A Comparison Of Machine Learning Algorithms to Detect Network Intrusions

Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of Edinburgh Napier University for the Degree of BEng (Hons) Software Engineering

School of Computing

5th April 2018

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Abstract

For any major company or business, network security is of the utmost concern, as breaches can incur huge damages to infrastructure, data, and reputation, as well as large fines. When preventing these breaches the use of firewalls alone are insufficient and so network intrusion detection systems are put in place, which monitor incoming traffic and provide an extra layer of security. These intrusion detection systems can employ machine learning techniques which allow them to detect novel attacks and zero day vulnerabilities not previously seen.

While the existing literature on machine learning for network intrusion detection is extensive there is an apparent lack of comparisons between single stage and two-stage classification techniques, i.e. where when classifying traffic it is first categorised as normal or intrusive, and then classified as a specific attack. This project aims to fill the gap in the literature regarding the performance difference between single and two-stage classification of network intrusions, and to determine whether or not there is a increase in the accuracy of classifications made using two-stage classification.

This dissertation presents a piece of software to simplify the comparison of single and two-stage classification techniques, and a comparison of several machine learning algorithms across the NSL-KDD and UNSW-NB15 datasets. Experimental results within this dissertation show that the overall accuracy of machine learning techniques can be improved through the use of two-stage classification and so is a worthwhile avenue of further research.

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1 Introduction

1.1 Background

For any major company or business security is of the utmost concern, with a study finding that in the UK in 2016 an estimated 46% of all businesses experienced a cyber security breach or attack (K, Jayesh N S, Tom R & Mark B, 2017). These breaches are particularly dangerous as even if a network is compromised a single time a company can have its entire database destroyed, or customer data leaked, leading to legal repercussions. When it comes to preventing these intrusions firewalls alone are insufficient for anything but the most rudimentary of attacks and so a Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) is employed to further bolster the security of the network. Traditional NIDS are placed strategically on a network to monitor all incoming traffic. It analyses the passing traffic and then compares it to a large library of known attacks and if it matches will flag the traffic. While these systems do provide some degree of protection they are unable to detect novel attacks or zero-day vulnerabilities and so some other method of identifying suspicious traffic is required. Introducing machine learning to a NIDS is one way of attempting to solve this problem first proposed by Denning, 1987. In using machine learning to detect network intrusions the system can be trained to recognise patterns of intrusive behaviour, allowing it to detect attacks which it may not have seen before but have characteristics of similar attacks. Machine learning also allows systems to be easily retrained to accommodate for new data on attacks as it emerges. There are two main categories of NIDS: misuse detection, and anomaly detection; both of which have their own advantages and disadvantages. The following literature review aims to discuss the different kinds of network intrusion detection systems, the algorithms that these systems employ, and the gap in papers which directly compare the performance of single stage and two-stage classifiers in the domain of network intrusion detection.

1.2 Research Questions

For this honours thesis there are a number of research questions which have been collated, and an attempt made to answer them. These questions in which I am interested in answering are the following:

- What is the rate of accurate detection and classification of network intrusions by single stage machine learning classification methods?
- What is the rate of accurate detection and classification of network intrusions by two stage machine learning classification methods?

- Which method of classification i.e. single stage or two stage, is more accurate and by what amount?
- Which configuration of algorithms in the two stage classifier produces the most accurate results?

In this context, accuracy is defined as a high number of true positives and true negatives, and a low number of false positives and false negatives when classifying network intrusions.

First research will be completed in order to gain an understanding of the history and current state of machine learning for network intrusion detection, through reading relevant research papers and articles. Next the individual algorithms and methods which go into detecting network intrusions will be researched and understood. This knowledge will then be put into developing a piece of software capable of running these algorithms and extracting metrics which will be used to answer these research questions.

1.3 Aims and Objectives

The aim of this project is to create a piece of software which is capable of running both single and two stage classification algorithm arrangements on a number of datasets and displaying the results in a clear manner. In doing so this will assist in answering the research questions put forward.

These research questions, specifically whether or not two stage classification provides more accurate results than single stage classification will be answered by meeting the following objectives:

- Perform a review of existing literature.
- Perform a review of existing software.
- Select appropriate machine learning classification algorithms.
- Select appropriate datasets for use in network intrusion detection.
- Implementation of software to assist in comparison of classification algorithms.
- Evaluation of software with regards to specification and other software.
- Evaluation of single stage classification performance versus two-stage classification performance.

1.4 Scope and Limitations

1.4.1 Deliverables

The list of deliverables for this project are the following:

- A review of literature on related topics and a report detailing the findings of such reports.
- A review of existing software which performs a similar role to the proposed software.
- A software requirement specification.
- A description of all testing which will be carried out.
- A report detailing the results of each classification algorithm and configuration of two stage classification algorithms
- An evaluation of the implemented software with regards to how well it meets the proposed specification, and how it compares to existing software.

1.4.2 Boundaries

There exists a large number of different classification algorithms and methods to perform network intrusion detection, therefore this project must focus on a few specifically. This project will focus on performing misuse detection rather than anomaly detection, and will limit the classification algorithms used to: k-Nearest Neighbour, Multi-layer Perceptron, and a Support Vector Machine. This investigation will also only be assessing the performance of misuse detection, and not anomaly detection.

1.4.3 Constraints

The largest constraint facing this project is that of time. There is a large amount of literature to be reviewed, and also a considerable amount of results which must be collected and results drawn from in a short amount of time.

1.5 Structure of this Dissertation

This dissertation can be divided into three main parts: part one is a review of the relevant literature and related works carried out in the field of network intrusion detection, as well as any existing software; Part two details the planning, design, implementation and testing of the software which is to be created to aid in the investigation; finally, part three details the results of

the experiments carried, an evaluation of the created software, an analysis of gathered results, and the conclusions drawn from the project as a whole.

Part one (Sections 2-3) involves a review of the existing literature within the field of machine learning for network intrusion detection and examines results of related works and individual machine learning algorithms. A review will also be done of existing software to see what features they offer in what aspects they might be improved.

Part two (Sections 4-5) describes the detailed software requirements, specific functionality which should be implemented, user interface designs, and a listing of what testing should take place. The methodology for the project is also detailed in this part which includes a description of the technologies and libraries used, the datasets used any the processing performed upon them, and finally how data will be collected and what metrics will be drawn from the results.

Part three (Sections 5-8) is a listing of results gathered in experiments carried out and an evaluation of the final software product against its initial design and any existing software. An analysis of the results gathered will then take place and conclusions drawn, as well as a review of research questions, learning outcomes, and suggestions for future work. also has an evaluation of the overall project how well it met its aims and suggestions for future work.

2 Literature Review

2.1 Search Strategy

While searching for relevant papers on the subject of network intrusion detection, a number of key terms were identified which could be used to find papers within the field. The main search term which was used was 'Network Intrusion Detection' which was used to find papers which were generally related to the topic. A number of suplemental search terms were identified and used in conjuntion with the main search term when attempting to find papers which used a specific technology within network intrusion detection. These included: 'Nearest Neighbor', 'k-NN', 'Neural', 'Self Organising Map', 'SOM', 'Recurrent', 'Hybrid', 'Stage', and 'Ensemble'. Using a combination of the main search term and these additions search terms allowed the discovery of papers directly relevant to the project. If two terms were required to be included within the search then the AND operator would be used to ensure that both were matched. Similarly if there were multiple terms for the same technique or technology, i.e. 'Nearest Neighbor' and 'k-NN' then the **OR** operator would be used, to reduce the number of individual searches which were required to be carried out. When papers were found and deemed relevant to the project, a review of citations included within those papers would also be carried out, which allows the finding of papers which are directly related to the subject but which may have been missed by the search terms specified. A seperate search was also performed when researching a relevant dataset by searching for the title of each dataset, such as: 'KDD Cup', 'NSL-KDD', 'DARPA', etc.

2.2 Databases

To find appropriate research papers, Google Scholar and the Edinburgh Napier University Library Search were used to locate articles and other databases which could also be searched. The databases from which the papers were retrieved were:

- ScienceDirect
- IEEE Xplore
- ACM Digital Library
- Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics

2.3 Paper Selection

At first a large range of papers were collected by title and held on to that could be relevant to the subject matter. Then the abstract and conclusion were read through to determine whether or not the paper was relevant to the research questions. Once the pool of papers had been reduced to a manageable size the entire paper was read through to attempt to make links between the content of the paper and the work which would be carried out and how they could assist in answering the research questions.

During this process, papers would be selected for use if they met all of the following criteria:

- Peer reviewed.
- If the paper is older than five years and has at least 50 citations.
- The paper is directly relevant to the research questions.

Papers would be rejected if they met any of the following critera:

- Too broad.
- Cannot be directly applied to the research questions.
- The paper has less than fifty citations and is older than five years.
- A newer more relevant paper on topic was found.

2.4 Network Intrusion Detection

The field of network intrusion detection was conceived by Denning, 1987, a paper in which the author describes a model for a "real-time intrusion-detection expert system" capable of discerning between normal and abnormal network activity. NIDS can be broadly categorized as performing either: misuse detection or anomaly detection. Misuse detection systems are first trained using some kind of learning algorithm on a set of labelled data where each entry is defined as being either 'normal' or 'intrusive'. Using this the system can create a sophisticated model of attacks, with a very high accuracy in detecting previously observed attacks and variations of such attacks. However, these types of systems perform poorly when faced with novel attacks being unable to accurately detect and classify them.

Anomaly detections systems are trained on a set of data in which every entry is an example of 'normal' network traffic. Training the system in such a way means that "behavior is flagged as a potential intrusion if it deviates significantly from expected behavior" Javitz, Valdes, Breen and Patton, 1994. This allows such systems to easily detect novel attacks which have not been observed before. Although these systems perform well at detecting novel attacks they also have a much higher false positive rate than misuse detection

systems. The reason for this is that "previously unseen (yet legitimate) system behaviors are also recognized as anomalies, and hence flagged as potential intrusions" Lazarevic, Ertoz, Kumar, Ozgur and Srivastava, 2003. Anomaly detection systems also suffer from a so called "semantic gap" where anomalies can be detected yet there is no further information on what type of attack has been performed Sommer and Paxson, 2010.

In the beginning of network intrusion detection research methods were proposed for an expert system NIDS Ilgun, Kemmerer and Porras, 1995, in which took knowledge from experts within the network security field and encoded them into rules with which the system could use to check traffic with to determine if it was intrusive. Then in W. Lee, Stolfo and Mok, 1999 a framework was proposed for the use of data mining for building NIDS. This was the first to employ machine learning in its approach to detecting intrusions, a method which today has been explored extensively. In using this approach to network intrusion detection the NIDS can detect attacks which have not been seen before, and can also be retrained quickly on data of new which have appeared, whereas an expert system would need updated in an expensive and slow process.

More recently hybrid approaches to network intrusion detection have been proposed in papers such as; Powers and He, 2008 and, Panda, Abraham and Patra, 2012, which employ a two stage classification approach. This two stage classification functions by first classifying network traffic as either 'normal' or 'intrusive'. Once intrusive traffic has been identified it is fed into a second stage which then determines the type of intrusion. Performing the detection and classification in this manner is beneficial as two separate classifiers can be used, allowing each to specialise, producing a higher rate of intrusion detection and a lower false positive rate.

The research questions which this dissertation aims to answer are surrounding the comparison of these hybrid approaches in comparison to single stage monolithic detectors, which is discussed in more detail in section 2.7.

2.5 Machine Learning Algorithms

This section will detail the Machine learning algorithms which have been chosen to be evaluated and compared in this thesis.

2.5.1 k-Nearest Neighbours

The k-nearest neighbours (k-NN) is one of the most simple machine learning classification and regression algorithms. k-NN is a lazy algorithm meaning that it uses the training dataset directly and therefore does not require any training time. The algorithm functions by first taking a training set of labelled vectors. A vector which is to be classified is then input, and the

algorithm calculates the distance from the input vector to each other point in the training set and selects the k nearest points from the training set. For each of these k nearest points their classifications are totalled and the classification which makes up the most of these neighbours is then output as the class of the input vector. In both Liao and Vemuri, 2002, and in Hautamaki, Karkkainen and Franti, 2004, it has been demonstrated that k-NN based network intrusion detection methods can produce good results. The k-NN algorithm has been selected for this thesis mainly because of its simplicity and according to Jain, Duin and Mao, 2000 it "can be conveniently used as a benchmark for all the other classifiers since it appears to always provide a reasonable classification performance inmost applications.".

2.5.2 Artificial Neural Network

According to Caudill, 1987 an artificial neural network (ANN) is "a computing system made up of a number of simple, highly interconnected processing elements, which process information by their dynamic state response to external inputs". The ANN is inspired by and aims to recreate the operation of a biological neural network, found within the brains of living animals. The neural network consists of several layers of neurons or nodes, which are interconnected by axioms each of which has its own associated weight which is altered over the course of the training of the network. These weights are adjusted through a method called backpropagation. A network will typically consist of three layers; the input layer, the hidden layer(s), and the output layer, shown in Figure 1.




Figure 1: Artificial Neural Network Layers

The input layer is where the neural network receives the data which it is to process. This input layer is then connected via weighted axioms to

the hidden layer(s). The hidden layer may consist of many layers and is responsible for the recognition of patterns within the input data. These hidden layers are then connected to the output layer, which gives the result or classification of the input data. The ANN is trained by feeding in a labelled dataset containing inputs and expected output(s). Each data entry which is fed into the network slightly alters the weights of all axioms within the network depending on the inputs and outputs, which when performed a large number of times allows the network to recognise patterns within input data and attempt to predict the correct output. Neural networks were first proposed for use within the field of network detection intrusion by Herve Debar, Becker and Siboni, 1992, who found them to be a promising method. ANNs are especially good for use with data classification problems and in turn with network intrusion detection as they can recognise complex patterns within datasets with a large number of features, such as network traffic Sung, 1998. Some early methods of network intrusion detection were also unable to make any sort of classification beyond a binary one, i.e. normal or intrusive, whereas ANNs can classify data into any number of categories allowing for a greater amount of information about an attack to be gained from the detection Moradi and Zulkernine, 2004.

However, while neural networks excel at classifying information and recognising complex patterns within data, they do suffer from a semantic gap. Garcia-Teodoro, Diaz-Verdejo, Maciá-Fernández and Vázquez, 2009 explain that "they do not provide a descriptive model that explains why a particular detection decision has been taken." meaning that the network is essentially a black box, and without the details of the operation of the network it is difficult to determine what features of a connection identify it as intrusive and how effectively it may perform on other tasks and in other areas. The remainder of this section will discuss several different kinds of ANN which have been successfully applied to network detection intrusion.

This basic form of neural network is also called a feed forward neural network (FFNN) and is the most simple class of neural network available in which the connections between neurons do not form a cycle unlike in a RNN, i.e. information only travels forward from input neurons to output neurons. These kinds of neural networks have been employed in a number of research papers to great effect. Mukkamala, Janoski and Sung, 2002 found that with the use of a neural network intrusions could be accurately detected more than 99% of the time. The same result was also found in Z. Zhang, Li, Manikopoulos, Jorgenson and Ucles, 2001 with a 99% detection rate. Linda, Vollmer and Manic, 2009, S. C. Lee and Heinbuch, 2001, and Moradi and Zulkernine, 2004 also all achieved the same results as other studies. Using these results it is clear that using a FFNN is a viable method detecting

network intrusions, as well as being simple to implement within a limit time frame. S. C. Lee and Heinbuch, 2001 also found that these networks are extremely adept at detecting novel attacks which is a desirable trait in a NIDS. It is for these reasons that a FFNN has been chosen to be implemented in this thesis.

2.5.3 Self Organising Map

The self organising map (SOM) is a type of ANN first proposed in the paper Kohonen, 1982 and is used to map high dimensional data into lower dimensions. The SOM is unlike the other neural networks which are to be examined as it can learn to classify data without supervision. This means that whereas a regular neural network will require an input vector and and output vector, the SOM will learn to classify data without the need for an output vector. This lack of need for supervised training can be extremely useful in the context of network intrusion detection as described by Rhodes, Mahaffey and Cannady, 2000 "This approach is particularly powerful because the self-organizing map never needs to be told what intrusive behaviour looks like. By learning to characterize normal behaviour, it implicitly prepares itself to detect any aberrant network activity." both in anomaly detection and especially in misuse detection as normal behaviour can be continuously fed into it without the need for examples of intrusive behaviour.

The SOM has been implemented and tested within a number of research papers with great success. In Powers and He, 2008 and Depren, Topallar, Anarim and Ciliz, 2005 it was found that the use of an SOM showed favourable false positive rates and attack classification results over other intrusion detection methods using the KDD 1999 Cup dataset. Similarly, in Lichodzijewski, Zincir-Heywood and Heywood, 2002 the researchers found that a SOM produced good results on the DARPA 1998 dataset with a low false positive rate and a correct classification rate of more than 95%. Kayacik, Zincir-Heywood and Heywood, 2003 too found SOM to be an effective method of classification with results much similar to the previous studies performed on the KDD 1999 Cup dataset however with a much higher rate of false positives.

These papers demonstrate that the SOM is a viable method for the detection of network intrusions giving high rate of correct classifications and low false positive rate, however this algorithm will not be implemented as part of this thesis. This algorithm has been chosen to not be implemented due to an unfamiliarity on the part of the researcher and also time constraints of the project associated with this unfamiliarity regarding the research and implementation it, with other methods being less time consuming to implement.

2.5.4 Recurrent Neural Network

A recurrent neural network (RNN) is a class of artificial neural network where the connections within the network connect back to previous neurons in order to form a cycle of nodes as shown in Figure 2. Having the neural network be structured in this manner allows it to process a sequence of input vectors allowing it to process data which relies on other vectors for context. RNNs are typically applied to problems such as handwriting recognition or speech recognition, however they can be particularly effective in network detection intrusion in recognising sequences of network traffic which alone are not suspicious but in a specific order can then be classified as intrusive behaviour.




Figure 2: Recurrent Neural Network

The first paper to advocate for the use of RNNs within the field of network intrusion detection was Hervé Debar and Dorizzi, 1992 in which it was found RNNs to be a promising method of detecting intrusions. A later paper Ryan, Lin and Miikkulainen, 1998 re-enforces this statement finding this method to be very effective when employed on real worlds data. Two papers using RNNs in order to detect network intrusions, Tong, Wang and Yu, 2009 and Ghosh and Schwartzbard, 1999 found this approach to have high rate of correct detection of 90%-100%, however with a slightly higher false positive rate than other methods of intrusion detection such as the SOM.

There are however some issues in using RNNs for network intrusion detection. In order to train the network for use in detection, sequenced data such as timed network traffic is required. In this thesis, the data set used is the KDD 1999 Cup dataset in which none of the data is sequenced therefore making it unsuitable for testing with a RNN, which is the main reason why this type of neural network will not be implemented.

2.5.5 Negative Selection

Negative selection is an algorithm in the field of artificial immune systems. Artificial immune systems are a class of algorithm which seek to imitate the immune system of a living creature. De Castro and Timmis, 2002 describes artificial immune systems as "adaptive systems, inspired by theoretical immunology and observed immune functions, principles and models, which are applied to problem solving.". There are several algorithms related artificial immune systems such as: Clonal Selection, Immune Network, and Dendritic Cell, however the algorithm which will be examined is the negative selection algorithm.

The negative selection algorithm takes its inspiration from the generation of T cells in the immune system. These T cells are capable of distinguishing between the bodies own cells and foreign cells, and are created pseudo-randomly. These cells then undergo a censoring process called negative selection in which cells that recognise the body's own cells are destroyed leaving only ones which detect foreign cells. This process is the basis for the negative selection algorithm where detectors (T cells) are generated by some method, randomly or otherwise, and detectors which detect self are deleted Forrest, Perelson, Allen and Cherukuri, 1994.

In the negative selection algorithm detectors must be represented by some means. In papers such as Dasgupta and Forrest, 1996 and J. Kim and Bentley, 2001b detectors are represented by fixed length bit string where each portion of the string is a binary representation of some feature of the input data. In order to determine whether or not these detectors match self, the detector is checked against each entry in the training set and if both of the strings contain the same stretch of r uninterrupted bits then the strings are said to match Powers and He, 2008. The detectors which do not match self are then used to detect intrusive behaviour by attempting to match incoming data represented as bit strings. If the incoming bit string matches any of the detectors it is flagged as intrusive. The use of binary strings as detectors however presents similar problems as found in neural networks. When a string is flagged as being intrusive it is difficult to extract semantic meaning from the detectors, i.e. it is apparent that the string is intrusive but

information about what features of the connection made it intrusive are not readily available González and Dasgupta, 2003. J. Kim and Bentley, 2001a also found that the use of bit strings for detectors becomes infeasible when using a dataset which contains a lot of different features for each entry, such as in the KDD 1999 Cup dataset. A solution to this problem lies in the use of real-valued detectors in the place of bit string detectors. Through the use of real values when defining detectors this allows a great amount of domain knowledge to be extracted from subsequent results. For example when a detector is activated and a connection flagged as being intrusive the detector can be examined and the exact features and values of the connection which triggered the detector can be viewed and higher level information can be extracted. In comparison it can be extremely difficult and time consumting to try and extract semantic knowledge from a bit string as it can be unclear what triggered the detector. In order to evolve detectors, there are two main methods of doing so: through random generation, or by means of a genetic algorithm. In the random generation method, a set of self is required, in the form of a dataset of non intrusive behaviour only. Detectors are then generated at random and tested to see whether or not they match the set of self using some method, i.e. r-contiguous bits, r-chunk matching, hamming distance etc. If the generated detector matches self it is discared and a new detector is generated until the detector does not match self and it is stored. Generating detectors by means of a genetic algorithm is described by Powers and He, 2008. In this paper a population of detectors is initialised where each feature of the detector has a 50% chance to be initialised as blank and ignored in detection. Leaving fields blank in this way increases the generality of the detector, allowing it to cover as large an area of non-self as possible and to detect more kinds of attacks. The fields which were not left blank during the initialisation are then randomly assigned a value from a list of allowed values for that feature. When evolving the population two parents are bred using a uniform crossover to produce a single child which then has a small probability of mutation. This mutation takes a field from the child and replaces its value with another value which is randomly chosen from the list of allowed values. This newly created child will then replace the parent which it is most similar to if it has a greater fitness. At the end of the evolution process detectors which match self are removed by comparing each detector with the self-set. Generating detectors in such a manner is advantageous as it allows detectors to be created quickly when compared to a purely random generation process.

This method of intrusion detection through the use of the negative selection algorithm has been implemented in a number of papers to great effect. Powers and He, 2008 shows that the negative selection algorithm evolved us-

ing a genetic algorithm can acheive detection rates of up to 98%. Dasgupta and González, 2002 found similar results similarly using a genetic algorithm with a self detection rate of 96% and a non-self detection rate of up to 86%. This demonstrates that negative selection is an effective and viable method of network intrusion detection.

2.6 Support Vector Machine

Support Vector Machines (SVM) are a machine learning classification method first proposed in a paper by Cortes and Vapnik, 1995. SVM's operate by implementing the following idea: "input vectors are non-linearly mapped to a very high dimension feature space. In this feature space a linear decision surface is constructed.". Boundaries may then be constructed around each class of points, and when a new input is mapped to this descision surface it's type may be determined based on what boundaries it falls within.

Support Vector Machines have been applied to network intrusion detection numerous times, all of which show very promising results. In a paper by Mukkamala et al., 2002, it was found that SVM's could be used to acheive a classification accuracy of 99.50%, even greater than that of a neural network which was tested giving an accuracy of 99.25%. Another paper by D. S. Kim and Park, 2003 found similar success using support vector machines, with accuracy comparible to the winner of the KDD99 Cup competition, again displaying the methods suitability for network intrusion detection. Finally a paper by Bhavsar and Waghmare, 2013 acheived the same success using SVM's, getting an accuracy 98.6%.

2.7 Research Contribution

During this dissertation the there are a number of goals which are aimed to be met and questions answered in order to ultimatley contribute to the research of network intrusion detection is some way. The main question which is to be answered is what is the difference in performance between a single stage classifier and a two stage classifier in the context of network intrusion detection, and to determine what the configuration of machine learning classifiers discussed within this project produces the highest accuracy network intrusion detection and classification of intrusive network connections, where accuracy is defined as a high number of true positives and a low number of false positives.

Within the field of network intrusion detection there have been numerous papers describing methods of detecting intrusion using single stage classifiers such as citations wherein network traffic data is fed into the classifier and the single classifier will determine whether or not the connection is intrusive, and if it is intrusive what class of intrusion it is. Hybrid intrusion detection systems function similarly however the main difference is that there are two

stages to the classification process. The first stage will be some form of anomaly detector which reads in network data and determines whether or not a connection is intrusive or not without specifying the type of attack that the intrusive connection is. Then the first stage of the classifier will send all data deemed as intrusive to the second stage of the classifier which will then determine the type of attack. Building an intrusion detection system in a manner such as this allows each stage of the system to specialise in detecting different aspects of a connection and therefore producing a higher detection and classification accuracy. While there have been several papers on hybrid classifiers in the domain of network intrusion detection such as Powers and He, 2008, Panda et al., 2012, and J. Zhang and Zulkernine, 2006, there is an apparent distinct lack of papers which directly compare the performance of a single stage monolithic classifier to that of a two-stage stage classifier and investigate different arrangements of machine learning algorithms to evaluate their performance. This gap in research papers is what this dissertation aims to fill.

The project will achieve that goal in the following manner: A number of machine learning algorithms will be chosen to be implemented, i.e. knearest neighbors, artificial neural networks, and negative selection. These algorithms will be housed by a peice of software which will be written to run them, obtain metrics and display information on the performance of each algorithm, in the form of tables and graphs, etc. Once this information has been extracted from each algorithm, an analysis and evauluation will be performed on the accuracy of each method, and a conclusion drawn.

2.8 Datasets

The datasets which have been chosen to perform the evaluation of the network intrusion detection methods are the NSL-KDD Dataset and the UNSW-NB15 dataset. The first dataset, NSL-KDD, is a corrected version of the original KDD 99 Cup dataset which comes from the Third International Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining Tools Competition and is based on data captured in the DARPA'98 IDS evaluation program Lippmann et al., 2000, Tavallaee, Bagheri, Lu and Ghorbani, 2009.

The original KDD 99 Cup dataset has been widely criticized by researchers and experts due to several factors such as; having a large number of redundant records "which cause the learning algorithm to be biased towards the most frequent records, thus prevent it from recognizing rare attack records" Panda et al., 2012, and in Vasudevan, Harshini and Selvakumar, 2011, for being outdated meaning that it does not account for new developments in network attacks. The NSL-KDD dataset is a revised version of the KDD99 dataset which has been shown to have eliminated many of the

faults of the original dataset while also acheiving better performance in the training of network intrusion detection systems Dhanabal and Shantharajah, 2015, primarily through the removal of a large amount of redundant and duplicated records, while maintaining the correct ratio of non-intrusive entries to attacks, allowing for much faster training of algorithms and collection of data which is a priority as there is a time constraint which must be followed during this project.

The second dataset, UNSW-NB15, is a new dataset form the University of New South Wales which aims to rectify problems present in both the KDD99 and NSL-KDD dataset. While the NSL-KDD dataset corrects many problems of the KD99 dataset regarding redundant records, it "is not a comprehensive representation of a modern low foot print attack environment." Moustafa and Slay, 2015. All of the features of this dataset have also been shown to be highly relevant, all of which contribute to aspects of a low footprint complex attack Moustafa and Slay, 2016.

Performing an evaluation on two datasets allows for the comparison of results between the two datasets to see if trends present in one are found in the other. This is important to confirm that the results found are significant and not simply due to chance, or some quirk of the dataset used.

2.9 Literature Conclusion

The research field of Network Intrusion Detection is one of upmost important due to the widespread prevelance of network security breaches and attacks. There have been a large number of studies performed in this area, with each resulting in varying levels of success. The algorithms chosen for this investigation have been proven to be effective at detecting network intrusions, and studies have also shown that through the use of hybrid network intrusion detection systems which make use of multiple classification stages and methods an increase in accurate classification rate. However, machine learning techniques have not yet proven accurate enough in their classification and detection rates to be deployed in a commercial setting, without substantial supervision. There is also a distinct lack within the research in making direct comparisons between different configurations of multiple stage classifiers, and also in making direct comparisons to their single stage counterparts. As a result of this, the conclusion has been reached that conducting an investigation into this area may prove beneficial for future studies, and may provide an insight into what configurations of multiple stage classifiers are effective in the context of network intrusion detection.

3 Existing Software

3.1 WEKA

Waikato Environment for Knowledge Analysis (WEKA) is a software suite designed to aid in data analysis and prediction modelling using machine learning techniques Hall et al., 2009. WEKA supports a number of tasks including: clustering, regression, classification, data and algorithmic visualization, feature selection, and data preprocessing. All of WEKA's functionality is available through the command line and also through the supplied user interface. Although WEKA does include a user interface it can be overwhelming to new users, and presents a sizeable learning curve to begin using due to the extensive functionally that the software provides. Providing WEKA with custom classification algorithms is done through the use of .jar files. This requires the user to pre-compile and package created classifiers, which can make quick editing and addition of new classifiers difficult, whereas the proposed software will use python allowing for .py files to be used directly, allowing for changes to accomdated more quickly and files added more easily.

The software created in this project, will aim to provide similar functionality as WEKA albeit with a highly reduced scope. The reasoning behind this being that the software will be very easy to use for the comparison of single and two stage classifiers without providing a large amount of functionality, to allow the software to be easy to pick up, user friendly and have a very specific use case.

3.2 Splunk

Splunk is a peice of software for collecting and analysing large amounts of real time machine generated data including network traffic (Splunk Inc, 2018). Splunks main use case is application management, network security and analytics. Although Splunk may be used for the comparison of classification algorithms on specific datasets, it is not its main use and it does not provide a simple way to compare single and multiple stage classifiers. In addition, the extremely extensive amount of functionally it offers presents a massive learning curve and so it may be more beneficial to have a specifically tailored peice of software which can provide more focused functionality such as the software proposed in this project. Splunk is also not open source software, which may be of concern to some and does not allow for user modification of the software.

4 Software

This section of the report will provide a high level description of the functionality and requirements of the software as well as describing the role of the user which will interact with the system. Detailed descriptions of functionality will also be included, and a list of hardware and software constraints, dependencies and assumptions made about the system and users. A detailed testing description will then be given outlining any and all unit testing and functional testing which will take place. Finally an evaluation will take place assessing how well the produced software meets its initial requirements and design.

4.1 Overall Description

This section will give an overview of the whole proposed system, and the basic functionality that it requires. It will also describe the users of the system as well as the dependencies and operating environment of the system.

4.1.1 Product Functions

The proposed software which will be developed is primarly to assist in the comparison of single stage and two-stage classifiers. The software will accept a dataset and supporting files in the form of: A training dataset, or a number of folds to use in k-fold cross-validation; A list of dataset features with thier data types; the number of runs to perform for stochastic classifiers; and optionally a list of categories to sort attacks into after classification. The user may also manually sort each of the features into one of three types, numeric, nominal, or binary.

The user may also specify any number of classifier configurations. These classifier configurations consist of either one or two filepaths which point to a python file containing the definition for a classifier, which use the specified classifier interface.

Once both the dataset and classifier configurations have been entered by the user, the classifiers will be run on the dataset and make predictions about either the testing dataset or training set folds and determine the class for each entry in the set. Once these preditions have been made, the results will be presented to the user. The results shown to the user come in the form of: precision, recall and f1-score metrics for each class, and each attack category; a confusing matrix, and then raw statistics regarding classification including true postives, true negatives, false postives, false negatives, etc. The user will also be shown a graph of any class they choose which will show the true positives, true negatives, false positives, and false negatives for each classifier configuration for the specified class, allowing for quick and easy comparison

between configurations.

4.1.2 User Characteristics

This software is primarily focused towards researchers and students interested in comparing machine learning classification algorithms with a single stage against those with multiple stages. The software may be used by them in order to quickly make comparisons between different configurations of classifiers and to assess the effectiveness of these configurations. They will be able to enter their own datasets and classifiers and receive results in a standard format, and to view these results in a graph.

4.1.3 Operating Environment

In order to run the software the following requirements must be met:

- Python 3.6.4+ with the following packages:
 - NumPy 1.14.0+
 - Pandas 0.22.0+
 - Pandas-ml 0.5.0+
 - Scikit-learn 0.19.1+
 - Scipy 1.0.0
 - Matplotlib 2.1.1+
 - PvQt 5.9.1+
- One of the following operating systems:
 - Windows 7 (x86) or greater
 - macOS 10.11 or greater
 - Linux with X11
- A system capable of running one of the above operating systems.

4.2 Specific Requirements

4.2.1 User Interface

When the user launches the program they should be presented with the main window as shown in Figure 3. The window consists of several main features, in the bottom left corner of the UI is the whee classifier configurations are specified. The buttons under each text box which say 'Select Classifier' may be used to open a file picker dialog and select a filepath. The 'Two Stage Classifier' checkbox can be checked which will turn the classifier configuration into a two stage classifier, and the second classifier box will be required. The tab containing the '+' symbol at the top of this section can be used to create new tabs which contain classifier configurations, which can be switched to by selecting one of the tabs along the top edge. The 'Run' button directly below this can be used to run the classifier configurations on the specified dataset.




Figure 3: Main Window Result Tab Wireframe

The large section in the top right of the window is the area in which classification results will be displayed, and the tabs above can be used to access the graph view, seen in Figure 4. In this tab the drop down can be used to select a class and the 'Select' button used to generate a graph of true postives, true negatives, false postives and false negatives for each classifier configurations for the specified class. In the small box in the bottom right of the window, the debug output from the program and classifiers will be shown. This output can then be cleared by pressing the 'Clear' button just below it. In the top left hand corner the 'File' button may be pressed which

will present the user with a dropdown menu through which the user may create a new classifier; which will open a new file dialog prompting for a filepath and create a new classifier file; or exit the program entirely.




Figure 4: Main Window Graph Tab Wireframe

Beneath the 'File' button there is a textbox which will display details regarding the dataset which has been selected. If the user wishes to specify a dataset, the 'Dataset' button underneath this can be pressed, and the user will be presented with the window seen in Figure 5.




Figure 5: Dataset Window Wireframe

In this window the user may specify a filepath for the training dataset, testing datset, dataset fields and attack categories by selecting the corresponding 'Select File' button underneath the label. Once the dataset fields have been selected they will populate the 'Nominal', 'Binary' and 'Numeric' columns. If there is no type specified within the file they will all be placed under the 'Numeric' column. The user may then manually set the field type by selecting the field name, and then either pressing one of the buttons labelled '<' or '>', or by right clicking and selecting the destination column. If the user wishes to use k-fold cross validation instead of a testing dataset they can check the 'k-Fold Cross Validation' checkbox and specify the number of folds in the 'Folds' spinner. They may also specify the number of stochastic classifier runs by entering a number into the spinner labelled 'Stochastic Classifier Runs'. Once the user has finished entering a dataset, they can press the 'Ok' button and the window will close. When this happens the textbox labelled 'Dataset info' in Figures 3 and 4 will be populated with information regarding the selected dataset.

4.2.2 Functional Requirements

FR1 - Select Classifiers

ID: FR1

TITLE: Select Classifiers

PRIORITY: High

DESC: The user should have the ability to specify which classifiers are used within a classifier configuration. The classifiers should be selected through a file picker diaglog.

DEP: N/A

FR2 - Two Stage Classification

ID: FR2

TITLE: Two Stage Classification

PRIORITY: High

DESC: Classifier configurations should be able to specified as two stage by

activing a checkbox and selecting a second classifier.

DEP: N/A

FR3 - Run Classifiers

ID: FR3

TITLE: Run Classifiers PRIORITY: High

DESC: The user should be able to press a 'Run' button which will take the classifier configurations specified and run them on the specified dataset. This should then return the results of the prediction made about the dataset.

DEP: FR1, FR2, FR18

FR4 - Create New Classifier

ID: FR4

TITLE: Create New Classifier

PRIORITY: Low

DESC: When clicking the 'File' button the user should be able to select an option which creates a new classifier. After clicking they should be presented with a file dialog which will prompt them ofor a filename and location. A py file will then be created using the interface for a classifier that the user may later make edits to.

DEP: N/A

FR5 - Debug Output

ID: FR5

TITLE: Debug Output PRIORITY: Medium

DESC: The standard output of the python application and any classifiers running should be piped into a text box within the main window of the program.

DEP: N/A

FR6 - Multiple Classifier Configurations

ID: FR6

TITLE: Multiple Classifier Configurations

PRIORITY: Medium

DESC: The user should be able to specify any number of classifier configurations by creating a new tab within the classifier configuration section, all of which will be run when the 'Run' button is pressed.

DEP: FR1, FR2

FR7 - Aggregate Results by Attack

ID: FR7

TITLE: Aggregate Results by Attack

PRIORITY: High

DESC: Once classification has taken place, the results should be grouped

by the categories specified by the user in the attack categories file.

DEP: FR3, FR9, FR15

FR8 - Write Results to File

ID: FR8

TITLE: Write Results to File

PRIORITY: Medium

DESC: After classification, the results returned should be written to a file, the name of which is a combination of the classifiers used and a timestamp of when classification finished.

DEP: FR9

FR9 - Get Classification Results

ID: FR9

TITLE: Get Classification Results

PRIORITY: High

DESC: Once classification has completed the results for each configuration should be collected and stored within some data structure for later use.

DEP: FR3

FR10 - Graph Results

ID: FR10

TITLE: Graph Results PRIORITY: High

DESC: Once results have been gathered they should be presented in the form of a bar chart. The user should be able to select a class, and the true positives, true negatives, false positives and false negatives for that class for each of the classifier configurations should be displayed in a chart.

DEP: FR9

FR11 - Select Training Dataset

ID: FR11

TITLE: Select Training Dataset

PRIORITY: High

DESC: The user should able to press a button and have a file picker dialog appear prompting them to select a training dataset. Once selected a textbox should be populated with this filename.

DEP: N/A

FR12 - Select Testing Dataset

ID: FR12

TITLE: Select Testing Dataset

PRIORITY: High

DESC: The user should able to press a button and have a file picker dialog appear prompting them to select a testing dataset. Once selected a textbox should be populated with this filename.

DEP: N/A

FR13 - k-Fold Cross Validation

ID: FR13

TITLE: k-Fold Cross Validation

PRIORITY: High

DESC: k-Fold Cross Validation should be selectable by the user by checking a checkbox and specifiy the required number of folds. When running the classifiers, the training dataset should then be partitioned and iterated

through using k-fold cross validation in place of a testing dataset.

DEP: FR11, FR3

FR14 - Select Dataset Column Labels

ID: FR14

TITLE: Select Dataset Column Labels

PRIORITY: High

DESC: The user should able to press a button and have a file picker dialog appear prompting them to select a the dataset column labels. Once selected a textbox should be populated with this filename.

DEP: N/A

FR15 - Select Dataset Attack Categories

ID: FR15

TITLE: Select Dataset Attack Categories

PRIORITY: High

DESC: DEP: N/A

FR16 - Categorise Dataset Fields

ID: FR16

TITLE: Categorise Dataset Fields

PRIORITY: High

DESC: Once the dataset column labels have been selected the columns labelled 'Nominal', 'Binary' and 'Numeric' should be populated with the dataset field names provided in the file, and categorised into the correct columns if a type was provided. The user should be able to move column names between these three columns by selecting an item, and either right clicking to create a context menu and then electing the destination column, or by pressing the buttons labelled '<' or '>' to move the item between columns.

DEP: FR14

FR17 - One Hot Encoding

ID: FR17

TITLE: One Hot Encoding

PRIORITY: High

DESC: The loaded datasets should be one hot encoded before they are used in classification. this involves converting all dataset columns listed as nominal

to their binary representation to increase classification performance.

DEP: FR18

FR18 - Load Data

ID: FR18

TITLE: Load Data PRIORITY: High

DESC: When the user has specified all of the filenames for the, training dataset, dataset columns and optionally the testing dataset and attack categories, the data should then be loaded from the files and placed into a pandas DataFrames for later processing.

DEP: FR11, FR12, FR14, FR15

FR19 - k-Nearest Neighbour Classifier

ID: FR19

TITLE: k-Nearest Neighbour Classifier

PRIORITY: High

DESC: A classifier should be implemented using the classifier interface using the scikit-learn Nearest Neighbour classifier.

DEP: N/A

FR20 - Multi-layer Perceptron Classifier

ID: FR20

TITLE: Multi-layer Perceptron Classifier

PRIORITY: High

DESC: A classifier should be implemented using the classifier interface using the scikit-learn Multi-Layer Perceptron.

DEP: N/A

FR21 - Negative Selection Classifier

ID: FR21

TITLE: Negative Selection Classifier

PRIORITY: Low

DESC: A classifier should be implemented using the classifier interface which

uses negative selection to classify network traffic.

DEP: N/A

FR22 - Support Vector Machine Classifier

ID: FR22

TITLE: Support Vector Machine Classifier

PRIORITY: High

DESC: A classifier should be implemented using the classifier interface using

the scikit-learn Support Vector Machine.

DEP: N/A

FR23 - Stochastic Classifier Averaging

ID: FR23

TITLE: Stochastic Classifier Averaging

PRIORITY: High

DESC: When a stochastic classifier is run, the results gathered should be averaged by the amount of runs which have taken place before displaying

them.

DEP: FR1, FR2

FR24 - Feature Selection

ID: FR24

TITLE: Feature Selection

PRIORITY: Low

DESC: Functionality should be implemented which allows analysis to be performed on the dataset on which features within the dataset are less important and can be removed to speed up and improve classifier performance.

DEP: N/A

4.2.3 Non-Functional Requirements

QR1 - Robustness

ID: QR1

TITLE: Robustness PRIORITY: High

DESC: The application should be robust and be able to handle many different kinds of datasets an classifiers, and will fail gracefully, showing error massages instead of grashing, when erroneous data is input

messages instead of crashing, when erroneous data is input.

QR2 - Responsiveness

ID: QR2

TITLE: Responsiveness PRIORITY: Medium

DESC: The user interface of the application should react promptly, and should stay responsive without hanging when long computations are being carried out in the background.

QR3 - Usability

ID: QR3

TITLE: Usability PRIORITY: Medium

DESC: The user interface should be user friendly, being easy to navigate with the functions of each piece of the interface being immediately evident. It should also take the least amount of clicks possible to navigate between views and to perform actions.

QR4 - Maintainability

ID: QR4

TITLE: Maintainability PRIORITY: High

DESC: The structure of written code should support easy maintainence by being constructed clearly and sensibly, without coupling of functionality. Sensible variable and method names as well as comments should be used to aid with code comprehension in future.

QR5 - Portability

ID: QR5

TITLE: Portability PRIORITY: Low

DESC: The application should work on many different operating systems and environments, e.g. Windows, Linux and MacOS.

QR6 - Correctness

ID: QR6

TITLE: Correctness PRIORITY: High

DESC: The loading of datasets, preprocessing of said datasets and classification of data should all be correct. If any of these steps are not correct then any results collected from the application cannot be used.

4.3 Testing

Testing will be carried out on the system to verify that the system is compliant with all requirements and works according to the specification. Unit tests will be written using the Python Unit Testing Framework to automatically carry out unit test to ensure there are no errors within the system, and that when changes are made the system no new errors are introduced. Manual testing will also be carried out by following the steps detailed below in Table 1, in order to ensure that the system meets the specification and that no errors are present. Manual testing is necessary in order to fully test areas of the code which unit tests cannot cover, such as the user interface functionality.

Table 1: Test Case Descriptions

ID	Objective	Precondition	Steps	Test Data	Expected Result
TC1	Create new classi- fier tab	There is only one tab in the classifier tab box.	- Press the '+' button above the classifier tab box.	N/A	A new tab is created with the number 2 on it.
TC2	Open dataset window.	N/A	- Press the 'Select Dataset' button in the main win- dow.	N/A	Dataset window is shown.
TC3	Select training dataset.	Dataset window is open.	- Press the 'Select Training Set' button. - Select a file.	Any .csv file.	Absolute path of the file appears in the textbox below 'Training Dataset' label.
TC4	Deselect k-Fold Cross Validation.	Dataset window is open and k-Fold Cross Validation checkbox is checked.	- Press the k-Fold Cross Validation checkbox.	N/A	Testing dataset label, textbox and button become enabled and folds spinbox is disabled.
TC5	Select testing dataset.	Dataset window is open.	- Press the 'Select Testing Set' button Select a file.	Any valid .csv file.	Absolute path of the file appears in the textbox below 'Training Dataset' label.

TC6	Select dataset fields.	Dataset window is open.	 - Press the 'Select Dataset Fields' button. - Select a file. 	A .csv file containing two columns, the second of which is one of the values: Numeric, Nominal, Binary.	Absolute path of the file appears in the textbox below 'Dataset Fields' label, and the 'Numeric', 'Nominal', and 'Binary' list views are populated.
TC7	Select attack categories.	Dataset window is open.	- Press the 'Select Attack Categories' button Select a file.	Any valid .csv file.	Absolute path of the file appears in the textbox below 'Attack Categories' label.
TC8	Display dataset info in main window.	Valid dataset files have been selec- ted and dataset window is open.	- Press the OK button in the bottom right of the dataset window.	N/A	The dataset window closes, showing no error message and the textbox in the top left of the main window is populated with information regarding the dataset.
TC9	Select classifier.	N/A	- Press the 'Select Classifier' button below the 'Classi- fier One' label. - Select a file.	Any .py file.	Absolute path of the file appears in the textbox below the 'Classifier One' label.
TC10	Select two stage classification.	Two stage classification checkbox is unchecked.	- Press the 'Two Stage Classifica- tion' checkbox.	N/A	The 'Second Classifier' label, textbox, and 'Select Classifier' button are enabled.
TC11	Select second classifier.	The 'Two Stage Classification' checkbox is checked.	- Press the 'Select Classifier' button below the 'Classi- fier Two' label. - Select a file.	Any .py file.	Absolute path of the file appears in the textbox below the 'Classifier One' label.
TC12	Error message on invalid training dataset filename.	N/A	- Enter a filepath which does not exist into the textbox below the 'Training Dataset' label Supply every other textbox with valid filepaths Press the OK button in the bottom right of the dataset window.	N/A	An error message is shown and the window does not exit.

TC13	Error message on invalid testing dataset filename.	N/A	- Enter a filepath which does not exist into the textbox below the 'Testing Dataset' label Supply every other textbox with valid filepaths Press the OK button in the bottom right of the	N/A	An error message is shown and the window does not exit.
TC14	Error message on invalid field names filename.	N/A	dataset window Enter a filepath which does not exist into the textbox below the 'Dataset Fields' label Supply every other textbox with valid filepaths Press the OK button in the bottom right of the dataset window.	N/A	An error message is shown and the window does not exit.
TC15	Error message on invalid attack categories filename.	N/A	- Enter a filepath which does not exist into the textbox below the 'Attack Categories' label Supply every other textbox with valid filepaths Press the OK button in the bottom right of the dataset window.	N/A	An error message is shown and the window does not exit.
TC16	Error message on invalid training dataset.	Valid dataset files have been selec- ted, except from training dataset which is invalid. A valid classifier configuration has been selected.	- Press the 'Run' button on the main window.	N/A	An error message is displayed and the program does not crash.
TC17	Error message on invalid testing dataset.	Valid dataset files have been selected, except from testing dataset which is invalid. A valid classifier configuration has been selected.	- Press the 'Run' button on the main window.	N/A	An error message is displayed and the program does not crash.

TC18	Error message on invalid field names.	Valid dataset files have been selected, except from dataset fields which do not correspond to the dataset. A valid classifier configuration has been selected.	- Press the 'Run' button on the main window.	N/A	An error message is displayed and the program does not crash.
TC19	Error message on invalid attack categories.	Valid dataset files have been selected, except from attack categories which do not correspond to the dataset. A valid classifier configuration has been selected.	- Press the 'Run' button on the main window.	N/A	An error message is displayed and the program does not crash.
TC20	Dataset window is populated with existing information.	Dataset file paths have been previously selected and the OK button pressed on the dataset window.	- Press the 'Select Dataset' button on the main win- dow.	N/A	The text boxes containing the paths to files should all be filled with the information which was entered previously, as well as fold count and stochastic classifier run count.
TC21	Error message on invalid classifier.	N/A	- Press the 'Select Classifier' button the main window. - Select an invalid .py file. - Press the 'Run' button.	An invalid .py file.	An error message is displayed and the program does not crash.
TC22	Delete classifier tab.	There is more than one tab in the classifier tab.	- Press the 'x' button next to the tab number in the classifiers tabs in any tab except the first.	N/A	The tab in which the 'x' button was pressed should close.
TC23	Show results for all classifiers run.	Valid dataset has been selected and valid classifier configuration has been selected.	- Press the 'Run' button.	N/A	A tab should be created on the main tab container for each classifier configuration run, and populated with classification information.

TC24	Show graph of classification results.	been run and	- Select the N/A 'Graphs' tab on the main window Select a class from the drop down in the 'Graphs' tab Press the 'Show' button.	A graph is shown which has a series for each classifier configuration specified.
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5 Methodology

5.1 Implementation

5.1.1 PyQt

PyQt is a set of Python bindings for the Qt application framework, which facilitates the writing of cross platform Qt applications which are capable of running on Windows, Mac, and Linux (PSF, 2018).

PyQt was chosen as the framework of choice for creating the application GUI over other frameworks such as Java Swing for a number of reasons, the greatest of which being that it would allow all development to be carried out in Python as the libraries which were already selected for machine learning were written in Python. Writing the entire project in one language comes with extra benefits such as being able to have a single development environment, simplifying application design as there is no need for interfaces between each language, and having the ability to write all unit tests in a single language. PyQt also has powerful tools which aid in the design and development of user interfaces in the form of Qt Creator, which increased the speed of development substantially, as well as an extensive set of online documentation.

5.1.2 Scikit-Learn

Scikit-Learn is a Python library consisting of a set of tools for easily performing machine learning and data analysis (Pedregosa et al., 2011). The library consists of a large number or pre-implemented classification, and pre-processing algorithms, as well as others such as clustering, regression etc. These pre-implemented algorithms allowed for a much faster development cycle and also guaranteed the correctness of all algorithms which were used, again speeding up development time by removing the need for testing individual algorithms. Sci-kit also provides some basic preprocessing in the form of scaling of inputs so that they are all within a normalised range, as well as some reporting which can be used to quickly extract a lot of information in the form of confusion matrices and classification reports from the results.

Some other libraries were considered for implementing the machine learning algorithms such as Tensorflow due to it's highly configurable nature and high performance due to having GPU acceleration, however the implementations of similar algorithms are considerably more complex using Tensorflow, and as time was a major factor in this project Scikit-learn was the preferable library. One final factor which influenced this choice is Scikit-learn's interoperability with Matplotlib allowing for graphs to be created quickly and easily.

5.1.3 Pandas

Pandas is a library which provides high performance, simple data structures and data analysis tools for Python (McKinney, 2010). Pandas provides to the programmer the DataFrame object type which allows for highly complex data manipulation to be carried out easily, such as data alignment and handling of missing data, dataset slicing, indexing and subsetting, merging and joining of multiple sets of data, etc. and is highly optimised for speed as the critical code within the library is written in C, allowing for much higher performance when compared to Python. This means that when working with very large datasets, such as the NSL-KDD and UNSW-NB15 which both have around 100,000 rows of data each, manipulations can be carried out quickly. The documentation for Pandas is also extensive and there exists a large online community of users which is indispensable during the learning of and development within the library.

5.1.4 Matplotlib

Matplotlib (Hunter, 2007) is a Python 2D plotting library which produces high quality graphs and charts in both hardcopy and interactive formats. Matplotlib makes creating complex charts extremely simple as well as offering a massive number of charts, including, histograms, bar charts, scatterplots, confusion matrices, etc., with as little lines of code as possible. One large reason for selecting Matplotlib for use is its interoperability with the other libraries and frameworks which were selected. It works with Scikit-learn with very little effort and also contains custom widgets for use with PyQt which allows for extremely fast and easy integration of Matplotlib charts into the user interface of the software.

5.1.5 Software

The software which was written is described with a class diagram, seen in Appendix E specifying each distinct class created along with its methods, properties and relationship with other classes, and with a use case diagram showing the general function of the software from the perspective of the user, as seen in Appendix F. A description of all of the software classes functions is as follows.

5.1.5.1 MainWindow

The MainWindow class is the class which is responsible for all of the logic behind the user interface of the main window. It inherits the QMainWindow class; a PyQt type which provides a main application window, and from Ui_MainWindow, which provides the specification and initialisation of the user interface. The classes main function is handling user input, creating new user interface elements and windows, and allowing the user to view classification results.

5.1.5.2 DatasetWindow

The DatasetWindow class is primarily responsible for defining what dataset the user wishes to use, to specify the data type of each column of said dataset. The window also allows users to choose between a testing dataset or k-fold cross validation and specify a number of folds, and to specify the number of runs a stochastic classifier should be run for. This class inherits from QDialog which provides the class with buttons allowing the user to accept or cancel the information they have input. It also inherits from Ui_DatasetWindow which like Ui_MainWindow provides the user interface for the window.

5.1.5.3 UIObject

UIObject is an interface which is used by other classes which implement a user interface for some window. It is required as when a user interface is inherited by a window class a number of methods are expected to be available in order to create and render the user interface at runtime.

5.1.5.4 Classifier

Classifier is an interface which any classification algorithm which is to be used must implement. It has one property, 'stochastic', which determines whether or not the classifier must be run multiple times, and a 'run' method which carries out the classification and returns the results.

5.1.5.5 QClfSelector

QClfSelector is a class which inherits from QWidget, the base class of all Qt user interface objects, and who's main function is to act as a widget that can be included within MainWindow multiple times. It provides the functionality of accepting user classifier arrangements and then fetching and running those classifiers, using whatever method has been specified by the user, be it k-fold cross validation or using a test dataset, or running stochastic classifiers multiple times and gathering the results.

5.1.5.6 QBarChart

QBarChart is a class which inherits from 'FigureCanvas', a Matplotlib class which interfaces with PyQt in order to create widget which can be displayed within a PyQt application. The class accepts a set of classification results and then constructs a Matplotlib chart which can be displayed in the Main-Window class for the user to view.

5.1.5.7 ErrorMessage

The ErrorMessage Class is the class responsible for displaying an error message popup to users, in a standard manner and encapsulates boiler plate code required for creating and showing a message box. The class inherits from QMessageBox which is a PyQt class provides a modal dialog for informing the user.

5.2 Datasets

5.2.1 NSL-KDD

Within the KDD-NSL dataset, traffic is categorised into either normal network traffic for a military network or into one of the following four attack categories:

- Denial of Service (DoS) Attacker tries to prevent legitimate users from using a service.
- Remote to Local (r2l) Attacker does not have an account on the victim machine, hence tries to gain access.
- User to Root (u2r) Attacker has local access to the victim machine and tries to gain super user privileges.
- Probe Attacker tries to gain information about the target host.

A complete listing of all attacks and their categories can been seen in Table 2, as well as the sample count of each category of attack in Table 3.

Table 2: NSL-KDD Dataset Attack Samples.

Attack	Samples	Category
back	956	dos
buffer_overflow	30	u2r
ftp_write	8	r2l
$guess_passwd$	53	r2l
guess_passwd	53	r2l

imap	11	r2l
ipsweep	3599	r2l
land	18	dos
loadmodule	9	u2r
multihop	7	r2l
neptune	41214	dos
nmap	1493	probe
normal	67343	normal
perl	3	u2r
phf	4	r2l
pod	201	dos
portsweep	2931	probe
rootkit	10	u2r
satan	3633	probe
smurf	2646	dos
spy	2	r2l
teardrop	892	dos
warezclient	890	r2l
warezmaster	20	r2l

Table 3: NSL-KDD Dataset Categories Samples.

DoS	Probe	u2r	r2l	Normal
45927	11656	52	995	67343

The dataset itself is also comprised of 41 features per connection recorded, a detailed listing of each and their type can be seen in Appendix G.

5.2.2 UNSW-NB15

Similarly, within the UNSW-NB15 dataset, as with the NSL-KDD dataset, traffic is also categorised into either normal network traffic for a military network or into one of the following seven attack categories:

- Fuzzers Attempting to cause a program or network suspended by feeding it the randomly generated data. Analysis 2,677 It contains different attacks of port scan, spam and html files penetrations.
- Backdoors A tecnique in which a system security mechanism is bypassed stealthily to access a computer or its data.

- DoS A malicious attempt to make a server or a network resource unavailable to users, usually by temporarily interrupting or suspending the services of a host connected to the Internet.
- Exploits The attacker knows of a security problem within an operating system or a piece of software and leverages that knowledge by exploiting the vulnerability.
- Generic A technique works against all block-ciphers (with a given block and key size), without consideration about the structure of the block-cipher.
- Reconnaissance Contains all Strikes that can simulate attacks that gather information.
- Shellcode A small piece of code used as the payload in the exploitation of software vulnerability. Worms 174 Attacker replicates itself in order to spread to other computers. Often, it uses a computer network to spread itself, relying on security failures on the target computer to access it.

Table 4: UNSW-NB15 Dataset Attack Samples.

Attack	Samples
Analysis	677
Backdoor	583
DoS	4089
Exploits	11132
Fuzzers	6062
Generic	18871
Reconnaissance	3496
Shellcode	378
Worms	44
Normal	37000

The UNSW-NB15 dataset is comprised of 42 features per connection recorded, a detailed listing of each feature, their type and a description of each can be seen in Appendix H.

5.3 Data Pre-processing

Before classification can take place it is necessary to perform some preprocessing upon both datasets, so that when they are used they are in a form which is most useful for classification, allowing for more accurate, and faster classification. The first form of pre-processing which will take place upon the datasets is in the form of one hot encoding. One hot encoding is a process wherein categorical features of a dataset are converted into a binary representation. This process can be seen in Figure 6, which shows a small snippet from the NSL-KDD dataset before, and after one hot encoding.

flag	src_bytes	dst_bytes		flag_SF	flag_S0	flag_REJ	src_bytes	dst_bytes
SF	491	0		1	0	0	491	0
SF	146	0		1	0	0	146	0
S0	0	0	\longrightarrow	0	1	0	0	0
SF	232	8153		1	0	0	232	8153
SF	199	420		1	0	0	199	420
REJ	0	0		0	0	1	0	0

Figure 6: One-hot Encoding Example

One hot encoding is necessary as many classification algorithms rely on either some kind of internal averaging, or some form of activation function which require numerical input in order to extract meaning from. Simply converting each of these categories from a nominal to a numeric representation is not sufficient as the categories lose meaning when represented by a series of numbers, i.e. when calculating distance from one category to another any number selected will be arbitrary, and the machine learning algorithm will attempt to extract a relationship between the numbers where there is none, therefore reducing accuracy in classification.

One side effect of one hot encoding is that when processing both the training and testing dataset it is possible that the testing set is missing some categories present within the training set, leading to the algorithms being unable to perform a categorisation. To rectify this the next form of preprocessing which must take place is the insertion of missing features from the training set into the testing set. To do this the training set is simply scanned to find features which are not present in the testing set, and then inserts them into the testing set at the same index thereby making both sets features identical.

The final form of pre-processing to be performed on the dataset is feature scaling. Feature scaling is where a range of data is normalised by scaling it to be within some range, in this case between -1 and 1. The formula used for doing this is seen below in Figure 7:

$$x' = \frac{x - min(x)}{max(x) - min(x)}$$

Figure 7: Feature Scaling Formula

where x is the original value and x' is the normalised value. Representing a range of values between a normalised range is important as a large number of classification algorithms compute the euclidian distance between two points and will therefore not work correctly if two different featues have wildy different scales. For example if one feature has a large range of numbers and another a very narrow range, the distance will be dependent only on the feature with the larger range, so each feature should be normalised to ensure that each contributes the same amount to the final distance which is computed. Feature scaling also allows classifers which use gradient descent, such as the multi-layer perceptron, to converge much faster allowing for faster collection of results.

5.4 Classifier Configurations

The following is a listing of the parameters used in the running of each of the classifiers implemented within the scikit-learn library, with the descriptions of each taken from the official documentation:

Table 5: Classifier Parameters

Classifier	Parameter	Value	Description
k-Nearest Neighbour	algorithm	'kdtree'	Algorithm used to compute the nearest neighbors.
	weights	'uniform'	Uniform weights. All points in each neighborhood are weighted equally.
	leaf_size	40	Leaf size used for the KDTree.
	p	2	Power parameter for the Minkowski metric.
	n_{-} neighbors	2	The number of nearest neighbours to search for, i.e. k .
Multi-Layer Perceptron	hidden_layer _sizes	100	The number of neurons within the hidden layer.
-	activation	'relu'	Activation function for the hidden layer, rectified linear unit function, returns $f(x) = max(0, x)$.

	solver	'adam'	The solver for weight optimization, 'adam' refers to a stochastic gradient-based optimizer proposed by Kingma and Ba, 2014.
	learning_rate	'invscaling'	The learning schedule, 'invscaling' gradually decreases the learning rate at each time step.
Support Vector Machine	kernel	'rbf'	Specifies the kernel type to be used in the algorithm, Radial Basis Function kernel.
	gamma	1e-1	How much influence a single training example has. The larger gamma is, the closer other examples must be to be affected.
	C	10	Trades off misclassification of training examples against simplicity of the decision surface. A low C makes the decision surface smooth, while a high C aims at classifying all training examples correctly.

5.5 Single Stage Classification

The first form of classification which will take place is single stage classification. In single stage classification only a single machine learning technique and stage is implemented in order to classify network traffic. The dataset is first read and preprocessed, and the entire set is used in order to train the machine learning classifier. One the classifier has been trained, the classifier will make predictions about the testing set, classifying it into normal traffic or any one of the attack categories for the dataset it was trained upon, e.g. the attacks seen in Table 2.

5.6 Two Stage Classification

In second form of classification to take place is two stage classification. In two stage classification, the classification processes is split into two separate stages, the first indentifying normal traffic, and the second identifying abnormal. Before the first stage is trained, the dataset must first be flattened, with all attack types being reduced to simply 'attack', resulting in a set of data labelled only 'normal' and 'attack'. This new dataset is then used to train the first classifier, and then predictions made about the testing set, consisting of only 'normal' and 'attack' classifications. The second classifier is now trained on the original, unflattened dataset with all of the normal traffic removed, resulting in a dataset consisting of only attacks. Once the

classifier has been trained, the traffic which was classified as being an attack by the first classifier is then fed into the second classifier, and is then labelled as a specific attack. The total result is then the combination of the traffic identified as normal within the first classifier and the attacks from the second classifier.

Performing classification in this manner is expected to give more accurate results than a single stage classifier as it allows each stage to specialise, with the first only needing to differentiate between two classes, 'normal' and 'attack', and the second stage focussed on specific attack types, in theory increasing the overall rate of accurate detection by reducing domain size.

5.7 Data Collection

When performing data collection a number of things were done to ensure the greatest consistency within the results gathered, that comparisons between classification methods are valid, and that the results portray the real world performance of such a classifier as closely as possible. The first thing done to ensure validity of results gathered is that classifiers which are stochastic, i.e. are non-deterministic, are run for a total of 30 times and the results are averaged to reduce the amount of randomness within the results and lower the chance that a classifier may perform abnormally well or otherwise.

To best represent the real world performance of the classifiers, k-fold cross validation was used as described by Refaeilzadeh, Tang and Liu, 2009. In k-fold cross validation the training dataset is partitioned into k equal parts, with one part being used as the testing dataset the classifier will make predictions about, and the remaining k-1 parts used as the training set. This process is repeated k times with a different fold used each time as the testing set, a diagram of which can been seen in Figure 8.

Iteration	Dataset									
1	$k_{\scriptscriptstyle 1}$	k_2	k_3	k_4	k_5	k_6	k_7	k_8	k_9	k_{10}
2	k_1	k_2	k_3	k_4		k_6	k_7	k_8	k_9	k_{10}
3	k_1	k_2	k_3	k_4	k_5	k_6	k_7	k_8	k_9	k_{10}
:					:					
9	k_1	k_2	k_3	k_4	k_5	k_6	k_7	k_8	k_9	k_{10}
10	k_1	k_2	k_3	k_4	k_5	k_6	k_7	k_8	k_9	k_{10}

Figure 8: k-Fold Cross Validation

The results from all of these folds can then be combined and used to obtain a single result for the performance of the classification method. Using

this method for testing the performance of classifier is preferable to the use of a testing set as the all of the data available is used as both training data and testing data, therefore giving a more accurate estimation of how well the classifier will generalize to any independent dataset, i.e. it gives a more accurate idea of how well the classifier will perform in practice.

The k value selected for the k-fold cross validation to be carried out in this investigation is k=10 as a study carried out by Kohavi et al., 1995 found ten-fold cross validation to be the most effective in producing accurate results. The same k value was used throughout for each classifier, as well as the using the same folds for gathering results without randomising to ensure that results collected were comparable.

Finally the same parameters were used for each of the classifier arrangements, as described in Table 5, to ensure that results across classifier arrangements were consistent with one and other.

5.8 Metrics

The following section describes the metrics which will be extracted from each of the classification results.

Precision is a measure of how many of the classifications made are relevant, the formula for which can be seen below in Figure 9:

$$precision = \frac{tp}{tp + fp}$$

Figure 9: Precision Formula

where tp is the number of true positives, and fp is the number of false positives. For example, if a classifier were to have a precision of 1.0 that would mean that only relevant traffic was classified, there were no false positives. This however does not tell us what percentage of the relative traffic was actually classified. To do this another metric must be used called recall.

Recall, also known as sensitivity, is a measure of what percentage of the total relevant records were classified. The formula for recall can be seen below in Figure 10:

$$recall = \frac{tp}{tp + fn}$$

Figure 10: Recall Formula

where tp is the number of true positives, and fn is the number of false negatives. For example, if a classifier were to have a recall of 1.0, that would

mean that every single record of that class had been identified and classified correctly, however even with a recall of 1.0 there may be a large number of false positives which is why it is important to also take a measure of precision. To combine both of these metrics into a single value, f1-score can be used.

f1-Score is a metric which takes both the precision and recall into account, the formula for which can be seen below in Figure 11:

$$f_1 = \frac{2tp}{2tp + fp + fn}$$

Figure 11: f1-Score Formula

where tp is the number of true positives, fp the number of false positives, and fn the number of false negatives. This metric is extremely useful if false positives and false negatives are weighted the same in terms of negative effects. Note that f1-score does not take true negatives into account, however in this case the sheer volume of true negatives for each class would cause a metric taking them into account yield no useful insight.

6 Results

6.1 NSL-KDD

The following section lists the results gathered running each classifier configuration on the NSL-KDD dataset. All of the metrics calculated using these results were first calculated per class, then combined and averaged for each category. This is done to ensure that classes with a lower number of samples are equally represented as the number of samples for each class within a category can vary greatly. The total number of true postives, true negatives, false postives, and false negatives for each category can be found in Appendix I.1.




Figure 12: NSL-KDD Classifiers Precision Graph




Figure 13: NSL-KDD Classifiers Recall Graph




Figure 14: NSL-KDD Classifiers f1-Score Graph

The values used in the creation of Figures 12, 13, and 14 can be found in Appendices I.2, I.3, and I.4 respectively.

6.2 UNSW-NB15

The following section lists the results gathered running each classifier configuration on the UNSW-NB15 dataset. In this dataset, attacks are already grouped into categories and so no averaging is necessary. The total number of true positives, true negatives, false positives, and false negatives for each category can be found in Appendix J.1.




Figure 15: UNSW-NB15 Classifiers Precision Graph




Figure 16: UNSW-NB15 Classifiers Recall Graph




Figure 17: UNSW-NB15 Classifiers f1-Score Graph

The values used in the creation of Figures 15, 16, and 17 can be found in Appendices J.2, J.3, and J.4 respectively.

7 Evaulation

7.1 Software

7.1.1 User Interface

From the wireframes shown in Section 4.2.1, a user interface was created conforming to those designs which will be discussed below.

The main window in Figure 18, shown below, was created from the design in Figure 3. As can be seen in this figure, the user can select filepaths which are then inserted into the appropriate text boxes, and there is a button available above the classifier configurations which will create a new tab in which to specify a new configuration. It can also be seen that the main window contains a box in the top right of the window, showing details about the selected dataset, a debug log with accompanying clear button, and a run button under the classifier configurations used for running those configurations.




Figure 18: Main Window Results Screenshot

The main box on the right hand side of the window contains the raw results for the classifier configurations, with different classifier results being available by selecting the corresponding number tab at the top of the box. Below in Figure 19, the menu bar can be seen showing the expected functionality, namely, the ability to create new classifiers and to exit the program.




Figure 19: Main Window Menu Bar Screenshot

Figure 20, shows the 'Graph' tab within the main window. The classification label can be selected through the drop down and the top of the graph, and then shown by pressing the 'Show' button. The graph produced shows the true positive, true negative, false positive, and false negative values for the selected label of all classifier configurations, allowing for easy comparison between each classifier.




Figure 20: Main Window Graph Screenshot

The final user interface created is that for the dataset window, shown in Figure 21 and created from the wireframe in Figure 5. It can be seen that all of the dataset files can be selected and their filenames placed into the appropriate text boxes, as well as the three columns, 'Nominal', 'Binary' and 'Numeric' being populated with the columns labels file selected. There exists buttons labeled '<' and '>' on each side of the columns for moving these labels between columns. Figure 22 shows the functionality for moving column labels through the right click context menu. The dataset window also allows the user to select between a testing set and k-fold cross validation, as well as the number of folds, and the number of runs a stochastic classifier should be averaged over.




Figure 21: Dataset Window Screenshot




Figure 22: Right Click Context Menu

From all of these figures, it can be seen that the produced software follows the wireframe designs created in Section 4.2.1.

7.1.2 Functional Requirements

Out of all of the functionality listed in Section 4.2.2 only two pieces of functionality were not delivered, the counts of which can be seen in Figure 23, and the priorities of each functional requirement can be seen in the MoSCoW analysis in Appendix D.




Figure 23: Delivered Functional Requirements

The two pieces of functionality which were not delivered were FR21 Negative Selection Classifier, and FR24 Feature Selection. The negative selection classifier was ultimately not delivered due to time. This method of classification was not available within Sci-kit Learn or any libraries which could be found and implementing this classifier from scratch would have taken a considerable amount of time, as well as extensively testing it to ensure correctness. Another problem with this method of classification comes in the form of the time which is required in order to train it. Generating detectors is an expensive process, which is only made more expensive by the large number of features in the selected datasets, and by implementing the algorithm in Python, which is considerably slower than an implementation written in c, and while c and Python interoperability is possible through Cython, this was out of scope for the project. For these reasons it was decided to not deliver this functionality.

The second piece of functionality not delivered, feature selection, was dropped for being out of scope. The software which was produced was primarily to be used for comparing classifier results. While implementing some kind of feature selection might have improved these classifier results and reduced the running times of the classifiers, it would have taken a large amount of time to create, and integrate with the user interface. Instead, it is assumed that when running the software, that the dataset will have already been feature selected, reducing the scope of the software and keeping it much more simple, accessible and user friendly.

7.1.3 Non-Functional Requirements

7.1.3.1 QR1 Robustness

The software produced is shown to meet the requirment of being robust through both unit and manual testing. The software supports datasets of many feature sizes, and up to hundreds of thousands of rows, as well as datasets with any number of destination classes, and any number of categories which to sort classes into and aggregate results for. If there are errors present within a dataset or supplied classifier the software will present an error message, and allow the user to re-select the faulty dataset or classifier without crashing or becoming unresponsive.

7.1.3.2 QR2 Responsiveness

User interface responsiveness was only partially achieved in the development of the software. When running one or multiple classifier configurations, the main thread will be blocked, only updating when debug output is written to the debug log at the bottom of the main window. This is not seen as a great problem however, as the running of classifiers cannot be canceled, and the debug output is still output in real time.

7.1.3.3 QR3 Usability

When compared to existing software such as WEKA and Splunk, the produced software is much simpler, and consequently easier to learn and use. All aspects of the user interface are clearly laid out for the user to see, and it takes no more than three clicks to reach any piece of functionality from any state in the program, making navigation quick and simple. The software is also highly focussed with a small scope, only aiming to compare single and two stage classification configurations, unlike WEKA which aims to provide an extensive set of functionality so that users can carry out many different and complex use cases, in turn making the program much more user friendly.

7.1.3.4 QR4 Maintainability

Maintainability will be aided in future through the use of comments throughout the program, describing the use of large methods and complex sections of code, sensible variable names which are self documenting. The class and use case diagram which were produced during the design of the software will also aid in the maintainance of the software, as well as the unit tests produced which can be used to ensure no functionality is broken when adding new features.

7.1.3.5 QR5 Portability

The software produced is highly portable, which is facilitated by what libraries and technologies where used in the production of the software. The Python language can be run on any operating system, as well as any packages and libraries that it uses, and the PyQt framework which was used for creating the user interface is available for use on all operating systems.

7.1.3.6 QR6 Correctness

To ensure that all results produced by the software were correct, libraries were used to implement the complex classification algorithms, as well as handling the creation and modification of the data structure used to hold the datasets. These libraries have already been highly tested and proven to produce correct results. Unit tests were also created to ensure that the custom methods implemented for manipulating and preprocessing data produced the correct results.

7.2 Classifier Performance

When examining the results collected in Section 6 a number of observations may be made, and conclusions drawn. In both the NSL-KDD and UNSW-NB15 datasets we can see the performance of the single stage classifiers as the first three results in each graph. From these single stage results we can get an idea of the general performance of each classification technique. When looking at the results in both datasets and for all metrics, it can be seen that combining any classifier with a more performant classifier for the second stage will always produce more accurate results, likewise, combining a classifier with a less performant classifier for the second stage will always produce less accurate results.

To get the most accurate idea of the performance gain or loss when using two-stage classification, configurations which use the same classifier in both stages of classification should be examined, which removes the inherent difference in classifier performances from the results.

When looking at the results from the NSL-KDD dataset, it can be seen that of the two stage classifier configurations consisting of the same two classifiers, i.e. k-NN/k-NN, MLP/MLP, and SVM/SVM, Figure 12 show that k-NN/k-NN and MLP/MLP both have a higher precision, while SVM/SVM has a lowered precision. The SVM/SVM configuration has a lower number of true positives for normal connections, as can be seen in Appendix I.1, in turn increasing the total number of false positives for all attack categories and reducing overall precision. This tells us that when identifying normal traffic using a support vector machine, it is important to also have each at-

tack class present to identify the boundaries between intrusive and normal traffic. When looking at recall in Figure 13, it can be seen that all configurations, k-NN/k-NN, MLP/MLP, and SVM/SVM, have increased a higher recall score. This shows that separating classifiers into two stages results in less false negatives overall for attacks in all classifiers, due to the second classifier being able to specialise in detecting only attacks. The f1-score for each of these classifiers gives us a good idea of what increase or decrease in performance we can expect from the classifiers assuming that false negatives and false positives are weighted the same, i.e. both are equally detrimental to classification results. Figure 14 shows that both k-NN/k-NN and MLP/MLP see an increase in f1-score, while SVM/SVM sees a reduction, even though the change in precision and recall are equal. This decrease in f1-score is due to thier being a greater total number of false positives than false negatives, and with the same weighting will decrease the f1-score more than the lower number of false negatives will increase it. All of the changes in these metrics can be seen below in Table 6

Table 6: Change in Metrics From Single to Two-Stage Classification on NSL-KDD Dataset.

	$\Delta Precision$	$\Delta Recall$	$\Delta f1 - Score$
k-NN/k-NN	+0.07	+0.14	+0.09
MLP/MLP	+0.03	+0.17	+0.04
SVM/SVM	-0.02	+0.02	-0.04

When looking at results gathered from the UNSW-NB15 dataset, it can be seen that of the two stage classifier configurations, both MLP/MLP and SVM/SVM experience a drop in precision, while k-NN/k-NN experiences a significant increase in precision. In both the MLP/MLP and SVM/SVM configurations a decrease in true positives for normal traffic can be observed, shown in Appendix J.1, as in the SVM/SVM configuration for the NSL-KDD dataset, contributing to a higher number of false positives within attack classes and resulting in a lower total precision, shown in Figure 15. This shows us that in the UNSW-NB15 dataset which is a low footprint dataset, individual attack types are crucial in identifying boundaries between normal and abnormal traffic. These two configurations however show an increased total recall score, shown in Figure 16. This shows us that without the normal traffic the second classifier may specialise and identify attacks much more easily, however the misidentified normal traffic from the first stage still leads to a lower precision. The k-NN/k-NN configuration shows the results to

the contrary, with it having a significantly increased precision, but lower recall. This difference is highly likely due to the inherent differences between classification methods. Both the k-NN and k-NN/k-NN configurations show the same classification rates for normal traffic, as shown in Appendix J.1, however the removal of normal traffic allows the k-NN/k-NN classifier to produce less false positives amongst attack classes, but a lower recall overall. This discrepancy can be explained by attack classes with a high number of samples receiving the false negatives of the classes with low samples, thereby decreasing recall by a large amount, and the classes with a large sample size will not have their precision affected in a significant way, resulting in higher precision and lower recall overall as all classes are weighted the same. As with the NSL-KDD dataset results, we can look at the f1-score of the classifier configurations, shown in Figure 17, to give us a good idea of the increase or decrease in overall performance of the classifiers. From the results we can see that the k-NN/k-NN configuration experiences an increase in f1-score over its single stage counterpart, MLP/MLP, shows no difference and SVM/SVM shows a decrease in overall performance. Again, as was with the NSL-KDD dataset, the f1-score is affected by the total number of classifications made in each category and is not simply a sum of precision and recall. The total change in precision, recall, and f1-score from single to two-stage classification can be seen below in Figure 7.

Table 7: Change in Metrics From Single to Two-Stage Classification on UNSW-NB15 Dataset.

	$\Delta Precision$	$\Delta Recall$	$\Delta f1 - Score$
k-NN/k-NN	+0.43	-0.06	+0.09
MLP/MLP	-0.04	+0.03	+0.00
SVM/SVM	-0.16	+0.08	-0.04

From all of these observations we may now draw some conclusions. It is always beneficial to combine classifier with a more performant classifier for the second stage of classification, which may prove useful if a certain classification method is required for the first stage, or if the running time is an issue a less performant but faster classifier may be used in conjunction with a higher performance classifier, to have both low running times and higher accuracy.

From the NSL-KDD f1-score results seen in Figure 14 and Appendix I.4, the highest performing classifier was a two-stage classifier, comprised of two multi-layer perceptrons, producing an f1-score increase of 0.04 over its single

stage counterpart and an f1-score increase of 0.01 over the next best performing classifier. From the f1-score results of the second dataset, UNSW-NB15, seen in Figure 17 and Appendix J.4, the joint highest performing classifiers were the multi-layer perceptron, MLP, and its two-stage counterpart, MLP/MLP.

When comparing the performance of two stage classifier configurations using the same classifier in both stages, it can be seen that the use of two stage classification can increase the performance with regards to precision, recall and f1-score, as is evident in both Tables 6 and 7. Although introducing a second classification stage does not always result in increased performance, this may be due to the classifiers used, and an improvement may be observed by using custom tuned classifier parameters for both the first and second stage, and so two stage classification should be considered when constructing a network intrusion detection system.

8 Conclusion

8.1 Research Questions

What is the rate of accurate detection and classification of network intrusions by single stage machine learning classification methods?

From the results collected using the NSL-KDD dataset, which can be found in Appendix I.1, and the metrics calculated from them, which can be seen in Figures 12, 13, and 14, as well as the results collected using the UNSW-NB15 dataset, which can be found in Appendix J.1, and the metrics calculated from them, which can be seen in Figures 15, 16, and 17, a table of results about single-stage classifier has been constructed which can be seen below in Table 8.

Table 8: Single Stage Classifier Performance

Dataset	Classifier	Precision	Recall	f1-Score
NSL-KDD	k-NN	3.64	3.62	3.61
	MLP	4.08	3.83	4.00
	SVM	4.38	3.83	4.03
UNSW-NB15	k-NN	2.93	3.20	3.00
	MLP	5.24	4.47	4.54
	SVM	4.60	4.14	4.28

What is the rate of accurate detection and classification of network intrusions by two stage machine learning classification methods?

Like the single stage classifiers, a table of two stage classifier metrics was created using results collected from both datasets found in Appendices I.1, and J.1, as well as Figures 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, and 17 which can be seen below in Table 9.

Dataset f1-Score Classifier Precision Recall **NSL-KDD** k-NN/k-NN 3.71 3.76 3.70 k-NN/MLP 3.72 3.67 3.68 k-NN/SVM 3.73 4.1 3.62 MLP/k-NN 3.63 3.57 3.52 MLP/MLP 4.11 4.00 4.04 MLP/SVM 4.42 3.83 4.02 SVM/k-NN 3.45 3.65 3.49 SVM/MLP 3.774.033.90 SVM/SVM 4.36 3.85 4.02 UNSW-NB15 k-NN/k-NN 3.36 3.14 3.06 k-NN/MLP 3.88 3.37 3.45k-NN/SVM 3.48 3.21 3.28 MLP/k-NN 3.76 3.66 3.56 MLP/MLP 5.20 4.504.54MLP/SVM 4.34 4.59 4.27 SVM/k-NN 3.59 3.5 3.69 SVM/MLP 5.07 4.4 4.43 SVM/SVM 4.18 4.24 4.44

Table 9: Two Stage Classifier Performance

Which method of classification i.e. single stage or two stage, is more accurate and by what amount?

From Tables 6 and 7, we can see the difference between single stage and two stage classifier performance with regards to precision, recall, and f1-score. These tables do not include results of two stage classifiers comprising of two different classifiers. This is because when a classifier is combined with a more performant classifier for its second stage, it will always increase its performance, where as if a classifier is combined with a less performant classifier for its second stage it will always decrease its performance.

These results show that using two stage classification can improve classification performance in some classifiers, with further room for improvement perhaps being possible with tailored parameters for the classifiers in both the first and second stage.

Which configuration of algorithms in the two stage classifier produces the most accurate results?

When using the NSL-KDD dataset the two stage configuration of classifiers which produces the most accurate results is the MLP/MLP configuration when examining f1-score. This configurations achieves an f1-score 0.01 higher than the next most performant configuration, and 0.04 higher than its single stage counterpart.

When using the UNSW-NB15 dataset the two stage configuration of classifiers which produces the most accurate results when looking at f1-score is also the MLP/MLP configuration. This configuration achieves the same performance as its single-stage counterpart and 0.2 higher f1-score than the next most performant classifier configuration.

8.2 Has the Project met it's Aims and Objectives?

The aim of this project was to create a piece of software to assist in the comparison of single and two-stage classifier configurations, on any arbitrary dataset and classification algorithm, and to use this created software to then gather results about those classifier configurations and compare them. This project has ultimately designed and managed the delivery of this software with almost all of the proposed functionality, as well as the results for multiple configurations of classifiers and a comparison of single and two-stage classification methods.

8.2.1 Aims met

- Perform a review of existing literature.
- Perform a review of existing software.
- Select appropriate machine learning classification algorithms.
- Select appropriate datasets for use in network intrusion detection.
- Implement software to assist in comparison of classification algorithms
- Evaluation of software with regards to specification and other software.
- Evaluation of single stage classification performance versus two-stage classification performance.

8.3 Reflection

I feel as though the management of the project was handled well. At the beginning of the project a rough timeline was constructed using the aims, objectives and deliverables expected which was then revised during the week 9 interim meeting to better reflect the course of the project. Once the requirements were decided upon for the software to be created during the project, a MoSCoW analysis was carried out, seen in Appendix D, which could be used to determine what the most important features were so that the project was delivered with the most functionality possible. Each week a meeting was held with my supervisor to ensure that the project was on track, and to decide upon the direction of the project, and what goals to complete in the following week. At the end of every meeting a diary sheet was compiled listing the work completed in the week prior and the goals set for completion in the following week, a complete listing of these diary sheets can be seen in Appendix C. Project management could have been further improved through the use of a piece of project management software such a Trello to keep track of all functionality and deliverables.

When beginning this project I had a very minimal amount of experience using Python, and zero experience in network security or machine learning techniques, and so a large amount of reading, research and learning was required. I feel as though I have performed extremely well in learning the topic of network intrusion detection using machine learning, and also in assessing, selecting, and learning technologies quickly at the start of the project. The software which was delivered although I believe to be of a high quality could have been more feature rich, including some more dataset pre-processing options, and different options for displaying results so that classifier could be compared more easily.

I am pleased with the outcome of the tests and the results which were gathered, which shows that there is a potential benefit in the use of two stage classification, however a lot more work can be done to confirm the benefit of this approach. I think that if more consideration had been taken in the planning of the project and I had some domain knowledge prior to the project I could have performed a much more in depth comparison, with many more classifiers and datasets.

8.4 Further Research

Although this project has shown that there is improvements in classification performance to be made through the use of two-stage classification, there is a great deal of further investigation which can take place. Some proposed areas of further research are:

- The use of a greater number of classifiers and configurations using methods such as: negative selection, self organising maps, random decision forests, decision trees, etc. in order to see how many classifiers benefit from being arranged in two stages.
- The use of a greater number of datasets such as the PU-IDS or ADFA-Linux datasets, to see if similar results are observed across all datasets and two-stage classification is truly beneficial.
- To test and find the ideal parameters for each classifier in both the first stage, detecting normal and abnormal traffic, and in the second stage, classifying specific attacks, instead of having the same parameters for both stages, which would be highly likely to improve overall performance.
- An investigation into feature selection in conjunction with two-stage classification to see if performance can be improved more significantly by removing features with low relevance to classification.

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Appendices

A Project Overview

Jack Anderson 40208539

Initial Project Overview

SOC10101 Honours Project (40 Credits)

Title of Project: A Comparison of Machine Learning Algorithms to Detect Network Intrusions

Overview of Project Content and Milestones

For this project, the main objective is to research different machine learning strategies for detecting network intrusions and to develop a piece of software which can obtain metrics from these algorithms. The focus of this project will be on a comparison of two-stage classifiers versus single-stage classifiers for detecting and classifying network intrusions. The dataset upon which these methods will be tested is the KDD Cup 1999 dataset, with the possibility of testing upon other data sets should time allow it.

The different strategies for machine learning will be gathered by reading relevant research papers and articles within the field of machine learning and network intrusion detection and selecting appropriate algorithms/strategies which are applicable for the chosen data set, and which are also feasible to implement within the timescale

The software will be a desktop application and will take either a predetermined algorithm or a user submitted algorithm, and a data set of network traffic. The software should then run the algorithm and extract metrics from it such as rates for false positives, true positives, false negatives, true negatives, overall accuracy of classification, etc. These results can then be used to plot graphs and charts to visualise this information to a user in a useful way.

A dissertation will be delivered at the end of the project and should contain a detailed design and plan of the software as well as complete testing strategy and results. Also included in the final report should be a comparison of several of the implemented algorithms to determine which is the most suitable for use if any at all.

A list of milestones for this project goes as the following:

- Initial Project Overview Submitted
- Relevant Algorithms Selected
- Project timescale Completed
- Literature Review Complete
- Software Design Completed
- Algorithms Implemented

- Software Implemented
- Software Testing Plan
- Software Tested
- Algorithm Comparison Completed
- Dissertation Written
- Poster Presentation Completed
- Project Submitted

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Jack Anderson 40208539

The Main Deliverable(s):

A list of the main deliverables for the project is as follows:

• Initial Project Overview • Software Implementation

• Gantt Chart • Algorithm Implementations

Literary Review
 Meeting Diary

Interim Report
 Algorithm Experimental Results

Requirement Specification
 Algorithm Comparisons

Software Design Document
 Software User Documentation

Software Test Plan • Dissertation

Software Test Results

• Poster Presentation

The Target Audience for the Deliverable(s):

The target audience for this project could include, machine learning and network intrusion researchers, and computer science students. Researchers may find the comparison of algorithms to be highly useful when carrying out preliminary research and could save time on selecting or discounting an algorithm. Computer science students may also find this project of use for experimenting with different network intrusion methods and different machine learning methods, giving them an insight on what they can be used for and how effective they are.

The Work to be Undertaken:

During this project, the work which must be undertaken is first extensive research of the subject area and collection of relevant sources. The project must then be planned and a timeline of work set out to be completed, with deadlines for each deliverable. Algorithms such as k-nearest neighbour, Artificial neural network, negative selection genetic algorithm, etc, will be implemented, compared and contrasted, specifically the performance of single stage against two-stage classifiers using these algorithms. At the same time as implementing these algorithms a requirement specification and then a design document will be created for the software package as well as a test plan. The design will then be implemented and then be tested according to the test plan. Once fully tested and proven correct the software can then be used to compare the algorithms and obtain metrics from then. The final dissertation will then be written which will include an analysis of the results for each algorithm.

Additional Information / Knowledge Required:

Additional research is required on network intrusion and two stage classifiers to best select the methods which will be implemented and explored. Research into similar software products such as WEKA ("Weka 3 - Data Mining with Open Source Machine Learning Software in Java", 2017) will also be conducted to source ideas and to see in which areas these pieces of software are lacking. Research on each individual algorithm to be implemented will also be required to ensure a correct implementation. And finally, an investigation into relevant libraries which may be used to assist with GUI creation, Graphing, and algorithm implementations.

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Jack Anderson 40208539

Information Sources that Provide a Context for the Project:

- 1. Tsai, C. F., Hsu, Y. F., Lin, C. Y., & Lin, W. Y. (2009). Intrusion detection by machine learning: A review. Expert Systems with Applications, 36(10), 11994-12000.
- 2. Sommer, R., & Paxson, V. (2010, May). Outside the closed world: On using machine learning for network intrusion detection. In Security and Privacy (SP), 2010 IEEE Symposium on (pp. 305-316). IEEE.
- 3. Denning, D. E. (1987). An intrusion-detection model. IEEE Transactions on software engineering, (2), 222-232.
- 4. Powers, S. T., & He, J. (2008). A hybrid artificial immune system and Self Organising Map for network intrusion detection. Information Sciences, 178(15), 3024-3042.
- Shon, T., & Moon, J. (2007). A hybrid machine learning approach to network anomaly detection. Information Sciences, 177(18), 3799-3821.
- 6. Mukkamala, S., Janoski, G., & Sung, A. (2002). Intrusion detection using neural networks and support vector machines. In *Neural Networks*, 2002. *IJCNN'02*. *Proceedings of the 2002 International Joint Conference on* (Vol. 2, pp. 1702-1707). IEEE.
- 7. Frank, J. (1994, October). Artificial intelligence and intrusion detection: Current and future directions. In *Proceedings of the 17th national computer security conference* (Vol. 10, pp. 1-12).
- 8. Weka 3 Data Mining with Open Source Machine Learning Software in Java. (2017). Cs.waikato.ac.nz. Retrieved 21 September 2017, from http://www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/ml/weka/

The Importance of the Project:

This project has importance as there has not been many papers directly comparing implementations of different machine learning approaches to network intrusion detection. While there are software packages which deal with gaining metrics from and comparing algorithms there is not one which is focused solely on network intrusion detection. Making a piece of software which is focused on one area of research may prove to provide greater insights, through more focused results or through ease of use regarding comparing single and multiple stage classifiers, whereas a more complicated piece of software may take a long time to become acquainted with and to produce results.

The Key Challenge(s) to be Overcome:

The key challenges to be overcome in this project are the implementations of the machine learning algorithms themselves. This is due to a personal lack of experience in implementing machine learning algorithms. Experience is also lacked in understanding formal descriptions of algorithms which may hinder my understanding of techniques when reading research papers. Another challenge will be creating a method of accommodating algorithms by creating interfaces which they will communicate with the main piece of software allowing for any algorithm to be entered by a user.

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A.A Project Timeline




Figure 24: Project Timeline Gantt Chart

\mathbf{B} Second Formal Review Output

SOC10101 Honours Project (40 Credits) Week 9 Report

Student Name: JACK ANDERSON Supervisor: SIMON POWERS Second Marker: NAGHMEH MORAL M

Please comment on the progress made so far

Date of Meeting: 9/11/17

Can the student provide evidence of attending supervision meetings by means of project diary sheets or other equivalent mechanism? yes no*

If not, please comment on any reasons presented

- weekly meeting Et keeping track of then Is the progress satisfactory? yes no* Can the student articulate their aims and objectives? yes no* If yes then please comment on them, otherwise write down your suggestions. - More recent poplication: - Inhoduction section: more recent affack

- Justification on: ML-borsal IDS

: chousen algorithms
: chosen aldorithms
: chosen aldoret: NBL-KDP

UNSW-NBIS

- Emparision on search term

- Study: Splink

- Study: Splink

ADFA-Linux

* Please circle one answer; if no is circled then this must be amplified in the space provided

Research question: hypothesis to add

Does the student have a plan of work? yes no*
If yes then please comment on that plan otherwise write down your suggestions.

- work plan has been discused during the weeking

Does the student know how they are going to evaluate their work? yes no* If yes then please comment otherwise write down your suggestions.

- comparion with cured produts: Sphink interns of performan for 3 adoprithms

Any other recommendations as to the future direction of the project

NIA

Signatures: Supervisor Symp PWM

Second Marker Maghini

Student Huk Anderson

Please give the student a photocopy of this form immediately after the review meeting; the original should be lodged in the School Office with Leanne Clyde

^{*} Please circle one answer; if **no** is circled then this **must** be amplified in the space provided

C Diary Sheets

EDINBURGH NAPIER UNIVERSITY	EDINBURGH NAPIER UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF COMPUTING	SCHOOL OF COMPUTING
PROJECT DIARY	PROJECT DIARY
Student: Jack Anderson Supervisor: Simon Powers	Student: Jack Anderson Supervisor: Simon Powers
Date: 15/09/2017 Last diary date: N/A	Date: 21/09/2017
Objectives:	Objectives:
Complete first draft of IPO. Continue reading about Network Intrusion Detection and Two Stage Classifiers Investigate WEKA software.	Correct issues with IPO Continue reading about network intrusion detection and two stage classifiers Investigate WEKA software more Begin outlining structure of the literature review
Progress:	Progress:
Decided upon language Picked several algorithms to implementation Read some research papers	Wrote first draft of IPO Explored WEKA Read research papers
Supervisor's Comments:	Supervisor's Comments:
Version 2 Edinburgh Napler University	Version 2 Edinburgh Napier University
EDINBURGH NAPIER UNIVERSITY	EDINBURGH NAPIER UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF COMPUTING	SCHOOL OF COMPUTING
PROJECT DIARY	PROJECT DIARY
Student: Jack Anderson Supervisor: Simon Powers	Student: Jack Anderson Supervisor: Simon Powers
Date: 28/09/2017	Date: 05/10/2017
Objectives:	Objectives:
Continue collecting citations Begin writing literature review	Continue writing literature review
D	Progress:
Progress: - Finalized IPO - Collected more citations to do with intrusion detection and ensemble classifiers Investigated WEKA - Outlined literature review structure	Collected more citations Began writing literature review
	Supervisor's Comments:
Supervisor's Comments:	
Version 2 Edinburgh Napier University	Version 2 Edinburgh Napier University

EDINBUR	GH NAPIER UNIVERSITY		EDINBURGH NAPIER UNIVERSITY	
SCHO	OOL OF COMPUTING		SCHOOL OF COMPUTING	
P	ROJECT DIARY		PF	ROJECT DIARY
Student: Jack Anderson	Supervisor: Simon Powers		Student: Jack Anderson	Supervisor: Simon Powers
Date: 12/10/2017	Last diary date: 05/10/2017		Date: 20/10/2017	Last diary date: 12/10/2017
Objectives:			Objectives:	
Continue writing literat Begin implementing th	Continue writing literature review Begin implementing the k-nn algorithm Go into more detail regarding the negative selectiand neural networks in literature review Back up some points made within the literature re		literature review	
Progress:			Progress:	
detection	ature review about history of intrusion egarding specific algorithms		Began section regardin	g algorithms within the literature review
Supervisor's Comments:		•	Supervisor's Comments:	
Version 2	Edinburgh Napler University		Version 2	Edinburgh Napler University
SCHO	GH NAPIER UNIVERSITY OOL OF COMPUTING ROJECT DIARY Supervisor: Simon Powers		SCHO	SH NAPIER UNIVERSITY OL OF COMPUTING ROJECT DIARY Supervisor: Simon Powers
Date: 26/10/2017	Last diary date: 20/10/2017		Date: 02/11/2017	Last diary date: 26/10/2017
Objectives:			Objectives:	
Add a conclusion to litt Finish search strategy Begin implementation	section in literature review		Finish first draft of litera Create the outline for th Update project schedul	ne entire dissertation
Progress:			Progress:	
	ew section on algorithms ature review about research contribution		No progress was made deadlines at the conclu-	e this week as I had two coursework sion of the week
Samuel Comments			Supervisor's Comments:	
Supervisor's Comments:				

EDINBURGH NAPIER UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF COMPUTING Student: Jack Anderson Supervisor: Simon Powers Last diary date: 02/11/2017 Date: 09/11/2017 At some point in the future update my literature review using all of the feedback within the interim report this includes More up to date references Justifications for different algorithms and machine learning in general Switching datasets from KDD 99 to a more recent/amended

Objectives:

 Created outline for dissertation 	
Finished first draft of the literature review Updated Gantt Chart to better reflect current project	schedule.

Switching summer one one
 Begin work on a k-nn classifier
 General research on python machine learning and GUI libraries

Sup	Supervisor's Comments:				

EDINBURGH NAPIER UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF COMPUTING

PROJECT DIARY

Supervisor: Simon Powers Student: Jack Anderson Date: 23/11/2017 Last diary date: 16/11/2017

- Continue to attempt to improve knn performance
 Continue work on creating GUI
 Implement multi-layer perceptron classifier

Progress:

- Began creating a simple GUI to start learning PyQt
- · Began writing simple unit tests

supervisor s	Comments:		

Version 2 Edinburgh Napier University

EDINBURGH NAPIER UNIVERSITY

SCHOOL OF COMPUTING

Student: Jack Anderson Supervisor: Simon Powers Date: 16/11/2017 Last diary date: 09/11/2017

Objectives:

- Improve k-nn classifier by finding alternative to onehot encoding.
 Begin creating the GUI

- Set up Github repository
 Researched and implemented preparing a dataset for processing
- Implemented a basic k-nn classifier
- Researched different GUI options

Supervisor's C	omments:	

EDINBURGH NAPIER UNIVERSITY

SCHOOL OF COMPUTING

PROJECT DIARY

Supervisor: Simon Powers Student: Jack Anderson Date: 09/01/2018 Last diary date: 23/11/2017

Objectives:

- Implement a multi-layer perceptron classifier
 Continue creation of a GUI

Progress:

No progress was made over the holiday period

Supervisor's	Supervisor's Comments:				

Supervisor's Comments:

EDINBURGH NAPIER UNIVERSITY	EDINBURGH NAPIER UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF COMPUTING	SCHOOL OF COMPUTING
PROJECT DIARY	PROJECT DIARY
Student: Jack Anderson Supervisor: Simon Powers	Student: Jack Anderson Supervisor: Simon Powers
Date: 16/01/2018	Date: 23/01/2018
Objectives:	Objectives:
Implement a support vector machine instead of negative selection classifier due to time constraints Continue work on the GUI Research feature selection and improving classifier performance	Research statistical significance testing Implement ability to run and compare several classifiers finish graphing and displaying results
Progress:	Progress:
Created a simple multi-layer perceptron classifier Implemented a large section of the GUI Dataset selection Field type categorising Custom classifier selection Basic window layouts	Implemented support vector machine classifier Added basic graph to GUI Added K fold cross validation User creation of template classifiers Linked back end computation to the GUI General bug fixes
Supervisor's Comments:	Supervisor's Comments:
Version 2 Edinburgh Napier University	Version 2 Edinburgh Napler University
EDINBURGH NAPIER UNIVERSITY	EDINBURGH NAPIER UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF COMPUTING	SCHOOL OF COMPUTING
PROJECT DIARY	PROJECT DIARY
Student: Jack Anderson Supervisor: Simon Powers	Student: Jack Anderson Supervisor: Simon Powers
Date: 30/01/2018	Date: 06/02/2018
Objectives:	Objectives:
Finish displaying results in GUI Implement ability to run classifiers several times and average results for stochastic classifiers such as MLP	Gather results for UNSW-NB15 Dataset.
Begin gathering results	Progress:
Progress: Added ability to run several classifier configurations at once Added graphing of classification results and selection of specific classes Fixed major bug regarding two stage classification results	Implemented stochastic classifier running and averaging. Gathered results for NSL-KDD dataset. Showing results in GUI. Fixed file writing bugs.
major oug regarding the study clussification results	Supervisor's Comments:

EDINBURGH NAPIER UNIVERSITY	EDINBURGH NAPIER UNIVERSITY	
SCHOOL OF COMPUTING	SCHOOL OF COMPUTING	
PROJECT DIARY	PROJECT DIARY	
Student: Jack Anderson Supervisor: Simon Powers	Student: Jack Anderson Supervisor: Simon Powers	
Date: 13/02/2018	Date: 20/02/2018	
Objectives:	Objectives:	
Continue writing dissertation	Gather some experimental results regarding dataset normal count and misclassification rates. Starting writing unit tests Start manual testing.	
Progress:	Keep writing dissertation.	_
Gathered results for UNSW-NB15 dataset. Began writing dissertation.	Progress:	_
Supervisor's Comments:		
	Supervisor's Comments:	
Version 2 Edinburgh Napler University	Version 2 Edinburgh Napier University	
EDINBURGH NAPIER UNIVERSITY	EDINBURGH NAPIER UNIVERSITY	
SCHOOL OF COMPUTING	SCHOOL OF COMPUTING	
PROJECT DIARY	PROJECT DIARY	
Student: Jack Anderson Supervisor: Simon Powers	Student: Jack Anderson Supervisor: Simon Powers	
Date: 27/02/2018	Date: 06/03/2018	
Objectives:	Objectives:	_
Write more of the dissertation.	Continue dissertation.	
Progress:	Progress:	
Ran tests on multiple normal counts within datasets. Dissertation writing. Wrote lots of unit tests. Carried out manual testing.	Re-gathered results to group into categories automatically. Continued with dissertation writing.	
Supervisor's Comments:	Supervisor's Comments:	
	<u> </u>	

EDINBURGH NAPIER UNIVERSITY	EDINBURGH NAPIER	UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF COMPUTING	SCHOOL OF COM	IPUTING
PROJECT DIARY	PROJECT DI	ARY
Student: Jack Anderson Supervisor: Simon Powers	Student: Jack Anderson Supervis	or: Simon Powers
Date: 13/03/2018		ry date: 13/03/2018
Objectives:	Objectives:	
Update literature review to reflect changes within the project. Dissertation.	Complete first draft of dissertation for the complete first draft d	or Simon to check over.
Progress:	Progress:	
Wrote more dissertation.	 Finished dissertation methodology. More dissertation writing. 	
Supervisor's Comments:	Supervisor's Comments:	
Version 2 Edinburgh Napier University	Version 2	Edinburgh Napier University
EDINBURGH NAPIER UNIVERSITY		
SCHOOL OF COMPUTING		
PROJECT DIARY		
Student: Jack Anderson Supervisor: Simon Powers Data 27/02/02/02		
Date: 27/03/2018		
Objectives:		
Finish dissertation.		
Progress:		
Almost complete first draft of dissertation given to Simon to		
check.		
Supervisor's Comments:		

D MoSCoW Analysis

Table 11: MoSCoW Analysis of Requirements

	Requirement		Prio	rity	
ID	Title	Must	Should	Could	Wont
FR1	Select Classifiers	X			
FR2	Two Stage Classification	\mathbf{x}			
FR3	Run Classifiers	\mathbf{x}			
FR4	Create New Classifier			\mathbf{x}	
FR5	Debug Output		\mathbf{X}		
FR6	Multiple Classifier Configurations		X		
FR7	Aggregate Results By Attack	\mathbf{x}			
FR8	Write Results to File		\mathbf{X}		
FR9	Get Classification Results	\mathbf{x}			
FR10	Graph Results		\mathbf{X}		
FR11	Select Training Dataset	\mathbf{x}			
FR12	Select Testing Dataset	\mathbf{x}			
FR13	k-Fold Cross Validation	\mathbf{x}			
FR14	Select Dataset Column Labels	\mathbf{x}			
FR15	Select Dataset Attack Categories	\mathbf{x}			
FR16	Categorise Dataset Fields	\mathbf{x}			
FR17	One Hot Encoding	\mathbf{x}			
FR18	Load Data	\mathbf{x}			
FR19	k-Nearest Neighbour Classifier	\mathbf{x}			
FR20	Multi-layer Perceptron Classifier	\mathbf{x}			
FR21	Negative Selection Classifier			\mathbf{x}	
FR22	Support Vector Machine Classifier	\mathbf{x}			
FR23	Stochastic Classifier Averaging		X		
FR24	Feature Selection				\mathbf{x}
QR1	Robustness	\mathbf{x}			
QR2	Responsiveness			\mathbf{x}	
QR3	Usability		X		
QR4	Maintainability	\mathbf{x}			
QR4	Correctness	\mathbf{x}			
$\frac{QR5}{}$	Portability			X	

E Class Diagram




Figure 25: UML Class Diagram

F Use Case Diagram




Figure 26: UML Use Case Diagram

G NSL-KDD Features

Table 12: NSL-KDD Features

Feature	Type
duration	continuous
protocol_type	symbolic
service	symbolic
flag	symbolic
src_bytes	continuous
dst_bytes	continuous
land	binary
wrong_fragment	continuous
urgent	continuous
hot	continuous
num_failed_logins	continuous
logged_in	binary
$num_compromised$	continuous
$root_shell$	binary
$su_attempted$	binary
num_root	continuous
$num_file_creations$	continuous
$\operatorname{num_shells}$	continuous
num_access_files	continuous
$num_outbound_cmds$	continuous
is_host_login	binary
is_guest_login	binary
count	continuous
srv_count	continuous
serror_rate	continuous
srv_serror_rate	continuous
$rerror_rate$	continuous
srv_rerror_rate	continuous
$same_srv_rate$	continuous
diff_srv_rate	continuous
$srv_diff_host_rate$	continuous
dst_host_count	continuous
$dst_host_srv_count$	continuous
$dst_host_same_srv_rate$	continuous
$dst_host_diff_srv_rate$	continuous

$dst_host_same_src_port_rate$	continuous
$dst_host_srv_diff_host_rate$	continuous
$dst_host_serror_rate$	continuous
$dst_host_srv_serror_rate$	continuous
$dst_host_rerror_rate$	continuous
$dst_host_srv_rerror_rate$	continuous

H UNSW-NB15 Features

Table 13: UNSW-NB15 Features

Field	Type	Description
dur	Float	Record total duration
proto	nominal	Transaction protocol
service	nominal	http, ftp, smtp, ssh, dns, ftp-data ,irc and (-) if not much used service
state	nominal	Indicates to the state and its dependent protocol, e.g. ACC, CLO, CON, ECO, ECR, FIN, INT, MAS, PAR, REQ, RST, TST, TXD, URH, URN, and (-) (if not used state)
spkts	integer	Source to destination packet count
dpkts	integer	Destination to source packet count
sbytes	Integer	Source to destination transaction bytes
dbytes	Integer	Destination to source transaction bytes
rate	Float	Connection rate
sttl	Integer	Source to destination time to live value
dttl	Integer	Destination to source time to live value
sload	Float	Source bits per second
dload	Float	Destination bits per second
sloss	Integer	Source packets retransmitted or dropped
dloss	Integer	Destination packets retransmitted or dropped
Sintpkt	Float	Source interpacket arrival time (mSec)
Dintpkt	Float	Destination interpacket arrival time (mSec)
sjit	Float	Source jitter (mSec)
djit	Float	Destination jitter (mSec)
swin	integer	Source TCP window advertisement value
stcpb	integer	Source TCP base sequence number
dtcpb	integer	Destination TCP base sequence number
dwin	integer	Destination TCP window advertisement value
tcprtt	Float	TCP connection setup round-trip time, the sum of synack and ackdat.
synack	Float	TCP connection setup time, the time between the SYN and the SYN_ACK packets.
ackdat	Float	TCP connection setup time, the time between the SYN_ACK and the ACK packets.
smean	integer	Mean of the ?ow packet size transmitted by the src

dmean	integer	Mean of the ?ow packet size transmitted by the dst
$trans_{-}depth$	integer	Represents the pipelined depth into the connection of http request/response transaction
res_bdy_len	integer	Actual uncompressed content size of the data transferred from the servers http service.
ct_srv_src	integer	No. of connections that contain the same service (14) and source address (1) in 100 connections
ct_state_ttl	Integer	according to the last time (26). No. for each state (6) according to specific range of values for source/destination time to live (10) (11).
ct_dst_ltm	integer	No. of connections of the same destination address (3) in 100 connections according to the last time (26).
$ct_src_dport_ltm$	integer	No of connections of the same source address (1) and the destination port (4) in 100 connections according to the last time (26).
$ct_dst_sport_ltm$	integer	No of connections of the same destination address (3) and the source port (2) in 100 connections according to the last time (26).
$ct_dst_src_ltm$	integer	No of connections of the same source (1) and the destination (3) address in in 100 connections according to the last time (26).
is_ftp_login	binary	If the ftp session is accessed by user and password then 1 else 0.
$\operatorname{ct_ftp_cmd}$	integer	No of flows that has a command in ftp session.
ct_flw_http_mthd	Integer	No. of flows that has methods such as Get and Post in http service.
ct_src_ltm	integer	No. of connections of the same source address (1) in 100 connections according to the last time (26).
ct_srv_dst	integer	No. of connections that contain the same service (14) and destination address (3) in 100 connections according to the last time (26).
is_sm_ips_ports	binary	If source (1) and destination (3)IP addresses equal and port numbers (2)(4) equal then, this variable takes value 1 else 0

Lack	Andorson	- 40208539
Jack	Anderson	- 40700009

SOC10101	Honours	Project
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attack_cat	nominal	The name of each attack category. In this data
		set, nine categories e.g. Fuzzers, Analysis, Back-
		doors, DoS Exploits, Generic, Reconnaissance,
		Shellcode and Worms
labels	binary	0 for normal and 1 for attack records

I NSL-KDD Results

I.1 NSL-KDD Classification Data

Table 14: NSL-KDD Classification Data

	Class	TP	TN	FP	FN
KNN	dos	45859	709629	282	68
	u2r	18	503805	35	34
	r2l	943	1006762	27	52
	probe	10578	491279	957	1078
	normal	67080	58436	194	263
MLP	dos	45896	709862	49	31
	u2r	25	503831	9	27
	r2l	897	1006731	58	98
	probe	11479	492073	163	177
	normal	67171	58404	226	172
SVM	dos	45884	709860	51	43
	u2r	20	503836	4	32
	r2l	886	1006756	33	109
	probe	11163	492087	149	493
	normal	67208	58055	575	135
KNN/KNN	dos	45869	709586	325	58
·	u2r	26	503802	38	26
	r2l	961	1006718	71	34
	probe	10611	491224	1012	1045
	normal	66944	58514	116	399
KNN/MLP	dos	45890	709846	65	37
	u2r	20	503828	12	32
	r2l	947	1006689	100	48
	probe	11477	492025	211	179
	normal	67067	58446	184	276
KNN/SVM	dos	45882	709862	49	45
	u2r	18	503836	4	34
	r2l	938	1006728	61	57
	probe	11322	491788	448	334
	normal	67067	58446	184	276
MLP/KNN	dos	45811	709676	235	116
-	u2r	21	503773	67	31
	r2l	861	1006730	59	134
	probe	10597	491321	915	1059

	normal	67132	58355	275	211
MLP/MLP	dos	45890	709840	71	37
,	u2r	23	503825	15	29
	r2l	882	1006694	95	113
	probe	11479	492043	193	177
	normal	67082	58387	243	261
MLP/SVM	dos	45889	709847	64	38
,	u2r	19	503837	3	33
	r2l	870	1006709	80	125
	probe	11310	491830	406	346
	normal	67086	58384	246	257
SVM/KNN	dos	45819	709661	250	108
	u2r	21	503739	101	31
	r2l	886	1006682	107	109
	probe	10618	491291	945	1038
	normal	67026	58430	200	317
SVM/MLP	dos	45902	709838	73	25
	u2r	26	503768	72	26
	r2l	894	1006700	89	101
	probe	11471	492016	220	185
	normal	67026	58430	200	317
SVM/SVM	dos	45895	709852	59	32
·	u2r	20	503837	3	32
	r2l	886	10067633	26	109
	probe	11330	491708	528	326
	normal	67026	58430	200	317

I.2 NSL-KDD Precision

Table 15: NSL-KDD Classifiers Precision Table

	dos	u2r	r2l	probe	normal
K-NN	0.91	0.14	0.68	0.92	0.99
K-NN/K-NN	0.9	0.28	0.63	0.91	0.99
K-NN/MLP	0.94	0.3	0.51	0.98	0.99
K-NN/SVM	0.93	0.58	0.64	0.96	0.99
MLP	0.94	0.38	0.79	0.98	0.99
MLP/K-NN	0.89	0.33	0.51	0.91	0.99
MLP/MLP	0.94	0.49	0.71	0.98	0.99
MLP/SVM	0.93	0.73	0.8	0.97	0.99
SVM	0.93	0.64	0.83	0.99	0.99
SVM/K-NN	0.9	0.21	0.44	0.91	0.99
SVM/MLP	0.94	0.37	0.49	0.98	0.99
SVM/SVM	0.93	0.65	0.83	0.96	0.99

I.3 NSL-KDD Recall

Table 16: NSL-KDD Classifiers Recall Table

	dos	u2r	r2l	probe	normal
K-NN	0.96	0.19	0.62	0.86	0.99
K-NN/K-NN	0.97	0.31	0.62	0.87	0.99
K-NN/MLP	0.94	0.19	0.57	0.98	0.99
K-NN/SVM	0.9	0.21	0.55	0.97	0.99
MLP	0.95	0.34	0.57	0.98	0.99
MLP/K-NN	0.89	0.28	0.53	0.88	0.99
MLP/MLP	0.94	0.44	0.65	0.98	0.99
MLP/SVM	0.92	0.34	0.61	0.97	0.99
SVM	0.93	0.36	0.6	0.95	0.99
SVM/K-NN	0.93	0.29	0.56	0.88	0.99
SVM/MLP	0.98	0.51	0.57	0.98	0.99
SVM/SVM	0.93	0.36	0.6	0.97	0.99

I.4 NSL-KDD f1-Score

Table 17: NSL-KDD Classifiers f1-Score Table

	dos	u2r	r2l	probe	normal
K-NN	0.93	0.16	0.65	0.88	0.99
K-NN/K-NN	0.93	0.28	0.62	0.88	0.99
K-NN/MLP	0.94	0.23	0.54	0.98	0.99
K-NN/SVM	0.91	0.29	0.58	0.96	0.99
MLP	0.95	0.36	0.72	0.98	0.99
MLP/K-NN	0.89	0.24	0.51	0.89	0.99
MLP/MLP	0.94	0.46	0.67	0.98	0.99
MLP/SVM	0.93	0.45	0.68	0.97	0.99
SVM	0.93	0.45	0.69	0.97	0.99
SVM/K-NN	0.91	0.22	0.48	0.89	0.99
SVM/MLP	0.96	0.43	0.54	0.98	0.99
SVM/SVM	0.93	0.45	0.69	0.96	0.99

J UNSW-NB15 Results

J.1 UNSW-NB15 Classification Data

Table 18: UNSW-NB15 Classification Data

	Class	TP	TN	FP	FN
KNN	Analysis	223	79699	1956	454
	Backdoor	37	81204	545	546
	DoS	1022	74140	4103	3067
	Exploits	3600	59893	11307	7532
	Fuzzers	1187	70162	6108	4875
	Generic	18145	61858	1603	726
	Reconnaissance	1381	76733	2103	2115
	Shellcode	26	81562	392	352
	Worms	0	82250	38	44
	Normal	22678	39454	5878	14322
MLP	Analysis	2	81639	16	675
	Backdoor	5	81711	38	578
	DoS	427	77489	754	3662
	Exploits	8905	65394	5806	2227
	Fuzzers	3511	73422	2848	2551
	Generic	18271	62979	482	600
	Reconnaissance	2397	78026	810	1099
	Shellcode	82	81748	206	296
	Worms	5	82283	5	39
	Normal	34931	42501	2831	2069
SVM	Analysis	1	81638	17	676
	Backdoor	4	81717	32	579
	DoS	800	75907	2336	3289
	Exploits	8658	65292	5908	2474
	Fuzzers	2860	74563	1707	3202
	Generic	18264	62874	587	607
	Reconnaissance	2517	77986	850	979
	Shellcode	94	81785	169	284
	Worms	2	82279	9	42
	Normal	34588	42403	2929	2412
KNN/KNN	Analysis	203	79670	1985	474
,	Backdoor	49	80915	834	534
	DoS	946	73280	4963	3143
	Exploits	4285	57926	13274	6847
	1				

	Fuzzers	1090	71343	4927	4972
	Generic	18133	62259	1202	738
	Reconnaissance	1287	78306	530	2209
	Shellcode	13	81899	55	365
	Worms	0	82288	0	44
	Normal	22678	39454	5878	14322
KNN/MLP	Analysis	1	81217	438	676
/	Backdoor	6	81707	42	577
	DoS	349	77379	864	3740
	Exploits	5073	42	7256	6059
	Fuzzers	63944	10210	7373	3590
	Generic	7256	23	205	686
	Reconnaissance	6059	19	1095	1717
	Shellcode	46	81712	242	332
	Worms	2	82286	2	42
	Normal	26790	35220	10112	10210
KNN/SVM	Analysis	1	81471	184	676
•	Backdoor	0	81747	2	583
	DoS	445	76114	2129	3644
	Exploits	5323	62928	8272	5809
	Fuzzers	1828	70357	5913	4234
	Generic	18159	63251	210	712
	Reconnaissance	1786	77821	1015	1710
	Shellcode	50	81841	113	328
	Worms	0	82288	0	44
	Normal	26790	35220	10112	10210
MLP/KNN	Analysis	235	79521	2134	442
	Backdoor	47	81069	680	536
	DoS	874	74930	3313	3215
	Exploits	5685	64706	6494	5447
	Fuzzers	1202	72640	3630	4860
	Generic	18124	62581	880	747
	Reconnaissance	1277	78108	728	2219
	Shellcode	20	81852	102	358
	Worms	0	82288	0	44
	Normal	34508	42933	2399	2492
MLP/MLP	Analysis	2	81640	15	675
	Backdoor	18	81641	108	565
	DoS	444	77396	847	3645
	Exploits	8978	65321	5879	2154
	Fuzzers	3750	73057	3213	2312

	Generic Reconnaissance	18304 2252	63142 77716	319 1120	567 1244
	Shellcode	99	81709	245	279
	Worms	5	82285	3	39
	Normal	34412	43013	2319	2588
MLP/SVM	Analysis	1	81640	15	676
	Backdoor	0	81747	2	583
	DoS	550	76358	1885	3539
	Exploits	9261	64580	6620	1871
	Fuzzers	3043	74085	2185	3019
	Generic	18231	63166	295	640
	Reconnaissance	2113	77833	1003	1383
	Shellcode	91	81829	125	287
	Worms	2	82288	0	42
	Normal	34398	42820	2512	2602
SVM/KNN	Analysis	235	79515	2140	442
	Backdoor	47	81063	686	536
	DoS	865	74938	3305	3224
	Exploits	5598	64417	6783	5534
	Fuzzers	1034	72506	3764	5028
	Generic	18129	62557	904	742
	Reconnaissance	1244	78106	730	2252
	Shellcode	20	81838	116	358
	Worms	0	82288	0	44
	Normal	33701	42301	3031	3299
SVM/MLP	Analysis	2	81637	18	675
,	Backdoor	22	81602	147	561
	DoS	746	76997	1246	3343
	Exploits	8511	66106	5094	2621
	Fuzzers	3380	72380	3890	2682
	Generic	18282	63069	392	589
	Reconnaissance	2264	77521	1315	1232
	Shellcode	91	81763	191	287
	Worms	5	82284	4	39
	Normal	33701	42301	3031	3299
SVM/SVM	Analysis	1	81639	16	677
,	Backdoor	3	81696	53	583
	DoS	656	75815	2428	4089
	Exploits	8647	64669	6531	11132
	Fuzzers	2880	74154	2116	6062
	Generic	18264	52841	620	18871

Reconnaissance	2350	77984	852	3496
Shellcode	114	81668	286	378
Worms	2	82267	21	44
Normal	33835	42675	2657	37000

J.2 UNSW-NB15 Precision

Table 19: UNSW-NB15 Classifiers Precision Table

	Analysis	Backdoor	DoS	Exploits	Fuzzers	Generic	Recon	Shellcode	Worms	Normal
k-NN	0.1	0.06	0.2	0.24	0.16	0.92	0.4	0.06	0	0.79
k-NN/k-NN	0.09	0.06	0.16	0.24	0.18	0.94	0.71	0.19	0	0.79
k-NN/MLP	0.01	0.13	0.34	0.4	0.25	0.99	0.6	0.16	0.27	0.73
k-NN/SVM	0.01	0	0.17	0.39	0.24	0.99	0.64	0.31	0	0.73
MLP	0.13	0.13	0.38	0.62	0.57	0.98	0.71	0.3	0.49	0.93
MLP/k-NN	0.1	0.06	0.21	0.46	0.25	0.95	0.63	0.16	0	0.94
MLP/MLP	0.11	0.13	0.38	0.61	0.52	0.98	0.68	0.32	0.53	0.94
MLP/SVM	0.06	0	0.23	0.58	0.59	0.98	0.68	0.44	0.1	0.93
SVM	0.06	0	0.23	0.59	0.6	0.99	0.69	0.44	0.1	0.9
SVM/k-NN	0.1	0.06	0.21	0.45	0.22	0.95	0.63	0.15	0	0.92
SVM/MLP	0.11	0.14	0.38	0.61	0.47	0.98	0.65	0.28	0.53	0.92
SVM/SVM	0.06	0	0.23	0.57	0.53	0.98	0.66	0.39	0.1	0.92

J.3 UNSW-NB15 Recall

Table 20: UNSW-NB15 Classifier Recall Table

	Analysis	Backdoor	DoS	Exploits	Fuzzers	Generic	Recon	Shellcode	Worms	Normal
k-NN	0.33	0.06	0.25	0.32	0.2	0.96	0.4	0.07	0	0.61
k-NN/k-NN	0.3	0.08	0.23	0.38	0.18	0.96	0.37	0.03	0	0.61
k-NN/MLP	0.01	0.03	0.13	0.43	0.4	0.96	0.52	0.14	0.03	0.72
k-NN/SVM	0	0	0.11	0.48	0.3	0.96	0.51	0.13	0	0.72
MLP	0.01	0.02	0.15	0.78	0.6	0.97	0.69	0.21	0.09	0.95
MLP/k-NN	0.35	0.08	0.21	0.51	0.2	0.96	0.36	0.05	0	0.94
MLP/MLP	0.01	0.02	0.16	0.79	0.61	0.97	0.65	0.26	0.1	0.93
MLP/SVM	0	0	0.13	0.83	0.5	0.97	0.62	0.24	0.05	0.93
SVM	0	0	0.13	0.82	0.43	0.96	0.6	0.23	0.05	0.92
SVM/k-NN	0.35	0.08	0.21	0.5	0.17	0.96	0.36	0.05	0	0.91
SVM/MLP	0.01	0.02	0.15	0.78	0.56	0.97	0.64	0.26	0.1	0.91
SVM/SVM	0	0	0.13	0.83	0.45	0.97	0.6	0.24	0.05	0.91

J.4 UNSW-NB15 f1-Score

Table 21: UNSW-NB15 Classifiers f1-Score Table

	Analysis	Backdoor	DoS	Exploits	Fuzzers	Generic	Recon	Shellcode	Worms	Normal
k-NN	0.16	0.06	0.22	0.28	0.18	0.94	0.4	0.07	0	0.69
k-NN/k-NN	0.14	0.07	0.19	0.3	0.18	0.95	0.48	0.06	0	0.69
k-NN/MLP	0.01	0.05	0.19	0.42	0.31	0.98	0.56	0.15	0.05	0.73
k-NN/SVM	0	0	0.13	0.43	0.26	0.98	0.57	0.18	0	0.73
MLP	0.02	0.03	0.21	0.69	0.58	0.97	0.7	0.25	0.15	0.94
MLP/k-NN	0.15	0.07	0.21	0.48	0.22	0.96	0.46	0.08	0	0.93
MLP/MLP	0.01	0.03	0.23	0.69	0.56	0.98	0.66	0.29	0.16	0.93
MLP/SVM	0	0	0.17	0.68	0.54	0.97	0.65	0.31	0.09	0.93
SVM	0	0	0.17	0.69	0.5	0.97	0.64	0.3	0.09	0.92
SVM/k-NN	0.15	0.07	0.21	0.48	0.19	0.96	0.45	0.08	0	0.91
SVM/MLP	0.01	0.04	0.22	0.68	0.51	0.98	0.64	0.27	0.17	0.91
SVM/SVM	0	0	0.17	0.68	0.49	0.97	0.63	0.3	0.09	0.91