

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

17 January 1983

NOTE FOR: D/ICS

FROM: EA/DDCI

83-0337

FYI, John found the attached briefing on the DoD Computer Security Program a very interesting one. He would like to know how you plan to monitor their activities and where follow-up on this important issue should be placed for the Intelligence Community--the IC Staff, the Security Committee, the Information Handling Committee, or perhaps a combination of all three.



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
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Computer Security Problems

- Explosive increase in computer utilization and data sharing.
- Classical problems and disagreements between producers and users of compartmented information are made greatly more visible and threatening in computer environments.
- While technology and usage provides for feasible penetration and/or subversion of Community computers, the lack of present or previous examples deflates the credibility of these vulnerabilities.
- Sharing of data between systems which employ differing methods for security.
- Absence of guidelines for balanced implementation of security aspects: computer, procedural, physical, personnel, communications and emanations.
- Computer Security policy lags behind the conditions of computer and data utilization, especially in networking.
- Conflicting, multiple responsibilities of Community participants on the SECOM's Computer Security Subcommittee leave it with too little resources to attack the tasks at hand.
- Computer security, compared to other security sectors, is an immature discipline.
- Community project managers are generally not aware of initiatives and advances being made in computer security--certification and accreditation are not understood and inadequately applied.

- Costs of security implementation are much more visible in computer environments than in paper environments--absence of security implementation also much more visible.
- Computer security evaluations concentrate on red-team attacks, and tracking of information spillage or penetration--patchwork approaches are generally misleading and their results non-transferable.
- Security requirements and posture of the Intelligence Community far more demanding than that of the private sector and majority of the Government--the Community has little impact on the architectures of mainline computer products.
- Community-funded secure system R&D not adequately followed up by utilization of the products in the Community.
- Computer security efforts fragmented throughout the Community.
- Rapidly increasing disparity between the number and sophistication of computer systems, and the computer security staffs charged with accrediting and auditing.
- Shortage of personnel with combination of security and technical computer skills.
- Lack of focus of computer security initiatives for budget defense.

TASK SEQUENCE



IMPLEMENTATION

ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- Under DCID 1/11, the Security Committee has the policy and overview charters for computer security. Transfer elsewhere would severely reduce SECOM credibility and effectiveness.
- The problems and tasks have been recognized for years, and have been attacked. The lack of success at computer security coordination for the Community has many causes, not the least of which is the lack of dedicated staffing. Individual problems have been temporarily, successfully attacked when concentrated efforts have been made by the Computer Security Subcommittee of SECOM. However, the Subcommittee cannot sustain such activity in parallel with the individual members' home-agency responsibilities.
- No individual Community component could act as the executive agent for computer security coordination because of the competing interests and sensitivities of the intelligence agencies. SECOM cannot delegate this role effectively.
- The most reasonable approach to the tasks at hand appears to be the establishment of small, competent, full-time staff of computer security experts within the Security Committee Staff. Approximately four professional personnel and one secretary would be required.

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