



CFG NINJA AUDITS

Security Assessment

MetaPuss Token

February 18, 2023



Table of Contents

1 Assessment Summary

2 Technical Findings Summary

3 Project Overview

3.1 Main Contract Assessed

4 Smart Contract Risk Checks

5 Contract Ownership

7 KYC Check

8 Smart Contract Vulnerability Checks

8.1 Smart Contract Vulnerability Details

8.2 Smart Contract Inheritance Details

8.3 Smart Contract Privileged Functions

9 Assessment Results and Notes(Important)

10 Social Media Check(Informational)

11 Technical Findings Details

12 Disclaimer



Assessment Summary

This report has been prepared for MetaPuss Token on the Binance Smart Chain network. CFGNINJA provides both client-centered and user-centered examination of the smart contracts and their current status when applicable. This report represents the security assessment made to find issues and vulnerabilities on the source code along with the current liquidity and token holder statistics of the protocol.

A comprehensive examination has been performed, utilizing Cross Referencing, Static Analysis, In-House Security Tools, and line-by-line Manual Review.






The auditing process pays special attention to the following considerations:

- Testing the smart contracts against both common and uncommon attack vectors.
- Inspecting liquidity and holders statistics to inform the current status to both users and client when applicable.
- Assessing the codebase to ensure compliance with current best practices and industry standards.
- Verifying contract functions that allow trusted and/or untrusted actors to mint, lock, pause, and transfer assets.
- Cross referencing contract structure and implementation against similar smart contracts produced by industry leaders
- Thorough line-by-line manual review of the entire codebase by industry experts.








Technical Findings Summary

Classification of Risk

Severity	Description
 Critical	Risks are those that impact the safe functioning of a platform and must be addressed before launch. Users should not invest in any project with outstanding critical risks.
 Major	Risks can include centralization issues and logical errors. Under specific circumstances, these major risks can lead to loss of funds and/or control of the project.
 Medium	Risks may not pose a direct risk to users' funds, but they can affect the overall functioning of a platform
 Minor	Risks can be any of the above but on a smaller scale. They generally do not compromise the overall integrity of the Project, but they may be less efficient than other solutions.
 Informational	Errors are often recommended to improve the code's style or certain operations to fall within industry best practices. They usually do not affect the overall functioning of the code.

Findings

Severity	Found	Pending	Resolved
 Critical	0	0	0
 Major	0	0	0
 Medium	1	1	0
 Minor	0	0	0
 Informational	0	0	0
Total	1	1	0



Project Overview

Token Summary

Parameter	Result
Address	0xF5e804896C75e6Eb294ec971904958De5b95b6a
Name	MetaPuss
Token Tracker	MetaPuss (MTP)
Decimals	18
Supply	1,000,000,000
Platform	Binance Smart Chain
compiler	v0.8.18+commit.87f61d96
Contract Name	MetaPuss
Optimization	Yes with 200 runs
LicenseType	MIT
Language	Solidity
Codebase	https://bscscan.com/address/0xF5e804896C75e6Eb294ec971904958De5b95b6a#code
Payment Tx	0x9f737fa6af3314a3bc49aff8e197d6073ba1379fc5a29cc997ceb7d3cd0dade5



Project Overview

Risk Analysis Summary

Parameter	Result
Buy Tax	0%
Sale Tax	0%
Is honeypot?	Clean
Can edit tax?	Yes
Is anti whale?	Yes
Is blacklisted?	No
Is whitelisted?	Yes
Holders	1
Confidence Level	High

The following quick summary it's added to the project overview; however, there are more details about the audit and its results. Please read every detail.



Main Contract Assessed Contract Name

Name	Contract	Live
MetaPuss	0xfF5e804896C75e6Eb294ec971904958De5b95b6a	Yes

TestNet Contract was Not Assessed

Solidity Code Provided

SolID	File Sha-1	FileName
MetaPuss	320fd0bef6b738f269d711d1dae9ae689b5dd18	MetaPuss.sol



Mint Check

The project owners of MetaPuss do not have a mint function in the contract, owner cannot mint tokens after initial deploy.

The Project has a Total Supply of 1,000,000,000 and cannot mint any more than the Max Supply.

Mint Notes:

Auditor Notes:

Project Owner Notes:



Owner can't mint new coins



Fees Check

The project owners of MetaPuss do not have the ability to set fees higher than 25% .

The team May have fees defined; however, they can't set those fees higher than 25% or may not be able to configure the same.

Tax Fee Notes:

Auditor Notes: The contract currently has 0% buy and 0% sale taxes, and cannot be set higher than 25%.

Project Owner Notes:



Fees can be changed up to a maximum of 25%



Blacklist Check

The project owners of MetaPuss do not have a blacklist function their contract.

The Project allow owners to transfer their tokens without any restrictions.

Token owner cannot blacklist the contract: Malicious or compromised owners can trap contracts relying on tokens with a blacklist.

Blacklist Notes:

Auditor Notes:

Project Owner Notes: undefined



MaxTx Check

The Project Owners of MetaPuss cannot set max tx amount

The Team allows any investors to swap, transfer or sell their total amount if needed.

MaxTX Notes:

Auditor Notes:

Project Owner Notes:

Project Has No MaxTX



Pause Trade Check

The Project Owners of MetaPuss don't have the ability to stop or pause trading.

The Team has done a great job to avoid stop trading, and investors has the ability to trade at any given time without any problems

Pause Trade Notes:

Auditor Notes: There is an Open Trade so holders cant trade until is enable.

Project Owner Notes:



Owner can't pause trading



Contract Ownership

The contract ownership of MetaPuss is not currently renounced. The ownership of the contract grants special powers to the protocol creators, making them the sole addresses that can call sensible ownable functions that may alter the state of the protocol.

The current owner is the address
0x204eef0aafbef12e021f58ca1006e064f5b00524
which can be viewed:
[HERE](#)

The owner wallet has the power to call the functions displayed on the privileged functions chart below, if the owner's wallet is compromised, they could exploit these privileges.

We recommend the team renounce ownership at the right time, if possible, or gradually migrate to a timelock with governing functionalities regarding transparency and safety considerations.

We recommend the team use a Multisignature Wallet if the contract is not going to be renounced; this will give the team more control over the contract.



Liquidity Ownership

The token does not have liquidity at the moment of the audit, block 25771850

If liquidity is unlocked, then the token developers can do what is infamously known as 'rugpull'. Once investors start buying token from the exchange, the liquidity pool will accumulate more and more coins of established value (e.g., ETH or BNB or Tether). This is because investors are basically sending these tokens of value to the exchange, to get the new token. Developers can withdraw this liquidity from the exchange, cash in all the value and run off with it. Liquidity is locked by renouncing the ownership of liquidity pool (LP) tokens for a fixed time period, by sending them to a time-lock smart contract. Without ownership of LP tokens, developers cannot get liquidity pool funds back. This provides confidence to the investors that the token developers will not run away with the liquidity money. It is now a standard practice that all token developers follow, and this is what really differentiates a scam coin from a real one.

[Read More](#)



KYC Information

The Project Owners of MetaPuss is not KYC.

KYC Information Notes:

Auditor Notes:

Project Owner Notes:



Smart Contract Vulnerability Checks

ID	Severity	Name	File	location
SWC-100	Pass	Function Default Visibility	MetaPuss.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-101	Pass	Integer Overflow and Underflow.	MetaPuss.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-102	Pass	Outdated Compiler Version file.	MetaPuss.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-103	Low	A floating pragma is set.	MetaPuss.sol	L: 7 C: 0
SWC-104	Pass	Unchecked Call Return Value.	MetaPuss.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-105	Pass	Unprotected Ether Withdrawal.	MetaPuss.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-106	Pass	Unprotected SELFDESTRUCT Instruction	MetaPuss.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-107	Pass	Read of persistent state following external call.	MetaPuss.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-108	Pass	State variable visibility is not set..	MetaPuss.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-109	Pass	Uninitialized Storage Pointer.	MetaPuss.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-110	Pass	Assert Violation.	MetaPuss.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-111	Pass	Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions.	MetaPuss.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-112	Pass	Delegate Call to Untrusted Callee.	MetaPuss.sol	L: 0 C: 0



ID	Severity	Name	File	location
SWC-113	Pass	Multiple calls are executed in the same transaction.	MetaPuss.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-114	Pass	Transaction Order Dependence.	MetaPuss.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-115	Pass	Authorization through tx.origin.	MetaPuss.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-116	Pass	A control flow decision is made based on The block.timestamp environment variable.	MetaPuss.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-117	Pass	Signature Malleability.	MetaPuss.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-118	Pass	Incorrect Constructor Name.	MetaPuss.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-119	Pass	Shadowing State Variables.	MetaPuss.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-120	Pass	Potential use of block.number as source of randomness.	MetaPuss.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-121	Pass	Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks.	MetaPuss.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-122	Pass	Lack of Proper Signature Verification.	MetaPuss.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-123	Pass	Requirement Violation.	MetaPuss.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-124	Pass	Write to Arbitrary Storage Location.	MetaPuss.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-125	Pass	Incorrect Inheritance Order.	MetaPuss.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-126	Pass	Insufficient Gas Griefing.	MetaPuss.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-127	Pass	Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable.	MetaPuss.sol	L: 0 C: 0



ID	Severity	Name	File	location
SWC-128	Pass	DoS With Block Gas Limit.	MetaPuss.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-129	Pass	Typographical Error.	MetaPuss.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-130	Pass	Right-To-Left-Override control character (U +202E).	MetaPuss.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-131	Pass	Presence of unused variables.	MetaPuss.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-132	Pass	Unexpected Ether balance.	MetaPuss.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-133	Pass	Hash Collisions with Multiple Variable Length Arguments.	MetaPuss.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-134	Pass	Message call with hardcoded gas amount.	MetaPuss.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-135	Pass	Code With No Effects (Irrelevant/Dead Code).	MetaPuss.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-136	Pass	Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain.	MetaPuss.sol	L: 0 C: 0

We scan the contract for additional security issues using MYTHX and industry-standard security scanning tools.



Smart Contract Vulnerability Details

SWC-103 - Floating Pragma.

CWE-664: Improper Control of a Resource Through its Lifetime.

References:

Description:

Contracts should be deployed with the same compiler version and flags that they have been tested with thoroughly. Locking the pragma helps to ensure that contracts do not accidentally get deployed using, for example, an outdated compiler version that might introduce bugs that affect the contract system negatively.

Remediation:

Lock the pragma version and also consider known bugs (<https://github.com/ethereum/solidity/releases>) for the compiler version that is chosen.

Pragma statements can be allowed to float when a contract is intended for consumption by other developers, as in the case with contracts in a library or EthPM package. Otherwise, the developer would need to manually update the pragma in order to compile locally.


References:

Ethereum Smart Contract Best Practices - Lock pragmas to specific compiler version.



Inheritance

The contract for MetaPuss has the following inheritance structure.



Privileged Functions (onlyOwner)

Function Name	Parameters	Visibility
renounceOwnership		public
transferOwnership	account (address)	public
updateWhitelist		external
bulkWhitelist		external
EnableTrading		external
rescueBNB	weiAmount (uint256)	external
rescueBSC20	tokenAdd (address), amount (uint256)	external





Smart Contract Advance Checks

ID	Severity	Name	Result	Status
MTP-01	Minor	Potential Sandwich Attacks.	Pass	Not found
MTP-02	Minor	Function Visibility Optimization	Pass	Not found
MTP-03	Minor	Lack of Input Validation.	Pass	Not found
MTP-04	Major	Centralized Risk In addLiquidity.	Pass	Not found
MTP-05	Major	Missing Event Emission.	Pass	Not found
MTP-06	Minor	Conformance with Solidity Naming Conventions.	Pass	Not Found
MTP-07	Minor	State Variables could be Declared Constant.	Pass	Not found
MTP-08	Major	Dead Code Elimination.	Pass	Not-Found
MTP-09	Major	Third Party Dependencies.	Pass	Not Found
MTP-10	Major	Initial Token Distribution.	Pass	Not found
MTP-11	Critical	distributeTokensBetween Holders is a multisender of tokens from contract.	Pass	Not found
MTP-12	Major	Centralization Risks In The X Role	Pass	Not Found
MTP-13	Informational	Extra Gas Cost For User..	Pass	Not found
MTP-14	Medium	Unnecessary Use Of SafeMath	Fail	Pending



MTP-14 | Unnecessary Use Of SafeMath

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Logical Issue	 Medium	MetaPuss.sol: 20, 11	 Pending

Description

The SafeMath library is used unnecessarily. With Solidity compiler versions 0.8.0 or newer, arithmetic operations

will automatically revert in case of integer overflow or underflow.

library SafeMath {

An implementation of SafeMath library is found.

using SafeMath for uint256;

SafeMath library is used for uint256 type in contract.

_balances[recipient] = _balances[recipient].add(amount);

magnifiedDividendPerShare = magnifiedDividendPerShare.add(
(amount).mul(magnitude) / totalSupply()

);

Note: Only a sample of 2 SafeMath library usage in this contract (out of 14) are shown above.

Remediation

We advise removing the usage of SafeMath library and using the built-in arithmetic operations provided by the

Solidity programming language

Project Action



Social Media Checks

Social Media	URL	Result
Twitter		Pass
Other	https://t.me/Metapuss_Channel	Fail
Website	https://www.metapuss.io/	Pass
Telegram	https://t.me/metapusschat	Pass

We recommend to have 3 or more social media sources including a completed working websites.

Social Media Information Notes:

Auditor Notes: undefined

Project Owner Notes:



Assessment Results

Score Results

Review	Score
Overall Score	94/100
Auditor Score	85/100
Review by Section	Score
Manual Scan Score	32/35
SWC Scan Score	36 /37
Advance Check Score	26 /28

The Following Score System Has been Added to this page to help understand the value of the audit, the maximum score is 100, however to attain that value the project must pass and provide all the data needed for the assessment. Our Passing Score has been changed to 80 Points, if a project does not attain 80% is an automatic failure. Read our notes and final assessment below.

Audit Passed



Assessment Results

Important Notes:

- Contract has no taxes.
- No high-risk Exploits/Vulnerabilities Were Found in the Source Code.
- Contract has been developed by Anoop and follow the coding best practices, we have fully tested the code and its functionalities.

Auditor Score =85
Audit Passed



Appendix

Finding Categories

Centralization / Privilege

Centralization / Privilege findings refer to either feature logic or implementation of components that act against the nature of decentralization, such as explicit ownership or specialized access roles in combination with a mechanism to relocate funds.

Gas Optimization

Gas Optimization findings do not affect the functionality of the code but generate different, more optimal EVM opcodes resulting in a reduction on the total gas cost of a transaction.

Logical Issue

Logical Issue findings detail a fault in the logic of the linked code, such as an incorrect notion on how block.timestamp works.

Control Flow

Control Flow findings concern the access control imposed on functions, such as owner-only functions being invoke-able by anyone under certain circumstances.

Volatile Code

Volatile Code findings refer to segments of code that behave unexpectedly on certain edge cases that may result in a vulnerability.

Coding Style

Coding Style findings usually do not affect the generated byte-code but rather comment on how to make the codebase more legible and, as a result, easily maintainable.

Inconsistency

Inconsistency findings refer to functions that should seemingly behave similarly yet contain different code, such as a constructor assignment imposing different requirements on the input variables than a setter function.

Coding Best Practices

ERC 20 Coding Standards are a set of rules that each developer should follow to ensure the code meets a set of criteria and is readable by all the developers.



Disclaimer

CFGNINJA has conducted an independent security assessment to verify the integrity of and highlight any vulnerabilities or errors, intentional or unintentional, that may be present in the reviewed code for the scope of this assessment. This report does not constitute agreement, acceptance, or advocacy for the Project, and users relying on this report should not consider this as having any merit for financial advice in any shape, form, or nature. The contracts audited do not account for any economic developments that the Project in question may pursue, and the veracity of the findings thus presented in this report relate solely to the proficiency, competence, aptitude, and discretion of our independent auditors, who make no guarantees nor assurance that the contracts are entirely free of exploits, bugs, vulnerabilities or deprecation of technologies.

All information provided in this report does not constitute financial or investment advice, nor should it be used to signal that any persons reading this report should invest their funds without sufficient individual due diligence, regardless of the findings presented. Information is provided 'as is, and CFGNINJA is under no covenant to audited completeness, accuracy, or solidity of the contracts. In no event will CFGNINJA or its partners, employees, agents, or parties related to the provision of this audit report be liable to any parties for, or lack thereof, decisions or actions with regards to the information provided in this audit report.

The assessment services provided by CFGNINJA are subject to dependencies and are under continuing development. You agree that your access or use, including but not limited to any services, reports, and materials, will be at your sole risk on an as-is, where-is, and as-available basis. Cryptographic tokens are emergent technologies with high levels of technical risk and uncertainty. The assessment reports could include false positives, negatives, and unpredictable results. The services may access, and depend upon, multiple layers of third parties.

