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17 February 1969

COINS LOG

1. A meeting of the COINS committee was held at NPIC at 1300 on the 14 of February 1969. State Department had no representative. [redacted] was there representing NPIC. [redacted] was there for this last meeting before leaving for South Viet Nam. [redacted] from DIAMS-3D is replacing [redacted] as Chairman of the Interface Panel and as a member of the T&A Panel he was also present.

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Recommendation for the adoption of a Common Users Language.

2. The first business was a discussion of COINS 047 of 13 February 1969 concerning the adoption of a Common Users Language. This document is circulating separately. [redacted] stated, and [redacted] agreed that a common keyboard seemed as necessary as a common users language since CIA and DIA languages resemble each other very closely. George will probably circulate a paper on the need for a common character set on the keyboard (and this does not necessarily mean ASCII). Copies of two user languages were given to the subsystem managers. One of them was QUL (the query and update language developed by the Computer Corporation of America) and the other was ADEPT 50. Nothing more was said on this subject at this time.

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Data Standards

3. [redacted] said that he had encountered very serious objections at DIA to George's papers on Data Standards. These objections were summarized in a letter which he gave to George.

The letter was only distributed to the attendees and nothing more

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everyones attention that there is a new panel at the National Academy of Sciences on computer Data Standards. Tony Oettinger is the chairman. [] aid that he believed Warren House is the secretary of this panel and was very skeptical of its success.

[] stated that implementation ^{of} ~~was~~ an agreed standard was even more of a problem than getting agreement in the first place. He used the ISC as an excellent example.

Results of the 10 to 14 February Experiment.

7. Generally speaking the experiment was not ^{too} ~~so~~ successful as far as getting answers to queries is concerned. []

reported that the switch was up every day, but the various systems - for example CIA ^{were} ~~was~~ not necessarily ^{up} ~~on~~ all that time.

[] discussed with [] the problem that CIA is having with the system. He intimidated ^{ATED} that these problems might be major ~~or~~ even so major as to require that the CIA computer be dedicated while COINS is on that computer. [] mentioned that

(at DIA) changing the switch, to a 360/30 gave CIA more difficulites than they first realized. One of the major problems is the fact that there is no polling on the system, that answers to queries are often dumped off the end of the line ^{when} ~~and~~ the CIA computer is not up or in a position to receive them. ~~That~~ This particular

problem had been caused by the nature of the 2701 (the predecessor ^{CIA's coupler} ~~to the system~~ ~~to the 360/30 switch~~). He also added that correcting this polling

problem might require either software changes at DIA or hardware changes by CIA. ~~That~~ There are a lot of major bugs now appearing the that/previous programmer had played down but ~~that~~ [] is

excellent and now that she is on COINS' problems, things should start

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working better. Bob stated that the 360/67 was on the CIA premises boxed, but site preparation problems forced back installation to the end of February. [] warned that CIA is going to have even more software problems with the 67. [] reported NPIC had had similar difficulties in getting answers to their queries. [] reported on the National Indications Center status. The teletype and circuits are in, KW-7s are available for installation and the power supplies were scheduled for shipment from Pennsylvania on the 11th of February, but had not arrived at NIC yet. The 2044th had scheduled the 11th and 12th of February for installation of the power supplies. When the equipment did not show ^{on} at those days NIC was cancelled out and he did not know when they would be rescheduled. The Interface Panel is going to meet during the week of 17 - 20 February and compare user logs for each agency with the switch log to try to determine what happened to each query made during the test of 10/14 February.

COINS Master Plan Objectives

8. As directed by George last week, the subsystem managers of each presented their selections of the number one objective/the CMP and how it was to be measured. These three papers, CIA, NSA, DIA, each selected the same first objective and the papers bore a startling resemblance to one another (collusion??). They seem to pretty well agree. [] also presented a new set of objectives for the experiment, based very largely on the Support Staff's previous papers. At first glance [] liked them very much and they might be the basis for a final solution to this thorny problem.

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9. The next meeting will be held at NPIC at 10:00 A.M., wednesday morning, the 26 of February 1969. The agenda will include a continuation of the discussion on objectives. George would like to get this cleaned up by March as he is going to UCLA for a week and a half.^{then} The agenda will also include a discussion of the Interface Panel's postmortem on the 10/14 Feburary test and an outline for a COINS Security Plan.

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14 February 1969

FROM: Manager, DIA COINS Subsystem

SUBJECT: First Objective of the COINS Experiment

1. Objective:

To: (a) establish and operate an experimental, interagency, interconnected, computer-based, intelligence information system with remote access capability; and (b), accumulate experience and data that will permit evaluation of the utility of such a system for interagency and interbuilding transfer of intelligence information.

2. How is the achievement of the Objective to be identified and measured?

a. The first part of the objective has already been partially achieved; i.e., the system has been designed, the hardware has been installed and connected together, and some intelligence information files are available for query from some remote access consoles. When all elements of the network are functioning together as planned and users can access any COINS file in reasonable time (15 minutes or less) during a reasonable period of each working day, the first part will have been achieved.

b. The second part is more elusive. Experience and data cannot be acquired regarding utility unless the system is used by VALID USERS of intelligence information (not just system testers). The system will not be used unless: (1) valid users are trained and find the system reasonably easy to operate; (2) there is intelligence information in each agency subsystem which is needed by USERS in other participating agencies (It is not sufficient for an agency to use just its own files. This can be done without any interagency system); and (3), the system is available to the users during a sufficient portion of each working day.

c. If the conditions enumerated above are met, the use experience will be achieved and the accumulation of data, as proposed by the T&A panel, should permit evaluation.

3. What constitutes failure to achieve the objective? The objective will not be achieved unless the system is used sufficiently by intelligence producers/users to provide data sufficient to evaluate its utility. It will not be used sufficiently unless: (a) it works for a reasonable period of time each day; (b) it contains material of use to intelligence producers/users; (c) it is relatively easy to use; (d) the response time is reasonably short.

15 min?