Protecting Your LLMs with Information Bottleneck

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NEURAL INFORMATION PROCESSING SYSTEMS

1. Background and Challenge

How do you defend against jailbreaking prompts?

Perturbation! $\widetilde{X} = M \odot X + (1 - M) \odot \mu$

- Fixed function: Losing key information
- Generative function: Computational cost is high



2. Motivation of Information Bottleneck

Objective:
$$X_{\mathrm{sub}}^{*} := \underset{\mathbb{P}(X_{\mathrm{sub}}|X)}{\arg\min}\ \alpha \underbrace{I(X; X_{\mathrm{sub}})}_{\text{Compression}} - \underbrace{I(Y; X_{\mathrm{sub}})}_{\text{Prediction}},$$

where, $X_{\mathrm{sub}} = X \odot M$

- Defending against adversarial prompts
- Without losing much of its information
- Responding to normal prompts



- Comparison between ours and baselines

Method	Finetuning	Filter	Support Ensemble	Information Extraction	Transferability	Support Black-box	Inference Cost
Fine-tuning	✔	✗	No	✗	✔	No	Low
Unlearning LLM	✔	✗	No	✗	✔	No	Low
Self Defense	✗	–	No	✔	✗	Yes	High
Smooth LLM	✗	✔	Yes	✗	–	Yes	Medium
RA-LLM	✗	✔	Yes	✗	–	Yes	Medium
Semantic Smooth	✗	✔	Yes	✔	–	Yes	High
IBProtector	✔	✔	Yes	✔	✔	Yes	Low

3. Methodology



Learning Objective: $\mathcal{L} = \mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{info}} + \alpha(\mathcal{L}_M + \lambda \mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{con}})$

informative, compressed, connective

- Modify the Compression Quantifier $I(X; X_{\mathrm{sub}})$

Given $p_\phi \sim \mathbb{P}_\phi$: $p_\phi(X_{\leq t}) = \pi_t | t \in [T]$

$$I(X; X_{\mathrm{sub}}) \leq \mathbb{E}_X \left[D_{\mathrm{KL}}[\mathbb{P}_\phi(X_{\mathrm{sub}}|X) \| \mathbb{Q}(X_{\mathrm{sub}})] \right],$$

Reformulated as:

$$\mathcal{L}_M = \sum_{t=1}^{T} \left[\pi_t \log\left(\frac{\pi_t}{r}\right) + (1 - \pi_t) \log\left(\frac{1 - \pi_t}{1 - r}\right) \right]$$

- Enhance the coherence in X_{sub}

$$\mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{con}} = \frac{1}{T} \cdot \sum_{t=1}^{T-1} \sqrt{(\pi_{t+1} - \pi_t)^2}$$

- The Informativeness Quantifier $H(Y|X_{\mathrm{sub}})$

$$H(Y|X_{\mathrm{sub}}) = -\sum_{X,Y} p(X \odot M, Y) \log p(Y|X \odot M)$$

Reformulated as:

$$\mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{info}} = \underbrace{-\sum_{t=1}^{|Y|} \log p(Y_t|\widetilde{X}, Y_{<t})}_{\text{Cross Entropy}} + \underbrace{\sum_{t=1}^{|Y|} D_{\mathrm{KL}} \left[f_{\mathrm{tar}}(\widetilde{X}, Y_{<t}) \| f_{\mathrm{tar}}(X, Y_{<t}) \right]}_{\text{In-distribution}}$$

4. Experiments

- Defence Experiments

Lower Attack Success Rate, Higher Benign Answering Rate!

Experiment		Prompt-level Jailbreak (PAIR)			Token-level Jailbreak (GCG)			TriviaQA
Model	Method	ASR ↓	Harm ↓	GPT-4 ↓	ASR ↓	Harm ↓	GPT-4 ↓	BAR ↑
Vicuna (13b-v1.5)	Original Attack	87.5%	4.034	3.008	82.5%	0.244	4.300	97.8%
	Fine-tuning	62.5%	2.854	2.457	32.5%	0.089	2.114	94.8%
	Unlearning LLM	66.7%	2.928	2.496	40.8%	0.123	2.537	92.2%
	Self Defense	44.2%	2.585	1.692	12.5%	-1.170	1.400	79.6%
	Smooth LLM	68.3%	3.115	2.642	24.2%	-1.252	1.767	90.9%
	RA-LLM	34.2%	2.446	1.832	8.3%	-1.133	1.411	95.2%
	Semantic Smooth	20.0%	2.170	1.525	**1.7%**	-0.842	1.058	95.7%
	IBProtector	**19.2%**	**1.971**	**1.483**	**1.7%**	**-1.763**	**1.042**	**96.5%**
LLaMA-2 (7b-chat-hf)	Original Attack	67.5%	3.852	1.617	27.5%	0.325	2.517	98.7%
	Fine-tuning	47.5%	2.551	1.392	12.5%	-0.024	1.233	97.0%
	Unlearning LLM	49.2%	2.507	1.383	12.5%	-0.084	1.258	**97.4%**
	Self Defense	45.0%	2.682	1.525	11.7%	0.208	1.492	92.6%
	Smooth LLM	43.3%	2.394	1.342	4.2%	0.189	1.100	95.2%
	RA-LLM	40.0%	2.493	1.362	4.2%	-0.070	1.116	97.0%
	Semantic Smooth	40.8%	2.250	1.333	10.0%	-0.141	1.417	96.5%
	IBProtector	**16.7%**	**1.315**	**1.125**	**0.8%**	**-1.024**	**1.000**	97.0%

- Defend against other attack methods

	Vicuna (13b-v1.5)			LLaMA-2 (7b-chat-hf)		
Method	ASR ↓	Harm ↓	GPT-4 ↓	ASR ↓	Harm ↓	GPT-4 ↓
Original Attack	88.6%	2.337	4.225	29.0%	2.167	1.883
Fine-tuning	26.8%	1.124	1.772	5.1%	1.597	1.192
Unlearning LLM	28.3%	1.127	1.815	5.1%	1.534	1.233
Self Defense	28.7%	1.291	**1.725**	8.7%	1.439	1.792
Smooth LLM	81.1%	1.673	2.168	35.5%	1.720	1.992
RA-LLM	54.1%	1.027	1.892	2.2%	1.484	1.253
Semantic Smooth	49.2%	0.417	2.022	5.1%	1.116	1.101
IBProtector	**18.9%**	**0.031**	1.854	**0.7%**	**0.608**	**1.036**

- Protect other target models



- Low Inference Cost

Method	Theoretical Cost	Simplify
Original Attack	$C_{\mathrm{ori}} = T \times c_X + \lvert\hat{Y}\rvert \times c_Y$	C_{ori}
Fine-tuning	$C_{\mathrm{sft}} = T \times c_X + \lvert\hat{Y}\rvert \times c_Y$	$\approx C_{\mathrm{ori}}$
Unlearning LLM	$C_{\mathrm{unlearning}} = T \times c_X + \lvert\hat{Y}\rvert \times c_Y$	$\approx C_{\mathrm{ori}}$
Self Defense	$C_{\mathrm{self\ def}} = C_{\mathrm{ori}} + (\lvert\hat{Y}\rvert \times c_X + \lvert\hat{Y}'\rvert \times c_Y)$	$\approx 2 \times C_{\mathrm{ori}}$
Smooth LLM	$C_{\mathrm{smooth}} = n \times [(1-k)T \times c_X + kT \times c_\mu + \lvert\hat{Y}\rvert \times c_Y]$	$\approx n \times C_{\mathrm{ori}}$
RA-LLM	$C_{\mathrm{ra}} = n \times [(1-k)T \times c_X + \lvert\hat{Y}\rvert \times c_Y]$	$\approx n \times C_{\mathrm{ori}}$
Semantic Smooth	$C_{\mathrm{semantic}} = 2n \times [T \times c_X + T' \times c_Y + T' \times c_X + \lvert\hat{Y}\rvert \times c_Y]$	$\approx 2n \times C_{\mathrm{ori}}$
IBProtector	$T \times c_p + (1-k)T \times c_X + kT \times c_\mu + \lvert\hat{Y}\rvert \times c_Y$	$\approx C_{\mathrm{ori}}$