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voluntary data release #31
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I think location histories via GPS do not give you much precision unless the device actively polls the GPS, which kills the battery, and even then not on many devices. There are many issues with bluetooth but devices can kinda run it in the background without draining the battery too badly. |
You can easily obtain a retrospective location history from Google. These
can be very precise because they are based on wifi information as well as
occasional GPS polling. I suggest you look at your own log, should you have
one, to get a sense of how precise they can be.
…On Sun, Apr 5, 2020, 14:18 Jeff Burdges ***@***.***> wrote:
I think location histories via GPS do not give you much precision unless
the device actively polls the GPS, which kills the battery, and even then
not on many devices. There are many issues with bluetooth but devices can
kinda run it in the background without draining the battery too badly.
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Privacy oriented individuals might choose not to use the app at all it features like this exist. Even if contact history (tokens) would be in the mobile phone, a user could very likely identify the contacts using the location history as a logbook. |
I'm kind of bouncing around a variant of this. We give people who test
positive to retrospectively collect their location data from GDPR compliant
providers and put it into the public domain. After their review and
agreement of course. Then no one needs to install an app, and they can
consider the community when they are primed to do so (don't want to infect
others, want to help others know if they might have been infected). Apps
can pick up that data and help people know if they are at risk. Uptake
isn't perfect but it helps. The app contact tracing breaks down if you
don't have a large fraction of the public using a compatible contact
tracing tool. Has it worked anywhere? The only working model for this is in
South Korea. And there the location history sharing is non-voluntary,
retrospective, and broadcast to whole communities.
…On Sun, Apr 5, 2020, 19:42 EliasA ***@***.***> wrote:
Privacy oriented individuals might choose not to use the app at all it
features like this exist. Even if contact history (tokens) would be in the
mobile phone, a user could very likely identify the contacts using the
location history as a logbook.
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The app does not aim at identifying locations that may be dangerous due to concentration of infected cases. This is a design decision. We limit the purpose of the application to the two goals described in the White Paper (notifying at-risk users, and provide epidemiologists with data to understand the disease). This enables us to collect and process very little data. In particular it avoids that we collect location data, which are highly sensitive and very hard to publish in a privacy-preserving way. |
Voluntary data release is completely compatible with your two design
decisions. If your implementation is ideal, perhaps it won't help to notify
the at-risk any more than a privacy preserving model. But, voluntary data
release will almost certainly provide far greater utility to
epidemiologists who study the dynamics of an outbreak over any privacy
preserving model over the same data.
You should consider supporting as a parallel thread in your approach. The
virus does not respect our privacy. If we want to maintain our right to
privacy, we need to provide a reasonable set of norms that yield good
performance in countering this threat, or there will be a stronger excuse
to violate this right in a long term way for the sake of pandemic control.
…On Tue, Apr 7, 2020 at 11:38 PM Carmela Troncoso ***@***.***> wrote:
The app does not aim at identifying locations that may be dangerous due to
concentration of infected cases. This is a design decision. We limit the
purpose of the application to the two goals described in the White Paper
(notifying at-risk users, and provide epidemiologists with data to
understand the disease). This enables us to collect and process very little
data. In particular it avoids that we collect location data, which are
highly sensitive and very hard to publish in a privacy-preserving way.
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I understand that there are risks to data release of this type, but it could be dramatically more useful, and simpler, if people who test positive volunteer their recent location history. This could be based on augmented GPS, such as from Google or other service providers, or manually recounted in an approximate way.
This data source would be very complete and technically simple. This is the kind of model that is being used in South Korea, although there it is definitely not voluntary. The location histories are broadcast by SMS to all the residents of an entire municipality.
Thus far, BT tracking has not been successful even in places where its uptake is encouraged like Singapore. It's important to consider promoting other options. These could rely on goodwill and community support which has been so essential to our current response (basically voluntary lockdown and isolation of much of the EU).
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