

Semantical Formalization, Run-Time Checks Proof and Verification for SPARK 2014

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Abstract. We present the first steps of a broad effort to develop a formal representation of SPARK 2014 suitable for supporting machine-verified static analyses and translations. In our initial work, we have developed technology for translating the GNAT compiler's abstract syntax trees into the Coq proof assistant, and we have formalized in Coq the dynamic semantics for a toy subset of the SPARK 2014 language [Spark2014]. SPARK 2014 programs must ensure the absence of certain run-time errors (for example, those arising while performing division by zero, accessing non existing array cells, overflow on integer computation). The main novelty in our semantics is the encoding of (a small part of) the run-time checks performed by the compiler to ensure that well-typed and well initialized terminating SPARK programs do not lead to erroneous execution. This and other results are mechanically proved using the Coq proof assistant. The modeling of on-the-fly run-time checks within the semantics lays the foundation for future work on mechanical reasoning about SPARK 2014 program correctness (in the particular area of robustness) and for studying the correctness of compiler optimizations concerning run-time checks, among others.

1 Introduction

We believe that the certification process of SPARK technology can be stressed by the use of formal semantics. Indeed, the software certification process as required by the DO-178-C [?] standard allows formal verification to replace some forms of testing. This is one of the goals pursued by the SPARK toolchain resulting from the Hi-Lite project [?]. On the other hand, the DO-333 supplement [?] (formal method supplement to DO-178-C) recommends that when using formal methods "all assumptions related to each formal analysis should be described and justified". As any formal static analysis must rely on the behavior of the language being analyzed, a precise and unambiguous definition of the semantics of this language becomes clearly a requirement in the certification process.

We also aim to strengthen the theoretical foundation of the GNATprove toolchain. The Ada reference manual [?] introduces the notion of *errors*. These correspond to error situations that must be detected at run time as well as erroneous executions that need not to be detected. In Ada, the former are detected by run-time checks (RTCs) inserted by the compiler. Both must be guaranteed never to occur during the process of proving SPARK (or Ada) subprograms within the GNATprove toolchain [?]. This can be ensured either by static analysis or by generating verification conditions (VCs) showing

that the corresponding error situations never occur at that point in the subprogram. The generated VCs must be discharged in order to prove the subprogram. Tools within the GNATprove toolchain strongly rely on the completeness of this VCs generation process. Our semantics setting on top of a proof assistant open the possibility to formally (and mechanically) verify (to some extent) this completeness. In practice, since VCs are actually generated from the RTCs generated by the compiler, this completeness verification amounts to analyzing the RTCs inserted by the compiler in the abstract syntax tree produced by the GNAT compiler.

Finally, one of our long-term goals is to provide infrastructure that can be leveraged in a variety of ways to support machine-verified proofs of correctness of SPARK 2014 static analysis and translations. To this end, we will build a translation framework from SPARK 2014 to Coq, which puts in place crucial infrastructure necessary for supporting formal proofs of SPARK analysis. Together with the formal semantics of SPARK, it provides the potential to connect to the CompCert [?] certified compiler framework.

2 Overview

In the long path through the definition of complete semantics for SPARK 2014, a very important step is to build a tool chain to make it possible in the future to be integrated into SPARK 2014 tool set. Now most of the formalization work are not really used or adopted by a real programming language partially because of the big gap between formalization and its real application. So we build a prototype of the tool chain from SPARK 2014 to Coq and build a bridge between SPARK formalization and its real application in SPARK GnatProve tool set. For the users of SPARK programming language, it also helps to convince them why SPARK is safety-critical programming language by the experimentation of the behavior of SPARK semantics on real SPARK 2014 programs.

Insert An Overview Graph

2.1 The Frontend of The Tool Chain From SPARK to Coq

In the front end of this tool chain, Gnat2XML, developed by AdaCore, translates SPARK programs to a fully resolved Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) XML representation with an accompanying XML schema. As part of the Sireum analysis framework [5], we have furtherly developed a tool called Jago [4] that translates XML representation of the GNAT compiler's ASTs into a Scala-based representation in Sireum. This open-source framework enables one to build code translators and analysis tools for SPARK 2014 in Scala. Scalas blending of functional and object-oriented program styles have proven quite useful in other contexts for syntax tree manipulation and analysis. Integrated into Jago are two kinds of translations: (1) type translation to translate Gnat2XML-generated XML schema to (inductive) type definition in Coq; (2) program translation to translate Gnat2XML-generated AST XML representation into Coq based representations.

2.2 SPARK 2014 Formalization and Proof in Coq

With Coq inductive type definition for SPARK AST syntax produced by Jago type translator, formal semantics encoding run-time checks for SPARK has been developed within Coq, which is referred as SPARK reference semantics. Besides, a formal semantics for SPARK AST extended with run-time check flags are defined, where run-time checks are performed only if the appropriate check flags are set for the operations. And an AST translator from a SPARK AST to a run-time check flagged AST is provided and proved correct with respect to the SPARK reference semantics.

2.3 Run-Time Checks Comparison

To verify the run-time check flags that are inserted by GnatPro frontend, a run-time check comparison function is developed to match the GnatPro generated checks against the expected checks required by our formalized SPARK reference semantics, and report any mismatches. For easy debug, any check mismatching information will be mapped back to the SPARK source location.

3 Formalization for A Subset of SPARK 2014 Semantics

3.1 Syntax of SPARK 2014 Subset

The subset of SPARK 2014 that we have formalized is significant, which includes array/record (non-nested) and procedure calls. Furthermore, it also supports some interesting SPARK / Ada language structures, such as nested procedures and subtypes.

SPARK AST syntax is represented with inductive type definitions in Coq. And each AST node is annotated with a unique AST number, which will be used to record the type for each ast node, or it can be used later to track back to the SPARK source program when a run time error is detected, or it can be used to locate the position in source program where the run time check flags inserted by Gnat front end is incorrect.

Here, we list some of SPARK language structures and show how we formalize them in Coq. Expression (*expr*) can be literal, unary expression, binary expression or name, and each expression is annotated with an AST number (*astnum*), which is represented by natural number. For type *name*, it can be identifier, indexed component or selected component. Indexed component is constructed with the constructor *Indexed.Component*, whose first *astnum* denotes the indexed component and the second *astnum* denotes the prefix expression represented by *idnum* and *expr* is for index expression.

```
Inductive expr: Type :=
| Name: astnum → name → expr
| ...
with name: Type :=
| Identifier: astnum → idnum → name
| Indexed_Component: astnum → astnum → idnum → expr → name
| Selected_Component: astnum → astnum → idnum → idnum → name .
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Inductive stmt: Type :=
| Call: astnum → astnum → procnum → list expr → stmt
| ...

Inductive type_decl: Type :=
| Subtype: astnum → typenum → type → range → type_decl
| Derived_Type: astnum → typenum → type → range → type_decl
| Integer_Type: astnum → typenum → range → type_decl
| Array_Type: astnum → typenum → type → type → type_decl
| Record_Type: astnum → typenum → list (idnum*type) → type_decl.

```

3.2 Run-Time Check Flags

In SPARK, run time checks flags are automatically inserted at SPARK AST by the front end during semantic analysis, and their corresponding run time checks are then discharged by formally verifying their generated verification conditions with the Gnat-Prove tool chain. So SPARK can guarantee the absence of run time errors for developing safety critical systems.

For our formalized SPARK 2014 subset, the following check flags are sufficient, which are enforced on the expression nodes.

- Do_Overflow_Check: This flag is set on an operator where its operation may cause overflow, such as binary operators (+, -, *, /), unary operator (-) and type conversion from one base type to another when the value of source base type falls out of domain of the target base type.
- Do_Division_Check: This flag is set on division operators, such as (/ , *mod*, *rem*), to indicate a zero divide check.
- Do_Range_Check: This flag is set on an expression which appears in a context where range check is required, such as right hand side of an assignment, subscript expression in an indexed component, argument expressions for a procedure call and initialization value expression for an object declaration.

3.3 Semantical Formalization With Run-Time Checks

The major semantical difference between SPARK and other programming languages is that verification for absence of run time errors are required by the language itself. So in our semantical formalization for SPARK language, run time checks is an important integrant and they are always performed at appropriate points during the language semantic evaluation. The program will be terminated with a run time error message once any of its run time checks fails during the program evaluation.

Value In SPARK semantics, return value for an expression evaluation can be either a normal basic value (integer or bool), a normal aggregate value (array or record value) or a run time error status detected during expression evaluation. Similarly, for a well-formed SPARK program, it should either terminate in a normal state or a detected run time error, which is expected to be detected and raised during program execution.

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Inductive return_value : Type :=
| Normal : value → return_value
| Run_Time_Error : error_type → return_value .

```

Run Time Check Evaluation A small but significant subset of SPARK run time checks are formalized in Coq, including overflow check, division check and range check. Overflow checks are performed to check that the result of a given orithmetic operation is within the bounds of the base type, division checks are performed to prevent divide being zero, and range checks are performed to check that the evaluation value of an expression is within bounds of its target type with respect to the context where it appears. A small fragment for overflow check formalization in Coq is:

```

Inductive overflow_check_bin : binop → value → value → status → Prop :=
| Do_Overflow_Check_On_Binops : ∀ op v1 v2 v,
  op = Plus ∨ op = Minus ∨ op = Multiply ∨ op = Divide →
  Val.binary_operation op v1 v2 = Some (BasicV (Int v)) →
  (Zge_bool v min_signed) && (Zle_bool v max_signed) = true →
  overflow_check_bin op v1 v2 Success
| ...

```

Now we only model the 32-bit signed integer for SPARK program, where Coq integer (\mathbb{Z}) is used to represent this integer value with a range bound between *min_signed* and *max_signed*. This integer range constraint is enforced through the above overflow check semantics when we define the semantics for the language. As we can see, overflow checks are required only for binary operators (+, -, *, /) among the set of binary operators in our formalized SPARK subset. And it returns either *Success* or *Exception* with overflow signal.

Expression Evaluation dd

Statement Evaluation dd

Declaration Evaluation dd

4 Run-Time Checks Generator Implementation and Proof

4.1 Formalization for Run-Time Checks Generator

4.2 Correctness Proof

4.3 Optimization and Proof

5 Evaluation

5.1 Run-Time Checks Generator Function

5.2 Application To SPARK 2014 Programs

6 Related Work

7 Conclusions and Future Work