

believing that proposition. In Chapter 5, Plantinga discusses perception. He notes that, as with memory, perceptual beliefs are often basic—that is, non-inferred. He also argues that we can have perception (or something like it) in the absence of sensuous imagery. Again, he argues that if sensory beliefs are formed in such a way that his criteria for warrant are met, then (given that they are true beliefs) so will they be warranted. In Chapter 6, Plantinga discusses a priori knowledge (the ability to see the truths of propositions or mathematics) and how his theory of warrant can account for them. As with memory, Plantinga stresses that what evidence there is for accepting or rejecting some bit of a priori knowledge is impulsional rather than sensuous evidence—it is that hard to define but familiar sense of “fitness” or “rightness”. If the conditions of his model of warrant are met, then so too will a priori beliefs be warranted and, if true, constitute knowledge. In Chapter 7, Plantinga tackles what he calls the “old” and “new” problems of induction. The old problem of induction derives from David Hume, who notes that induction (the belief that the future will resemble