



11/18

- Jeremy Andrus, Christoffer Dall, Alexander Van.t Hof, Oren Laadan, and Jason Nieh, Cells: A Virtual Mobile Smartphone Architecture, *SOSP'11, October 2011*.
- W. Enck, P. Gilbert, B.G. Chun, L. P. Cox, J. Jung, P. McDaniel, A. N. Sheth, TaintDroid: An Information-Flow Tracking System for Realtime Privacy Monitoring on Smartphones, *OSDI'10, October 2010*


OHA (Open Handset Alliance)




- ❑ A business alliance consisting of 47 companies to develop open standards for mobile devices



Background

- ❑ Android Inc. was founded in Palo Alto, California in October, 2003 by Andy Rubin, Rich Miner, Nick Sears, and Chris White.
- ❑ Their goal was to develop a "smarter mobile device that was more aware of its owner's location and preferences."





Android S/W Stack – Runtime (Cont)

■ Dalvik Virtual Machine (Cont)

- ✓ Executing the Dalvik Executable (.dex) format
 - › .dex format is optimized for minimal memory footprint.
 - › Compilation



- ✓ Relying on the Linux Kernel for:
 - › Threading
 - › Low-level memory management

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Android S/W Stack – Linux Kernel

- Relying on Linux Kernel 2.6 for core system services
 - ✓ Memory and Process Management
 - ✓ Network Stack
 - ✓ Driver Model
 - ✓ Security
- Providing an abstraction layer between the H/W and the rest of the S/W stack

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Taint
track

Main Point

- What is the main point of the paper?
 - Taint tracking can be implemented efficiently on Android
- What problems motivate this work?
 - Protecting user privacy on Smartphones

Taint-tracking

- How does taint-tracking work?
 1. Identifies Sensitive Data
 2. Taints and Tracks Data Flow via
 - Variables, Messages, Methods, and Files
 3. Monitors Behavior of Running Applications in Realtime
 4. Identifies Misuse of Private Data

General sense: not very practical

Background: Taint Tracking (aka information-flow tracking)

- Two ways to propagate information
 - Explicitly => direct transfer from one object to another
 - Implicitly => indirect transfer usually via control flow

How would you track this?

```
// x is sensitive
void foo(int x) {
    int y;
    if (x > 10) {
        x++;
    } else {
        x--;
    }
    y = 10;
    print(x);
    print(y);
}
```

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An Example

```
i = get_input();
two = 2;
if (i % 2 == 0) {
    j = i + two;
    l = j;
} else {
    k = two * two;
    l = k;
}
jmp l;
```

Variable	Value	Taint Status
i	8	true
two	2	false
j	8	true
l	8	true

1 bit taint tracking—tainted or not-tainted

Some research work used multiple taint bits to track how “tainted” a variable is

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For
causions

Example (no-control flow taint tracking)

```
i = get_input();
two = 2;
if (i % 2 == 0) {
    j = i + two;
    l = j;
} else {
    k = two * two;
    l = k;
}
jmp l;
```

Variable	Value	Taint Status
i	2	true
two	2	false
k	4	false
l	4	false

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

ignore control flow deps

TaintDroid Architecture

- TaintDroid is a system-wide integration of taint tracking into the Android platform
 - Variable tracking throughout Dalvik VM environment
 - Patches state after native method invocation
 - Extends tracking between applications and to storage

Message-level tracking

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
Performance : 3.5% memory
27% overhead

- ### Contributions
- Detects leakage of private after entering applications
 - Previous work deals with securing data from non-trusted applications
 - Works even if data is encrypted
 - Identify malicious App
 - measure performance

Main Point

- What is the main point of the paper?
 - Supporting multiple Virtual phones on one physical phone
- What problems motivate this work?
 - Work phone vs Private Phone


SINGLE KERNEL: MULTIPLE VPs




Details

- One foreground VP for displaying and multiple background VPs
- Remap OS resource id to virtual ones
 - Now each VP has its own private virtual namespaces
- Foreground VP has direct access to hardware
- If the foreground VP does not acquire exclusive access, the hardware can be shared by background VPs.
 - Kernel-Level Device Virtualization to support transparency and performance by introducing *device namespace*
 - User-Level Device Virtualization to support portability and transparency by proxy

SINGLE KERNEL: DEVICE SUPPORT



CELLS: DEVICE NAMESPACES



only process isolation

