash (T'_0 \text{ is total}) \wedge ((T_0 \text{ stably computes } F_{\mathcal{A}}) \iff (T \text{ stably computes } F_{\mathcal{A}})).$$

Existence of T_0 is clear by classical Turing machine theory (use the construction producing a total Turing machine with the same image as any given Turing machine).

Now, since $F \vdash ZFC$ by assumption, by (5.13) $F \vdash s(Tur(T_0))$. More specifically,

$$ZFC \vdash (F_{\mathcal{A}} \vdash s(Tur(T_0))).$$

But also

$$ZFC \vdash ((F_{\mathcal{A}} \vdash s(Tur(T_0))) \implies \neg(F_{\mathcal{A}} \text{ is 1-consistent}) \vee \neg(T_0 \text{ stably computes } F_{\mathcal{A}})).$$

Since $F \vdash ZFC$, we conclude that

$$F \vdash (\neg(F_{\mathcal{A}} \text{ is 1-consistent}) \vee \neg(T_0 \text{ stably computes } F_{\mathcal{A}})).$$

And so by (5.15):

$$F \vdash (\neg(F_{\mathcal{A}} \text{ is 1-consistent}) \vee \neg(T \text{ stably computes } F_{\mathcal{A}})).$$

So we get a contradiction, since F is consistent and by the assumption ($F \vdash F_{\mathcal{A}}$ is 1-consistent). \square

Since F is strongly consistent (using the contrapositive of the condition 5.11) it follows that:

$$F \not\vdash (\exists T \in \mathcal{T} T \text{ stably computes } F_{\mathcal{A}}).$$

\square

APPENDIX A. STABLE COMPUTABILITY AND PHYSICS - GÖDEL'S DISJUNCTION AND PENROSE

We now give some partly physical motivation for the theory above, and in particular for the notion of stable computability. As this work is aimed at mathematicians, we aim to be very brief. But developing this appendix would be very interesting in an appropriate venue.

We may say that a physical process is *absolutely not Turing computable*, if it is not Turing computable in any “sufficiently physically accurate” mathematical model. For example, it is known that solutions of fluid flow and N -body problems are generally non Turing computable (over \mathbb{Z} , and probably over \mathbb{R} cf. [3]) as modeled in mathematics of classical mechanics. But in a more physically accurate and fundamental model both of the processes above may become computable.

The question posed by Turing [2], but also by Gödel [6, 310] and more recently and much more expansively by Penrose [10], [11], [12] is:

Question 1. Are there absolutely not Turing computable physical processes? And moreover, are brain processes absolutely not Turing computable?

A.0.1. *Gödel's disjunction.* Gödel argued for a 'yes' answer to Question 1, see [6, pg. 310], relating the question to existence of absolutely unsolvable Diophantine problems, see also Feferman [4], and Koellner [8], [9] for a discussion.

We now discuss the question from the perspective of our main results. First by an idealized mathematician, we mean here a theory \mathcal{H} in the language of set theory ZFC , s.t. $\mathcal{H} = H^s$ of some $H : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathcal{Z} \times \{\pm\}$, with \mathcal{Z} denoting the set of first order sentences of ZFC , or a superset thereof. See also Remark 1.2, H is meant to be the actual time stamped output of a mathematician, idealized so that their brain does not deteriorate in time.

The need to work with stabilizations is clear, as mathematicians are not consistent, however it seems that mathematical knowledge does stabilize on truth. Here we are using 'stabilize' in the more common language sense, but in this setting this is equivalent to the mathematical stabilization H^s . Hence soundness and in particular strong consistency (Definition 5.11) of the stabilization \mathcal{H} is not an unreasonable hypothesis for our mathematician. For one discussion of the problem of idealization see Feferman [4]. We cannot do much justice to such considerations here.

Without delving deeply into interpretations, we suppose the following axioms for \mathcal{H} .

- (1) \mathcal{H} is definable in set theory. (This is natural, H is determined by some physical processes, and we expect that they can be formalized in set theory - colloquially they have mathematical models.)
- (2) $\mathcal{H} \vdash ZFC$.
- (3) The "Penrose property": $\mathcal{H} \vdash \mathcal{H}_A$ is 1-consistent, where \mathcal{H}_A is as in Theorem 1.7. (This might be informally interpreted as that our idealized mathematician knows the set theoretic definition of \mathcal{H} , and asserts that it is suitably consistent.)

The possibility that our mathematician indeed knows the definition of \mathcal{H} is perhaps not unlikely, especially if Question 1 has a negative answer. Just map the brain, its synapses, etc.; then assuming one knows the working of all underlying physical processes, use this to reconstruct the set theoretic definition of \mathcal{H} . This would be a fantastically difficult thing to do, but not a priori impossible. Given this, there is no reason to reject the above axioms.

Applying Theorem 1.7 we then get the following pseudo-theorem. (It is not a 'theorem' since of course \mathcal{H} is not at the moment properly defined.)

Pseudo-theorem A.1. *One of the following holds:*

- (1) \mathcal{H} is not strongly consistent.
- (2) \mathcal{H} is unable to prove that \mathcal{H}_A is stably computable, in particular \mathcal{H} is unable to disprove existence of absolutely non Turing computable physical processes.

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UNIVERSITY OF COLIMA, DEPARTMENT OF SCIENCES, CUICBAS

Email address: `yasha.savelyev@gmail.com`