

CFG NINJA AUDITS

Security Assessment

Archie Token Token

May 19, 2023

Audit Status: Fail

Audit Edition: Advance

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Assessment Summary

This report has been prepared for Archie Token Token on the Binance Smart Chain network. CFGNINJA provides both client-centered and user-centered examination of the smart contracts and their current status when applicable. This report represents the security assessment made to find issues and vulnerabilities on the source code along with the current liquidity and token holder statistics of the protocol.

A comprehensive examination has been performed, utilizing Cross Referencing, Static Analysis, In-House Security Tools, and line-by-line Manual Review.

The auditing process pays special attention to the following considerations:

- Testing the smart contracts against both common and uncommon attack vectors.
- Inspecting liquidity and holders statistics to inform the current status to both users and client when applicable.
- Assessing the codebase to ensure compliance with current best practices and industry standards.
- Verifying contract functions that allow trusted and/or untrusted actors to mint, lock, pause, and transfer assets.
- Cross referencing contract structure and implementation against similar smart contracts produced by industry leaders
- Thorough line-by-line manual review of the entire codebase by industry experts.





Project Overview

Token Summary

| Parameter | Result |
|---------------|---|
| Address | 0xD73c99e818aa0881C1Ac2641cEE6f570D8D79Eb4 |
| Name | Archie Token |
| Token Tracker | Archie Token (ARCHIE) |
| Decimals | 9 |
| Supply | 1,000,000,000 |
| Platform | Binance Smart Chain |
| compiler | v0.8.4+commit.c7e474f2 |
| Contract Name | Archie_Token |
| Optimization | Yes with 200 runs |
| LicenseType | MIT |
| Language | Solidity |
| Codebase | https://bscscan.com/address/0xD73c99e818aa0881C1Ac2641c EE6f570D8D79Eb4#code |
| Payment Tx | Ox |





Project Overview

Risk Analysis Summary

The following quick summary it's added to the project overview; however, there are more details about the audit and its results. Please read every detail.





Project Overview

Simulation Summary

| Parameter | Result |
|-----------------------|----------|
| Transfer From Owner | Pass |
| Transfer From Holder | Pass |
| Add Liquidity | Pass |
| RemoveLiquidity | Pass |
| Buy from Owner | Pass |
| Buy from Holder | Pass |
| Sale from Owner | Pass |
| Sale from Holder | Pass |
| Remove Liquidity | Pass |
| SwapAndLiquify | Pass |
| SwapAndSale w/Fee | Pass |
| SwapAndSale TX | |
| SwapAndSaleNoFee | Pass |
| SwapAndSale No/Fee TX | |
| ExcludeFromFees | Pass |
| LaunchPad | PinkSale |





| Parameter | Result |
|------------------|--------|
| Pool Creation | Pass |
| Pool Creation TX | |
| Pool Finalize | Pass |
| Pool Finalize TX | |
| Enable | Pass |

The following quick summary it's added to the project overview; however, there are more details about the audit and its results. Please read every detail.







Main Contract Assessed Contract Name

| Name | Contract | Live |
|--------------|--|------|
| Archie Token | 0xD73c99e818aa0881C1Ac2641cEE6f570D8D79Eb4 | Yes |

TestNet Contract was Not Assessed

Solidity Code Provided

| SoliD | File Sha-1 | FileName |
|--------|--|--------------|
| Archie | 9e66a5cfbfdbeae64e0293bfd513d54098702e4f | Archiev2.sol |
| Archie | | |
| Archie | | |
| Archie | | |





Mint Check

The project owners of Archie Token do not have a mint function in the contract, owner cannot mint tokens after initial deploy.

The Project has a Total Supply of 1,000,000,000 and cannot mint any more than the Max Supply.

Mint Notes:

Auditor Notes:







Fees Check

The project owners of Archie Token do not have the ability to set fees higher than 10.

The team May have fees defined; however, they can't set those fees higher than 10 or may not be able to configure the same.

Tax Fee Notes:

Auditor Notes: The contract currently has 10% buy and 10% sale taxes.







Blacklist Check

The project owners of Archie Token have the ability to Blacklist holders from transferring their tokens.

We recommend the Team be careful with a blacklist function as this can prevent a holder from buying/ selling/transferring their assets. Malicious or compromised owners can trap contracts relying on tokens with a blacklist

Blacklist Notes:

Auditor Notes:.







MaxTx Check

The Project Owners of Archie Token can set max tx amount.

The ability to set MaxTx can be used as bad actor, this can limit the ability of investors to sale their tokens at any given time if is set too low..

We recommend the project to set MaxTx to Total Supply or simiar to avoid swap or transfer from failures

MaxTX Notes:

Auditor Notes:

Project Owner Notes:

Project Has MaxTX







Pause Trade Check

The Project Owners of Archie Token can stop or pause trading

We recommend the Team only allow Open Trade and never use Stop Trade, as this will be catastrophic for the Project and Investors.

We recommend the Team create a reconsider doing it without the stop trade function.

Pause Trade Notes:

Auditor Notes:

Project Owner Notes:.

Owner can pause trading







Contract Ownership

The contract ownership of Archie Token is not currently renounced. The ownership of the contract grants special powers to the protocol creators, making them the sole addresses that can call sensible ownable functions that may alter the state of the protocol.

The current owner is the address

0x0f7b55e157f91528f1ee480727785f68ffdf8627

which can be viewed:

HERE

The owner wallet has the power to call the functions displayed on the privileged functions chart below, if the owner's wallet is compromised, they could exploit these privileges.

We recommend the team renounce ownership at the right time, if possible, or gradually migrate to a timelock with governing functionalities regarding transparency and safety considerations.

We recommend the team use a Multisignature Wallet if the contract is not going to be renounced; this will give the team more control over the contract.





Liquidity Ownership

The token does not have liquidity at the moment of the audit, block 28288508

If liquidity is unlocked, then the token developers can do what is infamously known as 'rugpull'. Once investors start buying token from the exchange, the liquidity pool will accumulate more and more coins of established value (e.g., ETH or BNB or Tether). This is because investors are basically sending these tokens of value to the exchange, to get the new token. Developers can withdraw this liquidity from the exchange, cash in all the value and run off with it. Liquidity is locked by renouncing the ownership of liquidity pool (LP) tokens for a fixed time period, by sending them to a time-lock smart contract. Without ownership of LP tokens, developers cannot get liquidity pool funds back. This provides confidence to the investors that the token developers will not run away with the liquidity money. It is now a standard practice that all token developers follow, and this is what really differentiates a scam coin from a real one.

Read More








Call Graph

The contract for Archie Token has the following call graph structure.







KYC Information

The Project Owners of Archie Token have provided KYC Documentation.

KYC Certificated can be found on the Following: KYC Data

KYC Information Notes:

Auditor Notes: KYC to be completed by PinkSale, project will be a SAFU Project.







Smart Contract Vulnerability Checks

The Smart Contract Weakness Classification Registry (SWC Registry) is an implementation of the weakness classification scheme proposed in EIP-1470. It is loosely aligned to the terminologies and structure used in the Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) while overlaying a wide range of weakness variants that are specific to smart contracts.

| ID | Severity | Name | File | location |
|---------|----------|---|--------------|----------------|
| SWC-100 | Pass | Function Default Visibility | Archiev2.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-101 | Pass | Integer Overflow and Underflow. | Archiev2.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-102 | Pass | Outdated Compiler Version file. | Archiev2.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-103 | Fail | A floating pragma is set. | Archiev2.sol | L:7C:0 |
| SWC-104 | Pass | Unchecked Call Return Value. | Archiev2.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-105 | Pass | Unprotected Ether Withdrawal. | Archiev2.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-106 | Pass | Unprotected SELFDESTRUCT Instruction | Archiev2.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-107 | Pass | Read of persistent state following external call. | Archiev2.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-108 | Fail | State variable visibility is not set | Archiev2.sol | L: 333 C: 9 |
| SWC-109 | Pass | Uninitialized Storage Pointer. | Archiev2.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-110 | Pass | Assert Violation. | Archiev2.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |





| ID | Severity | Name | File | location |
|---------|----------|--|--------------|-----------|
| SWC-111 | Pass | Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions. | Archiev2.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-112 | Pass | Delegate Call to Untrusted Callee. | Archiev2.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-113 | Pass | Multiple calls are executed in the same transaction. | Archiev2.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-114 | Pass | Transaction Order Dependence. | Archiev2.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-115 | Pass | Authorization through tx.origin. | Archiev2.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-116 | Pass | A control flow decision is made based on The block.timestamp environment variable. | Archiev2.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-117 | Pass | Signature Malleability. | Archiev2.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-118 | Pass | Incorrect Constructor Name. | Archiev2.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-119 | Pass | Shadowing State Variables. | Archiev2.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-120 | Pass | Potential use of block.number as source of randonmness. | Archiev2.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-121 | Pass | Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks. | Archiev2.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-122 | Pass | Lack of Proper Signature Verification. | Archiev2.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-123 | Pass | Requirement Violation. | Archiev2.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-124 | Pass | Write to Arbitrary Storage Location. | Archiev2.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-125 | Pass | Incorrect Inheritance Order. | Archiev2.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |



| ID | Severity | Name | File | location |
|---------|----------|--|--------------|-----------|
| SWC-126 | Pass | Insufficient Gas Griefing. | Archiev2.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-127 | Pass | Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable. | Archiev2.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-128 | Pass | DoS With Block Gas Limit. | Archiev2.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-129 | Pass | Typographical Error. | Archiev2.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-130 | Pass | Right-To-Left-Override control character (U +202E). | Archiev2.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-131 | Pass | Presence of unused variables. | Archiev2.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-132 | Pass | Unexpected Ether balance. | Archiev2.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-133 | Pass | Hash Collisions with Multiple Variable Length Arguments. | Archiev2.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-134 | Pass | Message call with hardcoded gas amount. | Archiev2.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-135 | Pass | Code With No Effects (Irrelevant/Dead Code). | Archiev2.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-136 | Pass | Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain. | Archiev2.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |

We scan the contract for additional security issues using MYTHX and industry-standard security scanning tools.





Smart Contract Vulnerability Details

SWC-103 - Floating Pragma.

| CWE-664: Improper Control of a Resource Throu | gh its |
|---|--------|
| Lifetime. | |

References:

Description:

Contracts should be deployed with the same compiler version and flags that they have been tested with thoroughly. Locking the pragma helps to ensure that contracts do not accidentally get deployed using, for example, an outdated compiler version that might introduce bugs that affect the contract system negatively.

Remediation:

Lock the pragma version and also consider known bugs (https://github.com/ethereum/solidity/releases) for the compiler version that is chosen.

Pragma statements can be allowed to float when a contract is intended for consumption by other developers, as in the case with contracts in a library or EthPM package. Otherwise, the developer would need to manually update the pragma in order to compile locally.

References:

Ethereum Smart Contract Best Practices - Lock pragmas to specific compiler version.





Smart Contract Vulnerability Details

SWC-108 - State Variable Default Visibility

CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards

Description:

Labeling the visibility explicitly makes it easier to catch incorrect assumptions about who can access the variable.

Remediation:

Variables can be specified as being public, internal or private. Explicitly define visibility for all state variables.

References:

Ethereum Smart Contract Best Practices - Explicitly mark visibility in functions and state variables





Inheritance

The contract for Archie Token has the following inheritance structure.





Privileged Functions (onlyOwner)

Please Note if the contract is Renounced none of this functions can be executed.

| Function Name | Parameters | Visibility |
|---------------------------|------------------|------------|
| renounceOwnership | | Public |
| transferOwnership | address newOwner | Public |
| setSwapTokensAtAm ount | | External |
| changeMarketingWall et | | External |
| excludeFromFees | | External |
| claimStuckTokens | | External |





Smart Contract Advance Checks

| ID | Severity | Name | Result | Status |
|-----------|---------------|--|--------|-----------|
| ARCHIE-01 | Minor | Potential Sandwich Attacks. | Pass | Not-Found |
| ARCHIE-02 | Minor | Function Visibility Optimization | Fail | Pending |
| ARCHIE-03 | Minor | Lack of Input Validation. | Fail | Pending |
| ARCHIE-04 | Major | Centralized Risk In addLiquidity. | Fail | Pending |
| ARCHIE-05 | Minor | Missing Event Emission. | Fail | Pending |
| ARCHIE-06 | Minor | Conformance with Solidity Naming Conventions. | Pass | Not-found |
| ARCHIE-07 | Minor | State Variables could be Declared Constant. | Pass | Not-Found |
| ARCHIE-08 | Minor | Dead Code Elimination. | Pass | Not-Found |
| ARCHIE-09 | Major | Third Party Dependencies. | Pass | Not-Found |
| ARCHIE-10 | Major | Initial Token Distribution. | Fail | Pending |
| ARCHIE-11 | Major | Complexity on the tax calculations. | Pass | Not-Found |
| ARCHIE-12 | Major | Centralization Risks In The X Role | Pass | Not-Found |
| ARCHIE-13 | Informational | Extra Gas Cost For User | Fail | Pending |
| ARCHIE-14 | Medium | Unnecessary Use Of SafeMath | Fail | Rejected |
| ARCHIE-15 | Medium | Symbol Length Limitation due to Solidity Naming Standards. | Pass | Not-Found |





| ID | Severity | Name | Result | Status |
|-----------|---------------|--|--------|-----------|
| ARCHIE-16 | Medium | Invalid collection of Taxes during Transfer. | Pass | Not-Found |
| ARCHIE-17 | Informational | Conformance to numeric notation best practice. | Pass | Not-Found |
| ARCHIE-18 | Informational | Enable Trade and Exclude Exist to create a whitelist. | Fail | Pending |





ARCHIE-02 | Function Visibility Optimization.

| Category | Severity | Location | Status |
|---------------------|----------|---------------------------|---------|
| Gas Optimization | i Minor | Archiev2.sol: L: 333 C: 9 | Pending |

Description

The following functions are declared as public and are not invoked in any of the contracts contained within the projects scope:

| Function Name | Parameters | Visibility |
|------------------|------------|------------|
| inSwapAndLiquify | | internal |

The functions that are never called internally within the contract should have external visibility

Remediation

We advise that the function's visibility specifiers are set to external, and the array-based arguments change their data location from memory to calldata, optimizing the gas cost of the function.

References:

external vs public best practices.





ARCHIE-03 | Lack of Input Validation.

| Category | y Severity | Location | Status | |
|------------------|------------|----------------------|---------|--|
| Volatile Code | Minor | Archiev2.sol: 912,14 | Pending | |

Description

The given input is missing the check for the non-zero address.

The given input is missing the check for the setswapAndLiquifyEnabled, setmarketingwallet, setmaxTxAmount,setmaxwalletamount, setnumTokensSellToAddToLiquidity,setAutomatedMarketMakerPairs, and rest of only owner are missing required function.

Remediation

We advise the client to add the check for the passed-in values to prevent unexpected errors as below:

```
require(receiver != address(0), "Receiver is the zero address");
...
require(value X limitation, "Your not able to do this function");
```

We also recommend customer to review the following function that is missing a required validation. setswapAndLiquifyEnabled, setmarketingwallet, setmaxTxAmount,setmaxwalletamount, setnumTokensSellToAddToLiquidity,setAutomatedMarketMakerPairs, and rest of only owner are missing required function.





ARCHIE-04 | Centralized Risk In addLiquidity.

| Category | Severity | Location | Status |
|-----------------|----------|----------------------|---------|
| Coding Style | Major | Archiev2.sol: 967,13 | Pending |

Description

uniswapV2Router.addLiquidityETH{value: ethAmount}(address(this), tokenAmount, 0, 0, owner(), block.timestamp);

The addLiquidity function calls the uniswapV2Router.addLiquidityETH function with the to address specified as owner() for acquiring the generated LP tokens from the ARCHIE-WBNB pool.

As a result, over time the _owner address will accumulate a significant portion of LP tokens. If the _owner is an EOA (Externally Owned Account), mishandling of its private key can have devastating consequences to the project as a whole.

Remediation

We advise the to address of the uniswapV2Router.addLiquidityETH function call to be replaced by the contract itself, i.e. address(this), and to restrict the management of the LP tokens within the scope of the contract's business logic. This will also protect the LP tokens from being stolen if the _owner account is compromised. In general, we strongly recommend centralized privileges or roles in the protocol to be improved via a decentralized mechanism or via smart-contract based accounts with enhanced security practices, f.e. Multisignature wallets.

- 1. Indicatively, here are some feasible solutions that would also mitigate the potential risk:
- 2. Time-lock with reasonable latency, i.e. 48 hours, for awareness on privileged operations;
- 3. Assignment of privileged roles to multi-signature wallets to prevent single point of failure due to the private key;

Introduction of a DAO / governance / voting module to increase transparency and user involvement

Project Action

owner is adding liquidity.





ARCHIE-05 | Missing Event Emission.

| Category | Severity | Location | Status | |
|------------------|----------|-----------------------|---------|--|
| Volatile Code | Minor | Archiev2.sol: 601, 14 | Pending | |

Description

Detected missing events for critical arithmetic parameters. There are functions that have no event emitted, so it is difficult to track off-chain changes. The linked code does not create an event for the transfer.

Remediation

Emit an event for critical parameter changes. It is recommended emitting events for the sensitive functions that are controlled by centralization roles.





ARCHIE-10 | Initial Token Distribution.

| Category | Severity | Location | Status |
|-------------------------------|----------|----------------------|---------|
| Centralization / Privilege | Major | Archiev2.sol: 395,13 | Pending |

Description

All of the Archie Token tokens are sent to the contract deployer when deploying the contract. This could be a centralization risk as the deployer can distribute tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community.

Remediation

We recommend the team to be transparent regarding the initial token distribution process, and the team shall make enough efforts to restrict the access of the private key.

Project Action

emit Transfer(address(0), owner, _totalSupply);





ARCHIE-13 | Extra Gas Cost For User.

| Category | Severity | Location | Status |
|------------------|-----------------|-----------------------|---------|
| Logical Issue | 1 Informational | Archiev2.sol: 560, 13 | Pending |

Description

The user may trigger a tax distribution during the transfer process, which will cost a lot of gas and it is unfair to let a single user bear it.

Remediation

We advise the client to make the owner responsible for the gas costs of the tax distribution.

Project Action

is declared public





ARCHIE-14 | Unnecessary Use Of SafeMath

| (| Category | Severity | Location | Status |
|---|-----------------|----------|--------------------|----------|
| | _ogical ssue | Medium | Archiev2.sol: 19,9 | Rejected |

Description

The SafeMath library is used unnecessarily. With Solidity compiler versions 0.8.0 or newer, arithmetic operations

will automatically revert in case of integer overflow or underflow.

library SafeMath {

An implementation of SafeMath library is found.

using SafeMath for uint256;

SafeMath library is used for uint256 type in contract.

Remediation

We advise removing the usage of SafeMath library and using the built-in arithmetic operations provided by the

Solidity programming language

Project Action

Everyone recommends the safe math because if there is any type of integers underflow or overflow, it prevents them and stops them and shows the error message. Which will help the user to understand that there is any kind of underflow of tokens in his wallets.





ARCHIE-18 | Enable Trade and Exclude from fees exist.

| Category | Severity | Location | Status |
|------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------|---------|
| Logical Issue | Informational | Archiev2.sol: 799, 13 | Pending |

Description

Enable Trade is presend on the following contract and when combined with Exclude from fees it can be considered a whitelist process, this will allow anyone to trade before others and can represent and issue for the holders.

Remediation

We recommend the project owner to carefully review this function and avoid problems when performing both actions.

Project Action





Technical Findings Summary

Classification of Risk

| Severity | Description |
|---------------------------------|--|
| Critical | Risks are those that impact the safe functioning of a platform and must be addressed before launch. Users should not invest in any project with outstanding critical risks. |
| Major | Risks can include centralization issues and logical errors. Under specific circumstances, these major risks can lead to loss of funds and/or control of the project. |
| Medium | Risks may not pose a direct risk to users' funds, but they can affect the overall functioning of a platform |
| Minor | Risks can be any of the above but on a smaller scale. They generally do not compromise the overall integrity of the Project, but they may be less efficient than other solutions. |
| Informational | Errors are often recommended to improve the code's style or certain operations to fall within industry best practices. They usually do not affect the overall functioning of the code. |

Findings

| Severity | Found | Pending | Resolved |
|---------------------------------|-------|---------|----------|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Major | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Minor | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| Informational | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| Total | 8 | 0 | 0 |





Social Media Checks

| Social Media | URL | Result |
|-----------------|---------------------------------|--------|
| Twitter | https://twitter.com/ArchieNeko_ | Pass |
| Other | https://discord.gg/bKxNt6Ku3j | Pass |
| Website | https://Archietoken.lo | Pass |
| Telegram | https://t.me/+25V5is_WBGc4N2Zh | Pass |

We recommend to have 3 or more social media sources including a completed working websites.

Social Media Information Notes:

Auditor Notes: undefined







Assessment Results

Score Results

| Review | Score |
|---------------------|--------|
| Overall Score | 77/100 |
| Auditor Score | 70/100 |
| Review by Section | Score |
| Manual Scan Score | 36/53 |
| SWC Scan Score | 35/37 |
| Advance Check Score | 6/19 |

The Following Score System Has been Added to this page to help understand the value of the audit, the maximun score is 100, however to attain that value the project most pass and provide all the data needed for the assessment. Our Passing Score has been changed to 80 Points, if a project does not attain 80% is an automatic failure. Read our notes and final assessment below.

Audit Fail







Assessment Results

Important Notes:

- No Issues or Vulnerabilities found.
- Project owner rejected changes.
- All onlyOwner functions are missing emits and requirements.

Auditor Score =70 Audit Fail







Appendix

Finding Categories

Centralization / Privilege

Centralization / Privilege findings refer to either feature logic or implementation of components that actagainst the nature of decentralization, such as explicit ownership or specialized access roles incombination with a mechanism to relocate funds.

Gas Optimization

Gas Optimization findings do not affect the functionality of the code but generate different, more optimalEVM opcodes resulting in a reduction on the total gas cost of a transaction.

Logical Issue

Logical Issue findings detail a fault in the logic of the linked code, such as an incorrect notion on howblock.timestamp works.

Control Flow

Control Flow findings concern the access control imposed on functions, such as owneronly functionsbeing invoke-able by anyone under certain circumstances.

Volatile Code

Volatile Code findings refer to segments of code that behave unexpectedly on certain edge cases that mayresult in a vulnerability.

Coding Style

Coding Style findings usually do not affect the generated byte-code but rather comment on how to makethe codebase more legible and, as a result, easily maintainable.

Inconsistency

Inconsistency findings refer to functions that should seemingly behave similarly yet contain different code, such as a constructor assignment imposing different require statements on the input variables than a setterfunction.

Coding Best Practices

ERC 20 Conding Standards are a set of rules that each developer should follow to ensure the code meet a set of creterias and is readable by all the developers.





Disclaimer

CFGNINJA has conducted an independent security assessment to verify the integrity of and highlight any vulnerabilities or errors, intentional or unintentional, that may be present in the reviewed code for the scope of this assessment. This report does not constitute agreement, acceptance, or advocation for the Project, and users relying on this report should not consider this as having any merit for financial advice in any shape, form, or nature. The contracts audited do not account for any economic developments that the Project in question may pursue, and the veracity of the findings thus presented in this report relate solely to the proficiency, competence, aptitude, and discretion of our independent auditors, who make no guarantees nor assurance that the contracts are entirely free of exploits, bugs, vulnerabilities or deprecation of technologies.

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