Automated Whitebox Fuzz Testing

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
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Fuzz Testing

- Send "random" data to application
 - B. Miller et al.; inspired by line noise
- Fuzzing well-formed "seed"
- Heavily used in security testing
 - e.g. July 2006 "Month of Browser Bugs"



Whitebox Fuzzing

- Combine fuzz testing with dynamic test generation
 - Run the code with its input
 - Collect constraints on inputs with symbolic execution
 - Generate new constraints
 - Solve constraints with constraint solver
 - Synthesize new inputs
 - Leverages Directed Automated Random Testing (DART) (
 [Godefroid-Klarlund-Sen PLDI 2005,...])

Dynamic Test Generation

input = "good"

```
void top(char input[4])
{
   int cnt = 0;
   if (input[0] == 'b') cnt++;
   if (input[1] == 'a') cnt++;
   if (input[2] == 'd') cnt++;
   if (input[3] == '!') cnt++;
   if (cnt >= 3) crash();
}
```

Dynamic Test Generation

```
void top(char input[4])
{
  int cnt = 0;
  if (input[0] == 'b') cnt++;
  if (input[1] == 'a') cnt++;
  if (input[2] == 'd') cnt++;
  if (input[3] == '!') cnt++;
  if (cnt >= 3) crash();
}
```

Collect constraints from trace
Create new constraints
Solve new constraints → new input.


Depth-First Search

```
void top(char input[4])
   int cnt = 0;
   if (input[1] == 'a') cnt++; I<sub>1</sub> != 'a'
   if (input[2] == 'd') cnt++; I<sub>2</sub> != 'd'
   if (input[3] == \!') cnt++; I<sub>3</sub> != \!'
   if (cnt >= 3) crash();
```

Depth-First Search


```
void top(char input[4])
{
   int cnt = 0;
   if (input[0] == 'b') cnt++;   I_0 != 'b'
   if (input[1] == 'a') cnt++;   I_1 != 'a'
   if (input[2] == 'd') cnt++;   I_2 != 'd'
   if (input[3] == '!') cnt++;   I_3 == '!'
   if (cnt >= 3) crash();
}
```

Depth-First Search



```
void top(char input[4])
{
   int cnt = 0;
   if (input[0] == 'b') cnt++;   I_0 != 'b'
   if (input[1] == 'a') cnt++;   I_1 != 'a'
   if (input[2] == 'd') cnt++;   I_2 == 'd'
   if (input[3] == '!') cnt++;   I_3 != '!'
   if (cnt >= 3) crash();
}
```

Key Idea: One Trace, Many Tests



Office 2007 application:

Time to gather constraints: Tainted branches/trace: 25m30s ~1000

Time/branch to **solve**,

generate new test, check for crashes:

~1s

Therefore, solve+check **all** branches for each trace!

Generational Search

```
void top(char input[4])
  int cnt = 0;
  if (input[1] == a') cnt++; I_1 == a'
  if (input[2] == 'd') cnt++; I<sub>2</sub> == 'd'
  if (input[3] == \!') cnt++; I<sub>3</sub> == \!'
  if (cnt >= 3) crash();
```


"Generation 1" test cases

The Search Space

```
void top(char input[4])
  int cnt = 0;
  if (input[0] == 'b') cnt++;
  if (input[1] == 'a') cnt++;
  if (input[2] == 'd') cnt++;
  if (input[3] == \'!') cnt++;
  if (cnt >= 3) crash();
                                                                      bod! baod bao! badd
         goo! godd
                     god! gaod gao! gadd gad! bood boo! bodd
                                                                                             bad!
```

SAGE Architecture

(Scalable Automated Guided Execution)



Initial Experiences with SAGE

- Since 1st MS internal release in April'07: dozens of new security bugs found (most missed by blackbox fuzzers, static analysis)
- Apps: image processors, media players, file decoders,... Confidential!
- Many bugs found rated as "security critical, severity 1, priority 1"
- Now used by several test teams across Microsoft

- Credit is due to the entire SAGE team and users:
 - CSE: Michael Levin (DevLead), Christopher Marsh, Dennis Jeffries (intern'06),
 Adam Kiezun (intern'07); Plus Nirvana/iDNA/TruScan contributors.
 - MSR: Patrice Godefroid, David Molnar (intern'07)
 (+ constraint solver Disolver)
 - Plus work of many beta users who found and filed most of these bugs!

ANI Parsing - MS07-017

Critical, out-of-band security patch; affected Vista

```
RIFF...ACONLIST
                         RIFF...ACONB
B...INFOINAM...
                        B...INFOINAM....
3D Blue Alternat
                        3D Blue Alternat
e v1.1..IART....
                     e v1.1..IART....
1996..anih$...$.
                        1996..anih$...$.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
                         . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
..rate......
                         ..rate......
                         ....seq ..
....seq ..
...IST....framic
                         ..anih...framic
on......
Seed file
                          SAGE-generated
                          crashing test case
```

ANI Parsing - MS07-017

Critical, out-of-band security patch; affected Vista

Seed file

```
RIFF...ACONLIST
                           RIFF...ACONB
B...INFOINAM...
                           B. INFOINAM...
3D Blue Alternat
                           3D Blue Alternat
e v1.1..IART....
                           e v1.1..IART....
1996..anih$...$.
                           1996..anih$...$.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
                                                Only
                           ..rate.....
..rate......
                                                1 in 2<sup>32</sup> chance
....seq ..
                           ....seq
                                               at random!
...IIST....framic
```

SAGE-generated crashing test case

Initial Experiments

#Instructions and Input size largest seen so far

App Tested	#Tests	Mean Depth	Mean #Instr.	Mean Size
ANI	11468	178	2,066,087	5,400
Media 1	6890	73	3,409,376	65,536
Media 2	1045	1100	271,432,489	27,335
Media 3	2266	608	54,644,652	30,833
Media 4	909	883	133,685,240	22,209
Compression	1527	65	480,435	634
Office 2007	3008	6502	923,731,248	45,064

- Starting with 100 zero bytes ...
- SAGE generates a crashing test for Media1 parser:

Generation 0 – seed file

- Starting with 100 zero bytes ...
- SAGE generates a crashing test for Media1 parser:

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- Starting with 100 zero bytes ...
- SAGE generates a crashing test for Media1 parser:

Generation 10 – bug ID 1212954973!


Found after only 3 generations starting from well-formed seed file

Different Seeds, Different Crashes

Bug ID	seed1	seed2	seed3	seed4	seed5	seed6	seed7	100 zero bytes
186719622	X	X	X		X		X	
203196211	X	X	X		X		X	
612334691		X	X					
106195998			X		X			
121295497			X					X
1 01162838			X		X			X
842674295					X			
124650935			X		X			X
1 52739307							X	
9 27783940							X	
795102569			X					

Media 1: 60 machine-hours, 44598 total tests, 357 crashes, 12 bugs

Most Bugs Found are "Shallow"



Blackbox vs. Whitebox Fuzzing

- Different cost/precision tradeoffs
 - Blackbox is lightweight, easy and fast, but poor coverage
 - Whitebox is smarter, but complex and slower
 - Note: recent "semi-whitebox" approaches
 - Less smart but more lightweight: **Flayer** (taint-flow analysis, may generate false alarms), **Bunny-the-fuzzer** (taint-flow, source-based, heuristics to fuzz based on input usage), **autodafe**, etc.
- Which is more effective at finding bugs? It depends...
 - Many apps are so buggy, any form of fuzzing finds bugs!
 - Once low-hanging bugs are gone, fuzzing must become smarter: use whitebox and/or user-provided guidance (grammars, etc.)
- Bottom-line: in practice, use both!

Related Work

- Dynamic test generation (Korel, Gupta-Mathur-Soffa, etc.)
 - Target specific statement; DART tries to cover "most" code
- Static Test Generation: hard when symbolic execution imprecise
- Other "DART implementations":
 - EXE/EGT (Stanford): independent ['05-'06] closely related work
 - CUTE/jCUTE (UIUC/Berkeley): same as Bell Labs DART implementation
 - PEX (MSR) implements DART for .NET binaries in conjunction with "parameterized-unit tests" for unit testing of .NET programs
 - YOGI (MSR) implements DART to check the feasibility of program paths generated statically using a SLAM-like tool
 - Vigilante (MSR) implements DART to generate worm filters
 - BitScope (CMU/Berkeley) implements DART for malware analysis
 - Catchconv (Berkeley) extends DART to check signed/unsigned integer errors
 - More..

SAGE Summary


- Symbolic execution scales
 - SAGE most successful "DART implementation"
 - Dozens of serious bugs, used daily at MSFT
- Existing test suites become security tests
- What makes it so effective?
 - Works on large applications (not unit test)
 - Fully automated (focus on file/network fuzzing)
 - Easy to deploy (dynamic binary instrumentation any lang. or build process!)
- Future of fuzz testing?


Thank you! Questions?

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Backup Slides

Most Bugs Found are "Shallow"





Coverage and New crashes: Low Correlation

