EXPLORING CRYPTOGRAPHY PROTOCOLS

WITH LIMITED EMPHASIS ON MATHEMATICS ©



ATTENTION

THESE SLIDES HAVE BEEN CRAFTED USING THE FOUNDATION OF MY MSC COURSE IN CRYPTOGRAPHY PROTOCOLS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF ISFAHAN.

I'VE MADE ADJUSTMENTS TO THE CONTENT TO ALIGN WITH THE SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES OF THIS PRESENTATION.

ALSO, MY INTENTION HAS BEEN TO MINIMIZE THE USE OF MATHEMATICAL CONCEPTS, WHICH MAY RESULT IN SOME CONCEPTS BEING SIMPLIFIED OR LESS PRECISE.




- 1. Identification and Entity Authentications Protocols
- 2. Zero Knowledge Protocols
- 3. Key Establishment Protocols
- 4. Threshold Cryptography and Secret Sharing Protocols
- 5. Special Purpose Protocols (like simultaneous contract signing, mental poker, fair exchange)
- 6. Identity Based Cryptography
- 7. Types of Digital Signatures
- 8. Secure Multiparty Computations



Agenda

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
Levels of Authentications

Weak Authentication (based on password)

• Strong Authentication (based on challenge and response)

• Extremely Strong Authentication (based on zero knowledge)





Protocol #1





My password is PW_A





| Alice | PW_A |
|-----------|--------|
| / | .,. |


Eavesdropping and Replay Attack

Unauthorized Access to DB

Dictionary Attack

Bob Knows Alice's Password





Protocol #2



I don't say who I am, but

My password is PW_A






| Alice | h(PW _A) |
|-------------|---------------------|
| / / | |

Map Hash of Password to a User with Complexity of n/2Birthday Attack to Find each PW





Protocol #3



I don't say who I am, but


My password is PW_A






| Alice h(PW _A salt _A) | | salt _A |
|--|--|-------------------|
| /// | | // |





Lamport











| user | next challenge | hash |
|-------|----------------|-----------------------------------|
| Alice | n | h ⁿ (PW _A) |





Lamport







user

Alice







n-1










Lamport (Small n Attack)




| user | hash |
|-------|--------------------------------------|
| Alice | h ¹⁰⁰⁰ (PW _A) |










Alice



 $h^{998}(PW_A) ... h^1(PW_A)$


Alice must store the latest value of "n"





Infinite Length Hash Chain (ILHC)









| user | hash |
|-------|----------------------|
| Alice | A ^x (s,d) |


A -> Algorithm

d -> Private Key

e -> Public Key

s -> Paintext

c -> Ciphertext




s ,
$$A(s,d)$$
 , $A^2(s,d)$, ... , $A^n(s,d)$, ...




• Types of S • Based or

Strong Authentications

- Types of Strong Authentications:
 - Based on symmetric encryption





Protocol #1

 $MAC_{K}(.)$



request for authentication

a big random r


 $MAC_{K}(r)$



 $MAC_{K}(.)$








in role of

Alice

Strong Authentication


Parallel Session Attack





Suppose both Alice and Bob could be authenticator and could be authenticated as well





Protocol #2

 $MAC_{K}(.)$



request for authentication

a big random r


 $MAC_{K}(A \mid r)$



 $MAC_{K}(.)$








Mutual Authentication or Bilateral Authentication


Both Alice and Bob can authenticate each other

- Two conditions of scheme:
 - Completeness: If both Alice and Bob are honest and the enemy is passive, the result of session must be pass by both.
 - Soundness: If the enemy got involved in just a flow or more, the result of session must be fail by both.










Protocol #4











 $MAC_{K}(.)$







Parallel Session Attack






Protocol #5










 $MAC_{K}(.)$






Asymmetric Encryption


| TA | Trusted Authority |
|----------------------|---|
| CA | Certificate Authority |
| PK _A | A's Public Key |
| PR_A | A's Private Key |
| sig _A (x) | Encrypt x by A's Private Key |
| $ver_A(x, y)$ | Decrypt y by A's Public Key and Verify $x == y$ |
| cert _A | $ID_A \mid PK_A \mid sig_{CA}(ID_A \mid PK_A)$ |





Protocol #6






 $sig_B(ID_A \mid r_2)$












Protocol #7






 r_2 , cert_A, sig_A(ID_B | r_1 | r_2)











Parallel Session Attack



 r_1 , cert_B initiator








 r_2 , cert_A r_3 , sig_B(ID_A | r_2 | r_3)

$$r_3$$
, $sig_B(ID_A \mid r_2 \mid r_3)$





Ref

- 1. Cryptography Protocols Course, Dr. Hamid Mala, University of Isfahan
- 2. https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8235
- 3. https://blog.goodaudience.com/understanding-zero-knowledge-proofs-through-simple-examples-df673f796d99
- 4. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zero-knowledge_proof#Definition
- 5. https://www.iconfinder.com/UsersInsights
- 6. https://www.iconfinder.com/Chanut-is

