# Forks and Upgrade Mechanisms

Or: what the hell is Bitcoin?!!

# Agenda

- BIPs
- Hard Forks
- Soft Forks
  - Examples
  - Unexpected power of soft forks
- Comparison
- A brief history of deployment methods
- Outlook

#### Bitcoin Layers

#### 1. Consensus

- 2. Peer Services
- 3. API/RPC
- 4. Applications

(defined in BIP123 - BIP Classification)

#### **BIPS**

#### https://github.com/bitcoin/bips

#### README.mediawiki

People wishing to submit BIPs, first should propose their idea or document to the bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org mailing list. After discussion, please open a PR. After copy-editing and acceptance, it will be published here.

We are fairly liberal with approving BIPs, and try not to be too involved in decision making on behalf of the community. The exception is in very rare cases of dispute resolution when a decision is contentious and cannot be agreed upon. In those cases, the conservative option will always be preferred.

Having a BIP here does not make it a formally accepted standard until its status becomes Final or Active.

Those proposing changes should consider that ultimately consent may rest with the consensus of the Bitcoin users (see also: economic majority).

# **BIPS**


Number	Layer	Title	Owner	Туре	Status
1		BIP Purpose and Guidelines	Amir Taaki	Process	Replaced
2		BIP process, revised	Luke Dashjr	Process	Active
8		Version bits with lock-in by height	Shaolin Fry	Informational	Draft
9		Version bits with timeout and delay	Pieter Wuille, Peter Todd, Greg Maxwell, Rusty Russell	Informational	Final
10	Applications	Multi-Sig Transaction Distribution	Alan Reiner	Informational	Withdrawn
11	Applications	M-of-N Standard Transactions	Gavin Andresen	Standard	Final
12	Consensus (soft fork)	OP_EVAL	Gavin Andresen	Standard	Withdrawn
13	Applications	Address Format for pay-to-script- hash	Gavin Andresen	Standard	Final
14	Peer	Protocol Version and User Agent	Amir Taaki, Patrick	Standard	Final

#### Consensus Rules


- Define what constitutes a valid block
  - Formatting
  - o Proof of work, coin supply, ...
  - Script execution, signature checks
  - Double spend check
  - Various limits (weight, script sizes, ...)
  - o Etc.
- Most difficult to change
- Broadly two ways of doing so:
  - via Hard Forks
  - via Soft Forks

#### Consensus Rules


# **Normal Operation**



# A fork, but not an upgrade: orphaned blocks



# A fork, but not an upgrade: orphaned blocks





Longest/heaviest chain (*under same consensus rules*) is the main chain. Shorter forks are abandoned / orphaned.


- Hardforks remove or relax consensus rules
- Blocks following new rules are rejected by old nodes
  - Not forwards compatible
- Can change pretty much anything about the coin
- Backwards compatible? Usually yes, but not necessarily!


#### Examples:

- Change proof of work function
- Change block header magic prefix to 211ectures
- Add new OP codes to script
- Increase coin supply, script size limit, ...









#### Hardfork Deployment

- Define activation block number far enough in the future
  - Give ample time for everyone to learn about it
  - o Give ample time for the ecosystem to upgrade wallets, exchanges, infrastructure, etc.
- Code conceptually straight-forward:

```
if (blockNumber > 663000) { // expected ~ end of 2020
    // apply new consensus rules, ideally containing replay protection
} else {
    // apply old consensus rules
}
```

#### Hardforks - Complications

- In a contentious upgrade, the chain can permanently split into two chains
- Before the actual fork, no one knows for sure if one side will be dominant, or if there will be two chains
- Which inherits the name?
- Which version to support as an exchange, wallet maker, user, ...?
- A lot of uncertainty and overhead.

 Unless replay-protected, transactions from one chain can be replayed on the other chain Hard

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.@petertoddbtc well written! To clear up confusion, 17.5k ETC was replay attacked on Coinbase (~\$40k USD)

Peter Todd @peterktodd

Progress On Hardfork Proposals Following The Segwit Blocksize Increase petertodd.org/2016/hardforks...

10:16 AM - 6 Aug 2016

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  - Different signature hash algorithm, SIGHASH\_FORKID
- Hardforks should always come with built-in replay protection.

#### They usually don't:(


#### Softforks

- Softforks add or tighten consensus rules
- Blocks following new rules are accepted by old nodes
  - forwards compatible
- Majority of mining power needs to upgrade. Normal full nodes do not.

#### Examples:

- Decrease coin supply
- Decrease limits, e.g. script size limit
- Remove OP codes from script, or redefine an OP\_NOP code

#### Softforks



# Softforks - Examples

\_

# Softforks - OP\_CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY

- Defined in BIP65
- Prevents spending an output until a certain time/block
- Introduction by modifying Script, the Bitcoin script language.
- Redefined OP\_NOP2 to fail if the specified time > nLockTime

**Upgraded** nodes see: <time> CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY DROP

Non-upgraded nodes see: <time> OP\_NOP2 DROP

--- Forwards compatible!

# Softforks - Segwit (BIP141)

P2PKH Input Script <signature> <pub/>pubKey> Output Script OP\_DUP OP\_HASH160 <pub/>pubKeyHash> OP\_EQUALVERIFY OP\_CHECKSIG

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
```
P2PKH
                              P2WPKH
Input Script
                             Witness
<signature>
                             <signature>
<pub/>pubKey>
                             <pub/>pubKey>
Output Script
                             Input Script: empty
OP_DUP
                             Output Script
OP_HASH160
                             <0>
<pub/>pubKeyHash>
                             <pub/>pubKeyHash>
OP_EQUALVERIFY
OP_CHECKSIG
```

# Softforks - Segwit (BIP141)

P2PKH	P2WPKH	Old nodes see
Input Script	Witness	
<signature></signature>	<signature></signature>	
<pub></pub> pubKey>	<pub></pub> pubKey>	
Output Script	Input Script: empty —	<b>Input Script:</b> <i>empty</i>
OP_DUP	Output Script	Output Script
OP_HASH160	<0>	<0>
<pub></pub> pubKeyHash>	<pub></pub> pubKeyHash>	<pubkeyhash></pubkeyhash>
OP_EQUALVERIFY		
OP_CHECKSIG		

# Segwit Script Versioning

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# [bitcoin-dev] Simplicity: An alternative to Script

Russell O'Connor roconnor at blockstream.io

Mon Oct 30 15:22:20 UTC 2017

Witness

<signature><script>

Input Script: empty

Output Script

<version>

<scriptHash>

Arbitrary new scripting language

Provides an easy way to add future script changes through softforks

#### **Unexpected Power of Softforks**

- After segwit, easy to softfork in arbitrary new scripting languages
- Can softfork in any change, really!
   (commit to a parallel block with arbitrary rules in the coinbase tx, possibly prohibit any other transactions in the main block)

Called **evil fork** or **forced soft fork** (Peter Todd)

vs. Softfork

Loosens rules

• Tightens rules

#### Hardfork vs. Softfork

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#### **Both:**

- Can modify the protocol arbitrarily
- Opt-out by default, can opt-in by upgrading

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From the BitMex write-up (https://blog.bitmex.com/bitcoins-consensus-forks/):

Miners <u>did not upgrade fast enough</u>, so the evaluation point was delayed until 15 March. Users running 0.6.0 rc1 who did not upgrade for the delay activated the softfork early and got <u>stuck on block 170,060</u> when an invalid transaction, according to their nodes, was mined. After activation, problems were caused as the remaining 45% of miners produced invalid blocks for several months after the softfork

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  - Called MASF Miner Activated Soft Fork
- Then started to use block version bits to encode multiple soft forks and their state, still with 95% miner signaling for coordination (BIP9)

Then, segwit was slated for activation, and everything changed



```
Blocksize debate

HF vs. SF

unhappy miners

ASICBOOST

Segwit2X
```

. . .

95% of mining supermajority: signaling or voting?

Idea: if the economic majority enforced a softfork, miners would have to follow. Otherwise their blocks would be rejected and be worthless.







# UASF - Use







#### Why I support BIP148

When I first started working on Bitcoin applications nearly six years ago, I worked under the assumption that even though the Bitcoin software itself

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


# UASF - Use



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#### I am the BearWhale: UASF Now!

submitted 1 year ago \* (last edited 1 year ago) by the bearwhale 💿 🔕





A signed version of this message can be found here https://pastebin.com/Lp5Djs5R<sup>[1]</sup>



Hello. I am the BearWhale. After a series of bad experiences with the banking system, I in most of my life savings into bitcoin when the price was fairly low, around \$8. For years I was HODLer. I was holding when Trendon Shavers ripped everyone off. I was holding when the



Segwit locked in August 2017.

Debate over whether miners started signaling because of UASF, or because of the Segwit2x agreement.

Reasonable people can disagree!

#### UAHF - User Activated Hard Fork

Same concept, but for hardforks.

#### Examples:

- Bitcoin Cash, born on the same day of segwit lock-in
- Segwit2x (user averted hard fork)

## So.. what the hell is Bitcoin?!

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A social construct, not accurately defined by code or mining power.

## Consensus Failure - Chain splits

Different nodes can follow different chains if there is a consensus bug (triggered accidentally or as an attack)

#### Examples:

- Bitcoin 0.8 introduced an accidental hardfork, switch from BerekelyDB to LevelDB. Fixed soon after with a softfork.
- Recent inflation bug: could have been triggered by a miner, but was not.
   Fixed with a softfork.

#### Future of Softforks in Bitcoin

The next softforks will likely be deployed using new segwit script versions.

Might not rely solely on miner signaling any longer, but we'll see!

Looking forward to Schnorr Signatures, SIGHASH\_NOINPUT, and much more!

# Fin