CSC 6580 Spring 2020

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Homework: Basic Blocks

Midterm

Midterm Topics

- Is it risky to disclose vulnerabilities (1/21)?
- Does Rice's theorem preclude analysis (1/21)?
- How might optimization break a program (1/28)?
- How do memory references work (1/28)?
- What are some simple assembly idioms (1/28-30)?
- How does two's complement arithmetic work (2/4)?
- How do you write inline assembly (2/4)?
- How does RIP work (2/6)?
- What do little endian and big endian mean (2/11)?
- How do the stack and EBP work (2/11)?
- How do you perform a system call (2/11)?

- What is a proper program (2/11)?
- What is a structured program (2/11)?
- How do you structure a program (2/13)?
- What are sections and the entry point (2/13)?
- What are basic blocks (2/25)?
- What is position-independent code (2/27)?
- What is RIP-relative addressing (2/27)?
- What is the PLT (3/5)?
- How do you determine if a variable is live (3/5)?
- How do you construct a simple trace table (3/5)?
- How do you do backward static slicing (3/10)?
- How to apply liveness and slicing to assembly (3/12)?

Basic Knowledge

Expect you to:

- understand binary and hexadecimal numbers;
- understand bitwise operators (and, inclusive or, exclusive or, not, shifting and rotating);
- be proficient in the C programming language, including pointers;
- have a basic familiarity with Python;
- know simple program analysis;
- know how to apply first order logic and algebra; and
- write clearly in complete sentences when explaining.

Don't memorize; apply

- Instructions used will be defined
 - ...but you need to know how to understand and create programs using them.
- Theorems used will be stated
 - ...but you need to understand how to apply them.
- Any calling convention used will be given
 - ...but you need to know how to use it.
- Unusual code idioms will be explained
 - ...but you should know how to read and write programs.

Linux System Calls

Where are these documented... really?

There are man pages. Section 2 of the man pages is devoted to the Linux system calls. (I still like using Chapman's quick reference: https://bit.ly/2W3IXBF.)

Introduction to section 2:

```
$ man 2 intro
```

Get a list of *all* the Linux system calls:

```
$ man 2 syscalls
```

Get information on the sys_exit system call:

```
$ man 2 exit
```

Anti-Sandboxing

Is your code being debugged? Sandboxed?







Maybe you don't want your code to be sandboxed! Maybe you are worried about loss of trade secrets, or someone capturing a decryption key, or even someone stealing your intellectual property!

- https://www.shadesandbox.com/
- https://www.sandboxie.com/
- https://solebit.io/

The Trap Flag

The processor has a trap flag (TF) that causes an interrupt after a single instruction executes (SIGTRAP). Install a signal handler with the ra_sigaction system call (not that easy), set the trap flag, and then jump to the code you want to run.

Am I being debugged?

Check the trap flag, but do it stealthy. So stealthy!

```
mov ss, dx
mov edx, ss
pushf
pop edx
and edx, 0x100
rol edx, 0x18
ror edx, 0x1a
pushf
and DWORD [esp], 0xffffffbf
or [esp], edx
popf
jz tf_set
```

pushf	Push the FLAGS onto the stack	FLAGS = 0b ODI <u>T</u> SZXA XPXC
		[ESP] = 0b ODI <u>T</u> SZXA XPXC
pop edx	Pop the flags into EDX	EDX = 0b ODIT SZXA XPXC
and edx, 0x100	Mask the bit 8 (the trap flag TF)	EDX = 0b ODIT SZXA XPXC
		& 0b 0001 0000 0000
		= 0b 000 <u>T</u> 0000 0000
rol edx, 0x18	Rotate left by 16+8 = 24 bits. It is a 32-bit register, so bit 8 ends up at position 8+24 = 32, which wraps around through the carry and ends up at bit 32-32 = 0	EDX = 0b 0000 0000 000 <u>T</u>
ror edx, 0x1a	Rotate right by 16+10 = 26 bits. It is a 32-bit register, so bit 0 ends up at position 0-26 = -26, which wraps around through the carry and ends up at bit 32-26 = 6	EDX = 0b 0000 0 <u>T</u> 00 0000
pushf	Push the FLAGS onto the stack	FLAGS = 0b ODIT SZXA XPXC [ESP] = 0b ODIT SZXA XPXC EDX = 0b 0000 0 <u>T</u> 00 0000
and DWORD [esp], 0xffffffbf	And the 32 bit value at the top of the stack to zero out bit 6	[ESP] = 0b ODIT SZXA XPXC & 0b 1111 1011 1111 = 0b ODIT S0XA XPXC EDX = 0b 0000 0 <u>T</u> 00 0000
or [esp], edx	Or the value on top of the stack with the shifted trap flag so the value is now in the ZF position	[ESP] = 0b ODIT S0XA XPXC 0b 0000 0 <u>T</u> 00 0000 = 0b ODIT S <u>T</u> XA XPXC
popf	Pop the FLAGS off the stack	FLAGS = 0b ODIT STXA XPXC
jz debugging	Now branch if ZF (really the original TF) is set	

Paranoid Fish

"Pafish is a demonstration tool that employs several techniques to detect sandboxes and analysis environments in the same way as malware families do."

https://github.com/aOrtega/pafish

Back to Slicing (on Semantics)

Example: Slicing Semantics

Instruction	Depends
[rax := (rax+1)%2^64, cf]	rax
$[rcx := (rax*8)%2^64]$	rax
[rsp := (rsp-8)%2^64, M[rsp] := rcx]	rcx
[rsp := (rsp-8)%2^64, M[rsp] := rax]	stack(0)
[rdi := 21]	stack(8)
[_optc]	stack(8)
[rcx := M[rsp+8], rsp := (rsp+8)%2^64]	stack(8)
[rax := M[rsp+8], rsp := (rsp+8)%2^64]	stack(0)
	rax

Example: Slicing Semantics

Instruction	Depends
[rax := (rax+1)%2^64]	rax
[rcx := (rax*8)%2^64]	rax
[M[rsp] := rcx]	rcx
[rsp := (rsp-8)%2^64]	stack(0)
	stack(8)
	stack(8)
[rsp := (rsp+8)%2^64]	stack(8)
[rax := M[rsp+8]]	stack(0)
	rax

Example: Slicing Semantics (Fixed)

Instruction	Depends
[rax := (rax+1)%2^64, cf]	rax
$[rcx := (rax*8)%2^64]$	rax
[rsp := (rsp-8)%2^64, M[rsp] := rcx]	rax
[rsp := (rsp-8)%2^64, M[rsp] := rax]	rax
[rdi := 21]	stack(0)
[_optc]	stack(0)
[rax := M[rsp+8], rsp := (rsp+8)%2^64]	stack(0)
[rcx := M[rsp+8], rsp := (rsp+8)%2^64]	rax
	rax

Example: Slicing Semantics (Fixed)

Instruction	Depends
[rax := (rax+1)%2^64]	rax
	rax
	rax
[rsp := (rsp-8)%2^64, M[rsp] := rax]	rax
	stack(0)
	stack(0)
[rsp := (rsp+8)%2^64]	stack(0)
[rcx := M[rsp+8]]	rax
	rax

Naïve Slicing in Assembly

- 1. LET $D[n+1] = \{v\}$
- 2. FOR i = n TO 1:
 - a. LET w = written(inst[i]) intersect D[i+1]
 - b. LET D[i] = D[i+1] w
 - c. IF w is not empty THEN LET D[i] = D[i] + read(inst[i])
 - d. IF D[i] intersect written(inst[i]) is not empty THEN mark i as needed

Liveness Analysis and Slicing in Assembly

Consider the block from the Python 3.7 executable.

Where does the jump go?

At each line we ask "What do the variables in the live set depend on?"

 If a variable in the live set is an Ivalue, then first remove it from the set and then add all corresponding rvalues to the set.

```
block at: 0x47e0f1
       r10, qword ptr [rbp + 8]
 mov
       rdi, rbp
 mov
       r11, qword ptr [r10 + 0x30]
 mov
       rdx
  pop
       rbp
  pop
        r12
  pop
 jmp
        r11
next: unknown
```

block	at: 0x47e0f1	Live Set (Before Line)
mov	r10, qword ptr [rbp + 8]	
mov	rdi, rbp	
mov	r11, qword ptr [r10 + 0x30]	
pop	rdx	
рор	rbp	
pop	r12	
jmp	r11	r11

At the end we need to know the value of R11

olock	at: 0x47e0f1	Live Set (Before Line)
mov	r10, qword ptr [rbp + 8]	
mov	rdi, rbp	
mov	r11, qword ptr [r10 + 0x30]	
pop	rdx	r11
pop	rbp	r11
pop	r12	r11
jmp	r11	r11

R11 is not an Ivalue; nothing is done to the set

Live Set (Before Line)
r10
r11
r11
r11
r11

R11 is an Ivalue; remove it from the set, leaving {}

Add the Ivalue R10 to the set

block at: 0x47e0f1 l	Live Set (Before Line)
mov r10, qword ptr [rbp + 8]	
mov rdi, rbp	r10
mov r11, qword ptr [r10 + 0x30] r	r10
pop rdx r	r11
pop rbp r	r11
pop r12 r	r11
jmp r11 r	r11

R10 is not an Ivalue; the set is unchanged

block at: 0x47e0f1 Live Set (Befor	
mov r10, qword ptr [rbp + 8] rbp	
mov rdi, rbp r10	
mov r11, qword ptr [r10 + 0x30] r10	
pop rdx r11	
pop rbp r11	
pop r12 r11	
jmp r11 r11	

R10 is an Ivalue; remove it from the set leaving {}

RBP is an rvalue and is added

block at: 0x47e0f1	Live Set (Before Line)
mov r10, qword ptr [rbp + 8]	rbp
mov rdi, rbp	r10
mov r11, qword ptr [r10 + 0x30]	r10
pop rdx	r11
pop rbp	r11
pop r12	r11
jmp r11	r11

If a line does not modify anything in the live set, discard the line

b	lock	at: 0x4	47e0f1					Live Set (Before Line)
	mov	r10,	qword	ptr	[rbp	+	8]	rbp
	mov	r11,	qword	ptr	[r10	+	0x30]	r10
	jmp	r11						r11

We obtain the reduced program

Next Time (after Spring Break): Midterm