

# CFG NINJA AUDITS

Security Assessment

**KTULU Token** 

January 10, 2023





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# **Assessment Summary**

This report has been prepared for KTULU Token on the Ethereum network. CFGNINJA provides both client-centered and user-centered examination of the smart contracts and their current status when applicable. This report represents the security assessment made to find issues and vulnerabilities on the source code along with the current liquidity and token holder statistics of the protocol.

A comprehensive examination has been performed, utilizing Cross Referencing, Static Analysis, In-House Security Tools, and line-by-line Manual Review.

The auditing process pays special attention to the following considerations:

- Testing the smart contracts against both common and uncommon attack vectors.
- Inspecting liquidity and holders statistics to inform the current status to both users and client when applicable.
- Assessing the codebase to ensure compliance with current best practices and industry standards.
- Verifying contract functions that allow trusted and/or untrusted actors to mint, lock, pause, and transfer assets.
- Cross referencing contract structure and implementation against similar smart contracts produced by industry leaders
- Thorough line-by-line manual review of the entire codebase by industry experts.





# Technical Findings Summary

### **Classification of Risk**

| Severity      | Description  |
|---------------|--|
| Critical      | Risks are those that impact the safe functioning of a platform and must be addressed before launch. Users should not invest in any project with outstanding critical risks.            |
| Major         | Risks can include centralization issues and logical errors. Under specific circumstances, these major risks can lead to loss of funds and/or control of the project.                   |
| Medium        | Risks may not pose a direct risk to users' funds, but they can affect the overall functioning of a platform  |
| Minor         | Risks can be any of the above but on a smaller scale. They generally do not compromise the overall integrity of the Project, but they may be less efficient than other solutions.      |
| Informational | Errors are often recommended to improve the code's style or certain operations to fall within industry best practices. They usually do not affect the overall functioning of the code. |

### **Findings**

| Severity                        | Found | Pending | Resolved |
|---------------------------------|-------|---------|----------|
| Critical                        | 0     | 0       | 0        |
| Major                           | 0     | 0       | 0        |
| Medium                          | 0     | 0       | 0        |
| Minor                           | 0     | 0       | 0        |
| <ul><li>Informational</li></ul> | 0     | 0       | 0        |
| Total                           | 0     | 0       | 0        |





# **Project Overview**

## **Token Summary**

| Parameter     | Result   |
|---------------|--|
| Address       | Oxaa3ac37D7d29fB54CE464E612b02c0598E04298A                                       |
| Name          | KTULU  |
| Token Tracker | KTULU (\$KTL)  |
| Decimals      | 18   |
| Supply        | 1,000,000,000  |
| Platform      | Ethereum   |
| compiler      | v0.8.15+commit.e14f2714  |
| Contract Name | Ktulu  |
| Optimization  | Yes with 200 runs  |
| LicenseType   | MIT  |
| Language      | Solidity   |
| Codebase      | https://etherscan.io/address/0xaa3ac37D7d29fB54CE464E61<br>2b02c0598E04298A#code |
| Payment Tx    | Oxd65277598871f655086e89862fd5aa31bef8aa91dcdb076eb<br>01822db9b67f84d           |





# **Project Overview**

### Risk Analysis Summary

| Parameter        | Result |
|------------------|--------|
| Buy Tax          | 2%     |
| Sale Tax         | 2%     |
| Is honeypot?     | Clean  |
| Can edit tax?    | No     |
| Is anti whale?   | Yes    |
| Is blacklisted?  | No     |
| Is whitelisted?  | Yes    |
| Holders          | 170    |
| Confidence Level | Medium |

The following quick summary it's added to the project overview; however, there are more details about the audit and its results. Please read every detail.





# Main Contract Assessed Contract Name

| Name  | Contract                                   | Live |
|-------|--|------|
| KTULU | Oxaa3ac37D7d29fB54CE464E612bO2cO598E04298A | Yes  |

# TestNet Contract Assessed Contract Name

| Name  | Contract                                   | Live |
|-------|--|------|
| KTULU | Oxfaeab522C2095c70A8CE5D220D80F9Abd16431D4 | Yes  |

### **Solidity Code Provided**

| SollD | File Sha-1                              | FileName  |
|-------|---|-----------|
| Ktulu | 83e60c86224cde77cfb0b77e44434cc59e6ed5d | Ktulu.sol |





## **Mint Check**


The project owners of KTULU do not have a mint function in the contract, owner cannot mint tokens after initial deploy.

The Project has a Total Supply of 1,000,000,000,000 and cannot mint any more than the Max Supply.

Mint Notes:

**Auditor Notes:** 

**Project Owner Notes:** 









### **Fees Check**

The project owners of KTULU have the ability to set higher than 25%

We Recommend the team to create a new contract with fees restrictions to avoid any problems, as alternative the team can use multi signature wallet to ensure the project is safe from a potential fee increase.

**Tax Fee Notes:** 

Auditor Notes: The contract currently has 5% buy and 12% sale taxes, and cannot be set higher than 25%.

**Project Owner Notes:** 







# **Blacklist Check**

The project owners of KTULU do not have a blacklist function their contract.

The Project allow owners to transfer their tokens without any restrictions.

Token owner cannot blacklist the contract: Malicious or compromised owners can trap contracts relying on tokens with a blacklist.

**Blacklist Notes:** 

Auditor Notes: blacklist is set for those tx origin from early buy

**Project Owner Notes: undefined** 







## MaxTx Check

The Project Owners of KTULU can set max tx amount.

The ability to set MaxTx can be used as bad actor, this can limit the ability of investors to sale their tokens at any given time if is set too low..

We recommend the project to set MaxTx to Total Supply or simiar to avoid swap or transfer from failures

MaxTX Notes:

**Auditor Notes:** 

**Project Owner Notes:** 

Project Has MaxTX







# **Pause Trade Check**

The Project Owners of KTULU can stop or pause trading

We recommend the Team only allow Open Trade and never use Stop Trade, as this will be catastrophic for the Project and Investors.

We recommend the Team create a new contract without the stop trade function.

**Pause Trade Notes:** 

Auditor Notes: There is an Open Trade so holders cant trade until is enable.

**Project Owner Notes:** 

Owner can pause trading







# **Contract Ownership**

The contract ownership of KTULU has been renounced.

Having no owner means that all the ownable functions in the contract can not be called by anyone, this often leads to more trust on the project.







# **Liquidity Ownership**

The token does not have liquidity at the moment of the audit, block 23906970

If liquidity is unlocked, then the token developers can do what is infamously known as 'rugpull'. Once investors start buying token from the exchange, the liquidity pool will accumulate more and more coins of established value (e.g., ETH or BNB or Tether). This is because investors are basically sending these tokens of value to the exchange, to get the new token. Developers can withdraw this liquidity from the exchange, cash in all the value and run off with it. Liquidity is locked by renouncing the ownership of liquidity pool (LP) tokens for a fixed time period, by sending them to a time-lock smart contract. Without ownership of LP tokens, developers cannot get liquidity pool funds back. This provides confidence to the investors that the token developers will not run away with the liquidity money. It is now a standard practice that all token developers follow, and this is what really differentiates a scam coin from a real one.

### Read More





# **KYC Information**

### The Project Owners of KTULU is not KYC.

**KYC Information Notes:** 

**Auditor Notes:** 

**Project Owner Notes:** 







# Smart Contract Vulnerability Checks

| ID      | Severity | Name  | File      | location                         |
|---------|----------|---|-----------|----------------------------------|
| SWC-100 | Pass     | Function Default Visibility                       | Ktulu.sol | L: 0 C: 0                        |
| SWC-101 | Pass     | Integer Overflow and Underflow.                   | Ktulu.sol | L: 0 C: 0                        |
| SWC-102 | Pass     | Outdated Compiler<br>Version file.                | Ktulu.sol | L: 0 C: 0                        |
| SWC-103 | Pass     | A floating pragma is set.                         | Ktulu.sol | L: 0 C: 0                        |
| SWC-104 | Pass     | Unchecked Call Return<br>Value.                   | Ktulu.sol | L: 0 C: 0                        |
| SWC-105 | Pass     | Unprotected Ether<br>Withdrawal.                  | Ktulu.sol | L: 0 C: 0                        |
| SWC-106 | Pass     | Unprotected<br>SELFDESTRUCT<br>Instruction        | Ktulu.sol | L: 0 C: 0                        |
| SWC-107 | Pass     | Read of persistent state following external call. | Ktulu.sol | L: 0 C: 0                        |
| SWC-108 | Low      | State variable visibility is not set              | Ktulu.sol | L: 266 C:<br>12, L: 267<br>C: 12 |
| SWC-109 | Pass     | Uninitialized Storage<br>Pointer.                 | Ktulu.sol | L: 0 C: 0                        |
| SWC-110 | Pass     | Assert Violation.                                 | Ktulu.sol | L: 0 C: 0                        |
| SWC-111 | Pass     | Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions.             | Ktulu.sol | L: 0 C: 0                        |
| SWC-112 | Pass     | Delegate Call to<br>Untrusted Callee.             | Ktulu.sol | L: 0 C: 0                        |





| ID      | Severity | Name   | File      | location   |
|---------|----------|--|-----------|--|
| SWC-113 | Pass     | Multiple calls are executed in the same transaction.                               | Ktulu.sol | L: 0 C: 0  |
| SWC-114 | Pass     | Transaction Order<br>Dependence.   | Ktulu.sol | L: 0 C: 0  |
| SWC-115 | Low      | Authorization through tx.origin.   | Ktulu.sol | L: 530 C:<br>83, L: 531<br>C: 75   |
| SWC-116 | Pass     | A control flow decision is made based on The block.timestamp environment variable. | Ktulu.sol | L: 0 C: 0  |
| SWC-117 | Pass     | Signature Malleability.  | Ktulu.sol | L: 0 C: 0  |
| SWC-118 | Pass     | Incorrect Constructor<br>Name.   | Ktulu.sol | L: 0 C: 0  |
| SWC-119 | Pass     | Shadowing State<br>Variables.  | Ktulu.sol | L: 0 C: 0  |
| SWC-120 | Low      | Potential use of block.number as source of randonmness.                            | Ktulu.sol | L: 383 C:<br>7, L: 530<br>C: 96, L:<br>530 C:<br>151, L:<br>532 C: 7,<br>L: 533 C:<br>7, L: 617<br>C: 37 |
| SWC-121 | Pass     | Missing Protection against<br>Signature Replay Attacks.                            | Ktulu.sol | L: 0 C: 0  |
| SWC-122 | Pass     | Lack of Proper Signature<br>Verification.  | Ktulu.sol | L:0C:0   |
| SWC-123 | Pass     | Requirement Violation.   | Ktulu.sol | L: 0 C: 0  |
| SWC-124 | Pass     | Write to Arbitrary Storage<br>Location.  | Ktulu.sol | L;0C:0   |





| ID      | Severity | Name   | File      | location  |
|---------|----------|--|-----------|-----------|
| SWC-125 | Pass     | Incorrect Inheritance<br>Order.                                | Ktulu.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-126 | Pass     | Insufficient Gas Griefing.                                     | Ktulu.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-127 | Pass     | Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable.                    | Ktulu.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-128 | Pass     | DoS With Block Gas<br>Limit.                                   | Ktulu.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-129 | Pass     | Typographical Error.   | Ktulu.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-130 | Pass     | Right-To-Left-Override<br>control character (U<br>+202E).      | Ktulu.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-131 | Pass     | Presence of unused variables.                                  | Ktulu.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-132 | Pass     | Unexpected Ether balance.                                      | Ktulu.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-133 | Pass     | Hash Collisions with<br>Multiple Variable Length<br>Arguments. | Ktulu.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-134 | Pass     | Message call with hardcoded gas amount.                        | Ktulu.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-135 | Pass     | Code With No Effects (Irrelevant/Dead Code).                   | Ktulu.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-136 | Pass     | Unencrypted Private Data<br>On-Chain.                          | Ktulu.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |

We scan the contract for additional security issues using MYTHX and industry-standard security scanning tools.





# Smart Contract Vulnerability Details

SWC-108 - State Variable Default Visibility

### **CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards**

### **Description:**

Labeling the visibility explicitly makes it easier to catch incorrect assumptions about who can access the variable.

### Remediation:

Variables can be specified as being public, internal or private. Explicitly define visibility for all state variables.

#### References:

Ethereum Smart Contract Best Practices - Explicitly mark visibility in functions and state variables





# Smart Contract Vulnerability Details

SWC-115 - Authorization through tx.origin

**CWE-477: Use of Obsolete Function** 

### **Description:**

tx.origin is a global variable in Solidity which returns the address of the account that sent the transaction. Using the variable for authorization could make a contract vulnerable if an authorized account calls into a malicious contract. A call could be made to the vulnerable contract that passes the authorization check since tx.origin returns the original sender of the transaction which in this case is the authorized account.

### Remediation:

tx.origin should not be used for authorization. Use msg.sender instead.

#### References:

Solidity Documentation - tx.origin

Ethereum Smart Contract Best Practices - Avoid using tx.origin

SigmaPrime - Visibility.





# Smart Contract Vulnerability Details

# SWC-120 - Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes

**CWE-330: Use of Insufficiently Random Values** 

### **Description:**

Solidity allows for ambiguous naming of state variables when inheritance is used. Contract A with a variable x could inherit contract B that also has a state variable x defined. This would result in two separate versions of x, one of them being accessed from contract A and the other one from contract B. In more complex contract systems this condition could go unnoticed and subsequently lead to security issues.

Shadowing state variables can also occur within a single contract when there are multiple definitions on the contract and function level.

#### Remediation:

Using commitment scheme, e.g. RANDAO. Using external sources of randomness via oracles, e.g. Oraclize. Note that this approach requires trusting in oracle, thus it may be reasonable to use multiple oracles. Using Bitcoin block hashes, as they are more expensive to mine.

#### References:

How can I securely generate a random number in my smart contract?)

When can BLOCKHASH be safely used for a random number? When would it be unsafe?


The Run smart contract.





# **Inheritance**

The contract for KTULU has the following inheritance structure.







# **Smart Contract Advance Checks**

| ID       | Severity      | Name  | Result | Status    |
|----------|---------------|---|--------|-----------|
|          | •             |   |        |           |
| \$KTL-01 | Minor         | Potential Sandwich<br>Attacks.  | Fail   | Pending   |
| \$KTL-02 | Minor         | Function Visibility Optimization  | Pass   | Pending   |
| \$KTL-03 | Minor         | Lack of Input Validation.   | Pass   | Resolved  |
| \$KTL-04 | Major         | Centralized Risk In addLiquidity.   | Pass   | Pending   |
| \$KTL-05 | Major         | Missing Event Emission.   | Pass   | Pending   |
| \$KTL-06 | Minor         | Conformance with Solidity Naming Conventions.                                   | Pass   | Not Found |
| \$KTL-07 | Minor         | State Variables could be Declared Constant.                                     | Pass   | In-Review |
| \$KTL-08 | Major         | Dead Code Elimination.  | Pass   | Not-Found |
| \$KTL-09 | Major         | Third Party Dependencies.   | Pass   | Not Found |
| \$KTL-10 | Major         | Initial Token Distribution.   | Pass   | Pending   |
| \$KTL-11 | Critical      | distributeTokensBetween<br>Holders is a multisender<br>of tokens from contract. | Pass   | Resolved  |
| \$KTL-12 | Major         | Centralization Risks In The<br>X Role   | Pass   | Not Found |
| \$KTL-13 | Informational | Extra Gas Cost For User   | Pass   | Pending   |
| \$KTL-14 | Informational | Unnecessary Use Of<br>SafeMath  | Pass   | Pending   |





### **\$KTL-01 | Potential Sandwich Attacks.**

| Category | Severity | Location          | Status  |  |
|----------|----------|-------------------|---------|--|
| Security | Minor    | Ktulu.sol: 742,13 | Pending |  |

### **Description**

A sandwich attack might happen when an attacker observes a transaction swapping tokens or adding liquidity without setting restrictions on slippage or minimum output amount. The attacker can manipulate the exchange rate by frontrunning (before the transaction being attacked) a transaction to purchase one of the assets and make profits by back running (after the transaction being attacked) a transaction to sell the asset. The following functions are called without setting restrictions on slippage or minimum output amount, so transactions triggering these functions are vulnerable to sandwich attacks, especially when the input amount is large:

- swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens()
- addLiquidityETH()

#### Remediation

We recommend setting reasonable minimum output amounts, instead of 0, based on token prices when calling the aforementioned functions.

#### Referrences:

What Are Sandwich Attacks in DeFi – and How Can You Avoid Them?.





# **Social Media Checks**

| Social<br>Media | URL   | Result |
|-----------------|---|--------|
| Twitter         | https://twitter.com/TitanKtulu  | Pass   |
| Other           | https://discord.gg/mZ8HPE7xVc, https://medium.com/@titan_68262, https://www.youtube.com/@ktuluerc20 | Pass   |
| Website         | https://ktu-lu.com/   | Pass   |
| Telegram        | https://t.me/ktuluerc20   | Pass   |

We recommend to have 3 or more social media sources including a completed working websites.

**Social Media Information Notes:** 

**Auditor Notes: undefined** 

**Project Owner Notes:** 







## **Assessment Results**

### **Score Results**

| Review              | Score  |
|---------------------|--------|
| Overall Score       | 82/100 |
| Auditor Score       | 85/100 |
| Review by Section   | Score  |
| Manual Scan Score   | 22/35  |
| SWC Scan Score      | 34/37  |
| Advance Check Score | 26 /28 |

The Following Score System Has been Added to this page to help understand the value of the audit, the maximun score is 100, however to attain that value the project most pass and provide all the data needed for the assessment. Our Passing Score has been changed to 80 Points, if a project does not attain 80% is an automatic failure. Read our notes and final assessment below.

### **Audit Passed**







### **Assessment Results**

### **Important Notes:**

- Contract has taxes up to 2%.
- Owner can't set max tx amount.
- No high-risk Exploits/Vulnerabilities Were Found in the Source Code.
- Owner has provided the link to the ownership renounce: https://etherscan.io/tx/0x9eccc3c1e1bc7aa3596e697943b075308d3249909435a29ec728e73128f5dd12

# Auditor Score =85 Audit Passed







# **Appendix**

### **Finding Categories**

### **Centralization / Privilege**

Centralization / Privilege findings refer to either feature logic or implementation of components that actagainst the nature of decentralization, such as explicit ownership or specialized access roles incombination with a mechanism to relocate funds.

### **Gas Optimization**

Gas Optimization findings do not affect the functionality of the code but generate different, more optimalEVM opcodes resulting in a reduction on the total gas cost of a transaction.

### **Logical Issue**

Logical Issue findings detail a fault in the logic of the linked code, such as an incorrect notion on howblock.timestamp works.

### **Control Flow**

Control Flow findings concern the access control imposed on functions, such as owneronly functionsbeing invoke-able by anyone under certain circumstances.

### **Volatile Code**

Volatile Code findings refer to segments of code that behave unexpectedly on certain edge cases that mayresult in a vulnerability.

### **Coding Style**

Coding Style findings usually do not affect the generated byte-code but rather comment on how to makethe codebase more legible and, as a result, easily maintainable.

### **Inconsistency**

Inconsistency findings refer to functions that should seemingly behave similarly yet contain different code, such as a constructor assignment imposing different require statements on the input variables than a setterfunction.

### **Coding Best Practices**

ERC 20 Conding Standards are a set of rules that each developer should follow to ensure the code meet a set of creterias and is readable by all the developers.





### Disclaimer

CFGNINJA has conducted an independent security assessment to verify the integrity of and highlight any vulnerabilities or errors, intentional or unintentional, that may be present in the reviewed code for the scope of this assessment. This report does not constitute agreement, acceptance, or advocation for the Project, and users relying on this report should not consider this as having any merit for financial advice in any shape, form, or nature. The contracts audited do not account for any economic developments that the Project in question may pursue, and the veracity of the findings thus presented in this report relate solely to the proficiency, competence, aptitude, and discretion of our independent auditors, who make no guarantees nor assurance that the contracts are entirely free of exploits, bugs, vulnerabilities or deprecation of technologies.

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