



# CFG NINJA AUDITS

Security Assessment

**Aniwar Token Token**

January 11, 2023



# Table of Contents

## **1 Assessment Summary**

## **2 Technical Findings Summary**

## **3 Project Overview**

### 3.1 Token Summary

### 3.2 Risk Analysis Summary

### 3.3 Main Contract Assessed

## **4 Smart Contract Risk Checks**

### 4.1 Mint Check

### 4.2 Fees Check

### 4.3 Blacklist Check

### 4.4 MaxTx Check

### 4.5 Pause Trade Check

## **5 Contract Ownership**

## **6 Liquidity Ownership**

## **7 KYC Check**

## **8 Smart Contract Vulnerability Checks**

### 8.1 Smart Contract Vulnerability Details

### 8.2 Smart Contract Inheritance Details

### 8.3 Smart Contract Privileged Functions

## **9 Assessment Results and Notes(Important)**

## **10 Social Media Check(Informational)**

## **11 Technical Findings Details**

## **12 Disclaimer**



# Assessment Summary

This report has been prepared for Aniwar Token Token on the Binance network. CFGNINJA provides both client-centered and user-centered examination of the smart contracts and their current status when applicable. This report represents the security assessment made to find issues and vulnerabilities on the source code along with the current liquidity and token holder statistics of the protocol.

A comprehensive examination has been performed, utilizing Cross Referencing, Static Analysis, In-House Security Tools, and line-by-line Manual Review.

The auditing process pays special attention to the following considerations:

- Testing the smart contracts against both common and uncommon attack vectors.
- Inspecting liquidity and holders statistics to inform the current status to both users and client when applicable.
- Assessing the codebase to ensure compliance with current best practices and industry standards.
- Verifying contract functions that allow trusted and/or untrusted actors to mint, lock, pause, and transfer assets.
- Cross referencing contract structure and implementation against similar smart contracts produced by industry leaders
- Thorough line-by-line manual review of the entire codebase by industry experts.








# Technical Findings Summary

## Classification of Risk

| Severity  | Description  |
|---|--|
|  Critical        | Risks are those that impact the safe functioning of a platform and must be addressed before launch. Users should not invest in any project with outstanding critical risks.            |
|  Major           | Risks can include centralization issues and logical errors. Under specific circumstances, these major risks can lead to loss of funds and/or control of the project.                   |
|  Medium          | Risks may not pose a direct risk to users' funds, but they can affect the overall functioning of a platform  |
|  Minor           | Risks can be any of the above but on a smaller scale. They generally do not compromise the overall integrity of the Project, but they may be less efficient than other solutions.      |
|  Informational | Errors are often recommended to improve the code's style or certain operations to fall within industry best practices. They usually do not affect the overall functioning of the code. |

## Findings

| Severity  | Found | Pending | Resolved |
|---|-------|---------|----------|
|  Critical      | 0     | 0       | 0        |
|  Major         | 1     | 1       | 0        |
|  Medium        | 0     | 0       | 0        |
|  Minor         | 2     | 2       | 0        |
|  Informational | 0     | 0       | 0        |
| Total   | 3     | 3       | 0        |



# Project Overview

## Token Summary

| Parameter     | Result  |
|---------------|---|
| Address       |   |
| Name          | Aniwar Token  |
| Token Tracker | Aniwar Token (ANIW)   |
| Decimals      | 18  |
| Supply        | 1,000,000,000   |
| Platform      | Binance   |
| compiler      | 0.8.10  |
| Contract Name | AniwarToken   |
| Optimization  | Yes with 200 runs   |
| LicenseType   | MIT   |
| Language      | Solidity  |
| Codebase      | <a href="https://bscscan.com/address/">https://bscscan.com/address/</a> |
| Payment Tx    | 0x9e1f9a910cb661d12e648ac2fadc57cfe02935636c2ba82b69dce5b5723a19c0      |



# Project Overview

## Risk Analysis Summary

| Parameter        | Result |
|------------------|--------|
| Buy Tax          | 1%     |
| Sale Tax         | 1%     |
| Is honeypot?     | Clean  |
| Can edit tax?    | No     |
| Is anti whale?   | No     |
| Is blacklisted?  | No     |
| Is whitelisted?  | No     |
| Holders          | 0      |
| Confidence Level | Low    |

The following quick summary it's added to the project overview; however, there are more details about the audit and its results. Please read every detail.



**MainNet Contract was Not Assessed**

**TestNet Contract was Not Assessed**

### **Solidity Code Provided**

| SolID       | File Sha-1                               | FileName        |
|-------------|--|-----------------|
| AniwarToken | 6406777983982431a2c1637cb9406de824fa4c53 | AniwarToken.sol |



# Mint Check

**The project owners of Aniwar Token do not have a mint function in the contract, owner cannot mint tokens after initial deploy.**

**The Project has a Total Supply of 1,000,000,000 and cannot mint any more than the Max Supply.**

Mint Notes:

Auditor Notes:

Project Owner Notes:



**Owner can't mint new coins**





# Fees Check

**The project owners of Aniwar Token do not have the ability to set fees higher than 25% .**

**The team May have fees defined; however, they can't set those fees higher than 25% or may not be able to configure the same.**

**Tax Fee Notes:**

**Auditor Notes:** The contract currently has 0% buy and 0% sale taxes, and cannot be set.

**Project Owner Notes:**



**Fees can be changed up to a maximum of 25%**



# Blacklist Check

**The project owners of Aniwar Token do not have a blacklist function their contract.**

**The Project allow owners to transfer their tokens without any restrictions.**

**Token owner cannot blacklist the contract: Malicious or compromised owners can trap contracts relying on tokens with a blacklist.**

**Blacklist Notes:**

**Auditor Notes:** blacklist is set for those tx origin from early buy

**Project Owner Notes:** undefined



# MaxTx Check

**The Project Owners of Aniwar Token cannot set max tx amount**

**The Team allows any investors to swap, transfer or sell their total amount if needed.**

MaxTX Notes:

Auditor Notes:

Project Owner Notes:

**Project Has No MaxTX**



# Pause Trade Check

**The Project Owners of Aniwar Token can stop or pause trading**

**We recommend the Team only allow Open Trade and never use Stop Trade, as this will be catastrophic for the Project and Investors.**

**We recommend the Team create a new contract without the stop trade function.**

**Pause Trade Notes:**

**Auditor Notes:** There is an Open Trade so holders cant trade until is enable.

**Project Owner Notes:**

**Owner can pause trading**



# Contract Ownership

The contract ownership of Aniwar Token is not currently renounced. The ownership of the contract grants special powers to the protocol creators, making them the sole addresses that can call sensible ownable functions that may alter the state of the protocol.

The current owner is the address which can be viewed: [HERE](#)

The owner wallet has the power to call the functions displayed on the privileged functions chart below, if the owner's wallet is compromised, they could exploit these privileges.

We recommend the team renounce ownership at the right time, if possible, or gradually migrate to a timelock with governing functionalities regarding transparency and safety considerations.

We recommend the team use a Multisignature Wallet if the contract is not going to be renounced; this will give the team more control over the contract.



# Liquidity Ownership

The token does not have liquidity at the moment of the audit, block

If liquidity is unlocked, then the token developers can do what is infamously known as 'rugpull'. Once investors start buying token from the exchange, the liquidity pool will accumulate more and more coins of established value (e.g., ETH or BNB or Tether). This is because investors are basically sending these tokens of value to the exchange, to get the new token. Developers can withdraw this liquidity from the exchange, cash in all the value and run off with it. Liquidity is locked by renouncing the ownership of liquidity pool (LP) tokens for a fixed time period, by sending them to a time-lock smart contract. Without ownership of LP tokens, developers cannot get liquidity pool funds back. This provides confidence to the investors that the token developers will not run away with the liquidity money. It is now a standard practice that all token developers follow, and this is what really differentiates a scam coin from a real one.

[Read More](#)



# KYC Information

**The Project Owners of Aniwar Token is not KYC.**

KYC Information Notes:

Auditor Notes:

Project Owner Notes:



# Smart Contract Vulnerability Checks

| ID      | Severity | Name  | File            | location    |
|---------|----------|---|-----------------|-------------|
| SWC-100 | Pass     | Function Default Visibility                       | AniwarToken.sol | L: 0 C: 0   |
| SWC-101 | Pass     | Integer Overflow and Underflow.                   | AniwarToken.sol | L: 0 C: 0   |
| SWC-102 | Pass     | Outdated Compiler Version file.                   | AniwarToken.sol | L: 0 C: 0   |
| SWC-103 | Low      | A floating pragma is set.                         | AniwarToken.sol | L: 2 C: 1   |
| SWC-104 | Pass     | Unchecked Call Return Value.                      | AniwarToken.sol | L: 0 C: 0   |
| SWC-105 | Pass     | Unprotected Ether Withdrawal.                     | AniwarToken.sol | L: 0 C: 0   |
| SWC-106 | Pass     | Unprotected SELFDESTRUCT Instruction              | AniwarToken.sol | L: 0 C: 0   |
| SWC-107 | Pass     | Read of persistent state following external call. | AniwarToken.sol | L: 0 C: 0   |
| SWC-108 | Pass     | State variable visibility is not set..            | AniwarToken.sol | L: 405 C: 9 |
| SWC-109 | Pass     | Uninitialized Storage Pointer.                    | AniwarToken.sol | L: 0 C: 0   |
| SWC-110 | Pass     | Assert Violation.                                 | AniwarToken.sol | L: 0 C: 0   |
| SWC-111 | Pass     | Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions.             | AniwarToken.sol | L: 0 C: 0   |
| SWC-112 | Pass     | Delegate Call to Untrusted Callee.                | AniwarToken.sol | L: 0 C: 0   |





| ID      | Severity | Name   | File            | location                     |
|---------|----------|--|-----------------|------------------------------|
| SWC-113 | Pass     | Multiple calls are executed in the same transaction.                               | AniwarToken.sol | L: 0 C: 0                    |
| SWC-114 | Pass     | Transaction Order Dependence.  | AniwarToken.sol | L: 0 C: 0                    |
| SWC-115 | Low      | Authorization through tx.origin.   | AniwarToken.sol | L: 1375 C: 27, L: 1413 C: 12 |
| SWC-116 | Pass     | A control flow decision is made based on The block.timestamp environment variable. | AniwarToken.sol | L: 0 C: 0                    |
| SWC-117 | Pass     | Signature Malleability.  | AniwarToken.sol | L: 0 C: 0                    |
| SWC-118 | Pass     | Incorrect Constructor Name.  | AniwarToken.sol | L: 0 C: 0                    |
| SWC-119 | Pass     | Shadowing State Variables.   | AniwarToken.sol | L: 0 C: 0                    |
| SWC-120 | Low      | Potential use of block.number as source of randomness.                             | AniwarToken.sol | L: 40 C: 111                 |
| SWC-121 | Pass     | Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks.                               | AniwarToken.sol | L: 0 C: 0                    |
| SWC-122 | Pass     | Lack of Proper Signature Verification.   | AniwarToken.sol | L: 0 C: 0                    |
| SWC-123 | Pass     | Requirement Violation.   | AniwarToken.sol | L: 0 C: 0                    |
| SWC-124 | Pass     | Write to Arbitrary Storage Location.   | AniwarToken.sol | L: 0 C: 0                    |
| SWC-125 | Pass     | Incorrect Inheritance Order.   | AniwarToken.sol | L: 0 C: 0                    |
| SWC-126 | Pass     | Insufficient Gas Griefing.   | AniwarToken.sol | L: 0 C: 0                    |



| ID      | Severity | Name   | File            | location  |
|---------|----------|--|-----------------|-----------|
| SWC-127 | Pass     | Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable.              | AniwarToken.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-128 | Pass     | DoS With Block Gas Limit.                                | AniwarToken.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-129 | Pass     | Typographical Error.                                     | AniwarToken.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-130 | Pass     | Right-To-Left-Override control character (U+202E).       | AniwarToken.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-131 | Pass     | Presence of unused variables.                            | AniwarToken.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-132 | Pass     | Unexpected Ether balance.                                | AniwarToken.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-133 | Pass     | Hash Collisions with Multiple Variable Length Arguments. | AniwarToken.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-134 | Pass     | Message call with hardcoded gas amount.                  | AniwarToken.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-135 | Pass     | Code With No Effects (Irrelevant/Dead Code).             | AniwarToken.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |
| SWC-136 | Pass     | Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain.                       | AniwarToken.sol | L: 0 C: 0 |

We scan the contract for additional security issues using MYTHX and industry-standard security scanning tools.



# Smart Contract Vulnerability Details

## SWC-103 - Floating Pragma.

### CWE-664: Improper Control of a Resource Through its Lifetime.

#### References:

#### Description:

Contracts should be deployed with the same compiler version and flags that they have been tested with thoroughly. Locking the pragma helps to ensure that contracts do not accidentally get deployed using, for example, an outdated compiler version that might introduce bugs that affect the contract system negatively.

#### Remediation:

Lock the pragma version and also consider known bugs (<https://github.com/ethereum/solidity/releases>) for the compiler version that is chosen.

Pragma statements can be allowed to float when a contract is intended for consumption by other developers, as in the case with contracts in a library or EthPM package. Otherwise, the developer would need to manually update the pragma in order to compile locally.

#### References:

Ethereum Smart Contract Best Practices - Lock pragmas to specific compiler version.



# Smart Contract Vulnerability Details

## SWC-115 - Authorization through tx.origin

### CWE-477: Use of Obsolete Function

#### Description:

tx.origin is a global variable in Solidity which returns the address of the account that sent the transaction. Using the variable for authorization could make a contract vulnerable if an authorized account calls into a malicious contract. A call could be made to the vulnerable contract that passes the authorization check since tx.origin returns the original sender of the transaction which in this case is the authorized account.

#### Remediation:

tx.origin should not be used for authorization. Use msg.sender instead.

#### References:

Solidity Documentation - tx.origin

Ethereum Smart Contract Best Practices - Avoid using tx.origin

SigmaPrime - Visibility.



# Smart Contract Vulnerability Details

## SWC-120 – Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes

### CWE-330: Use of Insufficiently Random Values

#### Description:

Solidity allows for ambiguous naming of state variables when inheritance is used. Contract A with a variable `x` could inherit contract B that also has a state variable `x` defined. This would result in two separate versions of `x`, one of them being accessed from contract A and the other one from contract B. In more complex contract systems this condition could go unnoticed and subsequently lead to security issues.

Shadowing state variables can also occur within a single contract when there are multiple definitions on the contract and function level.

#### Remediation:

Using commitment scheme, e.g. RANDAO. Using external sources of randomness via oracles, e.g. Oraclize. Note that this approach requires trusting in oracle, thus it may be reasonable to use multiple oracles. Using Bitcoin block hashes, as they are more expensive to mine.

#### References:

How can I securely generate a random number in my smart contract?)


When can BLOCKHASH be safely used for a random number? When would it be unsafe?

The Run smart contract.



# Inheritance

The contract for Aniwar Token has the following inheritance structure.





# Smart Contract Advance Checks

| ID      | Severity      | Name  | Result | Status    |
|---------|---------------|---|--------|-----------|
| ANIW-01 | Minor         | Potential Sandwich Attacks.   | Pass   | Not-Found |
| ANIW-02 | Minor         | Function Visibility Optimization  | Fail   | Pending   |
| ANIW-03 | Minor         | Lack of Input Validation.   | Fail   | Resolved  |
| ANIW-04 | Major         | Centralized Risk In addLiquidity.   | Pass   | Not-Found |
| ANIW-05 | Major         | Missing Event Emission.   | Pass   | Not-Found |
| ANIW-06 | Minor         | Conformance with Solidity Naming Conventions.                             | Pass   | Not Found |
| ANIW-07 | Minor         | State Variables could be Declared Constant.                               | Pass   | In-Review |
| ANIW-08 | Major         | Dead Code Elimination.  | Pass   | Not-Found |
| ANIW-09 | Major         | Third Party Dependencies.   | Pass   | Not Found |
| ANIW-10 | Major         | Initial Token Distribution.   | Fail   | Pending   |
| ANIW-11 | Critical      | distributeTokensBetween Holders is a multisender of tokens from contract. | Pass   | Resolved  |
| ANIW-12 | Major         | Centralization Risks In The X Role  | Pass   | Not Found |
| ANIW-13 | Informational | Extra Gas Cost For User..   | Pass   | Not-Found |
| ANIW-14 | Informational | Unnecessary Use Of SafeMath   | Pass   | Not-Found |



## ANIW-02 | Function Visibility Optimization.

| Category         | Severity  | Location                      | Status  |
|------------------|---|-------------------------------|---|
| Gas Optimization |  Minor | AniwarToken.sol: 20,12, 24,12 |  Pending |

### Description

The following functions are declared as public and are not invoked in any of the contracts contained within the projects scope:

| Function Name | Parameters | Visibility |
|---------------|------------|------------|
| pause         |            | public     |
| unpause       |            | public     |

The functions that are never called internally within the contract should have external visibility

### Remediation

We advise that the function's visibility specifiers are set to external, and the array-based arguments change their data location from memory to calldata, optimizing the gas cost of the function.



### References:

external vs public best practices.





## ANIW-03 | Lack of Input Validation.

| Category      | Severity  | Location               | Status   |
|---------------|---|------------------------|--|
| Volatile Code |  Minor | AniwarToken.sol: 20,12 |  Resolved |

### Description

The given input is missing the check for the non-zero address.

The given input is missing the check for the pause and unpause is missing required function.

### Remediation



We advise the client to add the check for the passed-in values to prevent unexpected errors as below:

```
...
require(receiver != address(0), "Receiver is the zero address");
...
```

We also recommend customer to review the following function that is missing a required validation. pause and unpause is missing required function.



## ANIW-10 | Initial Token Distribution.

| Category                   | Severity  | Location              | Status  |
|----------------------------|---|-----------------------|---|
| Centralization / Privilege |  Major | AniwarToken.sol: 17,5 |  Pending |

### Description

All of the Aniwar Token tokens are sent to the contract deployer when deploying the contract. This could be a centralization risk as the deployer can distribute tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community.

### Remediation

We recommend the team to be transparent regarding the initial token distribution process, and the team shall make enough efforts to restrict the access of the private key.

### Project Action

Token Distribution goes to the msg.sender.



# Social Media Checks

| Social Media | URL   | Result |
|--------------|---|--------|
| Twitter      | <a href="https://twitter.com/AniwarOfficial">https://twitter.com/AniwarOfficial</a> | Pass   |
| Other        | <a href="https://discord.gg/TVhwcXV3">https://discord.gg/TVhwcXV3</a>               | Pass   |
| Website      | <a href="https://aniwar.io">https://aniwar.io</a>                                   | Pass   |
| Telegram     | <a href="https://t.me/AniWarGlobal">https://t.me/AniWarGlobal</a>                   | Pass   |

We recommend to have 3 or more social media sources including a completed working websites.

**Social Media Information Notes:**

**Auditor Notes:** undefined

**Project Owner Notes:**



# Assessment Results

## Score Results

| Review              | Score  |
|---------------------|--------|
| Overall Score       | 84/100 |
| Auditor Score       | 70/100 |
| Review by Section   | Score  |
| Manual Scan Score   | 28/35  |
| SWC Scan Score      | 34 /37 |
| Advance Check Score | 22 /28 |

The Following Score System Has been Added to this page to help understand the value of the audit, the maximum score is 100, however to attain that value the project must pass and provide all the data needed for the assessment. Our Passing Score has been changed to 80 Points, if a project does not attain 80% is an automatic failure. Read our notes and final assessment below.

## Audit Passed



## Assessment Results

### Important Notes:

- No issues or vulnerabilities were found.
- The contract takes 1% on transfers and send them to owners wallet.
- make sure to dyor.

**Auditor Score =70**  
**Audit Passed**



# Appendix

## Finding Categories

### Centralization / Privilege

Centralization / Privilege findings refer to either feature logic or implementation of components that act against the nature of decentralization, such as explicit ownership or specialized access roles in combination with a mechanism to relocate funds.

### Gas Optimization

Gas Optimization findings do not affect the functionality of the code but generate different, more optimal EVM opcodes resulting in a reduction on the total gas cost of a transaction.

### Logical Issue

Logical Issue findings detail a fault in the logic of the linked code, such as an incorrect notion on how block.timestamp works.

### Control Flow

Control Flow findings concern the access control imposed on functions, such as owner-only functions being invoke-able by anyone under certain circumstances.

### Volatile Code

Volatile Code findings refer to segments of code that behave unexpectedly on certain edge cases that may result in a vulnerability.

### Coding Style

Coding Style findings usually do not affect the generated byte-code but rather comment on how to make the codebase more legible and, as a result, easily maintainable.

### Inconsistency

Inconsistency findings refer to functions that should seemingly behave similarly yet contain different code, such as a constructor assignment imposing different requirements on the input variables than a setter function.

### Coding Best Practices

ERC 20 Coding Standards are a set of rules that each developer should follow to ensure the code meets a set of criteria and is readable by all the developers.



## Disclaimer

CFGNINJA has conducted an independent security assessment to verify the integrity of and highlight any vulnerabilities or errors, intentional or unintentional, that may be present in the reviewed code for the scope of this assessment. This report does not constitute agreement, acceptance, or advocacy for the Project, and users relying on this report should not consider this as having any merit for financial advice in any shape, form, or nature. The contracts audited do not account for any economic developments that the Project in question may pursue, and the veracity of the findings thus presented in this report relate solely to the proficiency, competence, aptitude, and discretion of our independent auditors, who make no guarantees nor assurance that the contracts are entirely free of exploits, bugs, vulnerabilities or deprecation of technologies.

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