



## **Table of Contents**

### 1 Audit Summary

### 2 Project Overview

- 2.1 Token Summary
- 2.2 Risk Analysis Summary
- 2.3 Main Contract Assessed

### 3 Smart Contract Risk Checks

- 3.1 Mint Check
- 3.2 Fees Check
- 3.3 Blacklist Check
- 3.4 MaxTx Check
- 3.5 Pause Trade Check
- 4 Contract Ownership
- **5 Liquidity Ownership**
- 6 KYC Check

### 7 Smart Contract Vulnerability Checks

- 7.1 Smart Contract Vulnerability Details
- 7.2 Smart Contract Inheritance Details
- 7.3 Smart Contract Privileged Functions
- 8 Assessment Results and Notes(Important)
- 9 Social Media Check(Informational)
- 10 Technical Findings Summary
- 11 Disclaimer







# **Assessment Summary**

This report has been prepared for Lunar Token on the Binance Smart Chain network. CFGNINJA provides both client-centered and user-centered examination of the smart contracts and their current status when applicable. This report represents the security assessment made to find issues and vulnerabilities on the source code along with the current liquidity and token holder statistics of the protocol.

A comprehensive examination has been performed, utilizing Cross Referencing, Static Analysis, In-House Security Tools, and line-by-line Manual Review.

The auditing process pays special attention to the following considerations:

- Testing the smart contracts against both common and uncommon attack vectors.
- Inspecting liquidity and holders statistics to inform the current status to both users and client when applicable.
- Assessing the codebase to ensure compliance with current best practices and industry standards.
- Verifying contract functions that allow trusted and/or untrusted actors to mint, lock, pause, and transfer assets.
- Cross referencing contract structure and implementation against similar smart contracts produced by industry leaders
- Thorough line-by-line manual review of the entire codebase by industry experts.







# **Technical Findings Summary**

### **Classification of Risk**

Severity	Description
Critical	risks are those that impact the safe functioning of a platform and must be addressed before launch. Users should not invest in any project with outstanding critical risks.
Major	risks can include centralization issues and logical errors. Under specific circumstances, these major risks can lead to loss of funds and/or control of the project.
Medium	risks may not pose a direct risk to users' funds, but they can affect the overall functioning of a platform
Minor	risks can be any of the above but on a smaller scale. They generally do not compromise the overall integrity of the project, but they may be less efficient than other solutions.
Informational	errors are often recommendations to improve the style of the code or certain operations to fall within industry best practices. They usually do not affect the overall functioning of the code.

## **Findings**

Severity	Found	Pending	Resolved
Critical	0	0	0
Major	0	0	0
Medium	0	0	0
Minor	0	0	0
<ul><li>Informational</li></ul>	0	0	1
Total	1	0	4







# **Project Overview**

## **Token Summary**

Parameter	Result
Address	0xc1A59a17F87ba6651Eb8E8F707db7672647c45bD
Name	Lunar
Token Tracker	Lunar (LNR)
Decimals	18
Supply	10000000
Platform	Binance Smart Chain
compiler	v0.8.17+commit.8df45f5f
Contract Name	Lunar
Optimization	Yes with 200 runs
LicenseType	MIT
Language	Solidity
Codebase	https://bscscan.com/address/0xc1A59a17F87ba6651Eb8E8F70 7db7672647c45bD#code
Payment Tx	0x81f3fcd1e9f0c6aee2d9a516aa8ebaa9a11d0e0b6fb4765d280 60b6b638dd577







# **Project Overview**

## Risk Analysis Summary

Parameter	Result
Buy Tax	6%
Sale Tax	6%
Is honeypot?	Clean
Can edit tax?	Yes
Is anti whale?	Yes
Is blacklisted?	Yes
Is whitelisted?	Yes
Holders	Clean
Security Score	95/100
Auditor Score	99/100
Confidence Level	High

The following quick summary has been added to the project overview, however there are more details about the audit and their results please read every details.







# Main Contract Assessed Contract Name

Name	Contract	Live
Lunar	Oxc1A59a17F87ba6651Eb8E8F707db7672647c45bD	Yes

# TestNet Contract Assessed Contract Name

Name	Contract	Live
Lunar	0xA8CA720d120870f9cb6F99C2d73707849DDD1f83	Yes

## **Solidity Code Provided**

SolID	File Sha-1	FileName
ERC20	4d4cadbb6d32f5ce4903ddeac89347d718f9172a	ERC20.sol







# **Mint Check**

The Project Owners of Lunar does not have a mint function in the contract, owner cannot mint tokens after initial deploy.

The Project has a Total Supply of 100000000 and cannot mint any more than the Max Supply.

Mint Notes:

Auditor Notes: Customer has a mint compliance and cannot mint more than the total supply.

**Project Owner Notes:** 







## **Fees Check**


The Project Owners of Lunar does not have the ability to set fees higher than 25%.

Team May have fees defined, however they dont have the ability to set those fees higher than 25%. or may not have the ability to set fees.

Tax Fee Notes:

Auditor Notes: Contract currently have 6% buy tax and 6% Sale Tax.

Project Owner Notes:.











## **Blacklist Check**

The Project Onwers of Lunar has the ability to Blacklist holders from transferring their tokens.

We Recommend the team to be careful with a blacklist function as this can basically prevent ah holder from buying/selling/transferring their assets. Malicious or compromised owners can trap contracts relying on tokens with a blacklist.

#### **Blacklist Notes:**

Auditor Notes: Contract have a blacklist function presented, however this is done per wallet basis.

Project Owner Notes: Project Owner state the following 'We need to be able to ban people that are abusing the platform.'









# MaxTx Check

The Project Onwers of Lunar does not has the ability to set max tx amount

The Team allow any investors to swap, transfer or sale their total amount if needed.

MaxTX Notes:

Auditor Notes: There is a Max Wallet function however it cannot go below the desired tresh hold for saftey reasons.

Project Owner Notes: Project Owner State: 'Our measures against any one wallet controlling the system means that wallets are limited to 1% of the max supply.'

Project Has No MaxTX









## **Pause Trade Check**

The Project Owners of Lunar have the ability to stop or pause trading.


We recommend the team to only allow Open Trade and never use Stop Trade as this will be catastrofic for the project and investors.

We recommend the team to create a new contract without stop trade..

Pause Trade Notes:

Auditor Notes: Project Owner can start and stop trade at any given time, we have recommended the team to review this..

Project Owner Notes: Project Owner States: 'In case of an emergency, we need to be able to stop trading without pausing the contract, because then we can't fix the contract without people trading during the fix.'









# **Contract Ownership**

The contract ownership of Lunar is not currently renounced. The ownership of the contract grants special powers to the protocol creators, making them the sole addresses that can call sensible ownable functions that may alter the state of the protocol.

The current owner is the address

0x8C1DF8d7BcBE1395Ef66508F76a8732EaB65FBeE

which can be viewed from:

### **HERE**

The owner wallet has the power to call the functions displayed on the priviliged functions chart below, if the owner wallet is compromised this privileges could be exploited.

We recommend the team to renounce ownership at the right timing if possible, or gradually migrate to a timelock with governing functionalities in respect of transparency and safety considerations.

We recommend the team to use a Multisignature Wallet if contract is not going to be renounced, this will give the ability to the team to have more control over the contract.







# **Liquidity Ownership**

Most of the liquidity is currently locked, the lock can be seen here:

Liquidity Locker Link can be viewed from: HERE










# **Call Graph**

The contract for Lunar has the following call graph structure









# **KYC Information**

# The Project Onwers of Lunar has provided KYC Documentation.

## KYC Certificated can be found on the Following: KYC Data

**KYC Information Notes:** 

Auditor Notes: Customer is KYC by Dessert Finance

**Project Owner Notes:** 









# Smart Contract Vulnerability Checks

ID	Severity	Name	File	location
SWC-100	Pass	Function Default Visibility	ERC20.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-101	Pass	Integer Overflow and Underflow.	ERC20.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-102	Pass	Outdated Compiler Version file.	ERC20.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-103	Low	A floating pragma is set.	ERC20.sol	L: 2 C: 1
SWC-104	Pass	Unchecked Call Return Value.	ERC20.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-105	Pass	Unprotected Ether Withdrawal.	ERC20.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-106	Pass	Unprotected SELFDESTRUCT Instruction	ERC20.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-107	Pass	Read of persistent state following external call.	ERC20.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-108	Pass	State variable visibility is not set	ERC20.sol	L: 428 C: 29
SWC-109	Pass	Uninitialized Storage Pointer.	ERC20.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-110	Pass	Assert Violation.	ERC20.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-111	Pass	Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions.	ERC20.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-112	Pass	Delegate Call to Untrusted Callee.	ERC20.sol	L: 0 C: 0







ID	Severity	Name	File	location
SWC-113	Pass	Multiple calls are executed in the same transaction.	ERC20.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-114	Pass	Transaction Order Dependence.	ERC20.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-115	Pass	Authorization through tx.origin.	ERC20.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-116	Pass	A control flow decision is made based on The block.timestamp environment variable.	ERC20.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-117	Pass	Signature Malleability.	ERC20.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-118	Pass	Incorrect Constructor Name.	ERC20.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-119	Pass	Shadowing State Variables.	ERC20.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-120	Pass	Potential use of block.number as source of randonmness.	ERC20.sol	L: 421 C: 12,L: 496 C: 22, L: 497 C: 28
SWC-121	Pass	Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks.	ERC20.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-122	Pass	Lack of Proper Signature Verification.	ERC20.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-123	Pass	Requirement Violation.	ERC20.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-124	Pass	Write to Arbitrary Storage Location.	ERC20.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-125	Pass	Incorrect Inheritance Order.	ERC20.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-126	Pass	Insufficient Gas Griefing.	ERC20.sol	L: 0 C: 0







ID	Severity	Name	File	location
SWC-127	Pass	Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable.	ERC20.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-128	Pass	DoS With Block Gas Limit.	ERC20.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-129	Pass	Typographical Error.	ERC20.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-130	Pass	Right-To-Left-Override control character (U +202E).	ERC20.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-131	Pass	Presence of unused variables.	ERC20.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-132	Pass	Unexpected Ether balance.	ERC20.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-133	Pass	Hash Collisions with Multiple Variable Length Arguments.	ERC20.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-134	Pass	Message call with hardcoded gas amount.	ERC20.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-135	Pass	Code With No Effects (Irrelevant/Dead Code).	ERC20.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-136	Pass	Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain.	ERC20.sol	L: 0 C: 0

We scan the contract for additional security issues using MYTHX and industry standard security scanning tool







# Smart Contract Vulnerability Details

SWC-103 - Floating Pragma.

CWE-664: Improper Control of a Resource Through it	ts
Lifetime.	

**References:** 

### **Description:**

Contracts should be deployed with the same compiler version and flags that they have been tested with thoroughly. Locking the pragma helps to ensure that contracts do not accidentally get deployed using, for example, an outdated compiler version that might introduce bugs that affect the contract system negatively.

### Remediation:

Lock the pragma version and also consider known bugs (https://github.com/ethereum/solidity/releases) for the compiler version that is chosen.

Pragma statements can be allowed to float when a contract is intended for consumption by other developers, as in the case with contracts in a library or EthPM package. Otherwise, the developer would need to manually update the pragma in order to compile locally.

### References:

Ethereum Smart Contract Best Practices - Lock pragmas to specific compiler version.








# **Inheritance**

# The contract for Lunar has the following inheritance structure









# Priviliged Functions (onlyOwner)

Function Name	Parameters	Visibility
updateTransferFees	none	public
updateTradingEnable d	none	external
updateSellFees	none	external
updateOperationsWa lletAddress	none	external
updateMaxTokenAllo cation	none	external
pause	none	public
plexusMint	none	public
rescueNativeCurrenc y	none	public
rescueTokens	none	public







### **Assessment Results**

 Contract is a Proxy Contract and it's implemenation is under

0xb8448630a74ad7E871265ae661b8c3e470F7b5a4

- Lunar has been a very successful project, while this contract is a proxy contract and can be upgraded the project team has ensure it's safety.
- No high-risk Exploits/Vulnerabilities Were Found in the Source Code.
- Source Code and Contract is very complex, this is due to the team knowledge of coding. Is important to highlight the project skill set is beyond the normal range. This is great for the future of crypto, however not every investor will be capable of understanding the logics behind this.









### LNR-02 | Function Visibility Optimization.

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Gas Optimization	<ul><li>Informational</li></ul>	ERC20.sol: 424,13	Acknowledged

### **Description**

The following functions are declared as public and are not invoked in any of the contracts contained within the projects scope:

Function Name	Parameters	Visibility
name		public
symbol		public
decimals		public
pause		public
unpause		public
updateBuyFees		public
updateSaleFees		public

The functions that are never called internally within the contract should have external visibility

### Remediation

We advise that the functions' visibility specifiers are set to external and the array-based arguments change their data location from memory to calldata, optimizing the gas cost of the function.

References:







external vs public best practices.







# **Social Media Checks**

Social Media	URL	Result
Twitter	https://twitter.com/lnr	Pass
Instagram	https://www.instagram.com/Inrdefi/	Pass
Website	https://lunar.io/	Pass
Telegram	https://t.me/InrDefi	Pass

We recommend to have 3 or more social media sources including a completed working websites.

Social Media Information Notes:

**Auditor Notes: undefined** 

Project Owner Notes: Project also have discord under https://discord.gg/lnr









# **Appendix**

### **Finding Categories**

### **Centralization / Privilege**

Centralization / Privilege findings refer to either feature logic or implementation of components that actagainst the nature of decentralization, such as explicit ownership or specialized access roles incombination with a mechanism to relocate funds.

### **Gas Optimization**

Gas Optimization findings do not affect the functionality of the code but generate different, more optimalEVM opcodes resulting in a reduction on the total gas cost of a transaction.

### **Logical Issue**

Logical Issue findings detail a fault in the logic of the linked code, such as an incorrect notion on howblock.timestamp works.

### **Control Flow**

Control Flow findings concern the access control imposed on functions, such as owneronly functionsbeing invoke-able by anyone under certain circumstances.

### **Volatile Code**

Volatile Code findings refer to segments of code that behave unexpectedly on certain edge cases that mayresult in a vulnerability.

### **Coding Style**

Coding Style findings usually do not affect the generated byte-code but rather comment on how to makethe codebase more legible and, as a result, easily maintainable.

### **Inconsistency**

Inconsistency findings refer to functions that should seemingly behave similarly yet contain different code, such as a constructor assignment imposing different require statements on the input variables than a setterfunction.

### **Coding Best Practices**

ERC 20 Conding Standards are a set of rules that each developer should follow to ensure the code meet a set of creterias and is readable by all the developers.







### Disclaimer

CFGNINJA has conducted an independent audit to verify the integrity of and highlight any vulnerabilities or errors, intentional or unintentional, that may be present in the codes that were provided for the scope of this audit. This audit report does not constitute agreement, acceptance or advocation for the Project that was audited, and users relying on this audit report should not consider this as having any merit for financial advice in any shape, form or nature. The contracts audited do not account for any economic developments that may be pursued by the Project in question, and that the veracity of the findings thus presented in this report relate solely to the proficiency, competence, aptitude and discretion of our independent auditors, who make no guarantees nor assurance that the contracts are completely free of exploits, bugs, vulnerabilities or deprecation of technologies.

All information provided in this report does not constitute financial or investment advice, nor should it be used to signal that any persons reading this report should invest their funds without sufficient individual due diligence regardless of the findings presented in this report. Information is provided 'as is', and CFGNINJA is under no covenant to the completeness, accuracy or solidity of the contracts audited. In no event will CFGNINJA or its partners, employees, agents or parties related to the provision of this audit report be liable to any parties for, or lack thereof, decisions and/or actions with regards to the information provided in this audit report.

The assessment services provided by CFGNINJA is subject to dependencies and under continuing development. You agree that your access and/or use, including but not limited to any services, reports, and materials, will be at your sole risk on an as-is, where-is, and as-available basis. Cryptographic tokens are emergent technologies and carry with them high levels of technical risk and uncertainty. The assessment reports could include false positives, false negatives, and other unpredictable results. The services may access, and depend upon, multiple layers of third-parties.





