

HEXNINJA AUDITS



Security Assessment
NFTPussies Token

May 26, 2022

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Audit Summary

This report has been prepared for NFTPussies Token on the Binance Smart Chain network. CFGNINJA provides both client-centered and user-centered examination of the smart contracts and their current status when applicable. This report represents the security assessment made to find issues and vulnerabilities on the source code along with the current liquidity and token holder statistics of the protocol.

A comprehensive examination has been performed, utilizing Cross Referencing, Static Analysis, In-House Security Tools, and line-by-line Manual Review.

The auditing process pays special attention to the following considerations:

- Testing the smart contracts against both common and uncommon attack vectors.
- Inspecting liquidity and holders statistics to inform the current status to both users and client when applicable.
- Assessing the codebase to ensure compliance with current best practices and industry standards.
- Verifying contract functions that allow trusted and/or untrusted actors to mint, lock, pause, and transfer assets.



Project Overview

Token Summary

| Parameter | Result |
|---------------|---|
| Address | 0x91D74E31A2734F4E519861aB9917048822f0B489 |
| Name | NFTPussies |
| Token Tracker | NFTPussies (PUSSIES) |
| Decimals | 18 |
| Supply | 1,000,000,000 |
| Platform | Binance Smart Chain |
| compiler | v0.8.11+commit.d7f03943 |
| Contract Name | NFTPussies |
| Optimization | Yes with 200 runs |
| LicenseType | MIT |
| Language | Solidity |
| Codebase | https://bscscan.com/token/0x91d74e31a2734f4e519861ab9917048822f0b489 |
| Payment Tx | 0xd9b38d4300acf731c8a394743053af9c15007bbd5052515040fb170f1c7e1c48 |



Project Overview

Risk Analysis Summary

| Parameter | Result |
|------------------|--------|
| Buy Tax | 5% |
| Sale Tax | 5% |
| Is honeypot? | Clean |
| Can edit tax? | Yes |
| Is anti whale? | No |
| Is blacklisted? | No |
| Is whitelisted? | No |
| Holders | Clean |
| Security Score | 96/100 |
| Auditor Score | 96/100 |
| Confidence Level | High |

The following quick summary has been added to the project overview, however there are more details about the audit and their results please read every details.



Main Contract Assessed

Contract Name

| Name | Contract | Live |
|------------|--|------|
| NFTPussies | Ox91D74E31A2734F4E519861aB9917048822f0B489 | Yes |

TestNet Contract Assessed

Contract Name

| Name | Contract | Live |
|------------|--|------|
| NFTPussies | 0xcAF7C57fEA887a267bD4d5B66401E4e6453B06d1 | Yes |

Solidity Code Provided

| SolID | File Sha-1 | FileName |
|-------|--|--------------|
| token | 01cd0df67f1f6d7ea35d01d20b865137c42b0069 | token.sol |
| token | cfe3ed784fcdabb3882972746147314de6c72fe7 | IPresale.sol |
| token | | |



Smart Contract Vulnerability Checks

| Vulnerability | Automatic Scan | Manual Scan | Result |
|---|----------------|-------------|---------------|
| Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain | Complete | Complete | Low / No Risk |
| Code With No Effects | Complete | Complete | Low / No Risk |
| Message call with hardcoded gas amount | Complete | Complete | Low / No Risk |
| Hash Collisions With Multiple Variable Length Arguments | Complete | Complete | Low / No Risk |
| Unexpected Ether balance | Complete | Complete | Low / No Risk |
| Presence of unused variables | Complete | Complete | Low / No Risk |
| Right-To-Left-Override control character (U+202E) | Complete | Complete | Low / No Risk |
| Typographical Error | Complete | Complete | Low / No Risk |
| DoS With Block Gas Limit | Complete | Complete | Low / No Risk |
| Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable | Complete | Complete | Low / No Risk |
| Insufficient Gas Griefing | Complete | Complete | Low / No Risk |
| Incorrect Inheritance Order | Complete | Complete | Low / No Risk |
| Write to Arbitrary Storage Location | Complete | Complete | Low / No Risk |
| Requirement Violation | Complete | Complete | Low / No Risk |
| Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks | Complete | Complete | Low / No Risk |



Mint Check

The Project Owners of NFTPussies does not have a mint function in the contract, owner cannot mint tokens after initial deploy

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The Project has a Total Supply of 1,000,000,000 and cannot mint any more than the Max Supply.

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Mint Notes:

Auditor Notes:

Project Owner Notes:



Owner can't mint new coins



Fees Check

The Project Owners of NFTPussies does not have the ability to set fees higher than 25% .

Team May have fees defined, however they dont have the ability to set those fees higher than 25%.

Tax Fee Notes:

Auditor Notes: Initial Tax 5% and cant be higher than 25%

Project Owner Notes: .



Fees can be changed up to a maximum of 25%



MaxTx Check

The Project Owners of NFTPussies does not has the ability to set max tx amount

The Team allow any investors to swap, transfer or sale their total amount if needed.

Project Has No MaxTX



Pause Trade Check

The Project Owners of NFTPussies Owner can pause trading but he can move tokens.

We recommend the team to only allow Open Trade and never use Stop Trade as this will be catastrophic for the project and investors.

We recommend the team to create a new contract without stop trade..


Pause Trade Notes:

Auditor Notes: Project Owner has the ability to pause trade

Project Owner Notes: My point of view would be that in case there is a security issue in the contract, vesting or generally anywhere in the platform which could lead to someone getting significant advantage we can pause trading and deal with it, so that we prevent loss of value/funds for the token.



Owner can pause trading



Contract Ownership

The contract ownership of NFTPussies is not currently renounced. The ownership of the contract grants special powers to the protocol creators, making them the sole addresses that can call sensible ownable functions that may alter the state of the protocol.

The current owner is the address `0xecdff6dc6965cde3a80f79c8b7f13f47073a3435` which can be viewed from:
[HERE](#)

The owner wallet has the power to call the functions displayed on the privileged functions chart below, if the owner wallet is compromised this privileges could be exploited.

We recommend the team to renounce ownership at the right timing if possible, or gradually migrate to a timelock with governing functionalities in respect of transparency and safety considerations.

We recommend the team to use a Multisignature Wallet if contract is not going to be renounced, this will give the ability to the team to have more control over the contract.

Liquidity Ownership

The token does not have liquidity at the moment of the audit, block `15164039`



KYC Information

The Project Onwers of NFTPussies has provided KYC Documentation.

KYC Certificated can be found on the Following:
[KYC Data](#)

KYC Information Notes:

Auditor Notes: Asked project owner about KYC.

Project Owner Notes: Customer is KYC with PinkSale



Mythx Security Summary Checks

| ID | Severity | Name | File | location |
|---------|----------|--|-----------|-----------|
| SWC-100 | Pass | Function Default Visibility | token.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-101 | Pass | Integer Overflow and Underflow. | token.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-102 | Pass | Outdated Compiler Version file. | token.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-103 | Low | A floating pragma is set. | token.sol | L: 5 C: 0 |
| SWC-104 | Pass | Unchecked Call Return Value. | token.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-105 | Pass | Unprotected Ether Withdrawal. | token.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-106 | Pass | Unprotected SELFDESTRUCT Instruction | token.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-107 | Pass | Read of persistent state following external call. | token.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-108 | Pass | State variable visibility is not set.. | token.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-109 | Pass | Uninitialized Storage Pointer. | token.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-110 | Low | Assert Violation. | token.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-111 | Pass | Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions. | token.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-112 | Pass | Delegate Call to Untrusted Callee. | token.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-113 | Low | Multiple calls are executed in the same transaction. | token.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |



| ID | Severity | Name | File | location |
|---------|----------|--|-----------|--------------|
| SWC-114 | Pass | Transaction Order Dependence. | token.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-115 | Pass | Authorization through tx.origin. | token.sol | L: 474 C: 15 |
| SWC-116 | Pass | A control flow decision is made based on The block.timestamp environment variable. | token.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-117 | Pass | Signature Malleability. | token.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-118 | Pass | Incorrect Constructor Name. | token.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-119 | Pass | Shadowing State Variables. | token.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-120 | Low | Potential use of block.number as source of randomness. | token.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-121 | Pass | Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks. | token.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-122 | Pass | Lack of Proper Signature Verification. | token.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-123 | Pass | Requirement Violation. | token.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-124 | Pass | Write to Arbitrary Storage Location. | token.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-125 | Pass | Incorrect Inheritance Order. | token.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-126 | Pass | Insufficient Gas Griefing. | token.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-127 | Pass | Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable. | token.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-128 | Pass | DoS With Block Gas Limit. | token.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |



| ID | Severity | Name | File | location |
|---------|----------|--|-----------|-----------|
| SWC-129 | Pass | Typographical Error. | token.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-130 | Pass | Right-To-Left-Override control character (U+202E). | token.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-131 | Pass | Presence of unused variables. | token.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-132 | Pass | Unexpected Ether balance. | token.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-133 | Pass | Hash Collisions with Multiple Variable Length Arguments. | token.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-134 | Pass | Message call with hardcoded gas amount. | token.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-135 | Pass | Code With No Effects (Irrelevant/Dead Code). | token.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-136 | Pass | Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain. | token.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |

We scan the contract for additional security issues using MYTHX and industry standard security scanning tool



Security Check Details Page

SWC-103 – Floating Pragma.

CWE-664: Improper Control of a Resource Through its Lifetime.

Description:

Contracts should be deployed with the same compiler version and flags that they have been tested with thoroughly. Locking the pragma helps to ensure that contracts do not accidentally get deployed using, for example, an outdated compiler version that might introduce bugs that affect the contract system negatively.

Remediation:

Lock the pragma version and also consider known bugs (<https://github.com/ethereum/solidity/releases>) for the compiler version that is chosen.

Pragma statements can be allowed to float when a contract is intended for consumption by other developers, as in the case with contracts in a library or EthPM package. Otherwise, the developer would need to manually update the pragma in order to compile locally.

References:

Ethereum Smart Contract Best Practices – Lock pragmas to specific compiler version.
SWC-110 – Assert Violation

CWE-670: Always-Incorrect Control Flow Implementation

Description:

The Solidity `assert()` function is meant to assert invariants. Properly functioning code should never reach a failing assert statement. A reachable assertion can mean one of two things:

- A bug exists in the contract that allows it to enter an invalid state;
- The assert statement is used incorrectly, e.g. to validate inputs.

Remediation:

Consider whether the condition checked in the `assert()` is actually an invariant. If not,



replace the `assert()` statement with a `require()` statement. If the exception is indeed caused by unexpected behaviour of the code, fix the underlying bug(s) that allow the assertion to be violated.

References:

The use of `revert()`, `assert()`, and `require()` in Solidity, and the new REVERT opcode in the EVM.

SWC-113 - DoS with Failed Call

CWE-703: Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions

Description:

External calls can fail accidentally or deliberately, which can cause a DoS condition in the contract. To minimize the damage caused by such failures, it is better to isolate each external call into its own transaction that can be initiated by the recipient of the call. This is especially relevant for payments, where it is better to let users withdraw funds rather than push funds to them automatically (this also reduces the chance of problems with the gas limit).

Remediation:

It is recommended to follow call best practices: Avoid combining multiple calls in a single transaction, especially when calls are executed as part of a loop. Always assume that external calls can fail. Implement the contract logic to handle failed calls

References:

ConsenSys Smart Contract Best Practices

SWC-120 - Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes

CWE-330: Use of Insufficiently Random Values

Description:

Solidity allows for ambiguous naming of state variables when inheritance is used. Contract A with a variable `x` could inherit contract B that also has a state variable `x` defined. This would result in two separate versions of `x`, one of them being accessed from contract A and the other one from contract B. In more complex contract systems this condition could go unnoticed and subsequently lead to security issues.



Shadowing state variables can also occur within a single contract when there are multiple definitions on the contract and function level.

Remediation:

Using commitment scheme, e.g. RANDAO. Using external sources of randomness via oracles, e.g. Oraclize. Note that this approach requires trusting in oracle, thus it may be reasonable to use multiple oracles. Using Bitcoin block hashes, as they are more expensive to mine.

References:

How can I securely generate a random number in my smart contract?)

When can BLOCKHASH be safely used for a random number? When would it be unsafe?

The Run smart contract.

SWC Information Notes:

Auditor Notes:


Project Owner Notes:



Call Graph and Inheritance


The contract for NFTPussies has the following call graph structure

The Project has a Total Supply of 1,000,000,000 and has the following inheritance



Top Token Holders

The contract for NFTPussies has the following top token holders



Privileged Functions (onlyOwner)

| Function Name | Parameters | Visibility |
|--------------------|--------------------------------|------------|
| renounceOwnership | none | public |
| transferOwnership | address newOwner | public |
| setBuyTax | tax uint256 | external |
| setSellTax | tax uint256 | external |
| setAllowedContract | _contract address, enable bool | external |
| setLiquidityPair | _contract address, enable bool | external |
| setIgnoreTax | _contract address, enable bool | external |
| setTrading | enable bool | external |
| setAntibotBlocks | blocks uint256 | external |
| rescueTokens | token address | external |



Important Notes To The Users:

- NFT Pussies team is very responsive, we have asked the team to do several revisions of their contract and they have made those improvements.
- The team currently have a KYC with PinkSale.
- Owner can't charge fees up to 25%.
- Owner can't set max tx amount.
- Owner can pause trading.
- No high-risk Exploits/Vulnerabilities Were Found in the Source Code.

Audit Passed



Social Media Checks

| Social Media | URL | Result |
|--------------|---|--------|
| Twitter | https://twitter.com/PussiesNft | Pass |
| Reddit | https://www.instagram.com/nft_pussies/ | Pass |
| Website | https://www.nftpussies.com/home | Pass |
| Telegram | https://t.me/NFT_Pussies_Community | Pass |

We recommend to have 3 or more social media sources including a completed working websites.

Social Media Information Notes:

Auditor Notes: undefined

Project Owner Notes:



Disclaimer

CFGNINJA has conducted an independent audit to verify the integrity of and highlight any vulnerabilities or errors, intentional or unintentional, that may be present in the codes that were provided for the scope of this audit. This audit report does not constitute agreement, acceptance or advocacy for the Project that was audited, and users relying on this audit report should not consider this as having any merit for financial advice in any shape, form or nature. The contracts audited do not account for any economic developments that may be pursued by the Project in question, and that the veracity of the findings thus presented in this report relate solely to the proficiency, competence, aptitude and discretion of our independent auditors, who make no guarantees nor assurance that the contracts are completely free of exploits, bugs, vulnerabilities or deprecation of technologies.

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